Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp
Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job
mobility, and social inclusion and exclusion
Jennifer Whitson a,⇑, Cynthia S. Wang b, Joongseo Kim b, Jiyin Cao c, Alex Scrimpshire b
a
The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Management, McCombs School of Business, Austin, TX 78705, United States
Oklahoma State University, Department of Management, Spears School of Business, Stillwater, OK 74078, United States
c
Stony Brook University, Department of Management, College of Business, Stony Brook, NY 11794, United States
b
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 January 2013
Accepted 11 August 2014
Available online xxxx
Accepted by Michael Morris, Ying-yi Hong
and Chi-yue Chiu
Keywords:
Culture
Job mobility
Social inclusion
Social exclusion
a b s t r a c t
Research has demonstrated the effects of culture and mobility on the utilization of monetary rewards and
punishments in response to norm-related behaviors (e.g., honesty and dishonesty), but less is known
about their effects on the utilization of social inclusion and exclusion. Three experiments found that individuals in high job mobility contexts were more likely to exclude dishonest actors than those in low
mobility contexts; job mobility did not affect the level of social inclusion. Experiment 1 demonstrated
cultural differences in the utilization of social inclusion/exclusion versus monetary rewards/punishments, with perceived job mobility as an underlying mechanism. Experiment 2 provided a behavioral
measure of social inclusion/exclusion. Experiment 3 manipulated job mobility and found that the perceived difficulty of social exclusion mediated the relationship between job mobility and social exclusion.
This paper illustrates critical boundary conditions for past findings and provides insight into responses to
norm-related behavior across different cultures.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
When employees uphold or break norms, organizations often
have formal systems of responding, and research has shown that
rewards and punishments are critical in creating environments that
encourage good and deter bad behavior (e.g., Chen, 2012; Fuster &
Meier, 2010; Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006;
Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002). Practically, rewards and
punishments are effective in altering behavior (Kazdin, 2001), and
organizations design financial incentive systems (e.g., performance
bonus systems; financial sanctions) to reinforce positive norms and
to increase employee motivation. Research has demonstrated the
prominent use of both monetary rewards (Wang, Galinsky, &
Murnighan, 2009) and punishments (Gray, Ward, & Norton,
2012), and a meta-analysis established that both increase cooperation in social dilemmas (for a review, see Balliet, Mulder, & Van
Lange, 2011). However, whereas monetary rewards and punishments offer clear tools for managers to respond to employees
who uphold or break norms, they are less widely available to most
individuals. For example, coworkers generally cannot provide
financial bonuses and sanctions to peers.
⇑ Corresponding author.
In this paper, rather than focusing on monetary responses to
normative (e.g., honest) and norm-breaking (e.g., dishonest)
behavior, we draw attention to a form of response widely available
to organizational members: social inclusion (i.e., the act of including
someone in interpersonal relationships) and social exclusion (i.e.,
the act of excluding someone from interpersonal relationships;
Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005). Decisions to include normupholders or exclude norm-violators likely see more widespread
use, because they can be made by almost everyone in social, group,
or organizational contexts (Abrams et al., 2005). Importantly, our
proposal moves beyond monetary responses to normative and
norm-breaking behavior, delineating them from other responses,
particularly social inclusion and exclusion.
To date, little is known about how individuals from different
cultural contexts choose to socially include and exclude others.
We posit that the usage of these norm-related responses will differ
across cultural contexts and that a critical socioecological factor
driving these differences is the level of job mobility, i.e., the degree
to which individuals can change jobs and professions within a
given environment (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009).
The current research makes important contributions to theory
on culture and responses to norm-related behaviors by lending
insight into the crucial function that job mobility plays in different
responses within and between cultures. This is theoretically
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
0749-5978/Ó 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
2
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
compelling because social inclusion and exclusion and monetary
incentives may be utilized very differently, depending on the
socioecological context in which they occur. We next provide an
overview of the effects of social inclusion and exclusion. We then
theorize how perceptions and experiences of job mobility may lead
to differences in social inclusion and exclusion within and between
cultures.
The effects of social inclusion and exclusion
The need to belong is a fundamental human motivation
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and being accepted as a member of a
group is an integral human need (Maslow, 1968; Ryan & Deci,
2000). Social inclusion leads to a multitude of emotional and
health benefits. For example, when people’s need to belong was
satisfied, they exhibited higher intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci,
2000), reported greater well-being (Tay & Diener, 2011), and experienced increased self-esteem (Heppner et al., 2008). These effects
also occur at societal levels: not only did individuals with more and
higher-quality relationships have higher self-esteem, but countries
with inhabitants who regularly interacted with friends had higher
nationwide self-esteem levels (Denissen, Penke, Schmitt, & van
Aken, 2008).
Individuals also can socially exclude others. William James once
noted that being excluded is an extremely aversive experience,
writing, ‘‘No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were
such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned
loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof’’ (James, 1890, p. 293). In fact, the experience of exclusion can be so intense that socially excluded individuals exhibit
neural activity similar to that caused by physical pain
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary,
2005). Social exclusion engenders anxiety (Baumeister & Tice,
1990; Leary, 1990), loneliness (e.g., Peplau & Perlman, 1982), anger
(e.g., Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998), impaired self-regulation
(Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005), and self-defeating
behavior (e.g., Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002).
Given the powerful psychological and behavioral ramifications,
social inclusion and exclusion serve as effective ways to enforce
normative behavior. For example, including helpful individuals
and excluding unhelpful individuals shapes group socialization
and norms over time (Levine, Moreland, & Hausmann, 2005). Congruently, the threat of ostracism is considered a fundamental
mechanism of establishing a norm (Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, &
Van Lange, 2005) and actual ostracism has been shown to promote
cooperation in groups (Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014). These
findings suggest these strategies can be effective in promoting normative behavior, thus, influences on their utilization are crucial
topics of study. Despite these findings, there is a paucity of
research about their utilization across contexts with different levels of job mobility. In the next section, we discuss why culture and
job mobility might hold such an influential position in the use of
social inclusion and exclusion.
Culture and job mobility
Mobility is a socioecological construct (Oishi & Graham, 2010)
that takes into account the macro-environment (e.g., the structural
characteristics of cities; the economic and political landscape of a
community) and its psychological and behavioral ramifications.
Mobility has been studied in the context of residential mobility
(the degree to which people can change their residence within a
given environment; Oishi, 2010), relational mobility (the degree
to which people can change relationship partners within a given
environment; Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura, 2009) and job
mobility (the degree to which people can change jobs and professions within a given environment; Chen et al., 2009; Yuki et al.,
2007).
Recent research suggests that mobility is deeply tied to many
features of a given culture. For example, residential mobility alters
the qualities preferred in associates and friends (Lun, Oishi, &
Tenney, 2012) and influences self-construals (Oishi, Lun, &
Sherman, 2007). Cultural differences in relational mobility affect
the level of similarity between friends (Schug et al., 2009) and
monetary reward and punishment decisions (Wang & Leung,
2010). Finally, cultural differences in job mobility are associated
with different worldviews (Chen et al., 2009), with individuals in
high mobility contexts less likely to endorse a belief in a fixed
world.
Our reasons for focusing on job mobility are twofold. First, job
mobility has important implications for interpersonal interactions
within organizations. Second, mobility is a critical driver of cultural
differences, and perceived job mobility in particular influences cultural patterns of judgment and behavior (Chiu & Chen, 2004;
Stryker, 2007). Phenomena that occur at these societal levels are
powerful predictors of cross-cultural difference (Bahns, Pickett, &
Crandall, 2012; Chen et al., 2009; Falk, Heine, Yuki, & Takemura,
2009; Heine & Renshaw, 2002; Schug et al., 2009; Schug, Yuki, &
Maddux, 2010; Yuki et al., 2007), and therefore valuable factors
to be aware of in the life of an organization. Importantly, the frequency that employees change jobs and professions throughout
their work careers varies significantly by country (Borghans &
Golsteyn, 2012). For example, Americans change jobs quite frequently, with the average American holding approximately ten
jobs over a lifetime (Bialik, 2010; Topel & Ward, 1992). In an 11country comparison (Borghans & Golsteyn, 2012), college graduates in the United States changed jobs most often, with only 19%
of graduates still holding their first job after three years. In contrast, the Korean Employment Information Service (2009) reports
that the average Korean holds only 4.1 jobs over a lifetime. Job
mobility can also differ within countries (Chen et al., 2009); for
example, the 2007–2009 Great Recession resulted in a significant
decrease in job mobility in multiple countries (Meriküll, 2011;
Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2013). We argue that the employment
of social inclusion and exclusion is influenced by job mobility.
