Relative Stupidity and Past Tenses
Fabienne MARTIN
University of Stuttgart
1. Introduction1
It is well known that predicates like stupid are aspectually polysemous. Apart
from the fact that they can have permanent (or individual-level) or transitory
(stage-level) reading as illustrated in (1)2, they also alternate between what
Barker (2002) calls an “absolute” and a “relative” reading, cf. (2a) and (2b).
The reading in (2b) is called “relative” because the stupidity of Feynman is
“relativized” to the particular action described in the infinitival. The reading
in (2a) is called “absolute” because stupidity is then ascribed independently
of any action.
(1)
a. Pierre est honnête (est quelqu'un d'honnête)
Pierre is honest (is a honest person).
(ind.-level reading)
b. Pierre est parfois honnête.
Pierre is sometimes honest.
(stage-level reading)
a. Feynman est (était) stupide.
(absolute reading)
Feynman is (was) stupid.
b. Feynman est (était) stupide de danser comme ça.
(relative reading)
Feynman is (was) stupid to dance like that.
The construction in (2b) will be called the “stupide-de-cxn” (or “stupid-tocxn”) and the one in (2a) the “stupide-cxn” (or “stupid-cxn”). Note that the
relative reading is also obtained in presence of a gerund:3
1
2
3
I would like to thank Christopher Piñón for helpful discussions and the
reviewers and audiences of the First Fall Meeting in Formal Linguistics and
Chronos 10 for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to the anonymous
reviewers for their constructive proposals. I remain the only responsible for all
mistakes. This work is part of the B5 project 'Polysemy in a Conceptual System'
of the Collaborative Research Center SFB 732 of the University of Stuttgart,
financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
Some authors like Quirk et al. (1972) state that stupid predicates are in their
temporary uses “dynamic adjectives”, i.e. denote actions rather than states. Cf.
Martin 2008:113-118 for arguments against this hypothesis.
The preposition en heading the gerund will be systematically translated by in in
the English translation, although it might not be the best equivalent in each case.
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(3)
a. En vendant sa maison, Pierre a été stupide.
In selling his house, Pierre was stupid.
b. Pierre a été stupide en vendant sa maison.
Pierre was stupide in selling his house.
Three questions will be addressed here. Firstly, I will establish whether the
relative reading should be considered individual-level or stage-level. For
English, Stowell (1991), Landau (2009) and Oshima (2009) claim that the
stupid-to-cxn is unambiguously stage-level. Kertz (2006, 2010) argue on the
contrary that the same construction always selects the individual-level
reading of stupid-predicates. I will argue in Section 2 that the relative reading
of stupid-predicates can be either stage-level or individual-level, depending
on the tense chosen in the matrix clause. The second question concerns the
semantic relation between (2a) and (2b). As often observed (cf. Wilkinson
1970, 1976, Barker 2002, Oshima 2009), the entailment seems blocked from
(2b) to (2a): “Feynman might very well be stupid to dance wildly, in which
case [(2b)] is true, at the same time he is a Nobel laureate, in which case
[(2a)] may very well be false” (Barker 2002). This is what has been called the
“entailment puzzle”. In Section 3, I will claim that although arguably, the
entailment is blocked under the most salient reading of each construction
with an imperfect tense in the matrix clause, it goes through under some
readings of the two constructions. The third question concerns the differences
between the relative reading conveyed by the stupide-de-cxn and the one
expressed by the gerund as in (3). According to Landau (2009), the two
constructions are semantically similar. I will show in Section 4 that they
differ semantically and do not express the same kind of relative reading.
2. Oshima's account and new analysis
2.1. Introduction
Since the pros and contras of Barker's analysis have already been discussed
into detail by Oshima (2009: 377-380) and Condoravdi (2008), I focus here
on Oshima's account.
As already mentioned above, Oshima (2009) assumes that the stupid-tocxn is stage-level, while the stupid-cxn is individual-level. This allows him to
explain the entailment puzzle in a straightforward way (the transitory
interpretation is singled out in (2b), and the permanent one is thus not
entailed). But one of Oshima's main goals is to solve a second puzzle raised
by the same predicates (first observed by Wilkinson 1970), namely that they
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cannot be embedded under predicates of desire in the stupid-to-cxn. This has
been labelled the “embeddability puzzle” and is illustrated in (4).
(4)
a. Feynman veut être stupide.
Feynman wants to be stupid.
b. #Feynman veut être stupide de danser comme ça.
#Feynman wants to be stupid to dance like that.
c. #Feynman wanted (to be stupid, if he dances like that).
To explain this, Oshima assumes that the adj-to-cxn involves a hidden
conditional statement of the type “a does P2, and from this (and other known
facts) it can be inferred that a is transitorily P1 ” (a symbolises the controller,
P1 the property denoted by the adjective, and P2 the property denoted by the
infinitive). For instance, “John was wise to leave early” is paraphrased by
“John left early, and given that John left early, he must have been being
wise” (Oshima id.: 370).4 Oshima then attributes the unacceptability of (4b)
to the fact that the hidden epistemic modal statement is in the scope of the
predicate of desire. For instance, (4b) should be paraphrasable by something
like (4c), which exhibits the same kind of unacceptability. In (4b) and (4c), a
conflict arises because what is in the scope of a predicate of desire (or
intention, volition...) should be controllable by the attitude bearer, while
epistemic modal statements are uncontrollable, since “they are not made true
by manipulating entities of the concrete world” (Oshima, ibid.).
