NGO’s in the Biological Weapons Convention
Agents of contestation?
Niels van Willigen
Institute of Political Science, Leiden University
(willigen@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)
Koos van der Bruggen
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
(koos.van.der.bruggen@knaw.nl)
Paper presented at the:
7th ECPR General Conference
Bordeaux 4-7 September 2013
EARLY DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE
Introduction
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) are strongly involved in global
governance. In the academic literature NGO’s are depicted as agents with an
increasing influence on world politics. In some cases of multilateral cooperation, for
example the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), NGO’s significantly
influenced the outcomes of the negotiations (Short 1999; Williams, Goose &
Wareham 2008; Doherty 2009). In these particular two cases NGO’s formed an
important part of a larger transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998)
which successfully fought for the abolishment of two entire categories of weapons.
At other occasions, NGO’s made their voices heard against the downsides of
globalization and protested at meetings of the WTO and the G8. Hence, NGO’s are
often seen as agents which resist, contest, and/or transform the status quo in world
politics (Steffek 2013: 8).
There is however another, and arguably more realistic, qualification of the role of
NGO’s in world politics. NGO’s are more often partners of international
organizations and states than agents of contestation. A case in point is the way NGO’s
function in the United Nations (UN) where they cooperate with the member states and
other international organizations to such an extent that they have become ‘integrated
and institutionalized’ within the UN system (Dany 2013: 4). Partnership also occurs in
the above mentioned transnational advocacy networks which are coalitions of
amongst others NGO’s, (parts of) International Governmental Organizations (IGO’s)
and (parts of) the executive and legislative branches of governments (Keck and
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Sikkink 1999). As institutionalized actors, NGO’s may still change and transform
global governance, but not necessarily as an agent of contestation. Instead of
challengers to the state, they can be considered as partners which enhance the abilities
of the state in global governance (Raustiala 1997: 720).
In this paper we analyze the role of NGO’s as partners of the States Parties of the
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). The BTWC - officially the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction - was
signed in 1972. Since then, the treaty has evolved into the most important multilateral
institution addressing the problem of biological weapons. In many ways the BTWC is
a classic treaty in which the States Parties are the most important actors. Although the
growing role of NGO’s in world politics is generally acknowledged, reservations are
often made with respect to the role of NGO’s in international security (Knopf 2012:
169).
The aim of this paper is to understand the role of NGO’s in the BTWC. Based on
resource exchange theory, we offer an analysis of the role of NGO’s in this
multilateral treaty regime. Resource exchange theory holds that NGO’s gain access to
IGO’s in return for their expertise. Steffek (2013) recently presented a theoretical
framework which, based on resource exchange theory, aims to offer ‘a more systemic
approach to the analysis of IGO-NGO relations’. We argue that his framework can
also be applied to analyse state-NGO relations within a treaty regime which lacks a
treaty organization as is the case in the BTWC.
2
We start the paper with an elaboration on resource exchange theory. Special focus is
given to Steffek’s framework. Secondly, we analyse the role of NGO’s in the BTWC.
What kind of NGO’s are involved in the treaty regime? To what extent are they
allowed to participate in the Meetings of States Parties and the Review Conferences?
We show that the role of NGO’s has increased over time and we analyze their role in
the policy making process. Third, based on resource exchange theory we explain why
the role of the NGO’s within the BTWC increased. We put forward the argument that
the absence of a treaty organization in combination with the rapid developments in the
life sciences makes cooperation between NGO’s and Participating States in the
BTWC vital for accomplishing the goals of the treaty.
Resource exchange theory
Resource exchange theory explains why (in general) in the last few decades IGO’s
became increasingly open to NGO’s. Resource exchange theory was developed in
organization sociology in order to explain why organizations voluntarily exchange
material and/or immaterial resources (Kruck 2011: 13; Bouwen 2002: 368; Steffek
2013: 9). The theory is firmly grounded in a rational actor approach in which
cooperation takes place because actors expect to mutually benefit from their
interactions. When applied to the IGO-NGO relationship the basic argument of the
theory is that NGO’s exchange their material and immaterial resources (such as
expertise or legitimacy), for participation in the IGO (Raustiala 1997; Nölke 2000;
Brühl 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik 2003; Mayer 2008; Kruck and Rittberger 2010; Kruck
2011; Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck 2012: 25).
