Copyright 1983 by the
American Psychological Association, Inc.
Psychological Bulletin
1983, Vol. 94, No. 2, 239-264
The Schachter Theory of Emotion: Two Decades Later
Rainer Reisenzein
Free University Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany
Schachter's cognition-arousal theory of emotion is critically examined from both
a conceptual and an empirical point of view. Several of the theory's less clearly
defined aspects are clarified, and empirical evidence pertaining to three major
deductions from the theory is reviewed. It is concluded that only one of these
deductions, claiming that misattributed arousal from an extraneous source intensifies
emotional reactions, can be considered adequately supported by the data. Little
support is found for the second hypothesis, that arousal reduction leads to a reduction
in the intensity of emotional state, and the status of the third hypothesis, that
misattribution of emotionally induced arousal to a neutral source results in a
reduction of emotionality, is considered equivocal because of plausible alternative
interpretations of the pertinentfindings.Furthermore, it is concluded that there is
no convincing evidence for Schachter's claim that arousal is a necessary condition
for an emotional state, nor for the suggestion that emotional states may result from
a labeling of unexplained arousal. It is suggested that the role of arousal in emotion
has been overstated and that the available data support at best a rather attenuated
version of Schachter's theory—that is, that arousal feedback can have an intensifying
effect on emotional states—and that this arousal-emotion relationship is mediated,
in part, by causal attributions regarding the source of arousal.
Two decades have passed since Schachter
and Singer (1962) published the classic Psychological Review article in which they first
proposed what came to be known as the "cognition-arousal" theory of emotion. This formulation, alternatively labeled the "cognitivephysiological," "two-factor," "jukebox"
(Mandler, 1962), or simply the Schachter theory of emotional states, has since become the
most influential cognitive approach to emotions. Moreover, the theory has been influential
in areas of research other than emotion, such
as eating and obesity (Rodin, 1981; Schachter,
1967, 1971), psychopathy (Schachter & Latane, 1964), drugs (Nesbitt, 1974; Pliner &
Cappell, 1974; Rossi, Kuehnle, & Mendelson,
1978), dissonance (e.g., Cooper, Zanna, &
Taves, 1978; Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna,
This article was written while the author was a visiting
Fulbright Scholar at the University of California, Los
Angeles. I would like to thank Bernard Weiner, Shelley
Taylor, Sandra Graham and Ellen Skinner, as well as two
anonymous reviewers, for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of the manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Rainer Reisenzein, Free University Berlin, 1000 Berlin 19, Ulmenallee
32, Federal Republic of Germany.
1979; Zanna & Cooper, 1976), attitude change
(Cantor, Mody, & Zillmann, 1974; Mintz &
Mills, 1971), and other diverse areas (e.g.,
London & Monello, 1974; Maher, 1974;
O'Neal, 1971).
The theory, however, has not remained
without critics, and especially in recent years
increasing doubts have been raised as to the
adequacy of Schachter's formulation (e.g.,
Leventhal, 1980; Marshall &Zimbardo, 1979;
Maslach, 1979). The present article attempts
to critically assess the current status of
Schachter's theory. The review is organized
into three parts. First, the theory is examined
from a conceptual point of view, with an emphasis on the clarification of its less clearly
defined aspects; second, empirical evidence
pertaining to three major deductions from
the theory is reviewed;1 and third, the em1
Several partial reviews of Schachter's theory have
been published in recent years (Dienstbier, 1979a; Leventhal, 1979, 1980; Zillmann, 1978). However, in none
of these articles has the major emphasis been on a review
of Schachter's theory, none of them are complete, and
the conclusions of these authors differ at times from those
reached in the present paper.
It should also be noted that this review does not in-
239
240
RAINER REISENZEIN
pirical status of the theory is evaluated in the
light of those data, ending with a discussion
of several implications for theory and research on emotion.
Schachter's Theory From a
Conceptual Viewpoint
Two different versions of the Schachter theory can be distinguished: (a) the theory as
originally formulated by Schachter and Singer
(1962) and subsequently elaborated by
Schachter (1964; see also Schachter, 1971) and
(b) the attributional formulation of the theory
(e.g., London & Nisbett, 1974; Ross, Rodin,
& Zimbardo, 1969; see also Dienstbier, 1979b;
Kelley, 1967). Both versions will be discussed
in this section, with more emphasis on the
attributional formulation because it constitutes
the more widely accepted view.
The Theory
The set of propositions that makes up
Schachter's theory of emotion can be broken
down into two distinct subsets. The first of
these subsets concerns the components or
elements of an emotional state; the second
subset concerns processes of emotion generation.
Components of an emotional state. According to Schachter, an emotional state is
the result of the interaction between two
components: physiological arousal and a cognition about the arousing situation. Physiological arousal, which is conceptualized as
being diffuse (i.e., emotionally nonspecific)
in nature, determines the intensity, but not
the quality, of an emotional state. The cognition determines which emotion, if any, will
be experienced.
Both cognition and arousal are considered
necessary conditions for the occurrence of an
emotional state (this is implied in Schachter's,
1964, statement that they are related "mulclude the work on false physiological feedback, originated by Valins (1966), which rests on the fundamentally
different assumption that the belief of being aroused by
or having reacted to emotional stimuli is sufficient for
an emotional state. A comprehensive review of this area
of investigation has recently been provided by Liebhart
(1980).
tiplicatively"); if either of them is missing, no
emotion will be experienced. The mere presence (i.e., temporal coincidence) of these two
components is, however, clearly not sufficient
for an emotion (see Gordon, 1978; Leventhal,
1980). For example, to experience fear it is
not sufficient to be aroused at the same time
that one perceives oneself to be in danger. Even
with both the cognition of perceived threat
and arousal present one will not experience
fear unless one "connects up" (Gordon, 1978)
the cognition with the felt arousal; or, as
Schachter expresses it, unless one "labels"
one's arousal in terms of the "emotional" cognitions. Labeling of arousal has subsequently
been interpreted by attribution theorists (e.g.,
London & Nisbett, 1974; Ross et al., 1969) as
causal attribution of arousal. In terms of this
attributional analysis, then, an individual will
come to experience an emotional state if, and
only if, (a) arousal is present; (b) an appropriate
(i.e., emotional) cognition is present; and (c)
there is a perceived causal connection between
''these two elements (in other words, the individual attributes his or her arousal to the
emotional source; see Ross et al., 1969). Thus,
although Schachter does not make this explicit,
an emotion is actually a result of arousal and
two cognitions: one that characterizes the situation in an emotional way (e.g., the belief of
being endangered), and a second (a causal belief) that connects the emotional cognition (the
cause) with the arousal (the effect; Gordon,
1978).
It should be noted that the reinterpretation
of Schachter's labeling as causal attribution is
not completely unproblematic, because labeling appears to have a broader meaning than
causal attribution of arousal and, although it
includes the latter, it is not necessarily restricted to it (see also, Berkowitz, Lepinski, &
Angulo, 1969). For example, labeling can also
mean the evaluation of the appropriateness of
one's feelings by comparing oneself with others
(Schachter, 1971)—that is, the adoption of
norms of appropriate emotional conduct in a
situation. In fact, it has been argued (e.g.,
Maslach, 1979; Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977) that what was provided by the situational context in Schachter and Singer's
(1962) basic study were at best such normative
standards, rather than causal explanations of
arousal. However, the exact meaning of "la-
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
beling" is hard to determine even with a close
reading of Schachter's writings. The attributional interpretation has the considerable advantage of rendering this rather vague construct precise. Therefore, in the rest of this
article I will adhere to the attributional interpretation of Schachter's theory, which equates
labeling with causal attribution. Because of
this, Schachter's studies (e.g., Schachter &
Singer, 1962) will be discussed as "misattribution" studies, with the understanding that
this need not be exactly what Schachter had
in mind.
Processes of emotion generation. Schachter specifies two different ways an emotion
can be generated, one being the usual, everyday one, the second being more atypical and
perhaps mainly of experimental interest (cf.
Mandler,1975). In both cases, the processes
involved include emotional appraisal of the
situation, perception of arousal, and attribution of arousal; however, the temporal sequence of these processes differs.
In everyday emotional states, the cues that
arouse the organism also normally provide
(in the course of being appraised in an emotional way) the cognitive labels for arousal
(see Figure 1). As Nisbett and Schachter
(1966) state: "In nature, of course, cognitive
or situational factors trigger physiological
processes, and the triggering stimulus usually
imposes the label we attach to our feelings"
(p. 228). It also seems reasonable to assume
that the cognitive processes involved occur
quite rapidly and are largely unconscious in
nature (see Rule, Ferguson, & Nesdale, 1979;
Taylor & Fiske, 1978); the individual is aware
only of the resultant emotional state. If one
is willing to make this assumption, then criticisms of Schachter's theory (e.g., Lang,
241
1971) which maintain that the cognitive processes in question are too slow to account for
everyday emotional experience seem to be
largely unfounded.
The second way that an emotional state can
arise (see Figure 2) starts with the perception
of "unexplained" arousal, that is, arousal for
which no immediate causal explanation is
available or that is too intense to be sufficiently
explainable by the potentially arousal-producing cues salient to the individual. This
might be the case, for example, in physiological
disorders, consumption of drugs with unknown side effects, beginning illness, sleep deprivation, hormonalfluctuations,and so forth
(Dienstbier, 1979b). More importantly, however, it is possible to create such a state experimentally, as Schachter and Singer (1962),
and Schachter and Wheeler (1962) attempted
to do in the experiments that were designed
as the original tests of the theory.