Oshima proposes to formulate the hidden epistemic statement of the stupidto-cxn as a four-place relation that holds of an epistemic modal base (a set of
worlds compatible with the known facts), an ordering source based on
stereotypicality (a set of propositions in accordance with the normal course of
events), and two propositions, one of which being the restrictor of the modal
base. Ignoring the ordering source, Oshima translates the logical form of the
hidden epistemic conditional as e [p→q], where e is a necessity operator
that quantifies over worlds that are epistemically accessible from the world of
evaluation. The (simplified) semantic format he assigns to the two
4
Oshima's intuition is independently shared by other authors. For French for instance,
Riegel (1997:362) states that in this type of constructions, “the infinitival [...] justifies the
attribution of the property denoted by [the] adjective” (my translation). About the stupide-decxn, Meunier (1999:30) writes that “the content of the infinitival [...] presents itself as the
description of a clinical sign relying the diagnostic [expressed by the main adjectival clause], that
is the speaker's judgement.” (my translation). Norrick (1978) proposes something similar for the
in that phrase of stupid adjectives (He was stupid in that...), when he states that these phrases
give “the speaker's reason for applying the evaluative adjective in question” (p. 29, cited by
Léger 2006:360).
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constructions is given in (5) (a stands for the controller, P1 for the adjectival
predication and P2 for the infinitival one).
(5)
P2 (a) &
e [P2
(a) → (transitorily(P1))(a)]
The first conjoint corresponds to the presupposed component – the stupid-tocxn presupposes the occurrence of the action described in the infinitive, cf.
e.g. Meunier (1980), Norrick (1978), Wilkinson (1970, 1976) – and the
second one to the asserted one.
2.2. Problems and new analysis
2.2.1 Truth conditions of the stupid-to-cxn
The way Oshima accounts for the embeddability puzzle is convincing.
However, I do not think that the analysis summarised in (5) captures the right
truth conditions of the stupid-to-cxn. More specifically, it does not capture
the fact that the stupidity is limited to the participation to a specific event. To
see this, let us imagine that Peter, a Nobel Laureate, takes some magical X
pills, well known to have the power to make very stupid for some time.
(6)
a. Peter took some X pills. Thus, he was stupid for some time.
b. Peter was stupid to take some X pills.
c. Peter's stupidity manifested itself through his act (i.e. taking the X pills)
In this context, (5) perfectly reflects the meaning of (6a). Besides, (6a) can be
paraphrased in the same way as Oshima proposes to paraphrase the adj-tocxn, i.e. by “Peter took some X pills, and given that he took some X pills, he
must have been stupid for some time”. However, (6b) is very different from
(6a), in that it states that John's (transitory) stupidity was manifested through
his pill's taking (and not only inferred from this action, as Oshima and others
observe). The sentence (6a) does not state that the pill's taking is a
manifestation of stupidity; it only states that one can infer that Peter was
stupid from this action. Therefore, contrary to (6a), (6b) entails something
like (6c). I will call the action through which a quality manifests itself the
manifestation of the transitory state.
Another example that shows the same shortcoming runs as follows.5 There is
a monster who only eats wise people. Max was eaten by this monster. Was
Max wise to be eaten by the monster? Probably not.
Given the difference between (6a) and (6b), I propose to amend (5) and add a
5
Thanks to David Oshima for this example.
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conjoint to the asserted part of Oshima's semantic format in order to capture
the Manifestation relation. Since it presumably takes place between
eventualities, I adopt a neo-Davidsonian format.
(7)
∃e P2(e) & Agent (a, e)&
e [∀e P2(e) & Agent (a, e) → ∃s P1 (s) &
Holder (a, s) & Manifest (s, e)]
2.2.2. Kinds of dispositions
A second problem – which is certainly not specific to Oshima's analysis –
concerns the nature of “transitory dispositions”. Oshima assumes after others
that an intelligent person x can be once transitorily stupid. It is important to
note that in this situation, the transitory stupidity of x cannot be seen as a
manifestation of a general disposition, since x is supposed to be an intelligent
person to begin with. We rather deal here with something like “transitory
dispositions”.
The concept of transitory dispositions demands clarification, since it is prima
facie at odds with the philosophical literature on dispositions. Indeed, it is
generally assumed that dispositions are permanent. However, there are
different exceptions to this, and I believe it is useful to review them here to
clarify the concept that semanticists are after when analysing sentences like
(2b), and to link the (often implicit) ontological commitments of semanticists
to the philosophical discussions on the topic.
Firstly, philosophers like Mellor (1974) recognize the mutability of
dispositions, i.e. the fact that an individual may possess a disposition at one
time and yet not at another. For instance, a stuff might be elastic at a time t
and not elastic at a time t' without sacrificing its identity; Peter can be
generally stupid and sometimes have sparks of intelligence while staying the
same individual. However, it is not in this sense that Peter is said
“temporarily stupid” in a sentence like (2b). In fact, even a sentence like (2a),
which asserts an “absolute” (non relativized) trait of character to Feynman
seems to leave opened the possibility that this global trait is not verified by
Feynman at each moment. Many people would probably judge a sentence
like Feynman is intelligent true even if the Nobel Laureate Feynman
sometimes has moments of stupidity.
