Journal of American Studies, 43 (2009), 2, 255–276 f Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0021875809990065 Printed in the United Kingdom
The Conservative Lobby and
Nixon’s ‘‘ Peace with Honor ’’
in Vietnam
SANDRA S CANLON
This essay explores the responses of conservative political activists to the Nixon administration’s policy of ‘‘ peace with honor ’’ in Vietnam. Conservatives sought to influence the
administration by acceptance of Vietnamization, a policy they interpreted as affording a more
conventional prosecution of the war, and by pushing for increased aerial bombardment of
North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Divisions over the efficacy of détente derailed a unified
conservative position on Vietnam and forced reassessments of the legitimacy of Nixon’s
promise of ‘‘ peace with honor. ’’ While highlighting the basic premises of conservative foreign
policy during the late 1960s, this essay explores the means by which conservative leaders
attempted to forge consensus regarding the Vietnam War and the impact of increased political
power on the conservative movement’s foreign-policy priorities.
‘‘ Make no bones of this, ’’ Barry Goldwater declared to a part-elated, partshocked assembly at the 1964 Republican National Convention, ‘‘ don’t try
to sweep it under the rug. We are at war in Vietnam.’’ Goldwater’s speech
signified two steps that defined the conservative movement during the 1960s.
In accepting the party’s nomination for the presidency, Goldwater sealed
the deepening practical relationship between conservative activists and the
GOP. In defining the situation in Southeast Asia, he attached conservatives’
fervent anticommunism to the struggle for supremacy in Vietnam. The association between conservatives and ‘‘ hawkishness’’ regarding the Vietnam
War was common during the 1960s, and has been a recognized, if neglected,
factor in scholarship of the era.1 Recognizing the central importance of
Sandra Scanlon is a Lecturer in the History of America and the Wider World at the University
of Sheffield. Research for this article was made possible through grants from the Irish
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences and the Gates Cambridge
Foundation. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, the author thanks
Professor Anthony J. Badger, the members of the American History Research Seminar at
Oxford University, and the anonymous reviewers. E-mail : S.Scanlon@sheffield.ac.uk
1
Early histories of the Vietnam War, characterized by a liberal orthodoxy, dealt less with the
policies of conservatives than with relaying the flawed Cold War ideology and world view
that dominated the interventionist foreign policies of Democratic administrations.
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Sandra Scanlon
military escalation to the conservative position on Vietnam is necessary, but it
is also important to understand how the standard conservative line changed,
and indeed how it stayed the same, during the course of the long conflict. The
Vietnam War did not provide the unified conservative response that was
often referred to during this period, and which formed the basis of postVietnam assessments of conservative activity regarding the war. This article
discusses the divisions within the conservative community over Vietnam,
and demonstrates how and why conservative political leaders moved toward
acceptance of Richard Nixon’s limited military policies and limited political
objectives in Vietnam.
Large-scale unity was one of two central characteristics which defined the
conservative movement and Vietnam during the Johnson administration.
The other was overwhelming opposition to the military policies pursued by
the United States in Southeast Asia. In 1965, the leadership of the John Birch
Society, a right-wing educational organization, publicly opposed the US
ground war in Vietnam; the organization’s eccentric millionaire founder,
Robert Welch, claimed that the war distracted attention from the Soviet
military build-up elsewhere. Welch’s position occasioned an outpouring of
Revisionist histories initially discussed why the United States lost an assuredly winnable
war, and later appeared preoccupied with present political concerns (such histories were
also, however, a reflection of conservatives’ policies during the war years). It is not only
historians of the Vietnam War who have failed to document the role of the right regarding
the war. Recent histories of conservative activism during the 1960s have revealed, and to a
large extent overcome, the earlier imbalance in analyses of the period, and attest to the
significance of anticommunist mobilization in the organization of the conservative
movement. Post-1945 grassroots conservative activism has been ably analysed by Lisa
McGirr and Donald Critchlow. Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New
American Right (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2001); Donald Critchlow, Phyllis
Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism : A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton : Princeton University
Press, 2005). See also David Farber and Jeff Roche, eds., The Conservative Sixties (New York :
Peter Lang, 2003). Mary Brennan, Rick Perlstein, Kurt Schuparra and Matthew Dallek
contribute much to our understanding of the policy priorities and organizational techniques of the 1960s conservative movement. Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties:
The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1995);
Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus
(New York : Hill and Wang, 2001) ; Kurt Schuparra, Triumph of the Right: The Rise of the
California Conservative Movement, 1945–1966 (Armonk : Sharpe, 1998) ; Matthew Dallek, The
Right Moment : Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics
(New York : Free Press, 2000). See also Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side up:
A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America (New York : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1996);
Jonathan Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing : The Rise of Modern American Conservatism (New
York : Oxford University Press, 2002). James A. Hijiya, ‘‘ The Conservative 1960s, ’’ Journal
of American Studies, 37 (2003), 201–27. None of these histories, however, has systematically
examined the complexity of the right’s foreign-policy priorities, and the extent to which
these priorities altered as a result of the Vietnam War.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
257
conservative opposition that was unprecedented ; it allowed the political
activists associated with Barry Goldwater and the journal National Review
to label themselves ‘‘ responsible conservatives, ’’ and thus to purge the
conservative political campaign of far-right influence.
Conservative support for military intervention in Southeast Asia pre-dated
the intensification of the conflict in 1964 and 1965, but US intervention
could not subdue demands for military escalation.2 In defining the enemy,
conservatives looked to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam – North
Vietnam – rather than to the domestic insurgency ravishing the South. As
such, they argued that the United States could achieve immediate victory
by bombing the war-making potential of the Hanoi government and by
eliminating the sanctuaries used by the southern insurgents in Cambodia and
Laos. Kennedy and Johnson intended to limit any conflict in Southeast Asia
in order to prevent intervention by China or the Soviet Union, a potential
outcome of a US venture into North Vietnamese territory. Conservatives
argued that this was an unrealistic, even paranoid, assessment of the communist powers’ intentions. While fully convinced of the roles played by both
powers in arming and sustaining the Vietnamese insurgency, conservatives
did not believe that either would be willing to risk a nuclear conflict in order
to achieve a unified communist state in Vietnam.3 Conservative rhetoric
charged limited war strategies with having prolonged the war, and reflected a
refusal to acknowledge the limited political objectives in Vietnam. It was
believed possible to destroy the war-making potential of North Vietnam by
targeting US trade with European states known to be aiding the Vietnamese
communist effort, by bombing the supply routes to and inside Indochina,
and by exerting consistent pressure on the Hanoi government by bombing
its economic centres.4
2
3
4
Historians have accurately noted conservatives’ general opposition to a ground war in Asia,
principally because of the belief that such a war in Korea ended in stalemate, and that the
United States should rely on its air power. Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face : Organizing the
American Conservative Movement 1945–65 (Copenhagen : Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002)
270–72 ; Brennan, 117; George Herring, America’s Longest War : The United States and Vietnam,
1950–1975, 4th edn, (New York : McGraw-Hill, 2002) 144.
