EVALUATION
DIVISION
Management and utilisation
of Mission Essential Tasks Lists
Report No. 13/2011
20 September 2011
ISBN
ISBN
978-0-478-27856-9 (Print)
978-0-478-27857-6 (Online)
Published
February 2012
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Ministry of Defence
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PO Box 12 703
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New Zealand
www.defence.govt.nz
MOD 5500‐127 20 September 2011 The Minister of Defence The Evaluation Division of the Ministry of Defence has undertaken a review for the Minister of Defence, pursuant to section 24(2)(e) of the Defence Act 1990, of how the NZDF manages and uses Mission Essential Task Lists to link strategic
objectives to tactical-level training, to ensure forces train only for current and
likely employment. I submit the accompanying report for your information. The Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force have been provided with copies. Merus Cochrane Deputy Secretary (Evaluation) Management and Utilisation
of Mission Essential Task Lists
Report No. 13/2011
20 September 2011
Contents
Executive summary
iii
Chief of Defence Force response
ix
Section 1
Introduction
1
Section 2
Strategic and operational-level planning
5
Section 3
Tactical level planning
11
Section 4
Discussion and recommendations
15
Annex A
Joint Mission Essential Task List development
21
Annex B
Glossary
23
Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - i
ii - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Executive Summary
Introduction
1
This study reviewed how the NZDF links strategic objectives to tactical‐level training to ensure forces train only for current and likely employment. Specifically the review examined the management and use of Mission Essential Task Lists. It also reviewed the relationship between Employment Contexts, Military Response Options, and Mission Essential Task Lists. 2
Higher level planning against the NZDF Employment Contexts, as well as actual operations, produces potential Military Response Options that serve as a basis for operational level planning. Operational planning includes the assignment of forces and the grouping of Mission Essential Tasks into the Mission Essential Task Lists required by the Military Response Options. Mission Essential Tasks are drawn from universal lists of all of the collective tasks that military units must be able to perform to meet all possible tasking. 3
NZDF Purchase Agreements and Output Plans over a five year period commencing in the 1999/2000 planning year contained objectives for Service Chiefs to introduce systems of Mission Essential Task List ‐led training into their Services. They also provided for the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to lead the introduction of the operational level Joint Mission Essential Tasks Lists as guidance and direction for the Service Mission Essential Task Lists. 4
The linking of strategic objectives to tactical employment is necessarily a multi‐layered and interconnected process involving the strategic (HQ NZDF and Ministry of Defence) level, the operational or joint (HQ Joint Forces New Zealand) level, and the tactical (Service) level. 5
Based on our reading of the Defence White Paper 2010 we accepted the Employment Contexts and the current force structure as givens for this review. Military Response Options are a product of situation specific planning, unlike Mission Essential Tasks, which are more enduring and structured compendia of all of the things that forces must train for to achieve their missions. This review focussed therefore on Mission Essential Tasks and Mission Essential Task Lists because of their fundamental and enduring importance within a planning construct aimed at ensuring that forces train only for current and likely employment. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - iii
Executive Summary
Overview
Strategic and operational level Planning
6
In about 2007 HQ Joint Forces New Zealand produced a New Zealand Defence Force Universal Joint Task List, operational level contingency plans for eight fully documented Employment Contexts, and a Joint Mission Essential Task Lists Handbook. The operational level tasks contained in the NZDF Universal Joint Task List were developed from the equivalent United States publication. The NZDF draws on United States planning and describes tasks using the same or similar language to aid interoperability with the United States and other allies. 7
HQ Joint Forces New Zealand developed the Military Response Options for the fully‐documented Employment Contexts without strategic level guidance. Military Response Options should be developed from Military Strategic Assessments, but there is no current work or awareness of this in HQ NZDF Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch. 8
HQ Joint Forces New Zealand acknowledges that these suites of documentation need updating. Work has begun to validate the contingency plans for one or more Employment Contexts in each training year. The February 2011 Christchurch earthquake prevented the intended validation of an Employment Context during Exercise Southern Katipo. 9
Standing plans for contingencies such as counter‐terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are developed at the strategic level as they include inter‐agency considerations. These plans do not appear to flow down through the operational planning levels or include Joint Mission Essential Task Lists to guide tactical level training. 10
In May 2010, the NZDF Executive Leadership Team directed that the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand present a plan for updating Military Response Options. So far this has mainly brought to the surface questions in HQ Joint Forces New Zealand about how changes should be coordinated through the strategic, operational and tactical levels, as well as the ownership of the planning processes within that headquarters. 11
Direction and guidance from HQ NZDF about the whole system of Mission Essential Task List ‐led training is lacking. The involvement of the Ministry of Defence is minimal. Development has been piecemeal. The lack of coordination results in changes in one part of the Joint Mission Essential Task List system not necessarily flowing through into other parts. iv - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Executive Summary
Tactical level planning
12
Joint Mission Essential Task Lists guide Mission Essential Task List planning by the Services. While Joint Mission Essential Task Lists change only when contingency or mission plans change, Service Mission Essential Task Lists have more of an annual planning focus consistent with training guidance provided by HQ Joint Forces New Zealand. 13
In 2003, the Army adapted the US Army’s Universal Task List to form its own Universal Task List. We saw how a Land Force Group and two of its units used higher level guidance to produce annual training plans and Mission Essential Task Lists. However, there is not harmonisation of unit level planning across like units of the two Land Force Groups. Harmonisation is desirable because forces formed for a contingency or deployment could comprise units or personnel from either Land Force Group. 14