Culture, job mobility, and the utilization of social inclusion and
exclusion
Recent research on cultural differences in monetary responses
to norm-related behaviors suggests that mobility plays a crucial
role. Mobility critically influenced monetary responses, such that,
Americans (who tend to be higher in job and relational mobility)
rewarded honest actors more and punished dishonest actors less,
than East Asians (Wang & Leung, 2010; Wang, Leung, See, & Gao,
2011). The same effects were found when job mobility was manipulated rather than measured (Wang et al., 2011).
The authors posited that the strength of ties drove these effects
(Wang & Leung, 2010; Wang et al., 2011). The looser networks in
high mobility societies increased rewards as individuals attempted
to strengthen ties with more relationally-distant honest others. In
contrast, the tighter-knit networks generally found in low mobility
societies increased feelings of obligation to maintain order via punishment. These mobility-driven differences in the strength of ties
may also influence choices to include and exclude.
Specifically, we predict that job mobility, with its critical function in determining strength of ties, will influence how individuals
choose to socially include and exclude, with these effects dramatically differing from monetary responses. Unlike studies involving
monetary incentives, social inclusion and exclusion are inherently
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
tied to the contextual affordances of mobility. As we discuss below,
the ease with which one’s context affords the maintenance and
deepening of ties will influence social inclusion in response to normative behaviors. Further, the ease with which one’s context
affords the weakening of ties will influence social exclusion in
response to norm-violating behaviors.
Social inclusion can be about forming, maintaining, or strengthening ties with an individual. Congruently, social exclusion can be
about weakening or dissolving ties with an individual (Abrams
et al., 2005; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Within organizations,
employees rarely have control over who is introduced into or
ejected from their social contexts (i.e., hired or fired). As a result,
their choices to socially include will be based largely around decisions to maintain and deepen (rather than form) ties with individuals who share the same context as they do, whereas choices to
socially exclude will be based on decisions to weaken (rather than
dissolve) ties. Due to our emphasis on organizational contexts, this
paper therefore focuses on the maintenance, strengthening, and
weakening of ties.
In terms of social inclusion, low mobility environments provide
affordances that make it easier to maintain ties. Relationships with
others require communication and contact with one another (Hays,
1985). It may be easier to maintain ties in low mobility contexts
because the stable, dense networks in those contexts will help to
sustain them (Bian & Ang, 1997). Indeed, relationships in low relational mobility societies tend to be more stable and resilient to
shocks or neglect (Wiseman, 1986; Yuki & Schug, 2012). Moreover,
individuals in low mobility contexts may be motivated to deepen
existing ties, because those ties last longer and serve multiple functions (Lun et al., 2012; Oishi & Kesebir, 2012). Research supports
this proposition, as individuals in low residential mobility contexts
feel less lonely (Oishi et al., 2013), and have deeper relationships
with others that span multiple activities and preferences (Oishi,
2010). This suggests that individuals in an environment with low
job mobility will be more likely to have interconnected and stable
networks, making ties much easier to maintain and deepen (Dess &
Shaw, 2001; Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007), therefore
increasing social inclusion. In a low-turnover organization, one
can imagine coworkers will come to know each other’s preferences
and find it easier to invite each other to events. However, in a highturnover organization, the sparse and volatile nature of interpersonal networks would make it more difficult to do so.
Thus, because individuals in low mobility contexts perceive
maintaining and deepening bonds with others as easier, we expect
they will be more likely to socially include honest actors than individuals in high mobility contexts. Moreover, we test cultural differences in two countries: the United States and South Korea. We
speculate that Koreans are more likely than Americans to use social
inclusion, because South Korea has a lower level of job mobility
than the United States.
Hypothesis 1, Social Inclusion (H1SI): Individuals in low job
mobility contexts are more likely than individuals in high job
mobility contexts to socially include an honest actor.
Hypothesis 2, Social Inclusion (H2SI): South Koreans perceive
themselves as possessing lower job mobility than Americans,
which translates into increased social inclusion.
The contextual affordances of high job mobility allow individuals to more easily weaken bonds with norm-violators, and social
exclusion is an opportune method to punish them and clean up
the social environment simultaneously. Conversely, low job
3
mobility contexts provide fewer affordances for weakening undesirable relationships, making social exclusion more difficult to
employ in response to dishonest, norm-violating actors. Indeed,
research suggests that Americans express a greater desire to avoid
dishonest actors than do East Asians (Wang & Leung, 2010), implying that social exclusion may be a more prominent option in high
mobility contexts than in low mobility contexts.
In essence, social exclusion cannot be accomplished when one
is continuously brought into contact with a norm-violator, and it
is more feasible to exclude a norm-violator in a high mobility
environment where social networks are less dense. For example,
an employee in a low-turnover organization who wishes to
exclude a dishonest actor from social events will have a hard
time of it, as that actor is likely to have ties with many other
individuals in the organization, and thus their exclusion would
require the coordination of many. Conversely, exclusion would
be easier in the sparser networks of a high-turnover organization, and indeed, social exclusion is more likely to be used in situations when the cost is low, for example, when there is less
interdependence between individuals (Robinson, O’Reilly, &
Wang, 2013). Thus, we suggest individuals in high job mobility
environments will exclude more than those in low job mobility
environments.
We also test whether cultural differences exist between the
United States and South Korea. We predict that Americans are
more likely than South Koreans to use social exclusion as a
response to dishonest actors, because the United States has a
higher level of job mobility than South Korea.
Hypothesis 1, Social Exclusion (H1SE): Individuals in high job
mobility contexts are more likely than individuals in low job
mobility contexts to socially exclude a dishonest actor.
Hypothesis 2, Social Exclusion (H2SE): Americans perceive themselves to possess higher job mobility than South Koreans, which
translates into increased social exclusion.
Overview of experiments
Three experiments test the effects of job mobility on social
inclusion and exclusion. Experiment 1 examines how social
inclusion and exclusion, as well as monetary reward and punishment, are employed by Americans (high job mobility) and South
Koreans (low job mobility). We test perceived job mobility as
the mechanism underlying our proposed effects. Experiment 2
measures perceived job mobility and utilizes a behavioral measure of social inclusion and exclusion. Experiment 3 manipulates
perceived job mobility and tests whether social inclusion and
exclusion decisions are influenced by the perceived difficulty of
doing so.
Experiment 1: Culture, job mobility, and responses to honesty
and deception
Experiment 1 measured the perceived job mobility (Chen et al.,
2009) of Americans (high job mobility) and South Koreans (low job
mobility). We compared the effects of national culture and perceived job mobility on two different strategies of norm enforcement: monetary reward or punishment (using the measure from
Wang et al., 2009) and social inclusion or exclusion. We included
monetary responses to replicate previous findings (Wang &
Leung, 2010; Wang et al., 2011) and to provide comparison points
for the social inclusion and exclusion findings.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
4
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and variable inter-correlations, Experiment 1.
Variables
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
.34
.51
.19
3.60
3.78
22.05
.62
.47
.50
2.29
1.86
1.35
3.64
.49
1.00
.03
.51**
.00
.34**
.42**
.08
1.00
.03
.07
.17*
.01
.05
1.00
.01
.09
.28**
.02
1.00
.06
.02
.06
1.00
.13
.05
1.00
.05
1.00
Culture (0 = US; 1 = South Korea)
Behavior (0 = Honesty; 1 = Dishonesty)
Job mobility
Monetary response
Social inclusion or exclusion
Age
Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female)
Note: N = 221.
*
Correlation is significant at p 6 .05.
**
Correlation is significant at p 6 .01.
Method
Participants and design.1 Two-hundred and twenty one undergraduate students from a US southwestern university and a South
Korean university responded to a scenario as part of a class exercise.
The American sample included 146 students (94 females and 52
males; 70 Caucasians, 48 Asians, 19 Hispanics, 6 African Americans,
and 3 other races; mean age = 20.95, SD = 1.82, range = 19–31) and
the South Korean sample included 75 students (42 females and 33
males; all Asian; mean age = 24.19, SD = 5.10, range = 18–56). The
design was a 2 (behavior: honest, dishonest) 2 (culture: American,
Korean) between-participants design (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and correlation matrix).