In other words, Mellor's mutable dispositions are not the relativized
dispositions described in a sentence like (2b). Absolute dispositions can be
mutable or not, but when mutable, they should not be identified with
relativized dispositions.
Hurka (2006) is to my knowledge one of the few philosophers to have
explicitly articulated the two temporal dimensions of dispositions that
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distinguish “absolute' and something similar to the relative stupidity
expressed in (2b). Basically, according to Hurka, the distinction between
absolute and relativized dispositions matches the ones between persons and
acts: at a global level, virtues or vices like intelligence or stupidity are
applied to stable character of persons. At a local level, they are applied to
(temporary) specific acts: “we may say that a particular act was brave”
(Hurka, ibid., p. 69). He then discusses the arguments in favour of the
primacy of one type of dispositions on the other (Aristotle 1980 taking the
global use to be primary, and Ross 1930 taking the global one to derive from
the local one).
Despite the interest of this discussion, Hurka's distinction is again not the one
needed to distinguish (2a) and the relative reading (2b). Indeed, in sentences
like (2b), the adjective does not predicate the act denoted in the infinitival,
but the individual denoted by the subject, in accordance with what superficial
syntax suggests. A strong piece of evidence in favour of this claim is that, as
observed by Meunier (1999), some adjectives that enter the stupide-de-cxn
cannot be used to qualify an act, as it is obviously the case in sentences like
(8a). For instance, examples in (8c) are unacceptable, contrary to those in
(8b) (cf. Meunier 1999:31).
(8)
a. Danser sur la table était fou/ cet acte était fou.
Dancing on the table was crazy/ this act was crazy.
b. Pierre est timbré/ siphonné de danser sur la table.
Pierre is loony to dance on the table.
c. *Danser sur la table est timbré/siphonné; *cette danse/ * cette action est
timbrée/siphonnée.
Dancing on the table was loony; this dance/this act is loony .
From the fact that adjectives like timbré cannot apply to acts but are
acceptable in the stupide-de-cxn, it follows that the adjectival predication in
this construction is not applied to acts.
More relevant for the notion of temporary dispositions we are after is the
concept of “situational” dispositions proposed by “situationist”6 social
psychologists attacking the traditional concept of personality traits (cf. Doris
2002, Goldie 2004). The basic idea shared by these works is roughly the
following: absolute dispositions like honesty, intelligence or generosity do
not exist; they must be replaced by an array of situational dispositions like
dancing-on-the-table-stupidity, invite-Mary-intelligence, giving-money-to6
Not to be confused with the followers of the Cobra artistic movement and
readers of the Société du Spectacle of Guy Debord.
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the-X-charity-generosity, etc.7, that is, with dispositions situated in a certain
type of context.
I propose to equal what Doris (2002) or Goldie (2004) call situational
dispositions with the relativized dispositions denoted by stupid predicates on
their relative reading. However, contrary to these authors, I won't replace the
traditional “absolute” dispositions with them. I will rather assume that
dispositions come at least in two kinds, i.e. absolute or relativized.
Besides, I will assume that the distinction between “absolute” and
“relativized dispositions so defined should not be confused with the
distinction between permanent and transitory8 dispositions.9 In fact, as I will
argue just below, the two distinctions are orthogonal, although in absence of
any special context, absolute and relativized dispositions prefer different
temporal interpretations.
Firstly, unless the context provides information to the contrary, absolute
dispositions are conceived as permanent. The predicates which denote them
are associated to what Condoravdi (1992:9) calls an inference of temporal
persistence: “the inference of temporal persistence [of individual level
predicates] specifies the following: if an eventuality is going on at time t and
you have no information that it is not going on at some later time t', then infer
that it is going on at that later time t' as well.” With McNally (1994), I will
assume that this inference of temporal persistence also extends backwards
into the past. For instance, if I attribute absolute generosity to Peter at the
utterance time, you generally infer that Peter is generous at some later time t'
and some previous time t''.
This does not impede, however, that one can temporarily have an absolute
(global) disposition. This is for instance the case of Mellor's mutable
dispositions. A genius can sometimes have moments of absolute stupidity
(which can go unnoticed or not). I believe this is also what is described by
examples as in (9) provided by Chierchia (1995:178):
7
8
9
Fleming (2006) and Webber (2007) show that the psychological experiments
supposed to ruin the traditional definition of personality traits are in fact
compatible with it.
A transitory eventuality is here understood as an eventuality whose run time is
similar to the run time of an action (as vague as this definition is). An
eventuality which lasts for a significant proper subpart of the lifetime span of an
individual (like e.g. the state denoted by nouns like childhood) is not considered
to be transitory. It is here defined as a (reversible) permanent state.
On this point, I differ from Mari & Martin (2007)'s typology of abilities. Indeed,
what they call 'action dependent abilities' (on the model of the 'action dependent
states' of Martin 2008) are transitory by definition.
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(9)
John was intelligent on Tuesday, but a vegetable on Wednesday.
Chierchia assumes that on one of its readings, (9) requires a context where
John has a double personality which involves switching his mental capacities
on and off in an abnormal manner. Clearly, in this context, we have a
temporary absolute disposition, and not a relativized one. Indeed, on this
reading, (9) does not require the intelligence/stupidity of John to be
relativized to a specific situation.10
On the other hand, I agree with Oshima and others that relativized
dispositions are by default conceived as temporally delimited to the act
through which they manifest. But it is a defeasible preference: if I claim that
Peter is generous to give once 500.000 euros to a charity, I might attribute
this relativized disposition to Peter permanently. The purpose of the next
section is precisely to show that that the relativized disposition expressed by
the stupide-de-cxn can be construed either as temporary, or as permanent.
