Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order
Author(s): Hendrik Spruyt
Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 527-557
Published by: The MIT Press
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Institutionalselectionin international
relations:stateanarchyas order
HendrikSpruyt
conIn effect,
whatthisquestionasks is why,at varioustimesand in differing
individualsand groupsbelieveonepoliticalformratherthananotheris
texts,
bestsuitedto advancetheirinterests.
-Robert Gilpin
At the end of the feudalera, a dramaticeconomicchangeoccurred.Localized
barterexchangestartedto givewayto monetaryexchangeand translocaltrade.
forms
century,
a varietyof new institutional
By thebeginningof the fourteenth
had emergedfororganizingpoliticaland economiclife.Sovereignterritorial
states, city-leagues,and city-statesall tried to tap into the new sources of
economic wealth, particularlylong-distancetrade. Indeed, the city-based
politicalorganizationsinitiallydid verywell. In the longrun,however,roughly
had fallen
city-states
and city-leagues
bythemiddleoftheseventeenthcentury,
bythewayside.In thisarticle,I attemptto answerthe questionofwhythiswas
rivals.
statesdisplacedtheircontemporary
so and charthowsovereignterritorial
I argue thatthe sovereignterritorial
stateprevailedbecause it provedmore
at preventingdefectionbyitsmembers,reducinginternaltransaction
effective
to other units.It did this in three
costs, and makingcredible commitments
ways. First, sovereign rulers were better at centralizingjurisdictionand
authority.'Consequently,theywere in a betterpositionto preventfreeriding
and to graduallyrationalize their economies and standardizecoinage and
I thankDeborah Avant,PeterCowhey,Dan Deudney,JoelHellman,ArvidLukauskas,Helen
Milner,JohnOdell, JohnRuggie, AlexanderWendt, and the refereesof thisjournal for their
commentsand critiques.The researchwas supportedby the Columbia UniversityCouncil for
Research in the Social Sciences. The epigraphis fromRobert Gilpin,Warand Changein World
Press,1981),p. 42.
Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
state" witheitherthe term
1. In the followingpages I sometimesdenote "sovereignterritorial
"territorialstate" or "sovereignstate." These termsall referto a particularformof government
beyonditsborders.
whereinauthority
claimsinternalhierarchyand recognizesno higherauthority
in TheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(New York:
For thisdefinition
see StanleyBenn,"Sovereignty,"
Macmillan,1967),pp. 501-5.
IntemationalOrganzation48,4, Autumn1994,pp. 527-57
? 1994byThe IO Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
528 InternationalOrganization
weightsand measures. This economic rationalizationcorrespondedwith a
makeupof sovereignterritorial
greatercapacityto wage war.The institutional
states thus gave them competitiveadvantages over other organizational
possibilities.
to otheractors,was a means
whenconfirmed
Second,sovereignterritoriality,
ofstructuring
interunit
behavior.2States,or ratherthepoliticaland social elites
withinsovereignstates,preferredsimilartypesof unitsin theirenvironment
because sovereignrulerscould more crediblycommitthe membersof their
organization(throughtheircontrolof freeridingand defection)and because
parameters.
theirauthority
was exactlyspecifiedbyterritorial
Third,and as a consequence of the firsttwo conditions,actorsfromother
institutionalarrangementsdefected to states or copied their institutional
makeup.Displacementof alternativetypesthusoccurredfromthe bottomup
as well as the top down-actors "voted withtheirfeet" or copied what they
perceivedto be thesuperiororganizationaltype.
fromothersystemsof
authority
differed
The principleofsovereignterritorial
rule. Althoughinherentin the early medieval attemptsto reconstructthe
Roman Empire and the attemptsof the popes to build a Christiantheocracy
bothorganizationalattemptslackedprecise
was a notionofinternalhierarchy,
types-the city-leaguesand
territorialspecifications.The newer institutional
and thirteenth
centuriesthatemergedin thecourseofthe twelfth
city-states
also differedfromsovereignterritorialrule. The city-statesacknowledged
had
The city-leagues
territorial
limitsbutoftenlacked clear internalhierarchy.
and fixedborders(thatis, theywere
contiguity
neither,lackingbothterritorial
theylargelywereloose confederations
notterritorially
specified).Additionally,
havingno clear sovereign.
This article begins with the premise that the possibilitiesof continued
feudalism,a centralizedempire,and theocracyhad all waned by the early
The futurelaywiththreenew institutional
arrangements:
fourteenth
century.3
and the sovereignterritorial
state.The question
the city-league,
the city-state,
is whydid the last systemof rulewin out. Thus,whilewe oftentalkabout the
erergence of the state in termsof increasedtaxingpowers,the formationof
and the growthof the state in termsof
public ratherthan privateauthority,
scale, those are not the featuresof the state thatthis essay will examine.In
and sovereignterritorial
stateswere all state
city-states,
essence,city-leagues,
or territorial
limits.4
Instead,thefocus
forms,butnotall had internalhierarchy
prejudgesthe issue,since it is an anachronismforthis
2. The term"international"semantically
period.
had runtheircourseby1300,see
arrangements
3. For an argumentthatthesethreeinstitutional
Charles Tilly,ed., The FormationofNationalStatesin WestemEurope (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton
Press,1975),p. 26.
University
4. For a discussionof thevariousmeaningsof the term"state," see J.P. Nettl,"The State as a
ConceptualVariable," WorldPolitics20 (Summer1968),pp. 559-92.
Institutional
selection 529
of this essay is on a criticalfeatureof the modern state: the principleof
sovereignty-theprinciplethatauthority
is limitedbyprecisespatialtermsand
is subjectto no otherauthority.
Statedanotherway,authority
is territorial
and
exclusive.The originsofthatprinciple,whichcame to dominateEurope,can be
tracedto thelate Middle Ages. We need nowto explainitsdominance.
The next part of this article suggeststhat two bodies of literature-new
institutional
history(NIH) and historicalsociology-can be usefulin analyzing
the interactionbetween marketsand hierarchies.Both have analyzed how
actors,operatingin the absence of higherauthorityto arbitratedisputesand
enforce agreements,try to overcome that difficulty
by favoringcertain
institutionalsolutions.Historicalsociologyprovidesfor a taxonomyof how
actorsin practicehave resolvedthe tensionsbetweenmarketsand hierarchies.
The NIH literatureprovides a varietyof tools to explain whyinstitutional
arrangements
historically
have takena particularshape. Moreover,while it is
sometimesclaimedthatNIH is bydefinition
a post hoc enterprise,I willargue
thatthisapproachprovidessome a prioricriteriato suggestwhichinstitutions
willbe moreviablein thelongrun.
The followingpartsof thisarticlecomprisethe mainbodyof myargument,
beginningwith a descriptionof how the old political order-consistingof
crosscuttingand overlappingjurisdictionsof feudal lords, church,emperor,
and aspiringbut weak kings-proved unsuitableforan emergingprecapitalist
economicenvironment.5
The legal climatewas unfavorablefortradegiventhe
underdevelopmentof writtencodes, the importance of local customary
proceedings,the lack of instrumentally
rationalprocedures,and the crosscutting nature of jurisdictions.Economically,commerce sufferedfromgreat
variationin coinage and in weightsand measuresand a lack of clearlydefined
property
rights.Transactioncostswerehigh.6
Newer formsof organization-sovereignterritorialstates,city-states,
and
city-leagues-were in essence attemptsto solve the discrepancybetween
These forms
emergingtranslocalmarketsand existingpoliticalarrangements.
of organizationwere all, to some degree,the resultof increasingdemandsby
the towns to change the existingorder to one more conducive to their
preferencesand the resultof politicalrulersseekingto expand theirrevenue
and resources.
5. The literatureon emergentcapitalismranges in perspectivefroma neo-Marxistone to a
liberaleconomicone, focusingon propertyrightsand individualincentives.For an exampleof the
formerperspective,
see PerryAnderson,LineagesoftheAbsolutist
State(London: Verso, 1974); and
ImmanuelWallerstein,The Modem WorldSystem,
vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974). For
thepublicchoice approach,see Douglass Northand RobertThomas,TheRiseoftheWestemWorld
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1973); Douglass North, Structureand Change in
Economic History(New York: W. W. Norton,1981); and MargaretLevi, Of Rule and Revenue
ofCaliforniaPress,1988).
(Berkeley:University
6. I definetransactioncosts as the costs of arranginga contractex ante and monitoringand
enforcingit ex post. See Thrain Eggertson,Economic Behaviorand Institutions
(New York:
CambridgeUniversity
Press,1990),p. 14.
530 InternationalOrganization
This article does not examine the origins of these organizations.The
literatureon state formationis vast and diverse,and no attemptis made to
engage the literatureon the emergenceof particularsystemsof rule. There is
no suggestionthat the territorialstate emerged as an optimal solution to
individualpreferences.Rather, I examine why sovereignterritorialstates
possibilitiesin Europe. The emphasisis
eventuallydisplacedotherinstitutional
thusplaced on explainingselectionamongalreadyexistingalternatives.
I then compare the account herein to rival explanationsand discuss the
largerimplicationsof this article.The most obvious conclusion is that the
thatare distinct
international
systemcan go throughdramatictransformations
fromthe less comprehensivechangesin orderingprincipleor the distribution
ofpower.7
Two perspectiveson marketsand hierarchies:
newinstitutionalist
theorymeetshistoricalsociology
When do individualswho engage in economic transactionsseek hierarchy?
Whenmightpoliticalelitesseek to capitalizeon expandingtheirruleand when
not? Those questions are central to NIH and have a direct bearing on
institutional
relations.
changein international
But whetheror notNIH literaturecan explainactual politicaloutcomesis a
be broughtto
matterofdebate.8I arguethatthisapproachcan indeedfruitfully
bear on some oftheseissues,providedit is sensitiveenoughto historicalcases;
and here,historicalsociologycomesin.
The deductiveperspectiveof new institutionalism
as contractualagreementsbetween
The NIH approachexplainsinstitutions
rational individuals.This, of course, need not take the formof a formal
contract,but the premiseof thisview is that individualsengage in strategic
way,
exchange.Individuals,whethertheybehave in an optimizingor satisficing
ofinstitutional
thattheybelievewillbestmeet
structures
pursuethe formation
7. This lies in contrastto Waltz's view of internationalsystems.His argumentis that such
ofIntemational
systemsvaryonlybyorderingprincipleand capabilities.See KennethWaltz,Theory
Politics(New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 82ff.While bothorderingprincipleand capability
of international
affairs,
theyalone do notdetermine
remaincriticalelementsin anyunderstanding
the most fundamentaltypeof change in the internastructure.In otherrealistunderstandings,
tional systemis that of unit change. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in WorldPolitics
Press,1981),pp. 39-42.
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
8. See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalismin Comparative
Politics(New
eds., Structuring
Politics,"in Sven Steinmo,KathleenThelen,and FrankLongstreth,
Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; and JamesCaporaso, "Microeconomicsand
York: CambridgeUniversity
InternationalPolitical Economy: The Neoclassical Approach to Institutions,"in Ernst-Otto
Challenges(Lexington,Mass.:
Czempiel and JamesRosenau, eds., Global Changesand Theoretical
D. C. Heath, 1989),pp. 135-59.
Institutional
selection 531
thatprotectthemphysically
and
Traderswillpreferinstitutions
theirinterests.9
economically.That is, theywillprefersystemsof rule thathelp themto enter
intostablecontractsand thatdo notchargeexorbitanttaxesor fees.Theywill
mechanisms
be concernedwithex post renegingand will preferinstitutional
will
From theirside, politicalentrepreneurs
that diminishthatprobability.10
seek to capitalizeon gainsfromtradeand willseek to expandtheirrulein order
to do so.11They performa roughcalculus aimed at maintainingor expanding
theirownpoliticalpositions.
