Month in Review
News and Developments in Executive Liability and Insurance
November 2010 Volume 7
Financial Services Group, Legal & Claims Practice
A Division of Aon Risk Services, Inc.
Inside
 Cases of Interest
page 3
 SEC Filings and
Settlements
page 6
 Shareholder Class
Action Filings,
Settlements, and
Dismissals
page 7
Cases of
Interest
 An Insurer’s Duty to
Defend Is Triggered
if Allegations Give
Rise to the
Possibility
of Coverage
 Coverage Denied in
Crime Policy Due to
Late Notice
 No Coverage for
Claim Reported
Two Years after
Claim was “First
Made” and More
Than One Year after
Expiration of a
“Claims Made and
Reported” Policy
 Insurer Is Precluded
from Recouping
$15M D&O
Settlement Payment
Two Years after
the Fact
GENERAL NEWS
Pfizer Settles Derivative Suit; Insurance Funding Corporate Governance Reforms
Pfizer, Inc. (Pfizer) investors filed a shareholders’
derivative lawsuit against the company, as a
nominal defendant, and 19 of the company’s
directors and officers, alleging the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to detect
and prevent illegal marketing related to Pfizer’s
$2.3 billion settlement of charges that it had
engaged in off-label marketing of Bextra and
other drugs. The parties in the derivative suit
entered into a $75 million settlement agreement,
subject to court approval. In the settlement, Pfizer
and the other defendants agreed to create a
Regulatory and Compliance Committee to report
to the company’s board and take appropriate
steps to prevent future drug marketing violations.
One of the components making this settlement
unusual is the manner by which the committee’s
activities are to be funded. As part of the
settlement, a pool of funds—to be financed
entirely by insurance—will be used to pay for the
committee’s activities for five years. Under the
settlement stipulation, four of the company’s D&O
insurers “shall pay a total of $75 million into an
escrow account under the control of Pfizer.” After
payment of fees and expenses, the remaining
escrow funds “shall be subject to the exclusive
control of the Regulatory Committee for funding
activities of the Regulatory Committee for its initial
five years.” If the committee spends more than
the funds available, Pfizer will make up the
difference. If the committee spends less than the
remaining funds, unspent amounts will be
returned to the insurers. The insurers include
Illinois National Insurance Company, Twin City
Fire Insurance Company, Zurich American
Insurance Company, and Corporate Officers and
Directors Assurance, Ltd. (CODA). A further
provision of the settlement stipulation specifies
that the settlement contribution by CODA (the
fourth insurer) is subject to arbitration. Pfizer may
have to pay CODA up to $20 million depending
on the outcome of the arbitration. In addition, an
exhibit to the settlement stipulation indicates the
plaintiffs’ lawyers will seek attorneys’ fees of
$22 million plus costs of $1.9 million, which will
be funded by the $75 million. If the plaintiffs are
awarded the full amount of fees and costs sought,
the net funds remaining of the original $75 million
would be $51.1 million. Typically, derivative
settlements include some type of governance
reforms to be implemented within the corporate
entity. What is unusual about this arrangement is
that, among other things, there is a specific
amount of money to be set aside to fund the
compliance reforms to which the company has
agreed as part of a derivative settlement. What is
even more unusual, and arguably unprecedented,
is that the funds to be set aside for these activities
are to be provided for exclusively by the
company’s D&O insurers.
Study Finds Stock Performance Varies after the Filing of Class Action Lawsuits
Rob Bauer and Robin Braun, of Maastricht
University in the Netherlands, studied shareholder
litigation and reviewed a considerable amount of
research on securities class actions to determine
what class actions are actually trying to
accomplish. They released a paper entitled
Misdeeds Matter: Long-Term Stock Performance
after the Filing of Class Action Lawsuits. The
Month in Review— November 2010  1
GENERAL NEWS (CONT.)