The American Conservative Union’s 1965 statement on Vietnam epitomized the conservatives’ approach to a possible widening of the war. It denied that China would take the
‘‘ suicidal ’’ step of directly entering into war against the United States, while the Soviet
Union ‘‘ would hardly invite its own destruction as a nation ’’ by increasing the possibility of
a nuclear confrontation for the sake of Vietnam. ACU statement on Vietnam, 1965,
Thomas A. Lane Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA, Box 5, Folder:
American Conservative Union.
Young Americans for Freedom, the student organization established with the financial and
moral support of National Review activists during the first Draft Goldwater Campaign in
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Sandra Scanlon
Conservative political activism during the 1960s was characterized by two
movements. One was represented by grassroots mobilization around often
single-issue campaigns. The other involved the creation of elite organizations
and the increase of power within the Republican Party. This organizational
development on the part of politically motivated actors was to some extent
based on a particular foreign-policy agenda. Founded in 1955 by the youthful
and outspoken conservative activist William F. Buckley Jr., National Review
formed the vanguard in the articulation of a coherent foreign-policy ideology
for the emerging conservative movement. Indeed, Buckley stated that the
purpose of National Review was ‘‘ to articulate a position on world affairs
which a conservative candidate can adhere to without fear of intellectual
embarrassment or political surrealism. ’’5 The journal’s editorial board included individuals, most notably William Rusher, who were prominent in the
campaigns to draft Goldwater for the Republican presidential nomination,
and responsible for founding the conservative activist group the American
Conservative Union. The Republican right, represented by Goldwater,
Ronald Reagan, John Tower and John Ashbrook, was ideologically attached
to the foreign policy expressed by National Review. Southern conservatives
such as Strom Thurmond, while less allied with the movement propagated by
the new conservative activists, were also sympathetic to National Review’s
foreign policy. By the 1960s, the right wing of the Republican Party had fully
discarded its adherence to isolationism, and was engaged with the new conservative political organizations. While neither National Review nor its ally
Human Events acted as mouthpieces for the Republican right, the journals’
importance in articulating conservatives’ political ambitions ensured their
significance in the conservative movement. National Review was particularly
important in uniting the disparate elements of political conservatism. The
journal’s role in reflecting and influencing conservative foreign-policy goals
was paramount.
Modern American conservatism was built on a foundation of fervent
anticommunism. Shared economic and philosophical beliefs provided the
substructure of the conservative movement that emerged in the immediate
5
1960, organized a campaign, STOP-IBM, during the mid-1960s to prevent the IBM
Corporation from trading with the Soviet Union. Its propaganda effort was very successful,
leading the youth group to concentrate much of its later activity in this area. Its opposition,
for reasons of military strategy and morality, to trade with communist countries remained
resolute throughout its history. For details of the YAF campaign see Gregory Schneider,
Cadres for Conservatism : Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right
(New York : New York University Press, 1999), 101–7.
William F. Buckley Jr. cited in Perlstein, 155.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
259
postwar period, but it was the determined efforts of conservative activists to
meet the international communist threat head-on which defined the nature
of this movement and its organizations.6 Having achieved unity regarding
the significance of the role in the world of the United States, conservative
activists continued to labour under divisions between traditionalists and
libertarians. Frank Meyer of National Review provided an apparent solution
in the early 1960s. He defined the loose alliance between libertarians and
traditionalists based on a shared anticommunism. Meyer’s ‘‘ fusionism’’ was
distilled in a 1964 article (‘‘ What is conservatism ?’’) and was the formula by
which Meyer combined conservatives’ antistatist views and moral traditionalism with militant anticommunism. This philosophy’s origins were mainly
practical, born in part from the political experiences of conservatives in the
early 1960s, and from the recognition that a more coherent theoretical
framework was required if the movement was to avoid the factionalism that
undermined earlier forays into politics. Fusionism was a distillation of the
cooperative methods and ideas that began with the creation of National Review
and which climaxed with the 1960 and 1964 Draft Goldwater drives. Its
emphasis on anticommunism heightened the importance of foreign-policy
successes for conservatives ; intervention in Vietnam was supported because
it provided a corrective to the policies of diplomatic posturing, followed by
acquiescence and equivocation, which conservatives claimed characterized
the unwise and immoral policies pursued by government since 1945.
Conservatives’ commitment to Vietnam was based on demands for victory ; according to conservative ideologues, containment and neutrality could
6
George Nash wrote of the postwar conservative intellectuals’ commitment to anticommunism : ‘‘ Active anti-Communism at home and abroad fitted in very well with
other strands of the multifaceted conservative intellectual revival. ’’ George H. Nash,
The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, 2nd edn (Wilmington, DE:
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996), 114. Sara Diamond elaborated on the point to
include broader right-wing movements in America, stating that anticommunism suited the
efforts by such movements to ‘‘ bolster capitalism, militarism, and moral traditionalism.’’
Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States
(New York and London : Guilford Press, 1995), 9. More recently, James Hijiya has noted
that although ‘‘ everybody seems to agree that it was anticommunism that enabled conservatives to stick together _ unanimous agreement _ does not make a proposition
correct. ’’ Hijiya, reference on 216. Hijiya argues that economic, racial and nationalistic
issues, based principally on the ‘‘ conviction that Americans, especially in recent years, had
gone too far in the pursuit of human equality, ’’ also brought conservatives together. Hijiya,
219. Certainly additional factors, not least the organizational drive for political power,
fortified the conservative alliance. While economic and social factors contributed to the
nature of the conservative political programme in the postwar period, strident anticommunism formed the basis of the cohesive conservative political and social revival after
1945.
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Sandra Scanlon
lead only to such unsuccessful resolutions as the outcomes of the Korean
War and the Laos crisis.7 Conservatives initially opposed the containment
policy, arguing that it was morally ambiguous and overtly defensive. While
they continued to oppose this policy in theory, there were few calls for ‘‘rollback ’’ of communism in Eastern Europe following the Hungarian uprising
in 1956. James Burnham of National Review argued that the Eisenhower administration’s failure to intervene, while highly objectionable, forced conservatives to accept realistic limits to US foreign policy. Conservative
support for intervention in Vietnam was, in essence, based on the idea of
the war as a corrective to earlier policies of equivocation in the face of
communist expansion. They viewed it as a demonstration of strength in
opposition to the Soviet Union, rather than as a logical application of the
containment doctrine. And yet it was during this period that the conservative
commitment to roll-back faced its greatest challenge, a challenge that came
from within the conservative movement itself, rather than from liberal influence on foreign policy.8 This coalition of activists moved to increase
conservative influence in government, and in so doing altered its position
on the Vietnam War. In support of Nixon and his ambiguous calls for
‘‘ peace with honor,’’ conservative leaders explicitly accepted containment
and the possibility that they would also have to support an ambiguous end to
the Vietnam War.