Followingthe classic Coase theorem,marketarrangementswill sufficeto
costs
achieve efficient
solutions.However,when transactionand information
are not zero, a more hierarchicalformof organizationis called for.In short,
institutions
can be explainedbymicrolevelanalysisof individuals'preferences
and contractualchoices. OliverWilliamsonthusexplainsfirmorganizationby
costs.12That is,when
individualchoicesto reduce transactionand information
transactioncosts are high and propertyrights are ill-defined,then the
in a hierarchitheirinteractions
actorswillbenefitfromstructuring
contracting
willbe pursuedto thepoint
thatis, hierarchy,
cal fashion.Verticalintegration,
thatfurtherintegrationincreasesmarginalcosts of expansionover marginal
benefits.13
Individualsengagingin commercethus will have reasons to prefermore
hierarchywhen this reduces informationand transactioncosts and creates
more certitudein their environment.Political entrepreneurswill preferto
extend such hierarchybased on a calculation of a varietyof factors.This
calculationwill depend on theirresponsivenessto the demands of domestic
sucha strategy.
actorsand on thecostsof attempting
NIH literaturealso forcesus to focuson the consequences of institutional
choice. Two facets of institutionalarrangementsare critical:the abilityto
preventfreeridingand the abilityto crediblycommit.The abilityto prevent
free riding has an obvious internalcomponent. Collective goods will be
small or unless there is a
underprovidedunless the group is sufficiently
9. For excellentoverviewsof the literature,see TerryMoe, "New Economicsof Organization,"
AmericanJoumalofPoliticalScience28 (November1984), pp. 739-77; and Beth Yarboroughand
Robert Yarborough, "InternationalInstitutionsand the New Economics of Organization,"
44 (Spring1990),pp. 235-59.
IntemationalOrganization
10. See, forexample,the discussionon renegingbyBeth Yarboroughand RobertYarborough,
Cooperationand Govemancein IntemationalTrade (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,
to limitexpostrenegingin
1992),pp. 14ff.For an exampleof how actorsseek to deviseinstitutions
of CaliforniaPress,
see CharlesLipson,StandingGuard (Berkeley:University
foreigninvestments,
1985).
11. For one accountthatuses such "entrepreneuriallogic" see David Friedman,"A Theoryof
the Size and Shape ofNations,"JoumalofPoliticalEconomy,vol. 85, no. 1, 1977,pp. 59-77.
12. See Oliver Williamson,Marketsand Hierarchies(New York: The Free Press, 1975); and
Press,1986).
(New York: New York University
OliverWilliamson,EconomicOrganization
of states,see Beth Yarboroughand Robert
13. For an expansionof thislogicto the integration
Yarborough, "InternationalContractingand TerritorialControl: The Boundary Question,"
Economics,forthcoming.
and Institutional
Joumalof Theoretical
532 InternationalOrganization
dominant actor to prevent such free riding.14But it also has external
implications:can a particularactorcrediblycommit?That is,to whatextentcan
one expectan actorto complywiththetermsof an agreementonce it has been
concluded?15I will argue that some typesof organization(particularlythe
city-leagues)lacked the abilityto crediblycommit,eitherbecause it was not
clear that the negotiatingpartyspoke on behalf of all the membersof the
organizationor because the rulersof suchorganizationscould notpreventfree
ridingbytheirconstituents.
In short,NIH literaturecan be useful in explainingthe preferencesfor
It furthermore
contributesto explainingdomesticand
particularinstitutions.
outcomes.
international
consequencesof institutional
Some problems withnew institutionalism
Despite the elegant and parsimoniousexplanationsmade possible by this
theoreticalapproach,anyextensionof thistheoryfromeconomicorganization
to politicalinstitution
buildingmustbe made withcaution.As NIH proponents
themselvessuggest, economic and political organizationsdifferin some
fundamentalrespects. Most notably,the absence of a clear medium of
exchange-that is, the absence ofprofitmakingas an evaluativemechanismof
therationaleof suchassociation-makes comparisonsproblematic.16
Second, politicalassociationsare based on a varietyof individualmotives:
militaryprotection,ideological affinities,as well as economic rationale.17
Individual kings, lords, clergy,and merchantswill have variant sets of
preferences.The politicalbargainstruckbetweenthemneed not a prioribe
reducible to any particularset of preferences.The resultingorganization
cannotbe reducedto simpleoptimalefficiency
arguments.
Moreover, NIH proponents,because they assume that institutionsare
basically rational, run the risk of committinga similar error to that of
that
functionalist
arguments.Namely,theydeduce fromtheexistinginstitution
itsdevelopmenthad to takethisparticularcourse:theposthoc,ergopropter
hoc
is imputedto derivefromthefunctions
fallacy.The existenceof theinstitution
it performs.NIH assumes a directconnectionbetweenthe preferencesforan
thatwould performcertainfunctionsand the actual existenceof a
institution
14. The standardargumentis by Mancur Olson, The Logic of CollectiveAction (Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1965). See also Russell Hardin,CollectiveAction(Washington,
D.C.: ResourcesfortheFuture,1982).
15. For a brief discussion of some of the issues involved,see Williamson,Marketsand
Hierarchies,
pp. 20 and 48.
16. Moe, "New Economicsof Organization,"p. 761.
17. For example, Margaret Levi suggeststhat political associations are based on security
motives;see Levi,OfRule and Revenue.See also RichardBean, "War and the Birthof the Nation
State,"JoumalofEconomicHistory33 (March 1973), pp. 203-21; and Edward Ames and Richard
Rapp, "The Birthand Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis,"Joumalof EconomicHistory37 (March
1977),pp. 161-78.
Institutional
selection 533
from
Sometimespreferencesare thendeduced tautologically
giveninstitution.
performs.
thefunctionsthattheexistinginstitution
Finally,transactioncostsare oftenimputedpost hoc, as well. Dependingon
whethera particularoutcomeoccurred,transactioncostsare suggestedto have
been highor low. But as Williamsonhimselfnotes,thisleads to a tautological
use oftransactioncosts.18
is warranted.
For these reasons,greaterhistoricaland empiricalsensitivity
can be
Preferencesneed notbe imputed.The fallacyofposthoc rationalization
choices thenavailable to the individuavoided by describingthe institutional
one can examine
als.19Ratherthandeduce preferencesfromcurrentfunctions,
the individual'sactual choices amongalternatives.What transactioncostsand
reallymean can be made plausible by empiricaldata.
crediblecommitments
Theyneed not be deduced post hoc. Stated anotherway,new institutionalism
needs history.20
which
In sum,a microlevelfocuson the contractualnatureof institutions,
costs
empiricallytakes account of the role that transactionand information
choice,can be useful.It illuminatesthereasonsforpolitical
playin institutional
entrepreneursand merchantsto strike particularbargains. Moreover, it
will be
arrangements
providesforhypotheseson whetheror not institutional
successfulin thelongrun.Thus one mightexpectthatinstitutions
competitively
willbe competitively
successfulif theycan preventfreeridingand defection.
This abilitywill providethe means to rationalizethe domesticeconomyand
costs.Additionally,ifparticularorganizareduce transactionand information
tional units can reduce the level of defectionand ex post renegingbetween
themselves,then theycan crediblycommitto long-termagreements.If an
organizationcannotdo so, thereis good reason to excludesuch an actorfrom
sovereignrulersprovidedfocalpointsto
thepreferredset ofunits.Historically,
Theycould do so because theycould plausiblyspeak
regularizetransactions.21
on behalf of theirsubjectsand committhem.In game-theoreticterms,they
were able to engagein iterativebehavior.22
of Capitalism(New York: The Free Press,
18. Oliver Williamson,The Economic Institutions
1985),p. 4.
explanations,see Robert Keohane, After
critiquesof functionalist
19. For briefand insightful
Press,1984),pp. 80-83; BrianBarry,Sociologists,
Hegemony(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
of Chicago Press,1978), p. 169; and Yarborough
Economists,and Democracy(Chicago: University
and Yarborough,"InternationalInstitutionsand the New Economics of Organization,"pp.
252-55.
in
20. Manyof these pointsare also raised in Thelen and Steinmo,"HistoricalInstitutionalism
ComparativePolitics."
21. For a discussionoffocalpointsin enhancingcooperation,see Thomas Schelling,TheStrategy
Press, 1980). In myusage, however,I do not
of Conflict(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
associateitwithtacitcommunication.
22. See the discussionof how such actorscan overtakethe elementsin an entireset in Robert
Axelrod,"The Emergenceof CooperationAmongEgoists,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview75
(June 1981), pp. 306-19. For a discussionof the prerequisitesof iteration,see Kenneth Oye,
Press,1986),chap. 1.
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
CooperationUnderAnarchy
534 InternationalOrganization
Two historical solutions to marketsand hierarchy
Historically,the relationbetween marketand politicalauthorityhas often
taken two forms-imperialorganizationand ad hoc lord-merchantarrangements.Both formscan be understoodwithinthe explanatoryframeworkof
NIH.
In traditionalempires,most economic interactiontakes place withinthe
boundariesof the empire.The geographicalextensionof political authority
roughlycorrespondswiththe spatialextensionofthe primarymarket.Accordingto Roberto Unger,"Its mosttangiblefeatureis the overallcoincidenceof
AnthonyGiddens arguesthat"imperial
economicand politicalboundaries."23
expansion tends to incorporateall significanteconomic needs withinthe
domainof the empireitself,relationswithgroupson the perimetertendingto
be unstable."24ImmanuelWallersteinsuggeststhat economicallyintegrated
into empires.25While
zones, that is, world systems,oftenwere transformed
such an empiremightrecognizean outsideworld,it is regardedas a periphery
withwhichone would deal as a nonequal.26The overarchinghierarchycan be
providedby politicalimperialcontrol,as occurredin China, or by theocratic
as occurredin India.27
authority,
The argumentdoes not hold just fortraditionalempires.Clearly,modern
imperialpretensionsoftenhave been fosteredbycoalitionsbetweeneliteswith
Economic elites
transnationaleconomicinterestsand politicalentrepreneurs.
mightseek resourcesor marketsfortheirproductsto whichthe empiregives
thempreferentialaccess. Politicalrulersseek empireas a means of revenue,
glory,or manpower.28
But, of course, not all economic transactionsfall withinunifiedpolitical
control,even thoughsome tradersand rulersmightdesire such outcomes.29
Even in premodernempires,a substantialamountoftrademightbe conducted
Moreover,imperialpreferenceswillbe matched
beyondtheimperialfrontiers.
by other actorswho seek to delimitsuch extension.Indeed, the greaterthe
Press,1987),p. 113.
23. RobertoUnger,Plasticity
intoPower(New York: CambridgeUniversity
German and Japanese programsin
Unger places such modernempiresas the twentieth-century
thiscategory.
of CaliforniaPress,
24. AnthonyGiddens,TheNation-Stateand Violence(Berkeley:University
1987),p. 80.
p. 15.
25. Wallerstein,TheModem WorldSystem,
An
26. On thispoint,see FriedrichKratochwil,"Of Systems,Boundaries,and Territoriality:
InquiryintotheFormationofthe State System,"WorldPolitics39 (October 1986),pp. 27-52.
27. For an overviewofthesedynamics,see JohnHall, Powersand Liberties(Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress,1985).
Press,1986); and JackSnyder,
28. See Michael Doyle,Empires(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press,1991).
MythsofEmpire(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
did notfallunderpolitical
29. As Abu-Lughodnotes,manyeconomiczones, and worldsystems,
unification.She also notes, however,that unificationcan sometimesreduce uncertaintyand
protectioncosts. See Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony(New York: Oxford
University
Press,1989),pp. 208-9.
selection 535
Institutional
imperialdrive,the greaterthe possibilitythat a balancingcoalitionwill arise
againsttheimperialactor.30
that
Whencommerceoccursacrossboundarieswithoutpoliticalsupervision,
is, when the marketgeographicallyextendsbeyondexistingpoliticalauthorities,thenmerchantsmustrelyon self-help.On the one hand,merchantsmust
strikedeals withlocal lords (or kings)to obtain local protectionand trading
privileges.Unger termsthis set of arrangements"overlord-peddler"agreepassage,and
unobstructed
ments.The overlordoffersthetraderlandingrights,
protectionin exchangeforcertainfeesor taxes.In essence,tradersmuststrike
deals themselves,deals that are ad hoc and subjectto defectionby the local
arrangements
lord.In NIH terms,merchantshad to tryto create institutional
thatlimitedthe incentivesforex post reneging.It was unknownwhetherthe
otherpartywould respectthe termsof the bargain.As a result,long-distance
tradeoftenwas conductedbymerchantswho were relatedbykinor of similar
culturalbackground.31
Clan ties,reputation,and sharedculturewerecriticalto
commerce,since such traitshad particularadvantagesin preventingreneging
problems.32
and in reducingtransactionand information
and marketsgenerallyhas been solvedin twoways.