For the case of unexplained arousal,
Schachter proposed that this state would lead
to the "arousal of 'evaluative needs'. . . that
is, pressures would act on an individual in
such a state to understand and label his bodily
feelings" (Schachter & Singer, 1962, p. 381).
In the attributional reformulation of the
Schachter theory, the motivational construct
("evaluative needs") was abandoned, and it
was postulated that individuals experiencing
unexplained arousal would initiate an epistemic search process directed at locating a
cause for the arousal. More specifically, in the
case where no causal explanation of sufficient
likelihood is immediately available to account for the arousal, automatic (schematic)
processing is disrupted, and a more deliberate, and possibly (though not necessarily)
conscious attributional search process is set
Figure 1. The process of emotion generation in everyday life.
242
RAINER REISENZEIN
Figure 2. The process of emotion generation in the case of unexplained arousal.
into motion (see Rule et al., 1979). This attributional search process is terminated as
soon as a plausible cause for the arousal is
found; if this cause is of an emotional nature,
a corresponding emotion will result. It appears that "finding a cause" for arousal could
occur in at least two different ways: (a) by
detecting a cause that was previously unattended to or overlooked by the individual
and/or (b) by reappraising possible emotional
sources (e.g., by reinterpreting an event as
more threatening, funny, etc.). How this latter process could operate is not entirely clear,
although it has been argued that it might include anything from mere passive inference
(Bern, 1972) to active self-persuasion and
hypothesis-testing (Liebhart, 1980; Nisbett
& Valins, 1972). In the extreme case, even
an event that normally would not have been
capable of eliciting an emotion could this way
come to be appraised emotionally.
It should be reiterated that Schachter did
not intend this second way of emotion generation to be understood as a model for the
arousal of emotions in everyday life, although
many authors apparently have interpreted
Schachter this way. However, as London and
Nisbett (1974) make clear, "In nature . . .an
emotion may result immediately without any
'evaluative needs' having arisen or a 'process
of explanation' having been initiated" (p. 14;
see also Mandler, 1975). Nonetheless, heavy
emphasis has been put on this special case,
perhaps partially because of the fascination
of the associated experimental paradigm
(Schachter & Singer, 1962) and the predilection
for "nonobvious predictions" that was so
characteristic of social psychology of the 1950s
and 1960s (Bem, 1972). However, the fact that
this case of emotion generation was not meant
to be characteristic of the way emotions arise
normally suggests that this emphasis might
have been misplaced.
Clarification of Concepts: Emotion,
Cognition, Arousal
Precise meaning of concepts is one of the
key requirements of a testable empirical theory (Bunge, 1967). Applying this criterion to
Schachter's theory, it is difficult to deny that
the basic constructs of the theory—emotion,
cognition, and arousal—are among the least
precisely defined of psychological concepts.
Nor did Schachter always make fully explicit
the intended meaning of these constructs in
the context of his theory. As a consequence,
discussions of the theory have frequently
been plagued by lack of clarity and consensus
about the meaning of these central terms.
Therefore, an effort will be made to clarify
what their meaning is in the context of
Schachter's theory.
Emotion. Since James's (1884) time, psychologists have repeatedly pointed out the
confusion about the meaning of the concept
emotion (e.g., Leeper, 1965; Leventhal, 1974;
Mandler, 1975; Strongman, 1973). However,
although there is no generally accepted definition of emotion, it is now usually agreed
that at least the following four components
should be taken into account (e.g., Dienstbier,
1979b): emotional experience (subjective feelings), physiological arousal, expressive reactions, and emotion-related instrumental activities. Extending this viewpoint, some theorists have suggested that on a very general
level, emotions can be best understood as multidimensional response syndromes (e.g., Averill, 1968, 1980; Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970; Spiro, 1979; see also,
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
Hugdahl, 1981). This conception of emotion
also is certainly in accord with Schachter's use
of the construct. However, two important
specifications have to be made. First, Schachter's theory refers primarily to the subjective
component, that is, to the conscious experience
of feeling states (operationalized most directly
by reports about inner experience). Thus, it
is aptly termed a "theory of subjective feeling"
(Leventhal, 1974; see also Gordon, 1978). In
the first of his research reports (Schachter &
Latane, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962;
Schachter & Wheeler, 1962), Schachter is
somewhat ambiguous on this point, treating
expressive reactions, emotion-related instrumental activities, and reports about subjective
feelings (as well as stimulus evaluations) as
more or less equivalent and interchangeable
indicators of an underlying emotion. In his
summary statements, however, Schachter is
more explicit (Schachter, 1964, 1971). Specifically, when discussing Cannon's (1927; see
also Fehr & Stern, 1970) argument that sympathectomized animals continue to display
emotional behavior, Schachter argues that
physiological arousal is necessary for the experience of an emotion (feeling), but not for
emotion-related behavior (see also Hohmann,
1966).
Second, although Schachter specified the
relations between the arousal and the subjective (feeling) component of emotions, he left
the relations between subjective feelings and
both expressive and instrumental emotion-related behaviors unspecified. In particular, he
did not maintain that a subjective feeling state
motivates or causes corresponding overt behavior, as claimed by some authors (e.g., Berkowitz & Turner, 1974; Koenig & Henriksen,
1974). As London and Nisbett (1974) state:
"In certain of his studies of emotion, Schachter
has measured behavior (as distinguished from
a self-report of emotional state) but Schachter
has conceived of that measurement, not precisely as a measure of behavior which the
emotion causes . . . but simply as a measure
of the emotional state itself" (p. 22). From
this one can conclude that in empirical tests
of Schachter's theory, measures that tap subjective experience must be considered to be
of prime importance, whereas no definite predictions can be made for emotion-related behaviors without the help of some additional
243
assumptions concerning the feeling-behavior
relationship (see also Bern, 1972). In fact, such
assumptions are at least implicitly present in
many of the studies that include behavioral
measures (e.g., Schachter & Latane, 1964;
Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Storms & Nisbett,
1970).
Cognition. Although Schachter does not
clarify the meaning of "cognition" ("emotion
is a function of cognition and arousal") in
great detail, it becomes evident from the examples he refers to, as well as from the studies
he quotes in this context (specifically, Hunt,
Cole, & Reis, 1958), that what is meant by
cognition is a particular subjective interpretation of a situation or an event, such as interpreting a situation or an event as being
"dangerous," "hopeless," "funny," or "sexually exciting." These cognitions may be regarded as constituting part of the subjective
meaning that we constantly attach to our environment (Mandler, 1975). By referring to
these cognitive interpretations, rather than to
the eliciting objective stimulus events per se,
Schachter demonstrates his commitment to
the fundamental cognitive postulate that it
is the subjective representation of the environment that arouses emotions, motives, and
behaviors (Baldwin, 1969). However, neither
the specific types of cognitions that underlie
specific emotional states nor the processes of
interpretation that give rise to these states are
clarified by Schachter in any detail. His position nevertheless seems compatible with the
views of other theorists who have addressed
these problems. Specifically, a number of theorists have tried to identify the types of cognitions that might underlie specific, subjectively distinguishable feeling states (e.g., Beck,
1974; Hunt et al., 1958; Kemper, 1978; B.
Weiner, 1982; Roseman, Note 1). One can
tentatively conclude from this work that the
cognitions involved include evaluations, values, expectancies, and causal beliefs about
the events that are appraised. As to the processes of interpretation that give rise to these
emotionally relevant cognitions, several theorists have postulated some sort of unique
appraisal process to be crucially involved
(e.g., Arnold, 1970; Lazarus, 1968; Mandler,
1975). It is, however, usually emphasized that
this process is an integral part of the broader
cognitive analysis of our environment that
244
RAINER REISENZEIN
constantly takes place (Mandler, 1975).
Schachter would probably also agree with the
view espoused by some (e.g., Arnold, 1970;
Mandler, 1975) that the appraisal process is
usually rapid and unconscious, thus explaining why our emotional reactions to even
highly complex situations are often quite
rapid. Emotion, then, according to Schachter,
and in contrast to other views (e.g., Zajonc,
1980), is a postcognitive phenomenon.
Arousal. Although Schachter maintains
that "the present formulation . . . [applies]
to any of a variety of states of physiological
arousal (1971, p. 47), it becomes clear upon
closer examination that, as used by Schachter,
the term arousal refers primarily to heightened
activity of the peripheral vegetative system
(ANS; see Fehr & Stern, 1970; Lader & Tyrer,
1975): "emotional states m a y . . . be generally
' characterized by a high level of sympathetic
activation" (Schachter, 1971, p. 47). As mentioned above, this peripheral arousal is conceived as being essentially undifferentiated (i.e.,
emotionally nonspecific) in nature; or more
exactly, although Schachter does not deny the
possibility of emotion-specific physiological
patterns, he believes that physiological differences between emotions, if they exist, are too
subtle to be of psychological significance
(Schachter & Singer, 1962, p. 380). Furthermore, arousal per se is conceived of as affectively neutral (see also Schachter & Singer,
1979).
In addition, an important distinction must
be made between peripheral physiological
arousal per se and perceived arousal, that is,
the perception of feedback from the periphery (see Brener, 1977; Shields & Stern, 1979).
