Marbury v. Madison – Case Brief Summary
Summary of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and
sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The
Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before
Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to
compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the
United States.”
Issues
1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?
4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what
is specified in Article III of the Constitution?
5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional
power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the
last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of
the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States,
affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the
signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office,
he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts
are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
they both apply.
4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the
will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution
has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for
the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
http://www.lawnix.com/cases/marbury-madison.html
Fletcher v. Peck – Case Brief Summary
Summary of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (1810).
Facts
In 1795, nearly every member of the Georgia state legislature was bribed to permit the sale of 30
million acres of land at less than two cents per acre for a total of $500,000. Only one member of
the legislature voted against the legislation. The land was known as the Yazoo lands and
eventually became the states of Alabama and Mississippi.
As a result of public outrage, most of the legislators lost the following election and the new
legislature passed a statute in 1796 essentially nullifying the transactions. Those who had
purchased the land refused to accept the return of their purchase price and much of the land was
resold to bona fide purchasers at great profit.
Robert Fletcher (P) purchased 15,000 acres from John Peck (D) in 1803 for $3,000. Peck, in
spite of the 1796 statute, had placed a covenant in the deed that stated that the title to the land
had not been constitutionally impaired by any subsequent act of the state of Georgia. Fletcher
sued Peck to establish the constitutionality of the 1796 act; either the act was constitutional and
the contract was void, or the act was unconstitutional and Fletcher had clear title to the land.
Issue

Is a law that negates all property rights established under an earlier law unconstitutional?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. A law that negates all property rights established under an earlier law is
unconstitutional for violating the Contract Clause (Article I, Section 10) of the United
States Constitution.
The court, while deploring the extensive corruption in the earlier state legislature, held that
contracts signed under the original law must be accepted as valid. The motives of the legislators
could not be considered by the Court and were not the responsibility of bona fide purchasers who
were following the law. The court acknowledged that a legislature can repeal any act of a former
legislature, but that this principle did not apply where the legislature sought to undo actions taken
under the previous act while it was still valid.
The court held that the land grant was a type of contract, and therefore the Contract Clause (Art.
I, sec. 10 of the U.S. Constitution) applied. The Contract Clause states: “No State shall … pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant
any Title of Nobility.”
The court held that the 1796 law was an unconstitutional ex post facto law that sought to
penalize bona fide purchasers for wrongs committed by those from whom they were purchasing.
Disposition
Judgment for Peck. The 1796 statute was unconstitutional and the sale to Fletcher conveyed clear
title.
Concurrence (Johnson)
While states may not abrogate contracts, they may pass legislation that affects contracts.
McCulloch v. Maryland – Case Brief Summary
Summary of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
Facts
Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all banks operating in Maryland not chartered
by the state. The statute provided that all such banks were prohibited from issuing bank notes
except upon stamped paper issued by the state. The statute set forth the fees to be paid for the
paper and established penalties for violations.
The Second Bank of the United States was established pursuant to an 1816 act of Congress.
McCulloch (D), the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, issued bank
notes without complying with the Maryland law. Maryland sued McCulloch for failing to pay the
taxes due under the Maryland statute and McCulloch contested the constitutionality of that act.
The state court found for Maryland and McCulloch appealed.
Issues
1. Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though
that power is not specifically enumerated within the Constitution?
2. Does the State of Maryland have the power to tax an institution created by Congress
pursuant to its powers under the Constitution?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1. Yes. Congress has power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section 8).
2. No. The State of Maryland does not have the power to tax an institution created by
Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution.
The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the
land. There is nothing in the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied powers. If the end
be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.
The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct sovereign power or end of Government,
but only the means of carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. It may be exercised
whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers granted to the federal
government under the U.S. Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of any of the
powers expressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union be an appropriate
measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of legislative
discretion, not of judicial cognizance.
The Bank of the United States has a right to establish its branches within any state. The States
have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any manner control any of the
constitutional means employed by the U.S. government to execute its powers under the
Constitution. This principle does not extend to property taxes on the property of the Bank of the
United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary interest which the citizens of that State may hold in
this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the State.
Disposition
Reversed; judgment for McCulloch.
Note
This opinion is occasionally cited as Mccullough v. Maryland or alternatively as Maryland v.
McCulloch.
Gibbons v. Ogden – Case Brief Summary
Summary of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
Facts
New York granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right of steam boat
navigation on New York state waters. Livingston assigned to Ogden the right to navigate the
waters between New York City and certain ports in New Jersey.
Ogden (P) brought this lawsuit seeking an injunction to restrain Gibbons (D) from operating
steam ships on New York waters in violation of his exclusive privilege. Ogden was granted the
injunction and Gibbons appealed, asserting that his steamships were licensed under the Act of
Congress entitled “An act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the
coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same.” Gibbons asserted that the Act of
Congress superseded the exclusive privilege granted by the state of New York.
The Chancellor affirmed the injunction, holding that the New York law granting the exclusive
privilege was not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the grants
were valid. Gibbons appealed and the decision was affirmed by the Court for the Trial of
Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the highest Court of law and equity in the state of New
York. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
1. May a state enact legislation that regulates a purely internal affair regarding trade or the
police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate interstate commerce concurrent with
that of Congress, which confers a privilege inconsistent with federal law?
2. Do states have the power to regulate those phases of interstate commerce which, because
of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, be prescribed by a single
authority?
3. Does a state have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use of state waterways
inconsistent with federal law?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1. No. A state may not legislation inconsistent with federal law which regulates a purely
internal affair regarding trade or the police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate
interstate commerce concurrent with that of Congress.
2. No. States do not have the power to regulate those phases of interstate commerce which,
because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, be prescribed by
a single authority.
3. No. A state does not have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use of state
navigable waters inconsistent with federal law.
The laws of New York granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right of
navigating state waters with steamboats are in collision with the acts of Congress. The acts of
Congress under the Constitution regulating the coasting trade are supreme. State laws must yield
to that supremacy, even though enacted in pursuance of powers acknowledged to remain in the
States. A license, such as that granted to Gibbons, pursuant to acts of Congress for regulating the
coasting trade under the Commerce Clause of Article I confers a permission to carry on that
trade.
The power to regulate commerce extends to every type of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations and among the States. The commerce power includes the
regulation of navigation, including navigation exclusively for the transportation of passengers. It
extends to vessels propelled by steam or fire as well as to wind and sails.
The power to regulate commerce is general, and has no limitations other than those prescribed in
the Constitution itself. It is exclusively vested in Congress and no part of it can be exercised by a
State.
While the commerce power does not stop at the external boundary of a State, it does not extend
to commerce which is completely internal. State inspection laws, health laws, and laws for
regulating transportation and the internal commerce of a State fall within the state police power
and are not within the power granted to Congress.
Disposition
Reversed – judgment for Gibbons.
COHENS v. VIRGINIA
Location: Elizabeth River Parish (now site of Norfolk Naval Station)
Facts of the Case
An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen
brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State
authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters
of disputes between the states and the national government.
Question
Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the Virginia Supreme
Court's ruling?
Conclusion
Split Vote
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state
criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases
that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity
of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to
the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's
jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the
Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1792-1850/1821/1821_0
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD
Location: Dartmouth College
Facts of the Case
In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately
funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter
by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain
authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H.
Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.
Question
Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights
under the Contract Clause?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Dartmouth College, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 10
In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract
between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the
government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions
involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and
its citizens."