Procedure. Following Wang et al. (2009), American and Korean
participants received scenarios in their respective national languages (English in the US and Korean in South Korea) in which
an actor was honest or dishonest. The instructions, scenarios, and
questions were back-translated from Korean to English by independent translators to ensure accuracy.
To measure perceived job mobility (Chen et al., 2009), participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with four statements (from
5 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree; e.g.,
‘‘Compared to other societies, it is relatively easy for people in
our society to change from one profession to a totally different profession.’’). We dropped one reverse-coded item (‘‘In our society,
even when people change professions, the business network they
have established in their professions will still be very useful for
their new profession.’’) due to low correlations with the other
items ( .29, .10, and .06; Kim & Mueller, 1978) and low reliability
(Hinkin, 1995). The final three items were averaged (a = .63), with
higher numbers reflecting higher levels of perceived job mobility.
In the dishonest condition, participants read: ‘‘Imagine the following scenario: You recently completed some work with another
individual. You just found out that the individual was dishonest
about some key information regarding the interaction. As a result,
you only received $100. You would have received 50% more if the
other individual had given you honest information.’’ Thus, in the
dishonest condition, participants expected $150 and suffered a
$50 loss. In the honest condition, participants were told they
received $100 because the other person was honest; they expected
$50 and enjoyed a $50 gain. These scenarios ensured that the gain
1
We used three consistent criteria for excluding participants: (1) participants
whose responses indicated that they were not paying attention (e.g., answered all
5’s or 5’s across all scale items, even though items were reverse coded), (2)
participants who completed the survey too quickly or too slowly, given the suggested
time allotment and mean completion times (2.5 standard deviations above and below
the mean), and (3) participants who failed the experimental manipulation checks.
Twelve participants were excluded in Experiments 1 and 3 because of their lack of
attention. Six participants were excluded in Experiment 2 because the survey was not
completed within the time allotted. Finally, 9 participants were excluded from
Experiment 2 because they failed the manipulation check of whether the other person
acted honestly or dishonestly in Gneezy’s Deception Game.
from the honesty and the loss from the dishonesty was equivalent
at $50.
To ensure that Korean participants understood the monetary
stake, the US dollar amount was also presented in an equivalent
amount of Korean Won, based on the approximate exchange rate
($1 = 1000 Korean Won; adapted from Wang & Leung, 2010). For
example, a monetary portion of the dishonest scenario stated,
‘‘As a result, you only received $100 (approximately 100,000 Korean Won).’’
Finally, participants were asked about two types of responses to
the honest or dishonest actor. They were told as they answered
each question to imagine that response as the only one they had
available to them. The appearance of each question was
counterbalanced.
Social inclusion or exclusion. Participants indicated the degree to
which they would (in the honest condition) socially include the
individual in or (in the dishonest condition) socially exclude the
individual from their social circle (1 = not at all to 6 = extremely).
Monetary reward or punishment. Following Wang and her colleagues (Wang et al., 2009, 2011; Wang & Leung, 2010), respondents could spend hypothetical money to reward (in the honest
condition) or punish (in the dishonest condition) at a personal cost
set at one-tenth of the amount the individual would be rewarded
or punished. This information was presented in $20 increments,
from $0 to $100 (e.g., participants who punished $20 selected,
‘‘Punish the individual $20 (at a cost of $2).’’ For Korean participants, the dollar amount was also translated into Korean Won.
Results and discussion
The effect of culture on responses to honesty and deception. The
dependent variables were subjected to a 2 (behavior: honest versus
dishonest) by 2 (culture: American versus Korean) by 2 (strategy:
social inclusion/exclusion versus monetary reward/punishment)
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA). The third factor was
measured as a within-participant factor.2 A three-way interaction
emerged, F(1, 217) = 64.00, p < .001, suggesting the differential effects
of culture and behavior on the type of response utilized. To explore
the contrasts, we analyzed the effects of culture and behavior on each
type of response separately.
Social inclusion or exclusion. Participants were more likely to
include honest actors (M = 4.02, SD = 1.20) than exclude dishonest
actors (M = 3.56, SD = 1.46), F(1, 217) = 18.76, p < .001, d = .34. Also,
Americans (M = 4.11, SD = 1.22) were more likely than Koreans
(M = 3.15, SD = 1.39) to include and exclude the actors,
F(1, 217) = 28.94, p < .001, d = .73. An interaction emerged,
2
A correlation emerged between perceived job mobility and participant age,
r(219) = .28, p < .001. To ensure that participant age was not driving our job mobility
effects, we performed the analyses controlling for participant age and the results
remained consistent. Therefore, the results reported do not include participant age as
a control.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Fig. 1. Effect of perceived job mobility (mean ± one standard deviation) and
behavior on social inclusion and exclusion, Experiment 1.
F(1, 217) = 29.90, p < .001, such that Americans (M = 4.21, SD = 1.21)
were more likely than Koreans (M = 2.37, SD = 1.08) to exclude dishonest actors, t(217) = 7.85, p < .001, d = 1.60; Americans (M = 4.01,
SD = 1.22) and Koreans (M = 4.03, SD = 1.18) did not differ in the
extent to which they included honest actors, t(217) = .06, p = .95,
d = .02.
Monetary response. An interaction emerged, F(1, 217) = 32.60,
p < .001. Americans (M = 2.99, SD = 2.06) monetarily punished less
than did Koreans (M = 4.35, SD = 1.23), t(217) = 3.99, p < .001,
d = .80. In contrast, Americans (M = 4.21, SD = 1.89) monetarily
rewarded more than did Koreans (M = 2.74, SD = 1.01),
t(217) = 4.09, p < .001, d = .97. These results replicate those by
Wang and Leung (2010). No main effects emerged for culture,
F(1, 217) = .04, p = .84, d = .002, or for rewarding and punishing,
F(1, 217) = .61, p = .43, d = .14.
The effect of perceived job mobility on responses to honesty and
deception. We ran separate linear regressions for each dependent
variable, with perceived job mobility and behavior as independent
variables.
Social inclusion and exclusion. A Job Mobility Behavior interaction emerged for the utilization of social inclusion or exclusion,
b = .18, SE = .08, t(217) = 2.25, p = .03. As perceived mobility
increased, exclusion increased, b = .14, SE = .05, t(217) = 2.53,
p = .01. However, perceived mobility did not influence inclusion,
b = .04, SE = .06, t(217) = .70, p = .49 (see Fig. 1).
Monetary response. A Job Mobility x Behavior interaction
emerged for the amount of monetary response, b = .43, SE = .11,
t(217) = 4.06, p < .001. As perceived mobility increased, the
amount of monetary punishment decreased, b = .21, SE = .07,
t(217) = 2.89, p = .004, but the amount of monetary reward
increased, b = .22, SE = .08, t(217) = 2.85, p = .005 (see Fig. 2).
Moderated path analyses. We hypothesized that cultural differences in perceived job mobility explain why Americans and Koreans differ in their responses. To test this hypothesis, we ran two
moderated path analyses, one with social inclusion/exclusion and
one with monetary reward/punishment as the dependent variable.
For each moderated path analysis, we utilized the Second Stage
and Direct Effect Moderation Model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). In
this model, moderation occurs between the mediator and the
dependent variable (i.e., second stage moderation) and the independent variable and the dependent variable (i.e., direct effect
moderation). Our hypothesis was tested via two multiple regression models (see Table 2 for regression results). The first regression
5
Fig. 2. Effect of perceived job mobility (means ± one standard deviation) and
behavior on amount of monetary reward and punishment, Experiment 1.
tested and confirmed that Americans (M = .64; SD = 2.07) perceive
themselves to possess higher job mobility than Koreans
(M = 1.84; SD = 1.77), t(219) = 8.86, p < .001, d = 1.29. The second
regression tested whether the actor’s behavior influences the
extent to which perceived job mobility and culture affect the utilization of each norm enforcement strategy. We discuss the results
for each dependent variable and the overall path analysis significance testing below.
Social inclusion and exclusion. We predicted that Americans
socially exclude more and include less than Koreans, and that these
relationships are mediated by levels of perceived job mobility. We
regressed social inclusion/exclusion on culture (independent variable), job mobility (mediator), behavior (moderator), the culture behavior interaction, and the job mobility x behavior
interaction.