3
Participation is often conceptualized as access to decision-making processes in order
to influence policy outcome. Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck (2012: 25) mention two
drivers for this exchange. First, the compatibility of the NGO’s’ goals with those of
the IGO and, second, the extent to which the IGO is dependent on the resources these
non-state actors have to offer. The more essential and the less replaceable these
resources are, the more willing the IGO is to grant access to the NGO.
A more elaborate model of resource exchange between IGO’s and NGO’s is offered
by Steffek (2013). He distinguishes between pull factors and push factors causing
cooperation and connects these factors to the different phases of the policy process.
Drawing on public policy literature, Steffek identifies an international policy-cycle
consisting of six phases: agenda-setting, research and analysis, policy formulation,
policy decision, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. The push and pull
factors are connected to these six phases. The pull factors are IGO-centered and
explain why an IGO would cooperate with a NGO.
Steffek mentions four concrete reasons why an IGO would pull a NGO in: to identify
emerging issues; to acquire additional expertise, to help with implementation and to
help monitoring compliance. These reasons align with four concrete phases from the
policy cycle (i.e. agenda-setting, research and analysis, implementation and
evaluation). The model thus stipulates that IGO’s are not interested to pull NGO’s in
in the policy formulation or policy decision phase. NGO’s, however, push for
cooperation in all six phases. Six reasons are identified by Steffek why NGO’s seek
collaboration: to influence the agenda, to inform the research process and/or seek
financing for the provision of expertise, to influence the policy formulation, to
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influence the policy decisions, to seek financing for the implementation of projects
and to assure compliance.
As noted above, important element of the Steffek’s framework is that whereas NGO’s
seek to influence the policy formulation and policy decisions of IGO’s, IGO’s try to
avoid this. Steffek identifies an intergovernmental core of decision making which is
protected against NGO influence. Two qualifications are necessary. First, whereas the
policy phase model suggests that decisions are taken in the decision making phase, in
reality decisions are often shaped in the phases preceding it. Although it is plausible
that IGO’s keep NGO’s far from the formal decision making phase, the question is
how important this is in terms of NGO influence. Second, and more importantly, for
the policy formulation phase the intergovernmental core might exist in many IGO’s,
but might also be absent in other forms of multilateral cooperation. In less formal
international settings the intergovernmental core might be less strong. Evidence from
the antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions negotiations suggest that NGO’s
have been pulled in by states during the policy formulation and policy decision phase.
Even though NGO’s did not have a formal vote in Ottawa or Oslo, it would be
unthinkable that States Parties would have ignored the preferences of NGOs. In these
specific cases one could even argue that through their alliance with middle powers
which were sympathetic to a ban of these weapons, such as Norway, Canada and
Belgium, they indirectly had a strong vote in the policy formulation and decision
making phase.
In our paper we adopt the Steffek’s framework for investigating whether and how
resource exchange took place between States Parties and NGO’s. Based on resource
5
exchange theory, we expect that NGO’s have gained more access to the BTWC in
recent years. Especially with the recent advancements made in life sciences (such as
biology, bio-nanotechnology, and genetics). Because of these developments there is a
growing concern about the ability of the BTWC to deal with new proliferation
challenges. Therefore, we expect that with the advancements made in life sciences the
BTWC has become increasingly dependent on non-governmental organizations
(NGO) such as scientific organizations and industry to remain effective as a
multilateral institution. Resource exchange theory suggests that this would have
resulted in increased access of NGO’s to the BWC in the form of substantial
participation in the Meetings of States Parties and the Review Conferences. We
specifically look at the extent to which NGO’s within the BTWC are pulled in during
the policy formulation phase. Departing from the notion that the more dependent an
IGO is, the more it pulls NGO’s in, we hypothesize that due to the absence of a treaty
organization and the complex technical nature of biosecurity, NGO’s are pulled in
during the policy formulation phase.
NGO’s in the BWC
The BWC focuses on preventing states from developing biological weapons.
Negotiations on the BTWC started in 1969 because of a renewed interest in
controlling chemical and biological weapons. It helped that biological weapons were
considered to be abhorrent, but increasingly also of limited military relevance (Van
der Bruggen and Ter Haar, 2011: 22). The treaty entered into force in 1975 without a
verification system or implementation agency. An attempt was made to set up an
Organization on the Prohibition of Biological weapons (OPBW) at the beginning of
the 21st century, but it failed. As a result it is difficult to enforce compliance and
6
therefore the success of the BTWC mainly depends on cooperation, transparency, and
confidence building measures among the States Parties in cooperation with other
international institutions (such as the World Health Organization), and NGO’s.
