SECURITIZATION AND DESECURITIZATION
IN INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
A CASE STUDY OF ACEH SEPARATIST MOVEMENT
( DRAFT—NOT FOR QUOTATION )
YANDRY K. KASIM
UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG
Paper presented at the 8th Pan – European Conference on International Relations
18-21 September 2013, Warsaw organized by
The ECPR Standing Group on International Relations and
EISA in cooperation with
The Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw and
The Polish Association for International Studies
Ole Wæver firstly introduced the idea of securitization in-depth in 1995 and then a group of scholars, which later become associated with the Copenhagen School (Mutimer,
2007: 60), further developed the concept at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
(COPRI). As an analytical tool, securitization theory received its strong intellectual following in 1998, when Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde published their collaborative work titled Security: A New Framework for Analysis . Since then publications related to securitization and/or desecuritization in periodic international journals have grown in popularity (Gad and Petersen, 2011: 316). According to one author, securitization theory is one among the most prominent and influential post-Cold War approaches in the field of security studies (Williams, 2003: 511). The innovative worth of securitization theory can be found in “its usefulness for the study of the politics of security-policy making” (Knudsen,
2001: 358).
Literature on securitization, in my understanding, mostly concerns the theoretical development of the theory (cf. Huyman, 1998; Williams, 2003 and 2011; Aradau, 2004;
Balzaq, 2005; Alker, 2006; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald 2008; Gizzini, 2011). Most of these theoretical works largely focus on the speech act and scrutinize it from all perspective:from linguistic studies to post-structuralism or post-modernism perspective. There are only a few works emphasizing other dimensions of securitization, such as the extraordinary measures and the ‘emergency-ness’ of a particular situation (cf. Knudsen, 2001; Oelsner, 2007; Floyd,
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2011). The remaining empirical works on securitization analyze the construction of nontraditional threats to security through the speech act (cf. Roe, 2004; Gromes and Bonacker,
2007; Wilkinson, 2007; Vuory, 2008 and 2011; Hansen, 2011; Trombeta, 2011; Sjostedt, 2011).
While those works are not necessarily implausible, they might reduce the analytical value of the securitization theory. It appears that the theory is only fruitful when it analyzes an intangible and abstract fantasy of threat based on a discursive manner of a speech act. This is, to a certain degree, not fully in accordance with securitization theory which also acknowledges the military and political security of the state, respectively. Given this gap between the theory and its applications, this study seeks to apply securitization theory to analyze the Indonesian security dynamics during the democratic transition process. The application of the theory in this regard emphasizes the concept of securitization and desecuritization. By taking on securitization both from the Copenhagen School and beyond, I develop a framework of analysis where the nature of a threat is objective, of domestic origin, with violent episodes, the deployment of state security forces, and the unity of the state was at stake.
Securitization: Decision Making Process in Emergency
Based on my readings, I argue that there are four keywords important in understanding security within the context of securitization theory and three components of securitization. These keywords for security are (1) the existential threat , (2) referent object , (3) emergency situation , and (4) extraordinary measure . The existential threat refers to the superiority of one issue and is so distinct compared to others that it must receive absolute priority.
1 If the relevant referent object does not successfully address it, the issue at hand would put the existence of the referent objects in danger.
2 In essence, the very next step after invocating security is the declaration of an emergency situation. By declaring it, the state traditionally will claim “a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development”—that is the extraordinary measures. Therefore, the use of extraordinary measure refers to “the invocation of security […] to legitimizing the use of force […], a way for state for mobilize, or to take special powers” (Buzan, et.al
, 1998: 21).
The three components of securitization include the speech act, securitizing actors, audience . With regard to the first component, I adopt Vuori’s illocutionary understanding of the speech act. If securitization is understood in the context of emergency and exceptionality, if extraordinary measure is translated into the use of force, then it is fair to
1 The existential threat is the utmost important one compared to others. Here, existential is not referring to any of philosophical concept. Existential threat is regarded as threats to the existence of something, usually the state.
Referring to Michael C. Williams, the existential threat is “situations of maximum danger, potentially unlimited struggle and sacrifice that need to be both retained” See, Michael C. Williams, Words, Images, Enemies: securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly (2003) 47, p. 516.
2 The referent objects are things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan, et.al
, 1998: 21). Ralf Emmers summarizes referent objects into: (1) the state, in terms of military security; (2) national sovereignty or an ideology, in terms of political security; (3) national economies, in terms of economic security; (4) collective identities, in terms of societal security; and (5) species or habitats, in terms of environmental security (2004: 3-4).
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limit securitizing actors on those, borrowing from Carl Schmitt, who have the sovereignty to decide on the exception. They are political leaders, bureaucracies, and governing bodies— just to name three (Buzan et.al, 1998: 40). With regards to the audience, they are understood to be those who need to be persuaded and convinced by the securitizing actor in order to gain their acceptance and legitimacy for a securitizing move (Vuori, 2008). Though the
Copenhagen School does not specifically define it, Vuori has firmly suggested that there is not any need to specify the audience. It is better to remain flexible and leave the definition relatively open since, different socio-political context will lead to different audiences. Rita
Floyd even proposes to downgrade the audience’s role in a securitization process.
3 Here I adopt Floyd’s argument that the speech act is the utterance of warning and promise and securitization is completed when there is a change in the way actors behave after conducting the speech act (2011: 428-9). To put it colloquially, a securitization as a process is completed when the actor ‘talks the talk and walks the walk’.
Firstly, as all security debate is about survival, I limit securitization as an inherent process involved in the context of emergency and exceptionality.
4 The designation of existential threat to a referent object of security concurrently takes place with the claim for using the extraordinary measure. Mostly—if not always—the use of extraordinary measure is equal to the use of force or the state’s coercive instruments. Hence, emergency relates to the threatening situation and exceptionality relates to the use of extraordinary measure. To be clear, I limit the definition of security in this study to the problem of violence and the threat, use, and control of a state’s coercive force. I do however highly acknowledge the fact that the source of threat and conflict does not always originate from the military sector. Any possible unrest might also originate from political, social, economic sectors. But, if the dispute and animosity does not arise from and lead to specific form of violent conflict then they do not need to be considered as an object or problem of security.
