No. 11-7652
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
PERRY REESE, III,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS &
SURGEONS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
ANDREW L. SCHLAFLY
939 OLD CHESTER ROAD
FAR HILLS, NJ 07931
(908) 719-8608
aschlafly@aol.com
Counsel for Amicus
ii
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a physician can be properly convicted for his
medical decisions, and sentenced to imprisonment for
20 years, without proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that he had mens rea by acting with an illegitimate
medical purpose.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1
STATEMENT OF CASE .............................................. 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................... 7
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 9
I.
THE ELIMINATION OF THE MENS REA
REQUIREMENT OR GOOD FAITH DEFENSE IS
AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE .................. 10
II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
GRANTED TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ......... 13
CONCLUSION ........................................................... 15
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950)...................................................... 7
Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ...................................................................... 2
Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 975 (1975) .......... 2
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S.
367 (2004) .............................................................. 2
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ........... 7
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) ..................................................................... 2
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) ................ 14
Mackay v. Dea, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25684
(10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) ........................... 6, 11, 14
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) .... 10
Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2006) ........ 2
State v. Naramore, 25 Kan. App. 2d 302 (1998) ..... 12
State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio St. 3d 332 (2009) ............ 6
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) ................. 2
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (U.S.
2011) .................................................................... 14
United States v. Bamdad, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23598 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011) ............... 14
United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192
(E.D.N.Y. 1998)) .................................................... 9
v
United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768 (5th Cir.
2008) .................................................................... 13
United States v. Chube, 538 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2008) .................................................................... 14
United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th
Cir. 2006)............................................................. 14
United States v. Linder, 268 U.S. 5 (1925).............. 11
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)......10-11
United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1986) .................................................................... 13
United States v. Reese, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
16037 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011) ...................... passim
United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1978) .................................................................... 13
United States v. Rosenberg, 585 F.3d 355 (7th
Cir. 2009)............................................................. 14
United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.
2000) .................................................................... 15
STATUTES
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §
841 ............................................................... passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of
Justice (Part I of The Metaphysics of
Morals, John Ladd ed. & trans., BobbsMerrill Co., 1965) (1797)....................................... 9
vi
Jane M. Orient, M.D., “Health Bill Would
Shackle Doctors – Literally,” The Wall
Street Journal (May 30, 1996).............................. 2
INTERNET
http://www.aapsonline.org/hallofshame/nucklos
.pdf .............................................................................. 6
http://www.aapsonline.org/painman/actionsaga
inst.htm ...................................................................... 5
No. 11-7652
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
PERRY REESE, III,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons, Inc. (“AAPS”), is a national association of
physicians.
Founded in 1943, AAPS has been
dedicated to the highest ethical standards of the Oath
of Hippocrates and to preserving the sanctity of the
patient-physician relationship. AAPS has been a
litigant in this Court and in other appellate courts.
This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties, with
timely notice provided in compliance with Sup. Ct. Rule 37.2(a).
Pursuant to its Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus curiae authored
this brief in whole, and no counsel for a party authored this brief
in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, other than
amicus, its members, or its counsel make a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
1
2
See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542
U.S. 367, 374 (2004) (citing Association of American
Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)); Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
In addition, this Court has expressly made use of
amicus briefs submitted by AAPS in high profile
cases. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
933 (2000); id. at 959, 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 704
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit also
cited an amicus brief by AAPS in the first paragraph
of one of its decisions. See Springer v. Henry, 435
F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2006).
AAPS has long opposed the “criminalization of
medicine,” dating back at least to 1996 when its
Executive Director, Jane Orient, M.D., wrote a muchpublicized editorial about it in the Wall Street
Journal. See Jane M. Orient, M.D., “Health Bill
Would Shackle Doctors – Literally,” The Wall Street
Journal A14 (May 30, 1996) (observing how
physicians are being denied “the same due process
rights as people accused of rape or aggravated
assault”). The criminalization of medicine chills
innovation, causes the denial of care to patients, and
results in shortages of physicians.
