The Western History Association
The Frontier Army and the Destruction of the Buffalo: 1865-1883
Author(s): David D. Smits
Source: The Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 312-338
Published by: Western Historical Quarterly, Utah State University on behalf of the The
Western History Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/971110
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THE FRONTIERARMY AND THE
DESTRUCTIONOF THE BUFFALO:1865-1883
DAVIDD. SMITS
AMERICAN
HISTORY
have
CHOLARS
OFWESTERN
long recognized the post-Civil War frontier army's complicity in the
near-extermination of the buffalo. Historian Richard White represents the scholarly
consensus in stating that "various military commanders encouraged the slaughter of
bison" by white hide hunters in order to cut the heart from the Plains Indians'
economy. Some scholars implicate the army's high command more directly in the annihilation. Retired Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, for instance, claimed that
Generals William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan viewed the eradication of the buffalo as "the critical line of attack" in the struggle with the plains tribes. Paul Andrew
Hutton, Sheridan's able biographer, maintains that the scrappy little Irishman did his
utmost to further "his policy of exterminating the buffalo."'
But if mainstream interpretations assign to the army, or at least to important
commanders, a key (though imprecise) role in the great buffalo slaughter, a revisionist
school tends to absolve the military from responsibility for the annihilation. Thus, the
eminently fair-minded Robert M. Utley contends that although the army is "frequently" charged with pursuing an "official policy" of exterminating the buffalo, there
"was never any such policy." Utley argues that it was unnecessary to encourage the
buffalo hunters to carry on their profitable business, but he adds that "both civil and
military officials concerned with the Indian problem applauded the slaughter, for they
correctly perceived it a crucial factor that would force the Indian onto the reservation."2
Robert Wooster's insightful analysis of the War Department's strategic policy
against Indians from 1865 to 1903 acknowledges that "Sheridan and Sherman recognized that eliminating the buffalo might be the best way to force Indians to change
DAVID
D. SMITS
is a professorof history at TrentonState College, Trenton,New Jersey.
1 Richard
White, "It'sYourMisfortuneandNone of My Own":A Historyof theAmerican
West (Norman, 1991), 219; S. L. A. Marshall,CrimsonedPrairie:The WarsBetweenthe United
Statesand thePlainsIndiansDuringtheWinningof theWest (New York,1972), 83; Henry E. Davies,
TenDays on thePlains(1871; reprint,Dallas, 1985), 16.
2
Robert M. Utley, FrontierRegulars:The UnitedStatesArmyand theIndian, 1866-1891
(New York,1973), 412-13.
Buffalo hunting, Montana, 1882. Courtesy of the Haynes Foundation Collection, Montana
HistoricalSociety, Helena, Montana.
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their nomadic habits." Still, Wooster concludes that "the army, while anxious to
strikeagainstthe Indians'ability to continue their resistance,did not make the virtual
extermination of the American bison part of its official policy; in some cases, individual officerstook it upon themselves to try and end the slaughter."3
The purposeof this essayis to assemblethe evidence that establishesa direct connection between the army and the destruction of the buffalo. A scrutiny of official
military reports, personal letters, the reminiscences of retired army officers and
ex-buffalo hunters, the observationsof Indian Bureaupersonnel and Indians themselves, along with other eye-witness accounts reveals that traditionalinterpretations
have inadequatelydefined (and revisionistshave underestimated)the army'sinvolvement in the destructionof the bison.
General Sherman, more than any other officer, was responsiblefor devising a
strategyto conquer the Plains Indians. Rememberedmost for his Civil War "march
throughGeorgia,"Shermanwas a battle-seasonedveteran who in 1866 assumedcommand of the Division of the Missouri,which encompassedthe vast wind-blownblanket of grassknown as the Great Plains, home to those Indians whose life revolved
aroundthe buffalo.In 1869, ShermansucceededGrant as commandinggeneral,a position that he held until his retirement in 1883. The Civil War had taught Sherman
that the enemy'spowerto resistdependednot only upon its militarystrength,but also
upon the will of its people. He had learnedthat to shatterthe enemy'swill to resist, it
was necessaryto destroyhis ability to supplyhis armies.The man who desolatedmuch
of the South did so with the conviction that his Army of the Tennessee "mustmake
old and young, rich and poor,feel the hardhand of war";Shermanrelied on the same
strategyto subduethe Plains Indians.4
The Civil Warhad also taughtShermanthat railroadswere immenselyimportant
for moving troops, munitions, and supplies. Applying that lesson, he became convinced that the railroadstraversingthe plains would seal the fate of the aboriginal
inhabitants.To clear the central plains for the Union Pacific and the KansasPacific,
Shermanproposedto annihilate the buffaloin the region. On 10 May 1868, Sherman
wrote to his friendand comrade-in-arms,General Sheridan,"aslong as Buffaloare up
on the Republicanthe Indianswill go there. I think it would be wise to invite all the
sportsmenof Englandand America there this fall for a Grand Buffalohunt, and make
one grand sweep of them all. Until the Buffalo and consequent[ly] Indians are out
[frombetween] the Roadswe will have collisions and trouble."5
Sherman'sremarkswere not made in jest; his proposalcame very close to what
the frontierarmyactuallydid underhis leadership.Indeed, the army'shigh command
3 RobertWooster,The Militaryand UnitedStatesIndianPolicy, 1865-1903 (New Haven,
1988), 171-72.
4 William TecumsehSherman,Memoirsof GeneralW. T. Sherman(1875; reprint,New
York,1892), 2:227.
5 Sherman to
Sheridan, 10 May 1868, The Papersof PhilipH. Sheridan,microfilmreel
no. 17, ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress,Washington, DC (hereafterSheridanPapers).
DavidD. Smits
routinely sponsored and outfitted civilian hunting expeditions onto the plains.
Sheridan,as Hutton observes,"heartilyapprovedof the activities of the buffalohunters, feeling that they were doing the public a great service by depleting the Indians'
shaggycommissary."Sherman and Sheridan regularlyprovided influential American
citizens and foreignerswith letters of introduction to western commanders.The letters enabled the influential "to obtain supplies, equipment, military escorts, knowledgeable scouts, and other types of assistanceat frontiermilitaryposts."6
That accommodatingpolicy allowed the armyto advance its goal of exterminatthe
buffalowhile gaining favor with the prominent and powerful.Such hunting
ing
partiesnormallyslaughteredbuffaloand other game with recklessabandon.William
F Cody recounted how the armyassisteda partyof prominent businessmenwho visited Fort McPherson in 1871 as Sheridan'sguests. Many officers accompanied the
party,and two companiesof the Fifth Cavalryprovidedan escort.Cody remarkedthat
any guest "who wished could use armyguns."In fact, the Springfieldarmyrifle was
initially the favorite weapon of the hide hunters. The party killed over six hundred
buffaloon the hunt, keeping only the tongues and the choice cuts, but leaving the rest
of the carcassesto rot on the plains.7
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irving Dodge, who, like so many frontier officers,
was an avid hunter, took three Englishgentlemen on a twenty-dayhunt in Kansasin
the fall of 1872. In their excitement the Englishmenkilled 127 buffalo,"morebuffalo
than would have supplied a brigade."The next year the same partykilled a comparablenumber.8
The high command'smost elaboratepreparationsfor a buffalohunt were those
arrangedin January1872 for the Grand Duke Alexis, third son of the Czarof Russia.
Sheridan and his militaryentouragejoined Alexis and his attendants in Omaha. A
militaryescort consisting of two companiesof infantry,two of cavalry,and the Second
Cavalry'sregimental band, along with teamsters and cooks, completed the assemblage. All boardeda special train providedby the Union Pacific Railroadand headed
for North Platte, Nebraska.In five days of exuberanthunting the party slaughtered
hundredsof buffalo.9
Army commandersthroughoutbuffalocountrycustomarilytreateddistinguished
travelersto hunts. FormerCommissioner of Indian Affairs George W. Manypenny
observedthat "in the countrysurroundingmilitaryposts the pursuitof the buffaloand
other game is an amusementthat the officersengage in, and the visitors to the posts
are generallyentertained with a hunt." Post commandersoften furnishedtheir most
6 Paul Andrew
Hutton, PhilSheridanand His Army (Lincoln, 1985), 245-46. Hutton, in
his introductionto Davies (TenDays, 16), is awareof Sheridan'seffortsto destroythe buffalo
herds,but he neither analyzesnor recounts them.
7William F
Cody, "FamousHunting Partiesof the Plains,"Cosmopolitan17 (June
1894): 138-39.
8 Richard
Irving Dodge, The Plainsof theGreatWestand TheirInhabitants(New York,
1959), 132-33; George W. Manypenny,Our IndianWards(1880; reprint,New York,1972), 149.
9 Hutton, Sheridanand His
Army, 213-14; Cody, "FamousHunting Parties,"141.