Army formations and their subordinate units train for contingencies such as counter‐terrorism or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by including what they regard as appropriate Mission Essential Tasks in annual training plans. This approach removes the rigour of the operational planning process and creates the risk that the wrong collective training will be undertaken and that other units or Services may be training for different scenarios. 15
The Air Force is currently developing a tactical task list based on its own analysis of Employment Contexts, Outputs and operating concepts. The Air Force is grouping the resultant tasks according to the United States Air Force Tactical Task List. 16
The Air Force’s flying squadrons customarily drive training by aircraft type and the need for aircrew to advance through the various aircrew and instructor levels and maintain currency on aircraft types. 17
The Air Force’s back‐to‐basics approach offers the chance to review earlier training assumptions and to match collective training to actual operational requirements. 18
The Navy does not have a recognised tactical task list. It considers that its system for the Management of Naval Integrated Capability Assessment Reports (MONICAR) serves this purpose. The Navy uses MONICAR to plan Force Element training to meet presently funded Directed Levels of Capability and possible future Operational Levels of Capability. 19
Our impression is that maintaining Directed Level of Capability for naval Force Elements requires achievement of the training serials and objectives in MONICAR. These training serials and objectives are at a level of collective activity below tactical‐level tasks and are more to do with the capabilities of ships than possible or probable contingencies such as is the case with the Army. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - v
Executive Summary
20
While the Navy may consider there is alignment between its training serials and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, its system lacks obvious linkage to operational planning in the way envisaged in the NZDF’s Joint Mission Essential Tasks Lists Handbook. 21
The slow progress by the Services in implementing tactical task lists may in part be due to the vague specification of the requirements set out in the 1999/2000 Purchase Agreement and Output Plan. Discussion
22
Some people variously see Joint Mission Essential Task Lists and Mission Essential Task Lists as ways to carry out performance measurement, as budgetary tools, or as means of identifying the risks associated with not carrying out training. We acknowledge these views, but regard Joint Mission Essential Task Lists and Mission Essential Task Lists as the core of a system to focus collective training on current and likely future operations. 23
We questioned whether, at the tactical level, Mission Essential Task List‐
based planning is more relevant to the Army because of its need to arrange and train its forces in different ways, and less relevant to the Navy and Air Force because of their platform focus. The Navy disagreed as it regards some of its Force Elements as capability bricks in the same way that the Army does. The Air Force acknowledged that Mission Essential Task List‐
based training may be less relevant for it because of its focus on aircrew and aircrew instructor advancement and currency on aircraft types. But the Air Force also told us that training is based on approved roles or tasks. 24
There is no common scheme of battlefield or capability functions against which to reference NZDF, Army and Air Force universal tasks lists. Where linkage between Mission Essential Task List‐based operational and tactical level planning and training is required, a common schema or accurately mapped hierarchies should exist. 25
Contingency plans are based on illustrative scenarios and need to be flexible and scalable to fit actual operations. When designed in this way, and provided that they are inclusive of all likely tasking, plans have utility for making resourcing decisions about differences between current and possible future operations. 26
There are differing views on whether planning for Joint Mission Essential Task List‐based training should be a top down or a bottom up process. We believe that the top down approach is the correct one because it ensures that high‐level intent is the main determinant of operational and tactical plans. But some degree of command override is necessary so commanders vi - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Executive Summary
can ensure training maintains a full range of skills. Commanders also need flexibility to explore equipment capabilities and to enhance effectiveness through procedural and doctrinal change. 27
Joint Mission Essential Task List‐led training is a collection of disparate systems developed by HQ Joint Forces New Zealand and the Services and performance reporting is a combination of the NZDF’s Operational Preparedness Reporting System and other corporate reporting systems. An information technology project that was to have brought together exercise and activity scheduling, reporting and coordination of plans is now in abeyance due to competing resourcing priorities. Recommendations
28
It is recommended that HQ NZDF: a
develops and promulgates policy for, and appoints a sponsor to direct and guide, the ongoing development of Joint Mission Essential Task List‐based training throughout the NZDF; b
directs that NZDF task lists at both the operational and tactical levels are referenced against the same battlefield or capability functions or, if this proves to be not possible, that accurate mapping occurs between them; c
ensures that Military Response Options and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists are scalable for a wide range of responses possible under each illustrative planning scenario; d
ensures that Joint Mission Essential Task List‐based planning is inclusive of all likely contingencies 1 and not just the contingencies represented by the documented Employment Contexts; and e
within a top‐down approach to Joint Mission Essential Task List and Mission Essential Task List development; retains a degree of command override sufficient to ensure that: (i)
the focus on current operations and planning does not allow required capabilities to become dormant; or (ii)
capabilities may be researched and developed in the interests of effectiveness and procedural and doctrinal change. 1 This includes contingencies such as support to Police counter‐terrorism responses and assistance to the community in civil defence emergencies. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - vii
Executive Summary
29
It is recommended that the Navy: a
30
It is recommended that the Army: a
31
develops a tactical‐level system to demonstrate that its readiness training is aligned with relevant Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, and that there is no training redundancy. harmonises Mission Essential Task List development and training plans across units that perform the same or similar functions. It is recommended that the Air Force: a
eliminates training redundancy by ensuring that its final Air Force Task List is focused on the operational requirement rather than the capabilities of its aircraft. viii - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Chief of Defence Force response
