Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Handbook A Practical Guide to the Analysis of Alternatives 10 June 2013 Office of Aerospace Studies Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) OAS/A5 1655 1st Street SE Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5522 For public release. (505) 846-8322, DSN 246-8322 Distribution unlimited. www.oas.kirtland.af.mil 377ABW-2013-0453 1 2 Table of Contents PREFACE.................................................................................................................................................... 6 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 7 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2 DECISION MAKING AND HOW THE AOA FITS .................................................................... 17 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3 EFFECTIVENESS METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................43 EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY .....................................................................45 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................53 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................57 EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS RESULTS PRESENTATION .......................................................58 PERFORMING COST ANALYSIS................................................................................................ 60 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6 SCOPING THE ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................31 DEFINING THE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS ..........................................................................35 IDENTIFYING STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY .......................................................................35 DETERMINING LEVEL OF EFFORT .....................................................................................36 ESTABLISHING THE STUDY TEAM .....................................................................................38 STUDY PLAN PREPARATION AND REVIEW ........................................................................41 PERFORMING THE EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS ................................................................ 43 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5 MAJOR PROCESSES ...........................................................................................................17 WHAT DECISIONS MUST BE MADE/SUPPORTED? .............................................................19 ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN THE MATERIEL SOLUTION ANALYSIS PHASE ................................22 WHO USES THE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................22 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AOA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES ...................................................25 PLANNING THE ANALYTICAL EFFORT................................................................................. 31 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4 PURPOSE OF THE AOA ........................................................................................................8 AOA ENTRY CRITERIA .......................................................................................................8 AOA STUDY GUIDANCE ...................................................................................................10 AOA PRODUCTS ...............................................................................................................11 DECISION MAKER EXPECTATIONS OF AN AOA .................................................................13 REFERENCE INFORMATION ...............................................................................................15 GENERAL COST ESTIMATING ............................................................................................60 AOA COST ESTIMATING ...................................................................................................60 LIFE CYCLE COST CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................62 COST ANALYSIS RESPONSIBILITY .....................................................................................65 COST ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................67 COST RESULTS PRESENTATION.........................................................................................77 COST DOCUMENTATION ...................................................................................................78 PERFORMING THE RISK ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 80 6.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................80 3 6.2 6.3 7 ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES STUDY .......... 86 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 8 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................86 WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY? ..............................................................................................86 DEFINING THE MAINTENANCE CONCEPT AND PRODUCT SUPPORT STRATEGY .................86 SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE, COST, AND RISK ..........................................................87 RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND COST RATIONALE REPORT ...........94 SUSTAINMENT KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETER .............................................................95 ALTERNATIVE COMPARISONS ................................................................................................ 97 8.1 9 RISK IDENTIFICATION .......................................................................................................83 USING PREVIOUS ANALYSES ............................................................................................85 ALTERNATIVE COMPARISON METHODOLOGY ..................................................................97 DOCUMENTING ANALYTICAL FINDINGS ........................................................................... 104 APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................... 107 APPENDIX B: REFERENCES AND INFORMATION SOURCES ................................................ 113 APPENDIX C: STUDY PLAN TEMPLATE ...................................................................................... 114 APPENDIX D: FINAL REPORT TEMPLATE ................................................................................. 121 APPENDIX E: STUDY PLAN ASSESSMENT .................................................................................. 126 APPENDIX F: FINAL REPORT ASSESSMENT .............................................................................. 127 APPENDIX G: LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................ 129 APPENDIX H: OAS REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS FOR AFROC................................................... 130 APPENDIX I: JOINT DOD-DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES .......... 131 APPENDIX J: HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) ............................................................ 140 APPENDIX K: ACQUISITION INTELLIGENCE IN THE AOA PROCESS ................................ 148 APPENDIX L: MISSION TASKS, MEASURES DEVELOPMENT, AND DATA IN DETAIL ... 154 APPENDIX M: GAO CEAG, TABLE 2 .............................................................................................. 167 APPENDIX N: DEVELOPING A POINT ESTIMATE .................................................................... 170 APPENDIX O: CAPE AOA STUDY GUIDANCE TEMPLATE ..................................................... 182 List of Figures Figure 1-1: Figure 2-1: Figure 2-2: Figure 3-1: Figure 4-1: Air Force AoA Activities Overview ..................................................................... 12 Capabilities Based Planning (CBP) Process ....................................................... 18 Decision Framework ............................................................................................. 19 Example Study Team Structure .......................................................................... 40 General Approach for Effectiveness Analysis .................................................... 44 4 Figure 4-2: Figure 4-3: Figure 4-4: Figure 5-1: Figure 5-2: Figure 5-3: Figure 6-1: Figure 7-1: Figure 8-1: Figure 8-2: Figure 8-3: Figure 8-4: Hierarchy of Analysis ........................................................................................... 54 Notional Example of Tool and Measure Linkage ............................................... 56 Effectiveness Analysis Results Presentation ....................................................... 59 Comparing All Alternatives Across the Same Life Cycle ...................................... 65 Cost by fiscal year and appropriation ................................................................. 77 General LCC Summary (By Alternative) ........................................................... 78 Standard Air Force Risk Scale Definitions ......................................................... 81 Sustainment Key Performance Parameter ......................................................... 95 Aircraft Survivability System Cost/Capability Tradeoff Example .................. 99 Target Defeat Weapon Cost/Capability Tradeoff Example............................ 101 Example of Critical MOE Results ..................................................................... 102 Example of Comparing Alternatives by Effectiveness, Risk, and Cost ......... 103 List of Tables Table 4-1: Table 4-2: Table 5-1: Table 5-2: Table 5-3: Table 5-4: Table 5-5: Table 7-1: Table 7-2: Table 7-3: Weighting Measures ............................................................................................... 45 JCIDS JCAs ............................................................................................................ 48 GAO’s Basic Characteristics of Credible Cost Estimates .................................. 61 Most Common Cost Estimating Methods ................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)................................................................. 73 A Hardware Risk Scoring Matrix .......................................................................... 75 A Software Risk Scoring Matrix ............................................................................ 76 Sustainability Concepts/Attributes ....................................................................... 88 Measure of Suitability Description Example ....................................................... 90 Operations and Support Cost Element Categories ............................................. 92 5 Preface This is the 2013 version of the OAS AoA Handbook. It has undergone a major rewriting based upon recent changes to OSD and Air Force policy and guidance. It incorporates a number of recommendations we received from the AoA community about the 2010 version. This handbook is intended to make you think, it is not a one-approach-fits-all recipe. It is also not intended to be a standalone self-help manual. OAS has a companion handbook, the Pre-MDD Handbook, which addresses key analytic issues that precede the AoA. Since every AoA is different, the handbook emphasizes the whats and whys of requirements analysis and less on the how. The details of how are very problem specific and best done oneon-one with an OAS advisor. Philosophically, we have focused on broadly addressing the right requirements questions to the level of detail that the senior decision makers need. We advocate frequent and open communication both to understand what the senior decision makers need and to convey what the analysis uncovers. We advocate sound analytic processes, not specific tools. While detailed analytic tools are often necessary for key parts of an AoA, much can be learned with good use of simpler approaches such as parametric analyses and expert elicitation. We encourage you to read through Chapters 1 through 3 to get a general understanding of how the AoA relates to the requirements decision processes. More specific information regarding the AoA process can be found in Chapters 4 through 9. This handbook is grounded in over twenty years of providing analytic advice on Air Force and DoD AoAs. It has been shaped by best practices we have gathered from well over two hundred AoAs, and by what we have observed to be the expectations of Air Force and OSD senior decision makers. Those expectations keep evolving, and in response so will this handbook. If you have questions regarding the currency of your AoA handbook version, please contact OAS at (OAS.DIR@kirtland.af.mil) to ensure that you are in possession of the most recent version. We encourage you to contact us and ask questions if parts of the handbook are not clear, or you are not sure how they apply to your situation, or if you have suggestions on how to improve the document. We always appreciate feedback. Jeff Erikson Director, Office of Aerospace Studies 6 1 Introduction The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, risk, and life cycle cost (or total ownership cost, if applicable) of alternatives that satisfy validated capability needs (usually stipulated in an approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)). An AoA typically occurs during the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase and applies to all Acquisition Category (ACAT) initiatives in accordance with the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-601 and AFI 63-101 direction. The AoA must make a compelling statement about the capabilities and military worth that the alternatives provide. In short, the AoA must provide decision-quality information that enables senior decision makers to debate and assess a potential program's operational capability and affordability, and maximize its investment. AoAs are essential elements of three Department of Defense (DoD) processes that work in concert to deliver the capabilities required by warfighters: the requirements process, the acquisition process, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. Details of how AoAs support and interact with these processes are discussed in Chapter 2 of this handbook. Other Services/DoD Components have their own processes for executing AoAs. When the Air Force is directed to support an AoA led by another Service/DoD Component, the Air Force will follow the lead organization’s procedures and guidance. The Air Force’s direct involvement in the lead organization’s process will ensure that Air Force interests are considered and addressed in the AoA. Likewise, for Air Force-led AoAs, it is imperative that the Air Force represent, address, and analyze the supporting organizations’ issues and concerns. Finally, all AoAs must be conducted in accordance with the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) issued by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) at the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) and any additional guidance provided by appropriate requirements and acquisition authorities. The processes outlined in this handbook apply to all AoAs regardless of ACAT level or Joint Staffing Designator (JSD), formerly known as Joint Potential Designator (JPD) (for additional insight on the JSD definitions, see the JCIDS Manual). They ensure that the recommendations from the AoA represent credible, defensible results. The only difference between AoAs of different ACAT levels or JSDs is the level of effort, oversight, and approval required. According to the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has responsibility for all efforts that are JROC Interest regardless of ACAT level. Approval processes are dictated more by the JSD than by the ACAT level since any effort may have JROC or OSD interest, regardless of ACAT level. 7 The AoA process consists of the following primary activities which are described throughout the remainder of this handbook: study guidance development, planning, execution, and reporting. 1.1 Purpose of the AoA There are two primary goals of the AoA. The first is to provide decision-quality analysis and results to inform the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and other stakeholders at the next milestone or decision point. The AoA should shape and scope courses of action (COA) for new materiel to satisfy operational capability needs and the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the next acquisition phase. The AoA provides the analytic basis for performance parameters documented in the appropriate requirements documents (e.g., Joint DCR, AF Form 1067, Capability Development Document (CDD), and/or Capability Production Document (CPD)). Additionally, the AoA should use the capability gaps from the ICD(s) as starting points rather than as minimum standards to disqualify alternatives. The AoA should provide feedback to the requirements process of any recommended changes to validated capability requirements that appear unachievable and/or undesirable from a cost, schedule, performance, and/or risk point of view. The AoA results enable decision-makers to have the appropriate cost, schedule, performance, and/or risk tradeoff discussions. The second goal of the AoA is to provide an understanding of why alternatives do well or poorly. The AoA results should characterize the circumstances in which a given alternative appears superior and the conditions under which its outcome degrades. The AoA should explain cost drivers or factors that impact ratings of assessment metrics such as Concept of Operations (CONOPS), manpower, and performance parameters of alternatives. AoAs are useful in determining the appropriate investment strategy for validated, prioritized, operational needs. In addition to considering operational effectiveness, suitability, risk, and life cycle cost, the AoA should also highlight the impact to each alternative with respect to domestic and foreign policy, technical maturity, industrial base, environment, treaties, etc. AoAs also provide a foundation for the development of documents required at the next acquisition milestone, such as, the Technology Development Strategy (TDS), Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES), and Systems Engineering Plan (SEP). 1.2 AoA Entry Criteria Air Force policy requires that the following information be presented to the Air Force Requirements Review Group (AFRRG) for approval before a team may proceed in initiating an AoA study plan: A completed CBA that has been approved by the sponsoring command An Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC) approved ICD 8 An operational risk assessment of not filling the capability gap approved by the sponsoring command and the AFROC A list of the most promising alternatives to address the gap Intelligence Support Considerations approved by AF/A2 Signed AoA Study Guidance, by Air Force and when appropriate, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) The list of promising alternatives may include representatives of the following solution categories: Legacy systems Modified legacy systems Modified commercial/government/allied off-the-shelf systems Dual-use items Additional production of previously developed U.S./allied systems New development alternatives, which can include: o Cooperative development with allies o New Joint Service development o New DoD component-unique development For programs that have OSD (AT&L) as the MDA, the AoA entry criteria items discussed above as well as an AFROC validated and CAPE approved study plan are required at MDD. According to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) template, OSD (AT&L) requires that the following additional information be presented before an AoA will be approved at MDD: CONOPS summary - provides operational context for understanding the need and solution tradespace o Desired operational outcome o Effects produced to achieve outcome o How capability complements joint forces o Enabling capabilities Development Planning (DP) o Non-materiel solution approaches to mitigate the capability gap Review of what was considered • Includes buying more of existing • Includes using existing differently than current employment • Includes tolerating the gap Evidence of how well (or not) they mitigate the gap o Materiel solution approaches which could address the capability gap Review of what was considered Evidence that these approaches provide the desired operational performance parameters 9 o Which approaches are included in AoA guidance and/or study plan Evidence of technical feasibility to meet needed timeframe Basic capabilities that solution has to fill capability gap within needed timeframe (mission effectiveness) For each alternative, what are the implications or dependencies • Includes portfolio implications • Includes existing system impacts • Includes related ICDs • Includes additional capabilities needed to address the gap (System of Systems (SoS)/Family of Systems (FoS)) How are dependencies factored into the AoA study plan o When is the capability needed Is proposed materiel solution expected to be available What is being done to address the gap until the materiel solution becomes available Affordability constraints (describe how much DoD is willing to spend to fill the gap) In addition to the information required by policy, the following may be available from previous analytical efforts and early systems engineering activities and can be used in the AoA: Scenarios and threats utilized in the CBA Analysis measures (mission tasks, measures of effectiveness, etc.) utilized as evaluation criteria in the CBA Definition of baseline capabilities from the CBA Core team members from the ICD High Performance Team (HPT) membership Initial Concept Characterization and Technical Descriptions (CCTDs) from Early Systems Engineering (ESE) and DP activities This information is discussed further in Section 3.1.1 “Using Previous Analysis as the Foundation.” 1.3 AoA Study Guidance AoA study guidance is required prior to the MDD. AoA study guidance is developed to address the critical areas that the senior decision makers want explored during the AoA. For Air Force led AoAs, the study guidance will build upon the initial input identified during the ICD High Performance Team (HPT). A “Best Practice” is to maintain continuity of HPT membership from the ICD through the AoA (and beyond). Having enduring HPT membership will help provide continuity, greatly facilitate AoA planning, and ensure the stakeholder communities are properly represented. AF/A5R requires the sponsoring organization to notify AF/A5R-P for approval to proceed, prior to drafting AoA study guidance. The notification must also identify which specific AFROC 10 validated/prioritized topic and the associated ICD(s) this analysis will address. Additionally, an HPT is required to develop AoA study guidance and is usually conducted in conjunction with the ICD HPT. AF/A5R-P will review and approve the HPT membership prior to approving an HPT. Air Force policy has identified core organizations that have enduring membership for all HPTs. The sponsoring organization develops and coordinates the guidance and submits the document to AF/A5R-P. AF/A5R will approve all Air Force sponsored AoA study guidance before it is submitted to CAPE. For those AoAs where Director, CAPE elects not to provide AoA study guidance, AF/A5R will serve as the approval authority. The AoA study guidance provides direction and insight to the team to plan and execute the study. CAPE-issued AoA study guidance should be drafted using the AoA Study Guidance Template included in Appendix O of this handbook. There may be additional sections and major considerations required by the Air Force (either supplemental to CAPE guidance or when there is no CAPE guidance). 1.4 AoA Products Most AoAs produce four major products: 1. A study plan which outlines the background, key questions, guidance, methodologies, tools, data, schedule, and other elements of the AoA 2. An interim progress briefing to summarize early findings (this often results in refinement to the direction of the AoA) 3. A final report to document the AoA results in detail a. Includes identification of the tradespace explored b. Includes cost/performance/schedule tradespace findings 4. A final briefing, including the Requirements Correlation Table (RCT), to summarize the final results of the AoA Figure 1-1 illustrates the review process and sequence of events for these products beginning with the ICD HPT/draft AoA study guidance through the decisions supported by the AoA final report and briefing. 11 Figure 1-1: Air Force AoA Activities Overview The study plan is critical to the AoA process because it defines what will be accomplished during the AoA and how it will be done. As shown in Figure 1-1, the AoA study plan must be completed and approved prior to the MDD. The study plan must be reviewed by the AFRRG and validated by the AFROC. For those efforts with OSD oversight, the study plan must also be approved by CAPE prior to the MDD. The study plan should clearly identify how the effort will address all AoA guidance received from the Air Force and OSD. [Note: this requires the study team to develop and obtain AFROC validation of the study plan before the formal MDA decision is made to conduct an AoA]. Appendix D contains a recommended template for the study plan. The interim progress briefing is designed to provide interim results and to permit redirection of the AoA by senior reviewers. The most common reasons for interim progress briefings include: Changes to key assumptions and constraints Significant modification of the mission tasks and/or measures Knowledge gained in the analysis to date that would impact requirements decisions, such as: o Alternatives showing insufficient mitigation of the gaps o Alternatives demonstrating unaffordability o Recommendations for the focus of remaining analysis 12 o Early identification of areas requiring sensitivity analysis [Note: this is critical to end results because it identifies the key areas of the tradespace that need to be explored sufficiently.] The final report is the repository for AoA information describing what was done, how it was accomplished, and the results/findings. The final report requires significant time and effort to produce and staff. It should include detailed descriptions of the analysis and results of the AoA effort. Since team members may disperse quickly after their parts of the study are completed, it is important to continuously document the process and results throughout the study. If the final report is not finalized shortly after the end of the study, there may be little to show for what was accomplished during the AoA. A study not documented is a study not done. The final briefing is generated from the final report and is the mechanism to illustrate the answers to important questions and issues, and summarize the findings for the decision makers. [Note: the briefing is usually the item referred to more frequently. Therefore, the team must ensure that it is an appropriate representation of the final report.] It is important that both the final report and final briefing address the following: Enablers such as logistics, intelligence, Human Systems Integration, and communications and their impact on the cost, risk, and effectiveness of the study alternatives Key study questions sufficiently to inform the decision makers Appropriate operational performance parameters and threshold/objective values for the RCT Alternatives’ capabilities to mitigate gaps Performance, cost, and risk drivers Tradespace explored: o Trade-offs between performance, cost, and risk o Sensitivity analysis results (e.g., dependency of results on assumptions, scenarios, CONOPS/CONEMP, technology maturity, etc.) Affordability constraints identified at MDD Both the final report and final briefing should follow the entire review/oversight process to the AFROC and OSD for approval as outlined in AFI 10-601. As the products are created and briefed, the Study Director should consider the classification and proprietary nature of the information. The Study Director should also ensure the team understands the AoA products may contain pre-decisional information and should not be released outside the AoA study team or the approval chain. During the creation and briefing of each of these products, OAS stands ready to assist the study team. 1.5 Decision Maker Expectations of an AoA 13 Senior leaders and decision makers continually refine their expectations of an AoA. CAPE and the AFROC have identified the following key expectations for an AoA: Unbiased inquiry into the costs and capabilities of options (identify the strengths and weaknesses of all options analyzed) Identification of key trades among cost, schedule, and performance using the capability requirements (e.g., ICD and CDD gaps) as reference points Identification of potential KPP/KSAs and an assessment of the consequence of not meeting them Explanation of how key assumptions drive results, focused on the rationale for the assumption Explanation of WHY alternatives do or do not meet requirements and close capability gaps Identification of the best value alternatives based on results of sensitivity analysis Increased emphasis on affordability assessments (conditions and assumptions under which a program may or may not be affordable) Increased emphasis on legacy upgrades and non-developmental solutions versus new starts o Explore how to better use existing capabilities o Explore lower cost alternatives that sufficiently mitigate capability gaps but may not provide full capability Increased emphasis on expanding cost analysis to focus beyond investment, for example, O&S across the force beyond the alternatives being analyzed Explore the impact of a range of legacy and future force mixes on the alternatives Increased emphasis on exploring an operationally realistic range of scenarios to determine impact on performance capabilities and affordability CAPE and the AFROC have also identified what is NOT valued in an AoA: Building a case for a preferred solution by attempting to validate a pre-selected option instead of allowing results to inform the decision. Over-emphasis on meeting KPP thresholds by automatically disqualifying alternatives instead of exploring what is needed to sufficiently mitigate the gap and achieve an acceptable level of operational risk. Over-emphasis on performance capability without adequately addressing cost and schedule risks. Focus on the best system versus the best value for the investment. Focus on assumptions, data, and scenarios that unfairly skew the results toward a preferred alternative to the detriment of not understanding the actual need. In summary, the AoA must identify what is the best value, not what is the best system. 14 1.6 Reference Information The following terms and definitions are provided to facilitate the use of this handbook and the AoA process: Cost Driver - any element within the cost work breakdown structure (WBS) that has a noticeable or significant effect on the overall cost. Decision framework - the series of informal and formal investment decisions supported by operational requirements analysis. Enablers - any element, such as a system, process, or information that is required for the success of an assigned task or mission in support associated with an operational capability. Problem space - the area to be explored to determine how well AoA options mitigate the specific identified gaps associated with a specific mission or core function. Solution space - the range of alternatives that adequately address the capability gaps defined by the problem space and whose characteristics/performance parameters will define the tradespace to be analyzed. Stakeholders - any organization, agency or Service with a vested interest (a stake) in the outcome of the pre-acquisition analyses. A stakeholder may contribute directly or indirectly to these pre-acquisition activities. A stakeholder usually stands to gain or lose depending on the decisions made from these pre-acquisition activities. Tradespace - the range of options to address operational requirements that explore trade-offs among performance, risk, cost, and schedule. Tradespace analysis - analysis to highlight key trades among performance, risk, cost, and schedule, if they exist. These trades highlight where the tradespace exists to determine what level of required capability should be acquired, when, and at “what cost.” This analysis should also identify where there is no tradespace. The following references provide more detailed information regarding AoA processes and products: AFI 10-601 AFI 63-101 AT&L’s MDD Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Template AT&L’s MDD Checklist CAPE’s AoA Guidance Template Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) (https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=526151) Defense Acquisition Portal (https://dap.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx) 15 DoDI 5000.02 JCIDS Manual 16 2 Decision Making and How the AoA Fits The purpose of this chapter is to describe the operational capability requirements development process. It defines the decisions supported by various analytical efforts, the role of analysis, and the appropriate decision makers. Additionally, it shows the interfaces between the analysis and other activities. 2.1 Major Processes Capability Based Planning (CBP) supports operational capability requirements development. Figure 2-1 shows the six key processes that make up CBP. The six processes include the following, of which the first three have the greatest impact on the AoA: Strategic guidance is issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to provide strategic direction for all subsequent decisions and to provide planning and programming guidance for the building of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the development of acquisition programs. This information is the foundational guidance for all analysis. Support for Strategic Analysis (formerly known as the Analytic Agenda) is driven by guidance from OSD and the analysis and modeling and simulation are executed by the JS/J-8 to identify potential force structure issues and to provide detail on the Defense Planning Scenarios (DPSs) and Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs) used for identifying capability needs. The JCIDS process identifies capability needs based on input from the concepts and the Strategic Analysis and feeds the results to the acquisition and budgeting processes. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) is directed by the Comptroller and the OSD Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to ensure appropriate funding for the Department’s efforts. AT&L provides policy guidance and oversight on the acquisition process, makes acquisition decisions on Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS), and coordinates program decisions through use of capability roadmaps. The J7 manages the Joint Concepts development and approval process. These top-down identified concepts become the baseline for developing capability needs. 17 Figure 2-1: Capabilities Based Planning (CBP) Process For the Air Force, AFI 10-601, Operational Capability Requirements Development, outlines the processes for development of operational requirements documents (what JS/J8 calls JCIDS documents). There are several categories of operational requirements development efforts that may or may not require an AoA study for mitigating or closing gaps. The Air Force Requirements Review Group (AFRRG) reviews and approves the initial Requirements Strategy Review which defines the strategy for mitigating the identified gaps and the requirement for an AoA. Two categories where an AoA is not required are: Efforts that support technology refreshment of existing systems, but provide no new capability. An AoA is not required since there will be no new acquisition effort (e.g., AF Form 1067). Efforts to address current operational urgent needs are handled through the Urgent Operational Need (UON)/ Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process. If the effort addresses future new capabilities (including sustainment efforts that contain requirements for new capabilities) and requires articulated capability needs via JCIDS (i.e., ICD/CDD), then an AoA is required. 18 2.2 What Decisions Must Be Made/Supported? It is important to understand how the AoA fits into the decision framework and the decisions made prior to and following the AoA. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, there are four major decision points within the decision framework. Figure 2-2: Decision Framework The focus of Decision Point 1 is to ensure examine the “problem space” and decide if additional analysis is required. The problems to study may be downward directed (e.g., Chief of Staff of the Air Force) or identified by the Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI). This decision often identifies the need to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) or other analysis (e.g., DOTmLPF-P analysis). The analysis resulting from this decision point should answer: What parts of the problem are already understood? What is the gap(s)? What is the cause(s)? What will happen if we stay on the present course? What is the operational risk(s) caused by the gap(s)? How can the community better use what they already have? What gaps and risks remain? How much can be solved through modifications to existing systems? What gaps and risks remain? Is a new materiel option even feasible or is S&T investment needed? The results from this analysis inform Decision Point 2. At this point, a decision is made to develop (or not develop) an ICD. AF Policy requires the Air Force Requirements Review Group (AFRRG) to review and approve an initial requirements strategy review (RSR) prior to “Decision Point 2.” The purpose of this review is to conduct a strategic requirements overview that will accomplish the following: 19 Examine previous analysis (Is the CBA or other analyses sound?) Assess operational risk (Is there compelling operational risk to drive a need for a materiel solution?) Evaluate affordability (Do the costs merit an investment decision?) Validate capability gap(s) (Are the gaps still operationally relevant and a priority?) Examine materiel and non-materiel solutions (Will the solutions proposed for investigation likely close or sufficiently mitigate the identified gaps?) Information presented at the RSR and previous analysis informs Decision Point 2. The decision may include: Determining which gaps will not be addressed (risk is acceptable) Identifying DOTmLPF-P changes to better use current systems Deciding where to invest in Science and Technology (S&T) or modify current systems Approving development of an ICD when a new materiel solution is likely needed Identifying, scoping, and prioritizing the additional analysis needed before the Air Force will be ready to request an Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Note that Decision Point 2 does not authorize the start of an AoA. After Decision Point 2, ICD development, Development Planning (DP), and associated pre-MDD analysis are the primary activities that occur in preparation for the MDD (Decision Point 3). The focus of these activities is to identify the following information: Which gaps can be mitigated by non-developmental materiel solutions? What are the COTS/GOTS solution types? What are the broad cross-capability solution types? o Air, Space, Surface, Subsurface, Cyber? o Manned/unmanned? Sensor/shooter? How would these solutions be employed? What are the implied capabilities/needed to make it work (logistics, command and control, communications, intelligence, etc.)? What are the risks (technical, operations, integration, political, etc.) with each of these solutions? Which solutions demonstrate a capability to address the appropriate gap(s)? Which solutions are affordable? Which meet the scheduled need-date? The results from these activities (ICD development, DP, pre-MDD Analysis) become inputs for determining if any of the viable (existing and new) materiel solutions are likely to be affordable in the AF budget (funded through next milestone), mitigate enough of the gap(s) to be worth the cost and risks, and have an acceptable level of impact on other systems, functions and enablers. The following are several significant policy requirements that must be addressed prior to the start of an AoA: 20 The AFROC requires that each lead command present bi-annually, a list of ongoing and forecasted AoAs with traceability to the appropriate Core Function Master Plans (CFMPs). The AFROC reviews these lists for validation, de-confliction, and prioritization. As a result of this requirement, the lead command must identify the specific AFROC validated/prioritized AoA topic to analyze and its associated ICD(s). AF policy requires that the entry criteria identified in Section 1.2 be presented for approval prior to proceeding to AoA planning and development of the AoA study plan. AT&L policy and the AT&L MDD DAB template require the following information be presented at the MDD for approval to execute the AoA: o Approved ICD (Joint Staff/Service Sponsor) Definition of the CONOPS Identification of capability gap and operational risk of not filling the gap o Development Planning (Service Sponsor) Range of materiel solution approach(s) which could address the gap [Note: this is where the CCTD content is discussed. CCTDs must be approved by SAF/AQR prior to submission of the AoA Study Plan to the AFROC (see Section 3.1.1)] Evidence of technical feasibility and external implications of the alternatives in the AoA Timeliness to capability need o Approved AoA study guidance and plan (CAPE/Service Sponsor) o Acquisition Plans (Service Sponsor) Materiel solution analysis phase funding and staffing Program schedule, affordability constraints Entry criteria for next milestone/ADM content The following are the types of questions asked by the AFRRG/AFROC to determine if an AoA is required: Is this an AF priority now? Can we afford it now? What is the capability gap(s)? o Is it still valid in this budget reality? What is the operational impact/risk? What is the risk of maintaining the baseline? What is the risk of divesting this capability/system? AoAs contribute significantly to the acquisition process by providing the MDA critical information to inform milestone decisions. The MDA may authorize entry into the process at any point consistent with phase-specific entrance criteria and statutory requirements. AoAs are typically accomplished in the Materiel Solution Analysis, but may be accomplished in any subsequent acquisition phase to answer questions not addressed by a previous AoA or that 21 require updating. Results from the AoA provide information that allows the MDA to make an informed decision on whether an acquisition program is appropriate and at which milestone the program should begin. It also allows the Program Manager (PM) to structure a tailored, responsive, and innovative program. OAS can assist the analysis team in ensuring they have a defensible need to conduct an AoA. 2.3 Role of Analysis in the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase According to the JCIDS Manual, analysis executed during the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase supports the following: Assessment of potential materiel solutions to mitigate validated capability gaps identified in an ICD Identification of required DOTmLPF-P changes Identification of best course of action to inform the MDA on how to mitigate prioritized capability gaps Development of the Capability Development Document and Technology Development Strategy According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, analysis executed during the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase supports the following: Assessment of industrial and manufacturing capability for each evaluated alternative in the AoA. This information should be used when developing the TDS Identification of new or high risk manufacturing capability or capacity risks, if applicable. This should include any risks associated with production scale-up efforts and/or potential supply chain issues Consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives for each materiel solution analyzed. Assessment of whether or not the operational capability requirement can be met consistent with the cost and schedule objectives identified by the JROC [Note: if the operational capability requirement cannot be met consistent with the JROC objectives, need to identify the operational impact.] 