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I thus, treat securitization as the decision making process for the use of extraordinary measures. This argument finds a strong support in Ole Wæver 2011’s statement. He admits that “an increasing presence of non-western voices within the discipline should help return
3 Some researchers perceive that the securitizing actor-audience interactions happen in an equal position. It appears that within its structured power a securitizing actor can speak security and designate a threat. On the other hand, with their constitutional rights an audience has the power to decide whether or not to accept a securitizing move. Therefore, there should be some kind a balance of power between them. As the argument goes, if the securitization speech act can be understood as the illocutionary one, then in most cases, there can barely be equality between the speaker and the listener.
4 This limitation probably will generate a degree of debate, but arguably it is still in accordance with the
Copenhagen School’s main tenet. The School maintains the argument that the sum of all security debate is about survival (Buzan et.al
, 1998: 21). Under such a sense of emergency, the nature of security consequently is a request for exceptionality.
5 This is the common idea shared by epistemic security community in Indonesia. See for an instance, Makmur
Keliat, “Security and Democracy in Indonesia: The Need to Strike a balance”, in The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 39,
No. 2, 2011 . This limitation normatively is also not in an odd position with universal principle of the statecraft.
Even the liberal tradition itself acknowledges and justifies the postponing of normal rules of game during an emergency situation (Husyman, 1998: 571). Even more, the existence of organized violence (manifested in, but not limited to, the military institution or armed forces) has been regarded as a sign of modernity of the statecraft in world history (Harries-Jenkins & Doorn, 1974).
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war and violence to the agenda of critical or now security studies, including securitization studies” (2011: 475, emphasis mine). Put differently, securitization theory must not limitedly focus to viewing the power politics within a society in naming subjective, abstract, and physically nonviolent phenomena such as migration, HIV/AIDS, minority rights, feminism movement and others—which most of publications have been focusing on.
Desecuritization: Back to “Normality”
If securitization is a moving an issue outside the realm of normal politics, the reverse is also possible. Those who are responsible for securitizing the issue can move it back into the normal political realm (Roe, 2004: 282). Hence, desecuritization is the unmaking of an existential threat. The puzzle though is how to conduct desecuritization. In this regard,
Huysman presents two grounds for desecuritization: instrumental and ethico-political . The instrumental ground means “a security approach is not considered to be an effective way of dealing with the question at hand”. The ethico-political ground suggests that “one does not oppose securitization because it is an ineffective way of dealing with the question at hand but because one cannot ethically justify the specific organization of the political community articulated through security practices” (1998: 589).
In order to develop a better framework for studying desecuritization, Andrea Oelsner offers two mechanisms for desecuritization, two phases of desecuritization, and indications of observation at two levels. Her mechanisms consist of the passive and active ones.
6 In the former change takes place naturally while in the later it occurs by designed. The phases of desecuritization include the initiation process 7 , and the phase of development and consolidation 8 . In order to observe whether or not the consolidation phase has taken place, there are indicators at the governmental and societal level. On the level of government, the indicators are coordinated positions, shared discourses, common institutions and projects, joint declarations, cooperation protocols, and mutual visits. On the societal level, the indicators include a deeper and stronger interaction among societal organizations from previously conflicting entities.
6 In passive mechanism, there is a shift in the nature of a particular issue or party so the securitizing actors and audience in question no longer perceive them as a threat. Within the active mechanism one might observe that there is a degree of qualitative change of behavior in the interaction between securitizing actors and audience on one side and the issue or party which was perceived and defined as the threat on the other. Here, trust-building start taking place between actors of animosity (2005: 4).
7 For her initiation process for desecuritization, Oelsner relates the explanation with two paradigmatic traditions for giving a background on how a desecuritization move starts taking place. The first theoretical tradition is interdependence and institutionalism . This tradition holds an argument that the conflicting parties tend to avoid the use of force as an alternative to settle their dispute since the absolute gain from a more peaceful solution is far better off than the former. Considering negotiation as the outcome of power, interest, and capability calculation; the conflicting parties aware that a strategic cooperation among them should better serve their objective rather than through a violent engagement. The next background lies in the realist tradition . The tradition suggests that actors will change the way they behave and shift the way they see each other without necessarily being politically defeated once they secure a considerable incentive for doing so.
8 In the phase, Oelsner rests her explanation on constructivist tradition. Constructivists stress the important role of identity, idea, perception, and understanding which are shared and developed though repeated interactions.
They also claim that both interest and identity are not static and homogeneous in essence but they constantly change through practices and habits; that is, through interaction.
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Borrowing from Coskun (2011) my next proposal is to establish the components of desecuritization as consist of desecuritizing actors, the (desecuritization) speech act, and audience. As far as the question of desecuritizing actors is concerned, Oelsner suggests that
“the same actors that had previously advocated for securitization may now encourage the process of desecuritization”. While the process of securitization stresses the important role of state or formal authorities, desecuritization may open up wider opportunities for non-state actors to become involved and participate in the process. Claudia Aradau strongly argues that desecuritizing actors must include ‘the previously silenced other’ (2003: 26). Aradau’s argument firmly grasps the reality og the peace initiation and negotiation process where civil societies, or even ordinary individuals can really break the ice in a hostile environment.
Referring to Lane Hansen, there four outcomes of desecuritization: change through stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing (2011). Desecuritization as a change through stabilization refers to a situation where there is evidence of an explicit change in the security discourse through a gradual process. This gradual change brings less militaristic and less violent approaches in a concrete form.
9 Replacement refers to a process in which one issue is excluded from the security sphere while another is being securitized. Hence the outcome limitedly operates at the issue level which will not bring any difference in security discourse and, especially, in practice. Rearticulation refers to an action of moving an issue out of the security realm by actively offering political solutions to deal with the threat in question, and thereby addressing the very source of dispute. In rearticulation the conflicting parties realizes that collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation will better serve their interests and survival, than mutual antagonistic interaction.