The problemofhierarchy
In the imperial logic of organization,political elites mightbenefitfrom
expandingtheirauthorityover the relevantsphere of economic transaction.
They mightdo so to gain more revenueor tributeor to expand theirpower
base. Merchantsmightacquiesce to suchrule as itmightcreatemorecertitude
The Roman Empire thus benefitedboth
in their market environment.33
emperor and merchant.Similarly,the lamented "barbarian" extensionof
Mongol rule over much of the Eurasian continentin factbenefitedtrade by
placingEast-West trade routesunderunifiedpoliticalcontrol.Such developof
ments reduced uncertaintyby providingprotectionagainst infringement
propertyrights,violationof contracts,and outrightpredationby robbersand
local lords. Such rule mightreduce transactioncosts by providingforcertain
coinage and particularweightsand measuresand by reducingthe amountof
legal customs.
30. Snyder,MythsofEmpire,p. 6.
Tradein World
31. See Curtin'sdiscussionof tradediasporasin PhilipD. Curtin,Cross-Cultural
Press,1984).
History(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
32. See Janet Landa, "A Theory of the EthnicallyHomogeneous Middleman Group: An
InstitutionalAlternativeto ContractLaw," Joumalof Legal Studies10 (June 1981), pp. 349-62;
ofLaw:
"PrivateInternationalTrade in theShadowoftheTerritoriality
Hans-JorgSchmidt-Trenz,
WhyDoes It Work,"SouthemEconomicJoumal58 (October 1991),pp. 329-38; and JackCarrand
JanetLanda, "The Economicsof Symbols,Clan Names, and Religion,"JoumalofLegal Studies12
(January1983),pp. 135-56.
33. One mightobject thatthisexpansionshould not be perceivedas a contractbetweenruler
and ruled.However,ifone assumesthatat least a minimumof quasi-complianceis necessaryfora
governmentwill destroyits own basis of
tradingsystemto continue,then a purelyextortionist
revenueshouldittaxitsmerchantsto thepointthatthereare no incentivesto continueto engagein
commercialactivity.
536 InternationalOrganization
however,mighthave a negativeconsequence: it might
Imperial authority,
withinthe empire,
exploittraderswho, giventhat the marketlies primarily
forexit shortof surrendering
theiroccupation
would have littleopportunity
altogether.Unifiedcontroloverthemarketis thusa double-edgedsword.
In a decentralizedlogicof organization,merchantshave to strikedeals with
predationbyone
lordson an ad hoc basis. This reducesthe abilityoflong-term
lord because a merchantcan shiftto another. But it increases protection
problems and magnifiesthe uncertaintyand transactioncosts of crossboundarytrade withoutpoliticalprotection.(This mightbe one reason why
trade across boundarieswas oftenluxurytrade.High profitmarginscompensated forhighrisksand transactioncosts.)
In Europe a thirdarrangementemerged.When trade increasedin the late
Middle Ages, imperialorganization,eitherin the formof the Holy Roman
Empireor Roman theocracy,failed.But thisdid notmean thatmerchantsnow
became
had to fendforthemselves.The overlord-peddlerdeals increasingly
a
of
Of
these,
supervised and routinizedby variety political authorities.
in
that
it
created
to
have
long-term
advantages
proved
sovereignterritoriality
It reduced freeriding
morecertitudein the domesticeconomicenvironment.
than the alternatives.Externally,soverand transactioncosts more efficiently
eign authoritybecame a focal point around which to conduct international
affairs.In short,the success of the territorialstate can at least partiallybe
understoodbyitssolutionto thetensionbetweenmarketsand hierarchies.
The feudalera: local tradeand barterexchange
privatepossesFeudalismessentiallyentaileddecentralizedpoliticalauthority,
sion of the means of violence,and the lack of any distinctionbetweenpublic
that
and privateauthority.34
Those politicalfactorscreated an environment
greatlyhinderedcommerce.While goods were produced primarilyfor local
consumptionand exchangewas largelyin-kind,thisposed fewproblems.The
however,necessitatedsome
late medievalexpansionof tradingopportunities,
institutional
changes.
The feudal barriersto trade were varied. First,feudal organizationlacked
the absolute exclusionthatwe attachto privateproperty.Instead,continued
possession over time,seisin,establishedthe legitimacyof the holder. Since
productionconsistedmainlyof agriculturalcommoditiesthatwere tradedby
barterand oftentook place in the contextof reciprocalfeudal relations,this
was a workable solution. Holdings were embedded in a systemof mutual
disputes.Strayer's
featuresof feudalismare the subjectsof long-standing
34. The characteristic
descriptionis widelyaccepted,and thatis the one I use here. See JosephStrayer,Feudalism(New
York: Van NostrandReinhold,1965),p. 13.
Institutional
selection 537
obligations,and thusone could not easilyconveyanyexclusiverightto a third
party.35
Second,giventhatmoneywas scarce,feudalobligationsofnecessityrevolved
around in-kindtransfers.36
Indeed, the verybasis of feudal organizationwas
centeredaroundthe grantingof land by a highlord or kingto a lesservassal.
Lords or knightsof the manordemandedin-kindgoods and servicesfromthe
peasants and serfswho workedthe lands, in exchangeforwhich theywere
grantedprotection.All such relationswere highlypersonalizedand contextspecific.
The legal systemfurtherhindered commercialtransactions.Feudalism
evolved into a systemof preferentialbirthand operated as a closed caste
systemfavoringthe warrior aristocracy.37
No amount of material wealth
betweencommonerand noble. This entailedpreferendispelledthedifference
tial judicial proceduressuch as trialby ordeal and combat and judgmentby
noble peersratherthanbyinferiors.
Clearlysucharrangements
did notworkin
favoroftheburgherswhosoughtmorerationalmeansofcontractenforcement.
The highdegree of localized rule also yieldeda diversity
of legal customs.38
Given that even lesser lords had acquired previouslyroyal rightsto pass
judgment,so-called banal justice,each localityhad its own legal particularities.39This situationwas onlyexacerbatedby the general absence of written
law-with theexceptionofsouthernFrance and Italy,thelandsofthedroitecrit
(writtenlaw). Thus northern
France,theland ofthedroitcoutumier
(customary
law),was governedroughlybythreehundredlocal customary
codes.40
Transactioncostswere raisedfurther
bythefactthatsecularand ecclesiastical lordsused theirown weightsand measures.Indeed, manipulationof such
measures could yield tidyprofitsforlocal lords. They furthermore
required
tradersto use theirmeasuresand weightsat a givenlocation,ofcoursepayinga
fee to thelordforsuchuse. By thelate Middle Ages, Englandhad hundredsof
35. Michael Saltman,"Feudal Relationshipsand the Law: A ComparativeInquiry,"ComparativeStudiesin Societyand History29 (July1987), pp. 514-32. See also Marc Bloch,Feudal Society
(Chicago: University
of Chicago Press,1961),pp. 115-16.
36. Thus, Polanyi definedfeudalismas an in-kindeconomy. See Karl Polanyi, "Primitive
and Social
Feudalismand theFeudalismofDecay," in George Dalton, ed., EconomicDevelopment
Change(New York: NaturalHistoryPress,1971),pp. 141-47 and p. 142 in particular.An indicator
of thislocal consumptionwas the itinerancy
of kings.Kingstraveledto locationsto claimlodgings
and food,to whichtheywere entitledbythegite,theclaimto hospitality
fromtheirvassals.
37. Leopold Genicot, "La Noblesse au Moyen Age Dans L'Ancienne 'Francie': Continuite,
Ruptureou Evolution?" (Medieval nobilityin ancientFrance: Continuity,
break,or evolution?)
Comparative
Studiesin Societyand History,
vol. 5, no. 1, 1962,pp. 52-59.
38. For a good account of the local diversityof law, see Susan Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities
in Western
Europe900-1300 (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),chaps. 1 and 2. See also
Harold Berman, Law and Revolution(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1983),
particularly
chap. 13.
39. For a discussionoftheserightsoflocal lords,see GeorgesDuby,RuralEconomyand Country
Lifein theMedievalWest(Columbia: University
ofSouthCarolinaPress,1968),p. 181.
40. JeanDunbabin,Francein theMaking843-1180 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1985), p.
277.
538 InternationalOrganization
thousandlocal
different
majormeasures,withperhapsas manyas twenty-five
variations.4'
Finally,lords mintedtheirown coins. In France therewere perhaps three
hundredminters;in Germany,perhapssixhundred.Each Italian townhad its
own mint.42
Traders thus had to learn whichexchangerates were operative,
what the
whetheror not the local lords recentlyhad debased theircurrency,
goldvalue of suchcoin mightbe, and so forth.
All such mattersmade the conductof anybusinessa highlyspeculativeand
transaction
sometimesdangerousaffair.In the termsof new institutionalism,
and informationcosts were high, and the danger of ex post renegingwas
ubiquitous.
As longas barterand local exchangeprevailed,none ofthiswas particularly
problematic.By the late eleventh and early twelfthcenturies,however,a
dramatic economic transformation
began to take place.43Wastelands and
forestswere cleared, and agriculturalproductionand trade began to expand.
This economic revivalhad several causes-decreasing invasions,improved
agricultural
production,possiblyeven a changein weather.However,themost
criticalfactorin this transformation
was the role played by long-distance
trade.44Trade made increasingdivisionof labor possible.Consequently,many
newtownswerefounded,and existingtownsgrewin thewake ofthiseconomic
boom. Indeed, many currentEuropean towns trace their foundingto this
period.45
The growthoftownscaused a newpoliticalgroupto emerge:theburghersor
towndwellers.The existinginstitutions
had favoredthe interestsand perspectivesof clergyand feudal lords. The new actors,the townspeople,had little
41. Ronald Zupko, "Weights and Measures, Western European," in Joseph Strayer,ed.,
Dictionaryof theMiddleAges,vol. 12 (New York: Charles Scribner,1989), p. 582; Witold Kula,
Measuresand Men (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1986), provides a fascinating
accountofthevarietyofweightsand measuresand oftheirregulationas an issueofcontention.For
a classic discussion of the variation in weights and measures and coinage throughoutthe
World
Mediterranean,see RobertLopez and IrvingRaymond,MedievalTradeintheMediterranean
(New York: W. W. Norton,1967),pp. 11ff.
42. HerbertHeaton,EconomicHistory
ofEurope(New York: Harper and Row, 1948),p. 175.
43. Bloch describesthisperiodas thesecondfeudalperiod.See Bloch,Feudal Society,p. 69. The
in Carlo Cipolla,BeforetheIndustrial
economicgrowthis well-documented
Revolution(New York:
W. W. Norton,1980); Georges Duby, The EarlyGrowthof theEuropeanEconomy(Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell UniversityPress, 1974); and Jacques Le Goff,Medieval Civilization(New York: Basil
Blackwell,1988).
44. See Fernand Braudel, The Perspective
of the World(New York: Harper and Row, 1984);
Press, 1952).
Henri Pirenne,MedievalCities(1925, reprint;Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity
FritzRorig,TheMedievalTown
of Pirenne,see Le Goff,MedievalCivilization;
For a reaffirmation
(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1969), p. 20; GeoffreyBarraclough,Originsof Modem
Germany(New York: W. W. Norton,1984), pp. 4 and 76; and Adriaan Verhulst,"The Originsof
Towns in theLow Countriesand thePirenneThesis,"Past and Present122 (1989), pp. 3-35.
45. See Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lees, The Making of Urban Europe (Boston: Harvard
UniversityPress, 1985); and Edith Ennen, The Medieval Town (Amsterdam:North Holland
Publishing,1979).
Institutional
selection 539
influencein thatpoliticalset of arrangements.