Again, Schachter is not quite explicit on this
point, but it seems that, as far as the physiological component is concerned, perceived
arousal rather than arousal per se is the proximate determinant of an emotion; in other
words, arousal and its feedback becomes
"psychologically significant" (Mandler, 1975)
only to the degree that it is perceived by the
individual. This is definitely the case for
unexplained arousal (Schachter & Singer,
1962, p. 381). It also appears to be a necessary assumption for the more usual, everyday
process of emotion generation: How does
arousal enter cognitive processing (i.e., attribution) if it is not cognitively represented in
some form? However, in contrast to the position taken by Valins (1966), this perception
process has to occur via introception (see
Brener, 1977). Schachter's emphasis on the
perceptual experience of arousal, rather than
arousal per se, has several important consequences. First, it provides an additional
mechanism to account for the proposed unspecificity of arousal. Even if reliable emotion-specific physiological response patterns
could be detected at the periphery (for which
there is, in fact, little evidence; see e.g., Frankenhaeuser, 1975), the individual could still
end up with the perception of diffuse arousal
due to the relative insensitivity of the feedback system (Zillmann, 1978). Second, physiological arousal that is too low in intensity
to be perceived should not contribute to an
emotion. Third, since the intensity of perceived arousal is likely to be influenced by
a number of factors aside from the intensity
of the peripheral physiological reaction
(Shields & Stern, 1979), one might expect the
intensity of the subjective feeling state to be
influenced by the same factors, for example,
by the focus of attention (Scheier & Carver,
1977).
Finally, it should be noted that Schachter's
formulations, specifically his idea that an
unexplained state of arousal creates an explanatory search process, are not restricted
to physiological arousal, but "[the] conclusions are generalizable to almost any pronounced internal state for which no appropriate explanation is available" (Schachter
& Singer, 1962, p. 397). Other internal states
to which the theory has been applied have
been mentioned in the introduction.
Summary
According to Schachter, an emotion consists
of two components, physiological arousal and
a cognition about the arousing situation. Although these two components are necessary
conditions for the experience of an emotional
state, they are not sufficient; the individual
must, in addition, causally attribute the arousal
to the cognized emotional source. Furthermore, Schachter specifies two ways in which
an emotion can be generated. In everyday life,
stimulus events are appraised in an emotional
way; this triggers physiological arousal, and
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
this arousal is attributed automatically to the
eliciting conditions. In contrast, if an individual experiences unexplained arousal first, a
causal search process is set into motion; if an
emotional source is identified as the cause for
arousal, an emotion will be experienced. This
latter way of emotion generation is, however,
uncharacteristic of everyday emotional experiences. An analysis of the central constructs
of Schachter's theory—emotion, cognition,
arousal—leads to the conclusion that the theory deals primarily with emotional experience,
that cognition refers to an emotional appraisal
of a situation or an event, and that arousal
refers primarily to introceptively perceived
feedback from the periphery.
Review of Research
Of the predictions that can be deduced
from Schachter's theory, the ones that have
stimulated most research are the following
three:
1. If physiological arousal and/or its feedback is blocked or reduced in intensity during
an emotion, then the intensity of the emotional state will be reduced proportionally
(theoretically to zero with complete arousal
blockage).
2. If an individual can be led to misattribute "irrelevant" (e.g., artificially induced)
arousal to an emotional source, then the resultant emotional state will be intensified.
3. If an individual can be induced to misattribute emotionally induced arousal partly
or wholly to a nonemotional source, then the
intensity of the emotional state will be reduced.
These three major hypotheses will be used
to organize the ensuing review of empirical
research pertinent to Schachter's theory.
Effects on Emotion of Reduction of
Physiological Arousal Feedback
Two groups of studies that have examined
the effects of reduced arousal feedback on
emotion are relevant in the present context:
(a) studies of emotional experience in people
with spinal cord injuries, and (b) studies on
the effects of adrenergic receptor blocking
245
substances on emotion. A third group of
studies in which tranquilizers have been used
to reduce peripheral arousal (e.g., Cooper et
al., 1978; Schachter&Latane, 1964; Schachter & Wheeler, 1962) will not be reviewed
here because the drugs used in these studies
(e.g., chlorpromazine) exert their influence
mainly through direct action on central nervous system (CNS) structures; therefore,
these experiments do not tell much about the
role of peripheral arousal in emotion.
Emotional experience in spinal cord injured
people. Functional transsection of the spinal
cord eliminates proprioceptive, cutaneous, and
visceral afferent input from a substantial portion of the body (although it does not affect
cardiac feedback); therefore, an examination
of the emotional experience of spinal cord injured patients seems to be of direct relevance
to Schachter's theory. Unfortunately, the
amount of published research on this topic is
very small and methodologically controversial.
Best known is Hohmann's (1966) study,
quoted by Schachter himself as a major support for his theory, in which 25 patients with
total spinal cord lesions at various levels were
asked to compare the intensity of various feelings experienced after the injury with the intensity of comparable pre-injury experiences.
For feelings of anger, fear, and sexual excitement, patients reported a decline in intensity
of subjective experience, with reductions being
more marked the higher the lesion. In a later
study, Jasnos and Hakmiller (1975) presented
slides of clothed and nude females to 24 male
spinal cord injured patients, instructing them
to imagine that they were alone with the
woman and that she was "sexually available"
(this manipulation was effective in significantly
increasing heart rate). Subjects were then asked
to report their "thoughts and feelings," and
the responses were rated by judges as to the
degree of expressed emotion. It was found that
patients with cervical lesions reported less sexual excitement than those with thoracic or
lumbar lesions. Moreover, whereas the latter
groups reported significantly more sexual excitement in response to the slides of nude females than to those of clothed ones, the response of cervical patients did not differ. Declines in intensity of experienced sexual
excitement, though on a more anecdotal level,
have also been reported by Herman (1950).
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RAINER REISENZEIN
On the other hand, Hohmann's (1966) pa- side-effects of alpha-blockers, only betatients also reported that feelings of "senti- blockers have been studied to any extent with
mentality" had increased rather than de- regard to their effects on emotional reactions.
creased since the injury, and Jasnos and Hak- These latter substances act primarily on the
miller (1975) found no differences between cardiovascular system, significantly reducing
the different lesion levels in degree of expressed the effects of sympathetic nerve activity and
discomfort to slides depicting injuries. In ad- of circulating beta-receptors agonists (N.
dition, Dana (1921) studied a patient with le- Weiner, 1980a). In contrast to other drugs
sions at the cervical level and found no re- inhibiting sympathetic nervous system activductions in reported intensity of subjective ity, such as chlorpromazine (e.g., Schachter
feelings. However, in this case it has been ar- & Wheeler, 1962), however, there seems to
gued that the functional transsection of the be no direct effect on the CNS, at least in
spinal cord might not have been complete normal doses (Tyrer, 1976).
(Fehr & Stern, 1970).
Several studies have examined the effects
More importantly, methodological prob- of beta-blocking agents on various laboralems of these studies make them difficult to tory-induced anxiety states (Cleghorn, Peevaluate. Apart from obvious problems such terfy, Pinter, & Pattee, 1970; Gottschalk,
as experimenter effects and social desirability Stone, & Gleser, 1974; Liu, Debus, & Janke,
biases, the implicit assumption underlying 1978; Pinter, Peterfy, Cleghorn, & Pattee,
these studies, namely that "were it not for the 1967; Tyrer, 1976). Although in all of these
physiological effects of the spinal cord lesion, studies the desired reduction of peripheral
present and past experiences would be similar arousal was achieved (as compared with a
or identical" (Higgins, 1979, p. 186) must be placebo control), no reductions in reported
regarded as extremely tenuous. Considering anxiety were found in any of them. Similar
the dramatic life changes that normally result negative results were obtained by Erdmann
from a severe spinal cord injury, reports of and van Lindern (1980) for experimentally
decreased intensity of feelings could well be induced feelings of anger. Thus, one may cona result of the psychosocial adaptations the clude with the latter authors that "beta-blockpatient has to make, of changes in others' ing agents do not reduce experimentally inreactions, or of any number of causes other duced emotions in healthy subjects" (p. 336).
than the injury itself (Higgins, 1979). For exSeveral additional studies assessed the therample, a spinal cord injured person may have apeutic effects of beta-blocking agents on palearned to suppress feelings as a means of tients with moderate to severe anxiety sympcoping with a discouraging and depressing toms (see Jefferson, 1974, for a partial review).
reality (Trieschmann, 1980; Tucker, 1980). These studies vary from anecdotal, unconThese factors could also account for differ- trolled case reports to carefully designed douences in felt intensity of emotion between ble-blind trials, and they differ greatly in drug,
patients injured at different levels of the dose, patient selection, and assessment techspinal cord, given the more severe handicap niques. It might therefore not come as a surof cervical, as compared with lower-level in- prise that their results are not uniform. Genjured patients. Unless these factors are con- erally it was found that beta-blockers were eftrolled, for example, by comparing spinal fective in reducing experienced physiological
cord injured patients with a control group of symptoms, led to improved overall condition
patients suffering from a similarly severe and symptom ratings by therapists, and were
handicap but without disruption of the au- preferred over placebo by both therapists and
tonomic feedback system, results of these patients. More pertinent to the present review,
studies must be considered inconclusive.
at least two studies found beta-blockers to be
Effects of adrenergic receptor blocking effective in reducing subjective feelings of anxagents on emotion. With the development iety and tension, with the effect being comof adrenergic receptor blocking agents (alpha- parable to that of established anxiolytics
and beta-blockers), it has become possible to (McMillin, 1973; Wheatley, 1969). However,
experimentally reduce peripheral arousal re- as Tyrer (1976) points out, anxiety states in
actions in healthy subjects. Due to unwanted general practice tend to improve in the absence
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
of specific treatment; since no placebo control
group was included in these latter two studies,
the relative proportion of the total improvement due to drug action cannot be determined.
