DRAFT
Individuals, Institutions and Public Policy: Making the Linkages
B. Guy Peters
University of Pittsburgh
bgpeters@pitt.edu
How to link individuals and institutions has been one of the persistent questions in institutional
theory. This question is in some ways a restatement of some aspects of the familiar structure
versus agency debate in the social sciences, but has become more relevant as institutional theory
has become one of the dominant approaches for studying political science and public policy. As
Grafstein (1991) has pointed out, there is a fundamental paradox involved in this linkage:
individuals create institutions but then are constrained by them. Indeed, in many cases
individuals create institutions in order to be constrained by them.1
The linkage between the institutions in the public sector is important for ordinary citizens, but it
may be especially significant for the members of those institutions, given the involvement of
politicians and public servants in making and implementing public policy. And again these
linkages are reciprocal, as institutions constrain the actions of their members, but individuals also
shape the institutions within which they function. And further the members of the institution can
be conceptualized as linkages with external political and social forces that also want to shape the
institution and the policies adopted through the institution.
The linkage between individuals and institutions is to some degree a matter of conscious design,
but also is a more subtle and indirect activity. Certainly the designers of major institutions in
the public sector, such as the framers of constitutions (Sartori, 1997) have in mind constraining
some behaviors of the individuals who will populate those institutions, and encouraging other
behaviors by those institution members. To be effective in that framing these designers must
have some hypotheses about the behavior of individuals2, and a rather dark perspective about the
venality of homus politicus tends to dominate this framing–often accurately.
1
The obvious example is a constitution created in order that all political actors may
constrain their own actions and the actions of their competitors for power.
2
One example would be the assumption of the framers of the constitution of the Fifth
Republic in France that the parties (and individuals) on the political Left would never
cooperate with one another and hence the two ballot system would guarantee dominance
for the political Right. This assumption proved accurate until the election of 1981 when
the Left coalesced and the Right had more of a split.
-1-
Although framed in a certain manner, constitutions and other formal institutional arrangements
evolve in part through the actions of their members attempting to cope with a changing
environment and in part through the changing political ideas of the members. In organization
theory the significance of informal organization has been a mainstay of theorizing (see for
example Williamson, 1973), and in comparative politics there has been an increasing
understanding of the role of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003).
One way of understanding these linkages between individuals and institutions is to consider the
fundamental social mechanisms that are at work in the dynamics of institutions. This interest in
social mechanisms began primarily as a means of understanding causal processes in social and
political life (Norkus, 2005; Mayntz, 2004; but see Gerring, 2010), and as an alternative to
social science based on variables and correlation–especially correlations at the macro -level. A
mechanisms based conception of theory focuses on identifying the basic social tools, such as
power, that generate behaviors and therefore involves methodologies such as process-tracing.
While that role of understanding social processes remains the primary function for social
mechanisms in the social sciences, it also has substantial utility for understanding the dynamics
within institutions and organizations.
, 1998; Macey and Flache,
2009) has focused on the identification and analysis of these mechanisms, often within
institutions. Most of this literature, however, has focused on social institutions rather than on
institutions within the public sector. We can, however, consider the linkages between
institutions such as the public bureaucracy and its members in much the same way. While the
range of institutions and mechanisms may be broader among the social institutions, the logic is
much the same within public sector institutions and organizations.
For example, most bureaucratic organizations use a combination of Weberian authority,
normative pressure, and remunerative incentives to gain compliance. The literature on formal
structures within organizations, and on the informal organizations that may or may not support
the formal structures, can provide the foundation for this analysis (see Page, 1992). Indeed, most
of the organizational literature implicitly or explicitly emphasizes the linkages between
individuals and organizations, and especially emphasizes the means of generating compliance
within the organization.
These interactions between institutions and individuals can be conceptualized in terms of
possible stable combinations of patterns of internal control and patterns of individual
v v
. A
Ez
’ 1961)
f
z
through the discussion of matches and mismatches in compliance structures and motivations has
been largely forgotten in the study of institutions.(see Table 1). Although his work was based on
only three possible types of motivations and compliance patterns, the increased interest in social
mechanisms will provide a wider range of options and should provide an even richer analysis of
these linkages.
