A Coordination-Theoretic Model of the
Military Decision-Making Process
Steven Poltrock
The Boeing Company
Seattle, WA 98124
425-373-{2729; 2883}
steven.poltrock@boeing.com
Abstract—The
processes
underlying
complex
collaborative activities such as military decision making
are inherently variable. Even within a single organization
there are many variants of processes that have the same
purpose. When coalition members must work together,
these differences may be especially large, baffling and
disruptive. Coordination theory provides a method and
vocabulary for modeling complex collaborative activities
in a way that makes both the similarities and differences
between them more visible. To illustrate this we modeled
parts of the decision-making process as defined in a field
manual. The methods for coordination defined in this
model were all drawn from a repository of collaboration
processes. This approach has promise for helping to
merge or integrate different processes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Coalition members must work together despite
differences in language, culture, policies, and
organizational processes. When two or more
organizations follow different processes or procedures to
accomplish the same goals, these differences can become
obstacles to effective collaboration. A method for
analyzing processes that identifies the root causes of their
differences may help coalitions eliminate, reconcile, or at
least understand how and why their processes differ, and
lead to more effective joint efforts.
This paper presents a top-down approach for modeling
and analyzing the similarities and differences between
related complex processes. It is based on the insight that
much of collaborative work involves activities for
coordinating inter-dependent “core” tasks. Different
groups, even if they have the same core tasks, may choose
different ways for coordinating them. These choices can
yield work processes that appear widely divergent, even
though their purposes are essentially identical. Our
approach is based on making these shared core tasks and
differing coordination choices readily visible. Previously,
we investigated variation in change management
processes [9], which are critically important, complex
processes in industry. In this paper we consider military
decision-making processes and potential sources of
variation in those processes.
Mark Klein
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
617-253-6796
m_klein@mit.edu
In the following sections we introduce coordination theory and
a method, based thereon, for modeling processes. We apply
this method to the military decision-making process as
described in Army Field Manual FM 101.5 [3]. We then
consider how variations in this process might emerge.
2. COORDINATION THEORY
Coordination theory [6, 7, 8] is the general body of theory
about how people or software agents coordinate their
activities, and it has been the subject of research in both
computer science where the focus is on coordinating software
agents, and the social sciences, where the focus is on
describing how people coordinate.
A key concept in coordination theory is that collaboration
occurs in order to manage the dependencies between tasks. A
flow dependency exists when one person creates a product
required by another person. A sharing dependency exists
when a task requires a shared resource such as the labor of
people who are involved in other tasks. A fit dependency
exists when two or more people create products that must
integrate. There are, of course, many ways to manage each
type of dependency. People communicate, share information
with one another, hold meetings, and use collaboration
technologies in order to manage these dependencies. Variation
in complex activities is due largely to different choices
regarding how to manage these dependencies [9].
Malone and his colleagues [4, 5, 7] have developed a topdown approach to modeling complex activities based on
coordination theory. In this approach, one defines a process by
first identifying the core tasks and key dependencies in that
process. The next steps are to select the coordination
mechanisms that will be used to manage each dependency and
decompose the core tasks into subtasks. The selected
coordination mechanisms may introduce new dependencies
and exceptions that will in turn require additional mechanisms
and handlers. This decomposition can continue to any desired
level of detail. A key element in this approach is a large
taxonomically-organized repository, known as the Process
Handbook, which captures the substeps of these mechanisms,
the exceptions commonly encountered with each mechanism,
as well as handlers for resolving these exceptions. These
mechanisms represent, as we shall see, high-level building
blocks for creating models of collaborative processes.
3. MILITARY DECISION MAKING
The US Army Field Manual 101-5 [3] describes the
following seven steps in the military decision-making
process:
1. Receipt of mission
2. Mission analysis
3. Course of action development
4. Course of action analysis
5. Course of action comparison
6. Course of action approval
7. Orders production.
The manual presents a systematic process, identifies who
performs each step of the process, includes templates for
the outputs of some steps, and suggests some ways that
commanders may vary the process in response to
pressures of time or other circumstances. It does not, of
course, describe how other services, foreign or domestic,
plan missions.