Furthermore, in other studies that assessed
subjective feelings of anxiety it was found that
beta-blockers did not affect them (e.g., Granville-Grossman & Turner, 1966), or reduced
anxiety only in patients for whom physiological
symptoms formed a major part of the complaints (Tyrer & Lader, 1974; see also Tyrer,
1976). Lader and Tyrer (1975; Tyrer, 1976)
therefore conclude that the clinical usefulness
of beta-blockers with anxiety patients is probably limited to these latter cases and to cases
where anxiety is cued by the perception of
physiological symptoms in thefirstplace (e.g.,
heart neurotics; see Besterman & Friedlander,
1965; Nordenfelt, 1965; Nordenfelt, Persson,
& Redfors, 1968).
In sum, results from studies examining the
effects of beta-blocking agents on emotional
states provide only very limited support for
Schachter's theory. It must be kept in mind,
however, that these studies certainly do not
provide what would be an ideal test of the
hypothesis under consideration. That is, numerous sources of autonomic feedback are
left unaffected by beta-blocking agents. On
the other hand, if the link between arousal
and emotional experience were really as tight
as implied by Schachter's theory, then the
reduction of cardiovascular feedback accomplished by beta-blockers would seem to be sufficient to result in a statistically significant reduction in the intensity of the emotional state,
especially because other research suggests that
cardiovascular feedback accounts for some of
the most salient components of subjectively
experienced arousal (see, e.g., Fahrenberg,
1965; Shields & Stern, 1979).
Misattribution of "Irrelevant" Arousal to an
Emotional Source
Studies that have attempted to lead subjects to misattribute irrelevant arousal to an
emotional source can be conveniently divided into three subgroups according to the
method by which arousal has been induced:
(a) studies using drug-induced arousal; (b)
studies using transferred excitation from
247
prior stimulation; and (c) studies using simultaneously presented external stimuli to
induce irrelevant arousal.
Misattribution of drug-induced arousal.
Beginning with Schachter and Singer (1962),
a number of misattribution studies have examined the effects of drug-induced arousal
on emotions. Following Schachter and Singer's lead, the standard paradigm of these
studies consists of administration of an
arousing drug, such as adrenaline, isoprenaline, ephedrine, or amphetamine, in a situation containing some either explicitly or
potentially emotional cues. At the same time,
the true source of arousal is disguised by suitable cover stories and by either not informing
or misinforming subjects about the drug's
physiological effects. It should be noted that
although these drugs all simulate, more or
less perfectly, the results of sympathetic stimulation, amphetamine and ephedrine may
also have marked central effects such as wakefulness and euphoria (N. Weiner, 1980b);
thus, these latter drugs are only of restricted
value in tests of Schachter's theory.
Schachter and Singer (1962) injected subjects with either adrenaline or placebo.
Adrenaline-injected subjects were given, in
addition, either incorrect or no information
(misattribution groups), or correct information concerning the physiological consequences of the injection. All subjects were
then exposed to a situation that was designed
to provide cognitive cues suggestive of an
emotional labeling of their arousal. For half
of the subjects, this consisted of a confederate
acting in a euphoric manner; for the other
half, the confederate displayed angry behavior. Observations of subjects' verbal and nonverbal behavior in these situations, as well as
self-ratings of experienced affect, served as
the dependent variables. Results showed that
the expected differences in emotionality between the misattribution and the placebo
control groups were found for the behavioral
index only in the anger condition. Exclusion
of subjects in the misattribution groups who
attributed their perceived arousal to the injection despite the attempts to disguise the true
source ("self-informed") resulted in additional
significant differences for self-ratings in the
anger condition, as well as for the behavioral
index in the euphoria condition. However, the
248
RAINER REISENZEIN
absolute magnitude of the obtained effects was
rather small, especially for the self-ratings,
where the maximum difference between any
of the groups was only .9 on a 9-point scale
ranging from "very angry" to "very happy."
Moreover, and inconsistent with the predictions, all groups fell on the positive side of this
scale.
Numerous criticisms of this study have
been raised (e.g., Kemper, 1978; Lazarus,
1968; Leventhal, 1974; Manstead, 1979;
Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979;
Plutchik & Ax, 1967; Stricker, 1967; Zimbardo et al., 1977). Space limitations prevent
a discussion of these various criticisms, but
when reading them it becomes evident that
a control of possible deficiencies could either
have strengthened Schachter and Singer's
conclusions or weakened them. Recent replications of Schachter and Singer's experiment (Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach,
1979) suggest that the latter is more likely the
case. Marshall and Zimbardo (1979) replicated Schachter and Singer's "euphoria" condition, using an adrenaline-injected misinformed group as well as placebo control
group. In addition, two more groups receiving a somewhat stronger mean dose of adrenaline and two additional control groups were
run. Schachter and Singer's results were not
replicated. Instead, the misattribution groups
showed a feeling change toward the negative;
this change was significant for the higher dosage groups. Similar but weaker results were
obtained for a behavioral index. In response
to this study, Schachter and Singer (1979)
suggested that the symptoms described to
subjects in the misattribution groups actually
constitute some of the subjectively experienced symptoms of adrenaline injections;
these groups should therefore be considered
correctly informed, rather than misinformed,
and no misattribution effect can consequently be expected. Actually, however, manipulation checks by Marshall and Zimbardo
indicate that although some "self-information" did occur in these groups, the majority
of subjects did not spontaneously attribute
their perceived arousal to the injection, and
there were no significant differences in measured emotionality between self-informed
and not self-informed subjects. Thus,
Schachter and Singer's criticism does not in-
validate Marshall and Zimbardo's findings.
In addition, these findings are further corroborated by Maslach (1979), who replicated
both of Schachter and Singer's emotional
conditions, using hypnotically induced
arousal. Posthypnotic suggestions of amnesia
were used to prevent subjects from attributing their arousal to the true source. It was
found that subjects in the arousal conditions
who were left unaware of the cause of their
arousal experienced a significantly more negative emotional state than those who did not
experience arousal or were in a control group
that was not given posthypnotic amnesia suggestions. The confederate's behavior was not
found to affect reports of subjective feelings.
It did, however, exert an influence on subjects' overt behavior, reminiscent of the frequently observed lack of concordance between subjective experience and overt action
(e.g., Hodgson & Rachman, 1974; Rachman
& Hodgson, 1974). In response to these results, Schachter and Singer (1979) specifically
criticized the timing of arousal in Maslach's
study. In fact, it seems that arousal symptoms
were experienced by subjects before the confederate started enacting emotional behavior;
one should not expect misattribution under
such circumstances. Maslach (1979) has rebutted these criticisms with several arguments, including reference to an unpublished
study in which the same results were obtained
when these problems of timing had been rectified. Until this study can be examined further, however, one is forced to conclude that
the ramifications of Maslach's original experiment must remain somewhat ambiguous.
A number of further studies using essentially the same experimental paradigm have
examined the effects of drug-induced arousal
on such diverse emotional states as experience of humor (Schachter & Wheeler, 1962),
fear and anxiety (Bandura & Rosenthal,
1966; Erdmann & Janke, 1978; Gerdes,
1979; Rogers & Deckner, 1975; Schachter
& Lantané, 1964; Tyrer, 1976), anger (Erdmann & Becker, 1978; Erdmann & Janke,
1978; Erdmann & van Lindern, 1980; O'Neal
& Kaufman, 1972), elation (Erdmann &
Janke, 1978), emotional reactions and attitude change in psychotherapy (Hoehn-Saric
et al., 1974), and the experience of cognitive
dissonance (Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978).
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
Of these studies, those by Cooper et al.
(1978), Gerdes (1979), Hoehn-Saric et al.
(1974), Schachter and Latané (1964), and
Schachter and Wheeler (1962) did indeed
obtain some indication of an intensified
emotional state in subjects administered an
arousing drug (as compared with a placebo
control), but the evidence is either relatively
weak or indirect. Specifically, in the study of
Cooper et al. it was found that subjects who
had been administered amphetamine and
were then asked to write a counterattitudinal
essay subsequently changed their attitudes
more in the direction implied by their behavior than subjects who had been given a
placebo; from this it was inferred that the
state of cognitive dissonance, which is conceived by these authors as an aversive subjective state similar to an emotion, had been
intensified by the drug-induced arousal.
Hoehn-Saric et al. found that adrenaline-administered subjects described themselves as
significantly more "physiologically or emotionally" aroused during a stressful therapeutic session than placebo subjects, leaving the
exact meaning of these reports open to interpretation. In Schachter and Latane's experiment, the predicted results were obtained
only on a behavioral index for psychopathic
criminals, but not for nonpsychopathic criminals and a student control group. Schachter
and Wheeler (1962) found the expected differences between adrenaline and placebo subjects only for the more extreme categories of
an index of expressive behavior, but not for
subjective measures (stimulus evaluations).
Clear evidence for an enhancement of emotional experience in drug-administered subjects was obtained only by Gerdes (1979), and
then only for male subjects.
In evaluating these results, attention should
be drawn to the minimum two requirements
that a study has to meet to provide an adequate test of the misattribution hypothesis:
(a) the arousal manipulation must be effective, that is, significantly more arousal must
be present in the experimental (misattribution) group than in the placebo control
group, and (b) the misattribution manipulation must be effective, that is, subjects must
indeed attribute their arousal to the emotional source. A reexamination of the studies
reviewed above in terms of these two criteria
249
reveals that the arousal manipulation was
clearly not effective in the studies by Erdmann and Becker (1980) and O'Neal and
Kaufman (1972), and possibly also in the
experiment by Erdmann and Janke (1978).