In 1969, the Vietnam War remained a dominant symbol of conservatism’s
commitment to anticommunist dogma. Bill Buckley dismissed anti-war
claims about the civil-war characteristics of the struggle, and about the supposedly negative impact of US intervention. ‘‘ I will assent, ’’ he stated, ‘‘ to
the proposition that South Vietnam has been harmed by America’s efforts
during the past five years only to somebody who would say that France was
harmed by the efforts of the Allied armies to liberate it during the Second
World War. ’’9 William Rusher stated the conservative position succinctly :
‘‘ What will happen if we bug out on Vietnam is World War III.’’10
7
8
9
10
While most conservatives opposed the eventual settlement of the Korean War, they
praised the manner in which President Eisenhower was alleged to have ended it, essentially
promoting the view that Eisenhower’s implicit threats to use nuclear weapons forced a
settlement. Largely without exception, conservatives opposed Kennedy’s neutralization of
Laos.
See Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 304–6.
William F. Buckley, Jr. interview with David Butler, Playboy, May 1970.
William Rusher, quoted in James Southwell, ‘‘ US decline projected, ’’ Oregonian, 22 June
1969, William A. Rusher papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, Box 212, Folder: Speaking engagements, presentations, speeches and
lectures, 1969, June–July.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
261
Conservatives denied that the domino theory was flawed; Goldwater
asserted in March 1969 that the stakes in Vietnam were as high as they had
been ten years before and that ‘‘ if we don’t stop them in Vietnam, we will be
trying to stop them in the rest of Southeast Asia.’’11 James Burnham argued
that Vietnam was a
major historical turning point, comparable to, but probably more critical than, the
Greek civil war and the combined Hungary–Suez affair _ Victory in Vietnam
would vindicate those at home, as well as globally, who believe it better to confront
threats standing up than crawling.12
Conservatives were thus deeply concerned about US credibility as a superpower and active ally, and were determined to promote the issue in the
domestic political arena. They argued that protests against the Vietnam War
and calls in Congress for troop withdrawal across the world had already
eroded the moral strength of the United States. This, coupled with a negative
impression of American military strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, made
it necessary for the US to stand firm in Southeast Asia if the policy of
deterrence were to have any legitimacy. In Rusher’s view, ‘‘ America’s
determination (or failure of determination) to prevail in Vietnam is very
probably the crucial test for the future of the American society. ’’ Despite the
domestic focus of Rusher’s statement, he concluded, ‘‘ a nation may very well
have to meet certain ‘ challenges’ effectively or surrender its claim to greatness – certainly to predominance.’’13 In the face of arms negotiations and
growing cooperation with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), such issues gained greater importance and urgency, and it is
within the realm of emerging détente that the true significance of conservative assessment of Nixon’s Vietnam policies must be considered.
That conservatives could expect favourable policies from Richard Nixon
was by no means certain. Conservative attitudes towards his candidacy in 1968
were certainly divided, but he was understood to be a committed anticommunist hawk.14 Having provided vital support for Nixon, conservatives’
11
12
13
14
Letter, Barry Goldwater to Charles Batarseh, 15 March 1969, reprinted in Robert Alan
Goldberg, Barry Goldwater (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1995), 263.
James Burnham, National Review, 10 Jan. 1967.
Memorandum, William Rusher to the editors of National Review, 3 June 1969, Rusher
papers, Box 122, Folder: Staff correspondence and memoranda, general, March–Dec.
1969, original underlining.
Richard Nixon was not the preferred candidate of many conservative political activists. His
connection to the policies of the Eisenhower administration undermined his appeal to
conservatives, as did the perception, mainly correct, that he was not a committed conservative ideologue. William Rusher and F. Clifton White, who orchestrated the original
effort to nominate Barry Goldwater for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960
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Sandra Scanlon
expectation that they would play a significant role in the formulation of policy
was not unrealistic.15 Throughout the campaign and the early months of the
administration, however, few attempts were made to determine the exact
nature of Nixon’s policies for the conduct and successful conclusion of the
Vietnam War. Conservatives believed that Nixon had staked too much of his
personal credibility, political support and foreign-policy objectives on a successful end to the war. Even as it became evident that Nixon did not intend to
launch a determined effort to win the war militarily, conservatives continued
to praise Nixon’s handling of the conflict. When describing the new peace
terms offered by the United States to the Hanoi government in May 1969,
Nixon warned, ‘‘ if the needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. ’’ Rather than focus on the terms of the peace agreements, conservative leaders argued that this statement was proof of Nixon’s willingness
to take forceful measures if Hanoi did not respond favourably to the generous
overtures of the administration. Conservatives fully expected Hanoi to remain intransigent. While acknowledging Nixon’s statement that the administration had ruled out a purely military solution, conservative supporters of
Nixon’s policy praised his emphasis on a refusal to engage in unilateral
withdrawal, a policy that the President claimed would ‘‘ bring peace now, ’’ but
which ‘‘ would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later.’’16
Nixon was confident of the support of congressional Republicans, and the
Republican right vociferously endorsed his policies.17 In the months that
followed, the administration began to launch the programme that ultimately
defined the Nixon–Kissinger approach to the Vietnam War. The
Vietnamization programme was designed to continue the war, while meeting
the increasing domestic demand for de-escalation of direct American
15
16
17
and 1964, organized a campaign to draft Governor Ronald Reagan of California for the
nomination in 1968. Reagan, more suited in political temperament and ideology to the aims
of the conservative political leadership, posed a favourable alternative to Nixon. National
Review’s failure to endorse Reagan was based on the realization that he did not have the
political experience or support to win the nomination at that time.
Goldwater, grateful for Nixon’s support during his effort to win the party nomination and
presidency in 1964, publicly announced his support for a Nixon nomination in 1965.
Buckley offered his support to the Nixon effort in early 1968, and later claimed responsibility for having introduced Henry Kissinger to the Nixon team through John Mitchell.
Strom Thurmond’s endorsement of Nixon was vital in bringing over the southern conservatives to the Nixon side.
President Richard Nixon, nationwide radio and television address, 14 May 1969, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, DC : US
Government Printing Office, 1971).
For a discussion of Republicans’ early approaches to the Vietnam War see Terry Dietz,
Republicans and the Vietnam War, 1961–1968 (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1986).
