Dworkin's Legal Theory

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Dworkin’s Legal Theory
Understanding a particular philosophical position in the law sometimes means figuring
out their relation to other theories. On the basis of your reading of two essays by
Dworkin, how do you think he would evaluate the main tenets of the various legal
theories we have examined to date?
Natural Law Theory
A good summation of NLT can be found in Blackstone: “This law of nature being coeval
with mankind and dictated by God himself is of course superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding over the whole globe, in all countries and at all times. No human laws
are of any validity if contrary to this, and such of them as are valid derive their force and
all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.”
Legal Positivism
The main tenets of legal positivism include:
The Pedigree Thesis: The existence, content, and validity of the law is a function
of certain social facts (the command of the sovereign, the actions of a legislature).
The Separation Thesis: there is no overlap between the notions of law and
morality and legal systems have their own criteria for validity.
Conventionality Thesis: The social facts giving rise to legal validity are
authoritative in virtue of a social convention and the criteria that determine
whether or not any given norm counts as a legal norm are binding because of an
implicit or explicit agreement among officials.
Legal Realism
The main tenets of legal realism include:
The Local Indeterminacy Thesis: the class of available legal materials is
insufficient to logically entail a unique legal outcome in most cases worth
litigating at the appellate level.
The Discretion Thesis: in such cases, judges make new law in deciding legal
disputes through the exercise of a lawmaking discretion.
The True Sources Thesis: Judicial decisions in indeterminate cases are influenced
by the judge’s political and moral convictions—and not by legal considerations.
Dworkin’s Interpretive Theory of Law
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Riggs v. Palmer
On the 13th day of August 1880, Francis B. Palmer made his last will and testament, in
which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, the
plaintiffs in this action, and the remainder of his estate to his grandson, the defendant
Elmer E. Palmer…. At the date of the will, and subsequently to the death of the testator,
Elmer lived with him as a member of his family, and at his death was 16 years old. He
knew of the provisions made in his favor in the will, and, that he might prevent his
grandfather from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested some intention to
do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate possession of his property, he
willfully murdered him by poisoning him. He now claims the property. The sole question
for our determination is, can he have it?
Issue: Whether Elmer Palmer should be permitted to inherit his grandfather’s fortune,
given that he murdered his grandfather for the express purpose of receiving his
inheritance.
Some relevant facts:
The Statute of Wills, read literally, made it clear that the grandson would inherit,
the murder notwithstanding.
There were no statutes in effect which prohibited Elmer from inheriting the
fortune.
For all intents and purposes, the will was a valid legal document.
How ought we to rule in this case? Are we “bound by the rigid rules of law” (as Justice
Gray asserts in his dissenting opinion)? As Gray wrote:
I concede that rules of law which annul testamentary provisions made for the benefit of
those who have become unworthy of them may be based on principles of equity and of
natural justice. It is quite reasonable to suppose that a testator would revoke or alter his
will, where his mind has been so angered and changed as to make him unwilling to have
his will executed as it stood. But these principles only suggest sufficient reasons for the
enactment of laws to meet such cases.
Or do you find yourself agreeing with Justice Earl (and Ronald Dworkin)?
What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the legislative intention in
the general laws passed for the orderly peaceable, and just devolution of property that
they should have operation in favor of one Who murdered his ancestor that he might
speedily come into the possession of his estate? Such an intention is inconceivable. We
need not, therefore, be much troubled by the general language contained in the laws.
Besides, all laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their operation and effect
by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit
by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his
own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by
public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized
countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes.
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