In sum, dispositions come in four kinds: they can be permanent or transitory
on one hand, and absolute or relativized on the other. Absolute dispositions
are by default conceived as permanent, whereas relativized dispositions are
by default assumed to be transitory. The former do not have to manifest
themselves in acts, the latter do by definition.
Note that among the four possible kinds of dispositional ascriptions (absolute
permanent, relative transitory, absolute transitory, relative permanent), the
absolute transitory ascription might be the less frequent one. Indeed, it is
somehow weird (but not impossible) to ascribe a disposition to an individual
for a short moment only, in a context where this disposition does not manifest
itself through an act (otherwise, the disposition would not be absolute
anymore). Why indeed ascribe e.g. intelligence for a short moment to a
stupid individual, if not because this individual manifested intelligence
through an act?
2.2.3. The role of tense
10
Since he equates stage-levelness with temporariness, Chierchia considers that on
(9), intelligent is used as a stage-level predicate. It does not matter whether we
stick with this label or not. What is important is to distinguish between two
kinds of temporary uses: those under which intelligent denotes a temporary
absolute disposition, and those under which it denotes a temporary relative
disposition. There is an important truth conditional difference between the two
uses: used to express an absolute disposition, intelligent can be truly ascribed to
an individual who theoretically never manifests intelligence, while used to
express a relative disposition, it entails that the individual manifests intelligence.
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Another problem of the analysis sketched in (6) concerns the role of tense in
the interpretation of stupid-predicates. After Barker, Oshima assumes that the
stupid-to-cxn systematically denotes temporary dispositions. Neither Barker
nor Oshima take the role of tense on the adjectival predication into
consideration. Interestingly, more than 75% of the sentences given by Barker
to illustrate the relative reading have a past on the adjectival predication.
I do not think this choice is accidental. For French, Meunier (1999) already
points out the importance of tense in the interpretation of stupid predicates in
the stupide-de-cxn. She claims that with the present tense, the permanent
reading is possible in the stupide-de-cxn (i.e. the reading that Oshima should
avoid if as he claims, the disposition denoted by the adjective is always
limited to the action described in the infinitival). I will provide two
arguments in favour of the idea that the stupide-de-cxn can be individuallevel.
The first one has to do with the distribution of predicates like être un homme
intelligent “be an intelligent man” or être d'un tempérament effronté “to be of
a shameless nature”. These predicates only have an individual-level reading,
as shown by the fact that they are odd with the past tenses on their episodic
readings, like the existential/resultative reading of the present perfect, cf.
(10). Note that I will systematically translate the French passé composé with
a present perfect in the English translation, even if it might not always be the
best option.
(10)
a. #Hier, Pierre a été-PERF un homme intelligent: il a vendu sa maison.
Yesterday, Pierre has been an intelligent man: he sold his house.
b. #Hier, Pierre a été-PERF d'une nature compliquée: il a vraiment cherché
des difficultés.
Yesterday, Pierre has been a difficult person: he really looked for
difficulties.
If acceptable with the present perfect (PERF), the resulting sentence denotes
a single past “maximal” permanent state (which takes place during the whole
time span of x's life), whose right boundary has to precede the utterance time
U-T (therefore, x has to be dead at U-T), cf. (11). Note that (11) would not be
acceptable with an adverb of quantification like toujours “always”, which
confirms that predicates of this kind are “once-only” predicates (de Swart
1991).
(11)
Pierre a été-PERF un homme d'une rare intelligence. (OK at a funeral)
Pierre has been a man of a rare intelligence.
The fact important for us is that with a present, it is possible to use these
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predicates that only have a permanent reading in the stupide-de-cxn, as
illustrated in (12) below. This shows that the relative reading can be
permanent. Note that in presence of a gerund as in (12d), the relative reading
of stupide is also selected.
(12)
a. Tu es vraiment un homme intelligent d'avoir fait un back-up de ton
Iphone.
You are really an intelligent man to have done a back-up of your Iphone.
b. Elle est vraiment compliquée de nature d'organiser sa vie comme ça.
She is really of a complicated character to organize her life in that way.
c. Votre mari est un homme stupide de courir partout sur vous. (Internet)
Your husband is a stupid man to run everywhere on you.
d. En vendant sa maison, Pierre est un homme intelligent.
In selling his house, Paul is a smart man.
My claim is not that every “individual-level only” predicate is acceptable in
the stupide-de-cxn. For instance, several speakers do not find Meunier's
example (13) natural:
(13)
Paul est d'un tempérament effronté de mentir à Léa. (Meunier 1999)
Paul is of a bold nature to lie to Léa.
But the acceptability of examples like (12) suffices to show that stupidity
ascription can be simultaneously relative and permanent.
The second argument in favour of this idea concerns the differences in
interpretation between sentences like in (14a) and (14b) (or (15a) and (15b)).
(14)
a. Elle est idiote-PRST d'avoir invité-PERF son voisin.
She is stupid to have invited her neighbour.
b. Elle a été-PERF idiote d'inviter-PRST son voisin.
She has been stupid to invite her neighbour.
(15)
a. Elle est-PRST arrogante d'avoir répondu-PERF comme ça.
