CHAPTER 13
Slander of Title
and Assorted Slings and Arrows
of the Property Bar
Denis Binder
Western New England College
School of Law
Springfield, Massachusetts
Synopsis
§ 13.01. Introduction.
§ 13.02. Slander of Title.
[1]--Introduction.
[2]--Definition.
[3]--Protected Interests.
[4]--Practices Held to Constitute Slander of Title.
[5]--Elements.
[a]--Publication.
[b]--Malice.
[c]--Special Damages.
[d]--Special Standing Requirements.
[6]--Damages.
[a]--Compensatory Damages.
[b]--Attorneys Fees.
[c]--Punitive Damages.
[7]--Defenses.
[a]--General.
[b]--Statutory Privileges.
[c]--Statutes of Limitations.
[d]--Qualified Privilege.
[8]--Statutory Causes of Action.
[9]--Common Oil and Gas Situation.
[10]--Emerging Aeas of Environmental Disputes.
§ 13.03. Other Causes of Action.
[1]--Abuse of Process.
[2]--Malicious Prosecution.
[3]--Prima facie Tort.
[4]--Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations.
[5]--Trespass.
§ 13.04. Conclusion.
§ 13A. Appendix A: Primary Sources.
[1]--States.
[2]--Oil and Gas Cases.
[3]--Pooling Disputes.
§ 13B. Appendix B: Secondary Sources.
§ 13.01. Introduction.
This Chapter was prompted by a surge in litigation involving slander of title and related claims in oil and
gas litigation. The claims arise in title, leasing, and drilling disputes. A perusal of the oil and gas cases
indicate they do not present issues distinguishable in general from property and title disputes, but are simply
reflective of the increasingly litigious society in which we live.
§ 13.02. Slander of Title.
[1]--Introduction.
Slander of title is a traditional common law remedy, which fell out of vogue earlier this century but is
receiving renewed interest from practitioners. Thus, while slander of title is a well-recognized tort, the
caselaw is often of hallowed vintage. In addition, there exists a dearth of secondary authority on the tort, so
readers are referred to W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts,(1) The American Law Institute's
Restatement (Second) of Torts,(2) and several American Law Reports Annotations. (3)
[2]--Definition.
Slander of title is a relatively easy tort to understand, with both well-defined elements and a generally
accepted definition. Slander of title is traditionally defined as "a false and malicious publication, oral or
written, of words which disparage a person's title to property resulting in special damages." (4) The generally
accepted elements of the cause of action are(5)
(1) a publication of words,
(2) which are false,
(3) uttered maliciously,
(4) resulting in special damages,
(5) to the victims who owned or possessed an interest in the property slandered.
[3]--Protected Interests.
While we normally think of a "slander of title" cause of action as involving claims impugning one's title to
real property, the tort is actually much more expansive. It encompasses any kind of legally protected interest
in land, chattels, or intangibles. Protected interests include mortgages, leases, easements, reversions,
remainders, whether vested or contingent, executory interests, trusts or other equitable interests, patents,
trademarks, and copyrights.(6) By way of illustration, an 1866 Minnesota case involved slander of title to a
racehorse. (7)
In general, the cause of action arises in cases involving aspersions upon the title to property, as by placing a
cloud on the title, or its quality. For some courts, the essence of the cause of action is the invasion of the
owner's interest in marketability. (8) A marketable title is one which a reasonably prudent person would
accept free from all reasonable doubt, in law or fact, as to its viability. It is important to recognize that
expert witnesses can readily testify that the effect of filing a lis pendens is to render property
unmarketable. (9)
[4]--Practices Held to Constitute Slander of Title.
The most common act giving rise to a slander of title suit is the filing of a lis pendens. A lis pendens is
simply one example of a whole gamut of legal document filings that may trigger a slander of title action.
These include attorneys' charging liens, (10) fraudulent deeds, (11) invalid purchase contracts,(12) quit claim
deeds, (13) real estate broker liens, (14) materialmen's liens, (15) mechanics' liens, (16) leases, (17) deeds of
trust, (18) unenforceable or otherwise invalid purchase or sale agreements,(19) false or fraudulent
assignments, (20) labor liens, (21) levy of an execution, (22) as well as the failure to discharge a mechanics' lien
after the account is paid in full, or the failure to discharge oil and gas leases upon expiration.(23) The key in
all these situations is the malicious recording of, or failure to remove, a document that casts a cloud upon
another's title to real estate.
There need not be a complete denial of title. Any unfounded claim of an interest in the property that throws
doubt upon its ownership will suffice.(24)
It is also critical to note that the defamation need not occur through a written document. The tort may be
committed through oral statements.(25)
Physical acts, short of litigation, can also give rise to a slander of title claim. For example, one case
involved the posting of a sign at the entrance to a right-of-way stating heavy trucking was prohibited on the
road. (26) The effect was to prevent delivery and service vehicles from entering plaintiff's premises, as well
as discouraging potential buyers of the property. In another case, a fence was erected cutting off access to a
disputed area and road. (27)
Elsewhere, the cause of action has been based upon a communication to the Federal Land Bank asserting a
claim even though the preexisting lis pendens had been expunged. (28) Other actionable acts have included
delivery of a "notice and demand" to all banks in Montana, asserting liens on all checking accounts, savings
accounts, stocks, bonds, and safe deposit boxes of the other party.(29)
[5]--Elements.
[a]--Publication.
Publication of the offensive remark is critical to a slander of title claim i.e., communicated to a third party
who does not have an interest in the matter.(30) There is no actionable publication when a letter is sent to a
party having an interest in the matter.(31) A limited exception to this requirement occurs when there is a
filing or recording of an unfounded claim against the property of another.(32) The act of recording
constitutes "publication" since the filing is a matter of public record, open to anyone who wishes to search
the record.