The results of the study
indicated a very clear
trend; it was only in cases
where managers were
“accused of illegal insider
trading does the stock
price show above-market
returns in the postdisciplining phase.”
authors begin with an interesting premise—that
shareholder class actions are a corporate
governance tool investors can use to discipline
the managers in charge of their assets. Does
shareholder litigation pay off for investors over the
long term? How much does the type of allegation
matter? The authors studied whether a
disciplining effect occurs for sued companies and
their managers examining two different groups of
allegations: 1) cases wherein managers breached
their duty of care; and 2) cases wherein managers
breached their duty of loyalty, a more serious
offense as managers put their personal interests
ahead of shareholders. The results of the study
indicated a very clear trend; it was only in cases
where managers were “accused of illegal insider
trading does the stock price show above-market
returns in the post-disciplining phase.” The
authors found a slight improvement with
companies accused of accounting fraud, which
they found might be attributable to a welldocumented method of cutting costs and
conducting asset sales of high earning companies
that manipulated the books to maintain the
abnormal growth rates. On the other hand, the
stock prices for companies tended to waft in
instances where millions were paid to settle the
case. The authors concluded that theoretically,
companies might have an incentive to improve
corporate governance when threatened with a
lawsuit, but the incentive is mitigated by the fact
that most corporations consider these suits to
be: 1) random landmines without merit; 2) avoided
if possible; 3) settled if necessary; and 4) of little
bearing on the underlying governance of
the company.
Elements in Financial Reform Missing from Dodd-Frank Act
According to Kane, the
Dodd-Frank Act can be
considered a treatment
plan, and the success of
any treatment plan
depends on how
thoroughly the
targeted problems
have been diagnosed.
Edward Kane, a professor at Boston College and
one of the leading experts on American banking,
regulation, and risk, authored a paper entitled
Missing Elements in U.S. Financial Reform: a
Kubler-Ross Interpretation of the Inadequacy of
the Dodd-Frank Act. According to Kane, the
Dodd-Frank Act can be considered a treatment
plan, and the success of any treatment plan
depends on how thoroughly the targeted
problems have been diagnosed. Kane doggedly
strips away what he views as the “elements of
denial” in the legislation. First, the bill emphasizes
that risk management errors stemmed from
private players, while ignoring the government’s
failures. Second, the bill ignores the misaligned
incentives of regulators. Third, the bill ignores
continuing incentives to create loopholes and
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage (the
simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset in
order to profit from a difference in the price). Kane
states the securitization pre-crisis can be traced
to incentive conflict that allowed national safety
nets to subsidize leveraged risk-taking. Safety-net
subsidies encouraged regulation-induced
innovations, enabling firms to take risks that are
hard to monitor and politically, administratively,
and economically difficult for government officials
to oversee. Kane states that the Dodd-Frank
strategy of reform does not adequately acknowledge or address these conflicts, indicating that a
critical requirement would be to develop an
effective statistical structure for measuring the
“ex-ante value of safety-net support in the
aggregate and at individual institutions.” Kane
believes that to accomplish this, government and
industry should: 1) reconsider the informational
obligations that insured financial institutions and
their regulators owe to taxpayers as investors;
and 2) change the way information on industry
balance sheets and risk exposures is reported,
verified and used. Kane opines that without
reforms in the practical duties imposed on
industry and governmental officials, and reforms
in the way these duties are enforced, financial
safety nets will continue to expand. This expansion will then undermine financial strength and
stability by generating large rewards for creative
and aggressive risk-takers clever enough to
cash in their share of safety-net benefits before
they evaporate.
Month in Review— November 2010  2
CASES OF INTEREST
An Insurer’s Duty to Defend Is Triggered if Allegations Give Rise to the
Possibility of Coverage
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit
reversed the district
court’s decision and ruled
in favor of Goerner on
the issue of Axis’s
duty to defend.
In this case, Frederick Rick Goerner appealed
the district court’s decision in favor of Axis
Reinsurance Company (Axis). The district court
found that Axis had no duty to defend Goerner
against a suit brought by Manuchehr Neshat
(Neshat) under a D&O policy purchased by
Goerner’s former employer, TransDimension, Inc.