In this paper we consider NGO’s to be ‘private voluntary organizations whose
members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common
purpose’ (Karns and Mingst 2010: 8). The definition includes both non-profit and
profit oriented organizations (such as representatives from industry). Within the
BTWC no distinction is made between different kinds of NGO’s in the lists of
participants of meetings. For analytical reasons we distinguish between science
NGO’s (universities and research institutes), advocacy NGO’s, and business and
industry NGO’s.
Examples from the first category are Harvard, Sussex and Bradford University. In the
1990s they launched the Harvard Sussex Program (HSP, an inter-university
collaboration for research, communication and training in support of informed public
policy towards chemical and biological weapons) and the Bradford Project on
Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Both programs are
characterized by long and thorough research conducted by a staff of experienced
researchers, always together with a generation of young scientists. Another example
in this category is the Inter Academy Panel on International Affairs (IAP). The IAP
was launched in 1993 as a global network of science academies. Its primary goal is to
help member academies work together ‘to advise citizens and public officials on the
scientific aspects of critical global issues’ (Inter Academy Panel 2013). Since 2004,
the IAP has been actively involved in the issue of the relationship between security
7
and life science research. In that year a Biosecurity Working Group (BWG) was
established with the Academies of China, Cuba, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The BWG has developed a series of activities to
stimulate discussion on biosecurity.
The second category are non-profit advocacy organizations. These organizations
participate in the treaty regime in order to support the norm against the possession and
use of biological weapons. Examples are the Bio Weapons Prevention Project
(BWPP) and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).
The BWPP “was launched in 2003 by a group of non-governmental organizations
concerned at the failure of governments to fortify the norm against the weaponization
of disease. [The] BWPP monitors governmental and other activities relevant to the
treaties that codify that norm.” (Bio Weapons Prevention Project 2013). The BWPP’s
website (www.bwpp.org) publishes reports, background information on technical and
political issues and other relevant documents that are of interest to all politicians,
diplomats, scientists and concerned citizens. VERTIC is an independent, non-profit
making charitable organization. Established in 1986, VERTIC supports ‘the
development, implementation and verification of international agreements’ (VERTIC
2013). VERTIC is financially supported by some Western governments and has a
working area that is broader than that of Biological Weapons.
Finally, an example from the category of business and industry NGO’s is
Pharmaceutical and Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA). Strikingly,
business and industry NGO are largely absent in the BTWC meetings. They are
occasionally present, like when negotiations were held about a verification protocol,
8
but even then they took little effective action to influence the States Parties
(Littlewood 2005: 208). Also, an industry panel was organized during the Seventh
Review Conference in 2011 (BWPP 2011c). But in general business and industry
NGO’s play a small role in the treaty regime, which stands in large contrast with the
substantial role of business and industry in the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
NGO’s participate in all formal meetings of the convention. Hence NGO’s participate
formally as observers in the quinquennial Review Conferences and in the annual
Meeting of States Parties. Second, NGO’s participate as ‘Guests of the Meeting’ in
the annual Meetings of Experts. The Meeting of Experts consists of representatives
from States Parties, representatives of IGO’s (such as the World Health Organization,
WHO, the UN and the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
OPCW), and NGO’s. The topics to be discussed by the experts are determined by the
preceding Review Conference. At the Seventh Review Conference in December 2011,
for example, the States Parties decided that developments in the field of science and
technology related to the BTWC should be one of the three topics to be discussed in
the intersessional meetings. Although NGO’s are allowed to participate, it is
important to note the difference between the status of IGO’s and NGO’s within the
rules of procedure of the Meetings of Experts. Whereas IGO’s are automatically
entitled to participate as observers, NGO’s can only formally participate upon
invitation of the Chair of the Meeting of States Parties. They are invited as ‘Guests of
the Meeting’ to speak in a particular part of the programme. NGO’s which are not
invited are able to participate in the informal sessions only (BWC Implementation
Support Unit 2012).