[b]--Malice.
Unlike other common law causes of action for defamation, slander of title is not a strict liability offense.
The existence of malice is an essential element of the cause of action. (33) However, courts have used several
definitions of "malice." One of the most commonly cited sources is the famous New York Times v.
Sullivan (34) definition of malice: Publication of the matter with "knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard as to whether it is false or not."(35)
Courts often use traditional common law definitions of malice: a lack of good faith or probable cause;(36) an
attempt to vex, injure, or annoy the other party; (37) an intent to deceive or injure;(38) a statement made with
full knowledge of its falsity and for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff;(39) deliberate conduct without
reasonable cause;(40) and hatred or ill will.(41) Others have inferred malice from an absence of probable
cause or justifiable motives.(42) Malice may also be inferred from the language and the character of the act
committed. (43) One other approach is to determine if the person making the statement does so for any reason
other than to protect an interest for the protection of which a privilege is given.(44) Florida follows the view
that proof of malice is unnecessary to support a slander of title action if the act constituting disparagement is
unprivileged.(45)
[c]--Special Damages.
One of the few areas of widespread confusion and uncertainty lies with the requirement that plaintiff
establish special damages. Most jurisdictions require a showing of special damages.(46) Unlike other areas of
defamation law, damages are not presumed.
Texas has the tightest special damages requirement. Plaintiff must show the loss of a specific sale to a
specific person.
It has been held elsewhere that the plaintiff must either allege the names of inquirers
who became disinterested or who abstained from buying, after the alleged slander of title, or show the
impossibility of making those specific allegations. (48) While this showing would certainly constitute special
damages elsewhere, most jurisdictions are less restrictive in defining special damages. Loss of a lease will
suffice.(49) Kentucky has held that special damages can be shown by a diminution in the fair market value
of the property. (50)
For most jurisdictions, special damages can include pecuniary losses, (51) loss of a lease or building permit,
depreciation in value of a leasehold interest, (52) litigation expenses incurred in removing the effects of the
slander, prevention of prospective purchasers' bidding at a public sale,(53) and tying up property preventing
its development or sale during a twenty eight month period.(54)
Many jurisdictions also recognize attorneys fees and other costs of quieting or clearing title as special
damages.(55) Impaired vendibility of the land is sometimes stated as the special damages for which recovery
is permitted. (56)
The minority rule does not require special damages. The plaintiff is entitled to nominal or actual
damages.(57)
[d]--Special Standing Requirements.
Special damages are normally a prerequisite to a cause of action for slander of title. Unlike other forms of
defamation, there is no such thing as "slander of title per se."(58)
In addition, plaintiff is normally required to show an interest in the affected property. (59) Thus, there is no
standing to sue if plaintiff parted with all legally protected interests in the property before the lis pendens
was filed. (60) Similarly, a leasee's contractor, who was to drill an oil well, lacked standing even though he
certainly had an economic stake in the matter.(61) Illinois requires the plaintiff to have legal title to the real
estate in question. (62) California has held that a title acquired through adverse possession is not marketable
and, hence, cannot be slandered until the title is established by judicial procedures. (63) Louisiana limits
recovery to a plaintiff in actual possession of the property. (64) On the other hand, an older Oregon case
allowed the holder of an option to purchase land standing. (65)
[6]--Damages.
[a]--Compensatory Damages.
Compensatory damages include whatever economic loss was incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the
defendant's act. It does not include loss of the use of the money had the prospective sale been consummated
at an earlier date.(66) In an oil and gas leasehold case, the court stated:
In slander of title case resulting in the loss of an oil lease, a plaintiff may recover the amount for which he
could and would have sold the lease, had the sale not been frustrated, less the amount for which he could
have sold a lease on the land at the time of the trial with the cloud removed.(67)
The cause of action is for an injury to one's interest in property. Consequently, emotional distress is not, in
general, a recoverable damage in slander of title cases(68) and, hence, cannot serve as special damages.(69)
[b]--Attorneys Fees.
The cases are split on whether attorneys fees and costs involved in clearing the title are recoverable. For
many courts, a clear example of special damages are the costs of clearing title, which, of course, include
attorneys fees and the general costs of litigation.(70) The contrary position is based on the "American Rule"
that attorneys fees are not generally recoverable by the winning party; attorneys fees and costs of suit are
borne where they lie.(71) Statutes may provide for the award of attorneys fees.(72)
Under the American Rule, litigation expenses in the slander of title action are not recoverable without a
statutory provision to the contrary.
[c]--Punitive Damages.
The general common law rules for punitive damages apply in slander of title actions. (73) There is a
requirement of actual malice,(74) as well as actual damages, prerequisite to the award of punitive damages.
The majority rule, therefore, requires that special damages be established as a prerequisite for punitive
damages.(75) The minority approach holds that an award of nominal damages will suffice to support an
award of punitive damages.(76)
[7]--Defenses.
[a]--General.
Several defenses are factual, and go to refuting the basic elements of the cause of action. For example, the
defendant might show that the disputed facts were true,(77) or that the defendant lacked the requisite malice.
Good faith in asserting an interest in property is a complete defense.(78) Thus, the defendant might show he
acted in the reasonable belief that he had a valid claim against the property. (79) Similarly, the defendant
might establish a good intent and honest belief in filing suit to settle a dispute over title(80) or that the
defendant possessed probable cause to believe the truth of the statement. (81) The filing of a suit with
probable cause, accompanied by the filing of a lis pendens, does not constitute a slander of title.(82) An
assertion of a claims based upon advice of counsel is privileged so long as the facts are fully and correctly
revealed to the attorney. (83)
[b]--Statutory Privileges.