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Buffalo killed, Smoky Butte, Montana. Courtesy of the Glenbow
Archives, Calgary,Alberta.
accomplishedsoldier marksmenand ridersas escorts for the visitors, thereby making
the hunts all the more destructive.10
Militarycommanderswho permitted their troops to kill buffalodid so with the
knowledge that they were doing their part to resolve the so-called "IndianProblem."
Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, commander of the Department of the
Missouriin 1869-1870, exhibited this outlook. His headquartersat FortLeavenworth
affordedSchofield a propitioussite from which to launch strikes against the Plains
Indians and their buffalo. In retirement, Schofield wrote in his memoirs:"With my
cavalryand carbinedartilleryencampedin front, I wanted no other occupation in life
than to ward off the savage and kill off his food until there should no longer be an
Indian frontierin our beautifulcountry."11
10 Lee Humfreville,
J.
TwentyYearsAmongOur HostileIndians(New York,1899), 440;
G. O. Shields, Huntingin theGreatWest(1883; 5th ed., New York,1888), 133, 140-50; Colonel
George A. Armes, Ups and Downsof An ArmyOfficer(Washington, DC, 1900), 263-64; "The
YaleCollege Expeditionof 1870,"Harpers'sNew MonthlyMagazine43 (October 1871): 671;
Manypenny,Our IndianWards,148-49.
11 Lieutenant-GeneralJohn M. Schofield, Forty-SixYearsin theArmy (New
1897), 428.
York,
David D. Smits
Shermanhimself publiclyproposedthe employmentof the armyto slaughterthe
buffalo in order to subdue the plains tribes. On 26 June 1869, the prestigiousArmy
Navy Journalreportedthat "GeneralSherman remarked,in conversation the other
day,that the quickestway to compel the Indiansto settle down to civilized life was to
send ten regimentsof soldiersto the plains, with ordersto shoot buffaloesuntil they
became too scarce to support the redskins."Agreeing with Sherman, the Journal's
commentatormaintainedthat to campaigneffectively againsta wartimeenemy it was
ordinarilynecessaryto move on his armies,his works,his communications,or his supplies. But in a guerrillawar, such as that being fought against the plains tribes, the
enemy had no home base, no line of operationsor defense, no strategicpoints to defend and no importantstoragefacilities for ammunitionor provisions.A guerrillafoe
could be defeated only "by making it impossiblefor him to exist in the country he
operates in." The buffalo were to the Plains Indians what the Shenandoah Valley's
grain was to the Confederate armies of "Stonewall"Jackson and Jubal Early.Phil
Sheridanhad finally gained control of the ShenandoahValley,the Journalrecalled,by
laying "wastethe grainfields-the supplyof food and forageto the enemy-and it was
like robbing the Indian of his buffalo."As long as the buffaloroamed in great herds
the plains tribeswould spurnthe reservations.But the buffalo'sdisappearancewould
drawthe tribesto the reservationsfor subsistence.Furthermore,the Indians'determination to protect the buffalopasturesof the plains compelled them to oppose the railroad. Hence, accordingto the Journal,"to campaign against the buffalowould be, if
successful,not only to destroythe enemy'ssupplies,but to put the whole casus belli
out of existence by annihilation."'2
Sherman'sproposalwas a trial balloon. When it was not promptlyshot down, he
was encouragedto continue a policy that the army had actually alreadybegun. Of
course, in the post-Civil War era a parsimoniousCongress and a war-wearypublic
would not permithim to devote ten full regimentsto the annihilation of buffalo.But
the thin blue line that was America'swestern militaryforce would slaughterbuffalo
whereverand whenever practicable.
The army killed under the pervasive assumptionthat "regardlessof tribe, most
Indiansrequireda demonstrationof power."Army officershoped that America'sIndians could be civilized and Christianized,but the militarywas thoroughlyconvinced
that Indiansrespectedmartialpower and that only punishmentwould persuadethem
to capitulate. Sheridan expressedthis consensus viewpoint in an 1869 letter to the
army'sadjutantgeneral. In Sheridan'swords,"if he [the Plains Indian]does not now
give up his cruel and destructivehabits, I see no other way to save the lives and property of our people, than to punish him until peace becomes a desirableobject.""3
12
ArmyNavy Journal6 (26 June 1869): 705.
13
SherryL. Smith, The ViewFromOfficers'Row:ArmyPerceptionsof WesternIndians
(Tucson, 1990), 98; Sheridanto EdwardD. Townsend, 1 November 1869, SheridanPapers,microfilm reel no. 86.
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But punishingthe elusive plains tribesby defeatingthem in conventional battles
was extraordinarilydifficult. Infantrymenwere virtually useless in pursuinghostile
warriorsso long as there was grassfor their ponies. And as for the cavalry,Colonel
Philippe Regis de Trobriand,French aristocratand veteran commanderof volunteer
Union forces in the Civil War,summedit up accuratelywhen he wrote:"Inbrief, the
movement of Indian horsemen is lighter, swifter,and longer range than that of our
cavalry,which means that they alwaysget awayfromus."14
Frustratedbluecoats, unable to deliver a punishing blow to the so-called "Hostiles,"unless they were immobilizedin their winter camps,could, however,strikeat a
more accessibletarget,namely,the buffalo.That tactic also made curioussense, for in
soldiers'minds the buffalo and the Plains Indian were virtually inseparable.When
Captain RobertG. Carterof the FourthCavalryreferredto the "nomadicred Indian
and his migratorycompanion, the bison," he linked the two together in a manner
typical of militarymen. Soldierswho associatedthe buffalowith the Indian so inseparably could even occasionally pretend that slaughteringbuffalo was actually killing
Indians.Thus, on the buffalohunt stagedfor Russia'sGrandDuke Alexis, Chalkey M.
Beeson, a westernerhired as a guide, describeswhat happenedwhen the animalswere
found:"Custer,who was in chargeof the hunting party,stoppedand said, 'Boyshere's
a chance for a greatvictory over that bunch of redskinsthe other side of the hill. Major B., you will take charge of the right flank, I will attend to the left. General
Sheridanand the infantrywill follow direct over the hill. Ready! Charge!'"'5
Doubtlessthe commanderwho pretendedthat buffalowere "redskins"was a rarity, but the commanderwho used buffalofor shooting practice was not. Custer,GeneralJohn Gibbon, Colonel BenjaminF.Grierson,and Colonel GeorgeA. Armeswere
among the officers who orderedtheir raw pony soldiers to chase running buffalo to
teach these troopershow to shoot from horseback. Such hunts also broke the monotony of the daily routines of the campaignor post, providedgood exercise for men
and horses, and were, in the wordsof one lieutenant, "asgood a systemof scouting as
could be devised for the vicinity of the camp."General Hugh Lenox Scott recalled
that the army also encouragedofficers to take hunting leaves, provided they would
preparemapsof the terraintraversed.16
Commandersin the field and at militaryposts issuedhunting passesfreelyto their
seasoned troops so as to obtain fresh meat to supplement vapid army rations. Such
buffalo hunting would have been far more justifiable had it not been so wasteful.
14 Lucile M.
Kane, trans. and ed., MilitaryLifein Dakota:TheJournalof PhilippeRegisde
Trobriand(Lincoln, 1951), 64.
15
Captain R. G. Carter,On theBorderWithMackenzie;or, WinningWestTexasfromthe
Comanches(Washington,DC, 1935), ix; Chalkey M. Beeson, "A Royal BuffaloHunt,"Transactionsof theKansasStateHistoricalSociety10 (1907-08): 577.
16 Neil Baird
Thompson, CrazyHorseCalledThemWalk-A-Heaps:The Storyof theFoot
Soldierin thePrairieIndianWars(St. Cloud, MN, 1979), 121; LieutenantJamesH. Bradley,The
Marchof theMontanaColumn:A Preludeto theCusterDisaster(Norman, 1961), 120; Armes, Ups
and Downs, 179; Hugh Lenox Scott, SomeMemoriesof a Soldier(New York,1928), 124.