9
In general, NGO’s are only allowed to attend informal, public meetings within the
BTWC. In practice however, the BTWC meetings have become more open to NGO’s
in recent years. In the intersessional process (the Meetings of States Parties and the
Meeting of Experts), NGO’s are increasingly allowed to participate in meetings which
were previously off limits. During the Prepatory Committee (PrepCom) of the 2011
Review Conference a (for NGO’s closed!) debate took place in which the role of civil
society was discussed. This discussion was organized in reaction to a proposal from
the Chair, the Dutch ambassador Paul van den Ijssel, to allow NGO’s to participate in
the upcoming Seventh Review Conference unless States Parties would explicitly
object. According to the Chairman this would confirm the practice which had evolved
from 2008 onwards to allow NGO’s to attend all meetings in the intersessional
process. The final outcome was very different: NGO’s would not be allowed to attend
the Review Conference meetings unless the States Parties would explicitly agree to
grant access (BWPP 2011a; BWPP 2011b). Actual participation during the Review
Conference in December 2011 was limited to public sessions, because no decision
was taken to allow NGO’s in.
The PrepCom debate about the role of NGO’s and the increased openness during the
intersessionals are evidence of a process of resource exchange in which NGO’s may
participate in an international treaty regime in exchange for their expertise. In the next
section we analyze the push and pull factors which motivate States Parties and NGO’s
within the BTWC to increasingly cooperate.
10
Push and pull factors within the BWC
Having described the role of NGO’s in the BTWC in general we proceed to a more
specific analysis of the push and pull factors explaining cooperation between the
States Parties and NGO’s. To what extent do we observe resource exchange in the
different phases of the policy cycle? Let us start with some general remarks. At first
sight it seems that the intersessional process as it started in 2002, is an almost perfect
example of the push and pull model as described by Steffek. Even more, the
intersessionals can be seen as a structure through which NGOs become
institutionalized within the BTWC regime. However, some disclaimers should be
made about the relevance of the interessesional process and hence the influence of the
NGO’s within the regime.
First, this new intersessional structure was set up as a means to ‘save’ the BTWC. The
treaty regime got in an existential crisis after the failure to reach agreement on a
verification regime in 2002. After this failure, the incumbent chair of the BTWC, the
Hungarian ambassador Toth, explored the options for an alternative to the verification
protocol. The lowest common denominator among the States Parties proved to be the
intersessional process. The annually recurring Meetings of States Parties and
Meetings of Experts were accepted by all members of the BTWC, but only in
combination with the provision that no decisions could be taken during the
intersessionals.
Second, certainly in the first few years of the intersessional process the role of NGO’s
was very limited. Even the Meeting of Experts was more a meeting of diplomats than
a true meeting for experts and NGO’s. Many experts were in one way or another
11
linked to the delegations of States Parties and thus their independence can be
questioned. After some years, however, the possibilities for independent NGO’s to
fully participate in the Meetings of Experts increased.
Third, the States Parties of the BTWC are still organized according to the divisions
dating back from the time of the Cold War. There are three groups of states: the
Western group (including Japan, Australia, New Zealand), the Eastern group (the
former communist Eastern Europe) and the Non Aligned Movement group (consisting
of most Asian, African and Latin American states). Not surprisingly, the Western
group is most interested in the input of NGO’s. Many states of both other groups look
with less enthusiasm to the increasing role of NGO’s in the BTWC. This attitude is
reflected in the participation of NGO’s from these States Parties: there are almost
none. Almost all NGO’s come from states from the Western Group.
In spite of these qualifications, it is clear that the role of NGOs has increased. How
does the relation between NGO’s and the BTWC fit the model of Steffek? As said
before, he mentions four concrete reasons why an IGO would pull a NGO in: to
identify emerging issues; to acquire additional expertise, to help with implementation
and to help monitoring compliance. Furthermore he argues that IGO’s are not
interested to pull NGO’s in in the policy formulation or policy decision phase. Below
we apply this model to the BTWC.
Agenda setting
In the agenda setting phase, States Parties use NGO’s to identify new issues and
NGO’s try to influence the agenda. Both push and pull factors can be observed within
12
the BTWC. The meetings of experts have developed to a forum where debate can take
place on important new issues. Via the Meetings of states parties these issues can be
elaborated to agenda items for the next Review Conference. Maybe even more
important are the side events that take place during all BWC meetings and
conferences. Most of these side events are organized by NGO’s, universities or other
non-state actors. These side events have evolved to the most interesting meetings
during a BTWC gathering. This because in these events issues can be scheduled for
the agenda that are not debated during the official meetings, because it is too
premature or too much sensitive. Diplomats and representatives of the official
delegations are frequenting these meetings.