A bootstrap procedure with 5000 samples tested the magnitude
of the direct, indirect, and total effects at each level of the moderator (honest versus dishonest). We first consider results in the dishonest condition. The direct effect of culture on exclusion emerged,
with a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval (CI) of [ 2.41, 1.46]
not overlapping with zero. Although trending, the indirect effect,
which tested job mobility as a mediator between culture and
exclusion, did not emerge, with a 90% CI of [ .07, .32]. However,
the indirect effect, when combined with the direct effect, produced
a total effect, with a 99% CI of [ 2.40, 1.24]. These findings provide support for H1SE and H2SE: Americans perceived themselves
to possess greater job mobility than Koreans, which translated into
increased social exclusion.
In the honest condition, the CIs of the direct [ .79, .57], indirect
[ .23, .50], and total effects [ .50, .47] all overlapped with zero.
Therefore, H1SI and H2SI were not supported: no differences in
inclusion emerged by culture, and perceived job mobility did not
mediate the effects of culture on social inclusion.
Monetary response. We replicated Wang and Leung (2010)’s
study by regressing monetary reward/punishment on culture
(independent variable), job mobility (mediator), behavior (moderator), the culture behavior interaction, and the job mobility behavior interaction.
We again utilized the bootstrapping method by Edwards and
Lambert (2007). In the dishonest condition, we found a direct effect
of culture on monetary punishment with a 95% CI of [.39, 1.84].
Although the indirect effect through perceived job mobility did
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
6
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Table 2
Second stage and direct effect moderated path analysis results for social inclusion/exclusion and monetary reward/punishment, Experiment 1.
Perceived job mobility
Mediator variable model
b
Constant
Culture (0 = US; 1 = South Korea)
.84
2.48
Dependent variable model
Conditional indirect effects
Honesty
Direct
Indirect
Total
Dishonesty
Direct
Indirect
Total
p
<.001***
<.001***
.16
.28
Social inclusion/exclusion
b
Constant
Culture (0 = US; 1 = South Korea)
Job Mobility
Behavior (0 = Honesty; 1 = Dishonesty)
Job mobility Behavior
Culture Behavior
SE
Monetary reward/punishment
SE
4.07
.14
.06
.17
.01
1.80
Boot effect
.14
.14
.002
1.94
.12
1.82
.15
.30
.06
.21
.08
.40
p
b
<.001***
.64
.37
.41
.93
<.001***
4.14
1.28
.07
1.08
.17
2.41
Conf. interval
Boot effect
SE
p
.22
.44
.09
.31
.12
.58
<.001***
.004**
.46
.001**
.16
<.001***
Conf. interval
[ .79, .57]
[ .23, .50]
[ .50, .47]
1.28
.17
1.44
[ 2.05, .43]*
[ .63, .29]
[ 1.97, .84]*
[ 2.41, 1.46]*
[ .07, .32]
[ 2.40, 1.24]**
1.13
.26
1.39
[.39, 1.84]*
[ .15, .70]
[.75, 1.98]*
Note: N = 221.
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 5000.
*
p 6 .05,
**
p 6 .01,
***
p 6 .001.
+
p 6 .10.
not emerge [ .15, .70], the indirect and direct effects combined to
produce a total effect [.75, 1.98]. In the honest condition, a direct
effect of culture on monetary reward emerged [ 2.05, .43]. The
indirect effect did not emerge [ .63, .29], but the total effect of culture on monetary reward did [ 1.97, .84].
Experiment 1 replicated findings by Wang and Leung (2010)
that Americans were less likely than Koreans to monetarily punish
a dishonest actor, but were more likely to monetarily reward an
honest actor. Importantly, decisions to socially exclude versus
include portrayed a considerably different pattern of effects. As
predicted, Americans were more likely than Koreans to exclude
dishonest actors, with this effect driven by higher perceived job
mobility. However, contrary to our predictions, Americans and
Koreans did not differ in their levels of social inclusion.
Experiment 2: Behavioral social inclusion and exclusion
Experiment 1 demonstrated clear cultural patterns and so
Experiments 2 and 3 focused on the proposed mechanism, job
mobility, to clarify its effects. Experiment 2 moved beyond the scenario used in Experiment 1 by placing individuals in a context that
allowed behavioral choices. We used a modified version of
Gneezy’s (2005) Deception Game, in which one player sends a
truthful or misleading message and the other player chooses
whether to believe it, with their decisions jointly determining their
payoffs.
Participants also played Cyberball (Williams, Yeager, Cheung, &
Choi, 2012), in which they chose to include or exclude others in an
on-line ball tossing game. This paradigm was designed to duplicate
inclusion and exclusion decisions that occur in face-to-face group
interactions (Williams & Sommer, 1997) and has demonstrated
similar effects as face-to-face paradigms (Williams, 2009). We
believe this paradigm has implications for organizational settings
in which group members often engage in interconnected work
tasks and choose if and when to interact with others.
Method
Participants and design. One-hundred nineteen undergraduate
participants from a US southwestern university completed this
study for extra credit (80 females and 39 males; 50 Caucasians,
41 Asians, 24 Hispanics, and 4 other races; mean age = 29.61,
SD = 8.53, range = 18–40) and were randomly assigned to a dishonest or honest condition. We also measured participants’ perceived
job mobility (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics and correlation
matrix).
Procedure. We used the same job mobility scale as in Experiment 1 (Chen et al., 2009), and dropped the same item because
of decreased reliability and low correlations with the other items
(.20, .05, and .002). The three items were averaged (a = .60), with
higher numbers reflecting higher levels of perceived job mobility.
Stage 1. Participants were told they would be completing two
stages during the study. In Stage 1, participants took part in the
modified version of Gneezy’s (2005) Deception Game. Participants
were informed that they would be assigned at random to play as
Player A or Player B with another randomly chosen participant.
In reality, every participant played as Player B, and we manipulated
Player A’s choices. Participants were told that only Player As would
have the payoff matrix with two options (Options A and B) based
on a fictitious currency (MAXs). Participants (Player Bs) could not
see the payoff matrix, but were asked to choose Option A or B;
depending on the option selected, they would earn more or less
than Player A.
The instructions also indicated that, prior to their option choice,
Player As would send participants one of two messages: ‘‘Option A
earns you more than Option B’’ or ‘‘Option B earns you more than
Option A.’’ The instructions made it clear that only one of these messages was accurate. Because we controlled Player As’ choices, the
message always indicated that participants would do best by choosing Option A. Research (e.g., Gneezy, 2005) indicates that a large
majority of participants believe the message and choose Option A.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
7
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and variable inter-correlations, Experiment 2.
Variables
Mean
SD
1
2
3
3a
3b
3c
3d
4
5
1. Job mobility
2. Behavior (0 = Honesty; 1 = Dishonesty)
3. Total number of passes to prior player
a. Round 1
b. Round 2
c. Round 3
d. Round 4
4. Age
5. Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female)
.35
.54
1.41
.39
.20
.34
.49
29.61
.67
2.09
.50
.92
.49
.40
.47
.50
8.53
.47
1.00
.09
.03
.11
.08
.13
.01
.02
.11
1.00
.29**
.25**
.09
.02
.23*
.01
.01
1.00
.60**
.39**
.28**
.68**
.11
.08
1.00
.10
.24**
.43**
.17
.04
1.00
.003
.01
.02
.18*
1.00
.20*
.01
.07
1.00
.01
.04
1.00
.05
1.00
Note: N = 119.
*
Correlation is significant at p 6 .05.
**
Correlation is significant at p 6 .01.
After choosing Option A or B, participants in the honest condition
were told that Player A’s message was true, that they would receive
40 MAXs in Stage 1, and that ‘‘you would have received 50% less if
you had chosen the other option.’’ In the dishonest condition, participants were told that Player A’s message was not true, that they
would receive 40 MAXs in Stage 1, and that ‘‘you would have
received 50% more if you had chosen the other option.’’ Thus, their
payoffs were identical, but were framed as either an equivalent
gain or a loss resulting from a truth or a lie, respectively.
Stage 2. After completing Stage 1, participants then moved on to
Stage 2, in which they played an adapted version of Cyberball
(Williams et al., 2012). Participants were informed that they would
be interacting with three other participants who were simultaneously online during the study, one of whom was the honest or
dishonest actor from Stage 1. On the computer screen, participants
saw images of four figures. The participant was labeled as ‘‘You
(Player 2)’’ and the player from Stage 1 as ‘‘Prior Player 1.’’ The
two new players were labeled, ‘‘New Player 3’’ and ‘‘New Player
4’’, respectively. We controlled the actions of the other three players at all times.