10 Finally, based on McKanzie’s work, Hansen refers to silencing as a situation where an issue disappears or fails to register in a security discourse.
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9 One weakness of this outcome however lies inherently in its conservative and system-stabilizing characters. It means the ultimate purpose of desecuritization in this particular strategy is to bring stabilization into relations among adversaries without necessarily addressing the very source of animosity. Hence, as the result —instead of a rooted ethical acceptance among adversaries—there is no one who can provide a guarantee of both the direct and long term consequences of this change through stabilization.
10 As a political vision, rearticulation is the ideal outcome of a desecuritization process. It bears no conservatism problem as in the change through stabilization and faces no new problem as in the replacement. One challenge for rearticulation is more the normative and political question linked to stability and desirability. As Hansen put it ontologically, “ rearticulation claims finality, yet finality is inherently impossible”. Another remark needed is that rearticulation is anything but a smooth process. It is a result of a bitter bargaining process taking place in complex power dynamics and in a hostile environment.
11 This outcome was inspired by MacKenzie’s research on female soldiers in Sierra Leone. Mackanzie presents a finding that international communities in Sierra Leone’s peace process categorize female soldier merely as victims, abductees, camp follower, domestic workers, and sex slaves. In this case, the international communities have silenced and uncategorized those women as soldiers or combatants. Accordingly, MacKanzie categorizes this situation as a desecuritization . Though Hansen includes silencing as one of her desecuritization outcomes, it appears only for the sake of conceptual categorization.
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Securitization – Desecuritization Dynamics of a Separatist Conflict in Indonesia 12
Why does Indonesia make a good subject for the study of security and securitization?
With more than 17.500 islands, Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world. In terms of population, the country is the fourth largest in the world. Also, Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population, divided in hundreds of ethnic groups which implies that Indonesia is too diverse, and such diversity might become a source of conflict.
Indeed, Indonesia’s security dynamics have been through dramatic changes since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order Regime on May 21, 1998. Soon after Suharto left power and the country started its democratic transition, Indonesia suddenly turned into one of the most conflict-prone areas in the world. This fact can be seen both in the outbreak of horizontal conflicts between different groups of society, as well as, vertical conflicts. In the latter case, local challengers verbally and physically challenged the legitimacy of the central government. To summarize the scene, in its earlier phase of transition Indonesia had to deal at least with three separatist movements, three violent communal conflicts, and innumerous riots. Such a situation provoked some observers to start predicting the breakup of Indonesia
(Aspinall & Berger, 2001; Emmerson, 2000) and state that violence was an embedded culture of the Indonesians (Collins, 2002).
What is remarkable about the Indonesian story is that many of the nightmare scenarios familiar in other parts of the world failed to materialize here. Indonesia did not experience a balkanization as in a post-communist Yugoslavia or a post-USSR Georgia or
Chechnya (Mishra, 2009). In dealing with such security predicaments Indonesia has shown a certain degree of achievements in both mitigating conflicts and democratizing the country.
The termination of the conflict in Aceh has served as a case worth studying. To a certain degree, the peace in Aceh was not achieved by the military defeat of the separatist group, instead peace was agreed on in a negotiated manner with the signing of the Helsinki Peace
Treaty between the conflicting parties.
In this paper, I scrutinize the case of Aceh—which represents an instance of vertical conflict, manifested in the form of separatist movement—to explore how securitization and desecuritization worked during the conflicts. I choose the case of Aceh also because of its interest values. First, it was the most sustainable separatist movement in the history of independent Indonesia. Second, the 2002’s military operation in Aceh was Indonesia’s biggest military operation, second only to the annexation of East Timor in 1976. Third, in terms of fatalities, the case of Aceh demonstrated a high level of violence.
Aceh is located on the northern tip of the Sumatera island of Indonesia. It has long been known for its culture of resistance against external rule and influence. In the 1520s,
Aceh fought a war to resist Portuguese rule and influence. Later on, the region fought a war against the Dutch colonial rule from 1873 to 1913. After becoming one of the provinces of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, it took up arms against the central government in
12 The discussion on securitization and desecuritization dynamics in the case of Aceh separatist movement in this section is mainly based on from Rizal Sukma, Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons. Policy
Studies 3. (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2004).
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1953. Disappointed with the central government’s policy, this armed movement was aimed to separate Aceh from Indonesia and establish an Islamic state. The insurgency lasted about a decade. In December 1976, Teungku Hasan M. di Tiro –founder and chairman of the Free
Aceh Movement ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka / GAM) 13 declared independence for Aceh. GAM was reinvented in 1989 by committing small scale security disturbances in the province.
The government responded by creating the DOM ( Daerah Operasi Militer , Military Operations
Area) in 1990, and launching a large-scale campaign against GAM and Acehnese civilians.
Only by 1992, was the whole province effectively under military control. The DOM episode was characterized by a large number of human rights abuses cases and the military’s failure to apply basic principles of counterinsurgency. Hence, it created even more hatred and resistance among common people in the province. In the aftermath of Suharto’s resignation,
GAM resumed its activities in November 1998 and soon found significant support from large segments of the society, especially in rural areas.
The causes of the prolonged dilemma in the province can be divided into four main groups. The first cause is the unfair distribution of economic exploitation. Aceh is a rich region, which contains plenty of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, timber. In 1992, it was reported that Aceh provided 15% of Indonesia's total exports, and in 2003 the value of the oil and gas fields was estimated to generate US$1.2-1.5 billion annually. However , other contrasting examples can be found; in 2002 it was reported that Aceh was the poorest province in Sumatra and the second poorest in Indonesia.