Some jurisdictions provide an absolute, statutory privilege for the filing of judicial documents. (84) In these
states, the filing of a lis pendens or mechanics lien is protected by the statutory privilege.(85)
Other jurisdictions recognize that the mere filing of a lis pendens, or other document, such as a mechanics
lien, should not be actionable as a slander of title since the filer is simply complying with the statutory
means to protect his interests, as well as informing the public of pending litigation involving real
property. (86) California would permit a malicious prosecution suit in this situation if the requisite elements
for that cause of action are met.(87)
[c]--Statute of Limitations.
As usual, there is the standard statute of limitations defense. Some jurisdictions have a specific statute of
limitations applicable to these claims while others use general statutes of limitations.
The "discovery
rule" applies in determining when the requisite time period starts to run, i.e., when plaintiff could reasonably
be expected to discover the existence of the claim.(89) It has also been held that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run as long as defendant maintains the claim against the plaintiff's property. (90)
[d]--Qualified Privilege.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts(91) recognizes a qualified privilege to disparage another's title whenever
it would exist in a case of personal defamation.
[8]--Statutory Causes of Action.
A few jurisdictions expressly create a statutory cause of action. For example, Arizona allows $1,000 or three
times actual damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorneys fees and costs of suit, for the filing of
false documents in the county recorder's office. (92) Georgia allows the owner of any estate in land to
maintain an action for libelous or slanderous words which falsely and maliciously impugn his title if any
damage has accrued to him therefrom. (93) Special damages are a prerequisite to recovery under the Georgia
statute.(94)
[9]--Common Oil and Gas Situation.
In most situations, there is nothing to distinguish oil and gas disputes from other slander of title actions.
Most cases, regardless of their origin, involve "routine" title disputes.
However, there is one scenario in the oil and gas industry which has given rise to extensive litigation. It
involves successive oil and gas leases to the same tract. (95) The resolution of the dispute generally depends
upon whether the first lease expired for failure to comply with one of its terms and conditions, such as
drilling and production provisions or shut-in royalty requirements. Occasionally, the first leasee, upon
expiration of the lease, will not file the prescribed notice to release the recorded lease claim.(96) One way to
resolve these disputes is through a traditional trespass action, where malice and special damages are not
preconditions. (97)
[10]--Emerging Area of Environmental Disputes.
Attempts to stop unwanted development, often referred to as LULU's (Locally Unwanted Land Uses), entail
a number of techniques, often involving the courts through administrative appeals, statutory causes of
action, filing of lis pendens, and the like. There is a large scale effort by some developers to fight back by
filing countersuits against the opponents. These countersuits have been labeled "SLAPP" suits (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participants). SLAPP suits involve malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious
interference with advantageous relations, and defamation claims. The SLAPP suits usually fail, often on
First Amendment grounds,(98) and may subject the developer to a new round of litigation, including Rule 11
sanctions.(99)
A different type of claim involves allegations that one's property has been exposed to toxic chemicals and
that occupants bear an increased risk of cancer.(100) In today's world of heightened environmental
awareness, such an allegation can be devastating to property values and marketability. Such a claim goes
not to the title to the property, but to the "quality" of the owner's interest. (101)
§ 13.03. Other Causes of Action.
While slander of title has received the most attention recently, there are other causes of action arising out of
property disputes. These torts have a broad application across the litigation spectrum; they include abuse of
process, malicious prosecution, interference with contractual relations, interference with advantageous
relations, trespass, and the prima facie tort.
[1]--Abuse of Process.
The tort of abuse of process occurs when a legal procedure, although set out in proper form, has been
perverted to accomplish an ulterior or wrongful purpose for which it was not designed. The essence of the
cause of action is the misuse or misapplication of process, justified in itself, for an end other than that for
which it was designed to accomplish. The common example is that of a creditor using the criminal process
for debt collection purposes. In property disputes, the cause of action may arise when a defendant files a
claim, such as a mechanics lien, knowing that the claim is not valid so solely to induce a lessor to pressure a
third party into paying an obligation.(102) The critical issue is the purpose for which the process is used. (103)
When defendants are relying upon the advice of counsel, there has to be a full and fair disclosure of all
material facts to counsel before that advice can consitute a valid defense.(104)
[2]--Malicious Prosecution.
Closely related to abuse of process is malicious prosecution, which is defined as "a suit for damages
resulting from a prior criminal or civil legal proceeding that was instituted maliciously and without probable
cause and that terminated unsuccessfully for the plaintiff therein."(105) Several general elements and rules
apply, including: (1) an original criminal or civil lawsuit, (2) instituted maliciously, (3) without probable
cause, which suit (4) has terminated in favor of the defendant in the original suit. (106) The defendant in the
first suit is now the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution case. Malicious prosecution deals with maliciously
causing process to issue, while abuse of process is concerned with the misuse of process after it is
issued.(107)
The cause of action for malicious prosecution, as with abuse of process, is heavily disfavored by courts. The
burden of proof is on the party alleging malicious prosecution.(108) The plaintiff, therefore, must establish
both malice and a lack of probable cause on the defendant's part to establish the cause of action.
It is easy to determine if the initial lawsuit was resolved in favor of the original defendant. It is often held
that the existence of malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause. Consequently, in many
malicious prosecution suits the critical question will be the presence or absence of probable cause. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines probable cause as follows:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil proceedings against
another has probable cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which
the claim is based, and either
(a) correctly or reasonably believes that under these facts the claim may be valid under the applicable law,
or
(b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advise of counsel, sought in good faith and given after full
disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge and information.(109)
Prosecution of the suit with knowledge of the falsity of the claim constitutes the requisite lack of probable
cause.(110) It is generally held that probable cause is conclusively established when the party who instigated
the proceeding is successful in the trial court even if that court is reversed on appeal.