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
263
involvement. Furthermore, it was intended to allow Nixon to claim that he
had achieved ‘‘ peace with honor.’’ Beginning in July 1969, American force
levels were systematically reduced under the pretext that new units of the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam would replace US soldiers. Additional
resources were allocated for training and equipping South Vietnamese forces, and substantial increases in aid were earmarked to improve the Saigon
government and its pacification campaign. Historians remain divided in their
interpretations of Vietnamization. Some argue that the policy was either a
hopeful fantasy to which the administration succumbed, or a charade, designed to disguise a precipitate withdrawal and win popular backing.18
Kimball considers Vietnamization within the context of Nixon’s so-called
‘‘ madman theory ’’ and argues that it was initially developed in concert with
the possibility of escalating air and naval force against the communist enemy
in Vietnam.19 Larry Berman agrees with Kimball’s assessment in many respects, referring to Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia as evidence of the
President’s plans to negotiate while fighting, but Berman emphasizes the
extent to which Nixon and Kissinger planned to continue the war by
alternative means once the US had withdrawn its troops under the auspices
of a supposed settlement to end the war.20
18
19
20
Melvin Small argues that Vietnamization was meant to assure the American people that the
war was not endless and to convince Hanoi of full American support for administration
policy, but had the effect, he concludes, of convincing Hanoi to hold out for longer. Melvin
Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University Press, 1988),
191–92, 230. Robert McNamara has observed that the Nixon administration fell victim to
its own illusion of Vietnamization : ‘‘ the idea that the United States could withdraw completely and that the South Vietnamese government would successfully defend itself against
the NLF and North Vietnamese forces. ’’ Robert McNamara et al., Argument without End:
In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York : Public Affairs, 1999), 367. George
Donelson Moss claims that Vietnamization ‘‘ rested on a fantasy ’’ that the ‘‘ motley home
guards ’’ of South Vietnam ‘‘ could be molded into a modern strike force that would be able
to hold its own against the disciplined battle-tested units of the NVA. ’’ George Donelson
Moss, Vietnam : An American Ordeal (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall, 1990), 307.
Gerard DeGroot assumes a similar approach, although he also argues that the administration was aware that Vietnamization was not going to work, concluding that it ‘‘ did not
actually need to work, as long as it appeared that progress was made. ’’ The ‘‘ charade, ’’ as
DeGroot described it, ‘‘ worked too well; many Americans began to believe that Nixon had
found the magic formula to get the United States out of the war and defeat the communists. ’’ Gerard DeGroot, A Noble Cause ? America and the Vietnam War (New York :
Longman, 2000), 211.
Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 1998),
137–39, 154–55; and idem, The Vietnam War Files : Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era
Strategy (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2004), 11–13, 82–83.
Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor : Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York : Free
Press, 2001), 50–51, 261–62.
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Sandra Scanlon
Conservative leaders believed Vietnamization was a strategy for fighting a
more conventional war, and not simply a programme for ending the
American war in Vietnam. As such, they offered Nixon significant praise.
They believed that by transferring the major onus for fighting the war from
US to South Vietnamese hands, the war could be escalated and fought along
conventional lines. This intensified military campaign on the part of the
South Vietnamese, conservatives argued, should include assaults against
North Vietnam and the sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, and should be
complemented by intensified US bombing campaigns. Believing that military
restrictions had been imposed because of liberals’ fears of Chinese or Soviet
intervention against US forces, the Vietnamization programme offered conservatives the antidote to this problem. South Vietnamese attacks against
North Vietnam were unlikely to raise the spectre of international intervention, particularly in light of the clear role of North Vietnam in supporting
the southern insurgency. Domestic support for Vietnamization also encouraged conservative political support. As American casualties reduced, and
the expected draft reform was introduced, bombing and other necessary
military measures would, according to conservatives, surely become more
acceptable to the American public.21
Conservative support for Vietnamization was also determined by favourable interpretations of the Nixon Doctrine, which was articulated by the
President in an unscripted press conference at Guam.22 It is clear that conservative leaders believed the so-called Nixon Doctrine was a much more
influential factor in the development of Vietnamization than was actually the
case. Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) went so far as to claim that
Vietnamization should have been American policy all along.23 Accepting
21
22
23
Conservatives, both traditionalist and libertarian, argued in favour of ending conscription
and introducing a voluntary military. This was a consistent aspect of conservative lobbying
and a topic of discussion among those dealing directly with the administration. The Nixon
administration was responsive to such demands but argued that draft reform, rather than
the abolition of the draft, would have to suffice until the ending of the Vietnam War.
During a brief press backgrounder at Guam in July 1969, Nixon offhandedly stated that in
cases where a nuclear strike was unlikely, the United States would meet its treaty commitments through the provision of material and economic aid, rather than the direct deployment of American troops. Known as the Guam Doctrine, and following a concerted
effort by the administration, the Nixon Doctrine, the policy had not been discussed at
National Security Council meetings prior to this announcement. Jeffrey Kimball has
demonstrated that the so-called doctrine was actually a means of adding legitimacy and
clarity to Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization. Kimball, Vietnam War Files, 11–12 ; and
Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 154–5, 225.
‘‘ YAF in the News, ’’ April 1970, Patrick M. Dowd Collection, Hoover Institution
Archives, Stanford, CA, Box 3, Folder: Subject files, YAF/Newsletter, ‘‘ YAF in the
News. ’’ Presidential aide Jeb Magruder wrote at the time, ‘‘ YAF did much to support us, ’’
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
265
administration claims that Vietnamization was not a precipitate withdrawal,
and that the rate of withdrawal would depend on the readiness of South
Vietnamese armed forces, the level of enemy activity, and progress towards a
political solution at the Paris talks, conservatives were further convinced by
the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.24 Conservative support was
almost universal: from Congress to YAF to National Review, conservatives
argued that the war could be lost only in the United States, for it was being
won in Vietnam, and that it remained only for the government to continue to
provide the necessary material aid, including the use of United States air
power, for South Vietnam to maintain its defence and freedom.
The image of unified conservative support is misleading, however. The
groundswell of support which accompanied Nixon’s ‘‘Silent Majority ’’
speech in November 1969 was evident among congressional Republicans as
well as conservative political activists. This unity on the right was short-lived,
and by early 1970 the board of the American Conservative Union (ACU)
openly questioned administration policy. They urged the President to initiate
military measures in support of Vietnamization with greater rapidity and
force, demands that were echoed by YAF and that were alluded to in the
pages of National Review. Within the Republican Party, however, Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio, chairman of the ACU, stood as a lone voice
of conservative opposition to Nixon. Despite growing concerns about the
ultimate consequences of phased withdrawal, the Republican right remained
predominantly united and consistent in its strong public praise for the
President. Conservative anxieties about the Vietnamization strategy were
muted by the allied attack on enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, which, while
limited in scope and time, signified the attainment of one of the conservatives’ long-standing goals. Cambodia, Goldwater claimed, was the
24
Memorandum, Jeb S. Magruder to H. R. Haldeman, 30 April 1970, Colson files, Box 125,
Folder : YAF. YAF leaders reiterated this position in a report on Vietnam given to the
administration in April 1971. The report dealt largely with YAF’s recent fact-finding visit to
Vietnam, and included details of their wider activities in support of the administration
position. Letter, Ronald B. Dear, YAF director of regional and state activities, to Robert
Odle, White House aide, 30 April 1970, National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park, MD (NARAII), Nixon presidential materials, White House special files, Staff
member and office files, Charles Colson files, Box 125, Folder: YAF.