(TransDimension). The lower court concluded
that the duty to defend provision of the policy was
not triggered because the underlying complaint
did not specifically allege Goerner acted in his
capacity as TransDimension’s CEO, but rather,
asserted that he acted on behalf of two other
companies in the same industry. The 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Axis issued a
D&O policy requiring it to defend and indemnify
claims against TransDimension officers for “any
actual or alleged error” committed by an insured
individual “in [his] capacity as such.” Goerner
contended the actions alleged in the underlying
complaint were taken in his capacity as CEO of
TransDimension, and he was entitled to a
defense. Axis argued that, because the complaint
did not specifically allege that Neshat’s losses
resulted from actions Goerner took in his capacity
as CEO of TransDimension, the policy was not
triggered, and Axis was relieved of its duty to
defend. Initially, the court noted “[t]he determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend is
usually made in the first instance by comparing
the allegations of the complaint with the terms of
the policy.” The court then noted that the guiding
consideration is whether “the insured would
reasonably expect a defense by the insurer.”
Finally, the court emphasized that it “will not
sanction a construction of the insurer’s language
that will defeat the very purpose or object of the
insurance.” The appellate court referenced
California law stating that an insured can
establish a duty to defend by proving the
existence of the potential for coverage, and
rejected the contention made by Axis that it had
no duty to defend because the underlying
complaint failed to allege that Goerner engaged in
wrongdoing while acting in his official capacity.
The court noted that the underlying complaint
alleged sufficient facts giving rise to the possibility
of coverage on two grounds: 1) Goerner established that TransDimension had potential or
actual business dealings with all the persons and
companies named in the Neshat complaint; and
2) the Neshat complaint included allegations that
“TransDimension’s Board of Directors authorized
and paid for Goerner’s travels to meet with two of
those companies in Asia, which was a key factual
component of at least one cause of action.”
Therefore, Axis had a duty to defend Goerner
under the D&O policy. Accordingly, the 9th Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision and ruled in
favor of Goerner on the issue of Axis’s duty to
defend. Goerner v. AXIS Reinsurance Co., 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 21624 (9th Cir).
Coverage Denied in Crime Policy Due to Late Notice
A court dismissed a coverage suit brought by
Omega Advisors Inc. (Omega) accusing Federal
Insurance Company (Federal) of wrongfully
denying coverage for $5 million in losses Omega
suffered through the malfeasance of a senior
Omega employee who “engaged in serious
wrongdoing” in connection with Omega’s overseas investments. In 2004, this employee pled
guilty to criminal charges that he violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In 2005, the U.S.
government unsealed the information in which the
employee had pled guilty. In February 2006,
Omega filed a civil action against its employee
alleging fraud, breach of contract, and breach of
fiduciary duty. In August 2007, Omega notified
Federal of the loss. Federal denied coverage,
arguing that Omega should have provided notice
to Federal at the time it filed its civil suit against its
employee. Omega was insured under a Financial
Institution Bond issued by Federal that was in
Month in Review— November 2010  3
CASES OF INTEREST (CONT.)
Because Omega
discovered its loss during
the bond period but did
not report the loss to
Federal until 2007, the
court held that the loss is
excluded from coverage
under the bond.
force from April 13, 2005 to April 13, 2006. The
discovery of loss under Federal’s bond provided
that discovery “occurs at the earlier of an officer of
the ASSURED being aware of: 1) facts which may
subsequently result in a loss of a type covered by
this Bond, or 2) an actual or potential claim…
regardless of when the act or acts causing or
contributing to such loss occurred, even though
the…exact amount or details or loss may not then
be known.” The court held that Omega “had
knowledge of facts sufficient to charge its
employee with fraud and dishonesty in federal
court in February 2006.” As such, the court found
that Omega discovered its loss no later than
February 2006. According to the court, having
discovered the loss in February 2006, the loss is
covered under the bond period of April 13, 2005
to April 13, 2006. Since the bond expressly
excludes from coverage “loss not reported to
[Federal] in writing within sixty (60) days after
termination of this bond as an entirety,” coverage
was available for losses that were discovered
during the bond period and reported to Federal by
June 12, 2006. Because Omega discovered its
loss during the bond period but did not report the
loss to Federal until 2007, the court held that the
loss is excluded from coverage under the bond.
Omega Advisors, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 125934, (N.J. Nov. 2010).
No Coverage for Claim Reported Two Years after Claim Was “First Made” and
More Than One Year after Expiration of a “Claims Made and Reported” Policy
The court refused to
permit HCC “to
retroactively amend its
policy by trying to infer a
recoupment right
or attempt to circumvent
the policy’s terms by
invoking restitution.”