A Coordination Theoretic Model
The first step in developing a coordination theoretic
model is to identify the “deep structure” for the process,
i.e. the core tasks and their dependencies. Figure 1
presents three core tasks of the military decision-making
process. Receipt of a mission or expectation of a mission
is the trigger that initiates this process. The first core task
is to assess the state of the world, which includes
understanding the mission, the resources available to
carry out the mission, enemy capabilities, and the state of
the battlefield. This task encompasses the first two steps
defined in the field manual. A commander’s staff relies on
this assessment when developing courses of action, which
corresponds to the third step. The commander orders a
course of action selected from those developed by the
staff, corresponding to the last two steps. We will see that
course of action analysis and comparison emerge from the
management of dependencies because these are collaborative
activities. Note that there is no inherent implication in Figure 1
about the timing of these tasks; these three tasks could be
performed sequentially or concurrently.
Figure 1 – Core tasks of military decision making
The next step is to determine how to manage the
dependencies. Figure 1 contains only two flow dependencies,
and we begin by adding coordination processes for managing
each of these two flows as shown in Figure 2. The generic
manage-flow process found in the Handbook repository has
three parts responsible for managing the timing, usability, and
location of the flow. Each of these three parts is a process, and
like all processes they may encounter one or more exception
conditions that must be handled by some means. The
Handbook also contains exception handlers that can anticipate,
avoid, detect, or resolve exceptions. We can elaborate this
model of military decision making by selecting mechanisms
from the Handbook or by inserting the mechanisms in
common use by armed forces. In the model shown in Figure 2
and in subsequent figures the coordination mechanisms,
exceptions, and handlers found in the Handbook are labeled in
bold italic font, whereas tasks identified in Field Manual 1015 are in normal font. Figure 2 and subsequent figures show fit,
flow, or share dependencies, and they show that managing a
dependency is achieved by (iab) one or more coordination
mechanisms.
Figure 2 – Managing the flow between the core tasks
Assess State of the World
In Figure 3 we consider only the left side of the process,
decomposing the assess-state-of-the-world task and
elaborating how the flow of this assessment may be
managed. The commander and his staff determine the
information that they need and plan the reconnaissance
required to obtain that information. The reconnaissance
itself may involve many types of resources, including
sensors, aircraft, satellites, and people. The engagement
of these resources implies the existence of a share
dependency that must be managed. The coordination
mechanisms in the Handbook for managing a share
dependency include manager-based allocation, which
seems the most likely method for most resources. But this
coordination mechanism can encounter many types of
exception conditions, including resource poaching. This is
a condition in which a resource is unavailable because it
has already been assigned a lower priority task. There are,
of course, handlers for this exception condition. First, the
exception can be detected by monitoring resource
allocation metrics. Second, this exception can be resolved
by allowing higher priority tasks to preempt tasks that
have already been initiated. Figure 3 and subsequent
figures show that an exception condition is handled by
(ihb) one or more exception handlers.
The information produced by reconnaissance is integrated into
an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and
possibly other representations of the situation, requiring
contributions from all members of the staff. This integration
implies the existence of a fit dependency, which is managed
by the staff. They ensure that the information pertaining to
their area of responsibility is current and appropriately
integrated.
Managing the Flow of Assessments
Current information about the state of the world is critical
when developing courses of action. As indicated in Figure 2,
the flow of this information must be managed, including its
timing, usability, and location. Field Manual 101-5
emphasizes the importance of pushing (not pulling) the
information to ensure its timely arrival, which corresponds to
a mechanism in the Handbook for managing timing. The staff
is responsible for both assembling the information and
generating possible courses of action, and they are often
collocated to maximize their collaboration. Again, this
corresponds to a mechanism for managing the location.
Figure 3 – Assessing the state of the world
Managing the usability of the information requires
handling the exception condition in which information is
incomplete or incorrect. The Handbook suggests methods
for avoiding or detecting this exception. Incentives can be
provided to intelligence assets, information from sources
with poor reputations can be filtered out or marked as
untrustworthy, and sources can be monitored for evidence
that they have violated past commitments.
courses of action again requires managing their timing,
usability, and location, and in this case usability is critical. The
recommended course of action must be a well considered,
thoroughly evaluated plan. The staff and/or the commander
conduct a war game to evaluate the courses of action. War
games are a form of collocated multifunctional review, which
is a primary mechanism in the Handbook for avoiding delivery
of poor quality information.
Developing Courses of Action
Managing the Flow of Courses of Action
In Figure 4 we consider the right side of the process in
which courses of action are developed and evaluated, and
the commander orders a selected course of action.
Developing the course of action includes two main
subtasks: generating possible courses of action and
selecting one or more to recommend, which corresponds
to the steps of course of action analysis and comparison
defined in the field manual. Managing the flow of the
The staff delivers their recommendation to the commander
who issues the order. Field Manual 101-5 suggests that the
commander establish a schedule for the delivery of a
recommended course of action, and he will certainly be
pulling this information from his staff. They present their
recommendation to him in a collocated meeting. The
commander will also manage its usability.