Participants started the game in possession of the ball and were
asked who they wanted to throw it to: ‘‘Prior Player 1’’, ‘‘New Player
3’’ or ‘‘New Player 4’’. We measured participants’ tossing behavior,
with participants’ choices providing a measure of inclusion or
exclusion. To make tossing decisions more salient, emphasis was
placed on participants mentally visualizing the ball-tossing
between players; the figures and ball were animated on the computer, with the animation reflecting the participants’ tossing decisions and the other players’ subsequent reciprocation. To
standardize tossing decisions, after the participant tossed the ball,
the receiver tossed the ball back to the participant (e.g., if the participant tossed the ball to New Player 3, New Player 3 would return
the ball to the participant). Each back and forth tossing exchange
was coded as one round. Because passes were pre-programmed to
be returned to the participant, the game only included four rounds
to enhance the realism and reduce suspicion of the experience.
Results and discussion
Number of passes to Prior Player 1. We began by analyzing each
round separately. For Round 1, a binomial logistic regression analysis resulted in a Job Mobility x Behavior interaction, b = .41,
SE = .21, Wald = 3.75, p = .05 (see Fig. 3). As perceived job mobility
increased, the odds that the ball would be passed to the dishonest
actor decreased, b = .41, SE = .18, Wald = 5.57, p = .02, suggesting
that the level of job mobility was positively associated with the
usage of social exclusion. Following honesty, however, perceived
job mobility did not influence the odds of the ball being passed
to the honest actor, b = .005, SE = .12, Wald = .002, p = .97. Separate logistic regression analyses were conducted for Rounds 2, 3,
Fig. 3. Effect of perceived job mobility (mean ± one standard deviation) and
behavior on the probability of passing the ball to the prior player, Experiment 2
(Round 1).
and 4. The Job Mobility x Behavior interaction did not emerge
across the final three rounds (all p’s > .39).
To further explore the effects, we aggregated the number of
passes participants made to the Prior Player 1 across all four
rounds, with higher number reflecting higher inclusion/less exclusion, e.g., tossing the ball to Prior Player 1 in all four rounds was
coded as 4. We tested the effect of perceived job mobility and
behavior on the amount of social inclusion or exclusion. Participants tossed the ball to honest players more than to dishonest
players, b = .53, SE = .17, t(115) = 3.19, p = .002. However, no
interaction emerged, b = .02, SE = .08, t(115) = .24, p = .81.
Overall, we found no differences in social inclusion across the
levels of mobility. Conversely, individuals from high mobility contexts were more likely to exclude dishonest actors in the initial
Cyberball round than individuals from low mobility contexts, with
the effects dissipating in later rounds. It is possible that the later
rounds attenuated the effects of perceived job mobility because a
multi-round interaction with the same individuals would, over
time, reduce a participants’ sense of mobility within their current
set of interpersonal interactions. We discuss this possibility more
extensively in the general discussion.
Experiment 3: The difficulty of socially excluding
Experiment 3 aimed to accomplish several goals. First, as Experiments 1 and 2 measured perceived job mobility, Experiment 3
manipulated job mobility to test causality. Although Experiments
1 and 2 suggest that job mobility will not influence social inclusion,
we nonetheless measure it to be comprehensive. Second, we
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
8
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
improved the single-item measures of social inclusion and exclusion employed in Experiment 1 by using multiple-item measures
so as to better test the validity of our findings. Third, we ensured
that all aspects of the design were organizationally-related: our
participants were working adults, our scenarios situated participants within a working context, and our manipulation of mobility
was job-specific. Finally, we examined potential mechanisms
underlying our effects. In particular, we proposed that social exclusion will be more prevalent in high mobility environments because
it is less difficult to implement.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a high versus
low job mobility condition. We manipulated job mobility by asking
participants to read a scenario containing job statistics for a hypothetical country (Chen et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2011). Participants
in the low job mobility condition read: ‘‘Due to its government’s
labor policies, the job mobility in Country X is extremely low.
According to the research statistics provided by the National Academy of Social Sciences, the majority of the people in Country X
have worked in only 1 or 2 jobs in the same occupation throughout
their lifetime. About one third of the people who are older than
50 years of age still remain in their first job.’’
Participants in the high job mobility condition read a scenario in
which the job mobility in Country X was extremely high, with statistics showing that people in Country X had worked in 3–6 jobs
and that the percentage of people who remain in their first job
decreased after the age of 30. Two supporting graphs were presented with each condition.
Participants in both conditions were asked to imagine how they
would prepare for the job market if they were a citizen of Country
X and describe that preparation in as much detail as possible.
Social inclusion or exclusion. After the job mobility manipulation,
participants received the same scenario as in Experiment 1. Participants indicated the degree to which they would socially exclude
(in the dishonest condition) or socially include (in the honest condition) the actor. Social exclusion (inclusion) was measured using
the following three questions (adapted from Ferris, Brown, Berry,
& Lian, 2008): ‘‘After the incident, to what extent would you ignore
(include) the individual at work?’’, ‘‘. . .would you leave (stay in)
the area when the individual entered?’’, and ‘‘...would you be unresponsive (responsive) to the individual’s greeting at work?’’, 1 = not
at all to 6 = extremely. These items were averaged to form a measure of social exclusion (a = .86) and social inclusion (a = .81).
Perceived difficulty of social inclusion or exclusion. Participants
were then asked to rate how difficult it would be to implement
these strategies using four items, e.g., ‘‘How hard would it be for
you to do these things?’’, 1 = not at all to 6 = extremely. These items
were averaged to form a difficulty measure (a = .91).
Perceived effectiveness of socially including or excluding. Participants also rated eight items measuring the effectiveness of these
social exclusion (inclusion) strategies, e.g., ‘‘How likely would the
individual be to repeat the dishonest (honest) act if you did these
things?’’, ‘‘How strong are these punishments (rewards)?’’, ‘‘How
negatively (positively) affected would the individual have been
by these things?’’, 1 = not at all to 6 = extremely. These items were
averaged to form an effectiveness measure (a = .93).
To confirm that difficulty and effectiveness were two independent constructs, the two measures were analyzed via a principal
components analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation with kaiser normalization. Results revealed a two-factor structure (eigenvalues
greater than 1.0) explaining 73% of the variance and supporting
the discriminant validity of difficulty and effectiveness. All the
Hypothesis 3. Individuals in high job mobility contexts perceive
social exclusion as less difficult than individuals in low mobility
contexts, which translates into increased social exclusion.
An alternative explanation for why low job mobility was associated with decreased social exclusion in Experiments 1 and 2
involves the perceived effectiveness of social exclusion. As individuals in a low mobility environment are more likely to have collective self-construals (Oishi, Lun et al., 2007), it is not surprising that
their social exclusion causes greater fear and pain (Kim &
Markman, 2006) and is perceived to be a more effective social control (Hashimoto & Yamagishi, 2013) than social exclusion for individuals in a high mobility environment.
Furthermore, theory suggests that people are aware that, ceteris
paribus, punishments are felt more intensely than rewards
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and so tend
to use them more sparingly (Wang et al., 2009). If this is the case,
it logically follows that as social exclusion becomes more excruciating for those excluded (as in low mobility contexts), individuals
may feel they need to use this method less extensively. In short, an
important question is whether this rationale could also explain the
social exclusion findings from Experiments 1 and 2: that is,
whether individuals from low mobility contexts are more moderate in their use of social exclusion than those from high mobility
contexts because they believe that not as much exclusion is necessary to be an effective deterrent. We therefore included a measure
of perceived effectiveness to test this alternative explanation.
Method
Participants and design. One-hundred fifteen working adults in
the United States (45 females and 70 males; 90 Caucasians, 9
Asians, 6 Hispanics, 5 African Americans, and 5 other races; mean
age = 31.35, SD = 11.66, range = 18–67) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online survey program which
has been proposed to provide a diverse and representative sample
while yielding data that are equal to or exceed the psychometric
standards in established research (see Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011). The design was a 2 (job mobility: high, low) 2
(behavior: honest, dishonest) between-participants design (see
Table 4 for descriptive statistics and correlation matrix).
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and variable inter-correlations, Experiment 3.