2.4 Who uses the Analysis AoA study plans and results are usually briefed at high levels in the Air Force and the OSD. These products inform the decision making process to potentially change doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures and, if appropriate, support acquisition of new capabilities. AoA results influence the investment of significant DoD resources. Therefore, AoAs receive multi22 layered direction and oversight from start to finish. This direction and oversight is necessary to achieve agreement on the results and findings by all stakeholders. For all AoA efforts, the following organizations will typically review the analysis: Stakeholders AFRRG/AFROC Senior Review Group (SRG)/Senior Advisory Group (SAG) Approval authority of AoA Study Guidance (AF/A5R and CAPE, where appropriate) MDA OAS A5R functionals SAF/AQ SAF/A8 Stakeholders are representatives from any organization, Agency or Service with a vested interest in the outcome of the AoA. They include representatives from the requirements community, appropriate operational communities, engineers, logisticians, intelligence analysts, maintainers, etc. The primary role of the stakeholders is to represent the mission area/community associated with the problem being studied in the AoA and those who will design, support, and maintain these capabilities. They review the analysis to ensure that the trade-offs being examined inform the degree to which the gaps can be mitigated and the operational risk reduced. The AFRRG/AFROC, Senior Advisory Group, Guidance Approval Authority representatives and MDA representatives ensure the study team accomplishes what it planned to complete. They review the analysis to determine if the key questions are being answered and to provide redirection, if necessary. They are also the principal oversight organizations for the execution of the AoA. Their primary objective is to determine the degree to which each solution can mitigate the gap(s) and reduce the operational risk. The analysis used to inform the decision makers includes cost, effectiveness, risk, sensitivity, and tradespace. This information will also be used to inform AF and DoD investment decisions in order to resolve/mitigate the identified gap(s). The following are key areas that are scrutinized throughout the study: What enablers (e.g., logistics, intelligence, communications, and Human Systems Integration) are addressed? How well are their interdependencies understood? What are the costs associated with the enablers? Are the key questions answered sufficiently for the decision makers? How well does the analysis determine each alternative’s capability to mitigate each gap? How well does the analysis determine potential key parameters and threshold and objective values to inform development of the RCT? How well does the analysis explore the tradespace? What sensitivity analysis is accomplished to refine the threshold and objective values? 23 How sensitive is each solution to the analysis assumptions? How sensitive are the threshold and objective values to cost and schedule? What are the cost, schedule, and performance drivers? How do the costs compare with any affordability constraints identified at the MDD (based on rough cost estimate)? What questions are still unanswered? What information is still needed? What are the risks? Which parts of the analysis are sound and which are the best that could be done, but introduce more error? The exact questions and issues change over time and are based upon personalities and politics. OAS attends every AFROC and has a representative co-located with AF/A5R, giving us the ability to quickly adjust to new questions being asked and assist teams and sponsoring organizations to be better prepared. For AoAs where AT&L is the MDA, CAPE may also identify a Study Advisory Group (SAG) in the AoA study guidance. AT&L may use the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) and/or the Cost Performance IPT (CPIPT) to support their oversight of the AoA. See the Defense Acquisition Guidebook for information concerning these panels. AoAs that are Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Interest or Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) Interest must be presented to the Functional Control Board (FCB), JCB, and JROC. Their primary role is to validate the threshold and objective values in the RCT. Additionally, they provide informed advice to the MDA on the best course of action to mitigate the specified prioritized capability gaps. During the Technology Development phase, the program office will explore the tradespace using the threshold and objective values. Before the final report is presented to the JROC, CAPE also has the responsibility of accomplishing an AoA sufficiency review at the completion of the AoA. This is accomplished for all efforts that are JROC Interest, JCB Interest and/or have OSD oversight. CAPE’s sufficiency review is primarily focused on the following: Were the key questions answered? Does the analysis support the proposed acquisition investment strategy? Can the Joint military requirement be met in a manner consistent with the cost and schedule objectives recommended by the JROC? 24 OAS assists the study team in ensuring the analysis results are presented in a clear and comprehensive manner which address the questions and issues identified above. OAS conducts a risk assessment of the study plan, interim results, and final report for the AFRRG and AFROC principals. This assessment assists the Air Force in determining the investment course of action based on the analysis results. In addition to these roles, OAS provides assistance to the AoA Study Director in identifying each of these organizations before the initiation of the AoA, working with the stakeholder community, and preparing for each of the appropriate reviews and analytical decision points. 2.5 Relationship between AoA and Other Activities This section outlines the specific relationships between the AoA and other requirements related activities. 2.5.1 Activities that shape the AoA The main activities that lay the foundation for and provide a starting point for the AoA are: Capability Based Planning (which includes the CBA) Doctrine, Operations, Training, materiel, Leadership/Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTmLPF-P) Analysis Early Systems Engineering and Development Planning (DP) Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Depending on the AoA, there may be activities in non-DoD organizations (e.g. the other Federal Departments, the Intelligence Community, etc.) to consider. If so, contact OAS for assistance in making the right contacts with the appropriate agencies for analytical support. 2.5.1.1 Capability Based Planning Contributions The primary information that the Capability Based Planning contributes to the AoA is: Definition of the existing/programmed capabilities (also known as the baseline) Threats and scenarios utilized in the conduct of the CBA Measures and metrics utilized in the conduct of the CBA o Tasks, conditions, and standards o Evaluation criteria utilized in the CBA that demonstrate a gap exists Capability gaps identified during the conduct of the CBA o Assessment of the operational risk if the gap remains o Identification of the cause of the gap 25 Results of the CBA documented in a CBA final report and where appropriate, an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) Identification of the measures (or other metrics) that demonstrate that a capability gap exists from sources other than the CBA 2.5.1.2 DOTmLPF-P Analysis Contributions Prior DOTmLPF-P analyses, conducted as part of the CBA or as separate studies, focus on whether non-materiel approaches sufficiently mitigate any of the capability gaps by recommending changes to one or more DOTmLPF-P areas. The small “m,” refers to existing materiel solutions, not an initiation of a new program of record. According to the JCIDS Manual, the most common non-materiel approaches are: Alternative doctrinal approaches and alternative CONOPS. Investigating alternative CONOPS is a JCIDS requirement. Where applicable, alternatives should also consider CONOPS involving allied/partner nation or interagency participation. Policy Alternatives. When considering policy alternatives, the CBA must document which policies are contributing to capability gaps and under which circumstances. A policy change that allows new applications of existing capabilities or modifies force posture to increase deterrence is always of interest and should be considered. Organizational and personnel alternatives. This means examining ways in which certain functions can be strengthened to eliminate gaps and point out mismatches between force availability and force needs. A Joint DCR is generated when the DOTmLPF-P analysis shows that the capability gap can be sufficiently addressed by one of the three approaches below. In these situations, an ICD and AoA are not required. New non-materiel solution Recommending changes to existing capabilities of the Joint force in one or more of the eight DOTmLPF-P areas Increased quantities of existing capability solutions This DOTmLPF-P analysis should also identify any interdependencies between any potential solutions and S&T and/or experimentation recommendations. Refer to Chapter 4 of OAS’s Pre-MDD Analysis Handbook, dated June 2010, for additional guidance on the execution of this analysis. 2.5.1.3 Early Systems Engineering and Development Planning Contributions 26 The focus of Early Systems Engineering is not to engineer a system but to better understand the systems engineering aspects of the solution space and the technical feasibility. The goal is to determine the most viable, affordable solutions to be explored in post-MDD activities and processes, such as the AoA or S&T activities. This process is used to investigate types or categories of potential solutions (e.g., satellite, armed airframe, ground-launched weapon, cyber solutions) vice specific systems (e.g., B-2 with weapons modifications). Early Systems Engineering should also identify architectures appropriate to the capability areas being explored. These architectures enable a better understanding of the complexity of each of the materiel solutions. Since architectures integrate visions, requirements, and capabilities, they help provide unique insights for the MDA about the discriminating differences between the potential solutions. Some solutions may have multiple, complex interdependencies which must be identified to the decision makers. Architectures can also provide insight into the logistics and sustainment requirements of each of the solutions as well as the ease of improving them (such as technology insertions) over their individual life cycles. The final consideration for use of architectures is to illustrate how the capabilities provided by existing and “to-be” architectures address human system integration issues. This information will be critical to the MDD presentation and AoA planning efforts, especially: Understanding the impacts of each solution on other parts of the architecture Developing ROM costs across the architecture Gaining insights into the affordability aspects of MDD This will provide information to the decision makers about the external implications of the alternatives. [Note: when considering how architectures will be utilized, the objective is not to accomplish an architecture study at this time, but rather to use them to aid in the illustration of complex materiel solutions (i.e., family-of-systems (FoS) and system-of-systems (SoS) solutions) and interdependencies. Additionally, each solution should be examined to see how it impacts the baseline architecture and, in some cases, may result in a future architecture study.] In support of SAF/AQR’s Early Systems Engineering initiative, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) established DP with the overall objective of ensuring the launch of high-confidence programs capable of delivering warfighting systems with required capabilities on time and within budget. While it applies across the entire life cycle of a given capability, simply stated, DP is the process by which the AoA solution space is defined and CCTDs are developed prior to MDD. DP support is obtained by submitting a DP effort request to either AFMC or AFSPC, as appropriate. As stated in the SAF/AQ Early Systems Engineering Guidebook, the intent of early systems engineering is to enhance the quality and fidelity of proposed future military system concepts that may eventually be considered in AoAs. The primary means of meeting this intent is via development of a CCTD for each conceptual materiel approach being considered to fill the 27 related capability gaps/shortfalls. The CCTD provides a mechanism for documenting and communicating the data and information associated with the prospective materiel solution analyzed during the Pre-MDD analysis. This enables the analysis to produce increasing levels of detail regarding the materiel concepts under consideration. Chapter 3 of the SAF/AQ guide describes how this analysis effort and identification of the tradespace is supported. CCTDs are required at the Air Force Review Board (AFRB) that is conducted prior to the MDD. They are included as an appendix to the AoA study plan and final report. A “Best Practice” is to capture other information about the solution space in addition to that found in the CCTD or DCR (for non-materiel solutions). Some examples of other information to help define the solution space include: Overarching assumptions (these are the assumptions that are specific to the problem and apply to all potential solutions) Overarching operational concept/employment concept (this is what is defined in the ICD and refined as the overarching concepts independent of the individual solutions) Overarching operational considerations (this is problem specific and applies to all potential solutions equally) Overall DOTmLPF-P implications (these are the implications that apply regardless of solution) 2.5.1.4 MDD Contributions MDD is the formal decision to conduct an AoA and when the MDA accepts the approved AoA study guidance and AoA study plan. Current requirements development and acquisition policies identify the following list of recommended approaches in preferred order: 1. Implementation of DOTmLPF-P changes which do not require development and procurement of a new materiel capability solution. 2. Procurement or modification of commercially available products, services, and technologies, from domestic or international sources, or the development of dual-use technologies. 3. The additional production or modification of previously-developed U.S. and/or allied military or interagency systems or equipment. 4. A cooperative development program with one or more allied nations. 5. A new, joint, DoD component or interagency development program. 6. A new DoD component-unique development program. If sponsors select a less preferred approach from the list above (for example, the preferred solution is #1 but the sponsoring organization selects #2), they must explain and provide supporting evidence to justify the decision. It is critical to ensure that the range of alternatives includes non-Air Force solutions and U.S. government solution options. Since the Joint Staff now requires that all studies have to be identified in a central repository, J8 study repository 28 (currently known as Knowledge Management/ Decision Support (KM/DS)) is a great resource to review previously assessed solutions and other studies in the same mission area. It is also critical to ensure that pre-MDD activities include sufficient time to identify and explore these non-Air Force solutions. 2.5.2 Activities shaped by the AoA The AoA is a primary input to: Development of Technology Development Strategy (TDS) Development of Capability Development Document (CDD) The AoA provides information for the development of the TDS phase in the following manner: Informs technology maturation activities such as the building and evaluation of competitive prototypes and refinements of the user capability requirements leading up to a preliminary design review Informs development of a RCT which will identify the operational performance parameters, thresholds, and objectives to be explored during the TD phase. Aids in identifying which performance parameters require further refinement during the TD phase. The RCT must be included in the AoA final report. Informs assessments of the technical maturity of the proposed solution and when an MDA should consider abbreviating or eliminating the TD phase based on these assessments Informs development of the TDS and RFPs for the TD phase following the MS A decision where appropriate. With respect to updates to a JCIDS document such as a CDD, the sponsor must review the AoA to determine if it continues to be relevant. If a CDD update invalidates the previous AoA, the sponsor will update or initiate a new AoA to support the CDD update. A CDD may not be submitted for staffing and validation until the AoA is completed. The AoA provides information for the development of the CDD in the following manner: Provides sufficient information to define Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs) for multiple capability increments. A single CDD may be validated to support the MS B decisions for all of the described increments. Therefore, the CDD must clearly articulate the unique set of KPPs and KSAs for each increment and identify any KPPs and KSAs that apply to all increments. Provides a summary of the alternatives, performance criteria, assumptions, recommendations, and conclusions. Identifies where relevant training criteria and alternatives were evaluated. This information provides the analytical foundation for establishing the Training KPP. 29 Training aspects should be part of the cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs examined during the AoA. 30 3 Planning the Analytical Effort This section describes AoA planning activities. Since AoAs are used to support the decisions identified in Section 2.2, it is important to understand how to scope the AoA, utilize previous efforts as a foundation for analysis, identify the stakeholders, and form the team. Additionally, it is important to determine the level of effort required for the AoA. This section also describes use of the enduring HPT membership discussed earlier in the handbook. Lastly, this section addresses how to capture all planning details in an AoA study plan and the review/approval processes required for the plan. 3.1 Scoping the Analysis As identified in the JCIDS Manual, the study guidance and study plan should build on appropriate prior analysis including that conducted as part of the JCIDS process. AoAs are designed to provide decision quality information to inform investment decisions. As a result, it is important to tailor the AoA appropriately to focus on the information required for those decisions. Senior leaders are not looking to “reinvent the wheel” and repeat analysis that has already been accomplished, but instead on identifying what additional analysis is needed before the next milestone decision. It is important to understand what information the MDA needs to make an informed decision. Since planning for the AoA begins before there is any formal guidance or direction, it is critical that scoping discussions occur with decision makers early in the planning stage. This discussion assists in shaping the MDD Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) and AoA study guidance. This also helps ensure that the AoA effort is tailored to address only those issues that the decision makers need for their next decision. Therefore, it is essential that the Study Director have frequent interaction with the CAPE and MDA staff. A “Best Practice” is to contact OAS as soon as there is discussion about an upcoming AoA. OAS can facilitate and provide introductions, where necessary, with the appropriate CAPE, MDA and Air Staff functional representatives for the effort. This can help ensure that the AoA is properly scoped and tailored to meet AF and DoD needs. Many of the items that define the scope of the AoA will come from the CBA and/or Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTmLPF-P) analysis that precede the AoA. The following are typically used to establish the scope of the AoA: Capability gaps and any identified prioritization Mission areas and tasks Operational concepts and environment Threats and scenarios 31 Measures and standards Approaches and alternative concepts, including the baseline Maturity of the technologies Operational risk Timeframes Ground rules, constraints, and assumptions Science and Technology (S&T) activities and DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendations (DCRs) The following are examples of key overarching questions decision makers ask: How well does each alternative close the capability gaps? How does each alternative compare to the baseline (current capability)? What are all the enabling capabilities (C3, ISR, HSI, logistics, etc.)? What are the risks (technical, operational, integration, political, etc.)? What is the life cycle cost estimates (LCCE) for each alternative? What are the significant performance parameters? What are the trade-offs between effectiveness, cost, risk, and schedule for each alternative? 3.1.1 Using Previous Analysis as the Foundation It is important to understand what corporate knowledge exists within in the relevant stakeholder organizations. Other potential sources for information include: AF/A9 Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) RAND Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) AF Knowledge Now/Intelink J8 Study Repository (currently known as KM/DS) CAPE Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Army Experiment and Study Information System https://cac.arcicportal.army.mil/ext/aesis/aesis/default.aspx) AT&L’s Acquisition Information Repository (https://www.dodtechipedia.mil/AIR) OAS can also assist in identifying relevant studies for the effort. This research is focused on identifying the following: Where there is extensive knowledge Where there is little knowledge Where there is no knowledge 32 The next step is to determine the applicability of the previous analysis to the effort. Previous analyses are useful for identifying the baseline and other alternatives, and refining or developing scenarios and measures. Just because the title seems to fit does not mean that it is applicable. Contact the office associated with the previous analyses for assistance in determining applicability. It is important to understand the objectives of the previous analyses and the conditions under which it was executed to determine its relevance to the current study. By reviewing the previous analyses, the study team will be better prepared to conduct the AoA. 3.1.1.1 Using Scenarios from Previous Analyses AoA alternatives must be studied in realistic operational settings to provide reasonable comparisons of their relative performances. The AoA does this by adopting or developing one or more appropriate military scenarios. Scenarios define operational locations, the enemy order of battle, and the corresponding enemy strategy and tactics ("the threat"). Scenarios are chosen with consideration of AoA mission need, constraints and assumptions, and the physical environments expected. The scenarios selected from previous analyses should be considered first when determining which scenarios should be used in the AoA. Threats and scenarios determine the nature of the physical environment in which the alternatives operate. However, there is often a need to operate in a range of physical environments and this can drive the selection of scenarios. The environment reflects both man-made and natural conditions. Natural conditions include weather, climate, terrain, vegetation, geology, etc. Depending on the alternative, these conditions can impact the target selection process, the aircraft and munitions selection process, aircraft sortie rate, aircraft survivability, navigation and communications capabilities, logistics, etc. Man-made conditions such as jamming and chemical/biological warfare, have their own impacts. Chemical or biological warfare, for example, may impact the working environment for operational crews and logistics support personnel. This can impact the results of the war or how it is executed. Such real or potential threats may in turn affect aircraft basing decisions and sortie rates. The threat is most often developed and defined by the AoA study team working in conjunction with the intelligence community. Engagement of the intelligence community should begin early in the AoA process. MAJCOM intelligence organizations, DIA, and other intelligence organizations can provide detailed threat and target information. If System Threat Assessment Reports (STARs or STAs) are available, they could serve as the basis for the AoA threat description. The Defense Planning Guidance/Illustrative Planning Scenario (DPG/IPS) provides broad context for a limited number of scenarios and should be used as a starting point for scenario development. The DPG contains a strategic framework and general description of potential military operations in several areas of the world and for various contingencies. Variance from the DPG/IPS (called scenario excursions) must be identified, explained, and approved by DIA after sponsoring command A2 review. The Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) or other digital force projections are resources providing details on enemy, friendly, and non-aligned forces in these areas. In Joint AoAs, Army, 33 Navy, and Marine forces must be considered, as well as the Air Force. The order of battle and roles of allied and non-aligned forces must also be considered. Environmental factors that impact operations (e.g., climate, atmospherics, vegetation and terrain) are important as well. Typical threat elements addressed in an AoA are: • • • • • • The enemy order of battle Limitations on threat effectiveness, such as logistics, command and control, operational capabilities, strategy or tactics, and technology Countermeasures and changes in enemy strategy and tactics in response to the new system's capabilities (i.e., reactive threats) A range of threats to account for uncertainties in the estimates A target set representing a cross section of all possible targets Threat laydown showing potential threat systems and their location In summary, scenarios must portray realistic operational environments. A range of scenarios may be needed to investigate the full potential of the alternatives and their sensitivities to variations in constraints and assumptions, particularly with regard to threats. Refer to Section 3.1 of the OAS Pre-MDD Analysis Handbook for additional guidance on scenario selection. 3.1.2 Identifying Ground Rules, Constraints, and Assumptions (GRC&A) GRC&As help scope the AoA and must be carefully documented and coordinated with senior decision makers. Some GRC&As will be general in nature and encompass the entire study, while other GRC&As will be more specific and cover only a portion of the analysis. Many of these assumptions will be described in the AoA study guidance provided to the team prior to creation of the study plan. In this context, the specific definitions are: Ground rules – broadly stated procedures that govern the general process, conduct, and scope of the study. An example is: the working group leads will be members of the risk review board. Constraints - imposed limitations that can be physical or programmatic. Human physical or cognitive limitations or a specific operating frequency range are examples of physical constraints. Specifying the latest acceptable initial operational capability (IOC) date illustrates a programmatic constraint. Assumptions - conditions that apply to the analysis. Examples include specific manpower levels, inclusion of a target type that will proliferate in the future thus forcing consideration of a specific threat system, or that certain infrastructure or architectures will be provided by another program 34 GRC&A arise from many sources. IOC time constraints, for example, may be imposed by an estimated fielding date of a new threat or by the need to replace an aging system. Net-centricity or interoperability with the Global Information Grid (GIG), for example, may be dictated in the ADM. Regardless of the source, each GRC&A must be explicitly identified, checked for consistency, fully documented, and then accounted for in the scope of the AoA. Later they will need to be accounted for in the analytical methodologies. The source of and rationale for the GRC&A should also be noted, if known. The GRC&A are subject to scrutiny, particularly if not reviewed with the MDA, AF/A5R, CAPE and critical stakeholders early in the process. It is critical that the team thoroughly document each GRC&A. The study plan will contain an initial set of GRC&A, but may change as the study progresses. Any changes to the GRC&A should be vetted with stakeholders and decisions makers and documented in the final report. 3.2 Defining the Alternative Concepts The AT&L MDD DAB template requires alternatives be identified, fully understood, and presented at MDD. In addition, the AoA study guidance will identify a minimum set of alternatives that must be included in the AoA. The Air Force uses CCTD documents to describe the technical and operational aspects of each alternative. The CCTDs should be created during Development Planning (DP) and Early System Engineering. The AoA study team will refine the CCTDs to ensure they have sufficient information to support the effectiveness, cost, and risk analyses. SAF/AQR is responsible for approving the CCTDs prior to the MDD. At a minimum, the AoA must include the following alternatives: The baseline, which represents the existing, currently programmed system funded and operated according to current plans Alternatives based on potential, yet unfunded improvements to the baseline, generally referred to as the baseline+ or modified baseline. [Note: it is not always best to include all potential improvements to the baseline in one alternative, consider having multiple alternatives in this category.] Alternatives identified in the AoA study guidance (for example, COTS/GOTS, allied systems, etc.) 3.3 Identifying Stakeholder Community Stakeholder is defined as any agency, Service, or organization with a vested interest (a stake) in the outcome of the pre-acquisition analyses. A stakeholder may contribute directly or indirectly to the pre-acquisition activities and is usually affected by decisions made as a result of these 35 activities. Asking the following questions can help identify members of the stakeholder community: Who are the end-users (e.g., COCOMs, warfighters, etc.) of the capability? What enablers (intelligence, HSI, logistics, communications, etc.) have interdependencies within the solution space being analyzed in the AoA? How do the other Services, DoD agencies, and other government agencies fit into the mission area being explored in the AoA? The stakeholder community can assist the AoA study team identify other solutions available from other Services or agencies (within or outside DoD). Additionally, allied and partner nations may offer possible solutions. OAS can assist in identifying the stakeholder community. 3.4 Determining Level of Effort The level of effort (LoE) for the analysis will depend on various factors such as the study questions, complexity of the problem, time constraints, manpower and resource constraints, and type of analysis methodology. By controlling the scope of the study, the LoE is more likely to remain manageable over the course of the analysis. All study scoping decisions should be coordinated with stakeholders to ensure that expectations are managed. This ensures that the LoE and resources required are understood for each scoping decision. The results of these discussions should be documented so that everyone understands what is within scope and what is not. Answers to the following questions will aid in determining the LoE: How much analysis has been accomplished to date? (See Section 3.1.1) What remaining information needs to be learned from the AoA? (See Section 3.1) Who in the stakeholder community is available to participate in the effort? Are the right experts available and can they participate? How much government expertise is available? Contractor support? What data and tools are needed to execute the AoA? How much time and funding is available to execute the AoA? What level of analytic rigor is required? Where and what amount of analytic risk is acceptable to the decision makers? 36 There is a relationship between the level of effort and study risks. When defining the level of effort, it is important to identify areas of risk associated with the time and resources allotted to conduct the study. The answers to above questions will aid in identifying LoE and study risks. There are other risks associated with uncertainties inherent in the study process such as the effectiveness and cost analysis methodologies, funding and resources limitations, and insufficient time to conduct the study. For example, a study with limited time and resources may reach different conclusions compared to similar study with less constrained time and resources. In this example, the less constrained study could utilize more empirically based research methods that enhance confidence in the study findings. It is important that the team recognizes and documents these uncertainties, identifies the potential impacts, and provides this information to the decision makers. Once the LoE and study risks are identified, the team should discuss the implications with the senior decision makers. This discussion should include courses of action which identify possible tradeoffs to mitigate the risk (e.g., providing more resources and/or reducing scope to meet an aggressive study schedule). This discussion will ensure the LoE and risks are acceptable to senior decision makers. These agreed upon risk areas should be included in presentations to the AFRRG and AFROC. OAS, AF/A5R and SAF/AQ can aid in determining the appropriate LoE and study risks. 3.4.1 Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) and Acquisition Category (ACAT) Determination The JSD and ACAT level will also influence the LoE required. An effort that is expected to be designated as JROC Interest will have the same level of scrutiny as an ACAT I program effort or Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). The following types of efforts will have OSD oversight and CAPE-issued guidance: ACAT ID, ACAT IAM, JROC Interest, and labeled as “special interest.” OSD and JROC determine the classification using the following criteria: DoDI 5000.02 specifies: “The USD(AT&L) shall designate programs as ACAT ID or IAM when the program has special interest based on one or more of the following factors: technological complexity; Congressional interest; a large commitment of resources; the program is critical to achievement of a capability or set of capabilities; or a program is a joint program. Exhibiting one or more of these characteristics, however, shall not automatically lead to an ACAT ID or IAM designation.” Capabilities in Battlespace Awareness (BA), Command & Control (C2), Logistics and Net-Centric are initially considered JROC Interest because the capabilities are enablers that cut across Service boundaries 37 If not a Special Interest, ACAT I, or JROC Interest, capabilities in Force Application (FA) and Protection are initially considered Independent or Joint Information If not Special Interest, capabilities in Force Support, Building Partnerships, and Corporate Management & Support are initially considered Independent Revised definition of MDAP based on implementation of WSARA (DTM 09-027): o An MDAP is a DoD acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified program and: 1. That is designated by the USD(AT&L) as a MDAP; or 2. That is estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for RDT&E, INCLUDING ALL PLANNED INCREMENTS, of more than $365 million (based on FY 2000 constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement, INCLUDING ALL PLANNED INCREMENTS, of more than $2.19 billion (based on FY 2000 constant dollars). o This revised definition may result in a change in Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 3.4.2 Contract Support Technical support contractors often conduct substantial parts of the analysis. It is important to understand the study objectives before making contract support arrangements. This will increase the likelihood that the chosen contractor is well suited to perform the required tasks. Know the needs first, and then contract. It is important to remember that the responsibility for the AoA rests with the lead command and this responsibility should not be delegated to the contractor. Questions to answer to determine contractor support requirements: Is there adequate expertise available within the government? Are sources of funding available? For which study areas do I need contract support? Which contractors are qualified? What are the available contract vehicles? How will the contract be administered? Experienced and qualified contractors are often obtained through the Air Force product centers and program offices. For most product centers, access to technical support contractors is available through scientific, engineering, technical, and analytical (SETA) contracts. Also, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) are available to some product centers. Use of an existing contract for the best-qualified contractor can reduce the AoA initiation and development time considerably. 3.5 Establishing the Study Team 38 The Study Director leads the study team in conducting the AoA. The Study Director is normally appointed by the sponsor (most often the operational user) designated as the lead for the AoA. Management and integration of the information/products from each working group is undertaken by a core team of government representatives usually comprised of the Study Director, Deputy Study Director, lead and deputy lead from each working group, and the OAS representative. The enduring HPT membership should serve as the foundation of this core team membership to maintain continuity of the effort. Ideally, this team also includes members from previous applicable studies. Finally, the study team should include appropriate members of the stakeholder community (sponsoring command/ organization, other Air Force commands and agencies, Army, Navy and Marines, DoD, Joint Staff, and civilian government agencies). OAS and AF/A5R facilitate the AoA study guidance and study plan HPTs. OAS provides an advisor to the Study Director. The advisor assists in training, planning, executing, and facilitating the accomplishment of the AoA. The level of assistance from OAS is determined by the scope of the AoA and where the AoA fits in the overall Air Force prioritization. OAS is focused on ensuring quality, consistency, and value in AoAs. A “Best Practice” is to organize in a way that meets the study needs. The structure of the AoA study team depends upon the scope of the AoA and the level of effort required. Not all study teams are identical, but are instead tailored in size and skill sets to meet the objectives of the AoA. Team membership may include operators, logisticians, intelligence analysts, cost estimators, and other specialists. Depending on the scope of the AoA, the team is usually organized along functional lines to conduct the effectiveness, risk, and cost analyses. If the AoA is only focused on conducting sensitivity analysis of the assumptions from previous analysis and updating the cost estimates, the AoA study team will consist primarily of those members needed to conduct those specific tasks. In other words, each study team structure is dependent upon the questions the effort must answer and the specific scope of the AoA. Small AoA teams with dedicated members are often better able to react to the timeline demands of the AoA and may be more productive. Early and proper organization is the key to a successful study. Ideally, the working group leads and their deputies should be subject matter experts able to lead people, manage multiple situations, and facilitate their groups. It can be difficult to find individuals with all of these abilities. If unable to find a working group leader (or deputy) who can facilitate a group, OAS can assist. After the core team members have been identified, OAS can provide training to the team. The training will be tailored to the specific analytic effort and is best accomplished prior to the AoA study plan HPT. 39 Figure 3-1 illustrates an example study team structure and various oversight and support organizations. In situations when stakeholder organizations have conflicting interests, consider selecting working group co-leads from those organizations to facilitate their buy-in. Ad hoc working groups are formed to accomplish specific tasks in support of the other working groups. For example, the Alternative Comparison working group may be an ad hoc group because it is formed from members of other working groups to synthesize all of the analysis results to compare the alternatives (this is described further in Chapter 8 of this handbook). Figure 3-1: Example Study Team Structure Once the team is established, the working groups meet separately to address their fundamental issues. They also meet with other working groups and/or the entire study team to exchange information. Frequent and open exchanges of ideas and data are essential to a successful AoA. When the team is geographically dispersed, maintaining frequent and open communication is usually more challenging. Documenting questions, answers, and decisions made in the various work groups facilitates clear and effective communication. This can be done through taking and distributing minutes of study group meetings. Frequent interaction via telephone and e-mail at all levels should also take place. If possible, keep the study team intact throughout the AoA. A changing membership adversely impacts continuity and may create delays as new personnel are integrated into the effort. 