As far as the attribution manipulation is concerned, it was ineffective in Gerdes' (1979)
study for females, as well as in Marshall and
Zimbardo's (1979) and Maslach's (1979) experiment. Although in the latter experiments
the majority of subjects did not attribute their
arousal to the nonemotiorial source, this does
not mean that they positively attributed it to
the emotional cues present; in fact, it appears
that such was not the case in both of these
studies. Generally, the possibility of a failure
of the arousal and/or the misattribution manipulation cannot be excluded for all studies
in which appropriate manipulation checks
were not utilized. Evidence from manipulation checks which indicated that both manipulations were effective is in fact available
only for male subjects in Gerdes' (1979) study,
and in this case, intensification of fear experience was also found. Quite possibly, therefore, several of the reported studies that obtained null results simply did not provide an
adequate test of the misattribution hypothesis.
In addition to the studies just reviewed,
mention must be made of the considerable
number of "pre-Schachterian" adrenalineinjection experiments (e.g., Cantril & Hunt,
1932; Dynes & Tod, 1940; Frankenhaeuser
& Jaerpe, 1963; Frankenhaeuser, Jaerpe, &
Matell, 1961; Landis & Hunt, 1932; Lindemann & Finesinger, 1938; Marañon, 1924;
Pollin & Goldin, 1961; see Breggin, 1964, for
a partial review). Although these studies
were, of course, not designed as misattribution studies, there is the possibility that in
some of them, misattribution effects were inadvertently created. More specifically, three
types of reactions to adrenaline injections
could be observed in these studies: reports of
physiological symptoms only; reports of
"cold" or "as-if" emotions; and reports of
"genuine" emotional experiences, mostly of
anxiety. Furthermore, as far as such genuine
feelings of anxiety are concerned, it appears
that they were more likely; the more stressful
elements were present in the experimental
situation, the more the subjects were predisposed toward anxiety (e.g., chronically anx-
250
RAINER REISENZEIN
ious patients; Breggin, 1964), and the more
they were left unaware about the effects of
the injections. One might, therefore, speculate that these genuine fear experiences were
due to an inadvertently created misattribution effect. However, this post hoc interpretation should be regarded with considerable
caution, as it is equally likely that the feelings
of anxiety were cued by perceived physiological symptoms in the first place (Breggin,
1964). In addition, in some of these studies
genuine emotions were reported despite the
fact that subjects clearly knew about the
source of their arousal, which is inconsistent
with a misattribution explanation.
In sum, studies using drug-induced arousal
provide some, but hardly strong and consistent, evidence for a misattribution effect.
However, it seems that this can at least in part
be explained by manipulation failures. Apparently, it is more difficult to experimentally
create the preconditions for misattribution
effects (at least for drug-induced arousal) that
has been assumed by Schachter (1964).
Misattribution of transferred excitation.
The paradigm underlying the studies reviewed in this section, the so-called excitation
transfer paradigm, was originally developed
by Zillmann (1971). Essentially, it constitutes
an application of Schachter's theory to states
of arousal occurring sequentially. It is based
on the well-established fact (e.g., Cantor, Zillmann, & Bryant, 1975; Donnerstein & Hallam, 1978; Zillmann, 1971; Zillmann &
Bryant, 1974; Zillmann, Katcher, & Milavsky, 1972) that physiological arousal does not
terminate abruptly at the cessation of the
eliciting conditions; instead, because of slow,
humoral processes involved in the control of
sympathetic arousal, excitation decays relatively slowly. Therefore, if an individual has
been physiologically aroused in situation A,
and finds him- or herself subsequently in
emotion-provoking situation B, residual
arousal from A may still be present in B and
add to the arousal elicited by the emotional
stimuli themselves; thus the total arousal
level experienced in B is elevated. (As a simplifying assumption, one can think of this
integration of residual and newly generated
arousal as being roughly additive; see Zillmann, 1979). Zillmann has suggested that,
under specific circumstances discussed in
more detail below, an individual might come
to attribute the total arousal present in B to
the emotional stimuli and that in this case,
the emotional reaction will be intensified
through what is "essentially a misattribution
in situation B of the residual excitation from
A" (Tannenbaum & Zillmann, 1975, p. 181).
In line with these predictions, engaging in
strenuous physical exercise has been found
to significantly enhance hostile aggressive reactions in response to provocation, both
when subjects engaged in the exercise before
they were provoked (Zillmann & Bryant,
1974), or between provocation and opportunity to retaliate (Zillmann, Johnson, &
Day, 1974; Zillmann et al. 1972). Prior physical exercise has also been shown to enhance
sexual excitement in response to erotic films
(Cantor et al., 1975), to increase males' judgments of attractiveness, liking for, and "romantic attraction" toward an attractive female, and to decrease those judgments when
the female was unattractive (White, Fishbein,
& Rutstein, 1981, Exp. 1), and to intensify
negative mood induced by the reading of
negative self-referenced statements (Reisenzein & Gattinger, 1982). Furthermore, prior
exposure to either positively or negatively
toned arousing emotional material was found
to significantly enhance subsequent appreciation of music (Cantor & Zillmann, 1973),
dysphoric empathy in response to a sad
movie (Zillmann, Mody, & Cantor, 1974),
judgments of funniness of cartoons (Cantor,
Bryant, & Zillmann, 1974; but see Suls,
1976), and males' judgments of attractiveness, liking for, and romantic attraction toward an attractive female (White et al., 1981,
Exp. 2); again, these latter judgments were
decreased if the female was unattractive. Similarly, startle-induced arousal was found to
significantly increase males' judgment of attractiveness and liking for an attractive female experimenter, as well as females' judgments of an attractive male experimenter,
while decreasing those evaluations if both
subject and experimenter were male (Dienstbier, 1979a). Aggressive reactions in response
to provocation were found to be significantly
enhanced by prior exposure to uncontrollable loud noise (Donnerstein & Wilson, 1976,
Exp. 2), arousing aggressive films (Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Barrett, 1976), arous-
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
ing erotica (Cantor, Zillmann, & Einsiedel,
1978; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Evans,
1975) and other arousing films (Bryant &
Zillmann, 1979). Aggression-enhancement
effects have also been reported for arousing
erotic and aggressive communications interpolated between provocation and opportunity to retaliate (Baron, 1979; Day, 1976;
Donnerstein, 1980; Donnerstein & Barrett,
1978; Donnerstein & Hallam, 1978; Meyer,
1972; Zillmann, 1971; Zillmann, Hoyt, &
Day, 1974). In other studies using the same
paradigm, nonenhancement effects of interpolated arousing communications were found
(Bryant & Zillmann, 1977; Donnerstein et
al., 1975; Donnerstein et al., 1976; Zillmann
& Sapolsky, 1977) but, as will be explained
in more detail below, an excitation transfer
effect might nonetheless have been involved.
On the other hand, if subjects were treated
favorably or just not provoked, rather than
being provoked by a confederate after they
had been exposed to arousing erotic films,
they rewarded the confederate more when
given an opportunity to do so (Jaffe, 1981;
Mueller & Donnerstein, 1981).
Finally, three studies, though not intended
as tests of the excitation transfer model, also
showed results consistent with it: Rimm,
Kennedy, Miller, and Tchida (1971) obtained
evidence that snake-phobic subjects mastered
significantly fewer steps in a graded behavioral
approach test when first emotionally aroused
than when not; Hoon, Wincze, and Hoon
(1977) found that females' sexual arousal in
response to erotica was intensified by prior
exposure to fear-eliciting stimuli; and Dermer
and Pyszczynski (1978, Exp. 1) found that
males' expressed feelings of love (measured
by the Rubin love scale) for women with
whom they were romantically involved were
significantly enhanced by prior exposure to
arousing erotica.
At first sight, then, there seems to be impressive evidence for the excitation transfer
model. Upon closer examination, however,
several problems become apparent. To begin
with, there is reason to believe that the observed intensification of emotional reactions
in some of these studies was not mediated by
mere transferred excitation, but rather by an
emotional state induced by the prior stimuli.
For example, it is known that loud uncon-
251
trollable noise is experienced as subjectively
aversive (see, for example, Glass, Singer, &
Friedman, 1969); therefore, the observed intensification of aggression in the Donnerstein
and Wilson (1976, Exp. 2) study might have
been mediated by this emotional effect (e.g.,
by rendering subjects more sensitive to provocation). This interpretation would be consistent with the results of experiments investigating the effects of noise on helping (Sherrod & Downs, 1974; Yinon & Bizman, 1980;
see below). Similarly, increases in prosocial
behavior following exposure to erotic communications (Jaffe, 1981; Mueller & Donnerstein, 1981) could have been mediated by
a positive emotional state induced by these
communications (see, e.g., Zillmann & Sapolsky, 1977). This enhancement effect of
positive mood on prosocial behavior is well
documented (e.g., Staub, 1978). Note, however, that this alternative explanation can
clearly not account for the results of those
studies that used physical exercise to induce
arousal (a procedure that has been shown to
be affectively neutral; White et al., 1981), as
well as of those experiments that used both
negative and positive emotional materials
(e.g., Cantor et al., 1973) and those that
found aggression-enhancement effects of erotica (e.g. Cantor et al., 1978).