Thus, coupled withthe rise of
the towns,a new set of interestsand ideologicalperspectivesemergedwitha
newset of demands.The feudalorder-based on crosscutting
jurisdictionsand
on ill-defined
property
rightsand judicialprocedures-did notfittheburghers'
mercantilepursuits.Marketexchangeand traderequiredabstractcontractual
obligationswithmoneyas a medium.46
The emergenceoftownsthuscreateda
dynamicelementin the European politicalsystem.As Georges Duby wrote,
"Centralto therevitalizedprincipalities,
townsnowheld thekeypositionin the
politicalorderthatslowlyemergedfromthetangleoffeudalrelations."47
Despite the oppositionof the feudal aristocracy,
the Germanemperor,and
the church,the economic transformation
made new political arrangements
possible. Most accountsargue thatthe possibilitiesof continuedfeudalism,a
centralizedempire,and theocracyhad waned bytheearlyfourteenth
century.48
The futurelay withthree new institutionalinnovations:the city-league,the
city-state,and the sovereignterritorialstate. All three responded in some
degree to the demands of commercialactors,that is, of the townspeople.
statesemergedparticularly
in England and France,while
Sovereignterritorial
city-states
graduallyarose out of the roughlytwo hundredto threehundred
independentcommunesof Italy. Germanybecame the primarylocation of
whichunitedto curtailpredationbythelords.
city-leagues,
All three were able to respond to the precapitalistopportunitiesof the
period.It is thusa mistaketo arguethatsovereignterritorial
statessupplanted
feudal organizationin a linear and sequential way. All three institutional
arrangements-city-league,
city-state,and sovereignterritorialstate-could
mobilize more resources than could traditionalfeudal organization.The
questionis notwhyterritorial
statesreplacedfeudalismbutwhytheyultimately
managedto displacetheircontemporary
competitors.
In short, until the late Middle Ages, European political development
differedlittlefromthat elsewhere.Decentralized politicalauthoritynecessitated ad hoc bargainsand relianceon self-helpby social actors.Alternatively,
both emperorand pope attemptedto reestablishimperialorganization.In
Europe none of these possibilities-feudallordships,empire,or theocracyeventuallycarried the day. Instead, the dramaticeconomic change led to
institutional
innovationunique to theEuropean historicalexperience.
We mightconjecturethat the new institutionthatwould ultimatelyprove
most successfulwould be the one that could lessen the problemsof feudal
particularismthe most. A successfulinstitutionwould have to reduce the
46. For a discussion of the significantimplicationsof that transition,see Marvin Becker,
MedievalItaly(Bloomington:Indiana University
Press,1981).
47. Duby, The Early Growthof theEuropean Economy,p. 252. For a similarview, see John
Morrall,PoliticalThought
in MedievalTimes(Toronto:University
ofTorontoPress,1980),p. 42.
48. For an assessmentthatthesethreeinstitutional
arrangements
indeedhad cometo theend of
theirprimacyby 1300, see Tilly,The Formationof National Statesin Western
Europe,p. 26; and
Morrall,PoliticalThought
in MedievalTimes.
540 InternationalOrganization
number of crosscuttingand rival jurisdictions.By centralizingjustice and
authority,it could also reduce defectionby its constituents.Furthermore,
wouldreducethenumberoflegal codes, standardizejudicial
internalhierarchy
procedure,and providefor an appeals process. In the economic sphere,an
organization'ssuccessmightbe measuredbythe centralizationof coinage and
ofweightsand measures.Consequently,ifone acceptsthat
thestandardization
of laws,weightsand measures,and coinage are at least some
standardizations
of theprerequisitesfora moderneconomy,thenwe have a prioriindicatorsof
success. Furthermore,given that European trade would be transboundary
that
could a prioribe specifiedas an institution
trade,a successfulinstitution
could crediblycommitto internationalagreements.Of the new institutional
typesthatemergedin the late Middle Ages,whichperformedthese functions
in thecourseofthenextcenturies?
mostsuccessfully
Rivalryand selectionamongthenew
possibilities
institutional
Sovereign territorialrule
The possibility
ofunifiedpoliticalcontrolovertheprimaryarea ofeconomic
century.
interactions(the imperialsolution)had failedbythe earlyfourteenth
The expandinglevel of trade,therefore,occurredacross politicalboundaries.
of theirown,such as the
Consequently,tradershad to workout arrangements
a varietyofpolitical
with
negotiate
developmentofmerchantlaw,49and had to
authoritiesoverwhoseborderstheycrossed.
theeconomiesoftheirkingdoms
Rulers,however,realizedthatrationalizing
in
own
interests.
Consequently,theybecame
were
their
trade
and facilitating
tasks.
Internally,
politicalauthoriin
and
international
both
domestic
involved
domesticeconomyby
ties graduallybecame involvedin creatingan efficient
combatingfeudal particularism.Externally,theybegan to create conditions
that made long-termiterativebehaviorpredictableand relativelystable. In
claimedbyEnglishkings
fact,as P. H. Sawyerwrote,"One of theprerogatives
centurieswas the rightto regulatemerchants
in the thirteenth
and fourteenth
and commerce."50
One aspect of such regulationwas the attemptto centralizeand regulate
coinage. The disseminationof mints(for example,the small duchyof Berry
49. Merchant law is discussed by Berman, Law and Revolution,chap. 11. For a new
view of merchantlaw, see Paul Milgrom,Douglass North,and BarryWeingast,
institutionalist
"The Role of Institutionsin the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,PrivateJudges,and the
ChampagneFairs," Economicsand Politics2 (March 1990), pp. 1-23; AvnerGreif,"Institutions
and InternationalTrade: Lessons fromthe CommercialRevolution,"AmericanEconomicReview
82 (May 1992),pp. 128-33; and Bruce Benson,"The SpontaneousEvolutionofCommercialLaw,"
EconomicJournal55 (January1989),pp. 644-61.
Southern
50. The quotationis drawnfromp. 139 ofP. H. Sawyer,"Kingsand Merchants,"in P. H. Sawyer
ofLeeds, 1977),pp. 139-58.
and I. Wood, eds.,EarlyMedievalKingship(Leeds: University
Institutional
selection 541
alone had twelvedifferent
mints) correlatedwith frequentdepreciationby
manyofthemintinglords.51
To combatsuchfragmentation,
theearlyCapetian
kingsdeclared royalcurrencyto be the onlycurrencyof the French realm.52
Althoughfeudallordscontinuedto mintcoins,theirarea of usage increasingly
was limitedto that area immediatelyunder each's control.The numberof
mintsdeclined fromroughlythreehundredto thirtyby the beginningof the
fourteenth
century,
the end oftheCapetian reign.53
AlthoughEnglishmintingalreadywas muchmore centralized,the English
kingtriedto decreasefurther
thenumberofbaronialmints.Moreover,English
tradersbenefitedfroma regularcurrencythatwas debased onlyrarely.54
Monarchsalso triedto standardizeweightsand measures.Here the French
kinginitiallywas less successful.It was clear to the bourgeois,however,that
could ultimately
onlya hierarchicalformof government
make inroadsin that
direction.PhilipV (1316-22) was one of thefirstFrenchmonarchsto regulate
weightsand measures, but others continued the policy. Louis XI in the
fifteenth
Louis XII in thereformof 1508,and FrancisI and HenryII in
century,
a varietyof edicts in 1540, 1557, 1575, and 1579 all tried to reduce the
mind-boggling
varietyof measures then used throughoutthe kingdom.55
In
England, centralauthoritymade greaterinroads into standardizingweights
and measures.Some progressalreadyhad been made beginningin the twelfth
century.In 1317,thecrownhad orderedthatthestandardsofLondon be used.
Otherorders,such as the statuteof 1389 and the parliamentary
legislationof
1413,further
declared standardsand specifiedpenaltiesforoffenders.
But the
movementtoward standardizationreceived particularimpetus during the
Tudor government.In the words of Ronald Zupko, "Before the imperial
weightsand measuresera began in the thirddecade of thenineteenthcentury,
no period in Englishhistorywas as importantfromthe standpointof physical
standardsas theTudor."56
and customaryproceduresin the legal fieldalso were tackled.
Particularism
By themiddleof the thirteenth
century,
kingshad forbadetrialbycombatand
51. Duby,TheEarlyGrowthoftheEuropeanEconomy,p. 249.
52. For French royaleffortsin thisregard,see Robert Fawtier,The CapetianKingsof France
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), pp. 188-91. In general, all royal authoritiestried to
standardizeand rationalizethe legal process and bringmore certitudeto economictransactions.
See Berman,Law and Revolution,pp. 466-77; Peter Spufford,"Coinage and Currency,"The
CambridgeEconomicHistoryofEurope,vol. 2 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1987), p.
812; and HenryMyers,MedievalKingship(Chicago: Nelson-Hall,1982),p. 319.
53. See Heaton, EconomicHistoryofEurope,pp. 174-75; and WilliamJordan,Louis IX and the
ChallengeoftheCrusade(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1979), p. 209.
54. Carlo Cipolla, "CurrencyDepreciationin Medieval Europe," EconomicHistory
Review,vol.
15,no. 3, 1963,pp. 413-22. For the stabilityof Englishcoinage,see Duby, TheEarlyGrowthofthe
EuropeanEconomy,p. 251.
55. See particularlyKula, Measuresand Men, chap. 22. Also see Elizabeth Hallam, Capetian
France987-1328 (New York: Longman,1980),p. 284; and Myers,MedievalKingship,
p. 319.
56. Ronald Zupko,BritishWeights
and Measures(Madison: University
ofWisconsinPress,1977),
p. 74. For anotherdiscussionof Englishsuccess at centralization,
see Rorig,MedievalTown,pp.
65ff.
542 InternationalOrganization
byinsistingon hierarchiordeal.57Rulers triedto decrease local particularism
cal appeal procedures and by turningto Roman (that is, written)law for
greatercertitude.Roman law not onlyjustifiedsovereignrule,and hence was
desirablefromthe king'spositionforthatreason alone, but it also contained
WhileEnglishlaw did nottake thesame route,
developedtheoriesofproperty.
theretoo kingsbegan to rationalizejudicial procedure.As earlyas the twelfth
century,HenryII had startedto revolutionize"the systemof law in England
primarily
byimposingroyaljurisdiction,and royallaw,upon criminaland civil
mattersthathad previouslybeen under local and feudaljurisdiction,"in the
was
wordsofHarold Berman.58One ofthedimensionsofthisroyaljurisdiction
dispossessed. This ocgreaterprotectionfor those who were illegitimately
curredeven priorto the developmentof such principlesin Roman law on the
Continent.59
of theirdomesticconstituExternally,
kingsstartedto act as representatives
encies.60For example,theFrenchkingclaimedduringtheHundredYears War
that only he was allowed to negotiatewiththe English.6'Governmentalso
became involvedin regulatingtrade. Accordingto Jacques Bernard,"They
controlledall 'lettersof mark'and reprisalsagainstforeignmerchants,
strictly
and in their place substituteddue process of law.... they also tried to
validityand executionof tradingagreements."62
guarantee the authenticity,
Gradually,merchantlaw, the systemof law thatthe merchantshad adminiswas replacedbyroyal
teredthemselvesin an ingeniousself-helpconstruction,
law.63To use Nettl'sterm,sovereignrulersbecame thegatekeepersseparating
arena.64
theirdomesticrealmsfromtheinternational
thejudicialsystem
The processofrationalizing
theeconomyand centralizing
was a lengthyone. England was initiallymuch more successfulthan France.
Still,the latterhad also made considerableinroads into centralizationeven
policies of the earlyseventeenth
beforeJean-BaptisteColbert's mercantilist
rule,which
century.In short,fromthe verybeginningof sovereignterritorial
the
was formally
claimedbykingsin thelate thirteenth
centuryand throughout
p. 467.
57. See Fawtier,The CapetianKingsofFrance,p. 188; and Berman,Law and Revolution,
p. 445.
58. Berman,Law and Revolution,
59. R. C. Van Caenegem, The Birthof the English Common Law (New York: Cambridge
University
Press,1988),2d ed., pp. 44 and 91.
by
60. For an argumentthatthe Capetian kingshad formedthe basis forsovereignauthority
1300, see Hallam, CapetianFrance 987-1328, pp. 262, 266, and 308; and Fawtier,The Capetian
KingsofFrance,pp. 47 and 189.
61. Aline Vallee, "Etat et Securite Publique au XIVe Siecle: Une Nouvelle Lecture des
century:A new reading
ArchivesRoyales Francaises" (State and publicsecurityin the fourteenth
ofFrenchroyalarchives),Histoire,
EconomieetSociete1 (Spring1987),pp. 3-15. Similarlytheking
claimedjurisdictionin translocalaffairssuch as piracy.See FredericCheyette,"The Sovereignand
thePirates,"Speculum,vol. 45, no. 1, 1970,pp. 40-68.
62. JacquesBernard,"Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages 900-1500,"in Carlo Cipolla, ed.,
ofEurope,vol. 1 (Glasgow: Collins,1972),p. 314.