Military Decision Making
Has part
Assess state
of the world
Has part
Develop courses
of action
Flow
Has part
Manage flow
iab
Manage flow
Has part Has part Has part
Has part Has part Has part
Manage
usability
Order course
of action
Recommend
COA
iab
Manage
timing
Flow
Has part
Flow
Generate
COAs
Has part
Manage
location by
collocation
Has
exception
Manage
timing by
fixed
schedule
/variable
amount/
pull
Manage
usability
Flow
wrong
thing
ihb
Handler for flow
wrong thing
Has part
Filter by
individual
Has part
Colocated
multifunctional
reviews (war
game)
Figure 4 – Developing courses of action
Manage
location by
collocation
Coordinating across the Military Hierarchy
The analysis presented above has ignored the
coordination required between different levels of the
military hierarchy, and many levels may be involved.
According to effects-based planning, at each level of the
hierarchy the commander defines his orders in terms of
the outcome expected from each lower level unit. Those
units respond with a plan for achieving that outcome. This
coordination is repeated at every level of the hierarchy
involved in the mission. [1]
and with the mission and situation are managed by concurrent
decision making of all participants. Synchronization of the
elements of the plan (and the planning activity itself) are
managed by establishing a schedule. The fit is, of course,
managed prior to initiation of the mission.
Order course
of action
Develop course
of action
Fit
Planned actions
iab
Manage fit
Figure 5 depicts two adjacent levels of the hierarchy and
some of the key dependencies between those levels. This
figure shows only two levels and only one unit at each
level, but of course there may be many levels and many
units at the lower level. The commander issues a warning
order to all of his units at the onset of the mission (a share
dependency), and these units respond with updated
information about the resources available for performing
the mission that are fit together as part of the IPB. Later
the commander issues orders to all units (another share
dependency), and each unit responds with their plans for
accomplishing the order. Again, these responses are fit
together to provide a more detailed representation of the
plan and may result in modifications to the order.
Assess state
of the world
Flow
Has part
Develop courses
of action
Has part
Flow
Fit
planned
actions
Order course
of action
Share
Mission/Order
Share
Warn
Order
Fit
resource
information
Military Decision Making
Has part
Assess state
of the world
Flow
Has part
Develop courses
of action
Has part
Has part
Has part
Manage fit prior
Manage
Manage fit by Manage consistency
via concurrent synchronization to realization
participants
decision making
via schedule
Has
exception
Has
Has
exception exception
Design
conflict
Lastminute
rework
Has
Has
exception
exception
Design
conflict
ihb
Detect conflict
by soliciting
critiques
Figure 6 – Managing the fit of lower level plans
Military Decision Making
Has part
Has part
Has part
Flow
Order course
of action
Figure 5 – Coordination between levels
We can elaborate this model of coordination across levels
of the hierarchy by defining coordination mechanisms for
each of the four dependencies depicted in Figure 5. In
Figure 6 we consider only one of the dependencies,
managing the fit of the actions planned by all units within
the course of action ordered by the commander.
The generic manage-fit coordination mechanism has
several parts that address who manages the fit, what is fit
together, and when the fit is accomplished. In this case the
fit is managed by the participants, the commander and his
staff. Consistency of the courses of action with each other
The Handbook lists several exception conditions for each of
these coordination mechanisms, and in Figure 6 we have
included design conflicts and last-minute rework as two
examples. A design conflict may occur because a course of
action involves many parties who disagree about the actions to
be taken or the likely consequences of those actions. Soliciting
critiques of the courses of action is one means identified in the
Handbook for detecting these exceptions. Note that there are
two instances of a design conflict exception shown in Figure
6, but an exception handler is shown for only one of them.
People generally do not consider how to handle all the
exception conditions that may arise in their processes but only
those that seem more likely or have greater costs when
encountered.
4. PROCESS VARIATION
When activities are collaborative, the way they are performed
varies greatly from organization to organization, from one
team of participants to another, and from one time to another
[2]. In our investigation of engineering change management
processes we found that differences between change
management processes primarily concerned how they
coordinated and handled exceptions [9]. The managers
responsible for these processes were not arbitrary in their
choices of coordination mechanisms and exception handlers;
they selected the processes that best met their circumstances
and objectives.