DavidD. Smits
Customarilythe successfulhunters took only the tongues and humps from the slain
animals, leaving the rest of the carcass to decompose where it had fallen. Soldiers
killed huge numbersof buffalo in these hunts. Captain Albert Bamitz wrote to his
wife that his column of the Seventh Cavalry,marching against hostile Cheyennes
south of the Arkansas, had killed "not less than 75 buffaloes yesterday,and last
evening there was a generalfeast on fat buffalohumps,tongues, and marrowbones!"17
Many Indiansand whites consideredbuffalotongues to be a greatdelicacy;western soldiers craved them. In 1870, General John Pope, new commander of the
Departmentof the Missouri,wrote to his old West Point chum, Lieutenant Colonel
Richard I. Dodge, in command at Fort Dodge, requesting twelve dozen buffalo
tongues. Dodge quickly obliged by detailing a sergeantand a squad of marksmento
scourthe Kansasplains for the shaggybeasts.In three daysthey returnedwith a wagon
filled with more tongues than were ordered.To kill over 144 buffalo, animals that
could weigh over 2000 pounds each, solely for their tongues, which weighed an average of two pounds apiece, was perfectly justifiableto those frontiersoldierswho believed the herdswere expendable.18
Custer himself was the Seventh Cavalry'smost ardent and wasteful hunter. At
the conclusion of his expedition to the Yellowstonein the summerof 1873, he wrote
proudlyto his wife "Libbie"to informher of his prowessas a marksman."I must not
forget to tell you that during the expedition I killed with my rifle and brought into
camp forty-one antelope, four buffalo,four elk, seven deer (four of them black-tails),
two white wolves, and one red fox. Geese, ducks, prairie-chickens,and sage-hens
without numbercompleted my summer'srecord."19
Officers in the Seventh Cavalry and other regimentswere also fond of holding
contests to determine which individual or team could kill the most buffalo in a
specified time or under prearrangedconditions. Katherine Gibson, wife of Captain
FrancisM. Gibson of the Seventh, remembereda ten-day shooting contest in which
several officersand "a squadof enlisted men" from Fort Totten, in Dakota Territory,
participated.Seventh Cavalry officers arrangedanother competitive hunt in May
1867 near Fort Hays in which two teams, each composed of eight officers,competed.
The rulesagreedupon were that on differentdayseach team would leave camp at sunrise and return at sunset with its haul of tongues, the proof of the numberof buffalo
downed. The winning team brought in twelve tongues; the losers, who had to dine
the victors, collected eleven.20 In that instance the participants'inexperience at buffalo hunting kept the kill quite low.
17 Robert M.
Utley, ed., Lifein Custer'sCavalry:DiariesandLettersof AlbertandJenny
Bamitz, 1867-1868 (New Haven, 1977), 190.
18 Richard
Henry Pratt,Battlefieldand Classroom:FourDecadeswiththeAmericanIndian, 1867-1904 (New Haven, 1964), 63.
19ElizabethB.
Custer,Bootsand Saddles;or, Lifein DakotaWithGeneralCuster(1885;
reprint,Norman, 1961), 258.
20
KatherineGibson Fougera,WithCuster'sCavalry(1940; reprint,Lincoln, 1986),
144-45; Wayne Gard, The GreatBuffaloHunt (Lincoln, 1959), 64; Utley, ed., Lifein Custer'sCavalry,53.
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Officersstationed at FortsHays and Wallace took a heavier toll in animals in a
match that was dubbed"the buffaloshooting championshipof the world."Each team
placed a $500 bet on its own hunter, "BuffaloBill" Cody and the well-known scout
"MedicineBill"Comstock, respectively.Cody downed no less than sixty-nine animals
in three runs;Comstock killed forty-six.21
On anotheroccasion MajorFrankNorth, commanderof a celebratedbattalion of
Pawnee scouts, affordedCody an opportunity to exhibit his deadly marksmanship.
While on their march along the Republican the Pawnees spotted a herd of buffalo
that they planned to fall upon. Cody wanted to join the hunt, but the Pawnees objected to North saying, "the white talker would scare them away."22North relented
and, unaccompaniedby Cody, the Pawnee scouts baggedtwenty-threeanimals.Later
that day,when another herd was sighted, North insisted that Cody be given a chance
to prove his skill. Cody respondedby slayingforty-eightbuffaloin thirty minutes.
The total numberof buffalokilled by the frontierarmyin the post-Civil Warperiod should not be underestimated.Individualsoldiers,especiallyofficers,ran up huge
kills in their careersin buffalocountry.In 1887, for instance, Sherman'sclose personal
friend, General Stewart Van Vliet, who had no particularreputation as a buffalo
hunter, matter-of-factlyinformedSpencer F Baird,secretaryof the Smithsonian Institution, that he had personallykilled "hundreds."Furthermore,the soldiers'inexperience at hunting buffaloor their ignoranceabout the animals'needs sometimesled to
the deaths of largenumbers.Thus, on a hunt outside Camp McIntosh shooting troopers accidently stampededsixty-fourbuffalo and many antelope over a seventy-foot
precipice to their deaths in a writhing mass below. The sportsmenadventurerJohn
MortimerMurphyclaimed to have seen a troop of cavalrylasso one hundredbuffalo
calves and bringthem to a corralnear the post barracks.Although the little ones had
sufficient room to run about and an abundanceof hay and grass,"fewof them lived
more than a week."23
Nothing better exemplified the callousness with which the frontier army destroyedbuffalo than its use of artilleryto obliterate the unwanted beasts. Captain J.
Lee Humfrevilleclaimed that the soldiersat FortKeamey firedcannons into herds to
keep them out of the post. In his retirement,MajorGeneral D. S. Stanley recalledthe
soldiers'use of cannon at FortCobb to drive awayfromthe post a huge herd of buffalo
moving north in its annual springmigration.In Stanley'swords,"cannonwere fired,
men foolishly shot the poor beastsby the hundreds,"until the herd had finally passed.
Soon thereafter,"the weather turned very warm and the folly of shooting the poor
beastsappeared.The putrefyingcarcasses,by their stench-nearly ran the people out
21
Colonel W. F Cody, An Autobiography
of BuffaloBill (New York,1920), 122-27; Don
Russell,The Livesand Legendsof BuffaloBill (Norman, 1960), 91-94.
22
23
WildLifeon thePlainsand Horrorsof IndianWarfare(St. Louis, 1891), 450.
William T. Homaday,"The Exterminationof the American Bison,"Reportof the
NationalMuseum, 1887 (Washington, DC, 1889), 403; Mari Sandoz,The BuffaloHunters:The
Storyof theHideMen (New York,1954), 346; John MortimerMurphy,SportingAdventuresin the
FarWest(1879; reprint,New York,1880), 199.
DavidD. Smits
of the post, and for a week the whole command was kept busyhauling carcassesinto
heaps and burningthem."24
Colonel Grierson'sTenth Cavalry,composed of black enlisted men remembered
as the "BuffaloSoldiers,"attemptedto keep buffaloherds awayfrom FortSill by gunning them down in great numbers.Despite the Tenth's resolute efforts, however, it
was unable to drive the animals off. With regard to these endeavors the Kiowa
woman, Old LadyHorse, remembered:"Therewas war between the buffalo and the
white men. The white men built forts in the Kiowa country,and the woolly-headed
buffalosoldiersshot the buffaloas fast as they could, but the buffalokept coming on,
coming on, even into the post cemeteryat FortSill. Soldierswere not enough to hold
them back."25
Of all the white people'sactivities in Indian countrynone enragedand disheartened the Native Americans more than the destructionof their buffalo. Hide hunter
Billy Dixon reminiscedthat the annihilation "layat the very heart of the grievances
of the Indian against the white man in frontierdays."At the Medicine Lodge Treaty
Council of 1867, the greatKiowa chief Satanta complained bitterly about the army's
shooting of his buffalo."A long time ago this land belonged to our fathers,"lamented
Satanta, "butwhen I go up to the river I see a camp of soldiers,and they are cutting
my wood down, or killing my buffalo.I don't like that, and when I see it my heart feels
like burstingwith sorrow."Satanta was furiousat the armybecause the two infantry
companies that escorted the peace commissioners from Fort Lamed to Medicine
LodgeCreek had wantonly slaughteredbuffaloalong the route of their march.Riding
sparecavalryhorses, most of the soldier hunters had dismounted to cut the tongues
from the animals they had dropped;others sliced hump steaks from their kills; some
merely left the dead buffalolying where they fell and rode on to continue the bloodshed. In response,Satanta complained to General William Hamey, asking "has the
white man become a child, that he should recklesslykill and not eat?When the red
men slay game, they do so that they may live and not starve."26
Even before the Medicine Lodge TreatyCouncil, the army'shigh command on
the plains was convinced that the buffalowere on the brink of extinction. That the
herds on the eastern plains were fast disappearingwas apparentto many observant
persons. Indians complained about the diminishing numbers of animals and about
their absence from old haunts; tradershad raised the price of buffalo robes because
24 Humfreville,
TwentyYears,433; D. W. Moody,The Lifeof a Rover,1865 to 1926 (n.
p., n. d.), 28; D. S. Stanley, PersonalMemoirsof MajorGeneralD. S. Stanley,U. S. A. (Cambridge,
MA, 1917), 55. For an account of how the armykilled buffalowith twelve-poundhowitzers,see
Colonel Henry Inman, The Old SantaFe Trail:The Storyof a GreatHighway(New York,1897),
214.
25
Peter Nabokov, ed., NativeAmericanTestimony:A Chronicleof Indian-WhiteRelations
fromProphecyto thePresent,1492-1992 (New York,1991), 175.
26
Billy Dixon, LifeandAdventuresof "Billy"Dixon of AdobeWalls,TexasPanhandle
(Guthrie, OK, 1914), 55; Henry M. Stanley,My EarlyTravelsand Adventuresin America(1895;
reprint,Lincoln, 1982), 249; Tom McHugh, The Timeof theBuffalo(New York,1972), 282-83.