TheFontanaEconomicHistory
63. Benson,"The SpontaneousEvolutionofCommercialLaw," p. 651.
64. Nettl,"The State as a ConceptualVariable," p. 564.
selection 543
Institutional
the remnantsoffeudal
era, monarchsworkedtowardeliminating
preindustrial
particularism.
Of course,kingsand queens had reasonsof theirown to do so. By providing
such goods, they obtained the support of the towns and therebycapital.
Moreover,byenhancingthe economicwell-beingof the realm,theyincreased
theirownabilityto raise morerevenue.65
The city-league:fragmented
sovereigntyand nonterritoriality
The city-leaguelies in starkestcontrastto the state.The mostpowerfulof
suchleagues was the Hanseatic League, or Hansa, whichconsistedof 160-200
This league did notadopt
townsand monopolizedmostofthenortherntrade.66
It had no clear internalhierarchyand
the principleof sovereignterritoriality.
bordersto markitsjurisdiction.Because of its importance,and
no territorial
because its organizationwas typicalof manyothercity-leagues(such as the
RhenishLeague, the Saxon League, the Swabian League, and others),I will
in general.
ofcity-leagues
takethecase oftheHansa as representative
Unlike the situationin England and France, where the interestsof the
economycorrespondedwiththoseof theburghers,no
monarchin an efficient
claimto be a providerofinternalcollective
could legitimately
centralauthority
the objectivesof the others.In such
goods in the Hansa. Each townmistrusted
transactions
remainedunstable.Efforts
economic
an arena of mutualdistrust,
weightsand measuresmet
to
standardize
say,
or
Bremen,
Hamburg,
byLubeck,
withnoncooperation.Consequently,city-leaguememberscontinuedto use a
varietyof weights and measures to their own advantage.67Moreover, to
measuresmightvarywiththe distancefrom
complicatematterseven further,
the pointof origin.That is to say,tradersmanipulatedmeasuresto hide illicit
profitmarginsfromecclesiasticalscrutiny.
to overcomethislack of collectiveactionand create
One wayof attempting
greater standardizationwas the demand of the Hansetag (the Hanseatic
betweenkingand burghers,see GianfrancoPoggi, The Developmentof the
65. On the affinity
Press, 1978), p. 63; Edward Miller,"GovernModem State(Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity
mentEconomicPoliciesand PublicFinance 1000-1500,"in Cipolla, TheFontanaEconomicHistory
ofEurope,vol. 1,pp. 356 and 369; and Rorig,TheMedievalTown,pp. 58-64.
66. The seminalworkon the Hansa is by Philippe Dollinger,The GermanHansa (Stanford,
Calif.: StanfordUniversityPress, 1970). Wernicke gives a good descriptionof the Hansa's
formativeperiod and its regionaland local subassemblies.See Horst Wernicke,Die Stddtehanse
1280-1418 (The Hanseatic cities 1280-1418) (Weimar: HermannBohlaus Nachfolger,1983). A
good introductionto the historyof the Hansa can be found in G. V. Scammel, The World
Encompassed: The FirstEuropean MaritimeEmpires Circa 800-1650 (Berkeley: Universityof
CaliforniaPress,1981),chap. 2.
67. On the lack of success in standardizingmeasuresand weights,see Otto Held, "Hansische
im Mass und Gewichtswesenbis zum Jahre1500" (Hanseatic attemptsat
Einheitsbestrebungen
45 (1918), pp.
unityin measures and weightsuntil the year 1500), Hansische Geschichtsbldtter
127-67.
544 InternationalOrganization
Parliament)that its regionalassociationsadopt the standardsof one of the
dominanttownsof thatregion.The Dutch towns,forexample,were expected
to followthe lead of Cologne. But the Dutch, of course,benefitedfromusing
and manipulatingtheirown measuresand hence had littlereason to comply.68
to use and who
Nor could themanyHanseatictownsagreeon whichcurrency
should mintit. The Hansa saw the use of Brandenburgtalers,Lubeck and
Prussianmarks,Rhenishguilders,Flemishpounds,and othercurrencies.The
various attemptsto standardizecoinage, for example throughthe Wendish
unionon coinage,failedmiserably.Relativeto Englandand France,Hanseatic
currenciesremainedin disarray.69
Legal codes also remaineddiversethroughoutthe Hansa. Daughter cities
adopted the codes of mothercitiesin an ad hoc manner.Some citiesadopted
thelegal code ofLubeck,othersacceptedcodes fromMagdeburg,Hamburg,or
ofthe decisions
and implementation
enforcement
Furthermore,
othertowns.70
of the Hanseatic parliamentwere leftto the individualtowns.Althoughthe
such as exclusion,fortownsthatdefected,in
Hansa providedforpunishment,
general the sanctioningprocess left a great deal of leeway for individual
shirking.
Given the lack of effectivecontrolof each townover the others,even the
major townstended to pursue theirown objectivesratherthan providefor
collectivegoods as a hegemonicpower might.Thus, despite the political
organizationof the Hansa, memberscontinuedto relyon mechanismsusually
associatedwithself-helpsystemsto organizetrade.One such mechanismwas
of ordinancesto ensurethe maintenanceof strongfamily
the implementation
ties. Marryingnon-Hanseaticswas forbiddenand businesspartnershipswith
themcould be penalizedbytheloss oftwofingers.7'
The distrustamong Hanseatic membersnot only obstructedeffortsfor
butat thesame led to freeridingwhenexternalcollective
greatercentralization
activitywas called for. While the Hansa was sometimesquite successfulin
wagingwar,therewas alwaysthe dangerof individualcitiesrefusingto fulfill
theirobligations.Thus, the Saxon memberswere slowto supporttheWendish
townsin the war withDenmark.72Some of the Dutch membertownswere
reluctantto supportthe league againstnonmemberDutch townsin Holland
68. Leo Lensen and WillyHeitling,De Geschiedenisvan de Hanze (The historyof the Hansa),
(Deventer,Holland: Arko,1990),pp. 24 and 36.
69. Dollinger,The GermanHansa, p. 207. WilhelmJesse,"Die Munzpolitikder Hansestadte"
53 (1928), pp. 78-96,
(The coinage policyof the Hanseatic cities),Hansische Geschichtsblftter
contraststhe lack of success in standardizingcoinage and mintingin the Hansa withthe relative
success of France. See also Rorig,The MedievalTown,p. 65. Holborn commentson the lack of
centralizationand the chaotic currencyconditionsin Germanyas comparedwithEngland. See
Hajo Holborn, A Historyof Modem Germany:The Reformation(Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
Press,1959),p. 68.
University
p. 376.
70. Berman,Law and Revolution,
vande Hanze, p. 41.
71. Lensen and Heitling,De Geschiedenis
72. MatthiasPuhle, "Der SachsischeStadtebundund die Hanse im Spaten Mittelalter"(The
Institutional
selection 545
and Zeeland.73Even Lubeck and Hamburg,whichas the Hansa's dominant
townswere mostlikelyto preventfreeriding,were at one timebriefly
expelled
fromtheleague fordefectingfromtheleague themselves.
Sovereignactorsdeliberatelyprofitedfromthislack of unity.For example,
the Danish kingclaimed thatcertainprivilegeswere due to the Wendishbut
not the Prussiantowns,althoughprivilegeshad in factbeen agreed upon for
the Hansa as a whole. The Prussiansdrew the incorrectconclusionthat the
Wendish towns had defected and had negotiatedprivatebenefitsof their
own.74
also made it difficult
forthe league to
The lack of clear sovereignauthority
agreements.Treatieswere negotiatedby
crediblycommititselfto international
the league as a whole, but individualtownswere able to choose whetherto
ratify
thetreatyor not.Thus,althoughPrussiantownsrefusedto signthepeace
treatywith England in 1437, the Hansa neverthelessinsistedthat English
concessionswere due to the Prussians.75When English negotiatorsin the
sixteenthcenturydemanded a list of all Hanseatic townsso that theycould
claimthespecificprivilegesthattheHansa
knowwhichshipscould legitimately
had negotiated,the league refused.76
It fearedthatthe crownwould seek to
negotiatewithindividualtownsat the expenseof the league as a whole,a not
illusorydanger,sinceEnglandstoodto gainbyenticingtownsto defect.77
From its side, the league would occasionally welcome free riding to
forinfractions
of internationalagreeexonerateitselffromany responsibility
ments. For example, when England claimed that membersof the Hansa
engaged in piracyand violated agreementsthereon,the Hanseatic League
arguedthatit had no controloverindividualtowns.In otherwords,it had no
clearmeansto deal withfreeriding.78
The Hansa thus could not crediblycommititselfto long-termiterative
relationshipswith other governmentssince it could not controlindividual
towns' incentivesto free ride. Benefitsof defectionwould accrue to the
individualtown,whereasthecostswouldbe bornebyall. Moreover,theHansa
whichmemberswere partof the league, and
itselfbenefitedfromobfuscating
partners.
hence non-Hanseaticsoftendistrustedtheirnegotiating
104 (1986),
Saxon city-leagueand theHansa in the late Middle Ages), HansischeGeschichtsbldtter
pp. 21-34.
vande Hanze, p. 155.
73. Lensen and Heitling,Geschiedenis
des Sundzolls" (On the questionof the
74. DietrichSchafer,"Zur Frage nach der Einfuhrung
5 (1875), pp. 33-43.
introduction
ofcustomsdutiesin thesound),HansischeGeschichtsblitter
75. T. H. Lloyd,Englandand theGermanHanse 1157-1611 (New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press,1991),p. 370.
76. Georg Fink,"Die RechtlicheStellungder DeutschenHanse in der Zeit ihresNiedergangs"
(The juridicalpositionofthe GermanHansa in thetimeofitsdecline),HansischeGeschichtsblftter
(1936), pp. 122-37.See also Lloyd,Englandand theGermanHanse, pp. 294-304,319, and 378.
77. On Englishexpansioninto the Baltic,see Ralph Davis, EnglishOverseasTrade 1500-1700
(London: Macmillan,1973),pp. 16-19.
Press,1987).
78. JohnConybeare,TradeWars(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
546 InternationalOrganization
Finally,the Hansa did not followthe principleof territorial
delimitationof
its authority.79
It had no recognizedborders.Consequently,its attemptsto
bringnew membersinto the league ran directlycounterto the interestsof
sovereignstate actors,posing to themthe same danger as imperiallogics of
organization.Indeed, the Hansa acquiredprivilegesin Englandthatexempted
itfromparliamentary
statutes.80
In short,the city-leaguehad problemswithestablishinginternalhierarchy,
and consequentlyitwas less successfulthanstatesin standardizing
coinageand
centralizingjurisdiction.Externally,it was not able to crediblycommitto
internationaltreaties.Moreover,given its lack of clearlydefinedterritorial
itwas less compatiblewiththeterritorial
unitsin theinternational
jurisdiction,
system.In the Peace of Westphalia, for example, the princes refused to
recognizethe league.81However,individualcitiessuch as Bremen,Hamburg,
and Lubeckwereconsideredimperialcities(hence,de factoindependent)and
as city-states
were allowed to participate.82
The league thereforewas refused
noton thebasis ofthetotalmaterialresourcesat itsdisposalbuton thebasis of
itsparticularorganizationallogic.The structureof the league was such thatit
did notfitthatof an international
statesystem:itwas nota liketype.
I do notsuggestthatthematerialresourcesoftheorganizationare irrelevant
to excludethe Hansa in itsprime.However,a
altogether.It would be difficult
materialexplanationalone cannotclarifywhyso manysmall actorscontinued
as legitimateactors in internationalrelations.Bremen,Hamburg,and many
otherswere consideredindependentactorsformanycenturiesafterWestphalia. Whiletheirlimitedresourcesmighthave made themsecond-or third-order
playersin international
politics,theywereconsideredas legitimate
players.83
The demiseof the Hansa, therefore,
had severalcauses. First,itwas due to
the competitivenatureof the internationalsystemin whichit was confronted
by rivalformsof organization.Sovereignstates proved betterat mobilizing
their societies and enhancingtheir domestic economies. Territorialunits
graduallyencroachedon the independenceof the citiesthatwere membersof
theleague. Parallelwiththis"Darwinian"selectiveprocesswerethechoicesof
79. See WernerLink,"Reflectionson ParadigmaticComplementarity
in the Studyof International Relations," in ErnstCzempiel and James Rosenau, eds., Global Changesand Theoretical
Challenges(Lexington,Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989),p. 101.