Variables
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
.51
.55
2.50
3.62
3.99
31.35
.39
.50
.50
1.31
1.11
1.52
11.66
.49
1.00
.08
.10
.06
.13
.04
.15
1.00
.33**
.47**
.70**
.08
.05
1.00
.12
.44**
.06
.12
1.00
.62**
.05
.10
1.00
.04
.13
1.00
.43**
1.00
Manipulated job mobility (0 = Low; 1 = High)
Behavior (0 = Honesty; 1 = Dishonesty)
Difficulty
Effectiveness
Social inclusion or exclusion
Age
Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female)
Note: N = 115.
*
Correlation is significant at p 6 .05.
**
Correlation is significant at p 6 .01.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Table 5
First stage and direct effect moderated path analysis results for social inclusion/
exclusion, Experiment 3.
Difficulty
Mediator variable model
b
SE
p
Constant
Job mobility
Behavior
Job mobility Behavior
1.83
.36
1.37
1.03
.26
.34
.33
.46
<.001***
.29
<.001***
.03*
Dependent variable model
b
SE
p
Constant
Job mobility
Behavior
Job mobility Behavior
Difficulty
5.71
.12
2.20
.55
.24
.26
.29
.30
.40
.08
<.001***
.68
<.001***
.17
.004**
Conditional indirect effects
Boot effect
Conf. interval
Social inclusion/exclusion
Honesty
Direct
Indirect
Total
Dishonesty
Direct
Indirect
Total
.12
.09
.21
.43
.16
.59
[ .49, .26]
[ .28, .02]
[ .59, .20]
[ .07, .97]
[.003, .47]*
[.06, 1.15]+
Note: N = 115.
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 5000.
*
p 6 .05,
**
p 6 .01,
***
p 6 .001.
+
p 6 .10.
items were significantly loaded on the expected factors with no
cross-loadings.
Results and discussion
Social inclusion and exclusion. The likelihood of socially including/excluding the actor was submitted to a Job Mobility x Behavior
between-participants ANOVA. Participants were more likely to
include an honest actor (M = 5.16, SD = .73) than to exclude a dishonest actor (M = 3.03, SD = 1.31), F(1, 111) = 111.31, p < .001. An
interaction emerged, F(1, 111) = 3.84, p = .05. High mobility participants (M = 3.33, SD = 1.38) were more likely than low mobility
participants (M = 2.75, SD = 1.20) to socially exclude a dishonest
actor, t(111) = 2.16, p = .03; mobility did not influence social inclusion decisions (high mobility: M = 5.07, SD = .77 versus low mobility: M = 5.28, SD = .67), t(111) = .69, p = .49.
Moderated path analyses. We hypothesized that difficulty, but
not effectiveness, would explain the effect of job mobility on social
exclusion. To test this hypothesis, we used two First Stage and
Direct Effect Moderation Models (Edwards & Lambert, 2007), one
with difficulty as the mediator, the other with effectiveness as
the mediator. In this model, moderation occurs between the independent variable and the mediator (i.e. first stage moderation) and
the independent variable and the dependent variable (i.e., direct
effect moderation).
Difficulty. To test H3, we ran the moderated path analysis utilizing two regressions (see Table 5). The mediator variable model
tests the interactive effect of manipulated job mobility and behavior on difficulty.3 A Job Mobility Behavior between-participants
ANOVA yielded an interaction, F(1, 111) = 4.97, p = .03, with participants in the high job mobility condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.32)
3
We reported ANOVA results for ease of interpretation. As shown in Table 5, the
moderated path analysis utilized OLS regressions.
9
viewing social exclusion as less difficult to implement than those
in the low job mobility condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.43),
t(111) = 2.15, p = .03, d = .49. Differences did not emerge for social
inclusion (high mobility condition (M = 2.19, SD = 1.06) versus low
mobility condition (M = 1.83, SD = .92)), t(111) = 1.06, p = .29,
d = .36. Participants also viewed it as more difficult to exclude a dishonest actor (M = 2.88, SD = 1.41) than to include an honest actor
(M = 2.03, SD = 1.01), F(1, 111) = 13.86, p < .001, d = .69. The main
effect of job mobility did not emerge, F(1, 111) = .42, p = .52, d = .21.
The dependent variable model tests whether the increased difficulty of implementing inclusion/exclusion strategies decreased
their utilization. The more difficult participants thought it was to
include/exclude, the less likely they were to do so, b = .24,
SE = .08, t(110) = 2.98, p = .004.
As with Experiment 1, we used the bootstrapping method with
5000 samples and constructed bias-corrected CIs. In the dishonest
condition, indirect effect was significant [.003, .47] using a 95% CI.
The indirect effect combined with the direct effect [ .07, .97], produced a total effect [.06, 1.15] using a 90% CI. This analysis marginally supported H3: individuals in the high job mobility condition
viewed exclusion as less difficult to implement than those in the
low job mobility condition, which translated into increased social
exclusion. In the honest condition, CIs of the indirect [ .28, .02],
direct [ .49, .26], and total effects [ .59, .20] overlapped with zero,
indicating that difficulty did not mediate the relationship between
job mobility and social inclusion.
Effectiveness. We tested whether participants in the low job
mobility condition utilized less social exclusion because they perceived it as more effective. Participants perceived inclusion
(M = 4.19, SD = .95) to be more effective than exclusion (M = 3.15,
SD = 1.02), F(1, 111) = 30.75, p < .001, d = 1.06. However, the Job
Mobility Behavior interaction, F(1, 111) = .31, p = .58, and the
main effect of job mobility, F(1, 111) = .05, p = .83, did not emerge.
Due to the absence of these effects, we conclude that effectiveness
did not mediate the effects of job mobility on social exclusion, ruling out the alternative hypothesis.
Experiment 3 confirmed a causal relationship between job
mobility and social exclusion. Participants in the high mobility
condition were more likely to exclude dishonest actors than participants in the low mobility condition. Furthermore, the relationship
between mobility and exclusion was mediated by the difficulty of
exclusion, but not by effectiveness. No effects were found for social
inclusion.
General discussion
Across three experiments, using different cultural samples
(Americans, South Koreans), research methods (correlational,
experimentally manipulated), and measures of social inclusion
and exclusion (scenarios, behavioral), we consistently found that
individuals in high perceived job mobility contexts were more
likely to socially exclude dishonest actors than those in low perceived job mobility contexts, and that perceived job mobility did
not affect levels of social inclusion.
Experiment 1 demonstrated clear cultural differences in the utilization of social inclusion/exclusion versus monetary rewards/
punishments. Specifically, when employing monetary incentives,
Americans punished a dishonest actor less and rewarded an honest
actor more than South Koreans; however, Americans socially
excluded a dishonest actor more than South Koreans, whereas no
differences by job mobility emerged for the social inclusion of an
honest actor. Importantly, perceived job mobility was a contributing underlying mechanism. Experiment 2 provided a behavioral
measure of social inclusion and exclusion. It found that as perceived job mobility increased, the likelihood of tossing the ball to
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
10
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
a dishonest actor in the initial round of the game decreased, suggesting increased social exclusion. Experiment 3 examined the proposed theoretical mechanism and found that the perceived
difficulty, but not the perceived effectiveness, of socially excluding
a dishonest actor mediated the relationship between job mobility
and social exclusion. It also determined causality by showing that
manipulated perceptions of job mobility increased social exclusion.
As in Experiment 1, job mobility did not affect social inclusion
decisions in Experiments 2 or 3. In sum, these experiments provide
support for an emergent socioecological perspective that sheds
insight into how culture influences responses to norm-violating
behavior.
Critically, this research goes beyond past work that has focused
on cultural comparisons of monetary reward and punishment
responses. Our findings illustrate a new cultural pattern of results
and a boundary condition for previous work. While previous work
on reward and punishment behaviors showed that East Asians
were more monetarily punitive than Westerners, our results show
that Westerners can be just as punitive when utilizing a different
form of response. An individual’s choice to punish may depend
on the situational affordances of their culture and context. We
hope that this research will stimulate investigation into different
forms of responses, thereby expanding understanding of culture,
mobility, social norms, and responses to normative and norm-violating behaviors.
This research offers important practical implications for individuals in organizational contexts. An employee working abroad,
or even those who choose to move to a new company, should be
aware that differing contextual levels of job mobility may lead to
organizational cultures whose responses to norm-violating behavior may differ dramatically from what the employee is used to. For
instance, a manager who is hired from a stable (i.e., low mobility)
organization with clearly defined sanctioning systems may gain a
reputation in a more quickly changing entrepreneurial (i.e., high
mobility) organization for being unnecessarily punitive. Instead,
members of these entrepreneurial organizations may be used to
responding to norm-violating behaviors more informally, for
example, by excluding others. In sum, our research implies that
managers responding to bad behavior risk violating cultural expectations if they do not take into account the contextual mobility of
their organization.