40 3.6 Study Plan Preparation and Review An approved study plan is required prior to convening the Materiel Development Decision (MDD). The study plan should illustrate with sufficient detail how the team will execute the AoA to ensure the critical areas identified in the AoA study guidance are addressed. Appendix C of this handbook contains the template for the study plan. According to Air Force policy, prior to initiating a study plan, the sponsor will present the information associated with the entry criteria identified in Section 1.2 to the AFRRG for approval to proceed. An HPT is required for development of the study plan. AF/A5R-P must review and approve the membership prior to convening the HPT. The membership of the study guidance HPT should be the foundation for this HPT and the core membership of the study team. The study plan HPT membership can be altered at the discretion of the AF/A5R-P. The AF/A5R process for review and staffing of the study plan is: After the study plan has been prepared and coordinated with AoA stakeholders, sponsors will provide the AoA study plan and AFROC briefing to the AF/A5R Functional Division Chief and AFMC/OAS for assessment, simultaneously. The AF/A5R Functional Division Chief will forward the AoA study plan and AFROC briefing to AF/A5R-P with an AFMC/OAS assessment, simultaneously. AF/A5R-P will review (allow for five working days) the study plan and determine if the AoA study plan is ready to be submitted to the AFRRG for approval. Once the AFRRG concurs with the AoA study plan, the study plan and AFROC briefing will be submitted to the AFROC for validation. A widespread review of the plan is useful in improving the plan and ensuring stakeholder support for its execution. The review should start within the originating command and key team member organizations. The external review should be solicited from a variety of agencies, including OAS, appropriate AF/A5R functional divisions, AFMC/A3, other Services, and CAPE (for ACAT I and JROC Interest programs). According to AFI 10-601, the study plan should include the following to ensure approval: Identification of the specific gaps that are being addressed in the AoA Definition of the baseline (existing and planned) capability Identification of the stakeholders and their roles/responsibilities in the AoA Identification of the key questions identified in the study guidance 41 Identification of the alternatives identified by the study guidance. This includes discussion about the implications and/or dependencies identified about the alternative and how those dependencies will be factored into the analysis. Description of the methodologies to be utilized and must include the following: o Measures of effectiveness, performance, and suitability o Decomposition of the gaps and key questions o Traceability to measures used to establish minimum values in the ICD (from the CBA) o Cost work breakdown structure o Methodology to determine alternatives ability to mitigate gaps o Methodology to explore tradespace and description of what sensitivity analysis will be done to determine key performance parameters and threshold and objective values for the RCT o Methodology to conduct the cost/capability tradeoff analysis o Methodology for factoring in the dependencies identified for each alternative o Scenarios to represent the operational environment An OAS assessment of the study plan and its associated briefing is required prior to submission to AF/A5R-P. Appendix E contains the study plan assessment criteria used by OAS in their independent assessment of a study plan and associated briefing. This assessment is presented in bullet fashion, highlighting the risk areas with the credibility and defensibility of the analysis results. OAS will provide an initial assessment and get-well plan after the initial review to determine readiness for submission to AF/A5R. 42 4 Performing the Effectiveness Analysis Effectiveness analysis is normally the most complex element of the AoA and consumes a significant amount of AoA resources. The effectiveness analysis working group (EAWG) is responsible for accomplishing the effectiveness analysis tasks. The goal of the effectiveness analysis is to determine the military worth of the alternatives in performing Mission Tasks (MTs). The MTs are typically derived from the capabilities identified in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). A Capability Development Document (CDD), Capability Production Document (CPD), or Concept Characterization Technical Description (CCTD) may exist for the current baseline, and can be useful in determining MTs and measures for the EA effort. However, while there may be existing requirements documents, the team should use whatever documents provide the best, most current information. Avoid using information from sources that are superseded by or do not accurately reflect the current capabilities or required mission tasks. The ability to satisfy the MTs is determined from estimates of alternatives' performance with respect to measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs), and measures of suitability (MOSs). Additionally, AoAs and other supporting analyses can provide the analytical foundation for determining the appropriate thresholds and objectives for system attributes and aid in determining which of these attributes should be KPPs or KSAs. 4.1 Effectiveness Methodology The effectiveness methodology is the sum of the processes used to conduct the EA even if some pieces are done by other parts of the larger AoA team. The development of the effectiveness methodology is almost always iterative: a methodology will be suggested, evaluated against the resources and data available to support it, and then modified to correspond to what is both possible and adequate. As the AoA progresses, this development sequence may be repeated as more is understood about the nature of the alternatives, the models or analysis tools, and what is necessary to support the AoA decision. Analysis continues throughout the conduct of the AoA and based on what the team learns as it progresses, methodologies may be refined. Figure 4-1 General Approach for Effectiveness, shows the flow of analysis tasks discussed in this chapter. 43 Figure 4-1: General Approach for Effectiveness Analysis OAS does not recommend the use of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) or similar methods which implement weighting schemes as part of AoA effectiveness methodology. Typically, employing AHP/weighting adds complexities to the study results which are difficult to understand and difficult to explain to decision makers. OAS suggests keeping the effectiveness methodology as simple as possible in order to evaluate and present accurate, informative results. Measure weighting schemes can oversimplify the results and potentially mask important information. Table 4-1 below illustrates how measure weighting is dependent on the group determining the weighting and may not be representative of what senior leaders, stakeholders, or decision makers would consider important. 44 Table 4-1: Weighting Measures 4.2 Effectiveness Analysis Methodology Discussion of the EA methodology must begin very early in the process; even before the AoA study officially begins. In fact, since the study team is required to present their study plan along with the guidance at MDD, it is very important to provide a well developed and comprehensive plan at MDD. The plan must at a minimum identify the actual alternatives to be studied, the relevant mission tasks, gaps, and measures, and include specific information regarding the analysis tools and methodologies to be used to conduct the analysis. There should be clear logic linking the tasks, gaps, measures, and methodologies. The EA methodology is designed to compare the effectiveness of the alternatives based on military and operational worth. It encompasses and is influenced by the MTs, measures (MOEs, MOPs, MOSs), alternatives, threats, scenarios, operations concept, prior analysis, study schedule, and available analysis resources. The methodology must be systematic and logical. It must be executable and repeatable, and it must not be biased for or against any alternative. It is important that the team determine the appropriate level of detail required in the analysis. Because of the teams’ dependence on many factors, it can approach its final form only after the above factors are defined. The identification and selection of suitable analysis tools and input data sources must await development of the MTs, measures, selection of the alternatives, and determination of analysis level of detail. It is important to note though that, before measures can be developed, there must be agreement among the decision makers and stakeholders regarding which capability gaps to address first, followed by agreement on which are the appropriate mission tasks associated with the capability gaps. Finally, once the appropriate level of detail is determined and suitable analysis tools are identified, the team must be sure to secure the buy in of the senior decision makers. 45 4.2.1 Terms and Definitions While there are certainly several other definitions in use by many different organizations, the following terms and definitions are those used by OAS to describe parameters associated with capabilities, mission tasks, and measures. Capability – the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways across the DOTMLPF-P to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action. (JCIDS Manual) Mission Task – tasks a system will be expected to perform; the effectiveness of system alternatives is measured in terms of the degree to which the tasks would be attained. Attribute – a quality or feature of something. Attributes of mission tasks (e.g., survivability, persistence, availability, accuracy, etc.) form the basis for identifying and drafting measures. Measure – a measure is a device designed to convey information about an entity being addressed. It is the dimensions, capacity, or amount of an attribute an entity possesses. A measure is used to provide the basis for comparison or for describing varying levels of an attribute. Metric – a unit of measure that coincides with a specific method, procedure, or analysis (e.g., function or algorithm). Examples include: mean, median, mode, percentage, and percentile. Criteria – the acceptable levels or standards of performance for a metric. It is often expressed as a minimum acceptable level of performance (threshold) and desired acceptable level of performance (objective). Data – an individual measurement used to compute the metric for a measure. 4.2.2 Mission Tasks (MTs) Because the goal of the AoA is to identify the most promising solution(s), MTs must not be stated in solution-specific language. Each MT will have at least one measure supporting it. In general, measures should not call for optimizing aspects of a task or effect, because this often has unintended impacts on cost or other aspects of the alternatives’ performance. For example, one solution to minimizing aircraft attrition could be not flying missions at all; however, this solution would hardly be conducive to placing targets at risk. Similarly, maximizing targets destroyed may result in unacceptable attrition. There may be other cases; however, where optimization is desirable – ensuring maximum personnel survivability for instance. Regardless, measures must be grounded in requirements documents or through decision maker questions contained in the guidance. While the alternatives’ performance will be compared to each other, the team should resist rank ordering them or making recommendations based on a rank order. Remember, the alternatives should be evaluated on their capability to accomplish mission tasks and meet established requirements. It is possible that all the alternatives might not meet some or all requirements. 46 Conversely, while all the alternatives might meet all requirements, the highest performer might also be the most costly and/or most risky. Recommending the lowest performer still meeting all the requirements might be the preferred solution given its associated cost and risk. 4.2.3 Attributes Once the MTs are well defined and understood, the next step is to identify the necessary attributes of successful mission tasks. An attribute is essentially a property or characteristic of an entity – some desired characteristics of the entity. An entity may have many attributes, not all of which are of interest. Attributes should be problem specific and should be used in so far as they enlighten decision makers, answer key questions, and respond to guidance. The key should be to keep it logical, identify the desired attributes first, and then craft the measures to address them. The January 2012 JCIDS manual briefly describes attributes and provides several examples although this list is neither exhaustive nor directive. According to the manual: “The Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) produces a set of tasks and measures used to assess the programmed capabilities of the force. These measures should be based on the list of capability attributes outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure A. The Enclosure provides examples of appropriate attributes which should be used where applicable, although other attributes may be identified and used when those in Appendix A to this Enclosure are not appropriate.” Additionally, an excerpt from the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) Measures Primer, May 2007 identifies several characteristics of attributes that are useful to study teams when developing measures. AFOTEC defines an attribute as: “A property or characteristic of an entity that can be distinguished quantitatively or qualitatively by human or automated means. An entity may have many attributes, only some of which may be of interest for the information needs. Some of these attributes or characteristics might likely found in ICDs or other requirements documents. A given attribute may be incorporated in multiple measurement constructs supporting different information needs. Measurement is the process of assigning numbers to the attributes of an entity in such a way that relationships of the numbers reflect relationships of the attribute being measured.” A measure specifically addresses one or more attributes. Further, an attribute may have more than one measure associated with it. Since the AoA should trace its MTs back to the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), it is useful to link the study measures back using those attributes and their associated JCAs found in Appendix A, Enclosure A of the JCIDS Manual. [Note: that these attributes are not 47 comprehensive and not all JCAs are yet represented in the manual; however, these examples illustrate a variety of attributes that a team may identify]. In general, teams should not feel they are tied to any or all of these. Other attributes, not included in these examples, may be appropriate for certain mission tasks. Nevertheless, the team should, at a minimum, link its mission tasks back to the applicable JCAs as this linkage is required in the to be developed CDD which includes the AoA-developed Requirements Correlation Table (RCT) with identified Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs). Note that these JCAs may not apply to non-DoD mission tasks. As identified in the January 2012 JCIDS manual, the attributes for four of the JCAs are provided below. Table 4-2: JCIDS JCAs 48 4.2.4 Measures Measures are a central element when conducting an AoA. Without them, there is no way to determine the effectiveness and suitability of an alternative and their ability to close gaps either partially or completely. Properly formed and explicitly stated, measures will: Specify what to measure (what data to collect, e.g., time to deliver message) Determine the type of data to collect (e.g., transmit start and stop times) Identify the source of the data (e.g., human observation) Establish personnel and equipment required to perform data collection Identify how the data can be analyzed and interpreted Provide the basis for the assessment and conclusions drawn from the assessment There is no universal definition for a measure within the analytic and test communities. Each organization, developer, as well as academia and industry, defines the concept of a measure slightly different. While there is no universal definition, there are certain tenets that apply to all measures. Measures are not requirements although they are developed from requirements. Measures are typically not conditions such as altitude, temperature, or terrain but they will be measured under various conditions. In some situations; however, certain conditions may be measures of interest. For instance, altitude may be something a team might want to measure if it is critical to platform survivability. Finally, measures are not criteria although they will be evaluated against established criteria. Remember, measures should be framed by the tasks, conditions, and standards (criteria). Results from measures not only make it possible to compare alternatives, they also can be used to investigate performance sensitivities to variations of key assumptions and measure values. Such analyses help define input to follow-on requirements and acquisition documents such as the CDD, CPD, and TDS. There are a variety of terms used to describe the value of a capability to the operator/user and measures should be stated in terms of their capability to provide this value. Frequently used terms include military worth, military utility, operational utility and operational significance. Success can be measured relative to the immediate goals of the system (attack, communicate, detect, etc.) or relative to high-level goals related to "winning the war." However, in many cases, this determination is much more difficult and attributing “winning the war” to the performance of one particular system may not be possible. Nevertheless, some examples of measures demonstrating military worth are: Reduction in fratricide Loss/exchange ratio Targets held at risk Targets defeated Level of collateral damage 49 Attrition rate Quantity (and types) of resources consumed Number of operating locations needed Measures may come from a variety of sources. For some Air Force AoAs, the operational utility may be expressed in terms of the Air Force’s end customer which may be other departments and organizations such as U.S. Army, DHS, DOS, etc. The team should consider potential future studies and testing and attempt to craft measures that link to and are relevant for these events. 4.2.5 Types of Measures There are several different types of measures: Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) Measures of Suitability (MOSs) Measures of Performance (MOPs) 4.2.5.1 Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) Measures associated with attributes of operational effectiveness are referred to as MOEs. Operational Effectiveness: The overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat. Measure of Effectiveness: A measure of operational success that must be closely related to the objective of the mission or operation being evaluated. MOEs are a qualitative or quantitative measure of a alternative’s performance or characteristic that indicates the degree to which it performs the task or meets a requirement under specified conditions. They are a measure of operational success that must be closely related to the objective of the mission or operation being evaluated. There will be at least one MOE to support each MT. Each alternative is evaluated against each MOE criteria (requirement), and the results are used to differentiate performance and capability among the alternatives. MOEs should be focused on operational outcomes and closing the operational gaps rather than specific technical performance parameters. MOEs are usually developed by the study team. If possible, MOEs should be chosen to provide suitable assessment criteria for use during later developmental and operational testing. The team should look to the CBA, earlier analytic activities, requirements documents, and the testing community to help identify these criteria. This linking of the AoA to testing is valuable 50 to the test community and the decision maker. Involvement of the testing community is extremely helpful when developing “testable” measures. MOEs should be reviewed by principal stakeholders during development of the AoA study plan. Suitable selection of MOEs helps later independent review and evaluation of the AoA study plan and results. MOEs should be as independent of the alternatives as possible. The measures selected should not bias the alternatives in some way and all alternatives should be evaluated using all MOEs. Additionally, the team should be cautious of measures that are strongly correlated with one another to avoid overemphasizing particular aspects of the alternatives. In these cases, the team must be cognizant of the relationship among the measures to clearly understand the capabilities and limitations of the alternatives. Finally, MOEs should normally represent raw quantities like numbers of something or frequencies of occurrence. Attempts to disguise these quantities through a mathematical transformation (for example, through normalization), no matter how well meaning, may reduce the information content and might be regarded as tampering with the data. Although ratios are typically used for presenting information such as attrition rates and loss/exchange ratios, one should still use caution as a ratio can also essentially hide both quantities. This can be particularly misleading when sample sizes are small. It is generally better to identify the proportion (e.g. 4 of 5). 4.2.5.2 Measures of Suitability (MOSs) Measures associated with attributes of operational suitability are referred to as MOS. Operational Suitability: The degree to which a system can be placed satisfactorily in field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, reliability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, Human Systems Integration, manpower supportability, logistics supportability, natural environmental effects and impacts, documentation, and training requirements. Measure of Suitability: A measure of a system’s ability to support mission/task accomplishment with respect to reliability, availability, maintainability, transportability, supportability, and training. It is important for the study team to consider suitability areas when evaluating operational effectiveness. Suitability issues such as reliability, availability, maintainability (RAM), and deployability can be significant force effectiveness multipliers. A suitable system results in increased combat capability with smaller, more responsive deployable systems requiring fewer spare parts and people and less specialized equipment. In addition to significantly impacting mission capability, an alternative’s suitability performance could be a major factor in its life cycle cost. Maintainability issues could dramatically increase 51 the number of maintainers need to sustain a system. Major Human Systems Integration (HSI) issues might increase operator workload. Additionally, significant reliability issues could result in low operational availability. In developing requirements, lead commands must identify RAM and deployability performance parameters. Support requirements should relate to a system’s operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and total ownership cost. And, in fact, all AoAs are required to address these measures for all alternatives considered. Finally, sustainment is a mandatory Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for all ACAT I programs (for ACAT II and below programs, the sponsor will determine the applicability of the KPP). MOSs and the importance of examining sustainability during the AoA are discussed in much more detail in the Sustainability section. As will be discussed later in the Alternative Comparison section, the study team can and should identify not only trades among overall operational effectiveness, cost and risk, but also between effectiveness and suitability. For instance, can improvements in reliability be achieved if some requirements for performance are relaxed? 4.2.5.3 Measures of Performance (MOPs) Measures associated with a quantitative measure of physical performance or physical characteristics are MOPs. Measure of Performance: A measure of the lowest level of physical performance (e.g., range, velocity, throughput, etc.) or physical characteristic (e.g., height, weight, volume, frequency, etc.). MOPs are chosen to support the assessment of one or more MOEs. MOPs will support the MOEs by providing causal explanation for the MOE and/or highlighting high-interest aspects or contributors of the MOE. MOPs may apply universally to all alternatives or, unlike MOEs; they may be system specific in some instances. In order to determine how well an alternative performs, each MOP should have an initial minimally acceptable value of performance (often the “threshold” value). In addition to a minimum performance value, each MOP might also have an initial, more demanding value (often the “objective” value). While these values may come from existing requirements documents, there will be some cases where these documents and requirements simply do not exist prior to AoA initiation. In these cases, the team might rely on subject matter experts (SMEs), search Combat Air Force (CAF) standards, CONOPS, Concepts of Employment (CONEMP), and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), or use some combination of sources to help define performance standards. However, if these documents (or sources) are dated, are superseded by, or do not reflect current capabilities the team should find other legitimate sources for defining required performance parameters. In some cases where no legitimate source(s) can be found, one of the purposes of the analysis may be to determine where those required values should be. Regardless of the source, these initial 52 values and the rationale for their selection should be well documented as the MOPs and their performance criteria may later be directly or indirectly reflected in system performance parameters in the ICD/CDD/CPD or other documents. It is possible that the lack of identified performance values could signify that valid capability gaps have not been established. In this case, the team should look to earlier analysis (if any exists) such as the CBA to ensure capability gaps exist, a materiel solution is warranted, and the AoA is the next prudent path to pursue. Keep in mind that not all measures of interest for the study (MOEs, MOSs, and MOPs and their minimum performance values) will necessarily be explicitly identified in any source document. It is up to the team to identify what needs to be measured to adequately evaluate the alternatives’ capability to accomplish the required mission tasks and close the capability gaps. Finally, as with MOEs, the MOPs should be linked (where possible) to future testing requirements. As stated earlier, there is no universal definition of measures within the analytic and test communities. As will be discussed in Appendix L, different organizations not only use MOPs in different ways, but also use the term MOP to refer to different items or factors. Appendix L also contains more detailed information regarding the mechanics of developing mission tasks, measures, criteria, and conducting data analysis. 4.3 Levels of Analysis In the world of military operations analysis, levels of effectiveness analysis are characterized by the number and types of alternatives, threat elements, and the levels of fidelity needed for the study. A typical four-level classification for model selection is shown in Figure 4-2. At the base of the triangle is the engineering analysis performed on individual components of an alternative or threat system. One level up, engagement analysis can model the interaction between a single element of the alternative and a single threat. An example of this analysis is weapon versus target, or aircraft versus aircraft. Engagement analysis also looks at interactions of larger quantities of the same elements, or few-on-few. At the top two levels, mission/battle and theater/campaign (many on many), the analysis becomes very complex involving the modeling of most or all of the forces in a specific, complex scenario. At these higher levels the focus of the analysis changes. The applicable models and simulations (M&S) will also change, as does the complexity of the analysis. Analysis at higher levels may require inputs from supporting analysis at lower levels. While the supporting analysis may come from sources outside the AoA, it will often be performed by the AoA team. MOP values tend to be produced from engineering and one-on53 one analyses. MOE values tend to come from higher levels of analyses. MOS values may come from either source. There are no hard and fast rules, though, because of the range of issues considered in AoAs. Given the increasing complexity of the analysis encountered in moving up the pyramid, every effort must be made to use the appropriate level needed to answer the AoA's questions. In some cases, a team may need to use several levels of analysis to adequately address all AoA issues. Figure 4-2 depicts the analysis hierarchy. Figure 4-2: Hierarchy of Analysis Once measures have been identified and the methodologies to be used for each analytical effort determined, it is time to determine what “tools” will be used to develop measure data. The term “tools” is defined as spreadsheets, SMEs, methods, processes, and Modeling & Simulation (M&S). The analysis tools are the heart and soul of analysis and can consist of everything from hand-written steps executed with a "stubby pencil" to elegant mathematical formulations represented by thousands of lines of computer code. In some cases, they may include personin-the-loop simulations or the informed judgment of SMEs. Whatever their complexity or form, there comes a point when the AoA team must decide which tools to use to generate measure data for alternative comparisons. The measures developed for the analysis should dictate which tools are needed. Never develop measures based on the availability or familiarity of a particular analysis tool. Doing so (for example, because of easy accessibility to a particular M&S) may result in the wrong issues being investigated and the wrong alternatives being identified as promising. Once the measures 54 are identified, the necessary level(s) of analysis can be determined and a search conducted for tools suitable for those measure calculations. [Note: the study questions and the methodology to address those questions should always drive tool selection and who should do the analysis, not the other way around.] When selecting analysis tools consider the following: Information or input data requirements and the quality of the data sources Credibility and acceptance of the tool output or process results (e.g., SME assessments) Who is available to run the M&S, develop/manipulate the spreadsheets or participate in SME assessments Whether or not the tool can be applied to support the analysis within time and funding constraints Cost of running M&S Tool inputs come from all aspects of the AoA: threats and scenarios, alternative definitions, employment concepts, constraints and assumptions, etc. These may also be derived from the outputs of other tools. Before selecting an M&S tool, the sources of all inputs should be identifiable and credible. Where the best available tools fall short, the team must identify this information to decision makers. Information regarding some commonly accepted models can be obtained from the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT) located at the HAF/A9 portal page. Before deciding on a final integrated set of tools, it is useful to check that the toolset is adequate for evaluating all measures in the AoA. Constructing a linkage diagram as illustrated in Figure 4-3 may be useful for this. As shown, this diagram depicts the source of data to resolve the measure data values and provides a system level diagram of how the selected analysis tools are expected to work together. It should also show what information is expected to flow from one tool (or process) to another. A review of the linkage diagram should also ensure that a common set of assumptions is made across all the tools. Including a linkage diagram in the Study Plan should also enhance the understanding of those reading or reviewing the plan. 55 Figure 4-3: Notional Example of Tool and Measure Linkage 4.3.1 M&S Accreditation The DODI 5000 series requires that digital M&S used in support of acquisition decisions be formally accredited for use by an Accreditation Authority. Additionally, AFI 16-1001 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the VV&A of Air Force owned or managed M&S. MIL-STD-3022, DoD Standard Practice, Documentation of VV&A for Models and Simulation Accreditation outlines the templates for the M&S accreditation plan and report. Accreditation is an official determination by the accreditation authority that a model (or methodology, tools, data) is acceptable for a specific purpose and identifies risks associated with using that model. Accreditation provides credibility to the study by demonstrating the pedigree of the model, offering evidence that model is credible, and establishing that it is appropriate for its use within the study. The study team should allow time for the M&S accreditation process within the AoA schedule; this process should be discussed in the study plan and the accreditation plan should be included as an appendix to the study plan. OAS can help tailor an appropriate accreditation plan. Model accreditation begins with development of the accreditation plan. The plan contains criteria for model assessment based on the ability of the model to accept the required input data and to provide appropriate output information to resolve the MOEs. All data used for model 56 input and scenario configuration should also be accredited to ensure credibility of the output. While accreditation is important, the study team must balance the extent of work required to do the accreditation with the study questions at hand. In other words, the accreditation authority must determine what the appropriate level of accreditation is for this problem. Once the model assessment is complete, a final accreditation report is prepared. 4.3.2 Study Risk Fundamentally, AoAs consist of three primary analysis components: effectiveness, cost, and risk. Risk in this sense, refers to the operational, technical, and programmatic risks associated with the alternative solutions. Various factors such as technical maturity, survivability, dependency on other programs are considered in determining these risks. There are other risks (uncertainties) in AoAs associated with the conduct of the study rather than the alternatives themselves. Generally, these uncertainties pertain to factors that could impact the conduct of the study as described in Section 3.4, such as time and resource constraints. In terms of uncertainties associated with the effectiveness analysis, consider, for instance, a situation where a team is evaluating both existing, established, mature systems and newer, cutting edge technologies for which little historical data exists. While the team has access to sufficient, credible information (maintenance records, prior test results, historical performance data, etc.) regarding the operational capabilities of the mature technologies, it will need to make certain assumptions regarding the newer technologies that may or may not actually be true. Additionally, the team may only have a limited set of data, and/or subject matter expertise to rely on for analysis. While the SMEs may come to the conclusion that the second alternative should be capable of performing the required tasks to the required standards, they do not have any hard evidence to unequivocally support this conclusion. Due to the uncertainty associated with this data, the team will have less confidence in the conclusions drawn for the newer system. While the SMEs believe it will be operationally effective, it may not. These areas of uncertainty are excellent starting points for sensitivity analysis. Given the uncertainty of the information used to form some conclusion, what is the operational impact if the team is wrong? It is important that the team recognizes and documents these uncertainties, identifies the operational impact if an unanticipated outcome occurs, and provides this information to the decision makers. 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis Alternatives whose effectiveness is stable over a range of conditions provide greater utility and less risk than those lacking such stability. Alternatives in an AoA are typically defined with 57 certain appropriate assumptions made about their performance parameters: weight, volume, power consumption, speed, accuracy, impact angle, etc. These alternatives are then assessed against AoA-defined threats and scenarios under a set of AoA-defined assumptions. This provides very specific cost and performance estimates, but does little to assess the stability of alternative performance to changes in system parameters or AoA threats, scenarios, employment, and other assumptions. Stability can only be investigated through sensitivity analyses in which the most likely critical parameters are varied; for instance: reduced speed or increased weight, greater or less accuracy, different basing options, reduced enemy radar cross section, or when overarching assumptions are changed. This form of parametric analysis can often reveal strengths and weaknesses in alternative performance that are valuable in making decisions to keep or eliminate alternatives from further consideration. Sensitivity analyses should always be performed with an emphasis on alternatives that survived early screening processes. It should be budgeted for in the original plan; however, the specific sensitivity analysis to be conducted usually will not be known until well into the AoA. Sensitivity analysis can also add credibility to the information developed during the effectiveness analysis. Of course, it is always necessary to balance the amount of sensitivity analysis against its potential value and the available resources. In addition to sensitivity analysis, the team may want to consider examining various excursions from the original scenarios and other what if analysis to provide a more thorough and robust evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of the alternatives in differing operational environments and when employment situations change. 4.5 Effectiveness Analysis Results Presentation Once the effectiveness analysis has been completed, the most important task for the team is to provide a concise, cogent, and clear picture of the effectiveness of each alternative in relation to the requirements. The team must determine how to convey the critical information learned. In most AoAs, this is an art form far more than a science and requires serious operational and military judgment. One method to do this (similar to the figure below) is to present the values for the measures of each alternative using a color scheme indicating how well each measure was accomplished. This is only one example which may not be suitable in each case; particularly if the analysis included numerous measures. If a presentation such as this is used, a methodology needs to be developed to map measured values to the colors displayed. Any method chosen; however, should map measure values in relation to the threshold value and associated changes in military utility and reduction in the gaps – not in relation to one another. As discussed in section 4.1 above, OAS discourages roll-up, aggregation, and weighting schemes that tend to mask important information and potentially provide misleading results. Therefore, for studies with an abundant amount of measures information, a balance must be achieved between providing credible results with sufficient clarity and overwhelming or confusing the audience. 58 Figure 4-4: Effectiveness Analysis Results Presentation 59 5 Performing Cost Analysis 5.1 General Cost Estimating Generally, cost estimates are required for government acquisition programs, as they are used to support funding decisions. Developing a sound cost estimate requires stable program requirements, access to detailed documentation and historical data, and well-trained, experienced cost analysts. Cost estimating combines concepts from such disciplines as accounting, budgeting, economics, engineering, mathematics, and statistics. Establishing realistic estimates for projected costs supports effective resource allocation and increases the probability of a program’s success. In addition, cost estimates are used to develop annual budget requests, evaluate resource requirements at key decision points, and to develop performance measurement baselines. Cost estimating is defined as the process of collecting and analyzing historical data and applying quantitative models, techniques, and tools to predict the future cost of an item, product, program, or task. Cost estimating is an integral part of the AoA and is used to support the following activities: Evaluating program or sponsor viability, structure, and resource requirements Supporting a program’s or sponsor’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process (PPBE) Predicting future costs based on known historical technology and manpower requirements Evaluating alternative courses of action Supporting milestone decisions and reviews Forming the basis for budget requests to Congress 5.2 AoA Cost Estimating The Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) includes more than just the procurement cost of the system. Although procurement cost is important, it is often not the largest portion of the overall cost of an alternative. The LCCE can provide the following insights to inform acquisition decisions: Total cost to the Federal Government (to the U.S. treasury) of developing, procuring, fielding, and sustaining operations for each alternative for its expected life cycle The annual breakdown of costs expected for the alternative by funding categories (e.g. 3300 Military Construction, 3400 O & M, 3500 Military Personnel, 3600 RDT&E, etc.) Trade-off analysis/Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) to identify solutions that, given a fixed cost, provide the greatest (may be less than 100% solution) capability (CAIV is discussed in paragraph 5.5.4 below) The cost drivers of alternatives (i.e., those items having the greatest impact on the overall costs) 60 Cost of enablers and operational support for the capability being evaluated Estimated life cycle costs that represent what is necessary to deliver the predicted operational effectiveness for each alternative Projected costs associated with various operational, basing, fielding, or programmatic decisions expected for each alternative evaluated Uncertainty and risk associated with the cost estimate It is critical that all cost estimates included in AoAs be credible and clearly documented. Table 5-1 describes characteristics of credible cost estimates from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Cost Estimating guide. This guide has been referenced in several recent reports to Congress on how to improve DoD’s acquisition process. It is provided to help study teams understand what is necessary to produce credible cost estimates. Table 5-1: GAO’s Basic Characteristics of Credible Cost Estimates Characteristic Clear identification of task Broad participation in preparing estimates Description Estimator must be provided with the system description, ground rules and assumptions, and technical and performance characteristics. Estimate’s constraints and conditions must be clearly identified to ensure the preparation of a well-documented estimate All stakeholders should be involved in deciding mission need and requirements and in defining system parameters and other characteristics Availability of valid data Numerous sources of suitable, relevant, and available data should be used from similar systems to project costs of new systems; these data should be directly related to the system’s performance characteristics Standardized structure for the estimate A standard work breakdown structure, as detailed as possible, should be used. It should be refined as the cost estimate matures and the system becomes more defined. The work breakdown structure ensures that no portions of the estimate are omitted and allows comparisons to similar systems and programs Provision for program uncertainties Uncertainties should be identified and allowance developed to cover the cost effect 61 Recognition of inflation The estimator should ensure that economic changes, such as inflation, are properly and realistically reflected in the life cycle cost estimate Recognition of excluded costs All costs associated with a system should be included; any excluded costs should be disclosed and given a rationale Independent review of estimates Conducting an independent review of an estimate is crucial to establishing confidence in the estimate; the independent reviewer should verify, modify, and correct an estimate to ensure realism, completeness, and consistency The life cycle cost in an AoA captures the total cost of each alternative over its expected life and includes costs incurred for research and development, investment, operations and support, and end of life disposal. Sunk costs (funds already spent or obligated) are not included in the LCCEs; however, they may be of interest to decision makers and should be identified separately. All AoA LCCEs are based on peacetime operations and do not include any warrelated costs such as replacement of expended or destroyed assets or increased costs associated with wartime operational tempo. The study team should determine what is included in peacetime operations and what is included in contingency operations. For example, airlift operations during peacetime may entail scheduled flights in commercial airspace and operating at various established commercial and military airfields. On the other hand, some Special Operations missions during peacetime may appear to be contingency operations, such as flying limited sorties into areas not serviced by commercial airspace and landing in unimproved areas. It will be the study team’s responsibility to determine where the defining line between peacetime and contingency operations falls for their study, and to obtain WIPT, SRG, SAG, and AFROC concurrence with this critical assumption. 