80. Lloyd,Englandand theGermanHanse, p. 375.
81. Krasneris rightin pointingout thatWestphaliais nota dramaticbreakwiththepast. I see it
as a codification
of practicesalreadyunderwaycenturiesbeforethat.Nevertheless,it does servea
useful purpose as a benchmarksignifying
that the formationof a state systemwas comingto
fruition.See Stephen Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in JudithGoldstein and Robert
Keohane, eds.,Ideas and ForeignPolicy(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press,1993),pp. 235-64.
82. Hans-BerndSpies, "Lulbeck,die Hanse und der WestfalischeFrieden" (Luibeck,theHansa,
and thePeace ofWesphalia),HansischeGeschichtsblatter
100 (1932), pp. 110-24.
83. Structuration
theoristsmightframethisin termsofthe systemempoweringonlylike actors.
See, forexample,Giddens,TheNationStateand Violence,p. 282. Rephrasedthisimpliesthatactors
recognizeotherunits onlyon theirterms-they admitonlyother states as legitimateactors in
international
relations.
Institutional
selection 547
individuals to form or join units they perceived as superior modes of
organization.84
The Germanprincesthusstartedto mimicthe administrative
processes and legal frameworkof territorialstates.85Towns, no longer
convinced of the benefitsof membershipin the league, defected to the
protectionof territorialrulersor styledthemselvesas independentstates in
theirown right-howeversmall theymightbe. But the demise of the Hansa
also proceeded along anotherdimensionof mutualempowerment
and mutual
recognition.The Hansa-nonterritorialin nature,withonly a weaklyestablished hierarchy,and fraughtwith free riding-did not fit a systemof
demarcatedstates where sovereignscould crediblynegotiateon
territorially
behalfofthemembersof theirsocieties.
City-statesand fragmentedsovereignty
City-statesshared characteristicsof both sovereignterritorialstates and
looked somewhatlike leagues in thatthey
city-leagues.Internally,city-states
lacked the clear internalhierarchyof sovereignterritorialstates. Indeed,
CharlesTillydescribesbothsuchurbanorganizationsas fragmented
sovereignties.86When the two hundredto three hundredindependentcommunesof
northernItaly graduallywere incorporatedinto about a dozen largercitystates,theyweregiveninferiorstatus,roughlysimilarto thatofcolonies.87Such
subjugatedtowns,however,retainedmuch autonomy.Accordingto Giorgio
were leftto cities-a distribution
of power
Chittolini,"Large responsibilities
thatsome historianshave called a diarchy."88
theinhabitantsofthesubjugatedcitiesdid notenjoythebenefits
Conversely,
that derived frombeing a citizen of such dominantcities as Venice and
Florence.89When threatenedby foreignpowers,the subjugatedtownsoften
84. In otherwords,theyexercisedexitratherthan loyalty.See AlbertHirschman,Exit,Voice,
and Loyalty(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1970).
85. For this institutionalmimicry,
see Barraclough,Originsof Modem Germany,pp. 279 and
342-52; and Holborn,A History
ofModemGermany,
pp. 34-36 and 57.
86. Charles Tilly, Coercion,Capital, and European States,AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell,1990),p. 21.
87. For the earlyhistotyof thesecommunes,see Daniel Waley,TheItalian City-Republics
(New
York: McGraw-Hill,1969).
88. The quotationis drawnfromp. 699 of GiorgioChittolini,"Cities,City-States,
and Regional
States in North-CentralItaly," Theoryand Society18 (September 1989), pp. 689-706. Also see
Anderson,Lineages of theAbsolutistState, p. 152; Brian Pullan, ed., Crisisand Change in the
VenetianEconomyin theSixteenth
and Seventeenth
Centuries(London: Methuen,1968), p. 15; and
Jean-ClaudeHocquet, "Venise, Les Villes et les Campagnesde la TerrefermeXVe-XVIe siecles"
ofthemainlandin thefifteenth
and sixteenthcenturies"in
(Venice, and thetownsand countryside
NeithardBulst and Jean-PhilippeGenet, eds., La Ville,La Bourgeoisieet la Genese de L'Etat
Modeme(The city,thebourgeoisie,and thecreationof themodernstate) (Paris: CNRS, 1988),pp.
211-28.
89. For an expositionofthisinternalfragmentation,
see Eric Cochrane,FlorenceintheForgotten
Centuries1527-1800 (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1973), p. 65; Eric Cochrane,Italy
1530-1630 (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 46-47; Stuart Woolf,A Historyof Italy 1700-1860
(London: Methuen, 1979), pp. 57 and 63; and Frederic Lane, Venice:A MaritimeRepublic
(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,1973), p. 424.
548 InternationalOrganization
would favorforeignpowersover theirown dominantcity.The subjectcities
Consequentlythey
perceivedVenice as "the cityof threethousandtyrants."90
wereusuallygarrisonedbytroopsofthedominanttown.
This lack of internalunitycan be seen in the lack of rationalizationof
internaleconomies.Althoughmuch researchneeds stillto be done, particularlyon city-statesafterthe Renaissance, the evidence suggeststhat-not
unexpectedly,given these divisionsand lack of centralization-weightsand
did notoccur
late. Most standardization
measureswerestandardizedrelatively
The lack ofunityalso was visiblein thetensions
untilthe eighteenthcentury.91
betweencapitaland subjectcitieson economicmatters.For example,evidence
suggeststhatVenice deliberatelykept some industrieson its mainlandfrom
developingso as to preventcompetitionwithVenice itself.92
ofthedominant
was seen,withthecurrency
issues,less diversity
On currency
citybeing the one usually accepted throughoutthe city-state.Particularly,
stablecurrencysystem.93
Venice seemsto have establisheda relatively
however,remaineddiverse.Guilds, aristocLegal codes in the city-states,
racy, clergy,and the subject towns retained their own legal authority.
Jean-Claude Hocquet wrote that Venice "did not dream of issuing an
ordinancethatmighthave applied to theentirestate."94
In general,while in the course of the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies
stateswere on theirwayto rationalizingtheireconomies,
sovereignterritorial
the opposite tendencyseemed at workin Italy.Althoughthe various ruling
themselvesintoterritorial
had attemptedto transform
elitesof the city-states
states,theywere largelyunsuccessful.As Michael Knaptondescribes,Venice
took "no planned actionto create a moreeconomicallyintegratedregionwith
deliberatepolicies to favourfreerpatternsof internalflowof goods."95Italy
thus remainedplagued by "the survivalof innumerabletransitduties" and
dutiesand internalin
sufferedfromthe continuedexistenceof "protectionist
barriersto trade,"in StuartWoolfs words.96
Indeed, accordingto manyhistorians,the Italian city-statesrefeudalized.
into more inteblocked their transformation
Their internalfragmentation
grated and rationalizedeconomies. To again quote Woolf,feudal formsof
90. Denys Hay and JohnLaw, Italyin theAge of theRenaissance(London: Longman,1989), p.
261.
of the World,p. 289; Cochrane,Italy1530-1630,p. 183; and
91. See Braudel, The Perspective
ofItaly1700-1860,p. 208.
Woolf,A History
Venice(Cambridge,
and EconomicDecline in Seventeenth-Century
92. Richard Rapp, Industry
Press,1976),p. 160.
Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Republic,p. 427.
93. Lane, Venice:A Maritime
p. 210; and Woolf,A
94. See Hocquet, "Venise, Les Villes et les Campagnesde la Terreferme,"
ofItaly1700-1860,p. 64.
History
95. Michael Knapton,"CityWealth and State Wealth in NortheastItaly,Fourteenththrough
SeventeenthCenturies,"in Bulst and Genet, La Ville,La Bourgeoisieet la Genese de L'Etat
see Cochrane,Italy1530-1630,p. 9.
Modeme,p. 189. For a similarevaluationofFlorentineefforts,
96. Woolf,A HistoryofItaly1700-1860,pp. 52 and 59. See also Cochrane,Italy1530-1630,p.
183.
Institutional
selection 549
Indeed,
tenurebecame "obstacles to the possessionof fullpropertyrights."97
territorialdemarcationbetween such city-statesonce again became amorphous,sincefeudatoriesheld contiguousdomainsacrossborders.98
Externally,however,city-statesbehaved much like sovereignterritorial
states.They recognizedformalterritoriallimitsto theirjurisdiction-thatis,
they accepted borders-and routinized their diplomatic representation.99
While the subjugatedtownsretainedmuchlocal autonomy,as faras external
affairswere concernedthe dominantcitiesrepresentedthe entirecity-state.100
In other words,city-stateshad the means of establishingcredible commitments.101
thecity-states
died a slowdeath.While city-leagues
Unlike the city-leagues,
wereconsidered
city-states
wereunacceptableto theotheractorsin thesystem,
given that theywere
legitimatemembersof the internationalcommunity,
definedand providedclear focalpointsfornegotiation.Unlikethe
territorially
at odds with
was not inherently
the systemof rule of the city-state
city-league,
circumscribed
authority.
theprincipleofterritorially
however,the city-statessufferedfromsome of the same
Competitively,
problemsas the leagues, in thattheylacked internalunityand consequently
did notcome to
wereslowin rationalizing
theireconomies.Whiletheyformally
an end untiltheirincorporationby Napoleon, theirdecline had begun much
earlier.
Because sovereignterritorialstates were competitivelymore successful,
modelsforinspiration.When political
individualsturnedto thoseinstitutional
elites recognized the consequences of localism and the lack of economic
in theircity-states,
rulesof Frederick
theyturnedto the territorial
integration
and CatherinetheGreat as modelsworthyofemulation.102
In sum, some political and social actors will preferinstitutionsthat can
in theirinternaland externalenvironments.
Specificallyin
reduce uncertainty
commerce, actors will prefer organizationsthat reduce transactionand
didjust
information
costsand can preventexpostreneging.Sovereignauthority
that. Sovereign rulers centralized fragmentedpolitical systemsand thus
and domestictransactioncosts.As a consequence,by
reducedlegal uncertainty
97. Woolf,A History
ofItaly1700-1860,p. 51.
98. Cochrane,Italy1530-1630, p. 14. For similarassessmentsof the returnof feudalism,see
Woolf,AHistoryofItaly1700-1860,pp. 17-18; Knapton,"CityWealth and State Wealth,"p. 195;
and RuggieroRomano,"Italyin theCrisisoftheSeventeenthCentury,"in PeterEarle, ed.,Essays
in EuropeanEconomicHistory1500-1800(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),p. 193.
RenaissanceDiplomacy(New York: Dover, 1988),
99. See the discussionin GarrettMattingly,
firstpublishedin 1955.
100. Eugene Rice, The Foundationof Early Modem Europe 1460-1559 (New York: W. W.
Norton,1970),p. 115.
see F. H. Hinsley,
101. For the long-rundiplomaticsuccessesof some of the Italian city-states,
2d ed. (New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1986); and WilliamMcNeill, Venice:
Sovereignty,
ofChicago Press,1974).
TheHingeofEurope1081-1797(Chicago: University
102. Woolf,AHistory
ofItaly1700-1860,p. 85.
550 InternationalOrganization
preventingfree ridingand by rationalizingtheireconomies,such systemsof
rule were able graduallyto expand the level of resourcestheycould bringto
bear againstopponents.Unityand integratedeconomieswereprerequisitesfor
successinwar.
But sovereignauthoritiesalso reduced the problemsfacingtransboundary
trade by providingfor clear focal points throughwhich to negotiate.Such
rulers,moreover,could more crediblycommittheir subjects to long-term
agreements.Hence stateshad good reasons to preferlike units,thatis, other
sovereignterritorial
states,in theirenvironment.
Consequently,individualshad reasonsto mimicthosesuccessfulinstitutions
and to shiftloyalties.Individualsemulatedwhattheyperceivedto be successful
in orderto reduceuncertainty
and gain legitimacy.103
arrangements
A briefcomparisonwithalternativeaccounts
and the Hansa lay many
No doubtbehindthe declineof the Italian city-states
in oceanic shipcauses. Changingtrade routes,technologicalbreakthroughs
ping,evenmigrating
herring(in thecase of theHansa) have been suggestedas
causal variables.This essaydoes notdisavowtheimportanceofthosevariables.