Future directions
The findings that job mobility or national culture are not associated with social inclusion warrants further discussion. Because
participants’ choices to socially include were based largely around
decisions to maintain or deepen, rather than form, ties (e.g., in
Experiment 1, keeping an existing member of a social group; in
Experiment 2, passing a ball to another player; in Experiment 3,
social inclusion of a coworker), this may be why no differences
emerged. It may be easy for individuals in both high and low job
mobility contexts to maintain a relationship with honest actors.
Future studies could go beyond inclusion strategies based on
‘‘friendly defaults’’ to develop stronger manipulations or measures
to capture social inclusion strategies that require more effort (e.g.,
tie formation).
Our findings in Experiment 2 suggest that social exclusion decisions are contextually sensitive and individuals are likely to adjust
their reactions once the environmental mobility changes. For
example, whereas participants high in perceived job mobility were
less likely to toss the ball to the dishonest player in the initial
round of Cyberball, this effect dissipated over the next three
rounds. One possibility is that the norm of inclusion accentuated
by the Cyberball game resulted in an increase in participants’
inclusionary behavior over time, regardless of their respective
levels of job mobility. Another possibility is that multiple rounds
with the same three players engendered a perception of low mobility in which participants felt inextricably tied to the other players.
A further analysis using a median split to form high and low mobility groups suggests that these explanations may indeed have
played a part: participants in both low and high mobility contexts
in the final two rounds responded in a manner similar to participants in low mobility contexts in the initial round (i.e., in the first
round, only 14% of participants in high mobility contexts tossed the
ball to the dishonest actor, as compared to 37% of the participants
in low mobility contexts; in the final two rounds, between 30% and
43% of both groups tossed the ball to the dishonest actor). Future
research should examine this dynamic to better understand the
malleability of perceived mobility, and when the immediate situational context may override more stable measures of socioecological mobility (e.g., the job mobility scale utilized in Experiments 1
and 2).
A more fine-grained examination of various types of mobility
may also be worthwhile to explore. For example, whereas measures of job and relational mobility are often based on a perceived
societal mobility (i.e. how easy it is to change careers or relationships in a given environment; Chen et al., 2009; Schug et al.,
2009, 2010); measures of residential mobility are often based on
objective statistics (i.e. the number of residential moves people
have made; e.g., Oishi, Ishii, & Lun, 2009; Oishi, Lun et al., 2007;
Oishi, Rothman et al., 2007; Oishi & Schimmack, 2010; Yuki
et al., 2007). Oishi (2014) proposed that in contrast to most psychological research that examines how perceived societal mobility
affects cognition, emotion, and behavior, socioecological psychology can also employ environmental data (e.g. sex ratios in a given
environment, population density) to investigate how the objective
environment influences individual psychology.
Future research should compare the relative influences of perceived societal mobility versus objective mobility’s influence on
norm-related reactions. Moreover, it would be valuable to explore
whether the effects produced by job mobility also result from residential and relational mobility, or whether these different forms of
mobility differently influence the same phenomena. These three
types of mobility are correlated, but conceptually distinct, so
may exhibit notable differences in both their pattern and magnitude of effects. Perceived job mobility, for example, may exhibit
a stronger effect on behaviors related to organizational contexts.
In Experiment 1, we also measured perceived relational mobility
(Yuki et al., 2007; 12 items, from 1 = strongly disagree to
7 = strongly agree; e.g., ‘‘They have many chances to get to know
other people’’). A correlation between relational and job mobility
emerged, r(211) = .24, p < .001. However, the results suggested
relational and job mobility are distinct constructs: while controlling for relational mobility, the reported effects for job mobility
still hold.
Moreover, whereas the pattern of effects of relational mobility
on social inclusion/exclusion mirrored that of job mobility, the
effects were not as robust. The interaction between perceived relational mobility and behavior on the amount of social inclusion or
exclusion was in the same direction as the job mobility data but
not significant, b = .37, SE = .28, t(217) = 1.33, p = .19. This may
have occurred because the scenario specified a work-based relationship between the target individuals, thus resulting in a stronger effect for the more contextually pertinent construct of job
mobility.
It is also worthwhile to explore whether individuals react to
social inclusion and exclusion differently depending on the level
of job mobility in their environment. Although Experiment 3 found
that the level of perceived effectiveness of social inclusion and
exclusion was the same in low versus high job mobility environments, our measurement only captured the perception of the
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
initiator, but not the recipient, of social inclusion and exclusion. One
possibility is that when one individual decides to exclude another,
recipients in high mobility contexts will be less affected than those
in low mobility contexts; for with their higher mobility, the recipients can simply opt out of the situation, making the exclusion less
of a threat and ultimately, less of a punishment. In this case, less
threatening punishments may be balanced by the increased willingness of individuals in high mobility contexts to exclude. Thus,
the overall impact of the exclusion may in fact be the same across
contexts. Future research should try to examine this other side of
these interactions.
Conclusion
More tangible responses to norm-relevant behavior, such as
monetary incentives, generally occur via formal institutional or
organizational channels. Social inclusion and exclusion, on the
other hand, thrive in both formal arenas and in the informal webs
of human connection that lie just beneath the surface of any organizational chart. This research explores these latter forms of
responses to normative and norm-violating behaviors. Job mobility
does not alter responses to norm-relevant behavior via social
inclusion, but does via social exclusion, both within and across cultures. This provides greater insight into the relationship between
culture, mobility and the utilization of responses to normative
and norm-violating behaviors. These clashes of organizational
and national culture are not uncommon, and understanding how
different cultures choose to respond is an important step towards
reducing misinterpretations and helping improve cross-cultural
organizational dynamics.
References
Abrams, D., Hogg, M. A., & Marques, J. (2005). The social psychology of inclusion and
exclusion. New York: Psychology Press.
Bahns, A. J., Pickett, K. M., & Crandall, C. S. (2012). Social ecology of similarity: Big
schools, small schools and social relationships. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 15(1), 119–131.
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and
cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 594–615.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger
than good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4), 323–370.
Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Ciarocco, N. J., & Twenge, J. M. (2005). Social
exclusion impairs self-regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88(4), 589–604.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117(3),
497–529.
Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (1990). Point-counterpoints: Anxiety and social
exclusion. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 9(2), 165–195.
Bialik, C. (2010). Seven careers in a lifetime? Think twice, researchers say. The
Wall Street Journal. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704
206804575468162805877990> .
Bian, Y., & Ang, S. (1997). Guanxi networks and job mobility in China and Singapore.
Social Forces, 75(3), 981–1005.
Borghans, L., & Golsteyn, B. H. (2012). Job mobility in Europe, Japan and the United
States. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 50(3), 436–456.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 6(1), 3–5.
Chen, J., Chiu, C.-Y., & Chan, F. S.-F. (2009). The cultural effects of job mobility and
the belief in a fixed world: Evidence from performance forecast. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 97(5), 851–865.
Chen, M. L. (2012). The effect of leader reward and punishment behaviors on
subordinates’ budget reports. Engineering Economist, 57(1), 41–54.
Chiu, C.-Y., & Chen, J. (2004). Symbols and interactions: Application of the CCC
model to culture, language, and social identity. In S.-H. Ng, C. Candlin, & C.-Y.
Chiu (Eds.), Language matters: Communication, culture, and social identity
(pp. 155–182). Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press.
Denissen, J. J., Penke, L., Schmitt, D. P., & van Aken, M. A. (2008). Self-esteem
reactions to social interactions: Evidence for sociometer mechanisms across
days, people, and nations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1),
181–196.
Dess, G. G., & Shaw, J. D. (2001). Voluntary turnover, social capital, and
organizational performance. Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 446–456.
11
Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007). Methods for integrating moderation and
mediation: A general analytical framework using moderated path analysis.
Psychological Methods, 12(1), 1–22.
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003). Does rejection hurt?
An fMRI study of social exclusion. Science, 302(5643), 290–292.
Falk, C. F., Heine, S. J., Yuki, M., & Takemura, K. (2009). Why do Westerners selfenhance more than East Asians? European Journal of Personality, 23(3), 183–203.
Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Schultz, M. (2014). Gossip and ostracism promote
cooperation in groups. Psychological Science, 25(3), 656–664.