Twin City Fire Insurance Company (Twin City)
issued a number of liability policies to Emissions
Technology, Inc. (ETI) over a period of several
years. The 2006 policy, which covered ETI from
May 10, 2006 to May 10, 2007, was the focal
point of Twin City’s lawsuit. In October 2006,
during the 2006 policy term, ETI received notice
of a lawsuit filed by a former officer and director,
Gordon Pardy. The lawsuit alleged claims
apparently covered by the 2006 policy. ETI,
however, did not report the Pardy claim to Twin
City until November 2008—a delay of more than
two years from the time it first received notice,
and approximately 18 months following the
expiration of the 2006 policy. Twin City denied
coverage for the Pardy suit due to late reporting,
among other reasons. The policy’s declarations
provided that “coverage applies only to a claim
first made against the policyholder during the
policy period…[and] notice of a claim must be
given to the insurer as soon as practicable,
provided that such notice is given not later than
60 days after any manager becomes aware that
such claim has been made.” Importantly, policy
Endorsement No.1 specified that “[a]s a condition
precedent to coverage under this policy, the
Insureds shall give the Insurer written notice of
any Claim as soon as practicable, but in no event
later than sixty (60) days after the termination of
the Policy Period, or Extended Reporting Period.”
Twin City argued “the 2006 Policy is a strict
‘claims made’ policy meaning that under Arizona
law, untimely reported claims are simply not
covered, even if the insurer suffered no prejudice
from the reporting delay.” ETI conceded the 2006
policy was a “claims made” policy, but nonetheless contended that courts outside of Arizona
drew distinctions between “claims made” policies
that required notice “as soon as practicable,”
and “claims made and reported” policies that
required notice during the policy period or a
definitive time thereafter. To this end, ETI argued
that other jurisdictions require insurers to show
“prejudice” to deny coverage for late notice and
implored the court to adopt a similar approach.
The court declined to accept ETI’s invitation
because policy Endorsement No.1 rendered it a
“claims made and reported” policy “in any event–
which…requires no showing of prejudice to deny
coverage for late notice.” The court then quickly
dispensed of ETI’s argument that policy Endorsement No.1 was somehow a “bad-faith ‘burying’ of
important terms” because the notice provision
was amended by endorsement. The court
stressed that the endorsement contained a
boldface provision advising “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ
IT CAREFULLY.” Accordingly, the court held that
there is no coverage for the Pardy lawsuit
reported two years after the claim was first made
and more than one year after expiration of a
“claims made and reported” policy. Emissions
Technology, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117926 (D. Ariz. 2010).
Month in Review— November 2010  4
CASES OF INTEREST (CONT.)
Insurer Is Precluded from Recouping $15M D&O Settlement Payment Two Years
after the Fact
The court refused to
permit HCC “to
retroactively amend its
policy by trying to infer a
recoupment right
or attempt to circumvent
the policy’s terms by
invoking restitution.”
In 1998, Sprint Nextel Corporation’s (Sprint)
shareholders approved a reclassification of thenexisting common stock to create two separate
stocks that tracked Sprint’s traditional wireline
service (FON) and its wireless business (PCS).
At that time, Sprint shareholders gave the
company’s board of directors full authority, at
any time after 2002, to recombine the tracking
stocks in a manner that was fair to both classes
of shareholders. In February 2004, the board
unanimously voted to recombine the FON and
PCS tracking stocks, with each share of PCS
stock being converted into one-half share of FON
stock. On February 29, 2004, Sprint notified its
shareholders that, effective April 23, 2004, the
tracking stocks would be recombined by the
issuance of additional FON shares to PCS
shareholders, thereby leaving FON stock as the
sole surviving equity ownership instrument. As a
result, in early March 2004, certain Sprint shareholders filed various class action lawsuits against
Sprint and 14 of its directors and officers, claiming
that Sprint’s directors “breached their…fiduciary
duties in setting the Conversion Ratio,” which
they alleged “greatly under-valued PCS shares.”
They sought “money damages to compensate
them for the loss of value to their PCS shares.”