She is arrogant to have replied like that.
b. Elle a été-PERF arrogante de répondre-PRST comme ça.
She has been arrogant to reply like that.
In the (a)-sentences, the perfect is on the matrix clause, while in the (b)-ones,
it is on the embedded infinitive. In order to test the proposed hypothesis, I
submitted these pairs to 20 native speakers of French and tried to indirectly
identify which reading was preferred through some questions. For (14), they
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were asked whether one of the two sentences was less insulting for the
referent of the subject than the other, and in the positive case, they were
asked which one (s)he would prefer to hear about her/himself. Space was left
to justify the answer. Subjects were also asked to rate their confidence on a
scale from 0 to 10.
90% of the subjects said that (14b) (with a perfect on être) was less insulting
than (14a) (with a perfect on the infinitive). One subject didn't reply to the
questions, one did not find any difference between the two, and one said that
the two differ “incrementally” (until one arrives to the infinitive) but not
globally (i.e., the result of the interpretation is roughly the same, even if the
path leading to it differs). The average confidence scale was 7.6/10. With
regard to (15), 75% of the subjects said that (15a) (with a present on être)
attributes more arrogance to the subject than (15b) (with a perfect on être).
15% did not find any difference between the two. Three subjects did not
reply. The average confidence scale was 6.75/10.
The most interesting part of the answers was the justifications the speakers
provided for their answers. Two tendencies should be underlined. Firstly,
with a present on être, the judgement is often reported to be more permanent/
essential. Some relevant extracts of the comments provided are given below
(translations mine).
“In (14a) the judgement is more generalized than in (14b).”
“(14a) is paraphrased by the fact that she invited her neighbour signifies
that she is a real idiot, it betrays her stupidity.”
“In (14), the present is 'stronger' than the past.”
“In (14a) we start from the principle that 'he' is an idiot.”
“(14a) could mean that I’m anyway stupid, that the fact that I invited my
neighbour is an piece of evidence/an argument in favour of the idea that
I’m stupid.”
“I have the impression that (14a) is more compatible with stupidity qua
dispositional property of the subject.”
“In (14a) the present has an 'absolute' value, the person is permanently
stupid!”
“(14a) describes a natural stupidity, inherent to the person, like a
second skin she will never be able to get rid of, in two words, her
essence.”
“The judgment in (14a) is more essentialist than the one in (14b).”
“(15a) is continuous, it deals with a trait of his character which manifested
itself again in his answer.”
These comments show that the ascription tends to be construed as
permanent/essential with a present on the matrix clause.
A second tendency is that the judgement is said to be limited to the action
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described by the infinitive only when a perfect on être:
“in (14b) the fact of being stupid is linked (and limited) to the action of
inviting his neighbour.”
“(14b) qualifies a stupid act, not the person in general.”
“(14b) is about an isolated mistake.”
“(14b) betrays the stupidity of the action, not of the person.”
“(14b) only evaluates a particular situation.”
“(14b) conveys a judgement which is neither permanent, nor essential.”
“(14b) concerns more the act than the person.”
“(14b) implies that a person can take stupid decisions without stopping
being wise.”
“the past [...] limits the stupidity to a brief moment, the one of the decision
to invite him.”
“15b) could deal with a 'temporary' arrogance at a certain moment of time.”
“(15b) says that on one occasion, the person acted in an arrogant way.”
“(15b) is limited to the past and does not say anything about a general
attitude of the person, which could thus behave differently today.”
Interestingly, no subject claimed that the stupidity/arrogance was temporally
limited to the action with both tenses. On the contrary, the tendency is strong
to make the present perfect (and not the infinitival) responsible for the
transitory reading.
From these results and comments, one can safely conclude that (i) the tense
on the adjective plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the predicate; (ii)
in the stupide-de-cxn, stupide predicates can have a transitory or a permanent
reading, depending on the tense chosen. The specific role of the infinitive is
to select the relative reading of the adjective, but this reading can be
permanent or transitory. Accordingly, the representation in (7) leaves
underspecified the type of interval during which a satisfies the property
denoted by the adjective.
Note that these data are expected given the semantic contribution of tenses to
the interpretation of the sentences. With a present tense in the matrix clause,
given that this tense is unbounded, the sentence does not block the inference
of persistence triggered at the lexical level by evaluative predicates like
stupide (cf. Section 2.2.2). This explains why a-examples are by default
understood as conveying a permanent property. Given the perfect on the
infinitival, the event justifying the ascription is understood as past wrt the
utterance time. With a perfect tense in the matrix clause, given that this tense
is bounded, the sentence cancels the inference of persistence triggered at the
lexical level, and we infer that the subject's referent is not stupid anymore.
This explains why (b)-examples receive a transitory reading.
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According to one reviewer, the data just presented do not show that relative
ascriptions can be permanent (contrary to what I claim). Her/his claim is the
stupide-de-cxn expresses permanent relative stupidity only if the infinitival
describe a permanent situation, as e.g. in Il est stupide de toujours danser sur
la table “He is stupid to always dance on the table”. If the infinitival
describes a token event as in (14a) and (15a), the sentence describes a
permanent absolute judgement, not a relative one, despite of the stupide-decxn.
I have two comments on this objection. Firstly, nothing impedes a permanent
stupidity ascription to be relativized to a token event in the analysis proposed
here. The only condition to be filled for the ascription to be relative is that the
state s expressed by the matrix clause manifests itself in the event e described
in the infinitival. The Manifestation relation does not require full cotemporality between s and e. Therefore, s can be permanent and e episodic.