We have little information about variation in military decision
making, but we would be surprised if there were no variation
Table 1 - Tradeoffs for specializations of filtering out unwanted elements
Alternative
Best for
Cost
Filter by individual
Initial pruning of easy-to-find
Low
problems, such as missing data
Filter by team
Careful evaluation of resource from
High
multiple perspectives
in the processes employed by different countries or
different armed forces of a single country. Indeed, FM
101-5 [3] suggests that there is and should be variation
even between different commanders in the US Army and
in different circumstances. When there is little time
available for planning, for example, a commander may act
as a fast filter on possible courses of action instead of
waiting for a complete analysis of all options.
Quality
Low
Speed
Fast
High
Slow
Organizations may also differ in how thoroughly they define
their processes. When developing a coordination-theory model
of a process there is no obvious stopping point. Every process
has possible exception conditions, and handlers for these
exceptions can either be planned and included in the process
or invented when the exceptions are encountered. Culture may
also influence propensity to plan in greater detail.
5. CONCLUSION
Coordination theory coupled with the Process Handbook
provides a means of identifying alternative processes
tailored to meet different circumstances or goals. There
are alternative ways to manage each type of dependency,
and the Handbook provides tradeoffs among the
alternatives. Table 1, for example, presents the tradeoffs
between two methods for managing usability as part of
managing a flow dependency. Both of these alternatives
are included in Figure 4 as the process for determining
which courses of action should be recommended. The
preferred method is to consider all possible courses of
action in a war game (filter by team), but the commander
or another senior officer may exclude some courses of
action (filter by individual).
Many factors may influence which of these two processes
is employed. As Table 1 indicates, filtering by individual
is faster and may be chosen when little time is available,
but factors not included in Table 1 may also influence a
choice of processes. A commander may select filter by
team as a means of training his staff or to ensure that they
understand his intent. In some cultures or contexts a
commander may not trust all staff members and not want
to expose his views or options in a war game. Some
cultures may also constrain the ability of staff to criticize
a proposed course of action publicly.
In our analysis of engineering change management [9] we
found that the processes we examined differed in terms of
who was allowed to propose a change. Military decisionmaking processes may differ in terms of who is allowed
to propose courses of action. All members of staff are
encouraged to contribute according to FM 101-5 [3], but
this part of the process may also vary across cultures.
More senior officers in some cultures may insist upon
appearing to be the source of selected courses of action.
Those cultures require additional coordination
mechanisms for managing hidden flows of information
and ideas from subordinates, and identifying these flows
and the mechanisms used to manage them will require
research on cultural differences in process management.
Coalition operations require that people work together despite
differences in culture, organization, experience, resources, and
skills. Each coalition member is likely to have a different
process for accomplishing essentially the same tasks.
Coalition members with their own mission planning process
are likely to have difficulty appreciating why other members
follow different processes. Collaboration between coalition
members could suffer because of this failure of understanding.
They may not recognize how collaboration is intended to
occur, and consequently fail to provide information at
appropriate times or take appropriate action when information
is provided to them.
Models of mission planning based on coordination theory
could help understand the common structure of the activity
and identify differences and the reasons for those differences.
This paper considers only a subset of the dependencies that
require coordination and a subset of the coordination
mechanisms and exception handlers that could be employed in
this process. Suppose that a relatively complete coordinationtheoretic model existed for the military planning process
followed by a specific military organization. When actual
practice deviated from the model, the reasons for these
deviations could be understood by first determining whether
new exceptions occurred or different coordination
mechanisms or exception handlers were invoked. If different
processes were invoked, then tradeoff matrices could be
reviewed to determine likely reasons for the deviations.
Developing a more complete model of the processes employed
by two or more coalition members would provide visibility of
both the similarity and differences in their processes via a
similar analysis. This analysis could be the foundation for
defining a common process that spans coalition members or
for identifying points of integration between their different
processes.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
[5] Klein, M. and Petti, C. “A handbook-based
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[6] Malone, T.W. and Crowston, K. “What is
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[7] Malone, T.W., Crowston, K. and Herman, G.A.
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handbook. The MIT Press, 2003.
MIT’s contribution to this work was funded by The Boeing
Company, award MIT-BA-GTA-1.
Research was sponsored by US Army Research laboratory
and the UK Ministry of Defence and was accomplished under
Agreement Number W911NF-06-3-0001. The views and
conclusions contained in this document are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as representing the
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Army
Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government, the UK Ministry
of Defense, or the UK Government. The US and UK
Governments are authorized to reproduce and distribute
reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any
copyright notation hereon.