-2-
Further, although the Etzioni framework emphasized stable patterns of compliance of individuals
with the organization or institution, the mismatches may also say something about the capacity
of individuals to influence the institutions, and may be a useful mechanism for explaining
institutional change. For example, militaries had to alter somewhat their manner of dealing with
troops (see Levy, 2007) when they switched from being based on a draft (alienative
involvement) to an all volunteer force (remunerative or even moral). Likewise, the US federal
prisons had to alter their internal practices when faced with an influx of violent as opposed to
white collar criminals (Boin, 2001).
We can extend this organizational literature on compliance and the role of informality to
examine these comparative patterns among institutions. (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).
Although conceptualized more as informal institutions, this analysis points to how formal public
sector institutions interact with social institutions to produce policies, and variations among those
policies. Perhaps most importantly, this analysis demonstrates the manner in which formal and
informal structures can complement one another in the process of governing, rather like formal
and informal organization.
Control of members within institutions and organizations is rather well conceptualized. The
upward linkages between individual members of the organization/institution tend to be less wellunderstood. Within public organizations the familiar literature on street-level bureaucracy
provides some inklings about the manner in which lower echelon workers influence not only
their clients but also their organizations (Meyer and Nielsen, 2012). In addition, the attitudes and
values of lower echelon workers, and clients, may also influence the capacity of institutions to
manage in certain ways, I. e. the ability to use authority may be limited if lower-echelon
employees distrust the leadership of the organization.
These capacities to govern through authority also vary as general acceptance of authority within
the society also varies. For the public sector this change in the acceptance of authority is perhaps
particularly crucial as the legitimacy of governments may influence overall acceptance of the
dictates of leadership both within the institutions and among citizens. The recent (perceived)
scandal in the Internal Revenue Service in the United States was discussed widely among the
chattering classes as undermining even further public confidence in the federal government, and
making it therefore more difficult for the IRS to perform its central task of collecting taxes.
In addition, people constitute the raw materials for most institutions within the public sector–they
are characteristically people processing institutions. This is perhaps particularly evident in areas
of social policy but also even in policy areas such as defense that depend upon large number of
individuals being involved in the delivery of policies. While these institutions may have formal
structures and rules, they are also dependent upon the compliance of those individuals, and tend
to perform better if there is more than grudging acquiescence from their members and clients.
The variety of possible mechanisms for linkages can be related to the varieties of institutional
theory. For example, the sociological approach to institutionalism is associated with the use of
norms, values, routines, myths, symbols, etc. (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; March and Olsen,
1985). The mechanisms at play here are obviously different from the utilitarian mechanisms at
-3-
play in rational choice conceptions of institutions which assume that the manipulation of
incentives and disincentives can produce the desired behaviors from individuals. Within
historical institutionalism some scholars have assumed that positive feedback and learning
maintain the path dependency that is central to that approach (Pierson, 2000).
The Varieties of Linkages
“ k ”
p
p
v
institutions is rather vague, especially given that institutions are not static and go through life
cycles just as do their members. Therefore, we need to consider how individuals and institutions
interact at various stages in those life cycles. Clearly individuals will be more relevant at some
stages while the mechanisms within the institutions themselves may be dominant at other stages.
A
k
z
“
” v v –
the environment.
For the purposes of this paper can conceptualize institutions having at least three major stages or
“ v
” in their lives that involve interactions between individuals and the institutions. The first
is the formation of the institution, whether by conscious design or through evolution. Then
institutions will have periods of maintenance in which they function in a relatively routine
manner, And finally institutions change, whether in increments or through large-scale
“p
”, I
,
f
p p
k f
extreme version of change.3
To this point in the paper I also have been treating institutions and institutionalism as a relatively
undifferentiated whole. If, however, we consider institutions through the several lenses in the
literature (Peters, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 1993) we can identify a range of possible patterns of
linkage and intermediation. These various forms of linkage between actors and institutions also
involve the use of different instruments to secure those linkages, and also should expect differing
degrees of success. Likewise, some versions place greater emphasis on individual decisions than
on the role of structure (Scharpf, 1997).
To understand the interaction of individuals and institutions we need to consider both the stage
of action for the institution and the theoretical perspective on institutions. If we consider the
three stages mentioned above and four versions of institutionalism already mentioned:
normative, rational choice, historical and discursive–then we have a twelve cell table.