14 For the people of Aceh, Jakarta has done nothing but plunder, exploit, and unjustly manage their land. The second source of the problem is Suharto's New Order politics of excessive centralism and uniformity which brought negative consequences for local identity. The national government obsessed with the concept of national unity and thus forced uniformity on the whole the country, regardless of the pluralistic character of Indonesia as an entity. The third source of discontent is the excessive military repression. Due to massive human rights abuses and the politics of repression exercised by the military, Barber states “any tolerance of Indonesian rule was almost entirely extinguished”. The final cause is the politics of impunity. The central government’s inability or unwillingness to bring those responsible for human rights abuse to trial obviously contributed to unprecedented levels of disappointment among Acehnese
(Barber, 2000). In the next part, I discuss the securitization and desecuritization dynamics in
Aceh in chronological order, according to each post-Suharto administrations.
1.1.
B. J. Habibie’s Administration (May 21, 1998 – October 20, 1999): Unprecedented
Initiative
B.J. Habibie gained power from Suharto on 21 May, 1998. Signaling a breakthrough from the earlier regime, the new administration took desecuritizing measures for solving problem in Aceh. Three months after Habibie’s inauguration, the then minister of defense
13 The official name of this organization is the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). Within the territory, however, the organization is more widely known by its Indonesian language acronym.
14 Sinar Harapan , March 31, 2003.
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and commander of the armed forces, General Wiranto ended the Military Operation (Daerah
Operasi Militer / DOM) status in the province on 7 August, 1998.
15 In March 1999, Habibie visited Aceh to show his determination for a peaceful solution and dialogue. There he apologized for atrocities committed by the government and military in the past, and promised to release political prisoners in the province and bring the perpetrators involved in human rights violations to trial. In regards to the later, Habibie's government also established an independent commission, which was composed largely of Acehnese, to investigate the violations of human rights abuse in the province. Next he ordered the withdrawal of non-organic troops which were not directly assigned to the territorial commands in Aceh. Furthermore, Habibie’s administration also passed the Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy. Under this law, Aceh’s status as an Autonomous Region was restored. The law grants a wide range of autonomy to the province, including the provincial implementation of Islamic law for Muslims and compensation for past abuses by security forces.
However, the president’s desecuritization move did not resound well since most of his initiatives—if not all—failed to materialize. Habibie failed to fulfill his promise of bringing the perpetrators of human rights abuse to justice. Among other obstacles was the different interpretation among Jakarta’s elites regarding the time period of violation whereby past offenders could be brought to trial. For instance, it was said that “there was consensus of the government and the National Commission on Human Right that the team’s subject of investigation would only be right violation cases that occurred over the last year”.
16
Meaning, the investigation would not cover all violations committed in years prior to 1998.
The plan for withdrawing the troops also had to be abandoned. The increasing number of riots and the escalation of violence were two major reasons behind this failure. Even the national police requested later that military troops should not be withdrawn from a number of unrest-prone areas. Instead of troop withdrawal, Jakarta planned to establish military command in the province.
17 Facing protests by Acehnese leader and observes, the government delayed the plan as a response to “people aspiration”.
18 As for dialogue it was the first time Indonesia’s government made such an offer to the rebel group. The meeting was planned in Bangkok from 24-25 July 1999 and would include the rebel’s highest leader,
M. Hasan di Tiro, top Acehnese figure Hasballah M. Saad, Aceh Governor Syamsuddin
Mahmud as well as a top Indonesianist figure, Benedict Anderson of Cornell University.
However, the key figures expected to attend the dialogue—Syamsuddin Mahmud, Hasan di
Tiro, Hasballah M. Saad—either declined or were unable to make a physical appearance.
19
The very first dialogue initiative turned to ash.
Disappointed with the unfulfilled promises of the new government and with the military’s defensive attitude, GAM began to step up insurgency with a number of attacks
15 Atjeh Post, August 7, 2012.
16 The Jakarta Post, July 3, 1999.
17 The Jakarta Post, August 27, 1999.
18 The Jakarta Post, August 31, 1999. It was finally established in the later administration.
19 The Jakarta Post, July 22, 1999.
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against security personnel. On 2 November, 1998, encouraged by a few members of GAM, hundreds of youths in Kandang, a Northern Aceh district, carried out a raid, burned the
Indonesian flag, and tortured two military members. In response, 23 people were arrested by the military in the area. On 15 November, a state-owned radio station (RRI) was burned and the police arrested some 43 civilians accused of aiding the escape of the perpetrators. On 29
December, a group of GAM members abducted and later executed seven military personnel
(Barber, 2000). In July 1999—amid the meeting in Bangkok—a group of separatist rebels shot five of the security personnel and injured a number of others.
20
All in all, the government’s first effort at peace talk had already failed before they even got started. The incidents mentioned above became the basis for justifying the act of securitization in redeploying of troops in Aceh. The act of securitization was finally materialized by early January 1999, when Jakarta launched a new security device called
Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority). To support this operation, the security forces sent
2,000 personnel of PPRM ( Pasukan Penindak Rusuh Massa or Riot Prevention Force) to Aceh, consisting of both military and police troops (Sulistyanto, 2001). A number of incidents familiar to the Acehnese began to occur. Such incidents caused serious damage to the already tainted image of the military. At this point, the effort to desecuritize the Aceh’s separatist problem initiated by B.J. Habibie faced major obstacle. The government switched into emergency mode and extraordinary measure was installed.
1.2.
Abdurrahman Wahid’s Administration (October 20, 1999 – July 23, 2001): Aborted
Desecuritzation
In the high of violent conflict, attempts for peaceful resolution began to be put on the table again as Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president in October 1999. Initial contacts between the conflicting parties, facilitated by a Swiss’s base humanitarian NGO, the Henry
Dunant Center (HDC), led to the first round of confidential talks between the conflicting parties on 27 January 2000. The official to the UN in Geneva, Hasan Wirayuda, represented
Indonesia and GAM was represented by its minister of health, Zaini Abdullah. Central to
HDC’s approach was to “achieve a cessation of hostilities first and to move on to substantive political issues later” (Aspinall, 2005b). The first talks resulted in an agreement between the two parties to stop all forms of violence in Aceh. In addition to the talks in Geneva, the first meeting between the commander of GAM’s military wing, Teungku Abdullah Syafi’i, and a high official of Wahid’s government, State Secretary Bondan Gunawan, was held on 16
March in the movement’s headquarters in Pidie. Given that in the past Abdullah Syafi’i had maintained a hard-line position, the meeting strengthened the hope for a quick agreement.