AAPS has a strong interest in opposing the
elimination of the mens rea requirement in the
prosecution of physicians. Accordingly, AAPS has an
interest in this case.
3
STATEMENT OF CASE
Perry Reese, III, M.D., was a small practitioner
helping an underserved area of rural North Carolina,
earning roughly $65,000 a year. Tr. Day 4, at 5 (Doc.
79); Tr. Sentencing Proceedings, at 5. Like many
small-town physicians, Dr. Reese was informal and
flexible in responding to patient needs. For example,
while Dr. Reese was relocating he felt obligated to
accommodate patients requests by seeing some of
them outside of his office, similar to house calls. Id.
at 12-13.
Dr. Reese, an African American, had one
disgruntled patient whose son-in-law was the
Captain of Detectives for the Sampson County
Sheriff’s Department. Tr. Day 3 (Frye Testimony), at
24 (Doc. 75).
This patient and his son-in-law
arranged for a “sting” operation against Dr. Reese,
using an undercover agent to pose as a patient. Id. at
25-26.
Although unaware that he was being set up, Dr.
Reese nevertheless told the undercover agent that he
did not and would not sell any pills. Specifically, Dr.
Reese testified in his own defense that he told the
undercover agent (as she posed as a patient)
“emphatically that [he] never had any pills to sell
[and] she became very angry at” him for saying that.
Tr. Day 5 (Reese Testimony), at 150 (Doc. 80).
As reflected by that incident and Dr. Reese’s
extensive testimony at trial, there was no evidence
that Dr. Reese had the mens rea required for the
criminal convictions and a 20-year prison sentence.
But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
– in conflict with other Circuits – that such proof was
4
not necessary. United States v. Reese, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16037, *8-*9 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011). Instead,
the Fourth Circuit recounted bartering practices of
Dr. Reese – hardly unusual for an underserved rural
area – as though it were criminal:
[A patient] gave him rings, watches, a generator,
and other items that Reese told her he wanted
from the pawnshop where she worked ….
Id. at *7.
An $800-per-hour expert for the government
detailed his disapproval of Dr. Reese’s small-town
methods, none of which supported the serious charges
against him:
(1) failing to conduct proper examinations,
diagnosis, and follow-up, (2) issuing patients
prescriptions in others’ names, (3) re-dispensing
pills that patients had returned to him, (4) selling
pills directly to patients without a dispensing
license, (5) charging for a prescription without
seeing the patient, (6) routinely prescribing
medications outside of the office setting, (7)
prescribing patients up to 20 pills per day, and (8)
recommending that one of his patients chew
OxyContin ….
Id. at *8; Tr. Day 3 (Romanoff Testimony), at 103
(Doc. 69). The expert for the government concluded,
as summarized by the appellate court, that these
“were all inappropriate behaviors and beyond the
bounds of professional medical practice.” Reese, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 16037, at *8. But this testimony,
while possibly supportive of a malpractice claim if
actual harm resulted, does not prove criminal intent
for the serious charges at issue here.
5
No patient was demonstrably injured by Dr.
Reese’s practices at issue here, and none were cited
by the decision below in affirming a 20-year prison
sentence of Dr. Reese. Id. at *1, *11-*15. For
example, in contrast with analogous cases, no
patients died of overdoses and Dr. Reese was not even
a high-volume prescriber.
But a virtually
unprecedented application
of the
Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
against this small-town medical practice, despite its
lack of a meaningful separate criminal enterprise, led
to this unjust result. Id. at *1, *9-*11.
This draconian sentence of 20 years in prison is
far beyond the sentences of others in comparable
situations.2 Dr. Reese’s prison term was based on the
trial court’s refusal to take into consideration that
most, and perhaps all, of the prescriptions written by
Dr. Reese were in good faith.
