Demographics, Internal Stability and Security in China Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea den Boer (Texas A&M University and the University of Kent) April 2014 The rise of China and its impact on regional and international security has increasingly become a focus of attention for policymakers and scholars of international relations. In this paper, we argue that China is unlike any other previous aspirant for global power due to its highly abnormal sex ratio favoring males, and that because of this profound difference, existing international relations theories may be inadequate to explain that nation’s likely trajectory in the international system. Our research demonstrates that significant man-­‐made alterations to sex ratios resulting in profound dislocations to societal marriage markets can undermine national stability and security, particularly when coupled with other demographic trends arising from China’s low fertility. The continuing growth in China’s population, its age-­‐sex structure and the degree of gender imbalance have contributed to increased societal instability characterized by a rise in violent crime, increased numbers of secret societies and gangs, increased levels of muscular nationalism, and increased prostitution and trafficking in women and children. These national effects, in turn, can have regional and international repercussions. Demographic Masculinization and National Security China’s population is unique in terms of its size (1.34 billion people), but also due to the fact that men currently outnumber women by at least 34 million. The gender imbalance in the population may in fact be greater than suggested by recorded figures as our analysis of China’s 2010 Census reveals significant problems of undercounting. The sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) of the child and young adult population has been increasing since 1980, when China introduced the national family planning strategy known as the “one child policy.” The abnormally high birth sex ratio of 118-­‐120 males per 100 females, which has been rising since 1980, means that the sex structure of the youth and young adult population will persist for the near future despite the government’s attempts in the past ten years to redress the gender imbalance. The dearth of women among the young adult population is of particular concern to scholars who estimate that the sex ratio of the marriageable population will continue to rise and will peak between 2030 and 2045, with the effect that at least 20% of men will be unable to marry. A surplus of 40-­‐50 million bachelors throughout the mid-­‐ to late-­‐ 21st Century will have a significant effect on China’s stability and development as a nation. The men who comprise China’s involuntary bachelors (referred to as “bare branches”) typically have low socio-­‐economic status, with low levels of education and few marketable skills. These men feel disenfranchised from established society and their inability to form a family deepens their aggrievement with the existing social order. The increasing number of involuntary bachelors in China is a cause of great concern: sociological research shows that male criminal behavior drops significantly upon marriage and that the presence of significant numbers of unmarriageable men can be destabilizing to societies. In the case of China, by 2020 and beyond, the fact that a sizeable percentage of young adult males will not be making that transition will have negative social repercussions, including increased crime, violent crime, crimes against women, vice, substance abuse, and the formation of gangs that are involved in all of these antisocial behaviors. Unattached young adult males are several times more likely to engage in these types of behaviors than attached young adult males. Furthermore, unattached young adult males tend to congregate, and when they do, their behavior as a group becomes more antisocial and less risk averse. In addition to these types of antisocial behavior, Chinese history points to examples of bare branch gangs in the 19th century that coalesced into small armies, and then further coalesced into larger forces that challenged the authority of the government in their area. Historical examples 1 | P a g e demonstrate that one possible consequence of extremely high sex ratios is a significant change in the cost-­‐benefit calculus of the state concerning conflict, even interstate conflict. Deterrence of a state with abnormally high sex ratios may be more complicated than the deterrence of a state with a normal sex ratio, and this is something that US policymakers should keep in mind as they contemplate the rise of China as a world power. The high concentrations of involuntary bachelors in China’s poorer provinces (there are already a significant number of “bachelor villages”) may also be exacerbated by the presence of ethnic minorities in these areas, where the gender imbalance may contribute to social tensions. In fact the enforcement of strict family planning policies on the ethnic populations in these provinces is already a source of growing discontent in many of the Northern and Western provinces. China’s Aging Population and Declining Working-­Age Population One cannot look at China’s abnormal sex ratios in a vacuum. Other factors of an economic, cultural, and demographic nature must be considered alongside the rise of bare branches in China. Most of the developed nations of the world are aging due to sub-­‐replacement birth rates. China is also aging, but China is different from the other aging countries of the world in that a) it is not yet fully developed, b) most of its population is still poor, and c) it has the highest sex ratio in the world. By 2055, China’s elderly population will exceed the elderly population of all of North America, Europe, and Japan combined, and this is exacerbated by the now declining working-­‐age population. China’s impressive economic growth has been facilitated by its expanding working-­‐age population—the population aged 15-­‐64 increased by 55 percent between 1980 and 2005, but this age cohort is now in decline due to the declining fertility rate: in 2012 he working age population declined by 3.5 million and is expected to continue to decline unless there is a dramatic shift in China’s fertility rate. By 2050, one-­‐quarter of China’s population will be over the age of 65. Aging will have a negative effect on economic growth through higher pension and healthcare costs, fewer low-­‐income jobs, increased wage depression, slowing economic growth and job creation, declining interest from foreign investors, lower entrepreneurship, and higher budget deficits. There are other possible repercussions, as well. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Global Aging suggests that aging societies will shift their spending priorities, with a lower priority placed on infrastructure, defense, and education. Labor force declines also translate into lower tax revenues for governments, and if these governments are tempted by deficit financing, global financial stability may be compromised. The CSIS Commission feels that there may be a shift in global economic, political, and perhaps even military power away from aging societies. This may lead to a global economic recession or depression as the international system nears the second third of the 21st century. As noted above, however, the normal trajectory of aging nations, such as we see in Europe, may not apply to China. China will not gracefully relinquish its international power as Europe will because China has yet to enjoy the zenith of such power. We argue that China’s leaders, fully cognizant of the intersection of its long-­‐term trends in terms of sex ratio, aging, and development, may come to the realization—as has Russia—that any power gains it aims to make in the international system must be made in the short-­‐term, since in the long-­‐term, its prospects for such action will be severely compromised. Highly abnormal sex ratios may aggravate that perception, as we discuss below. China’s Floating Population It appears, then, that there may be a period of about 10-­‐20 years left in which China can still hope to experience the type of growth to which it has become accustomed. After that, levels of unemployment, shifts in government spending, and insecurity may mean that internal discontent is likely to rise sharply. One source of growing discontent in China concerns the government’s control of migration: the 1958 household registration system, or hukou, separates citizens into two key 2 | P a g e categories of urban and rural hukou and acts as an internal passport system to control residence and mobility within China, but further creates a class system based on whether one holds a rural or urban hukou. The rural hukou entitles the holder to land, whereas the urban hukou provides greater social benefits—the hukou determines whether individuals and their families are entitled to social welfare, housing, medical services, and schooling. Although migration outside of one’s hukou is illegal, China’s growth in the past thirty years is largely due to the workforce provided by migration to manufacturing zones in the coastal regions—China’s migrant or floating population has currently reached 269 million. In the Third Plenum held in November 2013, the Chinese government announced that they would be reforming the household registration system to make it easier for rural migrants to obtain an urban hukou, which may help to alleviate some of the discord between migrants and residents and reduce migrants’ vulnerability to abuse in the job market. For the near future, the floating population is a potent source of social instability. Although China’s official unemployment rate has hovered at approximately 4% for the past few years, true unemployment in China may be 12–20 percent: because unemployment figures apply only to those who are formally registered in the hukou system, China’s floating population (269 million), is excluded from unemployment figures. Comprising just 6 percent of the population in 2000, the floating population grew to 16.5 percent of China’s total population in 2010 and is expected to continue to increase each year. The floating population is linked to violent protests, some involving thousands of people, in areas of unemployment or in response to government seizures of land or other government actions, as well as gang activity. According to the Chinese Academy of Governance, the number of protests in China has increased greatly during the past decade, rising to 180,000 reported mass incidents in 2010. The floating population is rapidly changing the landscape of China’s urban areas and the Chinese government is aware of both the benefits and risks posed by internal migrants. The current floating population is young—62% are under the age of 35 and the majority of them have a junior high school level of education or less, and only slightly male (53%), although the sex composition of the floating population varies by geographic area and by employment sector. The sex ratio of the migrant population demonstrates clustering of men in specific areas—there are seven provinces where the sex ratio of the migrant population is above 120: Tianjin (166.1), Xizang (133.5), Qinghai (128.7), Shaanxi (120.5), Yunnan (120.2), Inner Mongolia (120.1), and Guangdong (120.1). Of these seven provinces, Guangdong may be the most significant because it accounts for 15.5% of the migrant population (men outnumber women among the migrant community by 3.1 million in Guangdong). The gender imbalance of migrants in these areas may mean that these areas are at risk for higher levels of crime and greater social instability. Compounding the situation is the March 2014 announcement of the state’s National New-­‐