[3]--Prima Facie Tort.
The prima facie tort is a "catch-all" intentional tort, which fell into disfavor in recent decades, but is
currently making a comeback. It is exceedingly expansive in its coverage. As stated in Sulphur Springs
Realty, Inc. v. Blackstone: (112) "A so-called prima facie tort is the intentional infliction of injury upon
another without excuse or justification by an act which in and of itself may not be unlawful." Liability may
be imposed even if the actor's conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability.(113)
[4]--Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations.
The cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations arises when a party seeks to interfere
with an existing relationship. It entails five elements:
(1) Existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party;
(2) Knowledge by the defendant of the contract or knowledge of facts which should lead him to inquire as
to the existence of the contract;
(3) Intent by the defendant to induce or cause the third party not to perform;
(4) Action by the defendant which induces or causes non-performance of the contract; and
(5) Resulting damage to the plaintiff.
As with slander of title, special damages are a precondition of recovery.(114) Unlike slander of title though,
malice is not a prerequisite.(115)
Damages for interference with contractual relations are measured by tort law and not by contract law. (116)
Thus, the damages may include the pecuniary losses of the benefits of the contract, consequential losses for
which the tortious act is the legal cause, and emotional distress and actual harm to reputation, if they are
reasonably to be expected to flow from the tortious act. Punitive damages are also available pursuant to the
normal rules. (117)
Interference with Prospective/Advantageous Contractual Relations. Unlike interference with contractual
relations, this cause of action is not dependent upon the existence of a present contract. To the contrary, the
tort is based upon a showing of intentional and improper interference which prevents formation of a
contract.(118) As set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a
contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the
benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.(119)
Comment b to Section 767 continues:
The issue in each case is whether the interference is improper or not under the circumstances; whether, upon
a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be permitted without
liability, despite its effect of harm to another. The decision therefore depends upon a judgment and choice of
values in each situation. This Section states the important factors to be weighed against each other and
balanced in arriving at a judgment; but it does not exhaust the list of possible factors . . ..(120)
[5]--Trespass.
The last tort in our survey is trespass, a traditional tort remedy. It is especially useful in situations where a
tenant or lessee, such as an oil and gas lessee, refuses to vacate land. Its advantages for the owner, or one
with rightful possession, are twofold. First, the good faith of the lessee is not a defense. The trespassory
invasion of the rightful possessor's right to exclude others is the essence of the cause of action. The
trespasser's motive (malice or good faith) is irrelevant to the determination of liability, although its motive
may go to damages. Second, the rightful possessor does not have to show special damages, such as the loss
of a specific opportunity to sell the property.
§ 13.04. Conclusion.
At the time of completion of this Chapter, the West Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,(121) affirming a slander of title judgment against TXO in the
amount of $19,000 in compensatory and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. If for no other reason than the
size of the punitive award, 526 times the compensatory award, there should be even greater attention paid in
the future to the slander of title tort in title and lease disputes.
§ 13A. APPENDIX A: Primary Sources.
[1]--States.
Alabama: Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 428 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1983); Procter v. Gissendaner, 579 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1978).
Arizona: Richey v. Western Pacific Development Corp., 684 P.2d 169 (Ariz. Int. App. Ct. 1984).
California: Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956); Gudger v. Manton, 134 P.2d 217 (Cal. 1943);
Stalberg v. Western Title Insurance Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Seeley v. Seymour, 237
Cal Rptr. 282 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1987) ($2.5 million punitive damages award struck down as excessive);
Castaic Clay Manufacturing Co. v. Dedes, 240 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1984) ($729,641.28 in
damages); Earp. v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1981); Howard v. Schaniel, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 678 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1980); Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart, 105 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Cal. Int.
App. Ct. 1972); Broadway Federal Savings & Loan Association of Los Angeles v. Howard, 285 P.2d 61
(Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1955).
Colorado: Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, 97 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1939); Salstrom v. Starke, 670 P.2d 809 (Colo.
Int. App. Ct. 1983); Sussex Real Estate Corp. v. Sbrocca, 634 P.2d 999 (Colo. Int. App. Ct. 1981); Williams
v. Burns, 540 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Colo. 1982).
Florida: Tishman-Speyer Equitable South Florida Venture v. Knight Investments, Inc., 591 So. 2d 213 (Fla.
Int. App. Ct. 1991); Palmer v. Shelby Plaza Motel, Inc., 443 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983); Bonded
Investment & Realty Co. v. Wakesman, 437 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983); Colen v. Patterson, 436 So.
2d 182 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983); McMurray v. U-Haul Co., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983);
Donald M. Patterson, Inc., v. Bonda, 425 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983); Local Mortgage Company of
Georgia v. Powell, 420 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Continental Development Corp. of Florida v.
Duval Title & Abstract Co., 356 So. 2d 925 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1978); Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29
(Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1973).
Georgia: Ferguson v. Atlantic Land & Development Corp., 281 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. 1981); Schoen v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 93 S.E. 82 (Ga. 1917); F.S. Associates, Ltd. v. McMichael's Construction Co., 399 S.E.2d 479
(Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1990); Daniels v. Johnson, 381 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1989); Harmon v. Cunard,
378 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1989); Lincoln Logs Homes Marketing, Inc. v. Holbrook, 295 S.E.2d 567
(Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
Illinois: LaSalle National Bank v. Kissane, 516 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1987); Whildin v. Kovacs, 403
N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1980); Allison v. Berry, 44 N.E.2d 929 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1942); Westfield
Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (SLAPP suit).