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they were less available; and eastern plains buffalo trails were "mossedover" from
disuse. In the 1866 edition of his memoir,ThirtyYearsof ArmyLifeon the Border,InspectorGeneral RandolphB. Marcyquoted Minnesota Indianfighter,General Henry
H. Sibley, who had predictedthat the tradein buffalorobeswould "soonresult in the
extermination of the whole race."In 1859, Marcy himself had journeyedfrom Fort
Randall on the lower Missourito Fort Laramiewithout seeing a single buffalo. The
experience had convinced him that the animalswere "rapidlydisappearing,and a few
years will, at the present rate of destruction, be sufficient to exterminate the species."27
At Fort Dodge in April 1867, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, then
commanderof the Department of the Missouri,which embracedMissouri,Kansas,
Colorado, and New Mexico, reminded several Arapaho chiefs, including Little
Raven, of some hard realities. "Youknow well that the game is getting very scarce,"
lectured Hancock, "and that you must soon have some other means of living; you
should thereforecultivate the friendshipof the white man, so that when the game is
all gone, they may take care of you if necessary."At a council held at Fort Lamed on
1 May 1867, Hancock said substantiallythe same thing to Satanta. DouglasC. Jones's
studyof the Treatyof Medicine Lodge reveals that the United States Peace Commission composed of seven men, three of whom were generalsin the regulararmy,took
for grantedthe impending extinction of the buffalo and did not even discusssaving
the herds.28
At the time of the famous Fort LaramieTreaty of April 1868, Sherman had
joined the Peace Commission, increasingits membershipto fourgeneralsand fourcivilians. The commissionerscreated the Great Sioux Reservation in western South
Dakota but allowed the relocated bands to retain "the right to hunt on any lands
north of North Platte, and on the RepublicanForkof the Smoky Hill River,so long as
the buffalomay range thereon in such numbersas to justifythe chase."29
By his own admission,Shermanwas at first"utterlyopposed"to that clause of the
treaty.He was determined to clear the central plains region between the Platte and
the Arkansasof Indiansso that the railroads,stage lines, and telegraphcould operate
unmolested. In the end, however, Sherman'sfellow commissionersconvinced him
that the treaty'sodious clausewas, in his words,"merelytemporary."Soon "thebuffalo
would cease to range as far north as the Republican"and the Indians"wouldassist in
27Theodore R. Davis, "The BuffaloRange,"
Harper'sNew MonthlyMagazine38 (JanuColonel R. B. Marcy,ThirtyYearsof ArmyLifeon theBorder(1866; reprint,Phila1869):
153;
ary
delphia, 1963), 301.
28John M. Carroll,ed., GeneralCusterand theBattleof theWashita:The FederalView
(Bryan,TX, 1978), 182, 199; DouglasC. Jones, The Treatyof MedicineLodge:The Storyof the
GreatTreatyCouncilas Toldby Eyewitnesses(Norman, 1966), 119.
29
TreatyWiththeSioux-Brule, Oglala,Miniconjou,Yanktonai,Hunkpapa,Blackfeet,
Cuthead,TwoKettle,SansArcs, and Santee-and Arapaho,1868, in IndianAffairs:Lawsand Treaties,comp. and ed. CharlesJ. Kappler(Wasington, DC, 1904), 2:1002.
DavidD. Smits
their destruction."30Sherman had learned a lesson that many other frontier army
officerswould also learn:sometimes Indiansthemselves could be used to help destroy
their beloved buffalo.
On 29 February1868, Sheridanarrivedat FortLeavenworthto assumecommand
of the Departmentof the Missouri.He was promptlyconfrontedwith the problemof
"Indiandepredations"resulting from raids by southern plains warriorswho had refused to remainconfined to the reservationsassignedto them by the Medicine Lodge
Treaty.In a 15 October 1868 letter to Sherman,Sheridan set forth his plans for dealing with such hostiles: "The best way for the government is to now make them poor
by the destructionof their stock, and then settle them on the lands allotted to them."
Sheridan'sstrategyfor destroyingthe hostiles' stock, by which he meant their buffalo
and horses, included the restorationto duty of the suspendedCuster,who was to play
a prominentrole in a winter campaignof total war.Among the troopsemployedwere
those of LieutenantColonel LutherP. Bradley,who, in commandof six companiesof
infantryand two troopsof cavalry,was to help clear the central plains of buffaloand
Indians.In his "PrivateJournal,"Bradleydescribedhis mission:"Orderedto the forks
of the Republicanto make permanentcamp:to kill all the buffalowe find, and drive
the Arapahoesand Cheyennes south, and the Sioux north."31Bradleycarriedout his
ordersenergetically,but his troops were able to find and kill comparativelyfew buffalo.
Evidently,then, at the outset of his winter campaignof 1868-1869, Sheridanwas
under the impressionthat the western army could significantly reduce the buffalo
herds,therebydemoralizingthe plains tribes.Sheridan'sconfidence in the army'sability to eradicatethe buffaloevaporatedas his participationin the campaigngave him a
better appreciationof the immensityof the southernherd. On 3 December 1868, from
a depot on the North Canadian, Sheridanwrote to the army'sassistantadjutantgeneral informinghim that the federalgovernment"makesa greatmistakein giving these
Indians any considerable amount of food under the supposition of necessity. The
whole countryis literallycovered with game. There are morebuffalothan will last the
Indiansfor 20 years."Sheridanalso realizedthat north of the Union Pacific Railroad
there rangedanother enormousherd. In it he had personallyobserved"not less than
200,000 in one day."32
After the completion of the winter campaign, in which the soldierskilled great
numbersof buffalo for meat, Sheridan returned to Fort Dodge in the first week of
March 1869. There, he and his quartermaster,MajorHenry Inman, had a conversation with Robert M. Wright, the post trader.Yearslater Wright maintained that the
30
Sherman to Sheridan, 2 May 1873, SheridanPapers,microfilmreel no. 17; Congress,
House, "Reportof LieutenantGeneral W. T. Sherman,"39th Cong., 2d sess., 1866, Ex. Doc. 1, p.
21.
31
Sheridanto Sherman, 15 October 1868, SheridanPapers,microfilmreel number86;
13 September 1868 entry in LutherP. Bradley's"PrivateJournal,"Box 1, LutherP.
BradleyPapers,
United States Army MilitaryHistory Institute, Carlisle Barracks,PA.
32
Carroll,ed., Custerand theBattleof theWashita,45.
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two officerscalled him in to help form an accurateestimate of the numbersof buffalo
in a one-hundred-mile-widestrip between Fort Dodge and Camp Supply.Wright rememberedthat the officers initially estimated the numbersto be ten billionanimals.
But then the incredulousSheridandecided that such an astronomicalnumber"won't
do." So, accordingto Wright, "they figuredit again, and made it one billion. Finally
they reached the conclusion that there must be one hundred million; but they said
they were afraidto give out these figures;nevertheless they believed them."33
Believing that there were at least one hundred million buffalo in the southern
herd alone, Sheridanwasforcedto abandonall hope of usinghis tiny armyto wipe out
the animals.At that time, Sheridanalso assumeda less aggressiveposition towardthe
plains tribesso as to accommodatePresidentGrant's"PeacePolicy"towardthe Indians. As historian FrancisPaul Pruchahas written, Grant'sPeace Policy reflected "a
state of mind, a determinationthat since the old waysof dealing with the Indianshad
not worked,new wayswhich emphasizedkindness and justice must be tried."34
Fora short time then, before the hide hunters actuallydemonstratedtheir capacto
ity exterminate the buffalo,Sheridan was disposedto rely on Grant'sproposedreformsto resolve the "Indianproblem."Without encouragementfrom the army'shigh
command to annihilate the animals,the frontierarmyon the southernplains was for
a time inclined to hunt buffaloonly for freshmeat to feed the troops.As Captain Robert G. Carter,an officer of the Fourth Cavalry who served with Colonel Ranald S.
Mackenziein the early 1870s wrote, "the rule of those days, and before the slaughter
of the buffaloand their extermination by 'pot hunters'for their skins began-was to
kill only as many as were necessaryfor the use of our garrisonsor commands in the
field to eke out their rations."35
Beyond Sheridan'sbelief that the buffalowere too numerousto be rapidlyextirpated, there are several other explanations for the opposition of some officersto the
indiscriminateslaughterof the great beasts. In the early 1870s, Colonel EdwardW.
Wynkoop, agent for the Cheyennes, furished one importantreasonto Henry Bergh,
president of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
Wynkoop wrote a revealing letter to Bergh,who was then engaged in a campaignto
gain supportfor congressionallegislation to protect the buffalofrom white hunters.
Wynkoop urgedthat the slaughtermust be terminated,because
it is one of the greatestgrievancesthe Indianshave and, to my personal
knowledge,frequentlyhas been their strongestincentive to declarewar.