Chief of Defence Force response
1
The contents of this report and its recommendations are noted. I am satisfied that the report presents an accurate representation of the management of the METLS processes within the NZDF. I endorse and support the findings of the report and accept the recommendations. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - ix
Chief of Defence Force response
x - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 1
Introduction
Introduction
1.1
This study reviewed how the NZDF links strategic objectives to tactical‐
level training to ensure forces train only for current and likely employment. Specifically the review examined the management and use of Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs). It also reviewed the relationship between Employment Contexts (ECs), Military Response Options, and METLs. 1.2
The nature of these planning constructs and the relationship between them is described as follows in the NZDF Output Plan. 2 … Employment Contexts are descriptions of representative and illustrative security events for which there is a likelihood that a New Zealand Government would expect to make a military response should they occur. Employment Contexts are selected through assessment of New Zealand’s geo‐strategic situation and international security trends. The Employment Contexts are also chosen on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence in the near and longer terms and the consequences for New Zealand’s Defence Outcomes if the NZDF was unable to provide an appropriate response. Employment Contexts include high‐level Operational Concepts which, in turn, drive Military Response Options (MROs) and the associated Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) … 1.3
Mission Essential Tasks are descriptions of collective activities 3 that military units must train for to achieve their missions. They are usually grouped in universal lists which are intended to be exhaustive collections of all of the tasks that military units could be required to perform to meet all of the possible missions that Government could require of them. 4 When they are operationalised into mission plans or contingency plans, selected mission essential tasks become METLs. 1.4
Mission essential tasks and their associated standards use common language in order to facilitate operational planning within the NZDF and with New Zealand’s allies. 2 3 4 NZDF 2010/2011 Output Plan, page S1‐8. ‘Collective’ denotes a task performed by a group of people as opposed to ‘individual’ tasks such as will appear in job descriptions. Although organisations’ lists of mission essential task are exhaustive, changing and new requirements will necessitate additions to the lists. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 1
Section 1 - Introduction
Background
1.5
The implementation of METLs‐based planning of collective training has been an objective of the NZDF for a number of years. A Key Result Area Objective in the NZDF’s 1999/2000 Purchase Agreement included an objective that the three Service Chiefs: Complete tactical task lists, complete with conditions and standards, for approved Employment Contexts with Response Times of up to 60 days 1.6
The last NZDF annual planning objective we found relating to mission essential tasks was in the 2004/2005 Output Plan, where the Key Priority Action Step to be led by the VCDF was to: Develop a Joint Mission‐Essential Task List with tasks and their associated conditions and standards fully developed for all NZDF strategic and Operational Level tasks. This task list must provide the logical guidance step for the single Services to develop Mission‐Essential Task Lists for each NZDF force element or group that guides the specification of training requirements. 1.7
This Key Priority Action Step introduces the important point that the development of mission essential tasks is a multi‐layered and interconnected process. The 2004/2005 Action Step required the joint or operational level 5 planning of mission essential tasks to be completed so that the Services could then implement connected systems of tactical level mission essential tasks as directed in the 1999/2000 Purchase Agreement. Review approach
1.8
This review is of contemporary relationships between ECs, Military Response Options, and METLs, as well as the management and utilisation of Military Response Options and METLs. We have not attempted to look forward to the types of Military Response Options and METLs that may be required of a future NZDF as signposted by the Defence White Paper 2010. There are two reasons for this. 1.9
Firstly, the White Paper envisages a future force structure that will see the NZDF retain and enhance its current mix of capabilities, enabling it to operate in places similar to where it is today, alongside current partners and friends. Enhancement decisions are yet to be made. 5 See the definition of the levels of military operations in the next Section. 2 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 1 - Introduction
1.10
Secondly, the first five of the Government’s Principal Tasks for the NZDF are: 6 a
to defend New Zealand’s sovereignty; b
to discharge our obligations as an ally of Australia; c
to contribute to and, where necessary, lead peace and security operations in the South Pacific; d
to make a credible contribution in support of peace and security in the Asia‐Pacific region; and e
to protect New Zealand’s wider interests by contributing to international peace and security, and the international rule of law. 1.11
These principal tasks are descriptively similar to the existing ECs in terms of geographical coverage. The current ECs and NZDF force structure present, for the time being, an effective base for the planning of Military Response Options, METLs and training. 1.12
We see Military Response Options as a product of situation specific planning, unlike mission essential tasks which are more enduring and structured compendia of all of the things that forces must train for to achieve their missions. This review has therefore focussed on mission essential tasks and METLs because of their fundamental and longer‐term importance in linking strategic intent to tactical employment. 1.13
Field work for this review was completed in June 2011. 6 Defence White Paper 2010, paragraph 4.8. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 3
Section 1 - Introduction
4 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 2
Strategic and operational level
planning
Introduction
2.1
Implementation of METLs‐based training is a multi‐layered process with multiple responsibilities. The intention was and is for HQ Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) to devise the operational or joint level lists of mission essential tasks according to higher‐level military strategic guidance. Development of the subordinate but connected tactical lists of mission essential tasks and associated planning is the responsibility of the Service Chiefs. 2.2
The terms ‘strategic level’, ‘operational level’ and ‘tactical level’ as used in this report are broadly consistent with the NZDF definition of those terms. 7 2.3
a
Military strategy concerns the broad military end‐state to support national strategic objectives. It is a product of the strategic level which is HQ NZDF and the Ministry of Defence. b