5.3 Life Cycle Cost Considerations 5.3.1 Sunk Costs Sunk costs are those that either already occurred or will be incurred before the AoA can inform any decisions on their expenditure. The best method of determining the cut off for sunk costs is to use the fiscal year in which the AoA is to be completed. Any costs that are expected to be incurred after that fiscal year should be included in the AoA LCCEs. 62 5.3.2 Research and Development (R&D) Costs The costs of all R&D phases, including Advanced Technology Demonstration (including Concept Development), Technology Development, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development, are included in this cost element. There are many types of R&D costs: prototypes, engineering development, equipment, test hardware, contractor system test and evaluation, and government support to the test program. Engineering costs for environmental safety, supportability, reliability, and maintainability efforts are also included, as are support equipment, training, and data acquisition supporting R&D efforts. 5.3.3 Investment Costs The cost of investment (low rate initial production, full rate production, and fielding) includes the cost of procuring the prime mission equipment and its support. This includes training, data, initial spares, support equipment, integration, pre-planned product improvement (P3I) items, and military construction (MILCON). MILCON cost is the cost of acquisition, construction, or modification of facilities (barracks, mess halls, maintenance bays, hangers, training facilities, etc.) necessary to accommodate an alternative. The disposal of this infrastructure should be captured in the disposal costs (discussed in paragraph 5.3.5). The cost of all related procurement (including transportation, training, support equipment, etc.) is included in the investment phase. 5.3.4 Operations and Support (O&S) Costs O&S costs are those program costs necessary to operate, maintain, and support system capability through its operational life. These costs include all direct and indirect elements of a defense program and encompass costs for personnel, consumable and repairable materiel, and all appropriate levels of maintenance, facilities, and sustaining investment. Manpower estimates should be consistent with the Manpower Estimate Report (MER), which is produced by the operating command’s manpower office. For more information, refer to the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group's Operations and Support Cost Estimating Guide, October 2007. 5.3.5 Disposal Costs Disposal costs represent the cost of removing excess or surplus property (to include MILCON) or materiel from the inventory. It may include costs of demilitarization, detoxification, divestiture, demolition, redistribution, transfer, donation, sales, salvage, destruction, or long term storage. It may also reflect the costs of hazardous waste disposition of storage and environmental cleanup. Disposal costs may occur during any phase of the acquisition cycle. If during development or testing some form of environmentally unsafe materials are created, the costs to dispose of those materials are captured here. 63 5.3.6 Baseline Extension Costs The baseline is the existing, currently programmed system funded and operated according to current plans. Baseline extension costs are those costs associated with maintaining the current capabilities (i.e., the baseline alternative) through the life cycle identified in the study. Only improvements that are included in the POM are part of the baseline. This may require Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) efforts, additional procurement, additional maintenance, or other efforts to continue to provide the baseline level of capability. Capabilities that may be provided by other alternatives but are not provided by the baseline alternative should be addressed as continued shortfalls in the baseline capability. For other study alternatives, these costs must be continued until such time as an alternative providing that additional capability is fielded and operational (Full Operational Capability (FOC), which will be based upon the study assumptions). 5.3.7 Life Cycle Time Frame The cost of each alternative (baseline and all proposed alternatives) must be evaluated for the same life cycle time frame. The time frame should span from the end of the AoA to the end of the life cycle as defined in the study (e.g., 20 year life cycle). This allows for a fair comparison of each alternative and may require service life extension efforts for other alternative (including the baseline) with expected shorter useful lives or the calculation of residual values for alternatives that may continue to provide capability past the study cut off dates. It is important estimate the costs associated with providing a capability (albeit possibly at different levels for different alternatives) for the same period of time. Figure 5-1 below illustrates the concept of comparing all alternatives across the same life cycle. In this example all alternatives provide their evaluated capability from FY02 through FY38. The assumption is that alternative 1 has the longest life and ends its useful life (and incurs disposal costs) in FY38. Each alternative has a different Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date where it becomes an operational asset and requires at least one Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) effort during its life. Alternative 2 may have some residual value at the end of the analysis time frame which should be included in the LCCE. The baseline alternative is shown incurring costs until such time as its capabilities are replaced by the new alternatives. There will likely be a ramp-down in baseline costs from IOC to FOC for each new alternative along with a corresponding ramp-up of alternative operational costs for the alternative being evaluated. 64 Figure 5-1: Comparing All Alternatives Across the Same Life Cycle 5.3.8 Pre-fielding Costs Pre-fielding costs are those associated with maintaining the capabilities being analyzed in the AoA until a specific alternative can be fielded to provide them. Pre-fielding costs must include the costs of maintaining the current baseline alternative (or capability) until such time as the other alternatives can be fielded (FOC). There may be ramp-up of new alternatives and a corresponding ramp-down of baseline capabilities from IOC to FOC depending on the study and its assumptions. 5.4 Cost Analysis Responsibility The working group created to evaluate costs for an AoA should be led by a government cost analyst (also referred to as cost estimator in this handbook) familiar with the type of capability being studied. This group should also include representatives from operating and implementing command organizations (stakeholders) with expertise in cost analysis and knowledge of the system alternatives. Additionally, other specialists can assist the team in assessing the cost implications of enablers (e.g., logisticians, intelligence analysts, Human Systems Integration practitioners, and communications specialists). OAS will serve as an advisor and assist the cost team throughout the AoA. As one of its first official duties, the cost analysis working group should request support from the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA). Specifically, this support should include AFCAA participation in the cost analysis working group, review and 65 validation of the methodologies, and an independent review of the final cost estimates. In response to this request, AFCAA may provide a representative to support the working group in developing the cost analysis methodology. If not possible, AFCAA should respond to the team’s request and identify what, if any, involvement they will have in the AoA. Their involvement may include providing regulatory guidance, reviewing and approving proposed cost analysis methodologies, and performing a sufficiency review, which is a form of NonAdvocate Cost Assessment (NACA), per AFPD 65-5 (August 2008). The cost group is responsible for the following cost analysis tasks: Request AFCAA support for the cost analysis Identify key cost analysis team support (stakeholders, modelers, etc.) requirements Develop appropriate cost analysis ground rules and assumptions and ensure they are consistent with other ground rules and assumptions in the study Develop the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) to be used in the cost analysis; the WBS is a hierarchical organization of the items to be costed Develop cost analysis approaches and methodologies Locate and determine the suitability and availability of cost models and data required Define the enabling (logistics, intelligence, Human Systems Integration, etc.) elements necessary to create the cost analysis Prepare point estimates and confidence ranges for the baseline and each viable alternative, as determined by the screening process Bound the LCCE point estimates with uncertainty ranges (or cumulative distribution functions) specifically identifying the 50th and 80th percentile points Document the cost analysis so that a qualified cost analyst can reconstruct the estimate using only the documentation and references provided in the final report Crosscheck the estimates to ensure the methodology and the ground rules and assumptions are consistent across all alternatives and that the LCCE is complete Include programmatic data in the cost analyses documentation, such as quantities and delivery schedules (whether known or developed by the cost team) Identify cost drivers (those elements to which estimates are most sensitive to changing) and perform sensitivity analyses on significant cost drivers demonstrating the impact of changing assumptions on the overall LCCE Coordinate with the effectiveness analysis working group to evaluate and identify any possible relationships between cost drivers and aspects of the alternatives that may drive capability delivery Address any funding and affordability constraints and specify schedule limitations Assuming such constraints are identified, provide necessary cost data to perform CAIV analyses Provide support to Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) for an affordability assessment of the alternatives’ impact on the entire mission area in accordance with DAG Section 3.2. 66 Present all costs in base-year dollars (BY$) and then-year dollars (TY$) Identify and use of the appropriate inflation indices for use in creating TY$ estimates (the most current OSD indices are published on the SAF/FMC web page) Separately identify sunk costs for each alternative Address manpower implications (government and contract manpower) to include all costs with employing each person for each alternative in the O&S cost Address appropriate environmental regulations, treaties, risk mitigation, etc. in determining disposal costs Address sources that are driving cost risk and uncertainty for each alternative and provide mitigation plans where possible Write cost section of the study plan, final report, and review group (WIPT, SRG, AFROC, etc.) briefings Participate in the alternative comparison and risk analysis efforts to ensure LCCE data is appropriately used and interpreted 5.5 Cost Analysis Methodology Cost analysis allows alternatives to be compared to the baseline system using their relative estimated costs. The cost methodologies to be used are initially outlined in the study plan and updated as the AoA proceeds. A recommended approach for structuring the LCCE process during AoAs is outlined in Table 2 (“The Twelve Steps of a High-Quality Cost Estimating Process”) of the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO CEAG), March 2009 (See Appendix M). This guides cost estimators of all levels of experience in developing the LCCE. The cost analysis group will use the same general work breakdown structure (WBS) to compute cost estimates for all viable alternatives. See Section 5.5.1 for a description of WBS. The level of alternative description available and the fidelity of the cost estimate will vary depending on the detail of alternative definition and its technological maturity. The definition of each alternative in the CCTD will serve as the foundation for the cost, effectiveness, and risk analysis efforts during the AoA. It is crucial that the same version of the CCTD be used as the basis for all analysis. As part of the cost methodology, the AoA study plan should identify general cost ground rules and assumptions underlying the analysis (for example: all maintenance will be provided with military personnel) as well as those specific to particular cost elements or life cycle phases (for example: System Engineering/Project Management (SEPM) will be estimated at 5% of green aircraft cost). At a minimum, the preliminary list of cost ground rules and assumptions should address the following: Cost basis of the estimate (specified in BY$) Duration (years) alternatives are to be operational (life cycle) for costing purposes Specific inflation indices used (OSD unless otherwise justified) 67 Definition of sunk costs (date separating costs expended or contractually committed from those to be included in the estimate) Schedule issues, including major milestones and significant events (IOC and FOC dates, production schedules and quantities) Basing, logistics, and maintenance concepts for each alternative Fully Burdened Cost of Energy(FBCE) MILCON requirements Intelligence, Human Systems Integration, and other enabler support requirements Environmental costs Personnel requirements and constraints Affordability constraints 5.5.1 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) The cost estimating methodology is generally based on a WBS. A WBS is a product-oriented (as opposed to functionally-oriented) tree composed of hardware, software, services, data, and facilities that define the product to be developed and produced. The following is a notional WBS for an aircraft system; it illustrates the typical elements found at the first three WBS levels (succeeding levels contain greater detail). Aircraft System Air Vehicle Airframe Propulsion Air vehicle software Armament Weapons delivery Systems Engineering and Program Management (no Level 3 breakdown) System Test & Evaluation (T&E) Development T&E Operational T&E T&E support Test facilities Training Equipment Services Facilities Data Technical publications Engineering data Management data Support data 68 Peculiar Support Equipment Test & measurement equipment Support & handling equipment Common Support Equipment Test and measurement equipment Support and handling equipment Operational/Site Activation System assembly, installation and checkout Contractor technical support Site construction Industrial Facilities Construction, conversion, or expansion Equipment acquisition or modernization Maintenance (industrial facilities) Initial Spares and Repair Parts (no Level 3 breakdown) Once the WBS has been created, cost estimates are collected for the WBS elements and then used to develop an overall point estimate for each alternative. It is recommended that study teams include a WBS to at least level 3 in their AoA study plans. This demonstrates to decision makers that the team understands each alternative. The CCTD is the best source of information to use in developing the WBS. Although the CCTD may not be complete when the study plan development effort begins, there should be enough information available to initiate development of the level 3 WBS. Each alternative’s WBS will be further defined and lower levels added during the analysis. For further information on WBS, refer to MIL-STD-881 Revision C, Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel Items (3 October 2011). 5.5.2 Cost Estimating Methodologies Once the cost estimating team has developed the WBS, the next step is to determine how to develop cost estimates for each element of the WBS. These individual estimates will form the basis of the overall point estimate. There are multiple cost estimating methods available which span the Acquisition Life Cycle to facilitate the cost estimating process. Depending on project scope, estimate purpose, project maturity, and availability of cost estimating resources, the estimator may use one, or a combination, of these techniques. Generally speaking, the estimating team should identify an overarching methodology that will frame the entire estimating effort, and also identify the specific methodology that is most appropriate for estimating each individual WBS element. As the level of project definition increases, the estimating methodology tends to progress from conceptual techniques to deterministic and definitive techniques. The cost team must choose the appropriate methodology which applies to where the program 69 or effort is in its life cycle. Early in the program, definitions maybe somewhat limited and actual costs may not have been accrued. Once a program is in production, cost and technical data from the development phase can be used to estimate the remainder of the program. DoD 5000.4‐M, Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) Manual, identifies five analytical cost estimating methods and techniques commonly used to develop cost estimates for DoD acquisition systems: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Analogy Engineering build‐up Parametric Extrapolation from actual costs Expert opinion For definitions and explanations for analogy, engineering build-up and parameter methods refer to Appendix N which is an excerpt from Chapter 11 in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Table 5-2 compares the most common cost estimating methods: 9999 70 Further information or details in applying any of these methods can be obtained through discussions with the Office of Aerospace Studies or by consulting the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (March 2009). 5.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis Sensitivity analysis reveals how the cost estimate is affected by changes in assumptions, ground rules, and cost drivers. The cost estimator must examine the effect of changing one assumption, ground rule, or cost driver at a time while holding all other variables constant. By doing so, it is easier to understand which variable most affects the cost estimate. In some cases, a sensitivity analysis can be conducted to examine the effect of multiple assumptions changing in relation to a specific scenario. Since estimates are built on a number of predicted technologies and assumptions, it is necessary to determine the sensitivity of the cost elements to changes in assumptions, ground rules, and cost drivers. If possible, cost estimators should quantify the risks they identify. This can be done through both a sensitivity analysis and an uncertainty analysis (discussed in the paragraph 5.3.5). Uncertainty about the values of some, if not most, of the technical parameters is common early in an alternative’s design and development. Many assumptions made at the start of a study may prove to be inaccurate. Therefore, once the point estimate has been developed, it is important to determine how sensitive the total cost estimate is to changes in the study assumptions, ground rules, and cost drivers. 5.5.3.1 Sensitivity Factors Some factors that are often varied in a sensitivity analysis are: Duration of life cycle Volume, mix, or pattern of workload Threshold/objective criteria Operational requirements Hardware, software, or facilities configurations Assumptions about program operations, fielding strategy, inflation rate, technology heritage savings, and development time Learning curves Performance characteristics Testing requirements Acquisition strategy (multiyear procurement, dual sourcing, etc.) Labor rates Software lines of code or amount of software reuse 71 Scope of the program Manpower levels and personnel types Occupational health issues Quantity planned for procurement Purchase schedule Many of these are usually cost drivers in AoAs and are responsible for sizable changes in early cost estimates. 5.5.3.2 Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) CAIV is one of the most common types of sensitivity analysis. CAIV is a technique for varying the expected cost of the alternative(s) and changing performance and schedule to determine the impact of funding limitations. This technique allows the cost team to perform “what if” analysis with funding levels even before such levels have been determined or included in budgets. It is good practice for the cost team to fluctuate the point estimate they have developed by decrements (for example, 0, 10, and 25 percent) and then, with the alternative development team, derive the number of units, performance characteristics, and schedules that such reduced funding levels would represent. It is likely this effort will identify a point at which it is not advisable to proceed with one or more alternatives. These results can provide important information to the decision maker. There are no set levels which the cost should be fluctuated, nor are there any set formats for displaying this information. Table 5-4 shows a recommended way to display CAIV results in the AoA; however, teams may have other methods that provide greater insights. 72 Table 5-2: Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) 5.5.4 Cost Models and Data Cost models incorporating the five methodologies are available to assist the cost analyst in developing the LCC estimates. The models and data intended for use in the AoA should be identified and described in the study plan. Cost models and data generally accepted by the Air Force cost analysis community should be used. AFCAA and CAPE can provide a comprehensive list of acceptable cost models and databases. Cost models frequently used include: ACEIT (integrated) COCOMO (software) CRYSTAL BALL (risk) LSC (logistics) SEER (software/hardware) SEM (software) 73 PRICE-H (hardware) PRICE-S (software) 5.5.5 Cost Risk and Uncertainty Because the LCCEs may be used as estimates for future program costs, it is important to determine the amount of uncertainty associated with the estimate. For example, data from the past may not always be relevant in the future, because new manufacturing processes may change a learning curve slope or new composite materials may change the relationship between weight and cost. Moreover, a cost estimate is usually composed of many lower-level WBS elements, each of which comes with its own source of error. Once these elements are added together, the resulting cost estimate can contain a great deal of uncertainty. 5.5.5.1 The Difference Between Risk and Uncertainty (GAO-09-3SP, GAO Cost Estimating Guide) Risk and uncertainty refer to the fact that because a cost estimate is a forecast, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate. Moreover, lack of knowledge about the future is only one possible reason for the difference. Another equally important reason is the error resulting from historical data inconsistencies, assumptions, cost estimating equations, and factors typically used to develop an estimate. In addition, biases are often found in estimating program costs and developing program schedules. The biases may be cognitive—often based on estimators’ inexperience—or motivational, where management intentionally reduces the estimate or shortens the schedule to make the project look good to stakeholders. Recognizing the potential for error, and deciding how best to quantify it, is the purpose of both risk and uncertainty analysis. It is inaccurate to add up the most likely WBS elements to derive a program cost estimate, since their sum is not usually the most likely estimate for the total program, even if they are estimated without bias. Quantifying risk and uncertainty is a cost estimating Best Practice addressed in many guides and references. DOD specifically directs that uncertainty be identified and quantified. The Clinger-Cohen Act requires agencies to assess and manage the risks of major information systems, including the application of the risk-adjusted return on investment criterion in deciding whether to undertake particular investments. While risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably, in statistics their definitions are distinct: 74 • • Risk is the chance of loss or injury. In a situation that includes favorable and unfavorable events, risk is the probability that an unfavorable event will occur. Uncertainty is the indefiniteness about the outcome of a situation. It is assessed in cost estimate models to estimate the risk (or probability) that a specific funding level will be exceeded. Therefore, while both risk and uncertainty can affect a program’s cost estimate, enough data will never be available in most situations to develop a known frequency distribution. Cost estimating is analyzed more often for uncertainty than risk, although many textbooks use both terms to describe the effort. 5.5.5.2 Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are often used in early analysis to determine potential costs, uncertainties, and risks. However, given the early stages of some alternative development there may not be credible TRL scores available. Table 5-5 from the 2003 Society of Cost Estimating Analysis (SCEA) “Cost Risk Analysis” paper may be of some assistance in identifying the risk areas associated with technology and hardware components of alternatives. Using the risk category (relates somewhat to phase of the life cycle) and the descriptors of the current state of the alternative or subsystem, a risk score (0-10) can be assigned which will help to identify relative risks amongst alternatives. For example, in the Technology Development phase of the life cycle (roughly equivalent to “Technology advancement” in the table) since the alternative being considered represents the state of the art (i.e., being used today) then the risk of requiring significant investment dollars for R&D would be low (or “0” in the table). On the other hand, in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase (roughly equivalent to “Engineering development” in the table) since the alternative has only a concept defined, the risk of having to invest sizable amounts of funding into development and testing of that concept is high (or “10” in the table). This is provided as a tool to help teams evaluate potential cost risks and uncertainty as they apply to AoA alternatives, other methods may be appropriate as well. Table 5-3: A Hardware Risk Scoring Matrix Risk score: 0 = low, 5 = medium, 10 = high Risk category 0 1–2 3–5 6–8 9–10 1. Technology Completed, advancement state of the art Minimum advancement required Modest advancement required Significant advancement required New technology 2. Engineering Completed, fully development tested Prototype Hardware and software development Detailed design Concept defined 3. Reliability Historically high on similar Modest problems known Serious problems known Unknown Historically high for same system 75 Systems 4. Producibility Production and yield shown on same system Production and yield shown on similar system Production and yield feasible Production feasible and yield problems No known production experience 5. Alternative item Exists or availability on other items not important Exists or availability on other items somewhat important Potential alternative in development Potential alternative in design Alternative does not exist and is required 6. Schedule Easily achieved Achievable Somewhat challenging Challenging Very challenging Source: © 2003, Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA), “Cost Risk Analysis.” 5.5.5.3 Software Cost Risk Another source of cost risk to alternatives is software development, modification, and integration. These aspects are evaluated in a similar fashion as hardware described in the previous section. Table 5-6 is a guide to make sure that estimates reflect what we know and what we don’t know about the development effort required for the software piece of the estimate. Like other sources of risk this needs to be addressed in the LCCE. Table 5.6, Software Scoring Matrix, was developed by the Air Force and published in the GAO Cost Estimating Guide. This guide helps the study team decide where the software cost risk is prevalent. As an example of how to use the Software Risk Scoring Matrix, a subject matter expert (SME) would determine whether the Design Engineering is scored as “0” (Design complete and validated) or as high as “10” (Requirements are partly designed). Table 5-4: A Software Risk Scoring Matrix Risk score: 0 = low, 5 = medium, 10 = high 1–2 3–5 6–8 Risk category 0 1. Technology Advancement Proven conventional analytic approach, standard methods Undemonstrated conventional approach, standard methods Emerging approaches, new applications Unconventional approach, concept in development Unconventional approach, concept unproven 2. Design Engineering Design complete and validated Specifications defined and validated Specifications defined Requirements defined Requirements partly defined 3. Coding Fully integrated code available and validated Fully integrated code available Modules integrated Modules exist but not integrated Wholly new design, no modules exist 4. Integrated Thousands of instructions Tens of thousands of instructions Hundreds of thousands of instructions Millions of instructions Tens of millions of instructions 76 9–10 5. Testing Tested with system Tested by simulation Structured walk-throughs conducted Modules tested but not as a system Untested modules 6. Alternatives Alternatives exist; alternative design not important Alternatives exist; design somewhat important Potential for alternatives in development Potential alternatives being considered Alternative does not exist but is required Modest schedule, few concurrent activities, review cycle reasonable Modest schedule, many concurrent activities, occasional reviews, late first review Fast track on schedule, many concurrent activities Fast track, missed milestones, review at demonstrations only, no periodic reviews 7. Schedule and Relaxed management schedule, serial activities, high review cycle frequency, early first review Source: U.S. Air Force. 5.6 Cost Results Presentation The format illustrated in Figure 5-2 is used to display the AoA cost analysis results; it allows the costs for each alternative and LCC element to be directly compared. This format can be used to present both Base Year (BY$) and Then Year (TY$) costs. Figure 5-2: Cost by fiscal year and appropriation Figure 5-3 presents each alternative's cost in terms of fiscal year spread and appropriation. Again, this format can be used for both BY$ and TY$. The results should be graphically displayed for presentation. Notice sunk costs are excluded from the estimates in both examples. 77 Figure 5-3: General LCC Summary (By Alternative) 5.7 Cost Documentation A complete set of cost documentation is an essential part of the AoA cost analysis. Without an explanation of the data sources and methodology used for each element of the estimates, the costs cannot be replicated and therefore may lack credibility. Chapter 3 of AFI 65-508, Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures, provides guidance on the level of documentation required. Attachment 5 to the same instruction contains a cost documentation checklist useful in determining the completeness of the cost documentation. 5.7.1 Tradespace Analysis during Alternative Comparison Once the team determines the format and data requirements for use in developing tradespace analysis during the alternative comparison phase of the study, cost analysis inputs will need to be developed to feed that process. The actual format of the data required will vary from study to study, so it will be incumbent upon the Study Director to identify both the cost and effectiveness data required for production of the tradespace analysis early to make the analysis useful. Refer to chapter 8 for more detail. 5.7.2 Cost Reviews The AoA study team reviews the cost estimates for consistency and completeness. OAS also reviews the cost section of the study plan and the final results as part of the overall AoA 78 assessment provided to the AFROC. Recent GAO reviews and AFROC requests have reinforced the preference for an independent review of the cost estimates. This review should be performed by an organization which has not been involved in creating the estimate. All AoAs, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level or Joint Staffing Designator (JSD), should have their cost analyses independently reviewed at the end of the study. An AFCAA independent review is the most desirable as it is the most robust and includes a sufficiency memorandum. However, resources realities and priorities mean AFCAA is not always able to perform the independent review of all AoAs. When AFCAA is unable to provide a complete independent review, the team needs to identify the level of independent review they can achieve. The recommended process for obtaining an independent review of an AoA study cost analyses is as follows: 1. Study Directors must contact AFCAA and determine if they will conduct the independent review. This is best done by the lead command sending a memorandum to AFCAA requesting they participate in the study and conduct the independent review. If AFCAA can provide this support, they will be included as part of the Cost Analysis Working Group (CAWG) and allowed to provide real-time assistance and guidance in order to shorten the “review” process at the completion of the study. 2. If AFCAA is not able to conduct the review they still may be willing to participate in the cost methodology development and planning, but not commit to the more formal independent review. 3. Once the level of AFCAA participation is known, the study team needs to consider their need to approach another organization to do the independent review. The options may include OAS, Product Center Financial Management (FM) office or a MAJCOM FM. The “correct” choice will be based in part upon issues of independence and resource availability. In Joint AoAs it may even be an appropriate financial management office from another Service or Agency. 4. In the absence of a government led independent review, Study Directors may choose to find a contractor organization to perform the review. 5. In all cases in which AFCAA is not able to perform the sufficiency/non-advocate reviews, the sufficiency review will only address the sufficiency and completeness of the costing. It is not considered a Service Cost Position (SCP), as only the Service Cost Agency can certify a SCP. 79 6 Performing the Risk Analysis In addition to analyzing the operational effectiveness and life cycle cost, the study team examines the risks associated with the various alternatives using the Risk Assessment Framework (RAF). The RAF is a scalable Air Force enterprise-wide risk assessment approach that fosters consistency and uniformity in the use of risk-related terminology within and across the Air Force. The RAF is linked to the Chairman’s Risk Assessment definitions and the CJCS Integrated Risk Matrix. This chapter provides a brief overview of the RAF to help study teams identify and rate risks associated with the alternatives. This risk assessment does not address the risks of conducting the AoA, these risks are addressed in Section 3.3. The application of RAF to the AoA is new and requires more definition. OAS is exploring approaches to develop the implementation methodology of RAF to the AoA. More explicit details regarding how to use the RAF will be provided in future materials. 6.1 Risk Assessment Framework The RAF provides a structured way for identifying and translating risks into a consistent and comparable format. The RAF is based on a tree structure where the base of the tree represents the aggregation of Service Core Functional objectives. Branches of the tree connect to nodes representing activities that are vital to the accomplishment of the objectives. Finally, the activities are connected to metrics that are designed to measure resource, schedule, or other performance factors that impact the activities. The following describes how risk assessments are accomplished up to the activity level. A similar assessment approach is used for levels above the activity level (see the HAF/A9 website on the Air Force portal for additional details). The RAF requires development of metrics with specific threshold values to assess risk. The metrics are associated with activities that are impacted by resource, schedule, or other performance factors as measured by the risk metrics. In the AoA, the activities may be associated with the capability gaps, mission tasks, or measures of effectiveness and suitability. Each risk metric for an activity is defined with two points (typically the success and failure endpoints) and successive levels between the two endpoints. The lowest point of risk for a metric is set such that the activity is assured of success as far as that metric is concerned. In other words, no additional improvement in that metric will increase the activity’s chance of success. Similarly, the highest point of risk for a metric is set such that the activity is assured to fail as a result of the critical factor associated with that metric. In other words, no degradation in that metric will worsen the activity’s chance of failure. In between the low and high risk points, there are thresholds marking risk assessment transitions from low to moderate to significant to high (see Figure 6-1). 80 Once the metrics have been defined, the study team can use various techniques such as professional military judgment, modeling and simulation, and data analysis to determine the risk rating. The analysis is conducted to determine where on the scale the particular metric falls for any given time frame and set of scenarios. The study team should explore the impact of changes to assumptions, criteria, scenarios, force structures, and time frames on the risk ratings. Those changes should be highlighted when discussing the results. The AoA risk assessment should address the following questions: What defines success and failure in the scenario context? This should build upon the operational effectiveness analysis results. o Which scenarios, timeframes, and force structure assumptions were used? o How were the success and failure points determined for each scenario/timeframe, etc.? What is being done or recommended in the future to mitigate the identified risks? o For operational – answer how well the gap can be mitigated by each alternative and to what level the operational risk is reduced. This enables decision makers to determine if that is an acceptable level. o For schedule and technical/manufacturing - identify mitigation strategies that should be considered if there is a follow-on acquisition. Using the metrics associated with each activity, the study team assesses the risk level for each activity as low, moderate, significant, or high (see Figure 6-1). Typically, the risk assessment of the activity is the same as the highest (worst) risk for the supporting metrics. If the worst-case is not appropriate, professional military judgment may be applied, but the rationale should be explained. Figure 6-1: Standard Air Force Risk Scale Definitions Presentation of the risk assessment results is expected to utilize a common format risk statement. A risk statement is required for each of the risks identified during the risk assessment. The study team will also need to identify the scenario(s), timeline(s) and force 81 structure(s) utilized for the AoA and their relationship to the identified risk element. The format for the risk statement is: “According to (organization), the (type) risk of (activity) is (assessment) with an (analytical rigor level) for (context/timeframe/force structure) assuming (mitigation measures/authority).” The key terms in the risk statement are defined as follows: Organization - organization accomplishing the risk assessment (study team) Type of risk – Operational, schedule, or technology/manufacturing (see Section 6.2 for definitions of these risks) Activity – actions that are impacted by resource, schedule, or other performance factors as measured by the risk metrics (for AoAs, activities could be associated with the capability gaps, mission tasks, or measures) Assessment - defined risk levels of low, moderate, significant, and high (See Figure 6-1 for risk level definitions). This is done for each of the risks associated with each activity. Each activity’s assessment will be the same as the highest (worst) risk assessed for supporting metric. If the “worst-case” risk level is not appropriate for the activity, professional military judgment may be applied but must be documented and substantiated for traceability and defensibility. This is usually the situation for AoAs due to the limited knowledge about the alternatives and risks at this point in the process. Analytic Rigor Level - gives leadership a quick understanding of how well the assessment embodies the desired attributes (defendable, measurable, repeatable, traceable, linkable, implementable, scalable, and incorporates military judgment). Each activity’s analytic rigor level will be set at the lowest rigor level of the metrics driving the activity level risk assessment. Levels 1-3 are the most appropriate for an AoA. The assessment levels are defined as: o Level 1 - findings are based heavily on subject matter expertise. The assessment process was not documented and lacks a tree structure and metrics. As a result, a different set of subject matter experts could reasonably develop different results. o Level 2 - assessment has limited structure. Discrete metrics are in place prior to execution of the assessment. There is some ability to trace metrics to the core function risk assessments via a tree structure. o Level 3 - assessment process has a fully developed tree structure. There is a traceable understanding of the linkages between vital objectives, activities and metrics that compose the assessment. o Level 4 - maximum level achievable to support an AFROC Risk Assessment. Prior to the assessment, fully defensible linkages between the assessed metrics and user (planning requirements) have been presented to the “Assessment Requestor” for validation. Assessors have explored cross-functional mitigation options and have included results in their assessment. Metric assessments are conducted via documented and analytically rigorous methods. This level is rare for an AoA; it will only be used when the AoA results are combined with other 82 analysis results in order to depict findings across one or more Service Core Functions. Scenario - intended to provide additional information needed to specifically frame the environment that the activity is assessed. Timeframe - timeframe for each assessment must be provided in guidance since it will drive both friendly and hostile force assumptions. Force Structure - provides the force structure assumption behind the assessment (e.g., programmed force or programmed force extended). Mitigation/Measures/Authority - identifies mitigation actions already taken or assumed across the areas of DOTMLPF-P by the organization making the assessment. This information is essential to aid decision makers in understanding what actions have been taken to date in order to best evaluate the situation and explore their risk management options. 