At the time, Sprint maintained a D&O insurance
program providing $100 million in policy limits in
several policy layers, with a $25 million
deductible. Zurich American Insurance Company
(Zurich) issued the primary policy and provided
$15 million in coverage. American Casualty
Company (CNA) and Houston Casualty Company
(HCC) issued policies in sequential excess layers,
each providing $15 million of coverage. The CNA
and HCC policies “follow form” and generally
incorporated the terms of the Zurich policy.
After a series of mediation rounds in 2007, the
parties to the shareholder litigation agreed to a
$57.5 million settlement, which was funded by
Sprint’s $10 million payment of the remaining
deductible, as well as full $15 million contributions
from Zurich, CNA and HCC. The fourth level
excess carrier contributed the remaining balance.
In written correspondence dated July 26, 2007,
HCC agreed to pay its limit and “reserve[d] its
rights to deny coverage and seek repayment.”
The carriers ultimately funded their respective
contributions toward the settlement and on
December 12, 2007, the court entered final
judgment in the shareholder litigation. For nearly
two and one-half years, HCC failed to communicate with Sprint concerning any potential
reimbursement claim. By the end of 2008, HCC
had decided not to sue Sprint for recoupment of
its settlement contribution and closed its claim
files. In December 2009, HCC learned of a recent
opinion from Massachusetts federal court,
Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (reported in
October 2010 Month in Review), wherein D&O
insurance did not cover amounts Genzyme paid
to settle the claims of individuals who asserted
they had received inadequate consideration in an
exchange for their tracking shares of an internal
Genzyme division. Consequently, HCC reopened
its claim file and initiated coverage litigation. HCC
construed the shareholder settlement as a
delayed payment of a preexisting corporate
obligation, which, HCC argued, is not an insurable
loss. HCC also argued that the settlement it paid
on Sprint’s behalf cannot be considered a loss
under the generally accepted meaning of that
term in the policy. The court rejected HCC’s
argument that the settlement merely represented
a preexisting obligation. To this end, the court
reasoned, “it is no understatement to say that one
of the principal reasons for D&O insurance is to
cover D&Os when they are alleged to have
breached such preexisting obligations. The mere
existence of generalized obligations to follow the
law and honor one’s fiduciary duty does not
render uninsurable a lawsuit alleging that
corporate directors failed to do so.” The court also
rejected HCC’s contention that there is a general
public policy against insuring this type of
settlement because HCC only decided to file its
recoupment action after Genzyme, “a case of first
impression,” was published. To the contrary,
Kansas public policy “favors enforcement of D&O
insurance policies” and HCC failed to pinpoint any
basis to support restitution or recoupment of the
Month in Review— November 2010  5
CASES OF INTEREST (CONT.)
settlement payment. The court recognized that
even though the D&O policy allows the insurer to
seek repayment of defense costs if those costs
were not covered, “there is no basis under the
policies for an insurer to make a settlement
advance and later to seek its return.” The court
refused to permit HCC “to retroactively amend its
policy by trying to infer a recoupment right or
attempt to circumvent the policy’s terms by
invoking restitution.” Although HCC may have
made its payment “grudgingly,” there “can be no
question that the payment was made voluntarily.”
Importantly, HCC’s settlement payment was not
based upon “fraud, duress or mistake of fact,”
which might justify setting a prior settlement aside
and requiring a restoration of funds. Finally, the
court found HCC had no excuse for why it
delayed filing its recoupment action for nearly two
years after the matter settled. Accordingly, HCC
cannot recover the $15 million it paid out to Sprint
to help fund the shareholder class action settlement under the terms of its policy. Houston
Cas. Co., v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124302 (E.D. Vir. 2010).
SEC FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS
Filings

The SEC filed insider trading charges against
The SEC settled charges
of FCPA violations against
Noble Corporation, and
ordered the company to
pay disgorgement of
$4,294,933 and
prejudgment interest
of $1,282,065.
Arnold McClellan, former partner of Deloitte Tax
LLP (Deloitte). The complaint alleged that
McClellan provided information regarding at least
seven confidential acquisitions planned by
Deloitte’s clients. According to the complaint,
McClellan, while serving as head of one of
Deloitte’s merger and acquisition teams, had
access to highly confidential information and
provided tax and other advice to Deloitte’s clients
that were considering corporate acquisitions. The
SEC is seeking disgorgement, prejudgment
interest, and penalties.