Planning and command of campaigns and major operations is at the operational level. The NZDF operational headquarters is HQ JFNZ. This leads to some planning using the terms ‘operational’ and ‘joint’ interchangeably. c
The tactical level is the Service‐level, where the training of forces to take part in joint or other operations takes place. These levels are related to mission essential tasks as follows: a
Mission essential tasks and task lists produced at the operational level headquarters (HQ JFNZ) are joint in nature. Joint METLs focus on military response options and therefore change when contingency or mission plans change. b
Services devise their own systems of mission essential tasks and task lists to focus the training they must conduct to be able to contribute to contingency and mission plans based on Joint METLs. Service METLs tend to have a more annual planning focus, on current or imminent 7 Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, NZDDP‐D, 2008. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 5
Section 2 - Strategic and operational level planning
deployments or contingency plans that are being emphasised within the annual planning focus. Strategic overview
2.4
Through the medium of defence policy and output planning the Government provides direction to the NZDF regarding the range of military responses it may wish to make to possible security events. Security events can be current or imminent operations or hypothesised events such as those represented by the Outputs and ECs in the NZDF Output Plan. The Outputs are descriptions of the capability that the Government has at its disposal for military responses under each EC. 2.5
NZDF Force Elements must be ready, within prescribed Degrees of Notice 8 or Response Times 9 to respond to directed tasking. Maintaining ‘Readiness’ 10 is expensive in terms of individual and collective training and the associated costs of ammunition and equipment maintenance and repair. It is now recognised that training costs can be reduced by maintaining higher degrees of Readiness only for more likely tasking, and lesser degrees of Readiness for less likely tasking. Scenario‐based planning including the formulation of Military Response Options, mission essential tasks and METLs is a key cost effectiveness approach. Operational level planning
2.6
Work which began in about 2003 in HQ JFNZ resulted in the production in about 2007 of a New Zealand Defence Force Universal Joint Task List, 11 a Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) Handbook, and supporting documentation 12 for representative ECs. 2.7
A top‐down approach is evident in the NZDF’s Joint METLs Handbook. According to the Handbook, strategic‐level planning against ECs involves the production of scenarios, Military Strategic Estimates and potential Military Response Options. Operational level planning further develops Military Response Options into mission plans including the assignment of Force Elements and the operational level joint mission essential tasks 8 Hours of notice, where forces have practically no time to be operationally prepared. 9 Days of notice, where forces have some time to move to an operational level of preparedness. 10 11 12 ‘Readiness’ is a qualitative measure of the, “current proficiency and effectiveness of a force element or force to conduct a range of activities defined against a Directed Level of Capability and Employment Context”, (NZDF 2010/2011 Output Plan). The New Zealand Defence Force Universal Joint Task List. This is the Joint Mission‐Essential Task List referred to in the 2004/2005 Output Plan Action Step. Strategic level plans including Military Response Options, operational level plans and a Joint Mission Essential Task/Assigned Force Element Matrix. 6 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 2 – Strategic and operational level planning
needed for the various response options. The joint mission essential tasks required for a particular Military Response Option form the Joint METL for that option. At the point that joint mission essential tasks are compiled into Joint METLs scenario‐specific conditions are applied to them. An outline of these steps is shown in Figure 2.1, and a fuller description of this process is shown at Annex A to this report. 2.8
Tactical level steps are included in Figure 2.1 to illustrate the major steps involved in turning strategic intent into tactical level training. Tactical level planning is discussed in the next section. Fig 2.1:
Outline Joint METLs-led training development
Security event
Policy-led response
Strategic-level
planning
Strategic Level
Military Strategic
Estimate (MSE)
Military Response
Option(s) (MROs)
Operational (Joint)level planning
Operational (Joint)
Level
NZDF Joint Universal Task List
JMETL
Service Universal Task List
METL
Tactical Level
Lower-level
collective tasks
Unit training plans
Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 7
Section 2 - Strategic and operational level planning
2.9
2.10
Using the processes depicted at the strategic and operational levels in Figure 2.1, HQ JFNZ has developed suites of documentation for eight representative employment contexts. The eight so‐called ‘fully documented ECs’ are: a
EC 1A: Illegal exploitation of marine resources within the New Zealand EEZ, and other low‐level threats to New Zealand territorial sovereignty b
EC 1D: Terrorist and asymmetric threats c
EC 2B: Natural and manmade disasters d
EC 2C: State failure or fragility leading to internal conflict and/or humanitarian crisis e
EC 2E: Challenges to legitimate governments, including civil war and secessionist conflict f
EC 4A: aggression to alter maritime boundaries or seize resources, or threats to freedom of navigation g
EC 4F: Inter‐State conflict h
EC 5D: Terrorist threats (“The War Against Terrorism”) The fully documented ECs represent an aggregation of other like ECs across the five geographically defined regions. In this way 23 of 28 ECs are covered by some level of contingency planning. 2.11
Furthermore, the view is also expressed in the documentation that the Joint METLs developed for the fully documented ECs can be cross referenced to modified Joint METLs to determine training requirements for operations arising from security events not covered by the standing documentation. However, see paragraph 2.15 below. 2.12
The operational level tasks contained in the NZDF Universal Joint Task List were developed within HQ JFNZ by extracting applicable mission essential tasks from the equivalent United States publication. 13 At the same time (2003 to 2007) HQ JFNZ produced the documentation comprising the eight fully documented employment contexts and the NZDF Joint METLs Handbook. 13
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 8 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 2 – Strategic and operational level planning
2.13
There has been no updating of this documentation since it was completed and HQ JFNZ acknowledges that it is outdated. 14 HQ JFNZ has commenced validating the documentation as part of an annual planning focus. HQ JFNZ intended validating employment context 2E 15 during Exercise Southern Katipo in February 2011, but the Christchurch earthquake meant that the assembled exercise forces were diverted for recovery operations. 2.14