6.2 Risk Identification Although many types of risks may exist (e.g., political, interoperability, etc.), senior decision makers expect, at a minimum, the following risk assessments to be conducted in the AoA: Operational risk assessment - the degree to which the operational risk associated with the specified gap could be mitigated if the alternative was implemented. Schedule and technology/manufacturing risk assessment - an assessment of the Technology Risk Levels (TRLs)/Manufacturing Risk Levels (MRLs) for an alternative’s critical technology elements (CTEs) which could impact the likelihood of delivering the required capability on schedule and within budget. The following lists some areas for the study team to consider when identifying operational, schedule, and technology/manufacturing risks: Determine operational impact, if any, of revised thresholds based on effectiveness analysis sensitivity analysis. In other words, does the threshold value need further adjustment based on the risk identified? Consider what might happen if changes in threat capabilities evolve either before, or in response to our fielding a potential alternative Examine current and proposed IOC/FOC schedules, design, suppliers, operational employment, resources, dependencies, etc. Identify testing requirements and their impacts on the various alternative timelines. Analyze negative trends in the industry or suppliers Determine impact of interdependencies on other programs/efforts to provide the full capability needed to appropriately mitigate the specified gap 83 Determine the level of coalition force needed and probability of getting that support A “Best Practice” is to recognize that risk identification is the responsibility of every member of the AoA team, and should occur throughout the conduct of the study. The study team should consider the following when identifying sources of risk: Threat - The sensitivity of the alternatives to uncertainty in the threat description, the degree to which the alternative or its employment would have to change if the threat's parameters change, or the vulnerability of the alternative to foreign intelligence collection efforts (sensitivity to threat countermeasure). Test and Evaluation - The adequacy and capability of the test and evaluation process and community to assess attainment of performance parameters and determine whether the alternative is operationally effective, operationally suitable, and interoperable. [Note: this requires T&E membership on the study team.] Modeling and Simulation (M&S) - The adequacy and capability of M&S to support all life cycle phases of an alternative using verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations. Technology - The degree to which the technology proposed for the alternative has demonstrated sufficient maturity (TRL) to be realistically capable of providing the required capability. Logistics - The ability of the alternative’s support concepts to achieve the sustainment KPP thresholds based on the alternative technical description, maintenance concept, expected availability of support data and resources, and the ability of the associated maintenance concept to handle the expected workload. Concurrency - The sensitivity of the alternative to uncertainty resulting from the combining or overlapping of life cycle phases or activities. Industrial Capabilities - The degree to which the manufacturing/industrial base has demonstrated sufficient maturity (MRL) to be realistically capable of providing the required capability. Schedule - The sufficiency of the time allocated by the estimated schedule to deliver the required capability by IOC/FOC. Command and Control - The ability of the alternative to work within the existing C2 environment as well as the ability of alternatives being evaluated to perform C2 functions in the operational environment, if appropriate. Interoperability - The ability of alternatives being evaluated to work with existing or planned systems in the operational environment. This may be C2 interoperability, the ability to coordinate fires from another weapon system, or the ability of a new component in an existing system to operate with the remaining subsystems. CONOPS - The impact of various aspects of the operational concept for an alternative on its mission effectiveness. For example, will basing in certain areas impact targets held at risk? What risk does that represent in operational or political terms? 84 Intelligence - The ability of resources expected to be available at IOC/FOC to provide the intelligence data required by the alternative, in the right format, in a timely fashion to allow the alternative to function as envisioned. 6.3 Using Previous Analyses The completed CBA(s) or other analyses that identified the specific gaps to be analyzed in the AoA also should have identified the operational risk associated with not filling that gap. This information should be used as a starting point for determining risks associated with the alternatives. The information may also reduce the requirement for additional analysis to support the risk assessment. The following resources will aid in conducting the risk assessment: Chairman’s Risk Assessment CJCS Integrated Risk Matrix and associated AF/A9 Risk Assessment Framework (RAF) DoD Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook, July 2009 prepared by DDR&E. Defense Acquisition Guidebook Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition SAF/AQ Guidance Memorandum on Life Cycle Risk Management (as based on the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition) 85 1 2 7 Assessing Sustainability in the Analysis of Alternatives Study 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 7.1 Introduction Acquiring systems that are both effective in meeting mission requirements and sustainable at lower total ownership costs continues to be a top priority in the Air Force. Early decisions in the acquisition life cycle have long-term sustainability implications that impact costs and mission effectiveness. Since most of the life cycle costs of a program are locked-in early during the technology development phase, it is important to address sustainability early in the acquisition process. The early stages of the acquisition process provide the best opportunity to maximize potential sustainability and mission capability. Accordingly, sustainability should be addressed in the AoA study to ensure Air Force senior leaders make informed decisions that result in sustainable and effective systems that meet mission requirements. 7.2 What is Sustainability? Sustainability is a system’s capability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operations to achieve military objectives. Sustainability depends on ready forces, materiel, and consumables in enough quantities and working order to support military efforts. Sustainability encompasses a wide range of elements such as systems, spare parts, personnel, facilities, documentation, and data. Sustainability performance not only impacts mission capability, but is also a major factor that drives the life cycle cost of a system. Maintainability issues, for example, could considerably increase life cycle costs by increasing the number of maintainers needed to sustain a system in the field. In other situations, significant Human System Integration (HSI) issues may increase an operator’s workload or poor reliability performance could result in low operational availability. 7.3 Defining the Maintenance Concept and Product Support Strategy Defining how alternatives will be employed in the operational environment is an essential step in conducting the sustainability analysis in the AoA study. The concept of employment (CONEMP) for each alternative should be defined in the CCTD document and include descriptions of the projected maintenance concept and product support strategy. Given that the alternatives are primarily developmental or conceptual at this early stage of the life cycle, defining the maintenance concept and product support strategy can be challenging and may require the assistance of system engineers and acquisition logistics, maintenance, supply, and transportation 86 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 specialists. In some situations, the maintenance concept and product support strategy may be based on similar existing systems that are relevant to the alternatives being considered in the AoA study. In situations where the alternative systems are new concepts, there may not be any existing systems that are sufficiently similar to use in defining the maintenance concept and product support strategy. In these cases, assistance from system engineers and other logistics specialists to help define the maintenance concept and product support strategy is particularly important. The maintenance concept is a general description of the maintenance tasks required in support of a given system or equipment and the designation of the maintenance level for performing each task. The maintenance concept is eventually implemented through a Life Cycle Sustainment Plan. As an example, assume the “system” is a computer, with a CPU, keyboard, and mouse. The maintenance concept for this system is a two-level concept, organizational and depot. The organizational level maintenance will restore the computer to service by the removal and replacement of the Line Replaceable Units (LRU) (e.g., the CPU, mouse, and keyboard). The organizational level will forward the failed LRU to the depot for repair by removal or replacement of failed assemblies, subassemblies, or parts based on economic criteria (i.e., repair or discard). Product support consists of the management and technical activities and resources needed to implement the maintenance concept, and establish and maintain the readiness and operational capability of a weapon system, its subsystems, and its sustainment infrastructure. Product support encompasses materiel management, distribution, technical data management, maintenance, training, cataloging, configuration management, engineering support, repair parts management, failure reporting and analyses, and independent logistics assessments. Product support is implemented by the Performance-based Logistics (PBL) strategy which seeks to optimize system availability while minimizing cost and the logistics footprint. The PBL strategy should be tailored to fit the individual system in the intended operational environment for the duration of its projected service life. The PBL strategy defines performance in terms of military objectives using criteria such as operational availability, operational reliability, total cost, logistics footprint, and logistics response time. PBL applies to both retail (base or organizational level) logistics operations and wholesale (depot) logistics operations. While the provider of the support may be public, private, or a public-private partnership, the focus is to achieve maximum weapon system availability at the lowest Total Ownership Cost (TOC). 7.4 Sustainability Performance, Cost, and Risk Sustainability of materiel solutions should be analyzed in the AoA study in terms of performance, cost, and risk. The following provides key methodological insights into the analysis of sustainability with respect to performance, cost, and risk. More detailed information can be found in the reference sources listed at the end of this section. 87 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 7.4.1 Sustainability Performance Analysis The AoA study provides the analytic basis for establishing an initial set of performance measures associated with concepts of sustainability such as reliability, availability, and maintainability. These measures are referred to as measures of suitability (MOS) and are designed to measure a system’s capability to support mission accomplishment. MOS’s are essential for conducting the sustainability analysis and should address sustainability related performance requirements identified or implied in previous studies such as Capabilities-Based Assessments (CBAs) and requirements documents such as the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). The analyst should consider the sustainment concepts and attributes described in Table 7-1 in developing the MOSs. Table 7-1: Sustainability Concepts/Attributes Concept/ Attribute Description Availability A measure of the degree to which an item is in an operable and committable state at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at an unknown (random) time. (MILHDBK-502, 30 May 1997) Reliability The ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system. (AFI63-101, 8 April 2009) Maintainability The ability of an item to be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skills using prescribed procedures and resources at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. (AFI63-101, 8 April 2009) Deployability The inherent ability of resources to be moved, used, sustained, and recovered with ease, speed, and flexibility to meet mission requirements. (AFPAM63-128, 5 October 2009) Supportability The degree to which system design characteristics and planned logistics resources, including manpower, meet system peacetime readiness and wartime utilization requirements. (AFI63-101, 8 April 2009) Interoperability The ability of U.S. and coalition partner systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces, and the use the data, information, materiel, and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JCIDS Manual, 31 January 2011) Compatibility The capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Common types of compatibility include electrical, electromagnetic, human-systems interface, and physical. (Human Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide, USAF Human Systems Integration Office, September 2009) Transportability The capability of material to be moved by towing, self-propulsion, or carrier through any means such as railways, highways, waterways, pipelines, oceans, space, and airways. (Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010) Environment Air, water, land, space, cyberspace, markets, organizations, living things, built infrastructure, cultural resources, and the interrelationships that exist among them. 88 Environmental considerations may affect the concept of operations and requirements to protect systems from the environment and to protect the environment from system design, manufacturing, operations, sustainment, and disposal activities. (Human Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide, USAF Human Systems Integration Office, September 2009) 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 Human Systems Integration The integrated, comprehensive analysis, design and assessment of requirements, concepts and resources for system Manpower, Personnel, Training, Environment, Safety, Occupational Health, Habitability, Survivability and Human Factors. (AFI10-601) System Training All training methodologies (embedded, institutional, Mobile Training Team, computer, and web-based) that can be used to train and educate operator and maintainer personnel in the proper technical employment and repair of the equipment and components of a system and to educate and train the commanders and staffs in the doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing the system in operations and missions. (JCIDS Manual, 31 January 2011) Safety Promotes system design characteristics and procedures to minimize the potential for accidents or mishaps that: cause death or injury to operators, maintainers, and support personnel; threaten the operation of a system or cause cascading failures in other systems. (Human Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide, USAF Human Systems Integration Office, September 2009) Occupational Health Promotes system design features and procedures that serve to minimize the risk of injury, acute or chronic illness or disability, and enhance job performance of personnel who operate, maintain, or support the system. (Human Systems Integration Requirements Pocket Guide, USAF Human Systems Integration Office, September 2009) Utilization Rate The average life units expended or missions attempted (launched and airborne) per system or subsystem during a specified interval of time. (AFPAM63-128, 5 October 2009) Documentation Operator and maintenance instructions, repair parts lists, and support manuals, as well as manuals related to computer programs and system software such as the software load instruction, user manuals, and system administrator manuals. (AFOTECPAM99-104, 9 November 2010) The analyst must consider various factors such as the study questions and objectives, the maturity of the alternative concepts, and data availability when selecting measures for the analysis. For example, emerging or developmental systems may not have sufficient data to measure certain aspects of sustainability. Given these factors, the analyst must use some judgment in determining whether the selected measures are sufficient for conducting the sustainability performance analysis. As stated in Chapter 4, the description of the MOSs should include the supported mission task, attribute, measure statement, criteria, and data information. Table 7-2 provides an example of a sustainability task and its associated measure parameters. At a minimum, the measure criteria should identify the threshold standard (i.e., the minimum acceptable operational value of a system capability or characteristic below which the utility of the system becomes questionable) and if necessary, an objective standard (i.e., an operationally significant increment above the threshold). 89 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 An objective value may be the same as the threshold when an operationally significant increment above the threshold is not identifiable. Table 7-2: Measure of Suitability Description Example Analysts typically rely on a combination of study methods to collect and analyze data and assess the sustainability of alternative systems. Selection of the study method depends largely on the data requirements, availability of applicable tools or techniques, and the maturity and specificity of the alternatives. Several commonly used methods are described below: Modeling and Simulation (M&S): A model is a physical, mathematical, or logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process that allows for investigation of the properties of the system. A simulation is a method for implementing a model over time. M&S offers several advantages such as repeatability and control since events can be replicated under controlled conditions. An example of M&S that has been used to analyze sustainability of systems is the Logistics Composite model (LCOM). LCOM is an Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT) model used to identify the best mix of logistical resources to support a given weapon system under certain operational constraints (e.g., aircraft sortie rates, maintenance and supply policies, manpower levels, and spare part quantities). Logistics resources include manpower, spare parts, support equipment, and facilities. The supportability of design alternatives can be evaluated by varying the reliability and maintainability characteristics of the components and tasks contained in the database. The impact of policy decisions (e.g., organizational, maintenance concepts, and personnel) upon resource requirements or sortie generation capability can be analyzed as well. Concept Characterization: Also referred to as “alternative characterization”, this method uses data and information gleaned from CCTD documents, Requests for Information (RFI), and other 90 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 documents (e.g., reports, studies, and analyses). Once verified by the analyst, the data and information can be used in various ways. For example, data may be used as inputs to parametric, statistical, or simulation models (e.g., altitude and range parameters are used along with other variables as inputs to a model to determine survivability of a system). Other possible uses of the data and information include resolving measures (e.g., the number of 463L pallet positions required for transport of an alternative identified in the CCTD is used to determine whether the alternative meets the two pallet position threshold standard for transport) as well as identifying operational, technical, and programmatic risks associated with sustainability. 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 Expert elicitation is a particularly useful for collecting information from subject matter experts regarding the deployability, transportability, and maintainability of alternatives. For example, after reviewing technical and design information associated with each alternative, maintenance experts are asked to answer a series of questions on the ease of maintainability of critical components of each alternative. Expert Elicitation: Expert elicitation is a structured approach of gathering subject matter expert judgment and answering questions concerning issues or problems of interest in a study. Since expert judgment is affected by the approach used to gather it, a specially designed process is required that includes procedures for developing questions, conducting the elicitation, and handling biases that may arise. Although the process is formal and structured, it can differ in terms of the degree of interaction between experts, level of detail in information elicited, number of meetings, type of communication method, and degree of structure in the elicitation process. Individual or group interviews are commonly used to elicit the information. Comparative Analysis: The purpose of the comparative analysis it to select or develop a Baseline Comparison System (BCS) that represents characteristics of the new system for projecting supportability related parameters, making judgments concerning the feasibility of the new system supportability parameters, and determining the supportability, cost, and readiness drivers of the new system. A BCS may be developed using a composite of elements from different existing systems when a composite most closely represents the design, operation, and support characteristics of a new system alternative. The analysis requires the use of experience and historical data on similar existing systems that are relevant to the materiel solutions being considered in the AoA study. If support parameters (e.g., resupply time, turnaround times, transportation times, and personnel constraints) are to be projected, then current systems (support systems) which are similar to the new system's support concept must be identified. This may be a support system completely different than the one supporting similar systems in design characteristics. The level of detail required in describing comparative systems will vary depending on the amount of detail known about the new system's design, operational, and support characteristics and the accuracy required in the estimates for new system parameters. Early in the system life cycle, when the design concept for the new system is very general, only a general level comparative system description should be established. For this preliminary analysis, the analyst should 91 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 identify existing systems and subsystems (hardware, operational, and support) useful for comparative purposes with new system alternatives. The results of the analyses can help identify supportability, cost, and readiness drivers of each significantly different new system alternative. 7.4.2 Operations and Support Cost Analysis Operations and Support (O&S) cost is the cost element associated with sustainability. In determining O&S cost, the cost analysis should include the support resources necessary to achieve specified levels of readiness for a range of assumptions regarding various aspects such as system reliability, maintainability, usage rates, and operating scenarios. Because of their potential impact on product performance, readiness, and cost, all manpower and personnel requirements (i.e., quantities, skills, and skill levels) should be identified and evaluated early. Due to the uncertainty in estimating resource costs such as manpower and energy, sensitivity analyses should be performed to help identify the various factors which drive life cycle costs. The O&S cost element structure is divided into six major categories (Table 7-3). If a cost applies to a system, the cost structure identifies where a specific type of cost should appear in the estimate. Some cost elements refer to expenses that may not apply to every system. For example, ground radar systems do not have training munitions or expendable stores. In this case, the O&S estimate for the radar system would omit (or record as zero) that portion of the cost structure. Table 7-3: Operations and Support Cost Element Categories Cost Element Description 1.0 Unit Personnel Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support personnel assigned to operating units. Includes active and reserve military, government civilian, and contractor personnel costs. While the cost elements in this category separate operators, maintainers, and other direct support personnel, unit personnel sometimes serve in more than one capacity. If this occurs, ensure that all three types are accounted in one of the categories and group the personnel specialties using their predominant responsibility. To the extent possible, government personnel costs will be based on personnel grades and skill categories. Costs of military, government civilian and contractor personnel will be separately shown in the estimate of unit personnel costs. 2.0 Unit Operations Cost of unit unit-level consumption of operating materials such as fuel, POL, electricity, expendable stores, training munitions and other operating materials. Also included are any unit-funded support activities; training devices or simulator operations that uniquely support an operational unit; temporary additional duty/temporary duty (TAD/TDY) associated with the unit’s normal concept of operations; and other unit funded services. Unit-funded service contracts for administrative equipment as well as unit-funded equipment and software leases are included in this portion of the estimate. Unit operating costs provided through a system support contract will be separately identified from those provided organically. 3.0 Maintenance Cost of all maintenance other than maintenance personnel assigned to operating units (includes contractor maintenance). Includes the costs of labor above the organizational 92 level and materials at all levels of maintenance in support of the primary system, simulators, training devices, and associated support equipment. Where costs cannot be separately identified to separate levels of maintenance, use the category that represents the predominant costs. All maintenance costs provided through a system support contract will be separately identified within the appropriate cost element. 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 4.0 Sustaining Support Cost of support activities other than maintenance that can be attributed to a system and are provided by organizations other than operating units. Includes support services provided by centrally managed support activities not funded by the units that own the operating systems. It is intended that costs included in this category represent costs that can be identified to a specific system and exclude costs that must be arbitrarily allocated. Where a single cost element includes multiple types of support, each should be separately identified in the cost estimate. 5.0 Continuing System Improvement Cost of hardware and software modifications to keep the system operating and operationally current. Includes the costs of hardware and software updates that occur after deployment of a system that improve a system's safety, reliability, maintainability, or performance characteristics to enable the system to meet its basic operational requirements throughout its life. These costs include government and contract labor, materials, and overhead costs. Costs will be separated into government and contractor costs within each cost element. 6.0 Indirect Support Cost of support activities that provide general services that cannot be directly attributed to a system. Indirect support is generally provided by centrally managed activities that support a wide range of activities. Indirect support costs are those installation and personnel support costs that cannot be directly related to the units and personnel that operate and support the system being analyzed. O&S cost analyses should include marginal indirect costs. The intention is to include only the costs that would likely result in changes to DoD budgets if the action being analyzed (e.g., new system development, etc.) occurs. The Department of Defense is increasingly using contract support for many aspects of system operations and support, including functions that have historically been provided by government organizations. Knowing the maintenance concept and product support strategy for each O&S function is important to cost estimators. O&S cost estimates should clearly identify the expected source of support for each element of an O&S cost estimate. Interim contractor support (ICS) provides logistics support on a temporary basis until a government support capability is established. The scope and duration of ICS varies depending on acquisition strategy and other management decisions. ICS costs are normally included in the O&S estimate, unless explicitly covered in the production/investment cost estimate. 7.4.3 Sustainability Risk Assessment The design, maintenance concept, product support strategy, support system design, and availability of support data and resources are significant sources of risk to the sustainability of a system. Risks associated with sustainability should be assessed early in the acquisition since failing to do so could cause significant consequences in the program’s latter phases. 93 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 The risk assessment of sustainability constraints and concepts should be an integral part of the sustainability analysis. The assessments should identify risk drivers, determine the sensitivity of interrelated risks, and quantify risk impacts. Again, the analyst should rely on experience and historical data to help identify risk factors. For more information, refer to the following sources of information: Air Force Analysis of Alternatives Measure Development Process and Guidelines. July 2011. Office of Aerospace Studies, Kirtland AFB, NM. Air Force Analysis of Alternatives Suitability Measures. July 2011. Office of Aerospace Studies, Kirtland AFB, NM. AFPAM 63-128 Guide to Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management. October 5, 2009. AFI63-101 Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management. April 8, 2009. Department of Defense Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, Sixth Edition. August, 2006. Department of Defense Acquisition Logistics Handbook. MIL-HDBK-502. May 30, 1997. USAMC Logistics Support Activity, Redstone Arsenal, AL. 7.5 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost Rationale Report For efforts designated as JROC Interest, an initial Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Cost Rationale Report (RAM-C Report) should be developed as part of the AoA study. For all other efforts, the required RAM-C Report is determined by the DoD component. The report is designed to ensure effective collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the establishment of RAM requirements for the Milestone A decision. Although this report may be limited in scope due to the many unknowns at this stage, it will still describe the reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements, assumptions, rationale, and ownership costs to ensure that effective sustainment is addressed early in the life cycle for all systems. For more information, refer to the following sources of information: Department of Defense Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Cost Rationale Report Manual. June 1, 2009. Washington, DC, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Department of Defense Guide for Achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability. August 3, 2005. USD AT&L Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-003 – Reliability Analysis, Planning, Tracking and Reporting. March 21, 2011. 94 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 7.6 Sustainment Key Performance Parameter For all projected Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs, sustainment is a mandatory Key Performance Parameter (KPP) that should be addressed in the AoA study and the associated initial RAM-C Report. For all other programs, the sponsoring command will determine the applicability of the sustainment KPP. See Appendix L for additional information on KPPs. As shown in Figure 7-1, the sustainment KPP consists of a KPP, availability, and two supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs), reliability and ownership cost (see Appendix L for more information on KSAs). It is important to note that AoA studies and other supporting analyses provide the analytic foundation for determining appropriate threshold and objective values of system attributes and aid in determining which attributes should be KPPs or KSAs. Figure 7-1: Sustainment Key Performance Parameter The availability KPP has two components, materiel availability and operational availability. Materiel availability (MA) is the measure of the total inventory of a system operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an assigned mission at a given time, based on materiel condition. Development of this measure is a program manager responsibility and is determined later in the acquisition cycle. Consequently, the measure would not be addressed in an AoA study in the pre-Milestone A phase. Operational availability (AO) is the percentage of time that a system or group of systems within a unit is operationally capable of performing an assigned mission. Development of this measure is 95 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 the requirements manager responsibility and requires an analysis of the projected system and planned use as identified in the CONEMP. Reliability is the ability of a system and its parts to perform its mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system. The basic concept of reliability is that the system performs satisfactorily, where satisfactorily implies a lack of a broad variety of undesirable events and subsequent impact. Development of the measure is a requirements manager responsibility. There are two aspects of reliability, mission reliability and materiel or logistics reliability. Mission reliability is the capability of a system to perform its required function for the stated mission duration or for a specified time into the mission. The mission reliability calculation depends on the system and may include numbers of operating hours, critical failures, successful missions, and sorties flown. Typical measures of mission reliability include break rate (BR), mean time between critical failure (MTBCF), and weapon system reliability (WSR). Materiel (logistics) reliability is the capability of a system to perform failure free, under specified conditions and time without demand on the support system. All incidents that require a response from the logistics system (i.e., both maintenance and supply systems) are addressed in the measure. The materiel (logistics) reliability calculation depends on the system and may include number of flight hours, maintenance events, operating hours, and possessed hours. A typical measure of materiel (logistics) reliability is the mean time between maintenance (MTBM). Finally, ownership cost is the operations and support (O&S) cost associated with the availability KPP. Ownership cost provides balance to the sustainment solution by ensuring that the O&S costs associated with availability are considered in making decisions. The cost includes energy (e.g., fuel, petroleum, oil, lubricants, and electricity), maintenance, manpower/personnel costs, support sustainment, and continuing system improvements regardless of funding source. All costs cover the planned life cycle timeframe. Fuel costs are based on the fully burdened cost of fuel. The analysis should identify the associated sources of reference data, cost models, and parametric cost estimating techniques or tools used to create the cost estimates. The ownership cost is included as part of the total life cycle cost estimate in the AoA study. For more information, refer to the following sources of information: Air Force Analysis of Alternatives Suitability Measures. July 2011. Office of Aerospace Studies, Kirtland AFB, NM. Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS Manual). January 19, 2012. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI 3170.01G) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. January 10, 2012. 96 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 8 Alternative Comparisons The AoA must explore tradespace in performance, cost, risk and schedule across a full range of alternatives to address validated capability requirements. Therefore, once the operational effectiveness analysis results, life cycle cost estimates, and risk assessments are completed, it is time to bring that information together and address overall sensitivities and tradeoffs through comparative analysis. Comparing the alternatives involves the simultaneous consideration of the alternatives’ cost, operational effectiveness, associated risks; the outcome of this comparison highlights the factors that influence the tradespace. Consumers are familiar with the concept of comparing alternatives, whether buying laundry detergent, a new car, or a home. They collect data on costs and make assessments on how well the alternatives will meet their needs (the effectiveness of the alternatives) and any potential risks associated with each option. With data in hand, consumers make comparisons and identify the tradespace to consider before buying the product or service. In an AoA, the process is essentially the same. Keep in mind that there is rarely a clear-cut single answer. 8.1 Alternative Comparison Methodology 8.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis during Alternative Comparison Sensitivity analysis continues during this phase. It should leverage sensitivity analysis accomplished in the operational effectiveness analysis, cost analysis, and risk assessments. The previous sensitivity analyses should have identified the cost, schedule, risk and performance drivers to be considered as part of the tradespace analysis being conducted during this phase. The sensitivity analysis associated with this comparative analysis must accomplish the following to ensure meeting the decision makers’ expectations and requirements for AFROC and CAPE sufficiency review. Identify the proposed parameters for the RCT, along with recommended threshold/objective values for further exploration in the tradespace. Identify why those parameters are proposed for the RCT Identify the assumptions and variables highlighted by the sensitivity analysis. Explore the sensitivity of the RCT values by addressing the impact of changes to cost, effectiveness, and performance, on the alternative’s ability to mitigate gaps Identify key assumptions that drive results Identify the conditions and assumptions for which an alternative is or is not affordable Identify the conditions and assumptions for which an alternative does or does not adequately mitigate the operational gap 97 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 8.1.2 Cost/Capability Tradeoff Analysis Identify how legacy forces complement the alternatives Examine of the robustness of the results. It should address the effectiveness, cost, and risk changes that alter the comparative relationships among alternatives. Examine variations of cost elements identified as significant drivers. This is intended to identify the point at which further expenditure provides little additional value. Identify performance parameters that make significant changes to mission effectiveness or most likely to influence development and/or production cost. The study team uses the cost/capability tradeoff analysis to determine the best value alternative that provides acceptable capability to the warfighter. In conducting the analysis, the study team should consider the affordability constraints expressed in the AoA guidance or ADM. Figure 8-1 shows an example presentation of the cost/capability tradeoff analysis results for a notional Aircraft Survivability System. Alternatives 1 and 2 are the most viable of the alternatives analyzed and are shown in the figure (note that non-viable alternatives are not displayed). The life cycle cost estimates are shown in $B along the x-axis. The y-axis shows the probability of survival for a specific ISC and vignette. The results from other scenarios and vignettes can be shown in separate charts to help the decision makers understand how robust the alternatives are in different scenarios/vignettes. Alternatively, the results associated with all the scenarios and vignettes analyzed in the study can be combined and presented in one chart. Probability of survival was selected since it will be a Key Performance Parameter (note that the threshold and objective values are highlighted on the chart). Other possibilities for the y-axis include reduction in lethality and loss exchange rate. The table below the graph provides a summary showing the probability of survival and LCCE values as well as the overall risk rating of the alternative for the increments of capability for each alternative. The color rating for the probability of survival is based on whether the alternative meets the threshold/objective value. Red: Did not meet threshold, significant shortfall Yellow: Did not meet threshold, not a significant shortfall Green: Met threshold Blue: Met objective 98 397 398 399 Figure 8-1: Aircraft Survivability System Cost/Capability Tradeoff Example 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 Alternative 1 with the basic capability is significantly below the threshold value and is therefore rated red, whereas alternative 2 with the basic capability meets the threshold and is rated green. Alternative 1 with the A and B increments of capability meet the threshold and are rated green, while alternative 2 with the X and Y increments of capability meet the objective value, and are therefore rated blue. In situations where there is no objective value (threshold = objective), then only the red, yellow, and green ratings should be used. In other situations where threshold and objective values do not exist, the team will need to explain the difference in performance without referencing these values. In this example, Alternative 1 with the A increment and Alternative 2 99 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 with the basic capability (circled in red) may be the best value options. Alternative 2 with the X and Y increments (circled in blue) are the high performance, cost, and risk options. Figure 8-2 shows another example presentation of the cost/capability tradeoff analysis results for a notional Target Defeat Weapon. Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 are the most viable of the alternatives analyzed and are shown in the chart. The life cycle cost estimates are shown in $B along the xaxis. The y-axis shows the probability of functional kill for two ISC vignettes. The vertical bars show the Target Template Sets (TTS) analyzed in the study. TTS range from very simple to extremely complex and are defined in terms of hardness, depth, construction design, and function (e.g., command and control, operations, storage, leadership, etc.). The current baseline performance is shown on the chart (probability of functional kill = .55). Alternative 1 provides increased probability of functional kill (+.11 over the current baseline systems) and is capable of functional kills in the TTS-F and G that are not possible with the existing baseline weapons. LCCE is $3B and the overall risk was rated moderate. Alternative 2 provides additional functional kill capability (+.17 over the current baseline systems) and is capable of functional kills in the TTS-F, G, H, I, and J that are not possible with the existing baseline weapons. LCCE is $4.2B and the overall risk was rated high. Finally, alternative 3 provides the most functional kill capability (+.22 over current baseline systems) and is capable of functional kills in the TTS-F, G, H, I, J, and K that are not possible with existing baseline weapons. LCCE is $5.3B and the overall risk was rated high. It is important to note that none of the alternatives are capable of functional kills in the TTS-L, N, O, and Q. If TTS-L, N, O, and Q include targets that are the most critical to the warfighter, the determination of whether any of the alternatives are a best value option becomes more difficult despite the additional capability each of the alternatives provide over the baseline. 100 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 Figure 8-2: Target Defeat Weapon Cost/Capability Tradeoff Example There may be other ways to present cost/capability trade information, but regardless of the method, the message must be clear and cogent. It is important to avoid rolling up or aggregating effectiveness results since it can hide important information. 8.1.3 Alternative Comparison Presentation The objective of the comparative analysis presentation is to show how the capabilities of each alternative close or mitigate the capability gap(s) and present the associated tradespace to the senior decision makers. Typically, there may be several viable alternatives, each with different costs, effectiveness, and risks. There is no requirement for an AoA to identify a single solution. 101 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 The study team must answer the high-level concerns/questions from the guidance and those that arise during the course of the AoA. The study team must also address the capabilities of the alternatives to close or mitigate the capability gap(s) and the associated reduction in operational risk (as identified in the CBA, ICD, and appropriate Core Function Master Plans (CFMPs)). The study team should illustrate the operational impact of failing to meet threshold values. The presentation should show why each key performance parameter in the RCT was chosen and the tradespace analysis that resulted in the threshold values. The RCT should contain those key parameters that are so critical that failure to meet them brings the military utility of the solution into question and risks appropriately mitigating the gap. Finally, the study team should identify and discuss the key items that discriminate the alternatives. This will aid in the presentation of the critical findings. Once all of the analysis is complete and understood, the study team must determine the most appropriate way to present the critical findings of the AoA. Decision makers expect this information to be presented for the capability gap(s) illustrating the trade-offs identified. There are several ways to display this as shown in the following examples. In addition to the presentation examples discussed in the cost/capability tradeoff analysis section, Figure 8-2 shows a notional example of an alternative comparison. In this illustration, MOEs a, b, and c are all critical, enabling the study team to show important differences in performance by alternative. Figure 8-3: Example of Critical MOE Results Figure 8-3 shows a second example of presenting findings from the analysis. The example presents the effectiveness, operational risk, technical maturity, other risk factors, and costs of each alternative. If this approach is utilized, it is important to define the color rating scheme. The 102 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 color ratings for the measures are based on the capability of the alternatives to meet the measure criteria (threshold, objective values). In this example, the operational risk and technical maturity color rating methods should be discussed and agreed upon by stakeholders and decision makers prior to executing the alternative comparisons. Once the study team applies the rating method, they should conduct a review of the results to determine whether the method is sound or must be revised. Figure 8-4: Example of Comparing Alternatives by Effectiveness, Risk, and Cost It is important to ensure the information presented is clear, concise, cogent, and unbiased. The presentation should accurately depict the analysis results, present understandable interpretations, and support recommendations. The more straightforward and clear the results are presented, the easier it becomes to understand the differences among the alternatives. The study team’s job is to help the decision makers understand the differences among the alternatives. The Study Director should determine the best way to tell the story of what was learned in the AoA. OAS and the A9 community can assist the team in developing the story. Every effort is different, but OAS and the A9 community will be able to share examples to aid in this development. Finally, the Study Director should plan sufficient time for stakeholder and senior decision maker review of the results. 103 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 9 Documenting Analytical Findings With analysis complete, the final report and final results briefing document what was learned concerning the ability to solve or mitigate the examined capability gaps. This documentation contains answers to key questions from decision makers. Appendix D contains the template for the final report. The primary purpose of the documentation is to illustrate, for decision makers, the cost, schedule, performance, and risk implications of tradespace around the validated capability requirements. The final report should also provide feedback to the requirements process. This feedback addresses those validated capability requirements that, upon further study, appear unachievable and/or undesirable from cost, schedule, performance, and risk points of view. The team provides the documents to the AFRRG and AFROC which determine Air Force investment decisions prior to delivery to the MDA and any other appropriate oversight groups. The JSD associated with the effort determines which decision makers, senior leaders, and review groups receive the documents. For JROC Interest efforts, the documents will also be provided to CAPE (for sufficiency review), JROC, JCB, FCB, and AT&L-led OIPT, DAB, and the Study Advisory Group. According to Air Force AoA final report approval criteria, the report should include: Assumptions and rating criteria used for evaluation in each of the analyses Answers to the key questions outlined in the study guidance. These must be answered sufficiently for decision makers to support the upcoming decisions. Identification of enablers and how they align with those outlined at the MDD and in the AoA guidance. Identification of the effectiveness, cost, and risk drivers and how they were fully explored in sensitivity analysis. Discussion of the tradespace through cost, effectiveness, and risk analysis. This must clearly identify for the decision makers where the trade-offs exist, the operational risk associated with the performance, and the degree to which the capability gap(s) have been mitigated. Identification of the key parameters in the RCT and analytical evidence to support the thresholds and objectives identified. This must include identifying what the associated cost drivers are for those values and how sensitive the cost is to those values. Identification of the sensitivity each alternative to the analysis assumptions and their sensitivity to specific scenarios. Identification of technical feasibility of thresholds and objectives identified in the RCT based on the affordability constraints identified. Identification and scope of additional information/analysis required prior to initiation of acquisition activities (e.g., requesting a milestone decision). 104 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 Identification of how the cost of each alternative aligns with the affordability constraints identified at MDD and in the study guidance. Identification of sustainability considerations for the operational environment. To facilitate a successful CAPE sufficiency review for the MDA, the team should provide the following: Identification of the measures evaluated, including any cost, performance, and schedule trade off analyses conducted. Evaluation of benefit versus risk. Risks should include an examination of technical, cost, and schedule risks in addition to operational risks. It is important for the team to address the non-operational benefits and risks with the same level of fidelity/rigor as the operational benefits and risks. Regarding risks, it is equally important for the team to carefully examine the non-operational risks as they can be significant contributors to program failure. Explanation of why alternatives do well or poorly. This must include rationale for the results. Explanation of how variations to CONOPS or performance parameters might mitigate cost or change effectiveness ratings. This should include characterizing the circumstances in which each alternative appears superior and the conditions under which it degrades. Identification of estimated schedules for each alternative. This should include an assessment of existing TRLs/MRLs for critical technologies. This assessment includes the impact of not completing development, integration, operational testing on schedule and within budget and the likelihood of achieving the proposed schedule. Identification of practical risk mitigation strategies (if they exist) to minimize impact to delivering operational capability, and any potential workarounds that may be applied if a risk comes to fruition. Identification of all DOTMLPF-P implications for each alternative. Identification and rationale for any questions not answered or analysis that remains incomplete and recommendations to address these in future. An HPT is not required for development of the final report; however, key stakeholders and representatives should be involved. Members of the enduring HPT are expected to develop the RCT and review the final report. A widespread review of the report is useful in ensuring the report appropriately addresses the areas addressed above. The review should start within the originating command. Outside review can be solicited from a variety of agencies, including OAS, appropriate AF/A5R functional divisions, stakeholders, other Services, as appropriate, and CAPE (for ACAT I and JROC Interest programs). According to AF/A5R procedures, the following process is to be followed for review and staffing of the final report: 105 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 MAJCOM provide the final report and briefing simultaneously to AF/A5R Functional Division Chief and OAS for assessment. The AF/A5R Functional Division Chief will forward the report and briefing (including the OAS risk assessment) simultaneously to AF/A5R-P. After AF/A5R-P Gate Keeper review, the final report will be submitted to the AFRRG. If the AFRRG concurs with the final report, it will be submitted to the AFROC for validation or approval depending on JSD. The OAS assessment criteria are applied to evaluate its credibility and completeness in light of the requirements outlined above and the study guidance. Appendix F of this handbook contains the OAS assessment criteria for the final report. See Appendix H for the recommended timelines for OAS review of documents prior to submission. 604 605 606 106 607 608 Appendix A: Acronyms ACAT Acquisition Category ACEIT Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum AF Air Force AF/A2 Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence AF/A5R Air Force Director of Requirements AF/A5R-P Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, Chief of Requirements Policy and Process Division AF/A9 Director, Studies & Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned AFCAA Air Force Cost Analysis Agency AFI Air Force Instruction AFMC Air Force Materiel Command AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center AFP Air Force Pamphlet AoA Analysis of Alternatives BA Battlespace Awareness BCS Baseline Comparison System BR Break Rate BY$ Base Year Dollars CAIV Cost As an Independent Variable CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD) CAWG Cost Analysis Working Group CBA Capabilities Based Assessment CBP Capabilities Based Planning CCTD Concept Characterization and Technical Description CDD Capability Development Document CJCSI Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CONEMP Concept of Employment 107 CONOPS Concept of Operations CPD Capability Production Document CPIPT Cost Performance Integrated Product Team DAB Defense Acquisition Board DAG Defense Acquisition Guidebook DAP Defense Acquisition Process DCAPE Director, CAPE DCR Doctrine Change Request DOE Department of Energy DoD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense Directive DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership/Education, Personnel, and Facilities DOTmLPF-P* *Note: in this version of the acronym, “m” refers to existing materiel in the inventory (Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) or Government Off the Shelf (GOTS)). DP Development Planning EA Effectiveness Analysis EAWG Effectiveness Analysis Working Group ECWG Employment Concepts Working Group FCB Functional Control Board FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center FM Financial Management FoS Family of Systems FOC Full Operational Capability GAO Government Accountability Office GAO CEAG GAO Cost Estimating Assessment Guide GIG Global Information Grid GRC&A Ground Rules, Constraints & Assumptions HPT High Performance Team 108 HSI Human Systems Integration IC Implementing Command ICD Initial Capabilities Document ICS Interim Contractor Support IDA Institute for Defense Analysis IIPT Integrating Integrated Product Team IOC Initial Operational Capability IPT Integrated Product Team ISA Intelligence Supportability Analysis ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISWG Intelligence Supportability Working Group IT Information Technology JCA Joint Capability Area JCB Joint Capabilities Board JCD Joint Capabilities Document JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System JCTD Joint Concept Technology Demonstration JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council JS Joint Staff JSD Joint Staffing Designator KM/DS Knowledge Management/Decision Support KPP Key Performance Parameter KSA Key System Attribute LCOM Logistic Composite Model LC Lead Command LCC Life Cycle Cost LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate LCMC Life Cycle Management Center LoE Level of Effort 109 LRU Line Replaceable Unit LSC Logistics Support Cost M&S Modeling & Simulation MA Materiel Availability MAJCOM Major Command MDA Milestone Decision Authority MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program MDD Materiel Development Decision MER Manpower Estimate Report MILCON Military Construction MOE Measure of Effectiveness MOP Measure of Performance MOS Measure of Suitability MOU Memorandum of Understanding MRL Manufacturing Readiness Level MS Milestone MSFD Multi-Service Force Deployment MT Mission Task MTBCF Mean Time Between Critical Failure MTBM Mean Time Between Maintenance NACA Non-Advocate Cost Assessment NSSA National Security Space Acquisition O&S Operations and Support O&M Operations and Maintenance OAS Office of Aerospace Studies OCWG Operations Concepts Working Group OIPT Overarching Integrated Product Team OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD/AT&L Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics OSD/Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 110 OSDCAPE P3I Pre-Planned Product Improvement PBL Performance-based Logistics PM Program Manager POL Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants POM Program Objective Memorandum PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution R&D Research and Development RAF Risk Assessment Framework RCT Requirements Correlation Table RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation RFI Request for Information RFP Request for Proposal S&T Science and Technology SAF Secretary of the AF SAF/AQ Assistant Secretary of the AF for Acquisition SAF/FMC Deputy Assistant Secretary of the AF for Cost and Economics SAG Study Advisory Group SCEA Society of Cost Estimating Analysis SEER Systems/Software Estimating and Evaluation of Resources SEM Software Estimating Model SEP System Engineering Plan SETA Scientific, Engineering, Technical, and Analytical SLEP Service Life Extension Program SME Subject Matter Expert SoS System of Systems SRG Senior Review Group STINFO Scientific & Technical Information T&E Test and Evaluation TAWG Technology & Alternatives Working Group 111 TDS Technology Development Strategy TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan TES Test and Evaluation Strategy TOC Total Ownership Cost TRL Technology Readiness Level TSWG Threats and Scenarios Working Group TY$ Then-year (dollars) USD (AT&L) Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics USAF United States Air Force VCSAF Vice Chief of Staff Air Force WBS Work Breakdown Structure WG Working Group WIPT Working-Level Integrated Product Team WSARA Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act WSR Weapon System Reliability 609 112 610 611 Appendix B: References and Information Sources 612 A. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual 613 B. CJCSI 3170.01H, JCIDS Instruction 614 C. Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s Guide 615 D. DODD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System 616 E. DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 617 F. Defense Acquisition Guidebook 618 G. DODD 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space 619 H. National Security Space Acquisition (NSSA) Policy—Interim Guidance 620 I. DOD 5000.4-M, Cost Analysis Guidance & Procedures 621 J. Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (and AF-specific implementation) 622 K. AFPD 63-1 – Capability-Based Acquisition System 623 L. AFI 10-601 – Capabilities-Based Requirements Development 624 M. AFI 10-604 –Capabilities-Based Planning 625 N. Information Technology (IT) Related Policies 626 O. Clinger-Cohen Act 1996 627 P. CJCSI 6212.01C - Interoperability and Supportability of IT and NSS 628 Q. DODD 4630.5 – Interoperability and Supportability of IT and NSS 629 R. DODI 4630.8 – Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of IT and NSS 630 S. DODD 8100.1 – Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy 631 T. Joint Pub 6-0 – Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations 632 U. MIL-HDBK-881B Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel Items (3 October 633 634 635 2011) V. DoD Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Cost (RAM-C) Rationale Report Manual 636 W. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 637 X. OSD Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide, May 1992 638 113 639 640 641 642 Appendix C: Study Plan Template This appendix contains the AoA Study Plan template required for the AoA. (CAPE desires a maximum of ten to fifteen pages.) 643 644 -----------------------------Cover Page ----------------------------- 645 <Name of Project Here> 646 647 648 649 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Study Plan 650 651 <Lead MAJCOM> 652 <Date> 653 654 Distribution Statement 655 Refer to these sources for more information: 656 657 1. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents” 658 659 2. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 80-30, “Marking Documents with Export-Control and DistributionLimitation Statements” (to be reissued as Air Force Instruction (AFI) 61-204) 660 661 Ask the Scientific & Technical Information (STINFO) Officer for help in choosing which of the available statements best fits the AoA 662 REMEMBER -- AoA information may be PROPRIETARY, SOURCE SELECTION 663 SENSITIVE, OR CLASSIFIED 664 665 666 114 -----------------------Table of Contents--------------------- 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 1. Introduction 1.1. Background 1.2. Purpose and Scope 1.3. Study Guidance 1.4. Capability Gaps 1.5. Stakeholders 1.6. Ground Rules, Constraints, and Assumptions 675 676 677 678 2. Alternatives 2.1. Description of Alternatives 2.2. Operational Concepts 2.3. Scenarios and Operational Environment 679 680 681 682 683 684 3. Effectiveness Analysis 3.1. Effectiveness Methodology 3.2. Measures 3.3. Sensitivity Analysis Methodology 3.4. Analysis Tools and Data 3.5. Modeling and Simulation Accreditation 685 686 687 688 689 4. Cost Analysis 4.1. Life Cycle Cost Methodology 4.2. Work Breakdown Structure 4.3. Cost Tools and Data 4.4. Cost Sensitivity and Risk Methodology 690 691 692 5. Risk Assessment 5.1. Risk Assessment Methodology 5.2. Risk Assessment Tools 693 694 695 6. Alternative Comparison 6.1. Alternative Comparison Methodology and Presentations 6.2. Cost/Capability Tradeoff Analysis Methodology 696 697 698 699 7. Organization and Management 7.1. Study Team Organization 7.2. AoA Review Process 7.3. Schedule 700 Appendices 701 702 703 704 705 A. B. C. D. F. Acronyms References CCTD(s) Modeling and Simulation Accreditation Plan Other appendices as necessary 115 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 ---------------------Plan Section Contents----------------------1. Introduction 1.1. Background • Briefly describe the history of the effort and related programs. Summarize relevant analyses that preceded this study such as applicable Joint Concept Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) or Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). This should include any lessons learned from previous efforts, especially those that were cancelled. • Explain why the study is being conducted now and the key decisions that have been made to this point. 1.2. Purpose and Scope • Describe the scope and purpose of the AoA. Describe any tailoring or streamlining used to focus the study. • Identify potential areas of risk and/or roadblocks pertinent to the study (particularly schedule, lack of required data, lack of stakeholder participation, etc.) • Identify the key acquisition or other issues that will be addressed in the analysis. Also explain why any key issues will not be considered or addressed in the analysis. • Identify the milestone decision the analysis will inform. 1.3. Study Guidance • Summarize the AoA study guidance from the Air Force and/or CAPE, as appropriate. • Identify the key questions in the guidance. 1.4. Capability Gaps • Identify and describe the specific AFROC or JROC approved capability gaps that will be addressed in the AoA. Identify the validated sources of these gaps. • Identify the threshold/objective requirement values in the ICD and how they will be treated as reference points to explore the tradespace. • Identify the timeframe for the operational need. 1.5. Stakeholders • Identify the stakeholders for this AoA and explain their roles/responsibilities in the AoA. • Describe how methodologies, alternatives, evaluation criteria, and results will be reviewed by the stakeholders and oversight groups (e.g., Senior Review Group, Study Advisory Group, etc.). 1.6. Ground Rules, Constraints, and Assumptions • Identify the AoA ground rules, constraints, and assumptions. Describe the implications of the ground rules, constraints, and assumptions. Reference appropriate assumptions identified in the ICD or AoA guidance and describe their implications to the study. • Identify the projected Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Full Operating Capability (FOC) milestones. 2. Alternatives 2.1. Description of Alternatives • Describe the baseline (existing and planned systems) capability. 116 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 • Describe the alternatives specified in the AoA study guidance and how the alternatives will be employed in the operational environment. Explain the rationale for including them in the study. Explain the rationale for excluding any specific types of alternatives in the study. • Discuss dependencies associated with each alternative and how the dependencies will be addressed in the analysis. • Identify the appendix that contains the CCTD(s) for baseline and each alternative. 2.2. Operational Concepts • Identify organizational functions and operations performed during the mission. This includes describing logistics and maintenance concepts. • Describe what enablers exist and how they interface with the alternatives. This includes identifying the dependencies of each alternative. • Discuss significant tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine used. • Discuss significant interfaces with other systems. • Identify any peacetime and contingency operation implications. Describe any deployment issues. 2.3. Scenarios and Operational Environment • Describe the scenarios that will be used in the AoA and rationale for their selection. This includes an explanation of how the scenarios represent the operational environment. • Describe the expected operational environment, including terrain, weather, location, and altitude. Describe how the environment will impact the alternatives. • Describe the enemy tactics (include potential countermeasures). 3. Effectiveness Analysis 3.1. Effectiveness Methodology • Describe the effectiveness methodology, including the types of analysis (e.g., parametric, expert elicitation, modeling and simulation, etc.). This includes describing how performance drivers will be identified and fully explored in the sensitivity analysis. • Describe how the methodology and associated measures will be reviewed by the appropriate stakeholder and oversight groups (e.g., Senior Review Group, Study Advisory Group, etc.). • Describe how the dependencies identified for each alternative will be addressed in the analysis. • Describe the decomposition of the capability gaps and how they will be addressed in the analysis. • Describe the methodology to explore the tradespace and give a brief description of what sensitivity analysis will be accomplished to determine Key Performance Parameters/Key System Attributes and threshold/objective (T/O) values for the Requirements Correlation Table (RCT). This includes describing how the tradespace around the capability threshold values will be explored to determine if adjustments need to be recommended based on the results. • Describe the methodology to assess sustainability concepts such as reliability, availability, and maintainability. 3.2. Measures 117 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 • • Identify the Measures of Effectiveness, Suitability, and Performance. Describe the traceability of the AoA measures to the requirements and associated minimum values identified in the ICD (from the CBA). • Describe the traceability of the AoA measures to the capability gaps and mission tasks. • Discuss how the measures are measurable and will support the development of the postAoA documents (e.g., CDD, CPD, TES, TEMP). 3.3. Sensitivity Analysis Methodology • Describe the sensitivity analysis that will be conducted to determine key performance parameters/key system attributes and threshold/objective values for the RCT. 3.4. Analysis Tools and Data • Describe the analysis methods and tools that will be used to conduct the analysis and the rationale for selection. Describe the input data to be used and corresponding sources. • Discuss how the data for the scenarios, threats, and each of the alternatives will be current, accurate, and unbiased (technically sound and doctrinally correct). • Describe how the analysis methods and tools will provide data to address the measures. Illustrate how the analysis methods and tools are linked (suggest using the confederation of tools diagram described in Chapter 4 of this handbook). 3.5. Modeling and Simulation Accreditation • Describe the modeling and simulation accreditation plan. • Discuss any potential model biases, such as “man-in-the-loop” biases. 4. Cost Analysis 4.1. Life Cycle Cost Methodology • Describe the cost analysis methodology. Describe how the cost drivers will be identified and fully explored in sensitivity analysis. • Describe how the cost analysis methodology will be reviewed by the stakeholders and oversight groups (e.g., Senior Review Group, Study Advisory Group, etc.). • Describe how the dependencies identified for each alternative will be addressed in the analysis. • Identify the economic operating life of the alternatives (e.g., 10 year, 20 year, 25 year Operations and Support cost). • Describe the methodology for costing Research and Development (R&S), Investment, Operations and Support (O&S), Disposal, and total LCC for each alternative. • Identify the sunk costs for information purposes only. 4.2. Work Breakdown Structure • Describe the cost work breakdown structure. 4.3. Cost Tools and Data • Describe the cost analysis methods (e.g., analogy, expert opinion, etc.) and models (e.g., ACEIT, CRYSTALL BALL, etc.) that will be used and the reason for their selection. Describe the input data to be used and corresponding sources. • Discuss any potential model shortfalls. 4.4. Cost Sensitivity and Risk Methodology • Describe the methodology to identify the cost drivers. 118 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 • Describe the methodology for determining the level of uncertainty for each element of LCC and each cost driver. • Describe how the cost of each alternative will be assessed with respect to the affordability constraints identified at MDD and in the AoA study guidance. 5. Risk Assessment 5.1. Risk Assessment Methodology • Describe the methodology for identifying risk (operational, technical risk, cost, and schedule). Discuss how empirical data will be used to assess technical risk, especially in the area of integration risk. • Describe the methodology to identify schedule drivers. 5.2. Risk Assessment Tools • Describe the risk assessment tools or models that will be used in the analysis. 6. Alternative Comparison 6.1. Alternative Comparison Methodology and Presentations • Describe the alternative comparison methodology. If using a color scheme (e.g., red, yellow, green), describe how the color rating will be determined from the values. • Describe how the alternative comparison methodology will be reviewed by the stakeholders and oversight groups (e.g., SAG). • Describe the methodology for performing the sensitivity tradeoff analysis. This includes describing how knee-in-the-curves for cost drivers will be determined to identify cost effective solutions rather than single point solutions. • Describe the methodology for identifying the assumptions and variables, when changed, will significantly change the schedule, performance, and/or cost-effectiveness of the alternatives. • Describe the methodology for identifying performance parameters, when changed, will significantly change operational effectiveness. Also identify performance parameters, if fixed as performance specifications, are most likely to influence development and production cost. 6.2. Cost/Capability Tradeoff Analysis Methodology • Describe the cost/capability tradeoff analysis methodology to determine the best value alternative(s) that provide acceptable capability to the warfighter. 7. Organization and Management 7.1. Study Team Organization • Identify how the team is organized and a general description of the responsibilities of each working group. • Describe the stakeholders and oversight groups (e.g., Senior Review Group, Study Advisory Group, etc.) and their roles. 7.2. AoA Review Process • Describe the review process and the oversight groups involved (e.g., Senior Review Group, Study Advisory Group, Milestone Decision Authority, etc.). 119 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 7.3. Schedule • Describe the AoA schedule (a chart of the timeline with key decision points and events is suggested). Discuss the ability of the study team to execute the study plan according to the schedule. Identify potential schedule risk pertinent to the study. APPENDICES A. Acronyms B. References C. CCTD(s) D. Modeling and Simulation Accreditation Plan E. Other appendices as necessary 885 120 886 887 888 Appendix D: Final Report Template This appendix contains the AoA Final Report template required for the AoA. 889 890 -----------------------------Cover Page ----------------------------- 891 <Name of Project Here> 892 893 894 895 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Final Report 896 897 <Lead MAJCOM> 898 <Date> 899 900 Distribution Statement 901 Refer to these sources for more information: 902 903 1. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents” 904 905 2. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 80-30, “Marking Documents with Export-Control and DistributionLimitation Statements” (to be reissued as Air Force Instruction (AFI) 61-204) 906 907 Ask the Scientific & Technical Information (STINFO) Officer for help in choosing which of the available statements best fits the AoA 908 REMEMBER -- AoA information may be PROPRIETARY, SOURCE SELECTION 909 SENSITIVE, OR CLASSIFIED 910 911 912 121 913 -----------------------Table of Contents--------------------- 914 915 Executive Summary 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 1. Introduction 1.1. Purpose and Scope 1.2. Study Guidance 1.3. Capability Gaps 1.4. Stakeholders 1.5. Ground Rules, Constraints, and Assumptions 1.6. Description of Alternatives 923 924 925 926 2. Operational Effectiveness Analysis Results 2.1. Operational Effectiveness Analysis Results 2.2. Operational Effectiveness Sensitivity Analysis Results 2.3. Requirements Correlation Table (RCT) 927 928 929 3. Cost Analysis 3.1. Life Cycle Cost Results 3.2. Cost Sensitivity and Risk Results 930 931 4. Risk Assessment 4.1. Risk Assessment Results 932 933 934 935 5. Alternative Comparison 5.1. Alternative Comparison Results 5.2. Sensitivity Analysis Results 5.3. Conclusions and Recommendations 936 Appendices 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 A. Acronyms B. References C. CCTD(s) D. Analysis Methodology Details E. Modeling and Simulation Accreditation Final Report F. RAM-C Report (JROC interest and other ACAT I efforts) G. Intelligence Supportability Analysis (ISA) H. Other appendices as necessary 946 947 948 949 122 950 --------------------- Report Section Contents----------------------- 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 Executive Summary • Describe the purpose of the study. • Identify key organizations associated with the study. • Summarize the results of the study. This must include a summary of the answers to the key questions in the AoA study guidance and identification of where the trade-offs exist, operational risk associated with the performance and to what degree the capability gap(s) have been mitigated by each alternative. • Summarize the key parameters in the RCT and the analytical evidence to support them. 1. Introduction 1.1. Purpose and Scope • Describe the scope and purpose of the AoA. Discuss how the AoA scope was tailored to address the AoA study guidance and ADM. Explain the reason for any incomplete analysis and the plan to complete any remaining analysis. • Identify any key MDA or other issues that were not considered or addressed in the analysis. Explain the reason for any unanswered questions and the plan to address them. • Identify the Milestone Decision the analysis results will inform. 1.2. Study Guidance • Summarize the AoA study guidance from the AF and CAPE, as appropriate. • Identify the key questions in the guidance. 1.3. Capability Gaps • Identify and describe the specific AFROC or JROC approved capability gaps that were addressed in the AoA. Identify the validated source of these gaps. 1.4. Stakeholders • Identify the stakeholders for the AoA and explain their roles/responsibilities in the AoA. • Describe how the methodologies, alternatives, evaluation criteria, and results were reviewed and accepted by the stakeholders and oversight groups (e.g., Study Advisory Group). 1.5. Ground Rules, Constraints, and Assumptions for the AoA • Summarize the overarching AoA ground rules, constraints, and assumptions. • Describe the expected need timeframe. 1.6. Description of Alternatives • Describe the baseline (existing and planned systems) capability. • Describe each of the alternatives assessed in the AoA (include any discriminating features). • Describe what enablers were addressed and how they align with those identified at MDD and in the AoA guidance. • Identify all DOTmLPF-P implications for each alternative. 2. Operational Effectiveness Analysis 2.1. Operational Effectiveness Analysis Results 123 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 • Describe the results of the effectiveness and sustainability analysis. 2.2. Operational Effectiveness Sensitivity Analysis Results • Describe the sensitivity analysis conducted. • Identify the key parameters highlighted by the sensitivity analysis (performance drivers) and how they were fully explored. 2.3. Requirements Correlation Table (RCT) • Identify the key parameters in the RCT and analytical evidence to support the thresholds and objectives identified. 3. Cost Analysis 3.1. Life Cycle Cost Results • Describe the results of the cost analysis. This includes presentation of the life cycle cost estimates (LCCEs) and any total ownership costs. 3.2. Cost Sensitivity and Risk Results • Identify the cost drivers highlighted by the sensitivity analysis and how they were fully explored. • Identify the level of uncertainty for each cost driver. • Identify how the cost of each alternative aligns with the affordability constraints identified at MDD and in the AoA study guidance. 4. Risk Assessment 4.1. Risk Analysis Results • Describe the results of the risk analysis. Identify operational and non-operational (e.g., technical, cost, schedule) risks. • Describe the initial acquisition schedule for each alternative, assessment of existing TRLs/MRLs for critical technologies which may impact likelihood of completing development, integration, operational testing on schedule and within budget. This should include an assessment of the likelihood of achieving the proposed schedule. • For significant risks, identify practical mitigation strategies to minimize impact to delivering operational capability and, if applicable, potential workarounds in the event risks are realized. 5. Alternative Comparison 5.1. Alternative Comparison Results • Describe the results of the alternative comparison. • Explain the rationale for disqualifying any alternatives from further consideration. • If appropriate, identify recommended changes to validated capability requirements for consideration if changes would result in acceptable tradeoffs. • Explain why alternatives do well or poorly (include rationale for the results). • Describe the results of the cost/capability tradeoff analysis. This must clearly identify where the tradeoffs exist and to what degree the capability gap(s) have been mitigated. 5.2. Sensitivity Analysis Results • Identify the performance, cost, and risk drivers and how they were fully explored in the sensitivity analysis. • Identify how sensitive the alternatives are to changes in assumptions and how they are sensitive to changes in specific scenarios. 124 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 • Identify how sensitive the alternatives are to changes in the threshold and objective values identified in the RCT (include the associated cost drivers for the values and how sensitive the cost is to the values). • Explain how variations to CONOPS could mitigate cost drivers or effectiveness (performance) shortfalls. This should include characterizing the conditions under which the performance of each alternative improves and degrades. 5.3. Conclusions and Recommendations • Provide conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis. • Provide answers to the key questions identified in the AoA study guidance (must be answered sufficiently to inform the upcoming decision). • Identify what additional information/analysis is needed prior to initiation of future acquisition activities and milestone decisions. APPENDICES A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. Acronyms References CCTD(s) Detailed Description of the AoA methodologies Lessons Learned Modeling and Simulation Accreditation Final Report RAM-C Report (JROC interest and other ACAT I efforts) Intelligence Supportability Analysis (ISA) Other appendices as necessary 125 1058 1059 Appendix E: Study Plan Assessment 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 This appendix contains the AoA Study Plan assessment criteria used by OAS in their independent assessment of an AoA Study Plan and associated briefing for presentation to the AFROC and OSD/CAPE. This assessment will be presented in bullet fashion, highlighting the risk areas with the credibility and defensibility of the analysis results as it progresses outside of the AF to the decision makers. OAS will provide an initial assessment and get-well plan after the initial review to determine readiness for submission to AF/A5R. 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1. AoA purpose, definition and scope consistent with guidance Identification of the specific gaps that are being addressed in the AoA. Identification of the key questions identified in the AoA study guidance. Definition of the baseline (existing and planned systems) capability. Identification of the alternatives identified by the AoA study guidance. This includes discussion about the implications and/or dependencies identified about the alternative and how the dependencies will be addressed in the analysis. Discussion of previous related studies and their relevance to this study. 2. Appropriate stakeholders, issues, constraints addressed Identification of the stakeholders and their roles/responsibilities in the AoA. Identification of how each part of the stakeholder and oversight communities will participate in the study and review processes. Addresses all assumptions and constraints in guidance. Additional assumptions and constraints are reasonable and do not artificially constrain the outcome of the study. 3. Analytic Methodology Measures of Effectiveness, Suitability, and Performance identified. Modeling and Simulation Accreditation Plan is acceptable. Decomposition of the capability gaps. Traceability of the AoA measures to the requirements and associated minimum values identified in the ICD (from the CBA). Cost work breakdown structure. Methodology to determine capability of alternatives to close or mitigate gaps. Methodology to explore tradespace and description of what sensitivity analysis will be accomplished to determine key parameters and T/O values for RCT. Methodology to conduct the cost/capability tradeoff analysis. Methodology for addressing the dependencies identified for each alternative. Scenarios to represent the operational environment. 4. Level of effort and schedule is reasonable Includes a schedule for AoA activities. Addresses potential milestones that are driving the AoA. Addresses the ability of the AoA study team to execute the study plan. Identifies potential areas of risk and/or roadblocks pertinent to the study (particularly schedule risk, lack of required data, lack of stakeholder participation, etc.). 126 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 Appendix F: Final Report Assessment This appendix contains the AoA assessment criteria used by OAS for their independent assessment of AoA Final Reports and associated briefings for presentation to the AFROC. This assessment will be presented in bullet fashion, highlighting the risk areas with the completeness, credibility and defensibility of the analysis results as it progresses outside of the AF to the decision makers. OAS will provide an initial assessment and get-well plan after the initial review to determine readiness for submission to AF/A5R. 1. Scope and problem definition consistent with guidance Description of the scope and purpose of the AoA. Demonstrated consistency with guidance. Discussed how AoA scope was “tailored” to address the AoA study guidance and ADM Identified any key MDA or other issues that were not considered or addressed in the analysis (if applicable). This included identification and rationale for any unanswered questions and/or incomplete analysis and description of the recommended plan to answer these questions and to bring any remaining analysis to closure. 