Indiana: Gary Municipal Airport Authority v. Peters, 583 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Morris v.
G. Rassel, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Davis v. Sponhauer, 574 N.E.2d 292 (Ind. Int.
App. Ct. 1991); Freiburger v. Fry, 439 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Display Fixtures Co. v. R.L.
Hatcher, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Curry v. Orwig, 429 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. Int. App. Ct.
1981); May v. Anderson, 42 N.E. 946 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1896); ODC Communications Corp. v. Wenruth
Investments, 826 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1987); Dominion Investments v. Yasechko, 767 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ind.
1991); Prohosky v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Gintert v.
Howard Publications, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (SLAPP suit).
Iowa: Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982).
Kansas: Glimac Oil Co. v. Weiner, 94 P.2d 309 (Kan. 1939); Safety Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Thurston, 648 P.2d 267 (Kan. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Berryman v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164 F.2d 734 (10th
Cir. 1947); Petroleum Energy, Inc. v. Mid-America Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Kan. 1991).
Kentucky: Ideal Savings Loan & Building Ass'n. of Newport v. Blumberg, 175 S.W.2d 1015 (Ky. 1943);
Hardin Oil Co. v. Spencer, 266 S.W. 654 (Ky. 1924); Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d
765 (Ky. Int. App. Ct. 1980); General Electric Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1990)
(injurious falsehood); Kidd v. Burlew, 407 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1969).
Louisiana: Daigle v. Pan American Production Co., 108 So. 2d 516 (La. 1958).
Maryland: Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 471 A.2d 735 (Md. 1984).
Mississippi: Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Development Corp., 511 So. 2d 112 (Miss. 1987).
Missouri: Greenlake Investment Co. v. Swartout, 161 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Int. App. Ct. 1942); McDonald v.
Amoret Farm Supply, 634 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Nolan v. Kolar, 629 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Int.
App. Ct. 1982) (5 year statute of limitations); Mueller v. Abdnor, 765 F.Supp. 551 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
($100,159.50 compensatory damages).
Montana: Johnson v. Murray, 656 P.2d 170 (Mont. 1982) ($101,500 in general and compensatory damages
and $100,000 in punitive damages); Jumping Rainbow Ranch v. Conklin, 538 P.2d 1027 (Mont. 1975);
Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 251 P.2d 553 (Mont. 1952).
New Jersey: Peters Well Drilling Co. v. Hanzula, 575 A.2d 1375 (N.J. Int. App. Ct. 1990).
New Mexico: Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 611 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Int. App. Ct. 1980); Bynum v. Bynum,
531 P.2d 618 (N.M. Int. App. Ct. 1975).
New York: Modulars By Design, Inc. v. DBJ Development Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. Int. App. Ct.
1991) (malice and special damages are essential elements of cause of action for slander of title).
North Carolina: Allen v. Duvall, 304 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. Int. App. Ct. 1983); Selby v. Taylor, 290 S.E.2d 767
(N.C. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Whyburn v. Norwood, 267 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. Int. App. Ct. 1980).
North Dakota: Serhienko v. Kiker, 392 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1986).
Ohio: Sulphur Savings Realty, Inc. v. Blackstone, 453 N.E.2d 1279 (Ohio Int. App. Ct. 1982).
Oklahoma: Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., 769 P.2d 146 (Okla. 1989); Rucker v. Burke, 84 P.2d 20
(Okla. 1938); Noble v. Johnson, 68 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1937); Smith v. Autry, 169 P. 623 (Okla. 1917);
McCowell v. Glasscock, 672 P.2d 682 (Okla. Int. App. Ct. 1983); Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991
(Okla. Int. App. Ct. 1981); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1974).
Oregon: Hubbard v. Scott, 166 P. 33 (Or. 1917).
Rhode Island: Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63 (R.I. 1990); DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546 A.2d 1344
(R.I. 1988); Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1990) ($21,664.72 compensatory damages and
$25,000 punitive damages).
South Dakota: Johnson v. Kirkwood, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 640 (S.D. 1981).
Texas: Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1983); A.H. Belo Corp. v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.
1982); Sadler v. Duvall, 815 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Texas American Corp. v. Woodbridge
Joint Venture, 809 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Int.
App. Ct. 1988) ($65,000 in punitive damages); Walker v. Ruggles, 540 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Int. App. Ct.
1976); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1943); Ryan v. Mo-Mac
Properties, 644 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1982);
Texas continued: Storm Associates, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Modern
Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1986); Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515
(Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1959); Marcus, Stowell & Beye Government Securities, Inc. v. Jefferson Investment
Corp., 797 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1986). McConnell, "Slander of Title: Onward Through the Fog," 24 S. Tex.
L.J. 171 (1983).
Utah: Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951).
Virginia: Donohoe Construction Co., Inc. v. Mount Vernon Associates, 369 S.E.2d 857 (Va. 1988); Wright
v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125 (Va. 1986); Lomah Electronic Targetry, Inc. v. ATA Training Aids, Ltd., 828 F.2d
1021 (4th Cir. 1987); Warren v. Bank of Marion, 618 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Va. 1985).
Washington: Ross v. Scannell, 647 P.2d 1004 (Wash. 1982); Lee v. Maggard, 85 P.2d 654 (Wash. 1938);
Clarkston Community Corp. v. Asotin County Port District, 472 P.2d 558 (Wash. Int. App. Ct. 1970).
West Virginia: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., ____ S.E.2d ____ 1992 WL 102319 (W.
Va. 1992).
Wyoming: Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982).
[2]--Oil and Gas Cases.