The ownership of the planning system that produces military response options and operational‐level tasks is unclear. The planning function within HQ JFNZ should reside in J5 (Joint Plans) Branch, but because of resourcing difficulties ownership of the planning documentation has rested with the J8 (Joint Requirements, Evaluation and Development) Branch. Strategic level planning
2.15
There is a level of contingency planning that sits outside that developed at HQ JFNZ. Standing joint plans for interagency operations such as SARABAND 16 and AWHINA 17 are examples of this. Training based on Joint METLs is intended to focus on what is important and affordable, and should maintain units’ readiness for all likely tasking. However, because interagency planning sits outside HQ JFNZ, that focus is lost, and analysis to derive unit level training for these types of interagency operations is conducted at the lower operational level and the tactical levels shown in Figure 2.1. 2.16
HQ JFNZ should respond to a strategic context set by HQ NZDF. However, there is not currently any involvement by HQ NZDF in METLs planning processes. HQ JFNZ believes Strategic Commitments and Intelligence (SCI) Branch should produce the Military Strategic Estimates which set the scene for the military response options. SCI Branch has no such current work and no formal link to these processes. 2.17
In May 2010 the NZDF Executive Leadership Team directed COMJFNZ to present a plan for updating military response options. This direction has raised more questions than answers at HQ JFNZ. Issues that have arisen include: 14
See, however, paragraph 2.17 of this Section. 15 Challenges to legitimate governments, including civil war and secessionist conflict in the South Pacific. 16 SARABAND is the national counter terrorism plan. 17 AWHINA is the plan for the provision of NZDF assistance to a civil defence emergency. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 9
Section 2 - Strategic and operational level planning
2.18
a
The production of Joint METLs involves many interrelated planning processes, and piecemeal changes cannot be made to just one part of the system such as military response options. b
The required planning extends higher than HQ JFNZ. c
Ownership of the planning processes within HQ JFNZ needs clarification. There is no champion in HQ NZDF of the whole system for producing Joint METLs and direction and guidance is lacking. HQ JFNZ should not modify Military Response Options in isolation from the higher levels of the NZDF, but there is no engagement from the branches and senior leadership in HQ NZDF. The Ministry of Defence should also have a role in planning at the higher levels. The 1999/2000 Key Result Area referred to in para 1.5 above recorded that the goal involved both the NZDF and the Ministry. 10 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 3
Ta c t i c a l l e v e l p l a n n i n g
Introduction
3.1
To fit in with overall METLs‐based planning and training, the Services need to devise their own mission essential tasks, which must link upwards to support and complement the Joint METLs‐based missions and plans of higher level organisations. Service mission essential tasks link tactical employment with strategic intent. As mentioned in Section 1, Service Chiefs were required in the 1999/2000 NZDF Purchase Agreement to develop tactical task lists, complete with conditions and standards, for approved ECs with Response Times of up to 60 days. This section discusses the progress made by the Services in the intervening 11 years. Army
3.2
The Army has taken up the development and implementation of tactical mission essential tasks with the most purpose. In 2003 the Army adopted and adapted the US Army Universal Task List to be its tactical level task list. 3.3
We visited the Headquarters 2nd Land Force Group and two of its units. Although the training planning showed a thoughtful approach based on higher level guidance and annually produced METLs, we understand that not all units within the two Land Force Groups are as advanced with METLs‐based training as the 1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Logistics Regiment. 3.4
There is not always consistency in unit level planning or training between like units of the two Land Force Groups. This is inefficient in terms of planning effort and potentially ineffective in preparing forces for deployment. Land Combat, Land Combat Support and Land Combat Service Support Forces could draw on individuals and sub‐units from either or both of the Land Force Groups when preparing for some particular contingency. Different unit training and preparation complicates the blending of personnel from different Groups. 3.5
Unit training plans revealed that tactical level military essential tasks do not encompass the lowest levels of collective training, which the Army calls battle tasks. Battle tasks are at the training level where the use of unique equipment or unit Standard Operating Procedures means that the training is necessarily different between units. Achievement of Army universal tasks needs units to teach and exercise the correct battle level tasks. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 11
Section 3 - Tactical level planning
3.6
The collective training plans developed by the 2nd Land Force Group draw on command guidance and the documented ECs. As noted in paragraph 2.13 above, command guidance takes a year‐on‐year approach to emphasising selected ECs. 3.7
Units must be ready to contribute to higher level inter‐agency contingency tasks such as counter terrorist response or civil defence assistance, in addition to their military tasks. At formation and unit level analysis and selection of appropriate operational level joint mission essential tasks and their inclusion in unit training plans achieves this. However it is apparent that some unit training uses operational level guidance flowed down through the Joint METLs process, while some involves less rigorous ad hoc means. Air Force
3.8
The Air Force has an active project to develop an RNZAF (tactical level) task list. The project has taken a holistic approach by drawing on NZDF Outputs and ECs, as well as aircraft‐specific Concepts of Operations and Statements of Operating Intent. The Air Force is referencing the resultant analysis to higher‐level NZDF doctrine. 3.9
The Air Force is developing tactical tasks by Force Element, and grouping and numbering tasks according to the core competencies of the United States Air Force Air Force Tactical Task List. Tasks are also being linked to the higher‐level tasks of the NZDF Universal Joint Task List. 3.10
Force Element task development thus far has focussed on getting buy‐in from the Force Elements, but the final RNZAF tactical task list will merge like tasks together. Assignment of Force Elements to tasks will occur during mission planning at the operational level. 3.11