Instead, it draws attentionto the internal and external consequences of
examinesthe Hansa and the
particulartypesof rule.Thus,whileit specifically
it means to suggestwhytheyas institutional
Italian city-states,
typeswere less
made themless successful-than soversuccessful-whytheircharacteristics
states.
eignterritorial
Are there alternativeindependentvariables that explain equally well the
generalnatureof unitchange in the European systembetweenroughly1300
and 1650? Given the anarchical nature of the internationalsystemand
consideringthefrequentoccurrenceof conflictin preindustrial
Europe, we do
well to ask howtheabove accountsquareswiththeprevalentviewthatchanges
inwarfarelayat theheartof stateformation.
Much of the discussionof thecauses of thefeudal-statetransformation
is at
cross-purposes.The questionof whetherwar made statescentersaround the
growthin extractivecapacities of government.Changes in warfarefavored
larger and more expensive armies, which necessitatedmore taxation and
That issue largelyhas been settled.Warfareindeed has
rationalgovernment.
had a profoundeffecton the growthof governmentand the influenceof
That is to say, when "state" denotes "formal
governmenton society.104
see Paul DiMaggio and WalterPowell,"The Iron
mimicry,
103. On the notionof institutional
Cage Revisited:InstitutionalIsomorphismand CollectiveRationalityin OrganizationalFields,"
AmericanSociologicalReview48 (April 1983), pp. 147-60. My thanksto Guy Peters and Stephen
thisargumentto myattention.
Krasnerforbringing
104. See, forexample,Karen Rasler and WilliamThomson,"War Makingand State Making:
GovernmentalExpenditures,Tax Revenue,and Global War,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview79
Institutional
selection 551
government"there is littledoubt that protractedconflicthas influencedthe
size and functionsofpublicauthority.
The questionexaminedbythisessay,though,is whydid thisparticularform
of state prevail.What preciselyabout a public authority
thatwas hierarchical
and spatiallydefinedcaused itto survivewhentheothertwotypesof authority,
seemed also quite viable? One mightargue that
city-leaguesand city-states,
because states were superior in waging war, defeated city-leaguesand
were absorbed into them.But such an account needs elaboration
city-states
and specification.For instance,the abilityto wage war itselfmust firstbe
explained.To argue thata particularinstitutional
form,thatis, the sovereign
territorial
form,was superiorat war begs the question.Whywas it superior?
Most accountsimplythatmilitary
superiority
was largelya functionofsize, and
in so doing,theyneglecttheconsequencesofinstitutional
characteristics.105
Some researchershave compared the institutionalefficiency
of different
territorialstates,by analyzingthe relativeefficiency
of similartypesof units.
BarryWeingastand Douglass North,forexample,have takena publicchoice
approachto investigate
whyEnglandwas able to raise capital at low rates,and
hencewage war at considerablyless costthanFrance.106
But thepresentarticle
is one of the firststudiesof the institutional
efficacy
of different
typesof units,
comparingterritorial
statesto theircontemporary
alternatives.
Second, since city-states
were at one time as powerfuland resourcefulas
sovereignstatesor even moreso, one mightask whystatessurvivedthatinitial
period.Indeed, in manycases therevenueof theItalian city-states
outstripped
thatof the emergingsovereignterritorial
states.And ifmoneyis the sinewof
power,thenduringthisperiodofmercenaryarmiestheanswerto thatquestion
is not straightforward.107
it is said thatmanyItalian townswere
Furthermore,
able to bringlarge armies to bear, even compared with France: by some
(June 1985), pp. 491-507; JohnBrewer,The Sinewsof Power (New York: AlfredKnopf,1989);
Michael Mann, States,War,and Capitalism(Cambridge:Blackwell,1988); WilliamMcNeill, The
Pursuitof Power (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982); Tilly, Coercion,Capital, and
EuropeanStates;and BrianDowning,TheMilitary
Revolution
and PoliticalChange(Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversity
Press,1992).
105. Oftenthese argumentsallude to military
and economicefficiencies
of scale. See Leonard
Dudley,"StructuralChange in InterdependentBureaucracies:Was Rome's Failure Economicor
Military?"Explorations
in EconomicHistory27 (April 1990),pp. 232-48; Bean, "War and theBirth
oftheNationState"; and Ames and Rapp, "The Birthand Death ofTaxes."
106. See Douglass Northand BarryWeingast,"Constitutionsand Commitment:
The Evolution
of InstitutionsGoverningPublic Choice in Seventeenth-Century
England,"Journalof Economic
49 (December 1989),pp. 803-32; Northand Thomas,RiseoftheWestemWorld;and North,
History
and ChangeinEconomicHistory.
Structure
107. For example,theDella Scala signoria,comprising
Parma,Lucca, and Modena, had a yearly
revenueofabout 700,000florinsin thebeginningofthefourteenth
Thiswas double thatof
century.
England at the time.See Reinhold Schumann,Italyin theLast FifteenHundredYears (Lanham,
Md.: UniversityPress of America, 1986), p. 116. The revenueof Venice and its Terra Ferma
aroundthe middleof the fifteenth
centurywas 60 percenthigherthanthatof France-more than
double thatof England or Spain. See Braudel, The Perspective
of the World,p. 120. See also the
estimatesin Knapton,"CityWealthand State Wealth."
552 InternationalOrganization
estimates Genoa could raise an army of fortythousand in 1295.108 The
Rhenish-Swabian League united about eighty-ninetowns to oppose their
feudaloverlordsin 1385. In 1377 a league of southernGermancitiesdefeated
againstwhomtheyhad allied,but also the
notonlythe CountofWurttemberg,
forcesof EmperorCharles IV when he chose to back the count. The Hansa
frequentlywaged war with Denmark, England, Holland, and Sweden. In
Fernand Braudel's estimate,initiallythe balance swung against territorial
Size was an imperfect
states.109
predictorof how the Darwinianprocesswould
thatinstitutional
mightmatterconsidefficiency
workand suggests,therefore,
erably.
Moreover, the abilityto wage war cannot explain why so many small
forceis the
territorial
statessurvived.If thepossessionofconsiderablemilitary
only explanation of which units survive,why did Germany-as well as
Italy-see the survivalof independentcitiesand miniatureprincipalitiesuntil
well into the nineteenthcentury?While city-leaguesand city-stateswere
such setbacksdid not lead to theirends as
occasionallydefeated militarily,
institutionaltypes.The Hansa's decline was slow and not premisedon any
withterritorialstatesdid
particularmilitarydefeat.Likewise,confrontations
not end thephenomenonof thecity-state.
the aggregatesize of politicalorganizationis not irrelevantAdmittedly,
small townscan hardlywield as muchforceas greatempiresno mattertheir
predictorof success.For example,
efficacy-butit is an imperfect
institutional
is sometimesexplainedbyreferenceto the
the declineof the Italian city-state
size of France and Spain,whichinvadedthe Italian peninsulain the sixteenth
century.Sovereignstateswere largerand hence could mobilizelargerarmies
and raise more revenue.However,those wishingto pursue that explanation
shouldrecall thatthe Republic of the Netherlands,a leadingpowerifnot the
hegemon of the seventeenthcentury,had as many citizens as Venice (1.5
million).Similarly,England,withonly40 percentof France's populationand
area underitscontrol,was able to matchFrance and Spain
muchless territorial
quite well. The Republic of the Netherlandsand England were able to fight
beforeacquiringempiresthemselves.In
empiresand largerstatessuccessfully
thatsuccesshas multipleexplanations,myparticushort,whileacknowledging
lar emphasis is the effectivenessand efficiencyof particularinstitutional
in mobilizingand rationalizingtheirdomesticeconomies.That
arrangements
in turnis an important
factorin determining
success.
military
Consequently,the approach here suggestsanswersto some of the puzzles
mentioned above. First, continued internal particularismmight partially
108. On the number of Genovese troops, see Scammel, The WorldEncompassed,p. 161.
thousandmen in 1550; see Cochrane,Florencein theForgotten
Florencefieldedabout twenty-four
Centuries,
p. 91. On the Rhenish-Swabianleague, see RhimanRotz, "GermanTowns,"in Joseph
Strayer,ed., Dictionaryof theMiddleAges,vol. 5 (New York: Charles Scribner,1985), p. 464. By
contrast,the Frenchstandingarmyafterthe end of the HundredYears War in the middleof the
fifteenth
centurynumberedabout fourteenthousand.
oftheWorld,p. 91.
109. Braudel,ThePerspective
Institutional
selection 553
explain the decline of Florence, Genoa, and other city-states.Second, in
thatselectionalso dependson whetheror nota unitis recognizedas
suggesting
legitimatebyotheractors,we have an explanationofwhysmallstatessurvived.
to sovereignterritorial
UnliketheHansa, theywerenot logicallycontradictory
rule."11
The approach taken here has, therefore,much in commonwiththe work
pioneered by North and Robert Thomas, by MargaretLevi, and by others.
Nevertheless,there are significantdifferences.First,NIH is susceptibleto
particularmethodologicalflaws.This articlehas triedto avoid some of those
existingalternative
pitfallsby lookingat competitionbetweensimultaneously
was an
institutions,
withoutsuggesting
thatanyof thosecompetinginstitutions
optimaloutcome.1"'A varietyof factorsintervenesbetweenpreferencesand
the creation of institutions.For example, second-ordercollective action
Moreover,dominant
problemsmaypreventthecreationof such an institution.
as theirprimary
social and politicalelitesalso need not have overallefficiency
emergencerequiresretracing
preference.A completeaccountof institutional
and the changesin relativepoweramongsocial actorsthat
theold institutions
enable themto pursue new institutional
choices, and analysisof the overall
change.That cannot
bargainstruckto createcoalitionsin favorof institutional
be done withinthe scope of this essay. I have looked only at the relative
of simultaneously
duringa specificperiod.
efficiency
competinginstitutions
selectionother
Second,thisarticledrawsattentionto aspectsof institutional
than Darwinian struggles.Competitivesuccess also depends on what actors
themselvesfindto be acceptable as a unit.Theyenforcetheirchoices through
recognitionof whichtypesof unitscan morecrediblycommitand hence form
deals.
preferablepartnersin international
to avoida tautologicaluse oftransactioncosts,thisarticlehas
Third,in trying
in a plausibleway.
triedto operationalizesuchcostsand crediblecommitments
I have definedtransactioncosts as the generalcostsof concludinganytypeof
contractin a given economy,ratherthan as the costs between ruler and
ruled.112
Fourth,I have extendedtransactioncostsand propertyrightsanalysisbythe
suggestionthatthese are heavilyinfluencedbywhetheror not a politicalunit
has a clear sovereignauthority
who has an incentiveto reduce such costs and
provide for protectionof such rights.That is, I have suggesteda specific
units.
independentvariableto accountforthevariationbetweendifferent
110. This notionof international
empowerment
also explainswhyAfricanstateshave persisted
despitetribaland irredentist
movements.For thatargument,see RobertJackson,"Quasi-States,
Dual Regimes, and Neo-classical Theory: InternationalJurisprudenceand the Third World,"
41 (Autumn1987),pp. 519-49.
IntemationalOrganization
111. Northarguesthatthe flawof suggestingoptimality
in outcomesexistedparticularly
in his
earlierwork.See Douglass North,Institutions,
Institutional
Change,and EconomicPerformance
(New York: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990), p. 7. For a discussionof thisproblem,also see
Moe, "New Economicsof Organization."
112. For the latteruse of transactioncosts,see Dudley,"StructuralChange in Interdependent
Bureaucracies";and Levi,OfRule and Revenue.