Research and analysis
Pull and push factors are also present in the research and development phase. Within
the BTWC, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) follows developments in science
and technology. The ISU is a small three-member secretariat tasked with assisting the
States Parties in implementing the decisions taken during the Review Conferences.
One of the concrete tasks is to follow developments in science and technology. In
preparation of the BTWC meetings, the ISU publishes reports on relevant
developments. There is a growing involvement of scientific experts that are asked to
analyse e.g. scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and its
(possible) effect on the implementation of the BTWC. Some universities (such as
Bradford and Exeter in the UK) have specialized departments for research on the field
of biological weapons. They provide solicited and unsolicited advice to the BTWC
and its States Parties. In preparation of the last Seventh Review Conference the ISU
developed a so called ‘think zone’ on the BTWC website, where scientists and other
13
experts could place articles and opinions. Another interesting example is the
installation of a Sounding Board (consisting of governmental and non-governmental
participants) by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs during the preparation of the
Serventh review conference (that was presided by the Dutch ambassador). Last but
not least it should be mentioned that the Harvard Sussex program and CBW Events
(related to BWPP) published a very elaborate and complete Briefing Book for the
Seventh Review Conference. This Book of more than 600 pages encompasses the text
of all relevant treaties, BTWC documents, UN documents and documents of other
organisations (Harvard Sussex Programm and CBW Events 2011). The UK
government paid for it, but there was cooperation of other states, including nonWestern states such as Russia.
Policy formulation
In contrast to what Steffek’s model suggests, there are both push and pull factors in
this policy making phase. As explained above, the intersessional meetings are a
combination of Meetings of States Parties and Meetings of Experts. During these
meetings NGOs and States Parties jointly identify new issues and present possible
courses of action. Since 2008 NGOs have continuously participated in all
intersessional meetings. Since its inception in 2002, the intersessional process has had
a large influence on the discussions during the Review Conference. It often produced
concrete proposals.
Both States Parties and NGO’s benefit from this and as a result both push and pull
factors are present. Although on average it is mainly states from the Western Group
which are in favour of NGO participation, even States Parties from the Eastern Group
14
and from the NAM, which are generally critical of involving NGOs during the
Review Conferences, accept the NGO role during the interesessionals. During the
above mentioned discussion about the role of civil society in the Seventh Review
Conference, some countries were against NGO involvement, but at the same time
made positive remarks about NGO participation in the interesessional process
(BWPP). Further, during the Review Conferences, most delegates are willing to share
information about closed sessions with the NGO community. Since 2006 the BWPP
BWPP publishes daily reports during BWC meetings with information on the most
important debates and developments. The way in which these reports are prepared and
spread shows that there is a close and harmonious relationship between the BWPP and
many official delegates and representatives of the BTWC. The states parties involved
share a common interest in making the BTWC process as transparent as possible. As
the formal diplomatic procedures and rules do not allow for the daily publication of
frank reports, all the parties involved agree to this information being spread in the
daily reports of the BWPP, which does not have any formal status.
Policy decision
In this phase of the policy process we do not observe any pull factors. The 2011
PrepCom discussion about allowing civil society into formal meetings was not
tailored towards allowing them to have a vote. Thus, within the BWC there is an
intergovernmental core which is indeed protected against NGO influence. An example
of this core is the Committee of the Whole during Review Conferences. This
committee has indeed as its task bringing all interventions and discussions together in
preparing a final declaration of the review Conference. This final declaration is the
guideline for the BTWC policy in the next period of 5 years and that is considered to
15
be too important and sensitive to involve NGO’s in the decisions. Looking at the
recent history of the BTWC it can be understood that States Parties are a bit reticent in
involving non state parties. The equilibrium in the new structure is the result of a
compromise between states with sometimes very different views and opinions.
Diplomats are too careful people to take the risk of destroying this equilibrium.
Moreover, what they can win by inviting NGO’s is already paid out in the other
phases. NGO’s with the BTWC seem to acknowledge and accept this, because there
are no significant attempts to get access to the decision-making phase.
Policy implementation
It is important to determine that we hardly can speak of a BTWC policy. The most
important policy decision has never been taken: installing a verification regime. As a
result the BTWC has no institutional backing to execute its policy. There is only the
(very competent but very small) ISU of three (sic) persons. As far as can be spoken of
policy it regards voluntary measures such as filling in forms on confidence building
measures. But these are activities that are undertaken by individual States Parties and
not by the BTWC as such. States Parties are therefore the most important policy
implementers. Nonetheless, the mandate of the ISU allows for cooperation with
NGOs.