Traditionally, aircraft type and the need for aircrew to advance through the categorisation system 18 and maintain currency on aircraft type have driven flying training. This carries the risk that the capability of the platform rather than the requirement to contribute to joint tasks will take priority. The Air Force should utilise production of the tactical task list as an opportunity to review training against actual operational requirements. 18 Categorisation is the system whereby aircrew and aircrew instructors are qualified to perform various aircrew duties such as co‐pilot and pilot or in the case of instructors, the instructional roles they may undertake. Categorisation is specific to an aircraft type. 12 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 3 – T a c t i c a l
level
planning
Navy
3.12
The Navy view is that NZBR 99 ‐ RNZN Instructions for the Generation, Maintenance, and Evaluation of Operational Capability together with MONICAR 19 is the system that links naval collective training to METLs at the operational level. 3.13
NZBR 99 provides RNZN Force Elements with guidance and instructions on generating and maintaining operational capability. 3.14
The MONICAR suite of applications is the Navy’s primary method for planning force element training to meet DLOC and OLOC requirements, and for reporting against those states. It measures and reports on the readiness of Force Elements at DLOC and their preparedness to build upon the DLOC state and be deployable on operations. It measures and reports on current missions, future missions (within the next four weeks) and readiness and preparedness against ECs. 3.15
It appears that maintaining DLOC for Navy Force Elements is more a matter of achieving the training objectives contained in MONICAR and less of an annually directed focus on possible or probable contingencies as is the case with the Army. It seems training objectives comprise collective activities at a level below tactical tasks, probably more aligned with what the Army describes as battle tasks. This is consonant with a view within the Navy that MONICAR tasks are about training and not about doing the mission. Some question whether there is meaningful linkage between lower level Navy tasks and operational level joint mission essential tasks. 3.16
MONICAR is a useful reporting tool, but it is not a naval tactical task list or mission essential task list. Neither on its own nor in combination with NZBR 99 is it a system for linking naval tactical employment with the higher level intent expressed in Military Response Options or Joint METLs. NZBRs 60 ‐ Management of Naval Integrated Capability Assessment Reports and 99 ‐ RNZN Instructions for the Generation, Maintenance, and Evaluation of Operational Capability are silent on the subject of mission essential tasks, METLs, and any linking of training states to joint capability through contingency plans or mission plans utilising Joint METLs. 3.17
The Navy may consider that its DLOC training can be aligned or mapped to Joint METLs, but the system lacks transparency and clear linkage to operational planning in the way envisaged in the NZDF’s Joint METLs Handbook. 19
Management of Naval Integrated Capability Assessment Reports. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 13
Section 3 - Tactical level planning
Progress to date
3.18
Progress by the Services towards implementing tactical task lists is mixed. None has achieved the1999/2000 Purchase Agreement objective to complete tactical task lists, complete with conditions and standards, for approved ECs with Response Times of up to 60 days. The vague specification in 1999 of what was required contributes to this. The wording of that direction suggests poor understanding at the time of the relation between mission essential tasks and METLs and the operationalising of METLs into performance‐oriented mission plans. Recommendations
3.19
It is recommended that the Navy: a
3.20
It is recommended that the Army: a
3.21
develops a tactical‐level system to demonstrate that its readiness training is aligned with relevant Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, and that there is no training redundancy. harmonises Mission Essential Task List development and training plans across units that perform the same or similar functions. It is recommended that the Air Force: a
eliminates training redundancy by ensuring that its final Air Force Task List is focused on the operational requirement rather than the capabilities of its aircraft. 14 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 4
Discussion and recommendations
Introduction
4.1
The preceding Sections have discussed the linkage of strategic direction to tactical employment through scenario‐based planning involving METLs. 4.2
The NZDF has made some progress at the operational level, including the production of an NZDF Universal Joint Task List. There is documentation relevant to contingency planning based on the ECs, although the documentation and the plans need updating. HQ NZDF does not seem to have had an active role in these developments, and progress by the Services in implementing systems of tactical mission essential tasks has taken different approaches with varied results. 4.3
Implementation of METLs‐based training throughout the NZDF has so far taken 11 years and is still not complete. The NZDF should refocus on what it expects of a METLs‐based readiness training system before determining what resource and priority to apply to its further development. A system of METLs for the NZDF
4.4
The NZDF’s Joint METLs Handbook presents Joint METLs as a bridge between strategic guidance and tactical employment. In the Handbook’s analysis Joint METLs are situated within a construct based purely on the ECs in the Output Plan and scenarios derived from the ECs. The Handbook presents Joint METLs as the heart of a system to encompass all of the tasks that the Government expects the NZDF to be able to do and therefore all of the training that the NZDF needs to carry out to undertake those tasks. 4.5
Others have different expectations of METLs‐based planning: a
Inspectors‐general want it to provide better performance measurement tools than they currently have. b
Commanders, trainers and budget managers hope that it will predict training costs more accurately. c
Commanders see it as a tool to identify to higher command the risk associated with not carrying out certain training. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 15
Section 4 – Discussion and recommendations
d
Some staff in HQ NZDF see it as being purely about collective training and therefore something that involves just HQ JFNZ and subordinate units. HQ JFNZ’s responsibility for development of Joint METLs in the mid‐2000s reinforces this view. 4.6
METLs are not the complete answer to arriving at the DLOC training bill; training plans do this. METLs themselves are not granular enough to produce training bills and do not capture all inputs to unit training plans. 4.7
NZDF tactical and operational level mission essential tasks identify the tasks needed to accomplish missions but do not describe how success occurs. Only when tasks are operationalised in a mission plan is there is something to measure through the addition of qualitative and quantitative performance standards. See further discussion on this subject in paragraphs 4.28 to 4.30 below. 4.8