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger acknowledged that both General Earle Wheeler and
General Creighton Abrams opposed the policy of phased withdrawal in June 1969, but
such concern remained largely private. Kissinger, White House Years (London: Phoenix
Press, 1979), 35. Conservative support for the policy was also buoyed by the favourable
analyses of Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert, who became an
official adviser to Nixon in October 1969 and, in December, proffered a favourable report
on the prospects of Vietnamization succeeding.
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Sandra Scanlon
action from which Nixon would achieve ‘‘ his greatness.’’25 It convinced
conservatives that liberals within Congress, rather than Nixon, threatened
the success of the American effort in Southeast Asia, a distinction that served
the administration by precluding conservative fears regarding the efficacy
of policy from translating into open hostility. Congressional amendments
calling for a specific date for withdrawal served only to rally conservatives to
the administration position, as did the excesses of anti-war protest. Conservatives universally reiterated the administration line by arguing that the
operation resulted in the capture of enemy supplies and the vitally important
port of Sihanoukville, prevented the annual enemy offensive during the dry
season of 1970, and severely disrupted all future assaults against South
Vietnam. Such assessments were overly positive, and were based on ideological and theoretical judgements, rather than independent evaluations of
the operation’s strategic value. Cambodia was clear evidence, however, that
the administration was willing to take strong measures, supporting the thesis
of pro-administration conservatives that Vietnamization would enable a
more conventional conduct of the war to reach execution.
The intensification of US withdrawals from Vietnam prompted resurgent
anxieties on the right. While there was no outright rejection of the
Vietnamization strategy, during September 1970 Senator John Tower was
forced to assure anxious conservatives. Tower stated that there was no
question of the Nixon administration preparing to ‘‘ accept a camouflaged
surrender to the demands of Hanoi.’’ He argued that the administration
would not leave South Vietnam until its established criteria had been met,
and until it was clear that South Vietnam was capable of withstanding any
attack from the North. Tower continued, ‘‘ There is no doubt that a substantial residual American force will have to be maintained there for some
time _ [W]e will have to continue to provide logistical, air and naval support
to South Vietnam.’’26 The issue of a residual American force was particularly
important, as by late 1970 there was little sign that greater South Vietnamese
military action, coupled with a concerted US effort to undermine the warmaking potential of North Vietnam, would be realized. The demand that a
residual force be stationed in South Vietnam became a prerequisite of any
possible settlement as far as many conservatives were concerned. By early
1971 the ACU was publicly declaring that the Nixon administration was
concerned only with the pace of withdrawals from Vietnam; there was no
25
26
Barry Goldwater, quoted in Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 263.
Senator John Tower, writing in the New Guard, Sept. 1970, Rusher papers, Box 212, Folder:
Speaking engagements, presentations, speeches and lectures, May–Sept. 1970.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
267
longer a consideration of victory, of employing options such as blockading
Haiphong. Such attacks were due to frustration with the level of control
being afforded the South Vietnamese, and growing concern for the American
role following final withdrawal. Jeff Bell of the ACU, writing to White House
aide Patrick Buchanan, objected to the administration’s recent association of
a residual American force in Vietnam with the prisoner-of-war matter.
According to Buchanan, conservative ‘‘feeling is that the prisoners issue
alone is a weak intellectual and political reed on which to hang the ‘ residual
force, ’’’ and that ‘‘the case for a residual force, and for gradual as opposed to
immediate withdrawal, needs justification _ in terms of the United States
overall objective in Southeast Asia. ’’ Nixon must, according to Bell, vindicate
America’s commitment to South Vietnam by leaving sufficient material to
ensure the country’s defence, and include American air and logistical support. This issue faced a precarious future, considering the growing strength
of congressional opposition to continued funding of South Vietnam.
Buchanan concluded, ‘‘their feeling is that _ some polarization is needed
now on Vietnam, to shore up the eroding support for overall Administration
policy. ’’27 This, ultimately, reflects a failure on the part of certain conservatives to consider fully the political sensitivity of the war, and the extent
to which large-scale polarization, particularly in Congress, could hinder basic
conservative objectives. Buchanan, though, was not simply referring to
‘‘ eroding support’’ on the left, but rather to growing hostility from conservative sources.
Many leading conservatives began to challenge administration policy on
grounds quite distinct from those demanding an intensified military campaign
to uphold the Saigon government. Columnist James Jackson Kilpatrick and
commentator Garry Wills argued that if the US was pulling out of Vietnam,
demonstrating its unwillingness to win, it should do so more quickly. This
sense of inevitable loss increasingly took its toll on conservative responses to
administration policy, not least because of growing public frustration with
the war. An acrimonious debate among YAF’s National Board is indicative of
the divisions within the conservative movement. Jerry Norton, a Vietnam
veteran and member of the national board, called on YAF to quietly abandon
the Vietnam issue. Norton asserted that, while at one point,
our position was a clarion call for rapid victory through escalation _ with Nixon’s
election, YAF’s position has ostensibly remained the call for victory, but we’re
27
Memorandum, Patrick Buchanan to the President, 1 April 1971, Nixon presidential materials, NARAII, White House Special Files : Staff member and office files, H. R. Haldeman
files, Box 76, Folder: Patrick Buchanan, April 1971.
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Sandra Scanlon
kidding ourselves if we don’t admit that, whatever the resolutions at conventions or
board meetings, for all practical purposes our position has shifted to support of the
Nixon policy, a policy of gradual withdrawal.28
Norton was the only acting member of the YAF national board to have
served in Vietnam, but neither his veteran status nor the fact that his assessment of YAF’s activities was largely accurate was sufficient to convince
his fellow conservatives. YAF’s executive board rejected Norton’s argument,
but it was becoming increasingly clear that it would be difficult to maintain
consensus on the Vietnam issue. National Review stalwarts Frank Meyer and
William Rusher increased their calls urging fellow conservatives to break
with Nixon. Meyer lamented the negative effect that the protracted war
was having on the conservative consensus, believing that its longevity was
undermining popular support for the struggle against communism, and
was eroding public understanding of the importance of this campaign. While
still acknowledging that Nixon had done much to withstand anti-war protest,
especially congressional pressure, Meyer and others increasingly bemoaned
the association of conservatives with the administration’s limited policy in
Vietnam.