The SEC filed fraud charges against two former
executives of LocatePlus Holdings Corporation
(LocatePlus). The complaint alleged that Jon
Latorella, former CEO, and James Fields, former
CFO, fraudulently inflated revenue at LocatePlus.
The SEC filed an amended complaint alleging that
Latorella and Fields, as the founder and a director,
respectively, of Paradigm Tactical Products, Inc.
(Paradigm), manipulated the stock in Paradigm by
causing Paradigm to issue shares to brokerage
accounts, failed to register the sale of the shares,
caused fraudulent press releases to increase
Paradigm’s stock price, after which, Latorella sold
the shares he controlled into the public market at
an artificially inflated price, again in unregistered
transactions.
Settlements

The SEC entered final judgment against Gary A. Reys,
former CEO of CellCyte Genetics Corp. Reys was
ordered to pay a penalty of $50,000, and was barred
from serving as an officer or director of a public
company for five years.

The SEC settled bribery charges and FCPA violations
against GlobalSantaFe Corp. (GSF). GSF was
ordered to pay disgorgement of $2,694,405,
prejudgment interest of $1,063,760, and a penalty
of $2,100,000.

The SEC settled insider trading charges against
Gary Allen Sorenson and Milowe Allen Brost, cofounders and owners of Syndicated Gold Depository
S.A. Sorenson and Brost were ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, disgorgement of over $210,000,000 and
a penalty of $100,000,000, and both were barred from
serving as officers or directors of public companies
having securities registered with the SEC.

The SEC settled options backdating charges against
Jacob “Kobi” Alexander, former chairman and CEO of
Comverse Technology, Inc. Alexander was ordered
to pay disgorgement of $26,206,298, prejudgment
interest of $21,442,157, a penalty of $6,000,000, and
was permanently barred from serving as an officer or
director of any issuer that has a class of securities
registered with the SEC.

The SEC settled bribery charges against Transocean,
Inc., and ordered the company to pay disgorgement of
$5,981,693, and prejudgment interest of $1,283,387.

The SEC settled charges of FCPA violations against
Noble Corporation, and ordered the company to pay
disgorgement of $4,294,933, and prejudgment interest
of $1,282,065.
Month in Review— November 2010  6
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION FILINGS, SETTLEMENTS AND DISMISSALS
Filings
Settlements
Capella Education Company
Services
Conseco, Inc.
Financial
$41,465,000
DeVry, Inc.
Services
Dendreon Corporation
Healthcare
$16,500,000
Gentiva Health Services, Inc.
Healthcare
Force Protection, Inc.
Capital Goods
$24,000,000
Green Bankshares, Inc.
Financial
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc.
Healthcare
$3,600,000
ITT Educational Services, Inc.
Services
Micron Technology, Inc.
Technology
$42,000,000
Lender Processing Services, Inc.
Technology
Toll Brothers, Inc.
Capital Goods
$25,000,000
Mela Sciences, Inc.
Healthcare
UTStarcom, Inc.
Services
Rino International Corporation
Consumer Goods
The St. Joe Company
Financial
Vivus, Inc.
Healthcare
Wilmington Trust Corporation
Financial
$2,900,000
[1st Partial]
Dismissals
Bare Escentuals, Inc.
2009/NDCA
Dismissed without prejudice.
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities,
LLC-FM Multi-Strategy Investment Fund
2009/SDNY
Dismissed without prejudice.
Comtech Telecommunications Corp.
Filed 2009/EDNY
Dismissed with prejudice.
Countrywide Financial Corp.
Filed 2010/CDCA
Dismissed with leave to
amend.
Insight Enterprises, Inc.
Filed 2009/AZ
Dismissed with prejudice.
KKR Financial Holdings, LLC
Filed 2008/SDNY
Dismissed without prejudice.
Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Filed 2009/NDCA
Dismissed with prejudice.
Sciclone Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Filed 2010/NDCA
Dismissed without prejudice.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
Filed 2001/NDGA
Dismissed without prejudice.
Aon Contact: Financial Services Group, Global Legal & Claims Practice, a Division of Aon Risk Services, Inc.
Steve Shappell, Esq., Managing Director P: 303.639.4110 E: Steve.Shappell@aon.com
Month in Review— November 2010  7