Little Robe, the Cheyenne chief who recently visited Washington, at
one time remarkedto me after I had censured him for allowing his
young men to kill a white farmer'sox: 'Yourpeople make big talk, and
33RobertM. Wright, "PersonalReminiscencesof FrontierLife in Southwest Kansas,"
Transactions
of theKansasStateHistoricalSociety7 (1901-02): 78.
34FrancisPaul Prucha,AmericanIndianPolicyin Crisis:ChristianReformersand theIndian, 1865-1900 (Norman, 1976), 30.
35Carter,On theBorderWithMackenzie,39.
325
David D. Smits
sometimesmake war,if an Indian kills a white man'sox to keep his wife
and children from starving.What do you think my people ought to do
when they see their cattle-the buffaloes-killed by your race when
they are not hungry?'36
If principledofficerslike Wynkoop opposed the buffaloslaughterbecause it enragedIndians and exacerbatedinterracialtensions, other officersopposed it because
they considered it both unnecessaryand wasteful.Accordingly,on 20 January1872,
Colonel William B. Hazen, not usuallyone to respect Indian rights,wrote to Bergh:
The theory that the buffalo should be killed to deprive the Indians of
food is a fallacy,as these people are becoming harmlessunder a rule of
justice. I earnestly request that you bring this subject before Congress
with the intention of having such steps taken as will prevent this wicked
and wanton waste, both in the lives of God's creaturesand of the valuable food they furnish.37
In addition, some frontierofficershad immoderatepride in the fighting ability of
their own military units or in the United States Army as a whole. The flamboyant
"LongHair"Custer boasted that he "could whip all the Indians on the Continent
with the Seventh Cavalry."The equally arrogantand ill-fated Captain William J.
Fetterman,who crowed, "give me eighty men and I would ride through the whole
Sioux nation," also exemplifies the type.38To such foolish men the notion that the
armyhad to resortto wiping out the buffaloin orderto subduemere "savages"was not
only preposterous,but it also reflectedbadly on the army'sfundamentalcompetence.
Officerswho viewed themselvesas truesportsmenalso disdainedthe greatbuffalo
slaughterbecause it bore no resemblancewhatever to the so-called "noble pastime."
Lieutenant Colonel Albert Brackett of the Second Cavalry expressed this view to
Bergh:"All reportsaboutfine sportand good shooting are mere gammon.It would be
equally good sport, and equally dangerous,to ride into a herd of tame cattle and
butcherthem indiscriminately.The wholesale butcheryof buffaloesupon the plains is
as needless as it is cruel."39
LieutenantColonel Dodge, who fancied himself a bona fide sportsman,regarded
buffalo as "the most unwieldy, sluggish, and stupid of all plains animals."To the
hunter on foot, buffalo were by no means difficult to kill in large numbers."If not
alarmedat sight or smell of a foe," wrote Dodge, "he will stand stupidlygazingat his
companions in their death throes until the whole herd is shot down." To be sure,
Dodge regardedbuffalohunting on horsebackas exciting and dangerous.But though
Globe,42d Cong., 2d sess., 1872, pt. 2, Appendix, 179-80.
36Congressional
37KansasDailyCommonwealth(Topeka), 2 February1872.
38
Stephen E. Ambrose, CrazyHorseand Custer:The ParallelLivesof TwoAmerican
Warriors(GardenCity, NY, 1975), 401; Ralph K. Andrist, The LongDeath:The LastDays of the
PlainsIndians(New York,1964), 108.
39Gard, Great
BuffaloHunt, 208.
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chasingbuffalowas thrilling to the novice, Dodge thought that "frequentrepetition is
like eating quail on toast every day for a month-monotonous."40
The more the "pot hunters" annihilated the buffalo for profit, the more
sports-mindedofficers like Dodge disdained buffalo hunting. In the spring of 1871,
Dodge himself was forced to kill twenty-six buffalo in order to split a herd that was
stampedingdown upon him. Apologetically he recalled that this was "the greatest
numberof buffalothat my conscience can reproachme for having murderedon any
single day.I was not hunting, wanted no meat, and would not voluntarilyhave firedat
these herds. I killed only in self-preservation,and fired almost every shot from the
wagon."41
In the earlyyearsof Grant'sfirst presidentialterm, because the army'shigh command was obliged to give the Peace Policy a chance to succeed and becauseSheridan
himself then believed the buffalowere too numerousto be rapidlydestroyed,the army
temporarilyabandoned its efforts to exterminate the animals. This is not, by any
means, to imply that the blue-coated soldiers'prodigalkilling of the buffalo ceased,
for the army had no difficulty in rationalizingits excesses. Even before the end of
Grant'sfirst term, however, events made it evident to the army'shigh command that
the buffalomust and could be annihilated.
Intensified Indian attacks on the southern plains in the early 1870s compelled
the army to forsakepeaceful methods for resolving the Indian problem. There, the
off-reservationtribeshad to be forced to give up their traditionalnomadic existence
and agency Indians had to be coerced into remaining on their assigned lands.
Shermandiscoveredfor himself the gravityof the Indian menace while on an inspection tour of Texas militaryposts in the springof 1871. Narrowlyescapingthe ambush
of a Kiowa raidingparty,Sherman soon learned of the tragicfate of twelve teamsters
whose wagon train was attackedby the same war party.Now convinced of the genuineness of the Indian threat on the southern plains, an enraged Sherman ordered
Colonel Mackenzieto employ the crack FourthCavalryto bring peace and orderto
the region. Sherman thereby abandoned the Peace Policy and Sheridan, as commanderof the Division of the Missouri,was responsiblefor all militarymattersin the
million-square-mileexpanse of the Indian insurrection.
Confronted with amplified Indian warfare,Sheridan found that he had new
means to end it. The fate of the southernherd was sealed in 1871, the yeara Pennsylvania tannery developed a method of converting buffalo hides into commercial
leather,especiallyusefulfor harnessesand the machine belting needed by an industrializing America. With every hide worth between $1 and $3, swarmsof hide hunters
invaded western Kansaswhere the animals still aboundedand where the KansasPacific and the Atcheson, Topeka,and Santa Fe railroadscould carrythe hides to eastern markets.
40
Dodge, Plainsof theGreatWest, 119, 127.
41
Ibid., 120-21.
DavidD. Smits
BuffaloSkinnersat Work.Courtesyof the Glenbow Archives, Calgary,
Alberta.
The "buffalorunners,"as the huntersliked to call themselves,decimatedthe centralplainsherdswith shockingrapidity.In the fall of 1873, LieutenantColonel Dodge
describedthe devastationthat the hide huntershad wreakedin Kansas:"Wherethere
were myriadsof buffalothe year before, there were now myriadsof carcasses.The air
was foul with a sickening stench, and the vast plain, which only a short twelvemonth
beforeteemed with animal life, was a dead, solitary,putriddesert."42
Having eliminated the herds in Kansas,the runnershoped to find fresh killing
fields farther south. But the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 had reservedfor the
Kiowas,Comanches,SouthernCheyennes, and Arapahoes,"the right to hunt on any
landssouth of the Arkansasso long as the buffalomay rangethereon in such numbers
as to justify the chase." By 1873, the "hardcase"hidemen had alreadyinvaded the
Indianhunting groundsin southwesternKansasto the south of the Arkansaswithout
interferencefrom the army.But they fearedthat if they crossedthe Cimarron,then
patrolled by troops from Fort Dodge, the soldiers would confiscate their teams.
42Ibid., 133.
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Therefore,a young runnernamed Steel Frazierproposedthat the 1idemen send a delegation to Fort Dodge to ask its commander,Lieutenant Colonel Dodge, what the
penalty would be if the hunters crossedinto the Texas Panhandle, where they knew
buffalostill abounded.The runnersneed not have fearedopposition from Dodge, for
despite his own sportsmanlikeunwillingnessto squanderbuffalo,he, like most of his
comrades-in-arms,believed that the Indian problemwould be resolvedas soon as the
buffalowere gone. Indeed, back in 1867 when Sir W. F.Butlerhad penitently admitted that he and his partyhad killed over thirty bulls on a hunt near Fort McPherson,
Dodge had responded:"Kill every buffalo you can! Every buffalo dead is an Indian
gone."43
According to buffalorunnerJ. Wright Mooar,who went with Frazierto the fort,
Dodge received them "verycordially,"after canceling his other engagements.Dodge
thoroughly enjoyed their visit and when asked what his policy would be if the
hidemen hunted in Texas, responded:"Boys,if I were a buffalohunter I would hunt
buffalo where buffalo are." Dodge then took the hidemen by the hands, bid them
goodbye, and wished them success.44
In the springof 1874, a contingent of buffalorunnersleft FortDodge, crossedthe
"deadline," and opened a base of operationsin the Texas Panhandleat Adobe Walls
on the north fork of the Canadian River. Several hundredenragedComanches and
Cheyennes attackedthat outpost on 27 June 1874. Learningof the Indian attack, the
governorof Kansasappealedto GeneralJohn Pope, commanderof the Departmentof
the Missouri,to send troopsto the relief of the runners.Pope was neither disposedto
coddle Indiansnor to preservethe buffalo,but he still refusedto comply.In justifying
his conduct to the secretaryof war,Pope wrote that the "tradingpost"at Adobe Walls
"soldarmsand ammunition,whisky,not only to the hunters, but to the Indians, and
the very armsand ammunition thus furnishedto the Indians they afterwardused to
attack and breakup this tradingpost, which was put there to enable the white hunters
to invade unlawfullythe Indian reservation."45
Pope'smilitarysuperior,Sheridan,who hoped for the southernherd'sdestruction
in orderto terminatethe tribaltreatyrights to hunt, was angrywith Pope for refusing
to protect the hidemen. Sheridan excoriated Pope in a letter to Sherman and defended his position in his annual reportto the secretaryof war.Sheridan'sreportaffirmedthat the hide hunterswere not guilty of provokingan Indian warbecause"the
business in which these parties were engaged made war an exceedingly undesirable
thing for them."The hard cases headquarteredat Adobe Walls probablysurvivedthe
Indian attack because they were warnedof it by an armyscout who carriedthe news
43Kappler,ed., IndianAffairs,980-88; Sir W. F Butler,SirWilliamButler:An
Autobiography(London, 1911), 97.