Indeed, even though the dialogue continued to be marked by a worsening security situation, both sides were determined to bring about concrete results (Sukma, 2004).
The second talk was held on 24 March 2000 and shortly followed by the third meeting on 14–17 April, which reached a substantial agreement, subsequently announced by
20 Ibid.
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Indonesia’s government officially on 4 May. On 12 May, a “Joint Understanding on
Humanitarian Pause for Aceh” was signed by both sides in Davos, Switzerland. Rather than calling it a cease-fire agreement, both sides maintained that the primary objective of the pact was to create a pause in the violence enabling them to begin working toward a peaceful political solution to the conflict. Toward this end, both sides agreed that the agreement, which would be in effect from 2 June to 2September, 2000, would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Acehnese affected by the conflict while at the same time promoting confidence-building measures toward a permanent peaceful solution (Sukma,
2004).
Even though the accord presented the first opportunity to begin a peace process, reactions in Jakarta military circles were ambiguous. On the one hand, military leaders expressed their support of the agreement and pledged that the TNI would implement the
Joint Understanding consistently. On the other hand, government initiatives to reach a negotiated political settlement did not receive enthusiastic support from the security leadership. Therefore the agreement did little to stop the hostilities. It failed to reduce violence and end the conflict in Aceh. Even when the agreement was extended to 15 January
2001, it failed to reduce, let alone stop, the violent and armed clashes in Aceh. In fact, the degree of violence during the second phase was far worse than the first(Sukma, 2004).
Despite making a point of not sending troops against the separatist, Wahid later had no better option. The president let the military deal with the problem in Aceh and a new security approach was initiated.
21 The nature of security operations in Aceh became clearer in
April 2001, with the issuance of Presidential Instruction ( Inpres ) No. 4 of April 2001. As a result, the structure of security forces in Aceh was reorganized, with the national police and the military commander in Aceh given equal responsibility for operations. From a baseline of
5.000 to 6.000 regular police and 4.000 to 5.000 territorial troops in the ‘Humanitarian Pause’ period, the government deployed some 25.000 troops to the region by April 2001 (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002).
As a consequence of Presidential Decree No. 4/2001, a new OKPH ( Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum or Operation for Restoring Security and Upholding the Law) was launched to coordinate the actions of the police and the military in Aceh. The overall operational command was headed by the chief of the National Mobile Police Brigade
(Brimob—the police paramilitary force), Major General Yusuf Manggabarani. There are two field commands with equal importance under this OKPH. The first one is the military command based in Lhokseumawe. The other is the police command based in Banda Aceh.
22
21 Global Intelligence Update, Indonesia’s Military Grow Impatient with Wahid , Asia Times Online , June 8, 2000.
22 The OKPH forces comprised four key elements. The first element, the police, consists of two forces: the regular police force which performs standard police functions, and Brimob which functions as a force to counter the military wing of GAM. The second element is the army territorial forces based throughout Aceh under two subregional military commands in Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe. The third element is made up of non-organic military reinforcements drawn primarily from other army territorial commands, army strategic reserve command
(Kostrad), and army special forces (Kopassus), including a special counterinsurgency unit called Rajawali Force.
The fourth element is the Navy and the Air Force, especially the Navy’s Marine Corps and the Air Force’s Special
Forces (Paskhas).
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This OKPH aimed to bring all security forces in Aceh under a single command headed by a police major general. Although the official commanding role was given to the police, it has been noted that “in practice, the police lack the training, equipment and manpower to cope with counterinsurgency operations and the real operational power lies with TNI Brigadier
General Zamroni based in Lhokseumawe” (Sukma, 2004).
1.3.
Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Administration (July 23, 2001 - October 20, 2004): Stick and
Carrot
The political change in 2001 finally impeached Wahid and his deputy, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, replaced him until 2004. Like her predecessor, Megawati continued the combination of security and negotiation approaches to cope with the conflict in Aceh. First of all, Megawati apologized to the people of Aceh for the excesses of the past. Later, she signed
Law No 18/200 which granted a wide range of autonomy to the province (Rabasa and
Haseman, 2002). Megawati’s administration also pursued a non-military solution by resuming talks with GAM leaders in Sweden. A new round of peace talks began in February
2002, and eventually both sides reached a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) on 9
December (Sukma, 2004).
23 As of 9 February 2003, the first part of the agreement was implemented and seven peace-zones were established in Aceh. During the first half of 2003 some progress was made during talks between the GAM and the Indonesian government.
24
The act of securitization in dealing with the problem occurred at the same time as government’s effort to desecuritize the problem. For instance, by the beginning of 2002, the government’s military campaign had succeeded in breaking up the GAM units into isolated bands. According to their sources, Rabasa and Haseman argue that these bands were not under unified central control but still held a common commitment to Acehnese independence. However, some appeared to have degenerated into criminals (Rabasa and
Haseman, 2002). Furthermore, the army’s presence in Aceh significantly increased as the government reestablished Aceh Military Command 25 in February 2002. This command had previously been closed down in the mid-1980s. The following days witnessed repeated armed clashes between the government’s troops and GAM rebels. Despite the reopening of the new command, the military was still unable to end the conflict in Aceh.
23 There was a degree of optimism at the time that COHA would succeed for three main reasons. First, unlike the
Humanitarian Pause, COHA offered a better mechanism for implementing and monitoring the agreement through the establishment of a Joint Security Committee that included peace monitoring teams from the
Philippines and Thailand, alongside representatives of TNI and GAM. Second, COHA provided for the establishment of, “peace zones” in the province expected to increase the incentive for peace among the warring parties. And third, there was stronger international backing. Japan, the United States, the European Union, and the World Bank promised they would provide substantial financial support for reconstruction in Aceh if the peace deal succeeded. Indeed COHA did bring a drastic reduction of the number of casualties (Rizal Sukma, op.cit
., p. 20.