Tr. Sentencing
Proceedings, at 11 (Feb. 18, 2010). Instead, this
unprecedented sentence on the evidence presented
was based on an unproven assumption that virtually
all of Dr. Reese’s prescriptions for controlled
substances somehow constituted drug dealing. Reese,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16037, *11 (rejecting
defendant’s argument “that the district court
improperly calculated the quantity of drugs
attributable to his conduct by failing to exclude
prescriptions written in good faith”).
For example, Dr. Jeri Hassman faced similar accusations and
received a plea agreement of no imprisonment, 2 years
probation, and 100 hours of community service … and continued
practicing
medicine.
http://www.aapsonline.org/painman/actionsagainst.htm (viewed
12/25/11).
2
6
The prosecution, conviction and harsh sentencing
of Dr. Reese were chillingly similar to that of another
African American physician, Dr. William Nucklos in
Ohio.3 Dr. Nucklos, like Dr. Reese, was sentenced to
20 years in prison and Dr. Nucklos, like Dr. Reese,
was prosecuted based on only a few patients. Dr.
Nucklos, like Dr. Reese, was helping in an
underserved area, and both became the scapegoat for
a broader drug problem for which they were not
responsible. Subsequently an Ohio appellate court
overturned Dr. Nucklos’s conviction and sentence,
and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court reversal of his conviction. State v. Nucklos, 121
Ohio St. 3d 332, 337 (2009).
The facts presented against Dr. Reese may
support revocation of a Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) registration, which would immediately end
any risk of harm to the public. See, e.g., Mackay v.
Dea, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25684, *4-*5 (10th Cir.
Dec. 23, 2011) (physician allegedly “had issued
prescriptions for controlled substances to a patient
even after she told him she shared her prescription
drugs with another person, had exchanged
prescription drugs for sexual favors, [lacked] a
legitimate medical purpose and … had been
prescribing extraordinarily large amounts of highly
addictive opioids”).
But instead of allowing an
efficient and immediately effective administrative
remedy, the lower court affirmed a 20-year prison
sentence against Dr. Reese without proof of criminal
intent justifying such a long sentence.
http://www.aapsonline.org/hallofshame/nucklos.pdf (viewed
12/24/11)
3
7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of AngloAmerican criminal jurisprudence.” Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (citing American
Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411
(1950)). A civilized society requires proof of criminal
intent before imposing nearly a life sentence. Yet
the 20-year prison sentence against Dr. Reese lacked
proof of mens rea to justify both the lengthy sentence
and its underlying conviction.
The Fourth Circuit eliminated the requirement of
mens rea for sentencing this physician with no prior
criminal history to 20 years in prison, for conduct
handled in other jurisdictions by merely revoking the
physician’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
registration. Such a vast disparity in punishment
illustrates a legal defect, and that flaw is a lack of
adherence to the essential mens rea requirement.
In applying the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),
21 U.S.C. § 841, against physicians for prescribing
medication – which is the proper job of physician –
proof of mens rea requires evidence that the physician
did not write those prescriptions in good faith as part
of his medical practice. An essential element of proof
for this crime must include a lack of good faith by the
physician. Criminal intent for distributing controlled
substances by someone authorized to do so – licensed
physicians holding DEA registrations – must include
something far more than what is required to convict
an ordinary drug dealer.
Several Circuits have properly affirmed this basic
right.
Without this defense, an innovative or
8
unconventional physician is vulnerable to unjust
prosecution.
When mens rea is not a required
element of the crime, good physicians refrain from
doing their best for patients, for fear that an
overzealous prosecutor may seek 20-year sentences
against them for practicing medicine. And when
physicians are frightened away from practicing
medicine in good faith, patients suffer.
Despite these well-recognized principles and
obvious policy considerations, the Fourth Circuit
rejected this requirement of mens rea and instead
criminalized acts that are outside the usual course of
professional practice. Unconventional or innovative
medicine becomes criminal under this novel Fourth
Circuit standard, even when the physician acts in
good faith.