We gave some thought to whether mission essential tasks are potentially as useful for planning of training in the platform‐based Services. We reasoned that the Army focuses on training units and sub‐units as building blocks of task tailored forces and therefore needs to deconstruct tasks to a lower level of detail than does the Navy and Air Force. We surmised that it is likely the Navy and the Air Force would use ships and aircraft in much the same configuration for a wide variety of tasks. Consequently, METLs‐based training may be a different issue for the platform‐based services. 4.9
The Navy did not accept this view. The Navy regards some of its Force Elements as capability bricks. A frigate deploying to anti‐piracy operations is a different package, requiring different readiness training, to a frigate deploying for high end war fighting. The Littoral Warfare Support Group might deploy any of its three elements (operational diving, mine counter measures and hydrography) individually or as a composite unit depending on the need. 4.10
The Air Force was more accepting of the notion that the platform nature of its aircraft made the deconstruction of tasks at the tactical level a less‐
complex consideration, while also maintaining that its training is based on approved roles or tasks. We note that deployable non‐flying units such as No. 209 (Expeditionary Support) Squadron may deploy either in whole or in part as components of task‐tailored forces. 4.11
We identified a number of areas for the NZDF to consider as it continues to implement METLs‐based training throughout the NZDF. 16 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 4 – Discussion and recommendations
Direction and guidance
4.12
If the NZDF wants Military Response Options and METLs embedded within a scenario‐based activity and training planning system then ownership of that system must be at a higher level than HQ JFNZ. The Ministry of Defence must be included where appropriate. HQ NZDF needs to provide direction, and appoint an appropriate sponsor. Successful implementation may require a project management organisation. 4.13
There is no NZDF policy relating to the whole system involved in turning strategic intent into tactical training and employment in the manner briefly described in paragraph 2.7 above. The only Service‐level policy found was in the sections in the Army Training Policies and Procedures manual pertaining to METLs and The Army Universal Task List. 20 The Army policy does not cover all the steps set out in Annex A. Neither should it. 4.14
The layered approach to implementing METLs and the multiple responsibilities implied in the approach mentioned in paragraph 2.1 is ineffective. Nobody or no headquarters of the NZDF is responsible for implementation across the whole organisation and development has, as a consequence, been piecemeal. Linkages
4.15
The NZDF, Army and developing Air Force universal tasks lists are not referenced to a common scheme of battlefield or capability functions. A common schema or accurately mapped hierarchies are required to show the link in METLs‐based planning and training between operational and tactical levels. 4.16
The operational level NZDF Universal Joint Task List is arranged according to the seven fundamental NZDF capabilities required to deliver war fighting. 21 4.17
The Army’s universal task list is arranged according to the seven Battlefield Operating Systems, 22 and is not aligned with the NZDF Universal Joint Task List: The 2009 version of the US Army’s universal 20 Respectively, Sections 2 and 7 of Defence Force Orders for the Army Volume 7 – Training Policies and Procedures. 21
These are Command, Inform, Prepare, Project, Protect, Operate and Sustain. NZDDP‐D Foundations of New 22
Zealand Military Doctrine. DFO(A) Vol 7 Training Policies and Procedures. The Battlefield Operating Systems are Intelligence, Manoeuvre, Fire Support, Air Defence, Mobility/Counter‐mobility/Survivability, Combat Service Support, and Command and Control. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 17
Section 4 – Discussion and recommendations
task list which the NZ Army has now adopted has followed yet another schema of six war fighting functions. 23 4.18
For convenience at this developmental stage the draft RNZAF tactical tasks are grouped according to the core competencies of the United States Air Force Tactical Task List, but the final ordering of them has yet to be decided. 4.19
The Navy does not have a tactical task list as such. The Navy does however need to be able to demonstrate alignment between MONICAR training tasks and relevant Joint METLs, and that there is no training redundancy. 4.20
Despite similarities among these various ways of ordering and describing capability and war fighting functions, there is not presently any mapping between operational and tactical levels. A number of people see this as a problem for the NZDF’s contingency and operational planning that will gain significance as the NZDF refocuses to meet its Joint Amphibious Operating Concept. Other planning considerations
4.21
The NZDF will use an existing plan if a matching event or contingency occurs. But the existing plan may not be the best plan for what is happening. Contingency Plans are necessary to plan training but those plans must be flexible and scalable for actual operations. 4.22
Flexible and scalable plans help establish the gap between current operations and future operations, or between DLOC and OLOC. If the view is taken that current operations are the primary focus, then having determined the Joint METLs‐based training required for current operations, the difference between that and the Joint METLs‐based training required for possible future operations can be analysed and serve as a basis for resourcing decisions. A similar rationale applies to the difference between DLOC and OLOC. 4.23
The NZDF needs to manage its system of METLs‐led activity and training so that changes made in one part of the system flow through into others. This will require people with the necessary authority and accountability acting according to a centrally‐directed plan. 4.24
The full value of Joint METLs‐led training will not be realised unless the training is the most economical formulation of all training that a Force Element must achieve to maintain readiness for all likely tasking. The process depicted in Figure 2.1 does not generate training for standing 23 Movement and Manoeuvre, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, Command and Control, and Protection. 18 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Section 4 – Discussion and recommendations
plans such as AWHINA. Decisions about appropriate training for those contingencies are being made at the tactical level. Joint METLs‐led training needs to be a construct based on not just the documented employment contexts, but also other likely or priority areas of employment. 4.25
There is uncertainty within the NZDF over whether the planning for Joint METLs based training should be bottom up or top down. A view expressed at the HQ JFNZ Training Branch was that, “We try to flow up. Can that bad guy in that vehicle, and what we have to do about him, be traced up to some employment context?” 4.26
The alternative view, and the one adopted in extant planning as represented by the documented ECs is that the requirement must flow from strategic‐level analysis and defence policy down through the planning structure. 4.27