Not all conservatives were so willing to abandon the administration,
however. Bill Buckley was appointed by Nixon to the United States
Information Agency, and was associated with Henry Kissinger.29 There is
little doubt that he valued his role with the administration highly, but
Buckley’s association with Kissinger endangered his dominant position
within the conservative movement.30 In April 1971, Patrick Buchanan
warned that ‘‘ while Buckley’s influence nationally is enormous, his influence
among the hard-core right politicos is being diminished, and we cannot
count on his bringing them over [in the 1972 election]. ’’ He concluded,
‘‘ Buckley gets a bit of the same constant criticism that conservatives in the
28
29
30
Memorandum, Jerry Norton to Randy Teague, n.d. (ca Oct. 1970), Dowd collection, Box 3,
Folder: Subject files, YAF/National Board – memoranda, circulars and printed matter.
Buckley was humorous about his closeness to the White House during an interview with
Playboy in 1970, claiming that he had ‘‘ discovered a new sensual treat _ It is to have the
President of the United States take notes while you are speaking to him, even though you
run the risk that he is scribbling, ‘Get this bore out of here. ’’’ Playboy, May 1970.
David Keene, executive director of YAF, later claimed that Buckley had been ‘‘ taken in ’’
by Kissinger. John P. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York :
Simon Schuster, 1990), 304. Buckley believed that he understood the nature of Kissinger’s
overall conception of foreign policy. The two met, and spoke via telephone, intermittently,
and the President often requested that Kissinger assuage Buckley’s concerns or queries
regarding foreign policy.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
269
White House do – that they’ve ‘sold out. ’’’31 As conservative support
outside the political arena began to diminish sharply, the administration
concentrated its efforts on maintaining the support of figures such as
Goldwater, Reagan, Tower and newly elected Senator James Buckley,
brother of Bill Buckley and candidate of the New York Conservative Party.
Meeting with Senate Republican loyalists in April 1971, Nixon restated the
necessity of ending the Vietnam War in such a way that South Vietnam
would be able to survive. But on this occasion there was no discussion of the
need to ensure South Vietnamese freedom perpetually. Rather, the South
Vietnamese were to be given a ‘‘ chance’’ of survival. The distinction was
highly important and indicated a change in the meaning of ‘‘ peace with
honor.’’ If Republicans, including Goldwater, objected to the administration’s altered objective in Vietnam, there is no record of dissent in the
chronicle of the Oval Office meeting. Neither is there evidence to suggest
that they were so concerned with the issue as to voice anxiety publicly.32 The
Republican right continued to project faith in Nixon’s ‘‘ peace with honor,’’
but largely failed to acknowledge that its meaning and implications had
fundamentally altered.
The growing divide within the conservative leadership over Vietnam
was overshadowed by the stark divide over Nixon’s China initiative. China
changed everything. Within two weeks of Nixon’s announcement that
he intended to visit the PRC, National Review conservatives announced a
‘‘ suspension ’’ of support for the administration.33 The group included representatives of National Review, Human Events, the ACU, the New York
Conservative Party, and YAF.34 Nixon’s spectacular move towards détente
pushed those wavering, such as Buckley and Burnham, into the opposition
camp. Despite the deteriorating military situation in Vietnam, however,
conservatives focussed their wrath on such issues as US strategic defence
31
32
33
34
Memorandum, Patrick Buchanan to the President, 6 Jan. 1971, Colson files, Box 52,
Folder : Conservatives.
Memorandum, Ken BeLieu for the President’s file, 21 April 1971, Box 84, Folder : April 18,
1971, President’s personal files.
News release, ‘‘ Prominent Conservative Leaders ‘Suspend ’ support of President Nixon,’’
issued by William Rusher, 29 July 1971, Rusher papers, Box 168, Folder : Nixon, Richard,
Conservative suspension of support, press releases, 1971.
The names of the following individuals appeared on the document : William F. Buckley Jr.,
Frank Meyer, William Rusher and James Burnham of National Review ; Allan Ryskind and
Tom Winter of Human Events ; John Jones and Jeff Bell of the American Conservative
Union ; Randy Teague, executive director of Young Americans for Freedom ; Neil
McCaffrey of the Conservative Book Club; Anthony Harrigan of the Southern States
Industrial Council ; and Daniel J. Mahoney, chair of the New York Conservative Party. See
Judis, 329, and Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 319–20.
270
Sandra Scanlon
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, rather than on the war.35 The failure to attack
Nixon’s Vietnam policy publicly at this time indicated a willingness to accept
a great deal less than victory. The China issue muted alarm over Vietnam,
with the conservatives’ public statement actually ‘‘ applauding _ the
President’s steadfastness in resisting the great pressures upon him to desert
Southeast Asia.’’36 Praise of Nixon’s stance against his anti-war critics did
not necessarily equate with support for his conduct of the war, but individuals such as Buckley were concerned with the image of those protesting
the China move. To again demand an intensified military campaign in
Vietnam risked making the conservatives look extreme. Considering the
division within the movement, with figures such as Buckley and Burnham,
and Republican members of Congress, urging continued support for administration policy in Vietnam, it was also difficult to profess an alternative
solution. As Congress moved ever closer to limiting the time frame in which
Nixon could achieve ‘‘ peace with honor,’’ conservatives were left with little
option but to push for a rightward shift in administration foreign policy in
general. As such, their demands focussed on specific issues of rearmament.
When the administration moved closer to détente, they attempted to use
their political leverage to launch a campaign by Congressman John Ashbrook
to challenge Nixon in several Republican primaries.37 The challenge to
Nixon’s China policy, and the unexpectedly feeble primary challenge by
35
36
37
News release, ‘‘ Prominent conservative leaders ‘suspend ’ support of President Nixon. ’’
On 1 Nov. 1971 the group submitted a series of proposals or questions to the administration, the main thrust of which was the need for increased defence spending in order to
correct the strategic imbalance in conventional weapons, and to escalate the military research and development budget. Memorandum, Charles Colson to Alexander Haig, 2 Nov.