24 Conflict Database, Uppsala University. Available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=201
25 Military Area Command, the first and the highest level of the territorial Army command structure (Wandelt,
2009)
11

Facing such a situation, the Indonesian government became increasingly impatient.
They accused the GAM of violating the COHA. Jakarta was also upset by the lack of progress in the disarmament process. Furthermore, the government also accused GAM of recruiting new members, strengthening its weapons stocks, committing extortion, and continuing to advocate Acehnese independence. In fact, around this period, hopes were high that Aceh would soon secede from Indonesia In one popular slogan from those days, independence was sebatang rokok lagi —only “a cigarette away”. At the other camp, GAM accused the military of being insincere in implementing the provisions of COHA, especially regarding the withdrawal of its troops. The military, on the orders of President Megawati in April, began to prepare for a military showdown in Aceh ( Aspinall, 2005a).
The Indonesian government, nevertheless decided to give peace one last chance when it agreed to come to Tokyo in May 2003, to negotiate with GAM’s Sweden-based leadership.
This last effort to save the peace process, however, ended in failure. As predicted, Jakarta’s three demands—that GAM must recognize the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, accept the special autonomy arrangement for Aceh, and agree to immediate disarmament—were rejected by GAM representatives. As the meeting in Tokyo faced a dead-end, it was a time for the police to exit and the military to get in (Sukma, 2004).
The government, through Presidential Decree No. 28/2003, decided to impose martial law across Aceh and initiated a military operation called Operasi Terpadu (Integrated
Operation) in the province. The government declared that the political goal of the operation was to resolve the Aceh problem by attaining two specific objectives: to eradicate GAM and to curb Acehnese support for independence by, “winning the hearts and minds of the people.” 26 The military operation was officially launched on May 19, 2003 and it was the largest Indonesian military operation since the annexation of East Timor in 1975 (Yamin,
2003).
27 While this operation was initially intended to last for six months, by early November
2003 the government had stated it clear that it would be extended for another six months.
Despite some problem in its implementation, this time the government has made it clear from the outset that the main objective of the campaign was to win the hearts and minds of the people. To achieve this purpose, currently the military operation is only one element together with a humanitarian mission, law enforcement, and governance. The legitimacy of the current operation is also enhanced by strong support from the Parliament, all political leaders, and the non- Acehnese Indonesian public at large. Furthermore, it was the first time the military had allowed its operation to be covered by the media. Using tactics inspired by the US Military during the war in Iraq, the media has in principle been allowed to report what it finds and sees on the ground, despite some restrictions imposed by Law
No. 23/1959 on National Emergency. According to Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, the
26 Presidential Decree (Kepres) No. 28/2003.
27 Kafil Yamin, Jakarta Offensive in Aceh Drags On , Asia Times Online , June 27, 2003.
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then chief of the military information center, the guidelines were sent by the US Pacific
Command and have been adopted in accordance with the local environment.
28
1.4.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Administration (October 20, 2004 - July 23, 2009):
Desecuritization Prevails
The 2004’s election brought a victory for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and
Vice-president Jusuf Kalla. The greatest achievement of Yudhoyono’s administration is its success in desecuritizing the longest vertical conflict in the country. Soon after the inauguration, the new administration gave peace talks another chance. By and large, the peace brokering in the new administration was led by the then Vice President Jusuf Kalla— a leading national businessman, who served as the minister of people welfare in the previous presidency, and the then head of the country’s largest political party. The Indonesian government and GAM agreed to appoint Finnish ex-President Martti Ahtisaari’s Crisis
Management Initiative (CMI) as the mediator. In the first round, the Indonesian government was again stressing its initial stance that every agreement must be based on the unitary state of Indonesia. Historically surprising, GAM eased of its previous stance and accepted the government’s conditions but added the term ‘self governance’. Their demand for ‘nothing but independence’ was finally excluded from the negotiation scene (Aspinal, 2005b).
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the government and GAM representatives on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland ended the conflict in Aceh that has operated at varying levels of intensity since 1976. The process of negotiation showed that both sides made significant compromises in order to reach an agreement. While GAM made the major strategic concessions by abandoning its demand for independence, the government eventually also conceded on several key issues.
Despite its success, the desecuritization process still faced challenges from inside the government. At least there are two major spoilers in this regard, the civilian politician from the Parliament and the hard-liner military officers. Hard-line views on how to resolve the
Aceh conflict had dominated talks since the later months of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency. As Harold Crouch and Aspinall observe “those who supported negotiations were always in a minority in the government and faced constant criticism from those who favored military action” (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003). With the civilian political elites, their paranoia regarding peace settlement stemmed from the traumatic loss of the former East
Timor province. Hence, they had been tough on separatism and, “foreign intervention” in internal conflicts. The typical complaints were that by negotiating in a foreign country and with the mediation of a foreign organization, the government was charged with
28 However, it was not easy for the media to cover the whole true story. The reporters could not rely on what the military says, they could not trust what GAM says either, and they could not see for themselves. The reporters could not rely on what the military says, they could not trust what GAM says either, and they could not see for themselves. See, Lin Neumann, Indonesia Military Hems in Press on Aceh , Asia Times Online , 22 July, 2003. However, it was not easy for the media to cover the whole true story.
13

“internationalizing” the conflict and recognizing GAM was recognized as a legitimate actor with a status equal to the Indonesian state.
Responding to such tough criticism, Vice-president Jusuf Kalla, frequently spoke to the media to defend the negotiations in his characteristically direct style. For an example, when some members of Parliament criticized the government negotiated outside the country, he said “GAM wanted guarantees from foreign countries, either ASEAN or the European
Union, We had no choice. This goes back to the arrest of GAM negotiators by the police in
May 2003. That was a fatal mistake. Negotiators cannot be arrested. The element of trust would be lost. It was like the Dutch East Indies Company which arrested Indonesian negotiators in Indonesia”.