Hobmann v. Southern Pacific Land Co., 233 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1987); Davis v. Cramer, 808
P.2d 358 (Colo. 1991); Allison v. Berry, 44 N.E.2d 929 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1942); Petroleum Energy, Inc. v.
Mid-America Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Kan. 1991); Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., 769
P.2d 146 (Okla. 1989); Noble v. Johnson, 68 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1937); New England Oil & Pipe Line Co. v.
Rogers, 7 P.2d 638 (Okla. 1931); Armbruster v. Thetis Energy Corp., 675 P.2d 476 (Okla. Int. App. Ct.
1983); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1943); Reaugh v. McCollum
Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1942); Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1942); Modern
Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1986); Storm Associates, Inc. v. Texas,
Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1959);
Jeanes v. Henderson, 703 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1983); Kidd v. Burlew, 407 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1969); Berryman
v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1947)
[3]--Pooling Disputes.
Pampell Interests, Inc. v. Wolle, 797 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1990); Covington v. Exxon Co., 551 So.
2d 935 (Ala. 1989); Palmer Exploration, Inc. v. Dennis, 730 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
§ 13B. APPENDIX B: Secondary Sources.
[1]--Law Reviews.
McConnell, "Slander of Title: Onward Through the Fog," 24 S. Tex. L.J. 171 (1983).
Prosser, "Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability," 59 Columb. L. Rev. 425 (1959).
Note, "Trade Libel and Its Special Damage Requirement," 12 Hastings L.J. 394 (1965).
Casenote, "Oil and Gas," 21 Tex. L. Rev. 448 (1943).
Note, "Disparagement of Property" 13 Columb. L. Rev. 13 (1913).
[2]--A.L.R. Annotations.
Ghent, "Slander of Title: Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Interest in Real Property to Maintain Action," 86
A.L.R.4th 738 (1991).
Marvel, "Allowance of Punitive Damages in Action for Slander of Title or Disparagement of Property," 7
A.L.R.4th 1219 (1981).
Pearson, "What Constitutes Special Damages in Action for Slander of Title," 4 A.L.R.4th 532 (1981).
[3]--Treatises.
W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 128 (Injurious Falsehood), § 129 (Interference
With Contractual Relations), and § 130 (Interference With Prospective Advantage).
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 28: Injurious Falsehood, § 624: Slander of Title (1977).
[4]--Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Practices Act(122) (RICO).
Mack, "Another Weapon: The RICO Statute and the Prosecution of Environmental Offenses," 45 Sw. L.J.
1145 (1991).
Binder, "The Potential Application of RICO in the Natural Resources/Environmental Law Contest," 63
Denv. U. L. Rev. 535 (1986).
Getty, "The Civil RICO Action: A New Weapon for Use in Securities and Commercial Fraud Cases," 5
Eastern Min. L. Inst. ch. 2 (1984).
Note, "Evolving RICO Issues for the Environmental/Natural Resources Practitioner," 6 J. Min. L. & Pol'y.
185 (1990-91).
Note, "RICO As a Remedy for Hazardous Waste Victims: Can Plaintiffs Overcome the Problems of
Causation," 64 St. John's L. Rev. 917 (1990).
Note, "The Applicability of Civil RICO to Toxic Waste Polluters," 62 Ind. L.J. 451 (1987).
[5]--SLAPP Suits.
McEvoy, "`The Big Chill:' Business Use of the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First
Amendment Rights, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. 503 (1990).
Pring, "SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation," 7 Pace Envtl L. Rev. 3 (1989).
Brecher, "The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach," 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 105 (1988).
Comment, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions," 27 Cal. W. L.
Rev. 399 (1991).
1. 1. W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts §§ 128­130 (5th Ed. 1984).
2. 2. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 624 (1977).
3. 3. See text, infra, at § 13B[2].
4. 4. See e.g. , Whildin v. Kovacs, 403 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1980).
5. 5. Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Schoen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 93 S.E. 82 (Ga. 1917); New England Oil &
Pipe Line Co. v. Rogers, 7 P.2d 638, 640 (Okla. 1931).
6. 6. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 624 (1977); W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 128, pp. 962-7 (5th Ed. 1984).
7. 7. Wilson v. Dubois, 29 N.W. 68 (Minn. 1886).
8. 8. Broadway Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of Los Angeles v. H.A. Howard, 285 P.2d 61, 73 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1955).
9. 9. See e.g. , DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546 A.2d 1344, 1347-48 (R.I. 1988).
10. 10. Ross v. Scannell, 647 P.2d 1004 (Wash. 1982).
11. 11. Smith v. Autry, 169 P. 623 (Okla. 1917); Castaic Clay Mfg. Co. v. Dedes, 240 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1987).
12. 12. Mueller v. Abdnor, 765 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
13. 13. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., ____ S.E.2d ____ 1992 WL 102319 (W. Va. 1992).
14. 14. Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951).
15. 15. Lincoln Log Homes Marketing, Inc. v. Holbrook, 295 S.E.2d 567 (Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
16. 16. Peters Well Drilling Co. v. Hanzula, 575 A.2d 1375 (N.J. Int. App. Ct. 1990).
17. 17. Reaugh v. McCollum Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1942).
18. 18. McDonald v. Amoret Farm Supply, 634 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
19. 19. Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1990).
20. 20. Lomah Elec. Targetry, Inc. v. ATA Training Aids Aust. Pty., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1987).
21. 21. Rayl v. Shull Enter., Inc., 700 P.2d 567 (Idaho 1984).
22. 22. Davis v. Wood, 143 P.2d 740 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1943).
23. 23. Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1959); Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991 (Okla. Int. App. Ct.
1981); Modern Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1986); Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., 769
P.2d 146 (Okla. 1989).