Further problems of interpretation pertain
specifically to the aggression studies reviewed
above. First, there is little evidence that the
subjective experience of anger was also intensified in these experiments. Of those that
measured the experience of anger and annoyance at all, only Donnerstein et al. (1976)
reported effects that paralleled the behavioral
data. Quite possibly, however, this absence of
effects on subjective measures could be due
to the fact that subjective experience was always assessed after the retaliatory opportunity; at this time, anger might already have
substantially declined. In addition, the rating
scales might have been too crude, or subjects
might have been unwilling to admit their anger (Younger & Doob, 1978). Whatever the
reason, the interpretation of the results of
these studies in terms of an excitation transfer
effect would be considerably strengthened if
clear evidence for an enhancement of subjective feelings of anger could be obtained
(Rule et al., 1979). Second, additional in-
252
RAINER REISENZEIN
terpretive problems are associated with those
experiments in which subjects were exposed
to arousing communications between provocation and opportunity to retaliate. There
is evidence that such communications are not
only arousing, but may also divert subjects'
attention away from their provocation-related angry cognitions, thereby decreasing
anger arousal (Donnerstein et al., 1975). This
may in fact have occurred in those studies
that showed nonenhancement effects (Bryant
& Zillmann, 1977; Donnerstein et al. 1975,
1976; Zillmann & Sapolsky, 1977). Furthermore, as far as erotic communications are
concerned, they might have, as mentioned
above, induced a positive emotional state
which was hedonically incompatible with the
negative feelings of anger and annoyance and
thereby reduced hostile aggression (Baron
& Byrne, 1977; Zillmann & Sapolsky, 1977).
Thus, in order to assess the relative importance of excitation transfer effects in studies
of this kind, careful measurement of the
arousal-inducing, attention-diverting, and
emotion-inducing properties of the interpolated communications seems essential. Furthermore, in order to correctly identify observed differences in aggressiveness as reduction or intensification, it is essential to run
an appropriate control group, that is a group
of subjects who are either left waiting between
provocation and opportunity to aggress, or
are exposed to nonarousing, emotionally
neutral, and not attention-diverting tasks or
communications (cf. Bryant & Zillmann,
1977). Due to the absence of adequate pretesting of the communications used and/or
absence of an adequate control group, interpretation of some of these aggression studies
as evidence for excitation transfer is ambiguous.
Finally, it is important to point out that
even the clear demonstration of excitation
transfer effects in humans does not in itself
imply the existence of the hypothesized mediating attributional process (Zillmann, 1978).
It could be argued that the findings above
might be more parsimoniously explained by
a drive-theoretical model, positing that the
pooled arousal simply functions as a "general
response energizer," intensifying whatever response is dominant in the response hierarchy
in the particular situation (Hull, 1943; Spence,
1956; see also Tannenbaum & Zillmann,
1975). However, apart from the fact that the
drive model, strictly speaking, does not extend
to conscious experience (and therefore could
at best explain only the behavioral results of
these studies), data are available that contradict
this simple interpretation and favor the attributional model. Specifically, it has been repeatedly observed that an excitation transfer
effect does not occur if individuals are placed
in an emotional situation immediately after
they have been exposed to arousing conditions;
an excitation transfer effect does occur, however, if a short period of recovery is interpolated
between the two arousing conditions (Baron
& Bell, 1977; Cantor & Zillmann, 1973; Cantor et al., 1975; Day, 1976; Zillmann, Johnson,
& Day, 1974; Zillmann, Mody, & Cantor,
1974). This phenomenon is exactly opposite
to what one would expect if the drive model
were correct, because the intensity of arousal
is undoubtedly stronger immediately after the
termination of the prior inducing stimulation
than after the recovery period. The misattribution of arousal model, in contrast, can neatly
explain these findings (Zillmann, 1978). It is
assumed that excitation transfer effects will
occur only if the individual does not causally
connect the residual state of excitation to the
prior inducing source. According to Zillmann,
such "correct" attribution is in turn highly
likely as long as the individual experiences
strong arousal feedback cues (such as heavy
breathing, heart pounding, etc.) that link the
perceived arousal to the prior inducer. Such
was presumably the case in the no-delay conditions of the experiments mentioned above.
That is, immediately after the first arousalinducing stimulation, arousal feedback cues
were still salient and in focal awareness; therefore, they virtually forced the individual into
attributing the perceived arousal to the inducing condition. After a recovery period, in
contrast, the intensity of arousal had somewhat
declined and obvious arousal cues were no'
longer salient; thus, misattribution became
possible. More direct evidence for this hypothesis comes from the studies by Cantor et
al. (1975) and Reisenzein and Gattinger
(1982). In Cantor et al.'s study, it was found
that there is a threshold for awareness of re-
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
sidual arousal; specifically, subjects thought
their arousal from physical exercise had already declined to baseline at a time when,
objectively, it was still significantly elevated.
An excitation transfer effect was subsequently
found for erotic films presented at this point,
but not for films presented immediately after
the exercise. Reisenzein and Gattinger found
that increasing the salience of arousal by a
manipulation of attentional focus (see Carver,
1979; Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth,
1979) significantly reduced the frequency of
misattribution and eliminated the excitation
transfer effect. Certainly, however, these findings should not be interpreted to mean that
intensity of residual arousal is the only factor
that influences excitation transfer. Other important factors might include the prior experience of subjects with similar situations,
the ego-involving capacity of cues, and the
salience and plausibility of alternative causes
(Rule et al., 1979). In fact, it has been found
that even intense arousal can be misattributed
if the alternative cause is made highly salient
to subjects (White et al., 1981).
In sum, the studies reviewed in this section
have demonstrated that exposure to prior
arousing stimulation can intensify a great
variety of subsequent emotional states. Despite interpretive problems associated with
a number of these studies, the existence of
excitation transfer effects appears to be well
documented. In addition, there is evidence
supporting the hypothesis that these effects
are indeed mediated by a process of causal
attribution.
Misattribution of arousal from a simultaneously present external source. Results
from excitation transfer experiments suggest
that misattribution of arousal is unlikely to
occur if the source of that arousal is salient
to an individual at the point of potential
misattribution. From this one might expect
misattribution to be unlikely in a situation
where the source of irrelevant arousal is simultaneously present with a relevant emotional source, insofar as the external presence
of the true source should usually make it salient to the individual (Kenrick & Cialdini,
1977). It has been argued, however, that this
is not always the case. Specifically, if the
source of irrelevant arousal is atypical, if the
253
individual has only limited experience with
it, and/or if the simultaneously present emotional cues are highly attention-attracting,
misattribution might occur even in this case.
Consistent with this reasoning is the finding that exposure to loud noise during retaliation significantly increases provoked subjects' aggressiveness (Donnerstein & Wilson,
1976, Exp. 1; Konecni, 1975). Furthermore,
Dutton and Aron (1974) reported results
from two field and one laboratory experiment suggesting that males' sexual attraction
toward an attractive female was increased
under fear-eliciting circumstances, and Kenrick and Johnson (1979) found that attraction ratings of another subject were significantly intensified under high noise when the
other was physically present; in contrast, high
noise lowered evaluations of a not physically
present person. These latterfindingsare consistent with a misattribution explanation if
it is assumed that a physically present person
elicits a positive emotional reaction to begin
with, whereas a not physically present person
elicits a negative one, which was in fact the
case in Kenrick and Johnson's experiment
(cf. White et al., 1981).
It has also been suggested that violations
of personal space (Worchel & Teddlie, 1976)
and, more generally, violations of a comfortable, situationally appropriate level of "intimacy behavior" (including, in addition to
space violations, things such as increased eye
contact, forward leaning, smiling, etc.; Patterson, 1976), elicit physiological arousal (evidence supporting this suggestion comes from
a number of studies, e.g., Aiello, Epstein, &
Karlin, 1975; Coutts, Schneider, & Montgomery, 1980; D'Atri, 1975; McBride, King,
& James, 1965; Schaeffer& Patterson, 1980),
which can then intensify whatever emotional
reactions are induced by the context through
what is essentially a misattribution of arousal
process.
Supporting this suggestion, Schiffenbauer
and Schiavo (1976) and Storms and Thomas
(1977) found that close interpersonal distances
increased evaluations of interaction partners
if the interaction was of a positive nature and
decreased them if the interaction was negative
in character. No effect was found when the
interaction was neutral (Schiffenbauer &
254
RAINER REISENZEIN
Schiavo, 1976). Evidence was also obtained
that subjects spent less time talking to an interaction partner at close distance if the partner
was described as dissimilar in attitudes (Storms
& Thomas, 1977). Furthermore, the subjective
experience of crowding and confinement was
enhanced by high gaze level from others most
when these others were believed to be dissimilar in attitudes (Schaeffer & Patterson, 1980).
Baron and Bell (1976b) and Baron (1978)
found that emotional reactions to another person requesting help were significantly more
positive and amount of help given was larger
under close than under far interpersonal distance when need was high; however, when need
was low and the helping request was therefore
probably perceived as illegitimate, a trend in
the opposite direction was obtained (Baron,
1978). Furthermore, several studies found that
a person standing close to another at a crosswalk induced significantly greater feelings of
uneasiness, produced increased crossing speed,
and was later helped less than a person standing
farther away (Konecni, Libuser, Morton, &
Ebbesen, 1975; Smith & Knowles, 1978,
1979). This was, however, not the case if the
invader appeared to be an artist sketching a
drawing, thus motivating a different interpretation of the space invasion (Smith & Knowles,
1979).