29 It was extraordinary for any Indonesian official, especially for the
Vice President, to compare the actions of the government to that of the former Dutch colonialists. In another occasion he maintained that, “If there is no peaceful resolution, doesn’t it mean we’ll have endless war? . . . Is that what the people want? If we don’t want war we’ve got to hold negotiations, or meetings. It’s funny isn’t it—people ask why are we talking with GAM, but they also ask why is there a conflict?” 30 Or, in his response against the other critics in Parliament, in June 2005 Kalla suggested that those tough-talkers should go to
Aceh and fight the war themselves.
31 Overall, although the government and political groups in Indonesia were divided on the process of negotiations, the balance shifted in favor of the peace camp. This was not because of any fundamental shifts of thinking of past conducts, but rather because those who had always favored negotiations had been elevated to more powerful positions (Aspinall, 2005a).
Concluding Analysis
So far this paper has chronologically explained the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization as the acts taken by post-Suharto’s governments in dealing with insurgencies in Aceh. Except for government abuses, insurgency is generally the most sensitive issue for the integrity and unity of a country. For Indonesia, Aceh’s insurgency movement was a ‘real’ existential threat where the unity of Indonesia was the referent object in this case. Given its cognitive prior, the unity of the state is one of the cardinal concerns shared by Indonesians in general. Colonial trauma, the Japanese occupation during the
Pacific War, the people’s struggle during the war for independence, local rebellions in the
1950s, and Western’s hypocrisy during the Cold War have become the major tenets in modern Indonesian history. The political impact of the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s led to the East Timor debacle, an empowered separatist rebellion, to internal violence conflict, and to the establishment of terrorist groups. Such historical trauma and crisis—which almost brought Indonesia to the verge of becoming a failed state—have spurred nationalist sentiments. Even moderate observers, legislators or scholars and government officials have never completely ruled out the use of military forces should other means fail to placate—in
29 Tempo , February 8–14, 2005
30 Serambi Indonesia , July 7, 2005
31 Tempo Interaktif , June 11, 2005
14

this case—the insurgents (Rüland, 2011). Furthermore, there was a time when h ard-line views dominated public discussion on how to resolve the Aceh conflict (Aspinall, 2005a).
Desecuritization moves—manifested as points of agreement in peace dialogues, e.g. cease fire, demobilization of rebel’s troops, withdrawal of military forces, repatriation of victim, political settlement—failed in the first attempts due to several factors. The most fundamental one is the lack of common understanding and interpretation on the agreements.
The Indonesian government strongly held onto a position that every agreement must be within the framework of the unitary state of Indonesia and law on Aceh’s special autonomy.
The government’s stance was ‘everything but independence’. For its part, GAM treated peace dialogues as means for internationalizing the conflict and gaining the independence.
There was a common believe that GAM exploited the peace process for its military consolidation, fund rising, weapons procurement, and recruitment of new members. GAM’s stance was ‘nothing but independence’ (Aspinall, 2005b; Schultze, 2004).
Departing from the government and GAM own stance which is at odds which each other, it was no surprising that the second reason for the failure of peace talk was lack of confidence between the two. GAM accused the Indonesian government of a lack of sincerity in implementing some earlier agreed upon points. The government failed to establish working committees, kept postponing subsequent meetings, detained GAM’s negotiators, maintained security operation in the province, and stood by as against human rights violations kept recurring. Hard-line elements within the government, both civil and military, also recurrently expressed their unsympathetic opinion on the peace talks in public, and threaten to use military force crush the rebel group. Being indifferent, GAM’s leading figures also frequently made public statements about their readiness and willingness to resort to violent means. With regard to cease fire, GAM frequently stressed that "not using weapons" was not the same as "not possessing weapons". Altogether, both the government and GAM’s threat to use of force were equally aimed at boosting its bargaining position once they meet up at the negotiation table ( Schultze, 2004) .
The third factor which led to the collapse of desecuritization moves prior to 2005 was the mediator’s failure in bridging gaps between conflicting parties. As I mentioned earlier,
HDC mediated peace dialogues took place between the Indonesian government and GAM from 1999 until its totally got shutdown in May 2003. HDC’s idea was stopping the violence first, and then slowly solving more fundamental (political) issues. In this line, the peace dialogue started with a cease fire then should be followed by the establishment of a zone of peace, GAM’s disarmament, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, and the establishment of
“all inclusive dialogues” involving wider elements in Aceh’s society in order to formulate a mechanism for long-lasting peace (Aspinall, 2005b; Schultze, 2004). The following dynamics showed that such an approach was too ideal and did not suit the situation where trust had yet to be developed between the conflicting parties.
The fourth factor is that Aceh’s local government and the elites had always been burdens in conflict settlement. Among the Acehnese, the credibility of local government was incredibly weak due to corruption. In addition, the fact that Aceh had been suffering from a
15

protracted conflict with a dominant military presence and central government, also contributed to the local government’s lack of performance. Increasingly, during the highest presence of GAM from 1999-2001, the local government in Aceh was almost entirely crippled and more then few local officials stated setting up networks with GAM (Schultze, 2004).
All together, these factors provided the grounds for either hardliners or decisionmaker, or both, to recurrently opt for securitization moves. Normally, the objective behind all the securitization moves (designating a threat, declaring emergency situation, executing extraordinary measure manifested in military operations) for settling conflict in Aceh, had always to establish stability and order in the region, to eradicate the rebel group, and to curb support for independence. In the period from 2001-2003, the central government’s dominant approach was the combination of a stick and carrot in order to put conflict to an end.
Operation Restoring Security was combined with political movements such as peace dialogues, economic development, social rehabilitation, and law enforcement. Therefore, there was an additional objective of securitization, which was to address the problem comprehensively. In this vein, and concerning the threat and level of violence, as well as the absent of rule of law in Aceh at the time, I argue that there was a solid background for
Indonesia as a state to move beyond ‘normal politics’ of negotiations and compromises.
Every state has a legitimate right to monopolize and to use coercive forces when facing actual violent threat coming from internal or external security environment. Hence,
Indonesia is not difference from other states.