24. 24. Gudger v. Manton, 134 P.2d 217 (Cal. 1943); Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951).
25. 25. Seeley v. Seymour, 237 Cal. Rptr. 282, 289 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1987).
26. 26. Wright v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125 (Va. 1986).
27. 27. Davis v. Sponhauer, 574 N.E.2d 292 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
28. 28. Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1981).
29. 29. Johnson v. Murray, 656 P.2d 170 (Mont. 1982).
30. 30. Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 428 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1983).
31. 31. Tishman-Speyer Equitable S. Florida Venture v. Knight Inv., Inc., 591 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
32. 32. Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1974). Contra, see Tishman-Speyer Equitable S. Florida
Venture v. Knight Inv., Inc., 591 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
33. 33. Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 428 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1983); Coffman v. Henderson, 63 So. 808 (Ala. Int. App. Ct. 1913);
Whildin v. Kovacs, 403 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1980).
34. 34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. 35. Morris v. G. Rassel, Inc. 576 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Freiburger v. Fry, 439 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ind. Int.
App. Ct. 1982).
36. 36. Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., Inc., 769 P.2d 146,
149 (Okla. 1989).
37. Sussex Real Estate Corp. v. Sbrocca, 634 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. Int. App. Ct. 1981).
38. 38. Hopkins v. Drowne, 41 A. 567 (R.I. 1898).
39. 39. Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 667 (R.I. 1990).
40. 40. Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1988); Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. Int.
App. Ct. 1959).
41. 41. Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 775 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1981).
42. 42. Jumping Rainbow Ranch v. Conklin, 538 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Mont. 1975), quoting Keiser v. Kile, 26 P.2d 194, 195 (Okla.
1933).
43. 43. See e.g. , Hopkins v. Drowne, 41 A. 567, 568 (R.I. 1898), reaffirmed in Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1990);
Noble v. Johnson, 68 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1937).
44. 44. Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 775 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1981).
45. 45. Colen v. Patterson, 436 S.2d 182, 183 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983).
46. 46. Rucker v. Burke, 84 P.2d 20 (Okla. 1938). In general, see Pearson, Annot., What Constitutes Special Damages in Action for
Slander of Title, 4 A.L.R.4th 532 (1981).
47. 47. See especially, A.H. Belo Corp. v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145, 146, (Tex. 1982). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Laney, 428
So. 2d 21 (Ala. 1983); Coffman v. Henderson, 63 So. 808 (Ala. Int. App. Ct. 1913); Whildin v. Kovacs, 403 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Int.
App. Ct. 1980).
48. 48. Barkhorn v. Adlib Assoc., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 121, 122 (D. Haw. 1962). See also Clarkston Community Corp. v. Asotin
County Port Dist., 472 P.2d 558 (Wash. Int. App. Ct. 1970).
49. 49. Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 884 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1988).
50. 50. Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Ky. Int. App. Ct. 1980).
51. 51. Davis v. Sponhauer, 574 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
52. 52. Davis v. Wood, 143 P.2d 740, 745 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1943).
53. 53. Selby v. Taylor, 290 S.E.2d 767, 769 (N.C. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
54. 54. Ferguson v. Atlantic Land & Dev. Corp., 279 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 281 S.E.2d 545
(Ga. 1981). In general, see Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Inv., 471 A.2d 735, 742 (Md. 1984); Peters Well Drilling Co. v. Hanzula,
575 A.2d 1375 (N.J. Int. App. Ct. 1990).
55. 55. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(1)(b) (1977). TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., ____ S.E.2d ____, 1992
WL 102319 (W. Va. 1992); Rayl v. Shull Enter., Inc., 700 P.2d 567 (Idaho 1984); Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 655 P.2d 513 (Nev.
1982); Den-Gar Enter. v. Romero, 611 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Int. App. Ct. 1980), cert. denied, 614 P.2d 545 (N.M. 1980); Freiburger v.
Fry, 439 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949); Sussex Real Estate Corp. v.
Sbrocca, 634 P.2d 999 (Colo. Int. App. Ct. 1981); Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1973); Donald M.
Paterson, Inc. v. Bonda, 425 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983).
56. 56. W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 128 at 971, n.3 (5th ed. 1984).
57. 57. Greenlake Inv. Co. v. Swartout, 161 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Int. App. Ct. 1942).
58. 58. Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. Int. App. Ct. 1980).
59. 59. Daigle v. Pan Amer. Production Co., 108 So. 2d 516 (La. 1958); Allison v. Berry, 44 N.E.2d 929, 934 (Ill. Int. App. Ct.
1942).
60. 60. Bynum v. Bynum, 531 P.2d 618 (N.M. Int. App. Ct. 1975); Bennett v. Pace, 731 P.2d 33 (Wy. 1987).
61. 61. Allison v. Berry, 44 N.E.2d 929 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1942).
62. 62. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Kissane, 516 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1987).
63. 63. Howard v. Schaniel, 169 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1980). In general, see Ghent, Annot., Slander of Title:
Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Interest in Real Property to Maintain Action, 86 A.L.R.4th 738 (1991).
64. 64. Daigle v. Pan Amer. Prod. Co., 108 So. 2d 516 (La. 1958).
65. 65. Hubbard v. Scott, 166 P. 33 (Ore. 1917).
66. 66. Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 777 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1981); Seeley v. Seymour, 237 Cal. Rptr. 282, 293 (Cal. Int.
App. Ct. 1987). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633, cmt i (1977).
67. 67. Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1988). See also Reaugh v. McCollum Exploration Co., 163
S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1942).
68. 68. Seeley v. Seymour, 237 Cal. Rptr. 282, 293 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1987).
69. 69. See Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Inv., 471 A.2d 735, 741 (Md. 1984).