As evidence for the misattribution of
arousal model, however, these findings must
be considered inconclusive. Concerning the
studies by Dutton and Aron (1974), it appears that their field experiments are beset
by significant methodologicalflaws(see Kenrick & Cialdini, 1977), and the results of the
laboratory experiment (Dutton & Aron, 1974,
Exp. 3) could not be replicated in four studies, including one exact replication (Kenrick,
Cialdini, & Linder, 1979). Whether the
aggression-enhancing effect of concurrent
noise (Donnerstein & Wilson, 1976, Exp. 1;
Konecni, 1975) was due to misattribution of
noise-induced arousal can be questioned on
the grounds that noise has been found to reduce helping behavior (rather than to increase it, as would be expected if the misattribution hypothesis were correct) in at least
two studies (Sherrod & Downs, 1974; Yinon
& Bizman, 1980). As mentioned before, these
findings could be more consistently ex-
plained in terms of the mediation of negative
affect. It might be noted in this context that
negative affect, rather than misattributed
physiological arousal, has also been found to
be a better explanation for the observed effects of heat stress on aggressive behavior (see
Baron & Bell, 1976a; Bell, 1981; Rule &
Nesdale, 1975).
As to the intimacy studies, they too fail to
rule out plausible alternative hypotheses. One
hypothesis that could account for most, if not
all, of thefindingsof these experiments is that
increased intimacy induces heightened levels
of attention and that these, in turn, serve to
magnify the impact of emotional stimuli,
helping requests, and so on (Baron, 1978). It
is also sometimes unclear to what extent it
was the intimacy violation per se, as opposed
to the Cognitive interpretation of that violation
(e.g., concerning the violator's motives), that
elicited arousal and emotional reactions (see
Smith & Knowles, 1979). Further research is
needed to explore these possibilities. This research should also include measures designed
to tap the hypothesized mediating processes
(e.g., attribution). At present, the evidence
from the studies reviewed in this section,
though consistent with a misattribution explanation, is not conclusive about the mediating mechanism.
Misattribution of Emotionally Induced
Arousal to a Neutral Source
Experiments that have attempted to induce
subjects to misattribute emotionally induced
arousal to a neutral source have generally relied
on one of two paradigms, one originally developed by Nisbett and Schachter (1966) and
the other by Ross et al. (1969). In both of these
paradigms, subjects are exposed to emotionally
arousing stimuli, while a different (nonemotional) cause for perceived arousal is made
salient to them. More specifically, subjects in
the misattribution groups in these paradigms
are either given a placebo described as. an
arousal-producing drug (Nisbett & Schachter,
1966) or are exposed to noise that is described
as having arousing side-effects (Ross et al.,
1969). For subjects in the control groups, the
placebo or noise is described as producing no
symptoms at all, or arousal-irrelevant symp-
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
toms such as itching. The underlying rationale
is that this way the "drug" or noise becomes
salient as an alternative cause for perceived,
and actually emotionally induced, arousal
symptoms for subjects in the misattribution
condition. Therefore, these subjects might be
led to discount (Kelley, 1972) the extent to
which the emotional source contributed to the
perceived arousal. As a result, the intensity of
the emotional reaction should be reduced.
In line with this reasoning it has been shown
that subjects in the misattribution, as compared with the control, condition evidenced
increased shock tolerance and reported shocks
to be less painful (Nelson, 1971; Nisbett &
Schachter, 1966); low-fear subjects showed decreased shock-avoidance behavior (CalvertBoyanowsky & Leventhal, 1975; Ross et al.,
1969; M. J. Weiner, 1971), reported less subjective fear and discomfort (Girodo, 1973;
Loftis & Ross, 1974a, Exp. 2; M. J. Weiner,
1971; M. J. Weiner & Samuel, 1975), and
showed increased task performance in stressful
situations (Rodin, 1976; M. J. Weiner & Samuel, 1975). Furthermore, subjects in the
misattribution condition displayed less aggressive behavior in response to provocation
(Harris & Huang, 1974a; Younger & Doob,
1978) and showed attenuated subjective emotional reactions (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman,
Buckley, & Birch, 1981) as well as reduced
altruistic behavior toward a person in need of
aid (Batson et al., 1981; Coke, Batson, &
McDavis, 1978, Exp. 1; Gaertner & Dovidio,
1977, Exp. 2; Harris & Huang, 1973). In addition, a misattribution treatment was found
to decrease the subjective experience of
crowding in close interaction situations (Worchel & Yohai, 1979), to increase cheating at
an ego-involving examination (Dienstbier,
1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971), to facilitate
abstinence from smoking (Barefoot & Girodo,
1972), and to alleviate insomnia (Storms &
Nisbett, 1970), heart neurotics' complaints
(Liebhart, 1974), and shyness-related behavior
in shy people (Brodt & Zimbardo, 1981). A
misattribution treatment was also found to
significantly reduce attitude change in a forced
compliance paradigm, presumably by reducing the intensity of experienced dissonance
(Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna, 1979; Zanna
& Cooper, 1974; Zanna, Higgins, & Taves,
255
1976), and to decrease both derogation of an
intelligence test and lack of effort attributions
following negative performance feedback
(Fries & Frey, 1980), presumably by reducing
the intensity of experienced negative emotion
induced by the negative feedback. Finally,
Loftis and Ross (1974a, 1974b) reported that
a misattribution manipulation facilitated extinction of a classically conditioned galvanic
skin response reaction, regardless of whether
the manipulation was introduced during acquisition trials (Loftis & Ross, 1974a, Exp. 2)
during extinction (Loftis & Ross, 1974a, Exp.
1), or even retrospectively after acquisition for
the preceding conditioning trials (Loftis &
Ross, 1974b).
There are, however, also a number of studies
reported that did not find a misattribution
effect. Zuckerman (1974) failed to obtain a
misattribution effect for subjects with dental
fear; Singerman, Borkovec, and Baron (1976)
with speech-anxious subjects; Holroyd (1978)
with test-anxious subjects; and Harris and
Huang (1974b) for sexual excitement in response to erotica. Furthermore, Storms and
Nisbett's (1970) study, which suggested a beneficial effect of misattribution on insomnia,
has been severely criticized on methodological
grounds (e.g., Bootzin & Nicassio, 1978), and
could not be replicated in four studies (Bootzin, Herman, & Nicassio, 1976; Heffler & Lisman, 1978; Kellogg & Baron, 1975; Lowery,
Denney, & Storms, 1979); and Barefoot and
Girodo's (1972) finding that a misattribution
treatment facilitated abstinence from smoking
was not supported when more stringent behavioral criteria were used (Chambliss &
Murray, 1979). At least part of these negative
findings might be explained by manipulation
failures; that is, either the emotional stimuli
presented to subjects failed to elicit noticeable
arousal, as in Harris and Huang's (1974b)
study (evidently no misattribution effect can
be expected under such circumstances, cf.
Dienstbier, 1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971;
Rodin, 1976), or the attempts to influence
subjects' attributions of arousal remained unsuccessful (Heffler & Lisman, 1978; Singerman
et al., 1976; cf. Nisbett & Schachter, 1966,
high-fear subjects). In addition, it could be
argued that target behaviors such as sleep-onset
latencies (in the insomnia studies) or cigarette
256
RAINER REISENZEIN
consumption (Chambliss & Murray, 1979) are
quite removed from any emotional state purportedly mediating those behaviors; as Ross
and Olson (1981) point out, such behavioral
variables should not be expected to be as easily
influenced by a misattribution manipulation
as variables more closely related to the emotional state.
From a practical point of view, these failures to obtain misattribution effects are important insofar as they include most of the
attempts to influence by a misattribution
manipulation clinically relevant target behaviors. Hence, the data do not seem to justify enthusiasm concerning the therapeutic
usefulness of misattribution treatments (Ross
& Olson, 1981). More significant from a
theoretical point of view, however, is the fact
that the misattribution explanation of these
findings has been challenged, and alternative
plausible hypotheses have been offered. For
the purpose of this review, these rival hypotheses are termed the "attention-diversion
hypothesis" and the "preparatory information hypothesis". According to the attentiondiversion hypothesis (e.g., B. Weiner, 1980;
see also, Loftis & Ross, 1974b), arousal symptoms described to subjects in the experimental groups are more alarming, interesting, or
surprising than the arousal-irrelevant symptoms described to subjects in the control
groups; therefore, they direct subjects' attention to the misattribution source and/or to
the self and decrease attention to the emotional cues present. As a result, the impact
of the emotional stimuli is attenuated. The
preparatory information hypothesis, on the
other hand, asserts that correct information
about to-be-expected symptoms in a stressful
situation reduces uncertainty and ambiguity
by leading to accurate expectations regarding
the stressor, and this, in turn, attenuates subsequent stress reactions (Calvert-Boyanowsky & Leventhal, 1975; Rodin, 1976).
What these two hypotheses have in common
is the suggestion that the reduction in emotionality observed in the misattribution studies was due to the different symptom information presented to subjects as part of the
misattribution manipulation (by either diverting their attention away from the emotional stimuli or altering the appraisal of
those stimuli) and not to attributions regarding those symptoms.