NZDF platforms and equipment have inherent capabilities which the NZDF has traditionally trained for. Training may exceed that required by current outputs. A top down approach to deriving Joint METLs is intended to eliminate redundant activities from DLOC training. But some command flexibility to depart from that top down approach is desirable. This would be in the case, for example, when training activities were not being emphasised in a particular period. Experimentation during training on sophisticated equipment could lead to greater effectiveness and procedural and doctrinal change. 4.28
The NZDF was until recently working on Project METIS, 24 which was intended to deliver activity scheduling and reporting and simplified co‐
ordination of plans. All exercises and activities were to have tasks associated with them and by that means the monitoring of mission essential tasks and METLs achieved was to be automated and more efficient. METIS would have given commanders a better appreciation of risks to training and preparedness in the face of resource cuts, and the ability to advise higher command accordingly. Many people were seeing METIS across the NZDF as a panacea for what is defective or missing from METLs planning. The project is now in abeyance due to competing resourcing priorities. 4.29
A system to cross reference training completed to mission essential tasks and thus the ability to eliminate activities which would duplicate the achievement of mission essential tasks would necessarily be complex. 24 METIS is not an acronym. Metis is the Greek goddess of wisdom and deep thought. Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 19
Section 4 – Discussion and recommendations
This suggests that an automated system with electronic data bases would be necessary. To be fully effective, any such system whether manual or automated would need the linkages between tactical and operational planning mentioned in paragraphs 4.15 to 4.19. 4.30
METIS was not to replace the NZDF’s Operational Preparedness Reporting System. Rather the intention was that by linking various corporate systems, it would deliver automated personnel and equipment data to the inspectors general more efficiently than current manual processes. Recommendations
4.31
It is recommended that HQ NZDF: a
develops and promulgates policy for, and appoints a sponsor to direct and guide, the ongoing development of Joint METLs‐based training throughout the NZDF; b
directs that NZDF task lists at both the operational and tactical levels are referenced against the same battlefield or capability functions or if this proves to be not possible that accurate mapping occurs between them; c
ensures that Military Response Options and Joint METLs are scalable for a wide range of responses possible under each illustrative planning scenario; d
ensures that Joint METLs‐based planning is inclusive of all likely contingencies and not just the contingencies represented by the documented ECs; and e
within a top‐down approach to Joint METLs and METLs development, retains a degree of command override sufficient to ensure that: (i)
the focus on current operations and planning does not allow required capabilities to become dormant; or (ii)
capabilities may be researched and developed in the interests of effectiveness and doctrinal change. 20 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Annex A
J o i n t M i s s i o n E s s e n t i a l Ta s k L i s t
development
1
According to the New Zealand Defence Force Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) Handbook, a Joint Mission Essential Task List is created in the following way: a
An EC is selected and the Strategic Context is distilled from the NZDF Output Plan. b
The strategic context is articulated as the Strategic Intent: Purpose, Method, Endstate. c
An Illustrative Planning Scenario is then created to provide the operational clarity required to facilitate further planning at the operational and tactical levels. d
Using the Illustrative Planning Scenario, a Military Strategic Estimate is produced to quantify the strategic framework around which the operational response will be constructed and bounded. This will include guidance on potential Military Response Options. e
Each Military Response Option will then be subject to a Joint Military Appreciation Process to develop an operational plan, inclusive of Mission Essential Tasks and indicative force assignments. f
The Mission Essential Tasks are a by‐product of the Mission Analysis process and are selected from the menu of tasks contained within the New Zealand Defence Force Universal Joint Task List. g
Once appropriate conditions and standards are applied, a Joint METL is created. h
The Joint METLs then describe all the tasks that the Government of New Zealand expects the NZDF to be able to do or contribute to across the spectrum of conflict. i
The conditions and standards within these task lists from the ECs define the training environment that the DLOC is to be set under. They are also the defining parameters that are to be used for the planning of Joint exercises, and/or Single Service exercises that contribute to DLOC. j
Joint METLs can also act as the starting point when planning actual operations, where the operation fits within one of the Government Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 21
Annex A - Joint Mission Essential Task List development
mandated operational paradigms (ECs). They describe the basic set of tasks that can then have their conditions and standards set against the actual operational situation that is being planned for. This is OLOC, which provides the basis for pre‐deployment training. In other words this is the difference between what has been trained for (the tasks with conditions and standards from DLOC), and what needs to be trained for (the same tasks with the conditions and standards set from the OLOC definition). k
2
If the operation is something not described within the EC construct (for example, Task Group CRIB), a new Joint METL can be created from the New Zealand Defence Force Universal Joint Task List during planning at HQ JFNZ. The tasks can be cross referenced from the existing Joint METLs associated with an EC to ascertain a level of DLOC for the tasks required for the new operation, enabling the training required to attain OLOC to be identified. Steps 1 a. to 1 d. above are strategic‐level planning that takes place in HQ NZDF. 22 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists
Annex B
Glossary
COMJFNZ Commander Joint Forces New Zealand DFO(A) Defence Force Orders for the Army DLOC Directed level of capability EC Employment Context HQ JFNZ Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand HQ NZDF Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force Joint METL Joint Mission Essential Task List METL Mission Essential Task List MONICAR Management of Naval Integrated Capability Assessment reports MSE Military strategic estimate NZBR New Zealand Book of Reference NZDDP‐D New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication – Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, 2004 OLOC Operational level of capability SCI Branch HQ NZDF Strategic Commitments and Intelligence Branch VCDF Vice Chief of the Defence Force Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists - 23
24 - Management and utilisation of Mission Essential Task Lists