In addition, VERTIC plays an important role in implementation. It runs a National
Implementation Measures (NIM) Programme, which includes assistance with
legislation. Article IV of the BTWC obliges each States Party to ‘take any necessary
measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition or retention of biological weapons in its territory and anywhere under its
16
jurisdiction or control’. This implies for example national legislation criminalizing the
activities mentioned in Article IV. Quite a few States Parties lack the necessary
knowledge and/or financial resources to implement this commitment. VERTIC than
‘(..) offers assistance with legislative drafting for BWC obligations, remotely or in
capitals, at no cost. VERTIC assesses the comprehensiveness of existing national
measures, identifies gaps, and proposes approaches to fully implement the BWC,
including amendments to existing legislation, a single issue law or omnibus
legislation to cover several CBRN treaties and related legal instrument’ (VERTIC
2013).
Policy evaluation
As there is no much policy on the BTWC level, evaluation is not the most important
element in BTWC meetings. Of course some States Parties stress the importance of
carrying out the Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s), and they keep pressing
states that are not filling in these CBM-forms. However, one of the reasons that the
enthusiasm for participating in the process is so limited, is that there is no follow-up
to the CBM’s at all. The forms are to be uploaded to the confidential space of the
BTWC-website, and that is it. Attempts - as during the most recent Meeting of
Experts (August 2013) - to relocate the forms to the public space (which would
increase transparency) and to organize sessions for debating the CBM’s were blocked.
Most of the opposing states belonged to the group of non-respondents.
In the field of policy evaluation some NGO’s are trying to influence the debate.
During the last Meeting of Experts King’s College (London) presented a policy brief
on how to deal better with CBM’s (Lentzos 2013). Moreover, BWPP presents a Bio
17
Monitoring Report which, modelled after the Landmine Monitor and Cluster
Munitions Monitor Reports, aims at assessing treaty compliance (Bio Weapons
Prevention Project 2011d).
Why did the role of NGO’s increase?
Above we argued that the role of NGO’s has increased and that resource exchange
takes place in almost all phases of the policy cycle. Was this due to an increased
dependence of the BWC on NGO-expertise? In other words, to what extent do we
observe resource exchange? Four key developments explain the increased role of
NGO’s from a resource exchange perspective. The first development is a general
trend of growing NGO participation in global governance. The BTWC is far from
immune for this trend and NGO participation may be partly explained by this.
Secondly, the failure in the Summer of 2001 to establish the OPBW meant that States
Parties started to look for alternative ways to strengthen compliance with the treaty
(McLeish and Trapp 2011: 538) and they needed the expertise of NGO’s to do this.
Thirdly, as we already referred to above, the developments in the life sciences make
involvement of NGO’s more important. It is hard for States Parties to keep on track
with the advancements. A final and fourth explanation is that compared biological
non-proliferation regime is not – as e.g. nuclear proliferation regime – in the hard core
of international security policy. It is a relatively less political salient issue, which
makes NGO involvement probably also less problematic.
Having said this, we emphasize that the increased NGO involvement is not unchecked
and in many ways limited. It surely is better than in some other arms control regimes,
but also much less than it could be – and in the eyes of many involved NGO’s –
18
should be. Furthermore, it could be argue that the role of NGO’s becomes even less
important if ‘real’ issues are at stake. This was shown by the recent case of scientific
development regarding the H5N1 (birdflew) virus. This case study falls beyond the
scope of our paper, so we limit us to the observation that States Parties took decisions
without consulting, and even by excluding, NGO’s. Also interesting is that this debate
also took place outside the BTWC circuit.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the role of NGO’s within the BTWC. They are hardly
agents of contestation. Instead, where they can they collaborate closely with the States
Parties of the BTWC. There is substantial cooperation which can explained by
resource exchange theory. The NGO’s provide expertise and in return they have
access to the treaty regime. The general trend of increased NGO participation, the
absence of a treaty organization, the advances in the life sciences and the relative low
importance which is given to biological weapons explain this. Most push and pull
factors identified by Steffek have been observed. However, we found that, contrary to
the expectations of Steffek’s, NGO’s are also pulled in during the policy formulation
phase. This first provisional analysis seems to show that the intergovernmental core
only exists within the policy decision phase.
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