Evidence supporting this suggestion comes
from experiments by Calvert-Boyanowsky et
al. (1975) and Rodin (1976). In Calvert-Boyanowsky et al.'s (Exp. 1) study, different
groups of subjects were provided either with
a list of arousal symptoms or a list of arousalirrelevant symptoms, the symptoms being
described either as typical effects of the emotional (shock) or the nonemotional (noise)
source. The only significant effect found was
a main effect for type of symptom information, suggesting that the provision of
arousal symptom information, rather than
attribution of the symptoms, accounted for
the reduction in emotionality. However, manipulation checks suggest that the attributional manipulation itself might have been
ineffective, thus leaving the possibility that
if it had been effective, it might at least have
had an additional effect. This speculation is
contradicted, however, by thefindingsof Rodin (1976). In this case, manipulation checks
suggest that the attribution manipulation was
effective. Nevertheless, it was again found
that subjects who had been given arousal
symptom information showed less stress, regardless of attribution, than control subjects.
In addition, M. J. Weiner (1971) found that
a reduction in emotionality was obtained
even if the supposedly arousing placebo was
administered after subjects had been informed that they would receive shocks, a timing that should actually have prevented misattribution (see Ross & Olson, 1981).
These findings, together with the fact that
there is hardly any direct evidence for attributional mediation in the misattribution
studies reviewed above (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977), justify doubts concerning the adequacy of the misattribution hypothesis. They
do not, however, provide any clear information as to which of the above-mentioned alternative hypotheses, if any, accounts for the
findings. Additional evidence is available that
supports both of these hypotheses. The attention-diversion hypothesis is substantiated
by results from Girodo (1973), who found
that subjects given correct (i.e. arousal)
symptom information and exposed to a feareliciting film not only felt significantly less
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
discomfort but also called significantly fewer
details of the film content than subjects given
irrelevant symptom information. Furthermore, Worchel and Teddlie (1976) found that
the experience of crowding was significantly
reduced in a close interaction situation if the
room contained a number of presumably distracting pictures and posters. Studies in different experimental contexts suggest, in addition, that distraction can be effective in reducing various types of stress reactions
(Leventhal, 1979; Thompson, 1981). As to the
preparatory information hypothesis, numerous studies have demonstrated that preparatory sensory information can be effective in
reducing various kinds of stress reactions
(Leventhal, 1979), and these effects seem to
be different from and not reducible to attentional diversion (Johnson, 1973; Leventhal,
1980).
In sum, in the studies reviewed in this section, a relatively robust phenomenon was
detected: Subjects who underwent a misattribution manipulation subsequently showed
reduced emotionality in a variety of situations and on a variety of indicators. The interpretation of these findings in terms of a
misattribution effect is, however, thrown into
doubt by results obtained in the few studies
that have attempted to systematically test the
misattribution hypothesis against alternative
explanations. Although this does not mean
that the misattribution hypothesis has been
shown to be invalid (see Dienstbier, 1979b,
and Ross and Olson, 1981, for attempts to
deal with some of the issues raised),2 it does
suggest that until further evidence is available, the status of the misattribution hypothesis should best be considered equivocal, and
both an attentional diversion and a preparatory information hypothesis (or a combination of both) should be considered plausiblble alternative hypotheses.
Discussion
The results of the foregoing review of research can be summarized in two main
points:
1. Of the three major empirical deductions from Schachter's theory that have been
reviewed, only the second one (claiming that
an emotional state will be intensified by mis-
257
attributed arousal from an irrelevant source)
can be considered adequately supported by
the data. In contrast, empirical support for
the first hypothesis (arousal reduction will
lead to a proportional reduction in the intensity of emotional state) is weak at best,
and the status of the third hypothesis (misattribution of emotionally induced arousal
to a neutral source will result in a reduction
of emotionality) is considered equivocal because of conflicting evidence and the existence of plausible alternative interpretations
of the pertinent findings.
2. No compelling evidence has been found
in support of some of Schachter's more
2
The validity of these attempts to account for the
problematic findings mentioned above can only be determined by future research. Without independent supportive evidence, they cannot be considered persuasive.
Ross and Olson (1981) have also advanced two arguments against the preparatory information hypothesis that
in their opinion render this alternative explanation implausible. First, they suggest that if this latter interpretation
were correct, then one should have observed a reduction
of physiological arousal in the groups given correct symptom information. As judged from reports of experienced
arousal symptoms, however, there was no such reduction
of arousal in the studies reported above; in fact, some
even found an increase in reported symptoms (e.g., Fries
& Frey, 1980; Harris & Huang, 1974a, 1974b; Worchel
& Yohai, 1979; Zanna & Cooper, 1974; Zanna, Higgins,
& Taves, 1976). It is, however, not at all clear that the
preparatory information hypothesis would predict a direct
reduction of arousal (cf. Leventhal, 1980). In fact, this
prediction is clear only as long as one operates within the
framework of Schachter's theory; for if misattribution did
not mediate the reduction of emotionality in these experiments, then the only other possibility left is that this
effect was due to a reduction of arousal. Thus, if such
arousal reductions do not occur, and if in addition the
misattribution explanation were definitely shown to be
wrong, one would have to conclude not only that the observed reduction of emotionality was not due to misattribution but also that it cannot be explained by Schachter's
theory at all.
Second, Ross and Olson suggest that the preparatory
information hypothesis cannot explain the findings by
Loftis and Ross (1974b). These latter authors found that
subjects who had undergone a galvanic skin response conditioning procedure and were at the same time exposed
to noise, but were told about arousing noise side-effects
only afterwards, nevertheless showed accelerated extinction
during the subsequent extinction trials. It could be argued,
however, that subjects expected aftereffects of the noise to
last throughout the extinction trials. In sum, Ross and
Olson's (1981) arguments do not seem capable of invalidating the alternative explanation proposed by CalvertBoyanowsky et al. (1975).
258
RAINER REISENZEIN
itely made by Schachter; nevertheless, it has
been implicit in many of the misattribution
studies). In some of these misattribution
studies, however, more reliable effects were
found on behavior than on subjective experience. This is perhaps most apparent in the
aggression studies reviewed in the context of
the excitation transfer paradigm, but similar
results have also been obtained in other misattribution experiments (e.g., Calvert-Boyanowsky et al., 1975; Nisbett & Schachter,
1966; Younger & Doob, 1978). As pointed
out by Bern (1972), Nisbett and Valins (1972),
and Nisbett and Wilson (1977), such findings
are paradoxical if it is assumed that the behavioral effects were mediated by subjective
states. Throughout the review, the possibility
has been stressed that these findings may
largely be methodological artifacts due, for
example, to inappropriate measurement
points, insensitive measures of subjective experience, unwillingness on the part of subjects to admit their feelings, and so forth.
There is much reason to suspect that such
factors might indeed account for these paradoxical findings; therefore, it would be premature to dismiss the feeling-mediation hypothesis. On the other hand, these findings
must not be taken too lightly, for should they
be substantiated by future research, then existing notions concerning the mediation of
the effects of arousal on emotion-related behavior would have to be substantially revised.
In conclusion, it can be said that Schachter's theory has undoubtedly been of tremenIn sum, then, the available data seem to dous heuristic value as a generator of resupport only a rather attenuated version of search; the large number of studies reviewed
Schachter's theory: that arousal feedback can above attests to this. It has also been imporhave an intensifying effect on emotional tant in focusing psychologists' attention on
states, and that this arousal-emotion rela- the long-neglected cognitive component of
tionship is mediated or modified in part by emotional states. Although there may be little
causal attributions regarding the source of disagreement about the cognitive compoarousal. Even this weak version of the theory nent, it does seem that the role of peripheral
is reasonably well supported only as regards arousal has been overstated and that the close
the effects of extraneous arousal from an link between arousal and emotion proposed
"irrelevant" source (cf. Hypothesis 2); con- by Schachter, and many others before him,
cerning the more usual case of naturally oc- may be based less on empirical fact that on
curring, emotionally induced arousal (cf. "symbolic relationships which are extrinsic
Hypotheses 1 and 3), its status is much more from a scientific point of view" (Averill, 1974,
ambiguous.
p. 148).
A final issue raised by this review of research concerns those Schachter-based modReference Note
els that assume subjective feeling states to be
mediators of overt behavior. (As mentioned 1. Roseman, I. Cognitive aspects of emotion and emobefore, this assumption has not been explictional behavior. Paper presented at the 87th Annual
strongly formulated propositions. Specifically, (a) none of the studies reviewed above
convincingly demonstrate that peripheral
arousal is, indeed, a necessary condition for
an emotional state, as claimed by Schachter.
The frequently weak effects of arousal manipulations on the intensity of emotional
states suggest, furthermore, that beyond the
point of zero arousal, the link between arousal
and emotion is much weaker than implied
by Schachter's theory, (b) In cases where
misattributed arousal from an extraneous
source was found to intensify emotional reactions, no firm evidence supports the notion
that this arousal was first perceived as unexplained and that this subsequently instigated
an explanatory search process (see also, Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Most probably, in these
"successful" misattribution studies, the extra
arousal stemming from a different source was
not perceived as unexplained at all, but the
total arousal experienced was attributed to
the emotional sources by default. It is consistent with this speculation that those methodologically sound studies that seem to have
come closest to creating a state of unexplained arousal (Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979;
Maslach, 1979) did not find evidence for a
misattribution effect. On the contrary, the
results of these experiments suggest that if
arousal is experienced as unexplained, this
will effectively interfere with an attribution
to a situationally suggested cause and tends to
lead to a negatively toned affective state.
THE SCHACHTER THEORY OF EMOTION
Convention of the American Psychological Association, New York, September 1979.
259
Berkowitz, L., Lepinski, J., & Angulo, E. Awareness of
own anger level and subsequent aggression. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11, 2 9 3 300.
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