44J. Wright Mooar,"The FirstBuffaloHunting in the Panhandle,"WestTexasHistorical
AssociationYearBook(1930): 109-10.
45Congress,House, "Reportof Bvt. Maj. Gen. John Pope,"43d Cong., 2d sess., 18741875, Ex. Doc. 1, pt. 2, p. 30.
DavidD. Smits
A buffalohunting camp in Texas.Courtesyof the Archives Division, TexasState Library.
Buffalohunterscamp, Texas Panhandle, 1874. Courtesyof the Archives Division, Texas
State Library.
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from Camp Supplywith the protection of a militaryescort. Having driven off the attacking Indian warriorsat Adobe Walls, the buffalorunnerswere escortedsafelyback
to Dodge City by three companies of cavalryfromFort Dodge.46
Despite the danger of Indians, however, the hide hunters returnedto Texas to
continue their bloody work. In response,conservation-mindedmen in the state legislatureintroduceda buffaloprotection bill in 1875. The prospectof saving the herds
alarmedSheridan who, it is said, appearedbefore a joint session of the Texas Senate
and House in that year.The generalsupposedlytold the legislators-no official record
of this meeting has been found-that they were making a sentimental mistake in attempting to protect the buffalo. In his published reminiscences, the aging buffalo
killer John R. Cook recalled Sheridan'stestimony:
He told them that instead of stopping the hunters they ought to give
them a hearty, unanimous vote of thanks, and appropriatea sufficient
sum of money to strikeand presentto each one a medal of bronze,with a
dead buffaloon one side and a discouragedIndianon the other. He said,
'These men have done in the last two years,and will do more in the next
year, to settle the vexed Indian question, than the entire regulararmy
has done in the last thirty years.They are destroyingthe Indians'commissary;and it is a well-known fact that any armylosing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage.Send them powder and lead, if
you will; but, for the sake of a lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell
until the buffaloesare exterminated.'47
Cook, himself a buffalorunner,may appearto some to be a biasedwitness, for he
regardedhis occupation as a patriotic service and proudlycited Sheridan'swords as
proofthat the army,the cutting edge of civilization, heartilyapprovedthe workof the
hide hunters.Nevertheless, Cook'saccount is credible.Sheridan,as will be seen, soon
opposed efforts to protect the northern herd. Moreover, Grant himself no longer
wished to preservethe herds. In 1874, he pocket-vetoed a bill to protect the buffalo
that had passedboth houses of the Congress.In essence, the bill made it unlawfulfor
any non-Indian to kill a female buffaloor to kill a greaternumberof males than were
needed for food. A fine of $100 for each animal unlawfullykilled would have been
imposed. There were insufficient votes to overrideGrant'sveto, and the bill died a
quiet death.48
46
Ibid., 27; J. Wright Mooar,"BuffaloDays:The Real Story of the 'CrackedRidgepole'
at Adobe Walls,"Holland's,The Magazineof theSouth(March 1933): 8; CharlesGoodnight et al.,
PioneerDays in theSouthwest,From1850 to 1879 (Guthrie, OK, 1909), 64.
47John R. Cook, The Borderand theBuffalo:An UntoldStoryof theSouthwestPlains
(1907; reprint,Chicago, 1938), 163-64.
48
Homaday,Extermination
of theAmericanBison,514-16. When visited by a complaining Sioux delegation in 1871, Grant'ssecretaryof the interior,ColumbusDelano, refusedto take
action to keep white hunters out of Sioux country.In his annual reportfor 1873, Delano summed
up the administration'sposition on the matter of preservingthe buffalo:"Iwould not seriously
regretthe total disappearanceof the buffalofrom our westernprairies,in its effect upon the
DavidD. Smits
PresidentGrant was also unwilling to use the armyto keep the hide hunters out
of Indian country,even though he had promiseda delegation of Southern Cheyennes
and Arapahoesthat he would do so. On 30 September1874, the tribes'agent, John D.
Miles, wrote to the commissionerof Indian Affairs,summingup the grievancesof his
charges:
The Cheyennes and Arapahoeswere assuredby the Presidenton their
recent visit to Washington that improperwhite men and BuffaloHunters should be kept from their country at all hazards,and they very naturallyexpected that some effortwould be made to keep that promise,but
they looked in vain-and the Cheyennes being the most restlessof the
two tribesgrew tired and endeavoredto avenge their own wrongs.49
The evidence that best substantiatesCook's contention is the army'smoral and
materialsupportfor the hide hunters and its own systematiceffortsto obliterate the
southern herd.50As for the army'smoral supportfor the runners,FrankH. Mayera
leatheryold hide man who bought his first Sharpsbuffalorifle fromLieutenantColonel Dodge, recalled a conversation that he had with "a high rankingofficer"on the
buffalorange in the 1870s. The officersaid:
Mayer, there's no two ways about it, either the buffalo or the Indian
must go. Only when the Indian becomes absolutelydependent on us for
his every need, will we be able to handle him. He's too independent
with the buffalo. But if we kill the buffalo we conquer the Indian. It
seems a more humane thing to kill the buffalo than the Indian, so the
buffalomust go.51
Cook himself maintained that during his hide-hunting years in Texas from 1875 to
1878 "the destructionof the buffalo... had the approvalof all frontierarmyofficers."
Cook noted that on one occasion Captain Nicholas Nolan of the Tenth Cavalryhad
commendeda groupof runnersby saying:"Congressought to pass a memorialin your
behalf,for you aremakingfutureIndianwarsan impossibilityby the destructionof the
buffaloes."52
Indians.I would regardit ratheras a means of hastening their sense of dependence upon the soil."
Record,43d Cong., 1st sess., 1874, pt. 3, 2105.
Congressional
49Agent John D. Miles to EdwardSmith, commissionerof Indian Affairs,30 September 1874, UpperArkansasAgencyRecords,LettersReceived1871-74, Microcopy234, Roll 882,
M1209, National Archives, Washington, DC.
50 "Billy"
Dixon, a runnerwho had fought at the Battle of Adobe Walls, contended (in
LifeandAdventures,56) that in order"to subdueand conquer the Plains tribesfor all time,"General Sheridanhad "urgedand practiced"the extermination of the buffalo.
51FrankH. Mayerand Charles B. Roth, The BuffaloHarvest(Denver, 1958), 29-30.
52Cook, Borderand the
Buffalo,444, 368.
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The army'sapprovalwas surelywelcomed;but farmore usefulto the hide hunters
was the free ammunition that they could obtain at any militarypost on the southern
plains. In Mayer'swords:
armyofficersin charge of plains operationsencouragedthe slaughterof
buffaloin every possibleway.Partof this encouragementwas of a practical nature that we runnersappreciated.It consisted of ammunition,free
ammunition, all you could use, all you wanted, more than you needed.
All you had to do to get it was apply at any frontier armypost and say
you were short of ammunition, and plenty would be given you. I received thousandsof roundsin this way. It was in .45-.70 caliber,but we
broke it up, remelted the lead, and some runners used government
powder.53
Beyond the free ammunition provided, the frontiermilitaryposts also furnished
protection, supplies,equipment, markets,storage,and shipping facilities to the hide
hunters.A case in point is FortGriffin,the rough-hewnsettlement that had grownup
in the shadowof the protective militarypost by the same name, founded in 1867. By
1874, the town had become the principal shipping and supplydepot for the buffalo
runnersin West Texas. William C. Lobenstein, a dealer in hides, pelts, and leather
with headquartersat Fort Leavenworth,had establishedin the town a branch office
for buying hides. Mountains of them were stockpiled there for transshipmentby
wagon to Fort Worth, where the Texas and Pacific Railroadhad completed a line in
1876. The Texan J. N. Atkinson claimed that in the 1870s there was in the town of
FortGriffina stack of buffalohides as long as a city block and "ashigh as a man could
reach throwing hides out of a wagon, and so wide that it must have been made by
drivingwagonsdown both sides of the pile in stacking."54The army'sprotection, cooperativeencouragement,and assistanceenabled the hide huntersto fan out onto the
buffalo ranges not only from Fort Griffin, but also from such posts as Forts Dodge,
Concho, and Richardson.