Type Urbanization Plan in March 2014, which aims to increase urbanization from current levels of 54% to 60% by 2020, and plans to ensure that 45% of those in urban areas have official urban status. The harmonious living conditions for migrants and urban residents sought by the government will be extremely difficult to achieve if 15%, or over 210 million, are denied the benefits given to those with an urban hukou. Furthermore, this mandated aggregation of the population will not only deepen resentment among many urban and rural residents, but will also provide an improved logistical foundation for recruitment of the disaffected, including bare branches, by groups with grievances against the current system. Current domestic consequences of the sex imbalance Although we predict that the imbalance in China’s age-­‐sex structure will peak in the next fifteen to twenty years, the negative consequences of the imbalance are already felt in terms of threats to women’s health and physical security (through increased trafficking, kidnapping of children, prostitution, risky sexual behavior leading to a rise in sexually transmitted diseases, abnormally 3 | P a g e high rates of suicide for women of child-­‐bearing age, and increased commodification of women) and increased violence and risky behavior linked to high sex ratio areas. Chinese criminologists acknowledge that China has experienced an unprecedented accelerated growth in criminal gangs in the past twenty years. Although the causes of the increased criminal activity are complex, the sex imbalance and the large numbers of unmarried men are exacerbating factors. An estimated 10-­‐30% of the floating population participates in criminal secret societies known as black societies (heishehui), groups believed to account for the majority of criminal activity in China, or in “dark forces” (e’shili), the more loosely organized criminal gangs. At the moment, China views the rise in gangs and increased crime rates as local, not national, problems, although many gangs are operating both nationally and internationally, and often with the collaboration of local government officials, as demonstrated by the recent crackdown in Chongqing (2009-­‐2010). The Ministry of Public Security has initiated rounds of “strike hard” campaigns to try and eliminate criminal gangs, but with limited success—tens of thousands have been arrested, but tens of millions are suspected to be involved in criminal gangs. Scholars testing the theory that high sex ratios lead to increased criminal activity in China found that for every 1 percent alteration of the sex ratio in favor of males, there was a corresponding 3.7 percent increase in violent and property crime rates in China. We do not claim that criminal violence results from large numbers of men, or that increased competition for mates leads to more violence, rather that high sex ratios coupled with marriage patterns that result in sizeable percentages of unmarriageable men who will not develop a meaningful stake in their societies can lead to violent behavior through which these men attempt to seek resources denied them. The Confluence of Aging and Masculinization in China: Government Responses When we look at global aging, China’s aging, and the synergy between the likely economic effects of aging and the effects of abnormal sex ratios on a society, the confluence is likely to be dangerous for the Chinese government. There appears to be an inevitable economic slowdown approaching in the global economy that will last well beyond the effects of the Great Recession of 2008, primarily due to aging trends in the most advanced economies. This global slowdown is likely to amplify the economic storm clouds already looming for China. A society with a masculinized young adult population, such as China’s, is likely to respond to significant economic hardship with heightened domestic instability and crime. As a result, the Chinese regime may be hard pressed to maintain its usual control over society and to meet this internal security challenge, the regime may well become more authoritarian as time goes on. Above all, however, the question for the government will be how to attract and maintain the allegiance of its bare branches and how to channel them toward less internally destructive deeds. Governments do recognize the growing threat posed by bare branch collectives. Historically, several strategies have been used to this end: encouraging outmigration, colonizing frontier areas, initiating large-­‐scale public works projects, immigration of women, and so forth. One sees some of these strategies in use already in China, such as increased migration of Chinese, especially young adult males, to the Russian Far East and other areas; expansion of settlement efforts in Xinjiang; erection of the Three Gorges Dam and immense canal projects; and a more-­‐or-­‐
less blind eye to cross-­‐border chattel markets in women from North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Burma (Myanmar), and other nations. But arguably China has not yet faced the real future of this possible threat. As noted previously, with each passing year, both the sheer number and the proportion of bare branches in China (and India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and several other surrounding nations) will grow significantly. In a survey of the historical literature of bare branch behavior, two troubling trends in governmental response were noted. Governments facing appreciable numbers of bare branches move toward greater authoritarianism to counter the rising instability. And in a few cases, it 4 | P a g e became clear that the government had chosen to co-­‐opt bare branches into the military to lower their level of resentment, only to find it necessary to send those armies away on distant adventures for fear of the ramifications of keeping those bloated armies close to population centers and seats of power. Arming bare branches and training them in military tactics only amplified the threat they posed to the government. In a sense, then, prospects for both democracy and peace were diminished by the creation of large numbers of bare branches in society. What we learn from history, then, is that masculinization of sex ratios degrades security for the country affected, and also for its neighbors. As security analysts contemplate the future of conflicts such as Jammu and Kashmir, and the Taiwan Strait, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that the calculus of deterrence may be altered by the presence of large numbers of bare branches in the affected countries over the next two to three decades, especially as the power of the West and Japan fades appreciably in the normal trajectory of aging nations. Furthermore, as noted, many of China’s neighbors, such as Pakistan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam also have abnormally masculinized populations, though not to as great a degree as China. Though abnormal sex ratios are certainly not a necessary condition for any conflict or war, predispositions to conflict may be—and historically have demonstrably been—aggravated by the existence of a large surplus of young adult males in one’s society, who form a standing pool of potential recruits for gangs, rebellions, or