Ferris, D. L., Brown, D. J., Berry, J., & Lian, H. (2008). The development and validation of
the Workplace Ostracism Scale. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(6), 1348–1366.
Fuster, A., & Meier, S. (2010). Another hidden cost of incentives: The detrimental
effect on norm enforcement. Management Science, 56(1), 57–70.
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. The American Economic
Review, 95(1), 384–394.
Gray, K., Ward, A. F., & Norton, M. I. (2012). Paying it forward: Generalized
reciprocity and the limits of generosity. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
143(1), 247–254. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031047.
Hashimoto, H., & Yamagishi, T. (2013). Two faces of interdependence: Harmony
seeking and rejection avoidance. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 16(2), 142–151.
Hays, R. B. (1985). A longitudinal study of friendship development. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 48(4), 909–924.
Heine, S. J., & Renshaw, K. (2002). Interjudge agreement, self-enhancement, and
liking: Cross-cultural divergences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
28(5), 578–587.
Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Nezlek, J. B., Foster, J., Lakey, C. E., & Goldman, B. M.
(2008). Within-person relationships among daily self-esteem, need satisfaction,
and authenticity. Psychological Science, 19(11), 1140–1145.
Hinkin, T. R. (1995). A review of scale development practices in the study of
organizations. Journal of Management, 21(5), 967–988.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Kazdin, A. E. (2001). Behavior modification in applied settings. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Kim, J.-O., & Mueller, C. W. (1978). Factor analysis: Statistical methods and practical
issues (Vol. 14). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Kim, K., & Markman, A. B. (2006). Differences in fear of isolation as an explanation of
cultural differences: Evidence from memory and reasoning. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 42(3), 350–364.
Korean Employment Information Service (2009). <http://eng.keis.or.kr/eng/
network/employ_info.jsp>.
Leary, M. R. (1990). Responses to social exclusion: Social anxiety, jealousy,
loneliness, depression, and low self-esteem. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 9(2), 221–229.
Levine, J. M., Moreland, R. L., & Hausmann, L. R. M. (2005). The social psychology of
inclusion and exclusion. In D. Abrams, M. A. Hogg, & J. M. Marques (Eds.),
Managing group composition: Inclusive and exclusive role transitions
(pp. 137–160). New York: Psychology Press.
Lewis, K., Belliveau, M., Herndon, B., & Keller, J. (2007). Group cognition,
membership change, and performance: Investigating the benefits and
detriments of collective knowledge. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 103(2), 159–178.
Lun, J., Oishi, S., & Tenney, E. R. (2012). Residential mobility moderates preferences
for egalitarian versus loyal helpers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
48(1), 291–297.
MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why does social exclusion hurt? The
relationship between social and physical pain. Psychological Bulletin, 131(2),
202–223.
Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Van
Nostrand.
Meriküll, J. (2011). Labour market mobility during a recession: The case of Estonia.
Working Papers of Eesti Pank, No 1/2011.
Moscarini, G., & Postel-Vinay, F. (2013, May). Did the job ladder fail after the great
recession? Paper Presented at NBER Project on the Labor Market in the
Aftermath of the Great Recession, Cambridge, MA.
Oishi, S. (2010). The psychology of residential mobility implications for the self,
social relationships, and well-being. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(1),
5–21.
Oishi, S. (2014). Socioecological psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 65,
581–609.
Oishi, S., & Graham, J. (2010). Social ecology lost and found in psychological science.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(4), 356–377.
Oishi, S., Ishii, K., & Lun, J. (2009). Residential mobility and conditionality of group
identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 913–919.
Oishi, S., & Kesebir, S. (2012). Optimal social-networking strategy is a function of
socioeconomic conditions. Psychological Science, 23(12), 1542–1548.
Oishi, S., Kesebir, S., Miao, F. F., Talhelm, T., Endo, Y., Uchida, Y., et al. (2013).
Residential mobility increases motivation to expand social network: But why?
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(2), 217–223.
Oishi, S., Lun, J., & Sherman, G. D. (2007). Residential mobility, self-concept, and
positive affect in social interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
93(1), 131–141.
Oishi, S., Rothman, A. J., Snyder, M., Su, J., Zehm, K., Hertel, A. W., et al. (2007b). The
socioecological model of procommunity action: The benefits of residential
stability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(5), 831–844.
Oishi, S., & Schimmack, U. (2010). Residential mobility, well-being, and mortality.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(6), 980–994.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001
12
J. Whitson et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Ouwerkerk, J. W., Kerr, N. L., Gallucci, M., & Van Lange, P. A. (2005). Avoiding the
social death penalty: Ostracism and cooperation in social dilemmas. In K. D.
Williams, J. P. Forgas, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), The social outcast: Ostracism, social
exclusion, rejection, and bullying (pp. 321–332). New York: Psychology Press.
Peplau, L. A., & Perlman, D. (1982). Perspectives on loneliness. In L. A. Peplau & D.
Perlman (Eds.), Loneliness: A sourcebook of current theory, research and therapy
(pp. 1–20). New York: Wiley.
Podsakoff, P. M., Bommer, W. H., Podsakoff, N. P., & MacKenzie, S. B. (2006).
Relationships between leader reward and punishment behavior and subordinate
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors: A meta-analytic review of existing and new
research. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99(2), 113–142.
Robinson, S. L., O’Reilly, J., & Wang, W. (2013). Invisible at work: An integrated
model of workplace ostracism. Journal of Management, 39(1), 203–231. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206312466141.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of
intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist,
55(1), 68.
Schug, J., Yuki, M., Horikawa, H., & Takemura, K. (2009). Similarity attraction and
actually selecting similar others: How cross-societal differences in relational
mobility affect interpersonal similarity in Japan and the USA. Asian Journal of
Social Psychology, 12(2), 95–103.
Schug, J., Yuki, M., & Maddux, W. (2010). Relational mobility explains between-and
within-culture differences in self-disclosure to close friends. Psychological
Science, 21(10), 1471–1478.
Stryker, S. (2007). Identity theory and personality theory: Mutual relevance. Journal
of Personality, 75(6), 1083–1102.
Tay, L., & Diener, E. (2011). Needs and subjective well-being around the world.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 354–365.
Topel, R. H., & Ward, M. P. (1992). Job mobility and the careers of young men. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 439–479.
Twenge, J. M., Catanese, K. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Social exclusion causes selfdefeating behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 606–615.
Wang, C. S., Galinsky, A. D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2009). Bad drives psychological
reactions, but good propels behavior: Responses to honesty and deception.
Psychological Science, 20(5), 634–644.
Wang, C. S., & Leung, A. K.-Y. (2010). The cultural dynamics of rewarding honesty
and punishing deception. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(11),
1529–1542.
Wang, C. S., Leung, A. K.-Y., See, Y. H. M., & Gao, X. Y. (2011). The effects of culture
and friendship on rewarding honesty and punishing deception. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 47(6), 1295–1299.
Wayne, S. J., Shore, L. M., Bommer, W. H., & Tetrick, L. E. (2002). The role of fair
treatment and rewards in perceptions of organizational support and leadermember exchange. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3), 590–598.
Williams, K. D. (2009). Ostracism: A temporal need-threat model. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 275–314.
Williams, K. D., Shore, W. J., & Grahe, J. E. (1998). The silent treatment: Perceptions
of its behaviors and associated feelings. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,
1(2), 117–141.
Williams, K. D., & Sommer, K. L. (1997). Social ostracism by coworkers: Does
rejection lead to loafing or compensation? Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 23(7), 693–706.
Williams, K. D., Yeager, D. S., Cheung, C. K. T., & Choi, W. (2012). Cyberball (version
4.0) [Software]. <https://cyberball.wikispaces.com>.
Wiseman, J. P. (1986). Friendship: Bonds and binds in a voluntary relationship.
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 3(2), 191–211.
Yuki, M., & Schug, J. (2012). Relational mobility: A socioecological approach to
personal relationships. In O. Gillath, G. E. Adams, & A. D. Kunkel (Eds.), New
directions in close relationships: Integrating across disciplines and theoretical
approaches. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Yuki, M., Schug, J., Horikawa, H., Takemura, K., Sato, K., Yokota, K., et al. (2007).
Development of a scale to measure perceptions of relational mobility in society.
(CERSS Working Paper No. 75), Center for Experimental Research in Social
Sciences, Hokkaido University.
Please cite this article in press as: Whitson, J., et al. Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and
exclusion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001