Under Sheridan'sleadershipthe armynot only abetted the hide hunters, it also
annihilatedbuffaloin the southernherd or drove the animalsawayfromIndianhunting grounds. Sheridan himself orchestrateda campaign consisting of five separate
militarycolumns that converged on the hostile bands in the Texas Panhandle. The
ensuing Red River War of 1874-75 ended with the final conquest of the southern
plains tribes. Among the thousands of bluecoats engaged were eight troops of the
Sixth Cavalryand fourcompaniesof the Fifth Infantryunderthe overall commandof
the doggedlyambitiousColonel Nelson A. Miles.
53Mayerand Roth, BuffaloHarvest,29.
54MaryJourdanAtkinson, The TexasIndians(San Antonio, TX, 1935), 331. The Texas
cattleman,JamesH. Cook recounted in his FiftyYearson theOld Frontieras Cowboy,Hunter,
Guide, Scout, andRanchman(New Haven, 1923), 84, that he had seen at FortGriffin in the
1870s, "apile of buffalohides near the sutler'sstore at least fifty yardssquareand ten feet high."
David D. Smits
On 5 August 1874, Miles'scommand, together with a company of buffalohuntleft
Fort Dodge headed for the Washita River where the hostiles were reportedto
ers,
be gatheringin force. Fourmonths later, nearly out of suppliesand immobilizedin a
camp on the Washita where he awaited grain from Camp Supply,Miles outlined his
futureplans to Lieutenant Colonel George A. Forsyth.Once resupplied,Miles proposed "to send a small but very effective force to head of Red River, thence to move
East clearing out those breaksand canons, and leaving them as barrenas possible."
After the "clearingout"was accomplishedMiles intended "to move all the force then
remaining in the field towardsSupply or Sill as circumstancesmay warrant,and I
would leave as few Indians or Buffalobehind, and as little for them to subsist on as
possible."55Yearslater, in his PersonalRecollections,Miles exhibited no regretsabout
the virtualexterminationof the plains buffalo.In describingthe mannerin which the
hide hunters eradicatedthe herds, Miles justifiedthe result:
This might seem like cruelty and wastefulextravagancebut the buffalo,
like the Indian, stood in the way of civilization and in the path of
progress, and the decree had gone forth that they must both give
way.... The same territorywhich a quarterof a century ago was supportingthose vast herdsof wild game, is now covered with domestic animals which affordthe food supplyfor hundredsof millions of people in
civilized countries.56
Was Miles'sallusion to "the decree"that "hadgone forth"actuallya referenceto
a militaryorderthat had been issuedfor the destructionof the buffalo?BrigadierGeneral Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Carlisle Indian School, testified that
such an orderwas actuallygiven. Pratt,who was a Tenth Cavalrylieutenant in charge
of Indianscouts duringthe Red River War,recalledfromhis retirementthat "the general destructionof the buffalowas orderedas a militarymeasurebecause it was plain
that the Indianscould not be controlled on their reservationsas long as their greatest
resource,the buffalo,were so plentiful."57
No such written orderhas ever been found in the extant militaryrecords,but this
is not surprising.It is probablethat Sheridandeliberatelyrefusedto issue the relevant
written ordersknowing that orallyconveyed orderscould be more easily concealed or
moreplausiblydenied. His Civil Warexperiencehad not only taughthim the value of
destroyingthe enemy'sresources,it had also taught him that the perpetratorsof such
warfarewere despised and vilified by its victims and their supporters.Why subject
himself and the armyto avoidableIndian enmity and humanitariandisapproval?And
why encourage an impressionthat the army was not competent enough to subdue
55 Alice BlackwoodBaldwin,Memoirsof theLateFrankD. Baldwin(Los
Angeles,
1929), 77; Nelson A. Miles Papers,United States Army MilitaryHistory Institute, Carlisle Barracks,PA.
56 General Nelson A. Miles, PersonalRecollections
and Observations(1896; reprint,New
York,1969), 135.
57Pratt,Battlefieldand Classroom,63.
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mere "savages"without having to resort to destroying their food supply? From
Sheridan'sperspective,the armyhad to promote the destructionof the buffaloin the
interest of civilization, but, in its own interests,it must do so covertly.
Sheridan was perfectly capable of conducting covert military operations while
refusingto issue explicit written orders.Indeed, in 1873, he secretly orderedColonel
Mackenzieand his FourthCavalryto invade Mexico to crush the Kickapoos,Lipans,
and MescaleroApaches who were engaged in raidsinto the United States from their
northern Mexican sanctuaries.Sheridan issuedsecret spoken ordersto Mackenziein
meetingsheld at FortClarkand elsewhere.No recordof these meetingswas kept. The
only source of information about what transpiredis Lieutenant Robert G. Carter,
Mackenzie's adjutant. Carter did not attend the meetings, but he learned from
Mackenzie what had occurred. As Carter told it, Sheridan ordered Mackenzie to
invade Mexico and to conduct againstthe hated Indian raidersa "campaignof annihilation, obliteration, and complete destruction."When Mackenzierequestedmore
explicit ordersSheridan angrilypounded the table and, according to Carter,raged:
"Damn the orders!Damn the authority! You are to go ahead on your own plan of
action, and your authorityand backing shall be General Grant and myself. With us
behind you in whateveryou do to clean up this situation, you can rest assuredof the
fullest support. You must assume the risk. We will assume the final responsibility
should any result."58
Three yearslater,in the face of renewedIndian raidsfromMexico, the new commander of the Department of Texas, General EdwardO. C. Ord, sent American
troops across the border in another secret operation. In justifying this invasion of
Mexico, Ord assuredShermanthat "Sheridangave me quasipermissionwhen I was in
Washington, by sayingwhy the devil don't you do it."59
With the many-sidedassistanceof the frontierarmy,the buffalorunnersmanaged
to destroy virtually the entire southern herd by 1879. As the animals dwindled in
numbersin the late 1870s, a few hide hunters relocated to the northern range, then
limited to western Dakota, northern Wyoming, and eastern Montana. After the surrenderof the greatOglala LakotawarleaderCrazyHorseand his followersto the army
in the springof 1877, the northernplains became appreciablysaferfor white interlopers. But army commanderson the northern plains remained worried about Sitting
Bull'sband, which had defied the policy of keeping the reservationIndiansconfined
to their assignedlandsby fleeing to Canada.Unable to persuadeSitting Bull to return
to the United States and unwilling to antagonizethe Canadian authoritiesby pursuing him into Canada,the army'shigh commandresolvedto starvehim into surrender
by deprivinghim of his commissaryon the hoof-the buffalo.
With the notable exception of Mari Sandoz, American historians of the
trans-Mississippifrontiershave been reluctant to accept that hard reality.Canadian
58
Carter,On theBorderWithMackenzie,422-23.
59 EdwardO.
C. Ord to Sherman, 27 June 1876, The Papersof WilliamT. Sherman,microfilmreel no. 23, ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress,Washington, DC.
DavidD. Smits
historians,however,have long arguedthat the United States governmentdeliberately
promotedthe destructionof the northern plains herd to force Sitting Bull to sue for
peace. In 1912, Canadian historian, Archibald Oswald MacRae, relying upon information from Colonel Lawrence W. Herchmer, former commissioner of the Royal
Northwest Mounted Police, concluded that the official policy of the United States
government had been to destroythe northern herd, "in orderto force the Sioux and
kindred warlike tribes to sue for peace and mercy because of starvation."MacRae's
countrymanand fellow historian, Norman FergusBlack, writing one year later, concurred.Black cited testimony that he had obtained from "well informedbuffalotraders,"such as Jean LouisLe Gare, the man who convinced Sitting Bull to returnto the
United States.60
Yet another Canadianhistorian of the early twentieth century,C. M. Maclnnes,
detailed the manner in which the United States army starved Sitting Bull and his
band into surrendering.The American army,accordingto Maclnnes, formeda cordon
of soldiers,Indian auxiliaries,and Red River "half-breeds"to drive the buffalosouthwardwhenever they moved north towardthe border.Sandoz echoed Maclnnes and
addedthat it was in the region between the MissouriRiver and the Yellowstone,shut
in by a line of prairiefire and guns, that the last and greatestslaughterof the northern
herd took place.61
The scholar inclined to believe that Sheridan was responsiblefor the slaughter
ought not be deterredby a letter that he wrote on 31 October 1879 to Adjutant General EdwardD. Townsend. In that letter, Sheridan did indeed expresshis belief that
the "wholesaleslaughterof the buffaloshould be stopped."But the killing to which
Sheridan objected was taking place, General Alfred Terryhad assuredhim, on the
Great Sioux Reservation itself.62 Sheridan opposed that destruction because the
reservationwas off limits to unauthorizedwhites and, more importantly,because the
buffalo there helped to feed and thus pacify hungry Indians, who were inadequately
suppliedwith food by the federalgovernment.