1971, Colson files, Box 52, Folder: Conservatives. The National Security Council staff
responded with a series of statements relating to administration foreign policy and defence
posture. Memorandum, Haig to Colson, 16 Nov. 1971, ibid. Goldwater expressed similar
concerns in private, in an April letter to the President and during a November meeting with
Kissinger. Letter, Senator Barry Goldwater to President Richard Nixon, April 13, 1971,
Nixon presidential materials, NARAII, National Security Council files, Name files, Box
816, Folder: Goldwater, Senator Barry. Memorandum, J. F. Lehman to Henry Kissinger,
9 Nov. 1971, ibid.
News release, ‘‘ Prominent Conservative Leaders ‘ Suspend ’ Support of President Nixon. ’’
Congressman John Ashbrook had served in the US House of Representatives since 1961,
and continued to hold this office until his death in April 1982. He was chairman of the
American Conservative Union from 1966 to 1982, and pushed for more open opposition
to the Nixon administration from July 1969 onwards. His campaign was endorsed by
leading conservative activists, including National Review, but not by his fellow conservatives
in Congress, when he entered the Republican primary races in New Hampshire and
Florida. Asserting that he would not run on a third-party ticket, and did not expect to win
the nomination, Ashbrook claimed that his aim was to push the Nixon administration to
the right, and to assert the independence of conservatives. Ashbrook’s manifesto,
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
271
Ashbrook, heightened division among conservative political activists and
weakened their focus on lobbying the administration regarding Vietnam.
Despite their hesitancy in publicly challenging the administration, conservative Republicans continued to privately lobby the White House to inaugurate intensified bombing campaigns. They grew unsure about the
effectiveness of administration policy, and accepted as unlikely the possibility
that a substantial residual force would be left to guard the borders of South
Vietnam. In November, Kissinger reassured Goldwater that extensive
bombing campaigns were planned for December, but by January Goldwater
was once again bewildered.38 Writing privately, he stated that a recent
briefing on Vietnam was ‘‘somewhat disturbing’’ :
I’ll have to say the results [of the bombing] were not what I thought they were going
to be or were from the press accounts, and I was very disappointed that the general
target that Mr. Kissinger had told me about had not been approached and remains a
target, and now I have my doubts as to whether or not the President and the Joint
Chiefs will be willing to risk it.39
Goldwater maintained a public silence; he was convinced of the need to
support the administration because of Kissinger’s emphasis on the negative
impact of the Mansfield amendment on negotiations, and by the President’s
assurance that ‘‘what we have done is as far as we can go’’ in terms of concessions.40 The administration had clearly conceded far more than Goldwater
was willing to accept in 1969, but conservative support was buoyed by White
House assurances that neither a coalition government nor an in-place ceasefire would be imposed on South Vietnam. Goldwater responded in simple
terms, stating that the administration should take the peace proposal and, with
regard to the Democratic doves, should ‘‘ shove it down their throats. ’’41
38
39
40
41
published in Republican Battle Line, Jan. 1972, Rusher papers, Box 135, Folder : ACU,
newsletter, Republican Battle Line, Printed versions, 1971–72.
Goldwater privately called on Kissinger to explain why the outlined bombing campaign
had not been carried out. Letter, Senator Barry Goldwater to Henry Kissinger, 26 Jan.
1972, NSC, Goldwater file.
Admiral John McCain briefed Goldwater on the bombing campaign during the latter’s en
route journey to Vietnam over Christmas 1971. Barry Goldwater diary report, 3 Jan. 1972,
Goldwater papers, Personal/political Series I, Box 5, Folder: Vietnam media.
The Mansfield amendment, introduced by Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) was finally
passed on 24 June 1971. While originally calling for a national policy of complete withdrawal within nine months, the bill’s language was later changed to ‘‘ the earliest practical
date. ’’ Even so, the bill’s passage was indicative of the growing probability that Congress
would deny funds for the continuation of the war.
GOP leadership meeting, White House, 26 Jan. 1972. Memorandum, Patrick Buchanan for
the President’s file, 26 Jan. 1972, Nixon presidential materials, NARAII, White House
Central Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Folder: January 23, 1972.
272
Sandra Scanlon
Goldwater’s comment indicates a frustration with the anti-war movement,
particularly that in Congress, and frustration with the continuing war. Yet he
retained his faith in the President, writing privately that Nixon had personally
assured him that he would not abandon the government of South Vietnam,
and concluding that Nixon ‘‘feels, as I have often said, that if we do this it will
end the United States as a world power as it would destroy the confidence of
the world.’’42
North Vietnam’s Spring Offensive against South Vietnam, which began
on 30 March 1972, provoked a stern US response. Nixon approved a massive
bombing campaign targeting enemy troops in South Vietnam and heavy
bombing of North Vietnam, including Hanoi and Haiphong harbour. While
the Paris peace talks continued in fits and starts during this period, they were
indefinitely suspended by the US on 4 May. Four days later, Nixon announced a new aerial interdiction campaign, Operation Linebacker, which
was the first continuous bombing of North Vietnam since 1968. Nixon also
announced the mining of Haiphong harbour, one of the principal demands
made by conservatives throughout the war. Because of their focus on external impetuses and support for the North Vietnamese campaign, conservative supporters of the war particularly welcomed the interdiction effort.
Conservative praise for the new military policies was almost universal, and
was most obvious in the declarations of support offered by conservatives in
Congress. Goldwater expressed admiration for Nixon ‘‘ finally taking the
steps so necessary to bringing about a quick end to the war in Indochina.’’
The North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam was, Goldwater asserted,
comparable to the North Korean invasion of South Korea or the Cuban
Missile Crisis. It was ‘‘ another instance of the Soviet Union attempting to
alter the world balance of power by remote control.’’43 Bill Buckley stated
that Nixon’s ‘‘ determination to use air power to stay the enemy’s juggernaut
is not simply a point of pride, ’’ but also ‘‘derives from a commitment to
history, annealed by the experiences that led to the second world war _ if
you let a military power which is strong enough to disturb the peace of the
whole world underwrite armed aggression against a little power, the fabric of
peace and stability is ruptured.’’ Conservatives thus attempted to connect
events in Vietnam to the wider international situation, largely in an attempt
to undermine the validity of détente.
42
43
Barry Goldwater diary report, 26 Jan. 1972, Goldwater papers, Personal/political Series I,
Box 5, Folder 2.
Barry Goldwater speech on Senate floor, 17 April 1972, Congressional Record.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
273
National Review offered significant praise for Nixon’s steadfastness in the
midst of severe domestic and international condemnation of the US attacks.
Conservatives were not relieved of their concern over the direction of US
foreign policy, however. Buckley claimed that it was paradoxical that Nixon
was acting against the Soviet ‘‘ planned and authorized’’ attack against South
Vietnam, while scheduling to visit Moscow in a matter of weeks. The administration remained committed to the negotiation of a peace settlement in
the near future, a fact that angered conservatives hoping for a more hardline
approach from the White House in line with the altered military strategies.
Buckley charged that the United States had ‘‘ drastically reduced [its] peace
terms, ’’ which now ‘‘ appear to be open-ended, so that there seems to be
nothing to stand in the way of the North Vietnamese continuing their
offensive until the opportune moment and then announcing that they will
go for cease-fire.’’44 Nixon’s declaration before Congress that he would
not abandon Vietnam prompted Buckley to declare, ‘‘ By God, I was proud
of Richard Nixon.’’45 But throughout the summer, National Review conservatives continued to stress that the military campaign must be intensified
to such a degree that Hanoi would be forced to accept US peace terms.