Secondly, if the stupide-de-cxn could convey an absolute dispositional
ascription and no relative one, (which I don't think is the case), we would
predict, contrary to fact, no difference in acceptability to arise between
sentences (16a) and (16b).
(16)
a. C'est un homme intelligent. Mais il est quand même stupide d'avoir
dansé sur la table.
He is a smart man. But he's nevertheless stupid to have danced on the
table.
b. C'est un homme intelligent. #Mais il est quand même stupide.
He is a smart man. But he's nevertheless stupid.
Indeed, in both cases, we should get a contradictory discourse made of two
opposite ascriptions of absolute dispositions. However, this is not the case in
(16a).
I agree however with the reviewer's intuition that ascriptions of relative
permanent stupidity like (14a) and (15a) seem very close to convey an
absolute permanent stupidity ascription. I come back to this point in Section
3.2.
We have a new problem to solve though. Indeed, in admitting that relative
ascriptions can be permanent, we lose Oshima's solution to the entailment
puzzle, which should therefore be accounted for in another way.
3. Revisiting the entailment puzzle
My claim is that under some readings of the two constructions (that previous
authors seem to neglect), the entailment from the stupide-de-cxn to the
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stupide-cxn does go through. Therefore, the entailment should not be
predicted to be systematically blocked. I will firstly examine which readings
are preferred with which tense and which context, and come back to the
entailment puzzle afterwards. The second relative reading (selected with the
gerund) is ignored along the way for the sake of clarity. Given its
unlikeliness, I will also completely ignore the transitory absolute reading.
Although possible, it is indeed weird to ascribe an ephemeral disposition to a
person independently of any of her actions, cf. the end of Section 2.2.2.
3.1. Preferred readings
3.1.1. The stupide-cxn
In French, the passé composé favours the relative reading of stupide
predicates, even when the infinitival or the gerund is syntactically absent. For
instance, for a sentence like Pierre a été stupide, the relative reading is
selected out of the blue. The way I account for this preference below is
roughly similar to Mari & Martin (2007)'s account of the interpretation of
pouvoir.
As mentioned before, relativized dispositions are preferably construed as
temporally bounded: they are by default attributed the same temporal
boundaries as the act through which they manifest themselves. Since
sentences with the passé composé express bounded eventualities, they
therefore favour the relative interpretation. But this is only a preference; it
can be overriden in the right context. For instance, (17) can also denote a
bounded permanent absolute reading (there was a period where Pierre was
an intelligent person, although he's not anymore), where intelligence is
ascribed independently of any particular action(s).
(17)
Pierre a été-PERF intelligent.
Pierre has been intelligent.
i.Transitory relative reading
ii. Permanent (generic) absolute reading
iii. Permanent (habitual) relative reading
(17) has a third reading, namely the permanent relative reading, which is then
habitual. This is for instance the case in presence of an adverb like toutes ces
années “all these years”, as in Pierre a été intelligent toutes ces années
“Pierre has been smart all these years”, meant as ascribing intelligence to
Pierre relatively to a particular kind of situations.
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A sentence like (17) has therefore two permanent readings. There is a truthconditional difference between the two: while an absolute disposition can in
principle never be instantiated (Pierre can be “absolutely” intelligent without
never having the opportunity to exert this disposition), a relativized
disposition must by definition take place in a certain situation. Thus contrary
to (17ii), (17iii) can in principle be true if Pierre never exerted his
intelligence.
With an imperfect tense on the matrix clause, the preferences are reversed:
(2)
a. Feynman est (était) stupide.
Pierre is (was) intelligent.
i. Permanent (generic) absolute reading
ii. Permanent (habitual) relative reading
iii. Transitory relative reading
Out of the blue, a sentence like (2a) is by default understood as denoting a
permanent absolute disposition because it expresses an unbounded
eventuality, which matches the representation we have by default of
permanent absolute dispositions. However, the same sentence can also have a
relative reading though, if the context makes clear that the ascription is
relativized to a specific act. It then preferably has a transitory reading.
3.2.2. The stupide-de-cxn
In presence of the infinitival, the relative reading is automatically selected.
The transient interpretation of the matrix clause is then preferred by default
(and it is in fact the only one recognised by sharped eyed semanticists like
Barker and Oshima).
(2)
b. Feynman est/était stupide de danser comme ça.
Feynman is/was stupid to dance like that.
This is true independently of the tense chosen. However, the judgements
collected above about (14)-(15) showed that with an imperfect tense on the
matrix clause (present or imparfait), this preference for the transient reading
can be overridden. Even more: the permanent reading is massively preferred
in (14a) and (15a). This might seem as a counter-evidence for the claim made
above that the stupide-de-cxn is by default interpreted as transitory. I think
that it is not the case. The fact that almost no subject points to the possible
transient reading of these sentences is most probably due to the contrastive
context I built for the tests reported above, somehow inciting the subject to
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choose between a more permanent and a more transient interpretation.
3.2. Back to the entailment puzzle
Now that the different readings have been listed and ranked with each
relevant tense, let us come back to the entailment puzzle. I will firstly address
the case of sentences with a present perfect on être, and then come to the
sentences with a present on the same verb (the case of the imparfait is
roughly similar).