As for the animalsoutside the reservation,Sheridanhoped to deal with them just
as he had dealt with the southern herd. To provide the hide hunters with an easily
accessible railroad,Sheridan was determined to push the Northern Pacific tracks
westwardfrom Bismarck,Dakota Territory,where they had arrivedin the summerof
1873. In promoting the westwardextension of the Northern Pacific, Sheridan was
acting on Sherman'sadvice. The latter wrote to Sheridan in 1872, "Ithink our interest is to favorthe undertakingof the Road, as it will help to bring the Indian problem
to a final solution."Sheridan zealouslyassisted the Northern Pacific, for he viewed
60
Archibald Oswald MacRae,Historyof theProvinceof Alberta([Calgary?],1912),
1:377;Norman FergusBlack,Historyof Saskatchewan
and theOld NorthWest (1913; 2d ed.,
Regina, Saskatchewan,1913), 200.
61
C. M. Maclnnes, In theShadowof theRockies(London, 1930), 145-46; Sandoz,Buffalo Hunters,340.
62
Sheridanto Adjutant General E. D. Townsend,31 October 1879, SheridanPapers,
microfilmreel no. 62.
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the railroadsas "new factors that cannot be ignored in the settlement of the Indian
question."63
With the army's unstinting support, the Northern Pacific reached the
Dakota-Montanaborder,near the center of the buffalo range, in 1880. Glendive,
Montana Territory,on the YellowstoneRiver, promptlybecame the headquartersfor
hundredsof buffalorunnerswho shippedthousandsof hides east on both the railroad
and on steamboatsthat carriedthem down the Yellowstoneand Missouririversto St.
Louis.
By 1881, with the army'shelp, the Northern PacificreachedMiles City, Montana
Territory.This raw frontiersettlement, protected by the militarypost at Fort Keogh,
joined Glendive as a headquartersfor the hide hunters.FortBuford,at the junction of
the Yellowstoneand the Missouri,was another majoroutfitting center for the buffalo
runners.As on the southern plains, the northernhunters relied on militaryposts to
serve as supply-distributionand hide-purchasingcenters.
Perhapsthe army'slogistical supportfor the hide huntersgave Montana pioneers
the impression that the slaying was the federal goverment's policy. This is what
Granville Stuart, a prominent early cattleman in Montana Territorybelieved. En
route from the Porcupineto Miles City in April of 1880, Stuart noted that the bottoms were strewnwith buffalocarcasses:
In many places they lie thick on the ground ... all murderedfor their
hides which are piled like cord wood all along the way.... Such a waste
of the finest meat in the world! Probablyten thousandhave been killed
in this vicinity this winter. Slaughtering the buffalo is a government
measureto subjugatethe Indians."64
Of course, armycommanderson the northernplains could encouragethe killing
of buffalofor seemingly legitimate purposesthat obscuredtheir real reasonsfor wanting the herds obliterated. Food needs enabled them to rationalize exorbitant
death-dealing. In 1882, a herd appearedon the northern side of the Yellowstone
where a high plateauoverlookedMiles City and FortKeogh in the valley below. Fifth
Infantrymen sent from the post killed so many animals that their meat filled a
half-dozen four-mule team wagons. General Hugh Scott rememberedthat soldiers
had no trouble keeping a six-mule team wagon carryingfresh buffalomeat into Fort
Meade "allthe time,"early in 1883.65
63
Sherman to Sheridan, 7 October 1872, SheridanPapers,microfilmreel no 17; Department of War,Reportof theSecretaryof War, 1880 (Washington, DC, 1880), 1:56.
64Granville Stuart,FortyYearson theFrontier(Glendale, CA, 1957), 2:104. The Montana cowpuncherE. C. Abbott, better known as "TeddyBlue,"sharedStuart'sviews on the
goverment's role in the annihilation. As "Blue"put it (in E. C. Abbott ("TeddyBlue")and
Helen Huntington Smith, We PointedThemNorth (Norman, 1939), 101-2), "all this slaughterwas
a put-upjob on the part of the government to control the Indiansby getting rid of their food supply."
65 Homaday,Extermination
124.
of theAmericanBison,509; Scott, SomeMemoriesof a Soldier,
DavidD. Smits
The troops also requiredcold-weather gear to protect them from the sub-zero
temperaturesof northern plains winters. In response,the QuartermasterDepartment
by the 1880s issuedlong buffaloovercoatsmanufacturedfrom the hides of cows killed
in the winter months when their coats were in prime condition. General George
Crook orderedfor his men arctic boots made from buffalo-furovershoes, wrapped
aroundcork-soledIndian moccasins.HungryNorthern Pacific Railroadconstruction
crews,protectedby the army,were fed elephantine amountsof buffaloand other wild
game. And the army still provided military escorts for sportsmenbent upon killing
"the monarch of the plains."In 1881, MajorJames Bell and twelve specially picked
Seventh Cavalrymen located a huge herd and helped to ensure several successful
hunts for George O. Shields'sparty,visitors to Montana Territory.66
In the same year, with the northern herd rapidlydeclining, Sheridan privately
expressedhis satisfaction.His note, "respectfullyforwarded"to an unknownrecipient,
probablySherman,betrayshis true feelings:
If I could learn that every Buffalo in the northern herd were killed I
would be glad. The destructionof this herd would do more to keep Indians quiet than anything else that could happen, except the death of all
the Indians.Since the destructionof the southern herd ... the Indians
in that section have given us no trouble.67
Sheridan got his wish. Within two years the northern herd had almost disappeared.General Shermanwas no less pleasedthan Sheridanwith the advancementof
civilization at the expense of the buffalo.Sherman recalled in his Memoirsthe Civil
War veteranswho "flockedto the plains"and helped to win the West from savagery.
"This was another potent agency in producing the result we enjoy to-day,"wrote
Sherman,"in having in so short a time replacedthe wild buffaloesby more numerous
herdsof tame cattle, and by substitutingfor the uselessIndiansthe intelligent owners
of productivefarmsand cattle-ranches."68
In conclusion, then, GeneralsShermanand Sheridan,amongother high-ranking
commandersof the post-Civil Warfrontierarmy,appliedto the Plains Indiansthe lessons that they had learned in defeatingthe Confederatestates. The army'shigh command decided to halt its effortsto destroythe buffaloherds duringPresidentGrant's
first term. But this decision, dictated by Grant's"PeacePolicy,"was only a partialand
temporary interruption in the general pattern of destruction. Once Sherman,
Sheridan,and like-mindedcommandersbecame disillusionedwith peacefulmethods,
they resumedtheir strategyof trying to conquer the plains tribes by destroyingtheir
commissaryon the hoof.
The destructionof the buffaloproceededthroughthree phases:the killing of the
animals on the central plains in the early 1870s; the slaughterof the herds on the
66
Shields, Huntingin theGreatWest, 133-170.
67SheridanPapers,microfilmreel no. 12.
68
Sherman,Memoirs,2:413-14.
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southern plains in the mid and late 1870s; and the near extermination of the great
beastson the northernplains in the early 1880s. Sheridanwas the officermost responsible for promotingthe annihilation. But because of his tendency, when dealing with
contentious or potentially embarrassingmatters, to issue oral rather than written
commands,document-mindedhistorianshave failed to appreciatethe army'scovert
role in the great buffaloslaughter.Undeniably, a few individualofficersopposed the
destruction, for as historian Sherry C. Smith has shown, "there was no monolithic
militarymind";but these dissentersproved unable to influence events.69
In the end, the frontierarmy'swell-calculatedpolicy of destroyingthe buffaloin
orderto conquer the Plains Indiansproved more effective than any other weapon in
its arsenal.Too small and too inept to vanquish the plains tribes expeditiously,the
armyaided and was in turn aided by the "sportsmen"and professionalhunters who,
along with the army itself, managed to destroy the Indians' staff of life. With the
mainstayof their diet gone the Indianshad no choice but to accept a servile fate on a
reservationwhere they could subsiston government handouts. Fromthe Indian perspective the buffalo'sdisappearancewas a shatteringblow. Crow Chief Plenty Coups
describedits impact to FrankLinderman:"When the buffalowent awaythe hearts of
my people fell to the ground,and they could not lift them up again.After this nothing
happened. There was little singing anywhere."Sitting Bull summedup the resultsof
the annihilation: "A cold wind blew across the prairiewhen the last buffalofell-a
death-windfor my people."70
Smith, ViewFromOfficers'Row, 182.
70FrankB. Linderman,Plenty-Coups:Chiefof theCrows(Lincoln, 1962), 311; Norman
B. Wiltsey,"The Great BuffaloSlaughter,"in The AmericanWest,ed. and comp. RaymondFriday
Locke (Los Angeles, 1971), 134.
69