Unfortunately, not all cells in this table appears to be filled, given that the various versions of
institutionalism are mute on some aspects of the life of institutions. That absence of
conceptualization within the approach does, however, say a good deal about the approach and its
utility for these purposes.
3
For a version of this analysis concerning public sector organizations see Hogwood and
Peters (1986).
-4-
The remainder of the paper will be organized around Table 1. I will go through each of the
columns of the table, examining how well each of the approaches provides a linkage between the
individual action and the institution at particular stage of the life cycle of the institution, The
relationship, however, is not that simple and within each there is a question of how individuals
shape the institution as well as how institutions shape the individual. In very few instances,
however, is there a clear answer on both directions of linkage, with the role of institutions in
shaping individuals being slightly better articulated in these approaches.
Formation of Institutions and Policies
The first observation to be made here is that the approaches to institutionalism do not do a very
good job of explaining the formation of institutions. The only version of institutionalism that has
a clear conception of formation is the rational choice approach. That said, this approach to
institutions has its own internal variations, so that there are at least two different social
mechanisms involved. For most conceptions of rational choice institutionalism there is an
assumption (perhaps implicit) that institutions will be created through design and through
hierarchy. For example, in the veto-point perspective associated with George Tsebelis (2000)
the assumption is that institutions can, and will, be designed. The notion of veto points helps the
designer understand how to design in order to produce the desired behaviors within the
institution.
In the principal-agent conception of rational choice institutionalism the role of the principal is
not all that different from the designer in the veto-point approach. In this conception the
institution is defined by a series of delegations of authority by the principals, with the agents
assumed to follow the directives of the principals. The formation of the institution in this
conception comes through making that delegation. The fundamental instrument at work then is
hierarchy, with the assumption that principals will monitor the behaviors of their agents and
punish malefactors (see Brehm and Gates, 2000).
For the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) version of rational choice institutionalism
associated with Elinor Ostrom (Araral, 2013) the formation of the institution is perhaps the
central contribution of the theory. The argument is that actors can cooperate to form institutions
to overcome collective action problems without the use of authority. Thus, in this model of
institution bargaining and learning are central elements of formation, with individuals involved
in those processes being central to the formation. Further, some scholars have also argued that
principal-agent relationships are evolving, and are increasingly defined by bargaining rather than
imposition (Miller, 2005; Marsh and Spies-Butcher, 2009).
The other three versions of institutionalism are largely silent on the formation of institutions.
The normative approach to institutions talks mor about the transition of organizations into
institutions (see below) than about formation per se. Historical institutionalism talks about the
“f
v
”
,
L
, 1992)
2008) later
emphasized the importance of social engineering in politics. Despite that, but there is little sense
of agency expressed when that formative moment is mentioned, and agency appears irrelevant
-5-
for the arguments being advanced in this approach. Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010)
has a somewhat stronger sense of the role of individuals in the formation of institutions, although
that role of agency is expressed primarily through the role of ideas in shaping institutions (see
also Campbell, 2002).
Even for the versions of institutionalism that do have some clear conception of the formation of
institutions the mechanisms involved in that formation are often not discussed explicitly. In
contrast to the IAD model that does have a clear idea about formation, the other versions of
rational choice appear to assume authority, or perhaps the power of good ideas, but are still not
very explicit about the mechanism,. And they are certainly not explicit in tracking through the
process through which the mechanism is utilized in formulating and implementing the design.
For all of these conceptions of institutions and institutional theory the concept of
institutionalization is important for understanding formation. For example, the Selznick (1947)
notion that institutions are created places a great deal of emphasis on the leaders of the structure
v
,
“
”
z
.
p
infusing the structure with values, much as Peters and Waterman (2004) argue that the principal
task of leadership in organizations (especially firms) is creating the organizational culture.
Through whatever mechanisms, institutionalization involves building an institutionalization
through routinization, values, or perhaps power.