2. Appropriate stakeholders, issues, constraints addressed Identification of stakeholder and oversight communities and explanation of their roles/responsibilities in the AoA Description of how methodologies, evaluation criteria, and results were reviewed and accepted by stakeholder and oversight communities 3. Analytic Execution Assumptions and rating criteria used in the evaluation Identification of which enablers were addressed and how they align with those outlined at the MDD and in the AoA guidance Identification of the performance, cost, and risk drivers and how they were fully explored in sensitivity analysis. Identification of how sensitive each of the alternatives are to the analysis assumptions and if they are sensitive to specific scenarios. Identification of the key parameters in the RCT and analytical evidence to support the thresholds and objectives identified. This must include identifying what the associated cost drivers are for those values and how sensitive the cost is to those values. Identification of technical feasibility of thresholds and objectives identified in the RCT based on the affordability constraints identified. Identification and scoping of what additional information/analysis is needed prior to initiation of any acquisition activities; to include requesting a milestone decision. Identification of how the cost of each alternative lines up with the affordability constraints identified at MDD and in the AoA study guidance. Identification of Measures of Suitability and how they are intended to be supported in the intended operational environment. 127 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 Identification of the metrics used, any weighting factors applied, and the rationale for applying each weighting factor. Analysis should illustrate interrelationship between the metrics and cost to facilitate cost/capability/risk/schedule tradespace discussions. Identification of the operational and non-operational (e.g., technical, cost, schedule) risks. It is important that the study team address the non-operational risks with the same level of fidelity/rigor as the operational risks. Non-operational risks can be significant contributors to future program failure. Identification of all DOTmLPF-P implications for each alternative Description of each alternative under consideration including discriminating features 4. Recommendations and Conclusions Supported by AoA Findings Answers to the key questions identified in the AoA study guidance. These must be answered sufficiently for decision makers to support the upcoming decisions. Illustration of the cost/capability/risk tradespace. This must clearly identify for the decision makers where the trade-offs exist, operational risk associated with the performance and to what degree the capability gap(s) have been mitigated. Rationale for disqualifying any alternatives from further consideration. If appropriate, recommended changes to validated capability requirements for consideration if change would enable more appropriate tradespace. Explanation of why alternatives do well or poorly. This must include rationale for the results. Explanation of how variations to CONOPS or attributes might mitigate cost drivers or low ratings on assessment metrics. This should include characterizing the circumstances in which each alternative appears superior and the conditions under which it degrades. Identification of estimated schedules for each alternative, assessment of existing TRLs/MRLs for critical technologies which may impact likelihood of completing development, integration, operational testing on schedule and within budget. This should include an assessment of the likelihood of achieving the proposed schedule based on DoD experience. 128 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 Appendix G: Lessons Learned This appendix provides rationale and guidance for capturing and documenting lessons learned. Lessons learned provide current and future AoA study teams with valuable knowledge derived from past and present AoA efforts. This knowledge includes information about the strengths and weaknesses of initiating, planning, and executing an AoA. Lessons learned from the beginning of the AoA to completion of the AoA process should be thoroughly documented. By capturing and documenting lessons learned, each AoA team can add to and benefit from the collective wisdom and “Best Practices” related to the AoA process. Some of the most commonly recurring Study Team lessons learned include: Meet regularly either in person or virtually Team composition of both Air Force and contractor personnel provides good complementary technical support Study Advisory Groups provide guidance, support and sanity checks The Study Director and the core team must lead the entire effort Small numbers of people meeting are more productive Buy-in of the senior leaders at all levels is critical Things will change – documentation and communication is critical Utilization of High Performance Teams can increase efficiency and has the potential to shorten timelines. They are especially useful when a team is faced with a very aggressive schedule 1195 129 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 Appendix H: OAS Review of Documents for AFROC This appendix provides a general timeline to follow for review of AoA related documents (study plans, final reports, and interim status briefings) in preparation for presentation to the AFROC. This timeline applies a staffing process that begins with the AoA document delivery to OAS and concludes with the presentation of the document at the AFROC. The staffing process may conclude prior to AFROC presentation if an intermediate body (AFRRG, MAJCOM, etc.) recommends that the document either; 1) does not contain sufficient information, or 2) is not appropriate for presentation at the next scheduled AFROC. This schedule is not fixed, but it does define the recommended minimum timeline necessary for satisfactory review and staffing by the organizations with an interest in AoA documentation. The first two weeks of review are designed to assist the study team in understanding OAS’ assessment and provides the team with the time needed to make any adjustments they see fit in preparation for the remainder of the staffing process. This timeline only applies to efforts that have had an OAS member embedded with the team throughout the effort. For studies in which an OAS member has not been imbedded, the AoA team should plan for a lengthier review process in order for OAS to become familiarized with the study, its objectives and the products subject to review. Suspense 6 weeks prior to AFROC AoA Team submits document to OAS. Provides presentation and document to OAS. OAS works with teams to refine products. 5 Weeks prior to AFROC OAS provides assessment of presentation and document to AoA Team & MAJCOM/Lead Command. OAS works with teams to refine products. 4 Weeks prior to AFROC AoA Team submits documents to AF Functional for review. OAS submits assessment to AF Functional. 3 Weeks prior to AFROC AF Functional submits document to AF/A5R-P in preparation for AFRRG. 2 Weeks prior to AFROC AoA Team presents document at AFRRG. OAS submits assessment to AFRRG. 1 Week prior to AFROC AoA Team revises document based on feedback/direction from AFRRG. Week of AFROC 1216 Activity AoA Team presents document to AFROC. OAS submits assessment to AFROC. Figure H-1. Example Timeline for Review of Documents and Briefings to the AFROC 130 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 Appendix I: Joint DoD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Acquisition Activities This appendix provides additional information for those Department of Defense (DoD)/Air Force Acquisition efforts which are part of the nuclear enterprise. It provides information regarding important stakeholders, councils, and committees which should be included in the AoA processes. It also points out the significantly longer process that is used by the Department of Energy (DOE) during and acquisition of nuclear weapons. These timelines can greatly impact the fielding of a new capability to the warfighter and close coordination is vital for program success. Complementary DoD and DOE Departmental Responsibilities Although there is a dual-agency division of responsibilities between the DoD and the DOE, these responsibilities are complementary. These complementary responsibilities are based on law and formal agreements to provide a safe, secure, and militarily effective nuclear weapons stockpile. All nuclear weapon development, production, sustainment, and retirement projects shall be coordinated fully between the DoD and the DOE, and shall consider total weapon cost and performance (including DOE costs and other resource requirements) in establishing military requirements and design objectives. The DoD and DOE will jointly determine the classification of developmental systems. Councils and Committees In addition to establishing roles and responsibilities two primary entities were established to provide support and advice in matters involving oversight, guidance, and day-to-day matters concerning nuclear stockpile activities: the Nuclear Weapon Council and the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee. Nuclear Weapon Council (NWC) 131 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273a. 1274b. 1275 1276c. 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 The DoDD 3150.1, E2.1.5. defines the Nuclear Weapon Council (NWC) as: “An advisory/approval body established under DoD-DOE MOU (reference (f)) and 10 U.S.C. 179 (reference (g)) to provide high-level oversight, coordination and guidance to nuclear weapons stockpile activities. It is chaired by USD (AT&L), with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a senior representative from the DOE as members.” All communication between DoD and DOE should be transmitted through the NWC. The Council provides an inter-agency forum for reaching consensus and establishing priorities between the two Departments. It also provides policy guidance and oversight of the nuclear stockpile management process to ensure high confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. The NWC serves as an oversight and reporting body and is accountable to both the Legislative and Executive branches of the government. The NWC meets regularly to raise and resolve issues between the DoD and the NNSA regarding concerns and strategies for stockpile management. The Council is also required to report regularly to the President regarding the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) was established with the following Strategic Nuclear Goals in mind: Maintain nuclear weapons system surety through timely and credible processes. Enable the development and implementation of nuclear technology to maintain air, space and information dominance. Sustain war-winning nuclear capabilities to ensure operational readiness and effectiveness. Highlighted below are the individual and joint responsibilities of the DoD and DOE. AFNWC has the DoD lead responsibility to coordinate nuclear weapon arsenal requirements with the DOE for refurbishments to be acquired within the Joint DOE-DoD 6.X Life Cycle process. 132 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a separately organized and funded agency within the Department of Energy (DOE) and has a multi-billion dollar per year budget to maintain the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile. NNSA manages life extension efforts using multipart nuclear weapon refurbishment process, referred to as the 6.X Process, which separates the life extension process into phases. Nuclear weapons are developed, produced, maintained in the stockpile, and then retired and dismantled. This sequence of events is known as the nuclear weapons life cycle. As a part of nuclear weapons management, the DoD and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have specific responsibilities related to nuclear weapons life cycle activities. Therefore, The DoD and the NNSA share responsibility for all U.S. nuclear weapons/warheads. The following chart depicts the Joint DoD and DOE relationships. The left side of the diagram includes the DoD organizational flow, beginning with the PM to the PEO, followed by the SAF/AQ, AFROC, JROC, up to the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). The USD(AT&L) coordinates with the NWC. On the DOE side, the flow begins with the NNSA PM to the NA-10 Defense Programs, and up to the NNSA N-1. The NNSA N-1 coordinates with the NWC. Joint DoD/DOE involves coordination of the DoD PM and NNSA PM 133 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 DoD Responsibilities The DoD is responsible for: Participating in approved feasibility studies Developing requirements documents that specify operational characteristics for each warhead-type and the environments in which the warhead must perform or remain safe Participating in the coordination of engineering interface requirements between the warhead and the delivery system Determining design acceptability Specifying military/national security requirements for specific quantities of warheads Receiving, transporting, storing, securing, maintaining, and (if directed by the President) employing fielded warheads Accounting for individual warheads in DoD custody Participating in the joint nuclear weapons decision process (including working groups, the warhead Project Officer Group (POG), the NWC Standing & Safety Committee (NWCSSC), and the NWC) Developing and acquiring the delivery vehicle and launch platform for a warhead; and storing retired warheads awaiting dismantlement in accordance with jointly approved plans. DOE Responsibilities 134 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 The DOE is responsible for: Participating in approved feasibility studies Evaluating and selecting the baseline warhead design approach Determining the resources (funding, nuclear and non-nuclear materials, facilities, etc.) required for the program Performing development engineering to establish and refine the warhead design Engineering and establishing the required production lines Producing or acquiring required materials and components Assembling components and sub-assemblies into stockpile warheads (if approved by the President) Providing secure transport within the U.S. Developing maintenance procedures and producing replacement limited-life components (LLCs) Conducting a jointly-approved quality assurance program Developing a refurbishment plan—when required—for sustained stockpile shelf-life Securing warheads, components, and materials while at DOE facilities Accounting for individual warheads in DOE custody Participating in the joint nuclear weapons decision process Receiving and dismantling retired warheads; and disposing of components and materials from retired warheads. Joint Nuclear Acquisition Process The Joint DoD-NNSA Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle consists of seven phases from initial research and Concept Design through Retirement, Dismantlement, and Disposal. This process is similar to, and has many parallels with, the Defense Acquisition System described in DoD 5000 directives and instructions. The United States has not conducted a weapon test involving a nuclear yield since 1992. This prohibition against nuclear testing is based on diplomatic and political considerations including the international Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 which the United States follows even though the treaty was not formally ratified. Although entirely new nuclear weapons could be developed without testing involving a nuclear yield, the United States has refrained from developing new devices and instead has emphasized stockpile management including programs to upgrade, update, and extend the service life of our current weapons. This sustainment effort is called the 6.X Process. 135 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 The Phase 6.X Process The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has a major role in the refurbishment and maintenance of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. To manage and facilitate the refurbishment process, the NWC approved the Phase 6.X Procedural Guideline in April 2000. 1382 1383 1384 136 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 Phase 6.1 – Concept Assessment (On-going) The Concept and Assessment Phase, consists of continuing studies by the DoD, the NNSA, and the Project Officer Group (POG). A continuous exchange of information, both formal and informal, is conducted among various individuals and groups. This exchange results in the focusing of sufficient interest on an idea for a nuclear weapon or component refurbishment to warrant a Program Study. During the 6.1 Phase, the NWC must be informed in writing before the onset of any activity jointly conducted by the DoD and the NNSA. Phase 6.2 – Feasibility Study (9-18 months) After the NWC approves entry into Phase 6.2, the DoD and the NNSA embark on a Phase 6.2 Study, which is managed by the POG for that weapon system. In a Phase 6.2 Study, design options are developed and the feasibility of a Phase 6.X refurbishment program for that particular nuclear weapon is evaluated. The NNSA tasks the appropriate DOE laboratories to identify various design options to refurbish the nuclear weapon. The POG performs an in-depth analysis of each design option. At a minimum, this analysis considers the following: Nuclear safety System design, trade-offs, and technical risk analyses Life expectancy issues Research and development requirements and capabilities Qualification and certification requirements Production capabilities and capacities Life cycle maintenance and logistics issues Delivery system and platform issues Rationale for replacing or not replacing components during the refurbishment The Phase 6.2 Study includes a detailed review of the fielded and planned support equipment (handling gear, test gear, use control equipment, trainers, etc.) and the technical publications associated with the weapon system. This evaluation is performed to ensure that logistics support programs can provide the materials and equipment needed during the planned refurbishment time period. Military considerations, which are evaluated in tandem with design factors, include (at a minimum): Operational impacts and/or benefits that would be derived from the design options Physical and operational security measures Requirements for joint non-nuclear testing Refurbishment options are developed in preparation for the development of the option downselect package. This package includes any major impacts on the NNSA nuclear weapons complex 137 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 Phase 6.2A – Design Definition and Cost Study (3-6 months) The NNSA will work with the National Nuclear Laboratories to identify production issues and to develop process development plans and proposed workload structures for the refurbishment. The National Nuclear Laboratories will continue to refine the design and to identify qualification testing and analysis in order to verify that the design meets the specified requirements. Cost estimates are developed for the design, testing, production, and maintenance activities for the projected life of the Life Extension Program (LEP) refurbishment Phase 6.3 – Development Engineering (1 - 3 years) Phase 6.3 begins when the NWC prepares a Phase 6.3 letter requesting joint DoD and NNSA. The NNSA, in coordination with the DoD, conducts experiments, tests, and analyses to validate the design option(s). Also at this time, the production facilities assess the producibility of the proposed design, initiate process development activities, and produce test hardware as required. At the end of Phase 6.3, the weapon refurbishment design is demonstrated to be feasible in terms of: Safety Use control Performance Reliability Producibility The design is thereby ready to be released to the production facilities for stockpile production preparation activities. These activities are coordinated with parallel DoD activities. The Lead Service may decide that a Preliminary Safety Study of the system is required in order to examine design features, hardware, and procedures as well as aspects of the concept of operation that affect the safety of the weapon system. During this Study, the Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group (NWSSG) identifies safety-related concerns and deficiencies so that timely and cost-efficient corrections can be made during this Phase. Phase 6.4 – Production Engineering (1-3 years) When development engineering is sufficiently mature, the NNSA authorizes the initiation of Phase 6.4. This Phase includes activities to adapt the developmental design into a producible design as well as activities that prepare the production facilities for refurbishment component production. 138 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 Generally, Phase 6.4 ends after the completion of production engineering, basic tooling, layout, and adoption of fundamental assembly procedures, and when NNSA engineering releases indicate that the production processes, components, subassemblies, and assemblies are qualified. Phase 6.5 – First Production (3-6 months) When sufficient progress has been made in Phase 6.4, the NNSA initiates Phase 6.5. During this Phase, the production facilities begin production of the first refurbished weapons. These weapons are evaluated by the DoD and the NNSA. At this time, the NNSA preliminarily evaluates the refurbished weapon for suitability and acceptability. A final evaluation is made by the NNSA and the Labs after the completion of an engineering evaluation program for the weapon. If the DoD requires components, circuits, or software for test or training purposes prior to final approval by the NNSA, the weapons or items would be utilized with the understanding that the NNSA has not made its final evaluation. The POG coordinates specific weapons requirements for test or training purposes. The POG informs the NWCSSC that the Life Extension Programs (LEP) refurbishment program is ready to proceed to IOC and full deployment of the refurbished weapon. The Lead Service conducts a Pre-Operational Safety Study at a time when specific weapon system safety rules can be coordinated, approved, promulgated, and implemented 60 days before Initial Operational Capability (IOC) or first weapon delivery. During this Study, the NWSSG examines system design features, hardware, procedures, and aspects of the concept of operation that affect the safety of the weapon system to determine if the DoD nuclear weapon system safety standards can be met. If safety procedures or rules must be revised, the NWSSG recommends draft revised weapon system safety rules to the appropriate Military Departments. Phase 6.6 – Full-Scale Production (Varies) Upon NWC approval to initiate Phase 6.6, the NNSA undertakes the necessary full-scale production of refurbished weapons for entry into the stockpile. Phase 6.6 ends when all planned refurbishment activities, certifications, and reports are complete. Aligning the DoE Phase 6.X processes with DoD Acquisition activities takes a lot of planning and coordination. The timelines for the DoE process are significantly longer than current DoD projections and data flow has to be tightly coordinated to ensure a successful program execution to meet warfighter timelines and requirements. 139 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 Appendix J: Human Systems Integration (HSI) OPR: SAF/AQ-AFHSIO hsi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil Introduction System hardware and software components are defined and transformed as technology evolves, but the human being is the one (and often the only) known factor as we begin to define a materiel solution to a capability gap. To begin planning and developing a new system, it is important to consider the human first. This is called Human Systems Integration (HSI). HSI defined: Human Systems Integration (HSI): “interdisciplinary technical and management processes for integrating human considerations within and across all system elements; an essential enabler to systems engineering practice” (International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), 2007) [The goal of HSI is] “to optimize total system performance, minimize total ownership costs, and ensure that the system is built to accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will operate, maintain, and support the system.” DoDI 5000.02 “The integrated, comprehensive analysis, design and assessment of requirements, concepts and resources for system Manpower, Personnel, Training, Environment, Safety, Occupational Health, Habitability, Survivability and Human Factors” AFI 10-601 Air Force HSI is frequently broken out into nine elements, known as “domains,” to help people think about and manage various aspects of human involvement/impacts. The AF HSI domains are: Manpower, Personnel, Training, Environment, Safety, Occupational Health, Human Factors Engineering, Survivability, and Habitability. These domains are explained later in this appendix. Integrating the human when developing alternatives The Department of Defense (DoD) places a high priority on our people, and the policies reflect that. The Air Force priority of “Develop and care for Airmen” is a guiding tenet for this work. The earlier humans are considered in the Integrated Life Cycle, and the consistency with which they are considered throughout all phases, the better the system will be and the better it will be for the people who use it. In fact, the DoD requires that acquisition programs give the human equal treatment to hardware and software as systems are developed: “The human and ever increasingly complex defense systems are inextricably linked. Systems, composed of hardware and software, enable the ability of 140 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 humans to perform tasks that successfully project combat power in difficult and lethal environments. High levels of human effectiveness are typically required for a system to achieve its desired effectiveness. The synergistic interaction between the human and the system is key to attaining improvements in total system performance and minimizing total ownership costs. Therefore, to realize the full and intended potential that complex systems offer, the Department must apply continuous and rigorous approaches to HSI to ensure that the human capabilities are addressed throughout every aspect of system acquisition….The DoD has embraced HSI as a systemic approach. The concept of HSI embraces the total human involvement with the system throughout its life cycle…. In summary, this means that the human in acquisition programs is given equal treatment to hardware and software.” (FY11 Department of Defense Human Systems Integration Management Plan, 2011. Washington, DC: DDRE, Director, Mission Assurance, and Director of Human Performance, Training & Biosystems.) These principles apply to unmanned platforms as well: “…unmanned systems are unmanned in name only. While there may be no Airman onboard the actual vehicle, there indeed are airmen involved in every step of the process, including the pilots who operate the vehicles’ remote controls and sensors and maintenance personnel.” (Gen Fraser, VCSAF, 23 July 2009) We have learned through the years that because of maintenance and data processing requirements, “unmanned” systems often require MORE people to operate and maintain them than traditional platforms. 1578 The importance of HSI 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 HSI ensures that the people who touch the system in any way are accommodated and provided with effective, usable, maintainable, safe equipment, which is integrated and designed properly. The earlier humans are considered in CONOPS, capability gaps, capability based analysis assumptions and constraints, and JCIDS documents, the better chance the equipment will be designed and funded for development with human considerations intact. 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 Human performance (HP) capabilities and limitations often become serious design constraints – they should be factored into analytical assumptions and constraints Effective HSI results in systems with excellent usability, availability, safety, suitability, accessibility, and maintainability Early recognition and consideration of the human element may preclude some deficiencies often found in OT&E that may be very costly to redesign HSI responsibilities DODI 5000.02, Enclosure 8 (new draft 5000.02 will be Enclosure 2-6) stipulates that the Program Manager (PM) is responsible for doing HSI during the development of the program. As 141 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 a member of the Analysis of Alternatives study team, consider the human when addressing questions, and develop the study’s assumptions and constraints. Determine costs related to mission tasks, threats, environments, manpower requirements, skill levels, effectiveness, system performance, usability, accessibility, maintainability, safety, etc. The analysis will tell PMs and System Engineers (SE) about the necessary characteristics and performance parameters of the new system. In turn, information will be used to make decisions impacting the lives of Airmen. It is important, therefore, that to provide a thorough basis for analytic decisions. 1608 The HSI process 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 "…A knowledgeable, interdisciplinary HSI team is generally required to address the full spectrum of human considerations, and the systems engineer is key to ensuring that HSI is included throughout the system’s life cycle…" (INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, Para 9.12.1 “HSI is Integral to the SE Process”, Version 3.2, 2010) “The objective of Human Systems Integration is to appropriately integrate the human into the system design to optimize total system effectiveness. To accomplish this, all aspects of human interaction with the system must be understood to the highest degree possible to optimize the system and human capabilities. For each program or system, different emphasis is placed on the human interaction depending on the type of system and its mission and environment.. (FY11 Department of Defense Human Systems Integration Management Plan, 2011. Washington, DC: DDRE, Director, Mission Assurance, and Director of Human Performance, Training & Biosystems.) Human roles, needs and impacts in maintenance, logistics, training, intelligence, security and other support functions can and should be accounted for in the HSI process – but only if they are first addressed in the CBA and AoA. Starting with the human as the integrating focus is a rational methodology to inform early systems engineering, development planning and concept characterization efforts. How HSI traces through the JCIDS documents – if the correct HSI language does not appear in any one document, it cannot be inserted in the next stage or put onto contract: 1. HSI in CBA: cites inability to safely perform mission, and unacceptable O&S costs due to long maintenance times. 2. HSI in ICD: cites need for operator safety and accessibility of components for maintenance. 3. HSI in AoA: MOEs/MOPs for safety, usability, accessibility 4. HSI in CDD: KPP for Force Protection, KPP for Safety, KPP for Sustainment, KSA for Maintainability, attributes for accessibility 5. HSI in CPD: KPP for Force Protection, KPP for Safety, KPP for Sustainment, KSA for Maintainability, attributes for accessibility 6. (after JCIDS) HSI in SRD: cites applicable parts of HSI DID and MIL STD 1472 for safety, usability, accessibility 142 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 [NOTE: A simple tool for considering human involvement, impacts, constraints, and trade-offs can be found at the end of this appendix.] Domains defined The HSI domains represent a diverse set of human resources-related issues to stakeholders in the acquisition process, many of whom are primary “bill payers” during the operations and support and disposal phases of the system life cycle. Since changes in one domain will likely impact another, domains should not be considered as separate stove-pipes. An integrated perspective, balancing the equities of all stakeholders, needs to start prior to MS A and continue through development and sustainment. Below are the AF HSI domains and some human considerations that might influence decisions and thoughts about effectiveness, usability, costs, etc. Notice that some human considerations appear in more than one domain. The placement of a consideration will often be overlapping, and it may be contextual (for example: vehicle exhaust may cause an Occupational Health issue, or an Environment issue, or both): Manpower: Wartime/peacetime manning requirements Deployment considerations Future technology and human aptitudes System manpower estimates Force structure Maintenance and logistics concepts Operating strength BRAC Considerations Manning concepts Life Cycle Cost implications of manpower decisions Manpower policies 1658 1659 Personnel: Selection and classification Personnel/training pipeline Demographics Qualified personnel Knowledge, Skills and Abilities Projected user population/recruiting Accession/attrition Career progression/retention Cognitive, physical, educational profiles Life Cycle Cost implications of personnel decisions Promotion flow 1660 143 1661 Training: Training strategy and concepts Training development and methods Impact on school house or resources Simulation/embedded/ emulation 1662 1663 1664 1665 Virtual applications Operational tempo Trainer currency Training vs. job aids Training system costs, Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness (OSS&E) efficiency Refresher and certification training Required lead time for training, and timeliness of delivery Manpower and Personnel policy implications for training flow and costs Environment: System hazards that affect or impact Natural resources the human or earth Air Local communities/political/cultural Water Pollution prevention Earth Exhaust/toxic emissions Noise Disposal Wildlife Recycle/ Reuse Safety: Safety Types: Human Flight Weapon Ground CBRNE/NBC Equipment Design safety Procedures: Normal Emergency System risk reduction Human error Redundancy of systems Total System Reliability Fault reduction Communication 1666 1667 Occupational Health: 144 Operational Health Temperature Hazards Humidity/salt spray Operational Environments Weather Acoustics Shock and vibration Biological and chemical Laser protection Radiation Ballistic spall/fragmentation Oxygen deficiency Exhaust/toxic emissions Air/water pressure Health care Lighting Medications Weight /load weight distribution Diagnose, treat and manage illness and trauma Heat, cold, hydration Stress Exercise & fitness – mission readiness Disease prevention (vaccines/hygiene) 1668 1669 Human Factors Engineering: Human-centered design Human-system interface (aka Human-Machine Interface (HMI)) Design impact on skill, knowledge, & aptitudes Cognitive load, workload Personal protection Fatigue Implications of design on performance Human performance Simplicity of operation, maintenance, and support Design-driven human effectiveness, efficiency, safety and survivability Costs of design driven human error, inefficiency, or effectiveness Personnel Survivability/Force Protection Situational Awareness Threats Ergonomics Fratricide & Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral Operational arenas Potential damage to crew compartment Camouflage/ concealment Protective equipment Sensors Medical injury (self, buddy, etc.) Fatigue & stress Degraded operations (long/short term) 1670 145 1671 Habitability: Living/work environment Impact on sustained mission effectiveness, (ergonomics, bed, toilet, bath, food prep, rest and eating areas) Support services (food, medical, Impact on recruitment, retention cleaning, recreation, etc.) Ingress/ egress Security for personnel/personal items Normal Emergency Evacuation of casualties While wearing/carrying equipment Storage space for equipment, spares, food, water, supplies 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 Power requirements for food safety, lighting, temperature control, safety/security HSI practitioners can assist the AoA teams by providing information and focusing thoughts on effectiveness, usability, task analysis, safety considerations, habitability/facility needs, occupational health impacts, etc. HSI Support throughout the AoA The Air Force Human Systems Integration Office (SAF/AQ-AFHSIO) hsi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil should be the first call for HSI support. They can coordinate the appropriate expertise from across the Air Force including AFLCMC, AFNWC, AFSPC/SMC, the MAJCOM HSI cells, and the 711 Human Performance Wing. Human Systems Integration Tool. Below is an easy matrix to help remember the domains and consider the many users of a program. It is populated with a few examples to provide an idea of how it is used to help keep all the humans using/touching a system (and the costs associated with them) in mind as when planning a new system. Use this when incorporating data into the assessment. Keep in mind that considerations in one domain may cause significant risks or tradeoffs in another. 146 Personnel Types? Types? Skill levels? Training Pilot, sims, SERE Schools, OJT Human Factors Engineering Cockpit design? Accessibility Lift / stretch constraints? Environment Exhaust, HAZMATExhaust, HAZMAT How many guards, how many gates, how many shifts? How many analysts to process data? How many loggies Other (ex: medical, ground station, fuel, mess, etc) Supporting 2 (ex: Weather supports system) Supporting 1 (ex: Intell supports system) Security Trainers Weapons load, transport load numbers Supported 2 (ex: system provides transport) Wartime / Peacetime Wartime / numbers Peacetime numbers Supported 1 (ex: system provides sensor intell) Manpower How many Fuelers, Medical Skill levels? Contract? Pilot and Mx Schools, Train-thetrainer, contractors ? Send threat updates realtime to cockpit? Exhaust, HAZMAT Send Wx updates to cockpit? Send threat info, video, sigs to Intell sqd In-flight refuel? Checklists, emergency shut-off valves Safety 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 Logisticians Operators HSI Domains Maintainers Humans Using System Occupational Health Temps, pressurize,Temps, gBack strain strain back strain, flight line ear prot. Personnel Survivability (aka Force Protection) Ejection, restraints, beacon, chaff Habitability Elimination packs,Space for cockpit temps, tools, restraints workbenche s, seating, moving large equip Example 1: Reducing Manpower in maintainers may cause a Safety or Occupational Health problem for the operator. Example 2: Decreasing the personnel skill levels of operators may cause a need for longer and more intense training, more trainers, or more advanced technical design to make up for the shortfall. 1707 147 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 Appendix K: Acquisition Intelligence in the AoA Process Analysis of Alternatives (AoAs) that are intelligence sensitive (i.e. either produce intelligence products or consume intelligence products during development and/or operation) require acquisition intelligence support and Intelligence Supportability Analysis (ISA). Acquisition Intelligence is the process of planning for and implementing the intelligence information and infrastructure necessary to successfully acquire and employ future Air Force capabilities. Acquisition Intelligence has two primary goals. 