With a present perfect on être, the stupide-de-cxn trivially entails the stupidecxn when an implicit infinitive is interpreted in the stupide-cxn. For instance,
(19a) (i) entails (19b) (i), and (19a) (ii) entails (19b) (ii).
(19)
a. Feynman a été stupide de danser sur les tables.
Feynman has been stupid to dance on the tables.
i. Transitory, relative
ii. (Bounded) permanent, relative (stupide toutes ces années de...)
b. Feynman a été stupide.
Feynman has been stupid.
i. transitory, relative (stupide de...)
ii. (bounded) permanent, relative (stupide toutes ces années de...)
iii. (bounded) permanent, absolute
Since as we just saw in the previous section, the most salient reading of
sentences as (19a) and (19b) is of the same nature – they both prefer the
transitory relative reading (i) – the entailment from (19a) to (19b) is generally
easily admitted by native speakers.
The relation from (19a) to (19b) under its readings (iii) is more interesting; I
come back to it later.
Trivially again, if an implicit infinitival is interpreted in (20b), (20a) (i)
entails (20b) (i), and (20a) (ii) entails (20b) (ii):
(20)
a. Feynman est stupide de danser sur la table.
Feynman is stupid to dance on the table.
i. permanent, relative
ii. transitory, relative
b. Feynman est stupide.
Feynman is stupid.
i. permanent, relative (stupide de...)
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ii. transitory, relative (stupide de...)
iii.permanent, absolute
However this time, these two entailments do not match the common speakers
intuitions, since the transitory relative reading is the most salient reading in
(20a) and the absolute permanent reading is preferred in (20b).
Note that the semantic analysis of the stupide-de-cxn given in (7) also
predicts that the entailment goes through from the relative reading to the
absolute one in all worlds epistemically accessible from the base world. More
concretely, (20a) (i) is predicted to entail (20b) (iii). Indeed, if the relative
reading as defined in (7) is verified, then in all words epistemically accessible
from the base world, there is a state s satisfying P1 such that a is the holder of
s. The same way, (19a) (ii) is predicated to entail (19b) (iii) in those worlds.
Is it a bad prediction of the analysis? I don't think so. In fact, the intuition of
speakers comforts the idea that the “absolute” stupidity ascription is
contained in the relative stupidity ascription. Remember these comments
about (14a): “the fact that she invited her neighbour signifies that she is a
real idiot, it betrays her stupidity”, or “in (14a) we start from the principle
that he's an idiot”, “the present has an absolute value, the person is
permanently stupid!”.
The reluctance to assume the entailment from (20a) to (20b) has two sources
at least. Firstly, as we just recalled, while the transitory reading is preferred in
(20a), the permanent one is favoured in (20b). Secondly, under the permanent
reading of the stupide-de-cxn, the reasoning embedded in the construction
resembles a logical fallacy, in that it draws an inductive generalization (be
permanently stupid) on the basis of poor evidence (a single dancing-on-thetable event). But the semantic analysis should not try to somehow “correct”
this hasty generalisation by not taking it into account. If people make these
hasty generalizations, and feel that the stupide-de-cxn conveys them, as the
speakers quoted above suggest, we should not refrain from reflecting it in the
semantic analysis.
4. Two kinds of relative stupidity ascriptions
In the introduction, it was observed that there are at least two ways in French
to express a “relative” stupidity ascription in French, namely the stupide-decxn and the gerund construction (stupide-en-cxn), as in (3a) and (3b). In this
section, I show that the two “relative” constructions differ in their semantic
and pragmatic properties, contra what is claimed by e.g. Landau (2009:324).
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A first difference to note between the two constructions is that the stupide-encxn does not systematically presuppose the event described in the gerund. Its
presuppositionality varies with the tense on the main clause, which suffices to
make clear that it is not presuppositional by itself, contrary to the stupide-decxn. With the imperfect tenses, the gerund construction presupposes the
event, cf. (21a) which entails (21e). With the passé composé, it does not, cf.
(21b) which does not entail (21e). The presupposition is systematically kept
when the gerund is fronted, cf. (22c) or postponed but prosodically detached,
cf. (22d). This is expected, since gerunds in (22c) and (22d) are appositives,
and appositives are presuppositional, cf. Beaver (2006).11
(21)
a. Peut-être que Pierre est intelligent en vendant sa maison.
Maybe Pierre was-IMP. /is clever in selling his house.
b. Peut-être que Pierre a été-PRES. PRFCT intelligent en vendant sa maison.
Maybe Pierre was clever in selling his house.
c. Peut-être qu'en vendant sa maison, Pierre a été-PRES.
intelligent.
PRFCT/était-IMP/est
Maybe in selling his house, Pierre was/ is intelligent.
d. Peut-être que Pierre a été/était/est intelligent, en vendant sa maison.
Maybe Pierre was/ is intelligent, in selling his house.
e. Pierre is selling his house.
Secondly, the gerund and the infinitival do not convey the same relation
between the state and the action they describe. A first indication of this is that
the gerund and the infinitival can simultaneously be used in the same
sentence.
(22)
a. En vendant sa maison, Pierre a été intelligent de se débarrasser d'un grand
poids.
In selling his house, Pierre has been clever to get rid of a heavy burden.
b. Pierre a été intelligent de se débarrasser d'un grand poids en
vendant sa maison.
Pierre has been clever to get rid of a heavy burden in selling his house.