Maintaining the Institution
The second stage in the life-cycle of institutions and the second task for the leaders of institutions
is to maintain those institutions once they have been created. The various theories contained
within institutionalism tend to have more to say about the maintenance of institutions than they
did about formation. Indeed, one of the problems with institutional theory has been that it tends
to treat institutions as if they always were and always will be. In reality institutions are always in
a process of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization and their maintenance is a crucial task
for those involved with the institutions.
The clearest explication of maintenance linkages is found in the normative institutionalism of
March and Olsen (1989). This conception of institutions depends upon the capacity of the
f
v
,
“
f pp p
”.
Learning constitutes the primary instrument for creating that internal logic, as members of the
z
f
.
“
,
,
...”
and all the other normative elements of the institution that guide decisions within that structure.
Much of the analysis of this style of institutionalism is focused on the fundamental problem of
maintaining the values of the institution.
On the other hand, most versions of rational choice institutionalism do not focus on the
maintenance of the institution, and are much more concerned with formation and change than
with preservation. The underlying assumption is that if the appropriate mixture of incentives and
disincentives is available within the institution it will be successful in maintaining its initial
-6-
design and in achieving its goals. Although implicit, however, there is a clear conception of
social mechanisms contained within these approaches, at least in the rather general sense of
incentives and disincentives.4
To some extent historical institutionalism is all about maintenance and little else, at least in its
original formulation (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). The emphasis on path
dependence in this approach to institutionalism makes maintenance a defining element of the
institution, and in this case also the policies associated with the institution.5 Although there is a
clear emphasis on maintaining the institution within the historical institutionalism the
mechanisms are somewhat less clear, at least in the initial formulation of the approach. The
assumption appeared to be simply that institutions and programs in the public sector are inertial
and conservative.
Later work in historical institutionalism has developed explanations for path dependence and
maintenance in institutions. Pierson (2000), for example, emphasized the importance of positive
feedbacks in maintaining the involvement of members of the institution. This would be true for
both political elites and the clients of programs. And, analogous to the logic of economic
versions of path dependency, the potential of the transaction costs involved in moving away from
the status quo. In both of these cases the mechanisms involved are economic, either costs or
benefits, rather than more social mechanisms such as authority or even power.
Finally, the model of institutional maintenance involved in discursive institutionalism depends,
f “
v
”
.
,
v
much like institutions within the normative model) maintains itself through a set of norms and
values that are expressed in an internal discourse.6 This coordinative discourse is, however, less
stable than the norms and values assumed within normative institutionalism so that maintenance
of any institutional equilibrium is short-lived. Rather, in rather sharp contrast to the historical
institutionalism significant internal change is assumed. And in terms of social mechanisms the
institution appears to be defined by continuing negotiation over its discourses, perhaps especially
the internal, coordinative discourse.
Institutional Change
4
These incentives and disincentives tend to thought of in remunerative terms, although
they could be no
v . I
“
f pp p
”
“
f
q
”. F
,
v
v )
v ,
with individual members receiving punishments if they fail to comply with the stated preferences
of the institution and/or its leadership.
5
Indeed, the historical institutionalism tends to define institutions around specific policies
or in economic versions specific products (David, 1985).
6
“
v
”
institution to the outside world.
-7-
The third stage of institutional life, for the purposes of this paper, is change. Institutions are
generally conceptualized in terms of stability rather than in terms of change, and in general
institutional theories have been less successful in explaining change than in explaining stability.
Indeed, the usual critique of institutionalism that it is static and can not cope adequately with
change. That said, these approaches do have something to say about how institutions change,
and particularly how they change in response to changes in their environments.
For rational choice institutionalism change is to some extent formation redux. In most versions
of institutionalism change is easy, as it simply involves some authoritative actor developing a
new set of incentives and disincentives. As individual preferences are assumed to be exogenous
and largely uniform changes in behavior will follow readily. The same mechanisms as were
involved in formation will be involved in change, both for the actors imposing the change and
for the actors responding to the change (including those for whom or on whom the policies are
being imposed).
The IAD version of rational choice institutionalism may pose greater difficulties for change. As
the solutions to collective action problems contained in this approach represent the outcome of
bargaining processes and thus may represent an equilibrium which upset may require extensive
additional bargaining, and perhaps produce an inferior solution, change will be threatening. To
the extent that it occurs, however, the change will be produced through the same mechanisms as
the initial solutions to the problem.