armies. When the domestic instability caused by bare branch collectives evolves into a more direct threat to governmental control of society, the government will see the internal threat from bare branches as more threatening than traditional external threats. In a context where the traditional great powers are fading in the normal aging trajectory, this bespeaks a relatively short window of time in which China can significantly alter its international system status in line with domestic pressures that include extremely high sex ratios. The Chinese government realizes that they must maintain the respect of their bare branch populations: a government perceived as weak invites the contempt of its society’s young men who might also exploit vulnerabilities to undermine the regime’s control over the country. Governments quickly learn they must react swiftly and aggressively in the wake of perceived slights and insults from other countries. A “virile” form of nationalism begins to creep into the government’s foreign policy rhetoric, and it is stoked domestically to keep the allegiance of young adult bare branches. Faced with worsening instability at home and an unsolvable economic decline, China’s government may well be tempted to use foreign policy to “ride the tiger” of domestic instability. The twin themes in Chinese nationalism of anti-­‐Japanese feeling and the unfulfillment of China’s reunification with Taiwan will still be deeply resonant to much of the population of China at that time because the young adults of that time, according to Chinese customary practice, will have largely been raised by their grandparents (who were born before World War II). In fact, these may be the only themes left that could unite the Chinese population, young and old, behind the national government. The government’s fanning of nationalist fervor has already been seen in the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where large and violent protests around the country were accompanied by the dramatic public destruction of Japanese goods and strong expressed anti-­‐Japanese sentiments. An interesting demographic situation that may well have its attractions for China is opening to the north. Russia’s case is especially acute, given its high mortality rates and very low birth rates. Russia loses the better part of a million people per year. The Russian Far East is rapidly depopulating and is at the same time the site of most of Russia’s great mineral and oil wealth. There has been a tremendous influx of Chinese into this area, with the result that 10–12 percent of the population of the Russian Far East is, in fact, now Chinese. Bare branches have traditionally been the first colonizers abroad, and it may be that Chinese bare branches will play an important role in the Sinification of the Russian Far East. Economic control of these natural resources would place China in a much better position to mitigate any economic decline it may face, but it could also have grave geopolitical consequences for the international community. 5 | P a g e US-­China Relations In the next two to three decades, we are likely to see observable security ramifications from the masculinization of China’s young adult population, especially when combined with an understanding of the economic and political consequences of global aging, the particularities of Chinese nationalism, and the epidemiology of pandemics such as AIDS. Even if sex ratios were rectified today, young adult sex ratios in China will result in a significant percentage of bare branches for at least the next 30 years. The US needs to be aware of the possibility of greater internal instability that will arise if China experiences reduced economic growth and increased rates of unemployment, which may disproportionately affect the bare branch population. Furthermore, as noted above, the US needs to consider the effect of China’s bare branches on its behavior with Japan, Russia, and bordering high sex ratio states. As China’s leaders contemplate the unique intersection of several long-­‐term demographic and economic trends, US policymakers should be aware that these leaders may perceive a relatively short window of time for China to leverage its rise so as to maximize power and achieve its perceived national interests in the regional and international system. Implications for American Foreign Policy The United States has no control or even influence over China’s population policies, and no other international actors do, either. Furthermore, while China’s population control policies are at the heart of its age-­‐sex population imbalance, China does not respond favorably to criticism of its domestic policies. There is much evidence, however, that suggests that supporting Chinese efforts to improve gender equality in areas of education, employment, and family planning can lead to positive reforms in Chinese policies in some areas. For example, instead of condemning the use of coercion in China’s family planning policies, actors such as the UNFPA, the Ford Foundation, the Population Council, and various scholars in the US have initiated or supported projects in China to increase the quality of reproductive healthcare and demonstrate that family planning can be successful while promoting women’s reproductive rights. The ‘Quality of Care’ projects in China are a positive example of collaboration to achieve greater rights for women and promote gender equality. In addition to support for gender equality measures in China, which would certainly be strong should a future American president hold that “the subjugation of women is a direct threat to the security of the United States,” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did, it behooves American foreign policy strategists to consider how unprecedentedly high sex ratios in China will color its rise to world power. Strategic “empathy,” in the form of calculating how this unique confluence of demographic and economic factors will be viewed by Chinese leaders, is a must. We argue that China is in for a rough domestic ride ahead, and part of that difficulty is attributable to highly abnormal sex ratios among young adults in that country. We caution American foreign policymakers to remember that the calculus of deterrence for high sex ratios states may well be significantly different than that for normal sex ratio states. 6 | P a g e