A second indication that they convey two different relations between the state
and the event is that there is no entailment from the stupide-en-cxn towards
the corresponding stupide-de-cxn. For instance, (23) is not a contradictory
statement..
11
Beaver (2006) is cited by Prévot et al. (2009). See Potts (2005) for the
alternative view that appositives are conversational implicatures.
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(23)
Pierre a été intelligent en s'achetant son nouveau portable. Enfin, je ne suis
pas sûre qu'il ait été intelligent de l'acheter (il en a déjà un), mais il a été
intelligent de choisir un clavier résistant aux liquides.
Pierre has been clever in buying his new notebook. Well, I'm not sure he has
been clever to buy it (he already has one), but he was clever to choose a
spill resistant keyboard.
As proposed above, the event e described by the de-infinitive manifests s. On
the other hand, the gerund merely describes the action allowing the controller
a to manifest his/her quality. But this “opportunity” to manifest some
cleverness does not have to manifest cleverness itself. For instance, buying a
notebook can be a way for Pierre to manifest some cleverness, without being
by itself a manifestation of cleverness. I propose to call Occasion the relation
between s and the event “enabling” a to manifest his/her quality.
Consequently, I will call Occasion the relation denoted by the gerund, while
Manifestation is the relation denoted by the de-infinitive.
To be sure, the occasion for a disposition to take place can also be its
manifestation. In fact, it seems that in absence of a de-infinitive, the gerund is
interpreted as describing the occasion and the manifestation of the
disposition.
(24)
En achetant son nouveau portable, Pierre a été intelligent.
In buying his new notebook, Pierre has been clever.
For instance, (24) invites to the inference that Pierre was clever to buy his
new notebook. But one deals here with a pragmatic enrichment of the
sentence, and not with one of its semantic components, since (24) leaves
open the possibility that the quality manifests itself through another action, as
shown by (23).
A third indication that the gerund and the de-infinitival differ is that with a
gerund, stupid-predicates can embed under predicates of desire.
25)
Pierre a voulu être intelligent en achetant son portable.
Pierre wanted to be clever in buying his notebook.
(25) is fine, which suggests that the stupide-en-cxn does not convey the kind
of epistemic statement hidden in the stupide-de-cxn and responsible for the
unembeddability puzzle.
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Fourthly, some adjectives can enter the stupide-en-cxn, but are somehow odd
with the stupide-de-one, cf. (26). 12
(26)
a. Pierre a été infidèle en dormant avec Léa.
Pierre has been unfaithful in sleeping with Léa.
b. ??Pierre a été infidèle de dormir avec Léa.
Pierre has been unfaithful to sleep with Léa.
Fifthly, while adj-to- and adj-of-nps-cxns accept perfect infinitivals, gerunds
cannot be easily perfectivized in these constructions.
(27)
a. Pierre a été intelligent d'avoir bu seulement un verre de vin.
Pierre has been clever to have drunk one glass of wine only.
b. ??Pierre a été intelligent en ayant bu seulement un verre de vin.
Pierre has been clever in having drunk one glass of wine only.
The contrast in (27) can be explained in the following way. The gerund
imposes an temporal overlap between the eventuality denoted by the
predicate and the one of the main clause (cf. Rihs 2010).13 When the gerund
is perfectivized, it denotes a resultant state. Thus, (27b) implies that the state
of intelligence is concomitant with the resultant state of the drinking event,
which is not the desired interpretation. On the other hand, the infinitival does
not have the same temporal constraint, and thus (27a) goes through.
Finally, on the syntactic side, the infinitive and the gerund also behave
differently. Firstly, contrary to the gerund, the infinitive cannot be anteposed
(*To sell his computer, John was clever, cf. Kertz 2006). Secondly, contra
what is claimed by Léger (2006:243), extraction out of the infinitive is
possible, cf. (28a). But it is completely unacceptable out of the gerund, cf.
(28b).
(28)
a. Qu'est-ce que Jean a été intelligent de vendre?
What Jean has been clever to sell?
b. *Qu'est-ce que Jean a été intelligent en vendant?
What Jean has been clever in selling?
12
13
I have not found the relevant differences between the quality denoted by
unfaithful and the stupid predicates. Similar to infidèle in French are partial
'partial', froid 'cold', parfait 'perfect', fouineur 'nosy', réprobateur 'reproachful'.
Rihs (2010) shows that the arguments of Gettrup (1977) and Kleiber (2007)
against the idea that the gerund imposes simultaneity are in fact not decisive.
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Given that extraction is easier out of a complement than out of an adjunct (cf.
Huang 1982), I take (28) to be an indication that the infinitive is a
complement of the adjective (see also Barker 2002), while the gerund is an
adjunct.
5. Conclusions
The analysis developed in this paper can be summarised as follows. Firstly, I
showed that the difference between the permanent and temporary readings of
stupid predicate should not be equated with the difference between their
absolute and relative uses. In fact, relative stupidity ascription can be
transitory or permanent. Tense plays the crucial role in the disambiguation of
these predicates in absence or in presence of an infinitive. Secondly, I argued
that the event denoted by the de-infinitive is a Manifestation of the state s
described by the adjective. Thirdly, it was shown that the de-infinitive and
the gerund differ on the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic side. Finally, it
was argued that despite the first intuition, the entailment from the stupide-decxn to the stupide-cxn does go through in some readings of the two
constructions.
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