Change in the normative version of institutionalism appears to come about primarily through
conflicts between the essential normative structure of the institution and its environment, or its
own actions (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). For example, if the normative structure of the
surrounding society changes more rapidly than that within the institution then the institution
must adapt or perhaps terminate. This is especially true for institutions, e.g. the military, that
depend upon a particular social mechanism (authority) that becomes less prevalent in the
surrounding society whose members are processed through the institution.7
The notions of change within the normative version of institutionalism depend on the role of
leadership and elites within the institution. It is they who are responsible for altering the
normative structure of the institution and re-socializing members into a new set of values. For
example, the numerous reforms of public administration implemented over the past several
decades have required leaders in government and within the individual organizations to convince
the workers within those organizations that the new, more market-driven ways of managing the
public sector were superior to the traditional administrative system. This is not to deny that
7
This was, for example, true for the US military during the Vietnam War when draftees
simply did not accept authority in the manner expected by officers, and by the
institution
as a whole. This change in the society produced a shift toward greater negotiation rather
than the imposition of authority, especially in the field.
-8-
change can be initiated from within the institution, requiring some negotiation across levels and
some eventual acceptance by leadership.8
As something of an aside, it should be noted that leadership comes up in several of these versions
of institutionalism. This rather old-fashioned concept has been making a return to prominence in
p
, 2013).
ff
j
“
p”
very much, especially from the perspective of social mechanisms (Helms and Peters, 2013).
The literature on leadership points to a variety of methods and a variety of purposes for
leadership, so as we consider how elites form institutions and promote change within those
institutions, it is crucial to be specific about the mechanisms in use.
The historical institutionalism poses the most important challenges for understanding change.
The defining feature of this version of institutionalism is the commitment to path dependence.
In9 the original discussion of historical institutionalism change occurred primarily if not
x
v
“p
q
”,
p
institutions. These changes are (presumably) more a function of environmental than internal
factors. The agency associated with those changes is not apparent and likewise the social
mechanism involved in change in this perspective is rather unclear.
The numerous critiques of the concept of punctuated equilibrium led to the development of
additional perspectives on change, focused more on gradual change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005;
Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). The various types of change in these perspectives does include
agency in the analysis. For example,
and attempts to contextualize the types of change
likely, but the mechanisms involved are still somewhat indistinct. But at least there is some
movement away from the extremely simplistic conception of change as occurring only through
large-scale interruptions of an existing equilibrium.
Finally, change in discursive institutionalism tends to rely on the same sort of social mechanisms
as are encountered at its creation. That is, if the institution is formed by reaching some
equilibrium of discourse through bargaining and exchange (of ideas) then change occurs in much
the same way. The primary difference would be that in the case of change there is (obviously)
an existing coordinative discourse that must be addressed in change. The conflict between the
existing dominant discourse and the prospective replacement discourse may resemble the
dynamics in the advocacy-coalition framework of Sabatier (1988), with negotiation and
reframing generating a compromise that does not threaten the stakeholders.
Individuals, Institutions and Policy
8
This was to some extent true for the Gore Reforms in the United States. See Peters and
Savoie (1994).
9
The environmental dependence of change does not contain any description of how
environmental conditions are perceived
-9-
The mechanisms for internal control within institutions mentioned above may also be extended
to consider the manner in which the institutions make and implement policy. Much of the
institutional literature has focused attention on the internal dynamics of those institutions rather
than being concerned with the manner in which those institutions influence their environment.
I p
v
“
” fp
compliance (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009; See also Shafir, 2012), and more collective outcomes
of policy.
The linkage between policy and institutions can be done in two ways. One would be to refer
k
L ’
1971)
“p
”.
While cause is perhaps too strong a word, the argument would be that the nature of the policy
being implemented, and the mechanisms shaping the institution, would be related. For example,
regulatory policies that rely heavily on formal legal compliance might also produce relatively
similar styles of management and behavior within the institutions and organizations responsible
for these polices. As noted above concerning people-processing institutions, the need to interact
with individual clients will affect the internal structure and behavior of the institutions.