The problem, however, did exist on how securitization was carried out rather than on normative decision of securitization. First, there were unclear policies, incoherent strategies, a weak chain of command and conflicting agendas of the government. Second, there was indiscriminate use of coercive measures which led the increasing level of violence and unsurprisingly caused human rights abuse. Finally, the very core of the problem was not rooted in military matters. It was all about economic exploitation together with centralism and uniformity. The situation moved from bad to worse when the Acehnese expressed their grievances about the uneven central-local politics of governance. The central government answered it with the use of violence. In the post-New Order era, the Acehnese’s demand to bring human rights violators to justice failed to spur Jakarta’s attention (Sukma, 2007). After all, the then military commander Gen. Chief Endriartono Sutarto gave a frank assessment when addressing the Parliament’s Commission I on Defense and Foreign Affairs saying that:
“It is true that the number of GAM has declined because of the efforts taken by TNI. But it will not mean that it will become zero. Because of that, I hope that the Commission will understand. It seems we have not been able to do what we hoped, so we apologize. . . . So long as the basic problems are not resolved, it will be like one dies, another takes his place, two die, four take their place. The problem in Aceh has arisen because of disillusionment.
And it is not the role of the military to resolve that” (Aspinall, 2005a; Media Indonesia, June 9,
2005).
While desecuritization moves from 1998 to 2005 always faced a thick wall until they finally collapsed, the last move in 2005 ended up with fruitful results. There are several
16

factors involved in the success of desecuritization in Yudhoyono’s administration. The first factor is there was a strong figure on the side of desecuritizing actors, namely Jusuf Kalla.
Jusuf Kalla had initiated contact with several of GAM’s top figures since 2004 and the CMIfacilitated peace dialogue was the result of it. For better or worse, Kalla sent some members from his inner circle as main negotiators representing the government—namely, Hamid
Awaluddin, as the minister of law and human rights and Farid Husain, as the deputy minister of people welfare. Publicly, Kalla actively pushed the idea that dialogue was the only solution for conflict settlement in Aceh. He actively convinced the public in general, as well as, national elites who shared a more hard-line view on the settlement of the conflict
(Aspinall, 2005b).
The second factor was internal development within GAM. After years militarily engaging with the central government, GAM finally exhausted it fighting capability. While militarily decreasing, GAM also learned that the central government might freeze negotiations and turn again to military solutions. There was also a widespread belief at the time that GAM was looking to transform itself into a local political party. Therefore the most plausible bid for GAM was dropping its ‘nothing but independence’ stance and start focusing on the ‘self governance’ demand (Aspinall 2005b; Drexler, 2007).
The third factor was the peace the mediator’s approach. Taking a different route from
HDC’s approach of mediation, CMI’s approach was ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. While including some negotiated points during HDC-facilitated dialogues such as cease fire, demobilization, and other, CMI’s framework also included a design of implementation together with a wider political settlement. This approach provided a better general picture of how to solve political disputes between the two parties before they can agree on it. As the result of the process, CMI succeeded in mediating an agreement on a comprehensive and creative peace agreement, which reflected a strong willingness from both sides to compromises. The peace agreement is creative since it provided a formula to deal with difficult issues in an indirect way, and avoid the birth of splinter groups (Aspinall,
2005b; Sukma, 2007. Ahtisaari’s personality, as the head of CMI, also played an important role during the mediation. His straightforwardness in expressing his opinions and maintaining his stance was able to placate and bridge Indonesian and GAM negotiators. As one of Indonesian delegates admits that “he was very authoritarian, decisive and sometimes even openly angry, which felt strange to us at first. But his directness made an impression
[…]. He in no way attempted to coax us to the table. On the contrary, we get the feeling that
[we] should be grateful that he agrees to spend time with us” (Ali, Monoarfa, and Effendy,
2008).
There are two important lessons learned from the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization in the case of Aceh’s separatism. I started by arguing that the desecuritization move taken by Yudhoyono’s administration signifies an outstanding case of a peaceful settlement of internal conflict in a democratizing country. Indeed, the implementation of the terms of the peace process as envisaged in the MoU has been relatively smooth. For one, violence has significantly decreased across Aceh since the
17

dialogue was concluded. Furthermore, the implementation of the points of agreement has been completed in due time and due process as agreed upon by both sides. Acehnese political prisoners and combatants have also received state’s amnesty and economic incentives as part of reintegration program. The national government has issued Law on
Governing Aceh (LoGA) on 11 July 2006. More important that providing detailed framework for re-building and governing Aceh, LoGA has served as “a testimony to the presence of a constituency of peace in Jakarta” (Sukma, 2007).
As the conclusion, the main message of this paper is to show that states in the process of democratic transition are more likely to be shrouded by conflict situations, which mostly originate from internal threats, rather than by a state of stability. Therefore, especially in
Weberian perspective, the state has the responsibility to manage these threats by developing institutional and policy frameworks that provide the security actors with a scope of duties in order to address threats and maintain stability. The securitization framework serves this purpose. However, opting for securitization in states undergoing democratic transition can be very vulnerable and cause negative consequences since the real challenge is to re-arrange its security governance system. Amidst the absence of strong democratic institutions, the politicization of security issues during a conflict period could lead to the domination of the political and military actors. Hence, desecuritization should be an ideal option. This framework has the potential to function as an early warning mechanism for the decisionmakers to wisely consider a conflictive issue before it escalates into a full security question.
In this view, a ‘referent object’ can only be considered a security matter if it is proved that it poses a clear existential threat to the existence of and the territorial sovereignty of the nation.
The military engagement could be considered as an option when the threat is within the category of armed violent acts and there is an assurance that the state has already considered all other non-violent solutions. The use of extraordinary measures (e.g. the deployment of military forces) must be temporary in nature, aimed to stop violent conflict, in order to provide room for a peaceful conflict solution mechanism to work, and in accordance with universal principles. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that there is no military solution for any domestic unrest. The main source of many internal conflicts do not stem directly from the military sector but more in a political, economic, and socio-cultural ones.
The use of the military in solving unrest should be regarded as a series of failures from civilian institutions to acknowledge the problem, to manage it, to prevent it from becoming escalated, and to solve it within the normal political bargaining process.
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