554 InternationalOrganization
Beforeconcluding,I mustnote thatI have notexaminedthequestionofwhy
states ultimatelyextended across the globe.113The focus has been narrow,
I do notclaim
lookingonlyat whystatesdisplacedotherEuropean institutions.
to have accountedfortheultimatedeclineof MingChina,TokugawaJapan,or
other imperialorganizations.However, the logic herein mightbe used to
that
extendthe argumentin thatdirection.For example,one could arguefirst,
exploit
no
actor
could
political
of
discrete
jurisdictions,
because oftheplurality
his or her subjectsto the same extentas imperialrulerscould. That is to say,
withina state system,predationis limitedbecause social actors have more
opportunityto exit that political systemand to seek refuge and better
ofJews
oftheHuguenotsand themigration
elsewhere.The flight
environments
fromAntwerpto Amsterdamare but two such examples;while the reasons
behindeach reason are complex,clearlybothmovementshad large economic
repercussions.Even Frenchabsolutismwas limitedin scope.114
Second, the developmentof the individualstateswas drivenbytheveryfact
An isolationistpolicysuch
and competitively.
thatstatesinteractedfrequently
as thatpursuedbyTokugawaJapansimplywas impossible.Competitiondrove
innovation.115
internaldevelopmentand institutional
Third,one mightexamineto whatextentsuchempireswerecompatiblewith
a systemof de jure equivalent actors. Since empires deny others such
equivalence,stateactorswouldhave an incentiveto prefersimilarinstitutional
elsewhere.
arrangements
Conclusionand implications
Why then did sovereignterritorialstates "win out" over rival institutional
forms?The answer advanced here lies along three dimensions.One causal
authority
Sovereignterritorial
efficiency.
variablewas competitiveinstitutional
rivalsdue to its internalstructure.While
provedsuperiorto itscontemporary
rivalformsof organizationinitiallymighthave controlledmore resources,in
the long run sovereign authorityproved to be better at combatingthe
Such rule could take the formof absolutist
of feudal authority.
fragmentation
as in England,but in all
governmentas in France or of a king-in-parliament
cases authority
was centralized.Polities such as the Republic of the Netherlands,whichlacked a formalsovereign,made up forthatlack by the de facto
113. For a comparisonbetween the competitivestate systemand non-European autarkic
empires,see Hall, Powersand Liberties;and John Hall, ed., States in History(Oxford: Basil
Blackwell,1986).
114. See David Parker,TheMakingofFrenchAbsolutism(New York: St. Martin'sPress,1983),
forthe argumentthatFrenchabsolutismwas paradoxicallyquite weak vis-a-visthe multitudeof
social actors.Robin Briggsnotes how monarchswere constrainedin the level of debasement,as
this would weaken their "internationalposition." See Robin Briggs,Early Modern France
Press,1977),p. 44.
1560-1715(New York: OxfordUniversity
115. As JohnHall pointsout,thatargumentalreadyhad been made byGibbon.Hall, Powersand
p. 14.
Liberties,
selection 555
Institutional
hegemonyof one city,Amsterdam,whichproduced much of Dutch revenue
ran the country.In the long run,however,the lack of formal
and effectively
centralgovernment
hurteven theDutch.1"6
institutionalized
In addition,territorialdemarcationof jurisdictionwithinternalhierarchy
proved to be an effectiveway of structuringinternationalrelations. By
withotherunits,sovereignrulersprovided
monopolizingexternalinteractions
focal pointsthroughwhichto regularizeinternationalrelations.This second
efficiency
goes hand in hand withthe first.The less the
aspect of institutional
the greaterthe abilityto mobilizesocietyand prevent
politicalfragmentation,
defectionand free riding.This in turnyielded a greaterabilityto commit
gains.
statescould achievelong-term
credibly.Hence sovereignterritorial
Third, sovereignterritorialstates proved mutuallycompatible. Indeed,
bordersare explicitagreementson respectivespheresofjurisdiction.Statesare
Bytheirspatial
de jure equivalent,althoughde facto,of course,theyare not.117
delimitation,they recognize that there is no logical necessitywhy such
formsof organiauthoritiesshouldencroachupon one another.Nonterritorial
zation such as the city-leaguethenor pan-Arabismtodayare logicallyat odds
withsovereignstatehood.118
Fourth, once the benefitsof internal centralizationand the abilityof
sovereignterritorialstates to engage in longer-termcommitmentsto one
or defectto
anotherbecame clear, actorsbegan to imitatesuch institutions
them.
This account of how and whysovereignterritorialstates displaced other
institutional
typesmightshed some lighton the questionofwhythe sovereign
territorial
statecontinuesto existgiventhe apparenttensionbetweenspatially
definedauthorityand the increasingly
nonspatialnatureof the international
Put another way, why have states become, and why do they
economy.119
unitsof the internationalsystemdespite the
continueto be, the constitutive
factthatthelevelof economicinteractionhas increasedso much?120
116. For a discussionoftheDutch case, see C. R. Boxer,TheDutchSeabomeEmpire1600-1800
(London: Penguin,1965), pp. 119 and 328; and R. J. Holton, Cities,Capitalism,and Civilization
(London: Allen and Unwin,1986),p. 108.
see David Held, PoliticalTheoryand theModem State(Stanford,Calif.:
117. For the difference,
Press,1989),chap. 8.
StanfordUniversity
of Islam and statehood,see JamesPiscatori,
views about the compatibility
118. For different
Press,1986).
(New York: CambridgeUniversity
Islam in a WorldofNation-States
119. The earlyindependenceliteraturein emphasizingtransnationalrelationsbelow the state
rule and the nonspatial
level can be read as describingthe tensionbetweensovereignterritorial
characteroftheglobal economy.See RobertKeohane and JosephNye,Powerand Interdependence
(Boston: LittleBrown and Company,1977). See also Robert Reich, The Workof Nations(New
York: AlfredKnopf,1991). Porterargues thatthe state is stillrelevant,but onlyin termsof an
ofNations(New York: Free
aggregationof sectors.See Michael Porter,TheCompetitiveAdvantage
Press, 1990). For the developmenttoward trulytransnationalorganization,see Christopher
Bartlettand Sumantra Ghoshal, ManagingAcross Borders(Boston: Harvard UniversityPress,
1989).
and Beyond:Problematizing
120. This issue is raised explicitlyin JohnRuggie,"Territoriality
47 (Winter1993),pp. 139-74.
Modernityin InternationalRelations,"IntemationalOrganization
556 International
Organization
This articlesuggestsa partialanswerto thatquestion.Politicalentrepreneursandsocialgroupshadgoodreasonstoprefer
a system
ofsovereign
states:
andpredictability
inboththeir
suchunitscreatedsomemeasureofregularity
The principle
ofterritoridomestic
economiesand in international
relations.
within
whichwassovereign
thoseborders,
delineated
authority,
allydelimited
whatwas to be "domestic"and what"international.121
Onlythoseformsof
thatwerebasedon suchdistinctions
by
wererecognized
politicalorganization
otheractors.Despitethe much-lamented
existenceof sovereign
territorialthatmakes
international
relations
ity,'22it is in facta methodof structuring
interactions
more predictableand regularized.In game theoreticterms,
statescouldplayiterative
sovereign
territorial
games,atwhichotherunitswere
less adept,precisely
becauseothers'governments
couldnotcredibly
commit
theconfederated
natureof city-leagues
made themparticularly
themselves;
suspect.
The previousargument
fromtheGrotianpositionadvancedby
thusdiffers
HedleyBullandothers.123
Thatistosay,I do notcontendthatterritorial
states
butthattheparticular
international
createa particular
internal
society
makeup
of the sovereign
of a unit,specifically
territorial
state,had externalconsethe particular
of theunit
quences.In the Grotianargument
characteristics
The Grotianargument
largelyare irrelevant.
is a sociological
one in thatit
rules.
explainshowunitsactwithin
a givensetofintersubjective
of
the
Although lack government
clearlyis a fundamental
problemof
international
realistpositionthat
relations,I disagreewiththe structural
andthedistribution
certainpatterns
oforderareimposedonlybyhierarchy
of
of powerin the systemimposescertain
Justas the distribution
power.'24
behaviorson actors,so the dominanttypesof unithave consequencesfor
ina given
andconflict.
cooperation
Indeed,whichtypeofunitgainsdominance
who is to countas an international
era itselfdetermines
actorin the first
place. Thus,whichever
unitof the
typeof unitbecomesthe constitutive
at a giventimedetermines
tobe an
international
whomwe understand
system
andwhomweconsider
a domestic
international
actoroperating
underanarchy
121. This issue has been well-describedbyKratochwil,"Of Systems,Boundaries,and Territoriality"; J. L. Holzgrefe,"The Origins of Modern InternationalRelations Theory," ReviewOf
International
Studies15 (January1989),pp. 11-26; and JohnRuggie,"Continuit and Transformationin theWorldPolity,"in RobertKeohane, ed., Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: Columbia
University
Press,1986),pp. 131-157.
122. For example,WrightcitesArnoldBrecht'sviewthatthe anarchyof the statesystemis the
primarycause of armed conflict:"There is a cause of wars betweensovereignstatesthatstands
above all others-the factthatthere are sovereignstates,and a verygreatmanyof them." See
of ChicagoPress,1942) p. 896.
QuincyWright,AStudyof War,vol. 2 (Chicago: University
123. HedleyBull, TheAnarchicalSociet (New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1977).
124. Realists such as Robert Gilpin have suggestedthatthe mostfundamentaltypeof system
changeis changein the typeof units, but therehas been littleresearchon whatthe effectsofsuch
change are. See Gilpin, War and Change in WorldPolitics,pp. 41-42; and Peter Katzenstein,
"InternationalRelationsTheoryand the Analysisof Change," in Czempiel and Rosenau, Global
Changesand Theoretical
Challenges,pp. 291-304.
Institutional
selection 557
Sovereigngovernmentworks as a gateactor operatingunder hierarchy.125
keeper.
This essay,therefore,providesan empiricaland materialexplanationof a
but not explained.Given that
facetthatstructuration
theoryhas highlighted
the natureof a systemneeds to be accountedforby the actionsof its agents
(i.e., states),we need to explainwhystatesempoweredonlylike units-other
states.AlexanderWendtarguesthatsinceindividualdiscreteunitsare takenas
approach...
given,"themostimportant
weaknessofneorealism'sindividualist
is thatitfailsto providea basis fordevelopingan explicittheoryofthestate."126
This essay contendsthattherewere materialreasons foragentsto empower
only similartypes of units,thus creatinga structurethat severelylimited
subsequentpossibilitiesforothertypesofunits.
The notionthateveryinternationalactorhad to have some formof internal
of what was
hierarchyand externaldemarcationalso led to a determination
"private"and what"public."As JaniceThomsonhas shown,actorsclassifiedas
system.For example,piracywas
privatewere disallowedintothe international
fora longtimea perfectly
legitimatepolicyforsovereignstates,butitgradually
was disallowedbecause itdid notfitthemoldofinternalhierarchy
and external
demarcation.Were pirates subjects of territorialstates and hence private
of theirsovereign?Or were theyactors
actorssubjectto the public authority
in the state systemand hence had to be weeded
who worked interstitially
out?127The same held true for mercenaries.Sovereign territorialstates
graduallyphased out theiruse.128The use offorcebynonstateactorsdid notfit
the territorialmode of authoritywherebyinternationalrelationswere conductedbysovereigngovernments.
of internaland externalrealmscontinuesas a constitutive
The specification
rule of internationalaffairs.It is exactlybecause a state systemis an ordering
in anotherstate'saffairs.That is,
devicethatone stateis reluctantto interfere
withautonomy.Since stateshave been one wayof
we have equated sovereignty
orderinginternationalrelations,ethnic and irredentistmovementsdefine
themselvesas statistin theirintent.With the possible exceptionof Islamic
movementsdefinethemselvesin the termsof the internafundamentalism,
tionalstatesystemin orderto be recognizedbytheothermembers.Theyclaim
ruleofthe
international
legitimacy
based on theiradherenceto theconstitutive
system-sovereignterritoriality.
betweenunits.
125. This correspondswithwhat Ruggiedescribesas the mode of individuation
and Beyond."
See Ruggie,"Territoriality
Problemin InternationalRelationsTheory,"
126. AlexanderE. Wendt,"The Agent-Structure
41 (Summer1987), pp. 335-70 and p. 342 in particular.Ashleymakesa
IntemationalOrganization
perspective.See RichardAshley,"The PovertyofNeorealism,"
similarpointfroma poststructural
pp. 255-300.
in Keohane,Neorealismand Its Critics,
127. See Janice Thomson, "Sovereigntyin Historical Perspective:The Evolution of State
ControloverExtraterritorial
Violence," in JamesCaporaso, ed., TheElusiveState(NewburyPark,
Calif.: Sage, 1989), pp. 227-54. See also Ritchie's account of Captain Kidd in Robert Ritchie,
Press,1986).
thePirates(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
CaptainKiddand theWarAgainst
128. JaniceThomson,"State Practices,InternationalNorms,and theDecline ofMercenarism,"
34 (March 1990),pp. 23-48.
IntemationalStudiesQuarterly