The resultant injustice when the requirement of
mens rea is abandoned is illustrated perfectly – and
tragically – by this case. A well-intentioned but
informal physician has been sent to prison for 20
years, not for harming anyone, but for practicing
medicine differently from others. The conviction was
based primarily on testimony by a government
witness that he disapproved of how the wellintentioned defendant, Dr. Reese, practiced medicine.
Criminalizing the good faith practice of medicine
is an issue of national significance, for physicians and
patients alike. It is also an issue that splits the
Circuits. The good faith practice of medicine should
not be a crime simply because someone disapproves.
Otherwise many innovators of medicine will either
end up behind bars, or refrain from advancing the
frontiers of the profession for fear of arbitrary
prosecution with overly harsh sentences.
9
Immanuel Kant properly rejected punishing
defendants for any reason, even a utilitarian reason,
other than defendants’ own criminal culpability:
“Juridical punishment can never be used merely
as a means to promote some other good for the
criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it
must in all cases be imposed on him only on the
ground that he has committed a crime; for a
human being can never be manipulated merely as
a means to the purposes of someone else and can
never be confused with the objects of the Law of
things ….”
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of
Justice (Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals) 100
(John Ladd ed. & trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965)
(1797) (quoted in United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp.
2d 192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)). The Petition for
Certiorari should be granted to restore the mens rea
requirement.
ARGUMENT
The constitutional and statutory requirement of
mens rea ensures that lack of good faith must remain
an element to be proven when prosecuting a
physician under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Holding otherwise,
as the Fourth Circuit did below, places physicians at
risk and results in denial of care to their patients.
This has consequences of national significance for
both the medical profession and the millions of
Americans who need good faith prescriptions to
alleviate pain and other maladies. The Petition for
Certiorari should be granted to correct the error
below on such a substantial matter.
10
The Petition should also be granted to resolve the
Circuit split created by the decision below.
I.
THE ELIMINATION OF THE MENS REA
REQUIREMENT OR GOOD FAITH DEFENSE
IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.
This 20-year prison sentence of a highly skilled
professional for practicing his trade in good faith,
without a finding of mens rea, is unprecedented in
Anglo-American law. This Court has emphasized that
a finding of criminal intent is fundamental
requirement:
The contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is no
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief
in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
When criminalizing a medical practice for writing
a prescription, the elements of proof must include a
lack of good faith by the physician. See United States
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975). This was an error of
national significance, inconsistent with both with the
statute and the U.S. Constitution, for the Fourth
Circuit to strip away this good faith defense.
In United States v. Moore, this Court approved of
how the trial judge:
instructed the jury that it had to find ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that a physician, who knowingly
11
or intentionally, did dispense or distribute
[methadone] by prescription, did so other than
in good faith for detoxification in the usual
course of a professional practice and in accordance
with a standard of medical practice generally
recognized and accepted in the United States.’
Id. at 138-39 (emphasis added). The Moore jury was
thus expressly instructed to convict or acquit based
on its finding about good faith. See also United
States v. Linder, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (acquittal
required if the jury found that defendant-physician
acted “in good faith” in prescribing narcotics).
Many innovative physicians advance medical
practice beyond the usual course of medical practice,
so that cannot be the proper test for criminal
prosecution.
Every unconventional physician
practices differently from others. It is not a crime to
do so, and certainly does not prove the charges
against Dr. Reese. Lack of good faith must remain
the essential test of criminal conduct in this context.
There is an easy, immediate means for addressing
any real problem of improper medical prescriptions
by a physician:
simply take away his DEA
registration and/or his license to practice medicine.
See, e.g., Mackay v. Dea, discussed supra p. 6. Any
improper medical prescriptions then immediately
stop. But that is not what occurred here, and in cases
in like it. Rather, a 20-year imprisonment was
obtained by an unusual application of the RICO laws
and in bypassing the mens rea requirement.
To obtain this draconian result, the Fourth Circuit
lowered the standard for proving guilt, which will
lead to further criminalization of the practice of
12
medicine.
The decision below exceeds statutory
authority and violates constitutional protections.