Conservatives called for bombing the dikes in North Vietnam.46 Such demands were less than heartfelt, however, as there was an air of resignation
regarding the pro-victory cause. While conservatives called for the administration to remain tough in the final weeks of negotiations, particularly in
October and November, there was a more general realization that if the war
were not concluded through negotiation, it might be ended on less favourable terms by an oppositional Congress.
This was a difficult period for the larger conservative movement. Writing
to Buckley in March 1972, Rusher cautioned that he could not ‘‘ recall a time
when American conservatism was in greater disarray,’’ and blamed disagreement over Richard Nixon as the primary cause of schism within the
movement.47 The ACU’s opposition to the support of Goldwater, Reagan
44
45
46
47
William F. Buckley, Jr., ‘‘ Nixon’s last stand, ’’ 13–14 May 1972, Buckley papers, Box 437,
Folder : Buckley columns, On the Right, May–June 1972.
William F. Buckley Jr., ‘‘ Touchdown, ’’ 6 June 1972, ibid.
Buckley rejected claims that, unlike the mining of Haiphong harbour, destruction of the
dikes in North Vietnam posed a considerably difficult humanitarian problem. Rather, he
asserted, ‘‘ it is hardly humane to drag out a war so that people get killed and inconvenienced not over a period of months but a period of years. ’’ William F. Buckley Jr.,
‘‘ Bomb the Dikes ?’’ 17 Aug. 1972, Buckley papers, Box 438, Folder: Buckley columns, On
the Right, Aug. 1972.
Letter, William Rusher to William F. Buckley Jr., 9 March 1972, Rusher papers, Box 121,
Folder : Staff correspondence & memoranda, William F. Buckley, 1971.
274
Sandra Scanlon
and others for Nixon led the organization to accuse the ‘‘ conservative
leadership ’’ of ‘‘dancing attendance on Richard Nixon, ’’ and of being
‘‘ partisan apologists for Cold War accommodation.’’48 The ACU was not
alone in attacking the position assumed by conservative Republicans, but
neither was division over Nixon the only reason for disorder on the right.
YAF suffered from a financial debacle that forced the organization to severely reduce its activities and to re-evaluate its future management.49 Both
the ACU and National Review endured sharp opposition because of
Ashbrook’s campaign against Nixon. Within this context, it became difficult
to consider and formulate a consistent, united policy regarding Vietnam. The
longevity and growing unpopularity of the war challenged conservative
commitment, as did the decreasing likelihood of a successful conclusion.
Abrogating responsibility for the war and its outcome, conservatives increasingly focussed on blaming liberals for the likely loss in Vietnam.
Operation Linebacker II, the so-called Christmas Bombing of North
Vietnam, did much to foster conservative support for the final outcome of
Nixon’s policies in Vietnam. In dealing with the enemy in terms of force, the
administration salvaged a measure of credibility with conservatives. The
bombing formed the basis of right-wing retrospective thinking on the war :
essentially that Nixon’s Vietnamization policy could have succeeded, hence
conservative support for Nixon’s early strategy, had it been coupled with
more forceful military measures. Blame for its failure was firmly laid at the
door of congressional weakness and ignorance. The bombing campaign
was hailed as evidence that a military solution to the war had been possible,
and indeed was the determining factor in forcing Hanoi to submit to US
demands. Pro-war convention stated that the war was lost in Washington,
not Vietnam, that anti-war protests comforted the enemy and weakened
American resolve, and that a morally feeble, liberal Congress undermined the
Nixon administration’s ability to fight the war to a successful conclusion.
Conservatives, including, but certainly not limited to, those who had remained faithful to the administration claimed that this had been their
understanding of Vietnamization all along. Goldwater, speaking in January
1973, stated,
The ceasefire and peace agreement in Vietnam marks one of the most important
victories that the United States has ever scored over Communist aggression _ What
the accord means is that a strong President, willing to take bold action, literally
48
49
Republican Battle Line, April 1972, Rusher papers, Box 135, ACU newsletter, Republican
Battle Line, printed versions, 1971–72.
See Schneider, Cadres for Conservatism, 152–59.
The Conservative Lobby and Nixon’s Peace with Honor
275
snatched victory from the jaws of defeat for our objectives in Indo-China _ [I]n
dealing with the communists, or any other adversary, our primary tools must be
military strength, and the willingness to use it in a just cause involving the peace of
the world and our own strategic national interests.50
The bombing campaign served to overcome the glaring weaknesses of the
Accords, allowing conservatives to declare publicly that North Vietnamese
violations would be met with swift and forceful responses. Genuine
Vietnamization would ensure that such would be the case, for the South
Vietnamese would be free from the political constraints imposed by the
United States’ policy of limited war. Coming full circle, the conservative
interpretation of Vietnamization once again appeared commensurate with
administration policy. It may not have been implemented to the extent that
conservatives desired, but Operation Linebacker II ensured that there was
sufficient credibility to Nixon’s claims that he had achieved ‘‘ peace with
honor,’’ while also highlighting the extent to which conservative political
figures were concerned with the means, rather than the ultimate consequences, of ending the Vietnam War.
Nixon’s personal preference for the hardline methods espoused by conservative supporters of the war was much in evidence throughout his administration. Conservatives found an ally in their interpretation of the war’s
significance to the US position in international relations. Nixon’s perspective
and goals in the international arena differed greatly, however, from those of
his conservative critics, fundamentally undermining conservative support for
the administration, and challenging the initial interpretation of phased withdrawal. But such differences did not devastate support for the means by
which Nixon was ending the war in Vietnam. By accepting that military
victory was politically impossible, conservatives effectively abandoned a core
principle of their standard policy regarding Vietnam, and undercut their
commitment to this particular war. It must be recognized that the movement’s leaders attached favourable meanings to the policy of Vietnamization,
meanings that were challenged by Nixon’s unexpected commitment to
détente. Essentially, however, conservative political leaders, particularly
those in the Republican Party, were exhausted by the Vietnam War, exhausted by its negative impact on domestic support for the anticommunist
crusade, exhausted by its correlation to the rise of the new left, and
exhausted by its successful challenge to the codes of warfare. Herein lay
50
Barry Goldwater press release, 24 Jan. 1973, Colson files, Box 120, Folder: Vietnam
ceasefire, January 1973. Emphasis added.
276
Sandra Scanlon
much of conservative support for Nixon’s policies, support that was at times
less than entirely enthusiastic, but which must surely be acknowledged as a
defining characteristic of the conservative movement during this period, and
a determining factor in the changing nature of conservative foreign policy
objectives and methods.