1) to identify Intelligence requirements early in the life cycle to minimize cost, schedule and performance risks and 2) to support programs/initiatives throughout their lifecycle with high quality intelligence material through a set of standard acquisition intelligence processes and tools. Background Intelligence integration in support of Air Force and Joint systems development has never been more important or challenging than it is in today's environment. When intelligence is not fully integrated into the Air Force's acquisition and sustainment processes, the results often include costly work-a-rounds or modifications, scheduling delays, unplanned adjustments to operations/maintenance, and/or delivery of a weapon system that has vulnerabilities to or is less effective against emerging threats. As future systems become more intelligence-dependent, the cost of omitting intelligence integration will increase significantly. Late identification of requirements hampers the ability of the intelligence community to conduct the long-term planning, funding and development of collection and production capability needed to support user's requirements. Intelligence customers, in turn, are forced to use existing intelligence products or contract out intelligence production, significantly impacting both weapon capabilities and/or increasing program costs. The expanded role of intelligence in the acquisition and sustainment processes is intended to minimize program cost, schedule, technical, and performance risk by enabling long term support planning by the intelligence community. Recent changes to DoDI 5000.02, CJCSI 3170.01, and AFI 63-101 and the publishing of the new DoDD 5250.01 have significantly increased the intelligence supportability requirements for weapon system programs. Specifically, program managers are responsible to ensure an ISA is conducted in collaboration with the local AFLCMC/IN intelligence office (also referred to as the local Senior Intelligence Officer-SIO, throughout this document) to establish program intelligence sensitivity, document intelligence requirements, and ensure current, authoritative threat data is used for analysis throughout the program life cycle. Intelligence Supportability Analysis (ISA) for AoAs After establishing that an AoA is intelligence sensitive, i.e. either producing intelligence products or consuming intelligence products during development and/or operation, analysis is conducted to 148 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 fill in the intelligence infrastructure details for capability enablers, their DOTmLPF implications, and associated costs. That established framework is then applied to the proposed alternatives resulting in a more complete and accurate picture of the proposals intelligence support requirements and associated intelligence supportability shortfalls. Ideally, ISA will already have been conducted on the baseline alternative, consult with the local SIO, requiring analysis only on the alternatives to identify and to document additional intelligence supportability needs. ISA is the process by which AF intelligence, acquisition, and operations analysts identify, document and plan for requirements, needs, and supporting intelligence infrastructure necessary to successfully acquire and employ AF capabilities, thereby ensuring intelligence supportability. The ISA results will provide the stakeholders with the needed info to compare a capability’s stated or derived intelligence (data and infrastructure) support requirements with the intelligence support capabilities expected throughout a capability’s life cycle. ISA results in the identification of derived intelligence requirements (DIRs) and deficiencies, along with associated impacts to both acquisition and operational capability if the required intelligence is not provided. Through ISA, stakeholders identify, document, and plan for derived requirements and supporting intelligence infrastructure necessary to successfully acquire and field Air Force capabilities. Several major types of intelligence products and services are needed by weapon systems (see Figure 1). Intelligence Products and Services Needed by Weapons Systems Threat Examples: •System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) •SAP Annex to STAR •SA-99 Sys Description •AA-99 FME Report •Jammer study •EWIRDB •TMAP models •IR/RF signatures Geospatial •Scenarios •Threat assessments •Order of battle •Platform Fit Data •Characteristics & Performance data Examples: •Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) •Digital Point Positioning Database (DPPDB) •Controlled Image Base (CIB) Information & Services (GI&S) and Targeting •Paper Maps •Signature data •Electronic Maps •Images •Database access •Terrain Data •Dynamic models •CAD models •Vector data •Other •Custom products Intelligence Examples: •Fighter Squadron intel personnel •Acq Intel personnel •SAR clearances for FS intel personnel •SAR clearances for MSIC analysts • TTPs •SCI facilities •SCI tools •SIPRNET Infrastructure •Manpower •Clearances •Training •Procedures •Facilities •Computer Systems •Connectivity •Other •Cooperative (mostly Adversary, but also includes Targeting Data •Other Neutral, Commercial, Coalition, and US systems) Some products are periodic; most are aperiodic 1771 1772 Figure K-1: Intelligence Products and Services 149 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 Acquisition Intelligence Analysts’ Support to AoAs AoA is an evaluation of the performance, operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs of alternative systems to meet a mission capability. The analysis assesses the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives versus the baseline capability, including the sensitivity of each alternative in the available tradespace. Acquisition intelligence has a role in all of the AoA working groups (WGs) identifying intelligence infrastructure requirements and implications. Threats and Scenarios Working Group (TSWG). The TSWG is responsible for identifying and providing the scenario(s) to be used during an AoA to assess the military utility and operational effectiveness of solutions being considered for possible AF acquisition to meet a valid requirement. Additionally, the TSWG provides threat performance and characteristic information from intelligence sources to enable the AoAs Effectiveness Analysis Working Group (EAWG) to simulate potential threats to mission effectiveness. The TSWG will be staffed primarily with acquisition intelligence professionals and SMEs. Members support the TSWG by providing relevant intelligence information to sustain TSWG decisions. The TSWG is the forum tasked to track, anticipate, and mitigate issues potentially impacting the identification, selection and recommendation of scenarios to the AoA WIPT. Other members may be added on an ad hoc basis to resolve issues, as they arise. Technology and Alternatives Working Group (TAWG). The TAWG acts as the interface with alternative providers, crafting the requirements request, receiving alternative data, and resolving questions between the providers and the rest of the AoA WGs. The acquisition intelligence specialist's role as a TAWG member is to ensure an ISA is conducted on all of the alternatives and intelligence needs are identified, and potential intelligence shortfalls are highlighted, including inputs from the acquisition intelligence costs analyst detailing what data is required to frame the ISR infrastructure costing analysis report. An example of decomposing how Alternative A navigates: Alternative A navigates to a target using a seeker. What type of data is needed to develop or operate the seeker (i.e. electro-optical signatures)? Does the IC produce that type of data? If not, identify this as a potential intelligence shortfall. The table below illustrates a typical AoA set of alternatives, from an intelligence supportability perspective. Each column represents an area of intelligence infrastructure that would be required for system development or operation. Refer to fig 1 page 2 for intelligence products and services. Alternative Comm Signatures Training Facilities Baseline Baseline + X A X Shortfall X X B Y X X X C Z X X X 150 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 Operating Concept WG. The acquisition intelligence specialist‘s role is to review the CONOPS from an intelligence perspective to ensure intelligence supportability issues/needs are noted. May also be called the Enabling Concept Working Group (ECWG). Effectiveness Analysis Working Group. The acquisition intelligence specialist participates in the creation of the analysis assumptions from the perspective of valid intelligence supportability and aids in the identification/supply of required data. Cost Analysis Working Group. Acquisition intelligence cost analysts, in coordination with, members of the other working groups, support the AoA by providing cost data on intelligence support-related activities external to the proposed solutions/alternatives (i.e. DOTMLPF). Acquisition Intelligence Analysts’ Support to Decision-makers When an AoA (or AoA Study Plan) is scheduled to go before the AFROC, acquisition intelligence analysts are asked to assess the AoA and highlight any ISA concerns. This is done via an Intelligence Health Assessment Memo for Record. In the MFR, the acquisition intelligence analyst identifies any potential concerns associated with the alternatives, or the AoA Study Plan if the Plan is being reviewed by AFROC. Sample IHA MFRs are below. 1830 Contact Information 1831 AFLCMC/IN, Ms. Mary Knight, 21st IS, DSN 986-7604, mary.knight@us.af.mil 1832 1833 1834 151 1835 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 1836 1837 FROM: AFLCMC/IN 1838 Building 556, Area B 1839 2450 D Street 1840 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 1841 1842 1843 SUBJECT: Deployable Tactical Radar Replacement (DTR2) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Update 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1. Intelligence Supportability Analysis for the DTR2 (YELLOW): AFLCMC/IN is supporting the development of the 3D Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR); one of the possible solutions in the DTR2 AoA. However, the AoA’s tradespace did not include the Combined Reporting Center (CRC) so intelligence (mission data needs) were not considered. This approach has led to intelligence supportability issues in previous AF ISR systems, such as Global Hawk’s integration with DCGS. 2. The intelligence community’s capabilities to support probable mission data needs are (YELLOW): The solutions to two of the primary operational capability gaps require information that has either been identified as a gap from other programs or will require information in a different format or fidelity then what is currently being provided by the intelligence community. These are: a. (YELLOW) Gap: Does not detect and track stressing air breathing targets and/or theater ballistic missiles. The intelligence data required to develop, test, and provide updates for the mission data to support identification for the CRC are not likely to be available to the fidelity necessary (new requirement over legacy system). b. (YELLOW) Gap: Does not have the ability to conduct non-cooperative combat target recognition (NCTR). NCTR will require signature data for the air breathing and ballistic targets that will be classified by DTR2. Since tactical radars have not needed this information in the past, signatures will likely be needed in different frequencies or fidelities than is currently regularly produced by the intelligence community. 3. Questions can be addressed to the undersigned, DSN XXX-XXXX, 1870 1871 //Signed// 152 @wpafb.af.mil. 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD FROM: AFLCMC/IN Building 556, Area B 2450 D Street Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 SUBJECT: Acquisition Intelligence Input for Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/Moving Target Indicator (MTI) JSTARS Mission Area (JMA) AoA Topic at 14-15 Sep 11 AFROC 1. ISA performed (YELLOW): AFLCMC/IN performed ISA for the SAR/MTI JMA AoA. The Intelligence Supportability Working Group (ISWG) worked directly with AoA members and leadership during the final six months of the AoA. ISA was not included in the tradespace but was considered parallel analysis. The ISA results were captured as an appendix within the classified AoA Final Report completed in August 2011 but not integrated into the main analysis. They were briefed to AoA Leadership during the July 2011 pre-AFROC AoA Executive WIPT. The results also informed ACC/A2X of recommended planning considerations associated with alternatives. 2. ISA Results (YELLOW): The ISA resulted in identification of Intel requirements for five combinations of platforms/sensors with SME-based assessment of risks and cost estimates for AoA discriminators, with manpower being the greatest based on large amounts of new sensor data. - Intel concerns are (YELLOW). The focus of the AoA was exclusively on sensors and platforms modeled against limited BMC2 missions and simulated against “watch box” data. This constraint limited the ability to perform meaningful ISA. The results for the “Target ID” Measure of Effectiveness was one of the key indicators that further ISA will be needed if alternatives are narrowed down for acquisition consideration. Lack of existing or emerging cohesive SAR/MTI AF Doctrine (BMC2 vs. ISR), coupled with immature technology for SAR/MTI Processessing Exploitation and Analysis and Dissemination (PED), are areas of potential future concern. 3. Address questions to the AFLCMC/IN POC, DSN XXX-XXXX. 1906 1907 1908 //Signed// 1909 1910 153 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 Appendix L: Mission Tasks, Measures Development, and Data in Detail 1. Data Categories and Levels of Measurement The Figure L-1 describes data categories and various levels of measurement associated with each category. Study teams must understand these different levels to determine the type of data to collect, decide how to interpret the data for a measure, and determine what analysis is appropriate for the measure. These levels are nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Understanding the levels of measurement guides how to interpret the data. It helps prevent illogical statements, especially when comparing results to criteria. 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Figure L-1: Categories and Levels of Measurement Some organizations include an “absolute” category generally described as data requiring absolute counts such as “number of operators.” The four described above; however, are those most commonly found in analytical and statistical literature. 2. Four Possible Combinations of Categories and Collection Methods Measures are categorized using the terms quantitative or qualitative, and the terms objective or subjective. While related, they are not the same thing, but are sometimes used incorrectly or interchangeably. To clarify, quantitative and qualitative refer to the type of data we need to collect while objective and subjective refer to the method used to collect the data. There are four possible combinations of these terms: 154 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Quantitative data with objective data collection Measure example: Target Location Error Rationale: The measure is quantitative since the measurement scale is on a ratio scale. The accuracy of a targeting pod is best answered by quantitative data (distance) with the data collected objectively (using a tape measure). Quantitative data with subjective data collection Measure example: Operator estimate of the probability of survival Rationale: Measure is quantitative since the measurement is on a ratio scale (0.0 to 1.0 probability). The data is collected subjectively by first-person responses to a questionnaire item. Qualitative data with objective data collection Measure example: Color of munitions Rationale: Measure is qualitative since the measurement is on a nominal scale (e.g., blue, red, green). The data is collected objectively by noting the color (human reading) or measuring the wavelength of light. Qualitative data with subjective data collection Measure example: Operator rating of display Rationale: Measure is qualitative since the measurement is on a ordinal scale (e.g., Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree). The data is collected subjectively (first-person reports) by asking operators via questionnaires for their opinion or perception. As discussed above, sometimes these terms are used incorrectly or interchangeably. Quantitative and objective are often used as synonyms for one another while qualitative and subjective tend to be treated as synonyms. Figure L-2 clarifies their use and relationship to each other. In addition, the table describes the appropriate statistical techniques to use for each data type/data collection type combination. 155 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Figure L-2: Data Types and Collection Methods 3. Data Collection Methods Not all situations allow, or even call for, quantitative-objective data. Qualitative-subjective data is appropriate in many cases: Someone’s judgment or perception of a system’s performance, capabilities, and/or characteristics is important in the assessment In some cases, data for attributes can only be obtained through judgment or perception of individuals (e.g., human mental states like workload or situational awareness) Qualitative-subjective data is needed to help explain quantitative-objective data Quantitative-objective data may not exist or it’s impossible to collect and/or analyze Quantitative-objective data can be more difficult to collect than qualitative-subjective data, but has many other advantages: Most informative and easiest to substantiate Sensitive analytical techniques (e.g., mean, correlation, regression, analysis of variance) can be applied to analyze data 156 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 Errors and bias are easier to identify and quantify In addition to measure data, other information not necessarily used to compute a metric should be collected such as conditions or factors, stakeholder (user, operator, maintainer) and AoA team comments, and data from other reports or events 4. Determining how to use data Data can be used in several different ways: Compute metrics for measures Serve as inputs to models Describe factors or conditions In past studies, some teams have referred to each of the above ways of using data as their MOPs. It’s up to each study team to determine what data is important enough to be measured, and how all other data should/should not be used and reported. How the data are used and what it may be called will likely vary from study to study. Although significant amounts of data may exist, study teams must consider a number of things in determining how to use data: Study objectives, questions, limitations, constraints, and guidance Characteristics of interest in the materiel alternatives being analyzed Availability of the data and confidence in the data The example below shows how the altitude data element can be used in different ways: Figure L-3: Altitude Data Element Example 5. Creating Mission Tasks and Measures Figure L-4 provides an example of MTs and measures that can be derived from the following Mission Statement in the ICD: The Theater commander must provide moving target indicator support to maneuver and surface forces across a Corps sized area. It must detect, track, and identify a wide range of potential 157 2040 2041 target categories and classes and communicate that information to enable the targeting and prosecution of those targets. 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 Figure L-4: Notional MTs/Measures 5.1 Measure Criteria Measure criteria represent a level of performance against which system characteristics and capabilities are compared. Measure criteria are expressed as threshold and objective values or standards: • • Threshold: A minimum acceptable operational value of a system capability or characteristic below which the utility of the system becomes questionable. (CJCSI 3170.01G and AFI 10-601) Objective: An operationally significant increment above the threshold. An objective value may be the same as the threshold when an operationally significant increment above the threshold is not identifiable. (CJCSI 3170.01G and AFI 10-601) 5.2 Types of Measure Criteria User-established criteria are explicitly stated or implied in a requirements document such as the ICD, CDD, CPD, and the TDS. They can be qualitative or quantitative. 158 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 An identified standard can be developed from requirements that describe system characteristics and performance but have no explicitly stated or implied metrics and criteria standards. Identified standards can be drawn from sources such as CONOPS, TTPs, SME input, studies, etc. They also can be qualitative or quantitative. Any perceived credibility concern can be mitigated by obtaining user concurrence. For both userestablished criteria and identified standards, it is important to document source and rationale. It is also important to keep in mind that requirements may evolve over the course of the AoA requiring updates to the measure criteria. Changes occurring after the publication of the study plan must also be clearly documented in the final report. 5.3 Measures Development Guidelines Keep the measure as simple as possible – a simple measure requires only a single measurement Develop measures that are important to understanding and assessing the alternatives as well as measures that enable discrimination among alternatives Measures should not be listed more that once for a mission task, but the same measure may be listed under different mission tasks Focus on the outputs, results of performance, or the process to achieve the activity Check to ensure the units of the metric match the criteria values Understand the type of data being collected and the appropriate statistics that can be used in the analysis Do not apply weights to measures, although some measures may be more important than others 5.4 Measures Examples Two examples of well-crafted measures and their associated attributes, metrics, and criteria are provided below. For each example there are two different forms of the same measure. The first shows a poorly developed measure, the second is the preferred form. These are examples of the mechanics of building a measure and are provided for illustrative purposes only. They do not cover the entire range of potential measures the study team may need. For development of the specific criteria, the team must refer to initial requirements documents, study guidance, etc. For more comprehensive information regarding building measures, OAS has developed a primer on measures development and guidelines and can provide in-person training. A third example is provided to illustrate a subjective/qualitative measure and its associated attribute and standard. Example 1: Measure descriptions should not contain metrics, criteria, or conditions, although metrics, criteria, and conditions are always associated with a measure. 159 2104 2105 2106 2107 Example 2: Do not define success with several attributes unless all must be met concurrently for the process to be successful. Define separate measures for each. 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 Example 3: Measure is qualitative since it will be measured using an ordinal scale (e.g., Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree). The data is collected subjectively (first-person reports) by asking operators via questionnaires for their opinion or perception. 160 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 5.5 Supporting Measures While not required, there are cases when supporting measures are appropriate. Supporting measures are used to explicitly show a relationship between measures and can be MOEs, MOSs, or MOPs that refer to a “parent” measure (Example 1). They support a parent measure by providing causal explanation for the parent measure and/or highlighting high-interest aspects or contributors of the parent measure. A parent measure may have one or more supporting measures. As shown in Example 1, the three supporting measures provide more insights into the probability of survival (parent measure). In this example, the detection, identification, and jamming capabilities of threat emitters is critically important to aircraft survivability. By using supporting measures, more information is collected to help explain the probability of aircraft survival. For instance, low survivability may result from poor detection capability (i.e., the aircraft systems are incapable of detecting a significant number of threat emitters, thereby making the aircraft vulnerable to these threats). In other situations, performance in identification and/or jamming capabilities may explain survivability performance. Example 1: It is important not to use supporting measures to roll-up or summarize to a parent measure (Example 2). A parent measure should stand by itself; it should not be a placeholder or umbrella for supporting measures. A parent measure should have its own metric and criteria. Aggregating 161 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 supporting measures in some mathematical or qualitative manner can introduce skepticism since the aggregation approach used may not be acceptable to all readers. Although one aggregation approach is shown in this example, there are really many possible ways to aggregate the results that could produce different parent measure ratings. For example, one might assign a number to the color code rating for each supporting measure and take an average to compute the parent measure color code rating or one might use subject matter experts to review the supporting measure results and assign a color code rating to the parent measure. Finally, the benefit of using supporting measures to gain insights into the parent measure performance is lost since the parent measure is not being measured. Example 2: 6. High Interest Measures – Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and Key System Attribute (KSA) KPP: Attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability. Some KPPs are mandatory depending on the program: Survivability, Net Ready (Interoperability, Information Assurance), Force Protection, Sustainment (Availability). Additionally, some KPPs are selectively applied depending on the program: System Training, Energy Efficiency (JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure B). KSA: System attributes considered critical or essential for an effective military capability but not selected as KPPs. KSAs provide decision makers with an additional level of capability prioritization below the KPP but with senior sponsor leadership control (generally 4-star level, Defense Agency commander, or Principal Staff Assistant). For the Sustainment KPP (Availability), there are two mandatory supporting KSAs: Reliability and Ownership Cost Efficiency (JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure B). [Note: please refer to JCIDS Manual for explanation of the mandatory KPPs and KSAs] 162 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 CBAs, AoAs, and other supporting analyses provide the analytic foundation for determining the appropriate thresholds and objectives for system attributes and aid in determining which attributes should be KPPs or KSAs. In fact, one of the requirements of the AoA is to produce an initial RCT which identifies an initial set of possible KPPs and KSAs. This RCT should be included in the AoA final report and it, or a later refined version of it, will become an essential part of the CDD. 7. KPP and KSA Development Guidelines: Determine which attributes are most critical or essential to a system and designate them as KPPs or KSAs (see JCIDS Manual, Enclosure B for guidance in selecting KPP and KSAs) Number of KPPs and KSAs beyond the required mandatory should be kept to a minimum to maintain program flexibility – Must contain sufficient KPPs/KSAs to capture the minimum operational effectiveness, suitability, and sustainment attributes needed to achieve the overall desired capabilities for the system – Some mission tasks may have more than one KPP and/or KSA, other mission tasks may not have a KPP or KSA Develop KPP/KSA measures (MOEs, MOPs, MOSs) that measure the critical or essential attribute Differences between the threshold and objective values set the tradespace for meeting the thresholds of multiple KPPs and KSAs 8. Rating Measures and Mission Tasks 8.1 Measures Once the effectiveness analysis has been completed, the values for the measures of each alternative need to be presented in a comprehensive manner. The following section provides one method for presenting each alternative using a color scheme to indicate how well each measure and mission task was accomplished. This is certainly not the only manner in which the results can be displayed; there are likely a multitude of methods for presenting information. Whatever the method chosen by the team keep in mind that OAS discourages “roll-up” and weighting schemes that tend to mask important information or potentially provide misleading results. The assessment process begins by rating measures. Measures are the foundation for assessing mission tasks since they are indicators of the successful (or unsuccessful) accomplishment of the mission tasks. Measures are typically rated against their threshold evaluation criteria with four possible measure ratings. As described earlier, these can be either user-established or an identified standard. However, when objective values are absolutely required for performance (i.e., not just to provide a “trade space”), an alternative rating scale which incorporates an additional rating for objective evaluation criteria can be used. And as discussed previously, in 163 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 some cases the capability/cost/risk results space may be used to help identify the threshold and objective values. In the following example, the measure would receive a blue code if it met or exceeded the objective value: When a measure does not meet the threshold evaluation criteria, operational significance becomes a key consideration. Study teams should leverage operational experience to apply judgment and determine the significance of the identified effectiveness and/or suitability shortfalls on the mission task. Use all available information (e.g., CONOPS, OPLANS) to help in making a determination. Key questions to consider when determining the significance of an operational or suitability shortfall include: How close to the threshold value is the measure? What is the operational significance (i.e., what is the consequence or impact on the mission task if the threshold criterion is missed by a certain amount)? If the shortfall is only under some operational conditions (e.g., adverse weather, mountainous terrain), what is the significance of the impact? The impact on the mission task ultimately determines whether the shortfall is significant or not. When a shortfall has only minimal operational impact on the mission task, it should be assessed as “not a significant shortfall.” However, when a shortfall has substantial or severe operational impact on the mission task, it should be assessed as a “significant shortfall.” “Inconclusive” ratings are used when there is insufficient information to assess a measure. On the other hand, a measure should be rated as “not assessed” when there is no information to assess it, or a decision is made by the team not to assess it for a specified reason. For instance, the assessment of a particular measure might be delayed until a later phase in the study. In either case (“inconclusive” or “not assessed”) the final report should explain the reason for either of these statements. 164 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 Consider the following guidelines when reporting results: State the measures supporting the mission task with the associated criteria Include ratings and visual indicators (Red, Yellow, Green) for the measures Include a narrative describing how the measures were rated Apply sound military and operational judgment in determining the significance of capability shortfalls Remember, the measures are the foundation for assessing mission tasks. 8.2 Mission Tasks After all measures have been rated, the focus of the assessment shifts from individual shortfalls at the measure level to the collective operational impact at the mission task level. In many cases, it is useful to show how well the alternative solutions accomplish the designated mission tasks. In many cases, some alternatives will perform some mission tasks well, but not others. Decision makers should be made aware of the capabilities and limitations of the alternatives as they relate to accomplishing all mission tasks and how well they do so. However, while it is necessary to rate the measures, rating the mission tasks is optional. Each study team must make a determination as to the best way to present the information to the decision makers. Nevertheless, as with measure assessment, teams should use operational experience and judgment to determine the overall impact of any capability shortfalls on the mission tasks. There may be one or more prominent or critical measures (e.g., KPPs) which are very influential on how well the mission task is achieved—such measures may drive the degree of operational impact on the mission task There may be measures that have interdependencies (e.g., messages can be sent quickly, but they are incomplete) which need to be understood and considered when determining the significance of impact Do not simply rely on the preponderance of measure ratings (e.g., 3 out of 5 measures met the criteria) to rate the mission task—use operational judgment and experience When there is insufficient information to assess a mission task, it should be rated “inconclusive” write an accompanying explanation Four possible mission task ratings include the following: 165 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 Rating measures and mission tasks is not a simple task. Do not rely on mathematical or heuristic based measure rollup or weighting schemes to derive a rating. Although simple to use, they are never the best way to communicate. 2288 166 2289 Appendix M: GAO CEAG, Table 2 2290 2291 2292 Following these 12 steps should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions. The entire guide can be found on the GAO website: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d093sp.pdf 2293 2294 167 2295 2296 168 2297 169 2298 Appendix N: Developing a Point Estimate 2299 170 2300 171 2301 172 2302 173 2303 174 2304 175 2305 176 2306 177 2307 178 2308 179 2309 180 2310 2311 181 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 Appendix O: CAPE AoA Study Guidance Template The following is provided by CAPE as a template to begin drafting the AoA Study Guidance. The word draft appears to indicate any study guidance developed from this template will be draft guidance, the template is not a draft. DRAFT (XXXXX PROGRAM NAME) ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES GUIDANCE Month XX, 2xxx 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 182 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 Program Name (Abbreviation) Analysis of Alternatives Guidance Purpose The goal of Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) guidance is to facilitate high caliber analysis, fair treatment of options, and decision-quality outcomes to inform the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) at the next Milestone and shape/scope the Request For Proposal (RFP) for the next acquisition phase. CAPE guidance should direct the AoA to explore tradespace in performance, schedule, risk and cost across a full range of options to address validated capability requirements. Additionally, the guidance should support an AoA feedback mechanism to the requirements process of recommended changes to validated capability requirements that, upon further study, appear unachievable and/or undesirable from a cost, schedule, risk and/or performance point of view. Background The guidance should provide a brief background on why the AoA is being conducted and how we got here. It should discuss the history of the effort and characterize related programs, to include lessons learned from previous cancellations. This section should also include a discussion of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved capability gaps and their role in the AoA study. The guidance should make clear that the values of the capability gaps in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and draft Capability Development Document (CDD) should be treated as reference points to frame decision space rather than minimum standards to disqualify options. The AoA should illuminate the operational, schedule, risk and cost implications of tradespace around the validated capability gaps. Assumptions and Constraints Defining and understanding key assumptions and constraints are important in properly scoping the issue, defining excursions, and limiting institutional bias. Assumptions that are standard or trivial and therefore provide limited insight on what is actually driving the answer are not of interest. Since assumptions can determine outcomes, the guidance should direct the study team to identify the key assumptions driving the AoA results. Significant assumptions can include U.S.: enemy force ratios, threat characterization, CONOPs, etc. All major/key assumptions and constraints should be validated by the Study Advisory Group (SAG) as they are developed, but prior to beginning analysis. Alternatives This section should delineate the base case set of alternatives. These alternatives typically include a baseline (legacy systems and their approved modifications through the current POM), modified legacy systems, modified commercial/government/allied off the shelf systems, and new development alternatives. The alternatives should be distinctly defined, with enough detail to 183 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 support the analytic approaches used. The alternatives should be grounded in industry, national lab or other agency responses; the AoA should avoid contriving unrealistic, “idealized” options. The guidance should direct the AoA to explore a full range of viable modifications to legacy systems. For all alternatives, the AoA should assess features that appear to provide substantive operational benefit and apply to all viable alternatives (e.g., if a type of sensor is found to provide notably improved effectiveness for one alternative, the AoA should explore incorporating that feature in all alternatives). Alternatives should also consider variations or excursions for attributes that are significant cost drivers. The intent is to find the “knee-in-the-curve” for the cost driver to ensure consideration of cost effective solutions rather than single point solutions that turn out to be unaffordable. Analysis The analysis should be based on sound methodologies and data that are briefly outlined in the Study Plan. The guidance should establish an early milestone/date for the AoA team to present their detailed methodology and data approaches, tools, scenarios, metrics, and data in- depth to the SAG and other stakeholders. The AoA should spell out the scenarios and CONOPS used and explain the rationale for the inclusion of non-standard scenarios. If non-standard scenarios are employed the study team should explain in depth outcomes unique to those scenarios. The guidance should direct that a range of less stressing and more stressing scenarios be used, rather than using only highly demanding scenarios. The guidance should instruct the AoA to spell out the metrics used, any weighting factors applied to these metrics, and the rationale for applying each weighting factor. Metrics should include comparisons between the (weighted) metrics and cost to facilitate cost, performance and schedule tradeoff discussions. A problem with many legacy AoAs is that they have focused on operational benefits and downplayed technical, schedule, and cost risk. To avoid this, the guidance should instruct the AoA team to give full treatment to non-operational risks, since these factors have been a major cause of failed programs in the past. Within the technical risk area, empirical data should guide the AoA’s assessment, with particular focus on integration risk. The guidance should direct the AoA team to explain the rationale for the results, which goes well beyond simply presenting outcomes. The AoA team should understand that the value of the analysis is in understanding why options do well or poorly. The study guidance should require the AoA team to acknowledge the limitations and confidence in the results due to lack of mature or reliable data at the time of the AoA. The team should also explain how/if variations to CONOPS or attributes of alternatives might mitigate cost drivers or low ratings on assessment metrics. Also, many AoAs have presented preferred options only for those cases advantageous to 184 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 the option. The guidance should instruct the AoA to characterize the circumstances in which a given option appears superior and the conditions under which its outcomes degrade (a useful example of this was in the AoA for the replacement of the M113 armored personnel carrier, which showed how casualties varied according to the explosive weight of improvised explosive devises). Cost Analysis. Provide an analysis of life-cycle costs that includes estimates of development, production, operating and support (O&S), and disposal costs. These estimates should be of sufficient quality to support acquisition and investment decisions, but are not to be of budget quality. O&S cost estimates will cover a common life-cycle period for the system under consideration (for most, a 20-year period) for all alternatives, consistent with the Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide (Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 2007). The estimates shall include point estimates for the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), as well as total life-cycle cost. Life cycle estimates should be calculated as point estimates and also shown as 50% and 80% confidence levels. The cost analysis will identify APUC estimates for varying procurement quantities, if applicable. Present-value discounting should be used in comparing the alternatives, in accordance with OSD and Office of Management and Budget guidelines. Costs should be expressed in current-year dollars and, if appropriate in the context of FYDP funding, in then-year dollars. Costs should be presented at the major appropriation level with defined risk ranges to communicate the uncertainty associated with the estimates. The cost portion of the analysis should include an assessment of how varying the annual procurement rate affects cost and manufacturing risk when appropriate (e.g., procuring items faster to complete the total buy sooner vice buying them more slowly over a longer period of time). Schedule and Technology/Manufacturing Risk Assessment. The AoA should include estimated schedules for each alternative, as well as an assessment of existing Technology Risk Levels (TRLs)/Manufacturing Risk Levels (MRLs) for critical technologies which may impact the likelihood of completing development, integration, and operational testing activities on schedule and within budget. Since legacy AoAs have often proposed development and procurement schedules that were more aggressive than we actually achieved, future AoAs should include an assessment of the likelihood of achieving the proposed schedule based on our experience. Where significant risks are identified, the assessment should outline practical mitigation strategies to minimize impact to delivering the operational capability to the warfighter, and if applicable, notional workarounds in the event the risks are realized. Sensitivity Analysis. The AoA will identify assumptions, constraints, variables and metric thresholds that when altered, may significantly change the relative schedule, performance, and/or cost-effectiveness of the alternatives. The sensitivity analysis should identify cost, schedule, and performance drivers to illuminate the trade space for decision makers. (e.g., identify performance 185 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 attributes that make the largest changes to the force’s mission effectiveness or are likely to most influence development and/or production cost.) Other specified analysis as required: All mandatory Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) as noted in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) manual should be analyzed, as applicable. Additionally, if a value has been specified within the requirements documents for these KPPs, describe the risk incurred for failing to achieve these values. DOTmLPF-P Assessment. The AoA will evaluate the implications for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) for each alternative. Operational Energy Assessment. If applicable, the AoA will include an examination of demand for fuel or alternative energies under each of the alternatives, using fully burdened costs. The study director will: o Ensure the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) method is used in computing costs for the Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) and documented in the final report. o Brief the SAG as to whether FBCE significantly differentiate between the alternatives being considered. o In cases where it does not significantly differentiate between alternatives, the Service shall complete the FBCE work external to the AoA. Specific questions to be answered by the AoA Additional program-specific questions should be included that do not repeat the requirements described elsewhere in the guidance. Rather, these questions should probe issues that are specific to the program – e.g., how a program would achieve high reliability; how a program might mitigate risk if the technology required fails to materialize; how a program might trade lethality versus survivability if cost (or weight) is a limiting factor. This section of the guidance should be a description of ideas that are substantive to the specific program and pose questions that, when answered, will highlight the truly important aspects of the tradespace for the program. Administrative Guidance A SAG will oversee the conduct of the AoA and ensure that the study complies with CAPE guidance. The group will be co-chaired by OSD CAPE and a Service representative and will include representatives from OUSD(AT&L), OUSD(P), OUSD(C), OUSD(P&R), ASD(R&E), ASD(OEPP), DOT&E, the Joint Staff, and the Services. The SAG is responsible for ensuring that the study complies with this guidance. The SAG has the authority to change the study guidance. 186 2517 2518 2519 2520 2521 2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532 2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 The organization performing the AoA will present an AoA study plan (not to exceed 10 pages) for CAPE approval 30 days after the issuance of the AoA Study Guidance or no less than 30 days prior to the Material Development Decision. The organization performing the AoA will work with OSD CAPE to develop a schedule for briefing the SAG on the AoA study team’s progress. The briefings should be held bimonthly unless needed more frequently. In between briefings to the SAG, the study lead will maintain dialogue with OSD CAPE. The guidance should set strict time limits on the analysis timeline – shorter is better. If the AoA analysis is expected to take longer than 6-9 months, the scope of work should be reconsidered to ensure the analysis planned is truly necessary to inform the milestone decision. The final deliverables will include a briefing to the SAG and a written report. The written AoA report is due to D,CAPE at least 60 days prior to the Milestone Decision (to allow for sufficiency review) and to the other SAG members to properly inform the stakeholders prior to the release of the RFP for the next acquisition stage. The final report will provide a detailed written record of the AoA’s results and findings and shall be on the order of no more than 50 pages in length, plus the Executive Summary which should be no more than 10 pages in length. 187