A physician should not be sent to prison for nearly
the rest of his life simply because a jury disagrees
with how he practices medicine in the developing
field of pain management. There was never a bona
fide finding of criminal intent that Dr. Reese was
engaging in drug dealing, and this sentence based on
a lack of finding of criminal intent should be
reversed.
State courts have been more protective of the
fundamental requirement of mens rea. The Supreme
Court of Kansas properly overturned the conviction of
a physician when there was reasonable doubt about
criminal intent. State v. Naramore, 25 Kan. App. 2d
302 (1998). In an observation particularly applicable
here, that court said, “there is a reason why there has
yet to be in Anglo-American law an affirmed
conviction of a physician for homicide arising out of
medical treatment based on such highly controverted
expert evidence as here.” Id. at 322.
Yet Dr. Reese was sentenced to 20 years in prison
not for criminal acts with proof criminal intent, but
merely for prescribing medication outside the usual
course of medical practice. It is not a crime to be
unconventional, and the Petition for Certiorari should
be granted to clarify that proof of mens rea is
required.
13
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD
BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT.
The decision below conflicts with other Circuits in
eliminating the requirement of mens rea for
convicting and sentencing physicians.
Certiorari
should be granted here to resolve that Circuit split.
As explained by Point II of the Petition, Pet. at 1011, several other Circuits have required proof of
criminal intent – that a physician prescribed for a
reason other than a legitimate medical purpose – as a
condition for conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841. This
requirement is not satisfied by merely producing an
expert to testify that he disapproved of how a
defendant practiced medicine.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
established that a conviction of a physician for
violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof that “he
acted knowingly and intentionally” and that “he did
so other than for a legitimate medical purpose and in
the usual course of his professional practice.” United
States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032, 1033
(5th Cir. 1978)). See also United States v. Brown, 553
F.3d 768, 781 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the burden of
proof that prescriptions were “other than for a
legitimate medical purpose”). But the Fourth Circuit
below dropped this essential element of criminal
intent, requiring proof that the prescriptions were not
“for a legitimate medical purpose.” United States v.
Reese, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16037, at *5.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has adhered to a
requirement of proof of criminal intent before
14
convicting a physician under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 585 F.3d 355,
357 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In order for a prescription to be
unlawful it must not have a legitimate medical
purpose and must be dispensed outside the usual
course of medical practice.”) (citing United States v.
Chube, 538 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2008)).
The Ninth Circuit has also repeatedly required
proof by the prosecution that a physician’s
prescribing was done “without a legitimate medical
purpose.” United States v. Bamdad, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23598, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011) (citing
United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
Even the standard used by the Drug Enforcement
Agency itself for seeking revocation of its registration
requires evidence that prescribing was done “without
a legitimate medical purpose.” Mackay v. Dea, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 25684, *4 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2011).
Far less evidence of wrongdoing was recounted in Dr.
Reese’s case here than in the Mackay case, and yet
Dr. Reese was sentenced to a 20-year imprisonment
while it was a close question whether to merely
revoke Dr. Mackay’s DEA registration in that
decision.
To the extent this conflict between the Fourth
Circuit below and the other Circuits is due to a lack
of statutory clarity, it is time to overturn 20-year
sentences based on such statutory vagueness. See,
e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284
(U.S. 2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should admit
that [the statute’s] residual provision is a drafting
failure and declare it void for vagueness.”) (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
15
In the context of a patient death – which did not
occur here – “[w]ell-intentioned but inappropriate
medical care, standing alone, does not raise an
inference that a killing was deliberate, willful, and
premeditated.” United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222,
1232 (10th Cir. 2000). Similarly, lack of good faith is
not to be inferred from an informal, or even
unconventional, rural practice. The record below
simply does not support a prison sentence of 20 years
for this physician, and the legal defect was the lack of
proof of criminal intent.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW L. SCHLAFLY
939 OLD CHESTER ROAD
FAR HILLS, NJ 07931
(908) 719-8608
aschlafly@aol.com
Counsel for Amicus
Dated: December 29, 2011