70. 70. See e.g. , Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1990). In general, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633 (1977).
71. 71. Sadler v. Duvall, 815 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1991); Allen v. Duvall, 304 S.E.2d 789, 793 (N.C. Int. App. Ct.
1983).
72. 72. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 940 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); McDowell v. Glasscock, 672 P.2d 682 (Okla. Int. App. Ct.
1983).
73. 73. In general, see Marvel, Annot., Allowance of Punitive Damages in Action for Slander of Title or Disparagement of Property,
7 A.L.R.4th 1219 (1981).
74. 74. Continental Dev. Corp. of Florida v. Duval Title & Abstract Co., 356 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1978); Johnson v.
Kirkwood, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 640 (S.D. 1981).
75. 75. Rite Aid Corp. Lake Shore Inv., 471 A.2d 735, 742 (Md. 1984); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982).
76. 76. McDonald v. Amoret Farm Supply, 634 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
77. 77. ODC Communications Corp. v. Wenruth Inv., 826 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1987); Safety Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Thurston, 648 P.2d 267 (Kan. Int. App. Ct. 1982) (validity of second mortgage).
78. 78. Berryman v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1947).
79. 79. Whildin v. Kovacs, 403 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1980); Serhienko v. Kiker, 392 N.W.2d 808, 815 (N.D. 1986); Storm
Assoc., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1982); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902, 908
(Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1943).
80. 80. Hardin Oil Co. v. Spencer, 266 S.W. 654 (Ky. 1924).
81. 81. Coffman v. Henderson, 63 So. 808 (Ala. Int. App. Ct. 1913).
82. 82. See also McMurray v. U-Haul Co., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983).
83. 83. Noble v. Johnson, 68 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1937); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. Int. App. Ct.
1943). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483, 491 (Tex. 1942).
84. 84. See e.g. , Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 409 (West 1982).
85. 85. See e.g. , Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956); Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112 (Miss. 1987);
Frank Pisano & Assoc. v. Taggart, 105 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1972) (mechanics lien). See also Ferguson v. Atlantic
Land & Dev. Corp., 281 S.E.2d 545, 547 (Ga. 1981).
86. 86. Whyburn v. Norwood, 267 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. Int. App. Ct. 1980); Johnson v. Kirkwood, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 640 (S.D. 1981);
Donohoe Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mount Vernon Assoc., 369 S.E.2d 857 (Va. 1988); Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63 (R.I. 1990).
87. 87. Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956).
88. 88. See e.g. , Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (1972 & Supp. 1991) (1 year); Selby v. J.T. Taylor, 290 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Int. App.
Ct. 1982).
89. 89. Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. 43, 48 (Cal. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
90. 90. See Warren v. Bank of Marion, 618 F. Supp. 317, 321-22 (W.D. Va. 1985).
91. 91. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 646A (1977).
92. 92. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-420 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
93. 93. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-9-11 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1991).
94. 94. Daniels v. Johnson, 381 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Int. App. Ct. 1989); Anderson v. Golden, 569 F. Supp. 122, 145 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
See also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 565.108 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
95. 95. See e.g. , Kidd v. Burlew, 407 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1969); Allison v. Berry, 44 N.E.2d 929 (Ill. Int. App. Ct. 1942); Petroleum
Energy, Inc. v. Mid-America Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Kan. 1991).
96. 96. See e.g. , Berryman v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1947).
97. 97. See e.g. , Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. Int. App. Ct. 1959).
98. 98. Westfield Partner, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
99. 99. See e.g. , Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
100. 100. See e.g. , Gintert v. Howard Publications, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
101. 101. In general, see Harbeson, "Toxic Clouds on Titles: Hazardous Waste and the Doctrine of Marketable Title," 19 Envt'l
Affairs 355 (1991).
102. 1. Morris v. Rassel, 576 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
2. Display Fixtures Co. v. R.L. Hatcher, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1982).
104. 3. Id. at 30.
105. 4. Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63, 68 (R.I. 1990).
106. 5. Morris v. G. Rassel, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
107. 6. See McMurray v. U-Haul Co., Inc., 425 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. Int. App. Ct. 1983).
108. 7. Serhienko v. Kiker, 392 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1986); Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63, 66 (R.I. 1990).
109. 8. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675 (1977).
110. 9. Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956).
111. 10. Serhienko v. Kiker, Jr., 392 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1986).
112. 11. 453 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (Ohio Int. App. Ct. 1982).
113. 12. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 at 279 (1979). In general, see K. Vandevelde, "A History of Prima Facie Tort:
The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort," 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 447 (1990).
114. 13. Modulars By Design, Inc., v. DBJ Dev. Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. Int. App. Ct. 1991).
115. 14. Bynum v. Bynum, 531 P.2d 618, 621 (N.M. Int. App. Ct. 1975). Contra, see Petroleum Energy, Inc. v. Mid-America
Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420, 1429 (D. Kan. 1991).
116. 15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, cmt. d (1977). Contra, see Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson
Inv. Corp. 797 F.2d 227, 231-2 (5th Cir. 1986).
117. 16. Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Inv., 471 A.2d 735 (Md. 1984).
118. 17. Williams v. Burns, 540 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (D. Colo. 1982); Wright v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Va. 1986).
119. 18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1977).
120. 19. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, cmt. b (1977). See Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 51 (10th Cir.
1963).
121. 1. ____ S.E.2d ____ 1992 WL 102319 (W. Va. 1992). [This case is described and discussed at McClanahan, "Oil & Gas Law
Update," 13 Eastern Min. L. Inst. § 19.03[10] (1992), infra, this Volume -- Ed.]
122. 1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961­1968 (1988, Supp. I 1990, & Supp. II
1991).