There may also be intermediary linkages between the nature of policy and the institutions of
governance, a linkage that may be seen most clearly in social policy. The linkage here depends
upon the street-level bureaucrats mentioned above who deliver programs and have frequent
contacts with members of the public, especially the less affluent members (see Dubois, 2010;
Auyero, 2012). Thus, while institutions assign these individuals roles and expect certain types of
behaviors defined largely through legal authority, those individuals also shape institutions
through their willingness (at least at time to advocate for their clients).
The alternative perspective on the linkage between policy and institutions is through policy
instruments. Just as social mechanisms represent basic means of producing and organizing
action, policy instruments represent fundamental means of influencing the economy and society
(see Salamon, 2001; Le Gales, 2010). But those policy instruments are far from neutral in
institutional or political terms and have real consequences for the internal dynamics of
institutions (Howlett, 2000; Peters, 2000). Further, as governments have increasingly focused
“ f”p
M
, 2004)
v v
p
depend less on power and authority and more on negotiation.
This paper has been concerned with the linkages among individuals, institutions and policy. In
so doing it has explored the complex interactions of micro and macro-level phenomena in
policymaking, and attempted to illustrate the manner in which fundamental mechanisms (both
social and instrumental) can shape those interactions. Although institutions are important in both
political theory and in everyday discourse about governing, the multiple conceptions of
institutions in the literature requires careful consideration of the several possible interpretations
of these structures, and the implications of each.
This analysis has focused perhaps more in the internal dynamics of the institutions than on the
linkage with policy. This is because, to some extent, the linkages with policy are implied by the
nature of the mechanisms assumed to be functioning internally. So, normative institutionalism
-10-
assumes that policies will be driven by norms just as internal commitment of the members of
institutions is driven by norms. And rational choice institutionalism assumes much of the same
calculative logic for policy as is assumed to operate within the institution.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to unpack some of the complexities, and the potential, of social
mechanisms as they operate within political institutions. I have addressed these issues through
examining the various approaches to institutionalism in the existing literature. For each of these
approaches I have attempted to understand how institutions are created, change and maintain
themselves. Although all allegedly components of a broad political science approach to
institutions, these versions of institutionalism all have their own perspectives on what constitutes
institutions, and on the mechanisms that make institutions function.
To understand how these various versions of institutionalism function internally, and how they
relate to public policies I have attempted to understand the fundamental social mechanisms in
operation within each conception of institutions, and especially how they operate at various
stages in the life cycles of those institutions. The difficulty in performing this analysis is that
many of these theoretical approaches are not always clear how they function at all these stages of
the lives of institutions. They may be very clear about some aspects of the lives of institutions,
e.g. both normative and discursive institutionalism about maintenance, but then very opaque
about other stages.
And these approaches may be even less clear about how the institutions relate to public policies.
One of the weaknesses of many approaches to institutions in the public sector is that although
they may be defined by policies (especially historical institutionalism), they do not make explicit
linkages between their internal performance and their activities directed at the external
environment. This is contrast to the manner in which most economics and management versions
of institutions function, with very clear concerns about their impact on the environment, and the
impact of the environment (the market) on the internal functioning of the institution.
Although the utilization of social mechanisms to understand the dynamics of institutions does
provide insights into these structures, the lack of adequate specification of the theories in these
terms makes the analysis less powerful than it could be. That said, however, the attempt to
identify the fundamental mechanisms associated with these institutions and their functioning can
begin to further elaborate the theories. The continued theoretical development of institutionalism
can benefit from the consideration of these version of social theory, as well as greater specificity
concerning the internal dynamics of these structures.
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-11-
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Table 1
Etzioni Typology of Compliance Relations
Kinds of Involvement
Kind of
Power
Coercive
Alienative
Calculative
Moral
X
Remunerative
X
Normative
X
X-Stable Patterns
Source: Etzioni (1961, p. 12)
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Table 2
Stages of Institutions, Institutional Theories and Mechanisms
Stages of Institution
Formation
Maintenance
Change
Socialization
Conflict;
Types of
Institutional
Theory
Normative
Institutionalization
a la Selznick
Rational Choice
Design;
Evolution (IAD)
“F
Discursive
v M
”
Negotiation
????
P
D p
Coordinative
Discourse
-17-
Design;
Learning
Punctuations
Displacement, etc.
Negotiation
Conflict