SAC Worksheet
Team Members ~ A _____________________________
B ____________________________
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Should the United States have committed troops to the civil war in Vietnam?
Main arguments for Position A:
Main arguments for Position B:
Clarifying questions after presentation:
Clarifying questions after presentation:
Answers:
Answers:
Key points for group discussion
Common ground reached
Background Overview
At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the same conference that established North and South Korea as separate
nations, the newly independent nation of Vietnam was partitioned into northern and southern sectors. The goal of
this partition was to stabilize political animosity that had arisen between communist and nationalist Vietnamese
factions during the Franco-Vietnam War. The international community feared that upon the final removal of
French colonial forces in Vietnam a civil war might ensue. In order to avoid this civil war, control of the Northern
portion of Vietnam above the 17th parallel was given to the communist forces led by Ho Chi Minh. The southern
sector was under the control of anti-communist nationalists under Ngo Dinh Diem. It was not the intention of the
Geneva Accords to separate Vietnam into two separate nations, as had happened in Korea. Instead, the partition
was supposed to ease tensions so that the country could unify in 1956 after nation wide elections were held. Neither
the United States, nor the Vietnamese nationalists, approved of the Geneva Accords. Even at the time of the
Geneva Conference, it was known that Ho Chi Minh had the support of the majority.
Due to the heightened tensions created by the Cold War, the United States felt that it was necessary to form a
strong alliance with the nationalist forces of South Vietnam. Under the US policy of containment, which was
strengthened by both the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines, the United States’ number one objective in foreign
policy was to stop the spread of communism. It was imperative to the United States to support Diem with whatever
he needed to win the elections set for 1956. As the elections drew near, it was apparent that if held, Ho Chi Minh
would be elected leader of unified Vietnam. He had led the fight for independence against France and was revered
throughout both the Northern and Southern countryside as the liberator of Vietnam. The United States and the
South Vietnamese interim government feared that Vietnam would become a united communist nation. The US,
under President Eisenhower, believed in the Domino Theory. They feared if Vietnam became communist all of
Southeast Asia would fall to communism. Diem, supported and encouraged by the US, refused to hold the Geneva
mandated elections, and instead declared South Vietnam the independent Republic of Vietnam with him as leader.
The North was, of course, outraged and began a military campaign against the South.
From1956 to 1975 a civil war was fought in Vietnam. It was not a cleanly divided civil war between North and
South. Instead the war was fought primarily on Southern soil between the Republic of Vietnam forces against
Northern forces and the Vietcong. The Vietcong were South Vietnamese who backed the Northern cause and Ho
Chi Minh. This made the war much more complicated than many other civil wars. Initially, the United States only
provided monetary aid and some military officers for training to the South Vietnamese. However, after over four
years of civil war, where the South was completely on the defensive, the United States upped their support for
South Vietnam. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy agreed to send his elite military Green Berets into South
Vietnam to train South Vietnamese military forces. Slowly more and more American troops were sent to Vietnam as
advisors and trainers. While the American forces were only supposed to be there for support, they were given
permission to fire if fired upon. Due to the guerilla nature of warfare being used by the Vietcong, US soldiers were
being engaged in combat and slowly the US was being pulled more into the war. In the summer of 1963, with no
real progress being made for the South Vietnamese and American casualties starting to number, Kennedy scaled
down the training forces planning to go the Vietnam. Some believe that he planned to remove American forces
entirely. However, upon his assassination in November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson became President and inherited
the alliance with South Vietnam. In 1964, Johnson authorized the American military forces already in Vietnam to
actually begin combat missions alongside South Vietnamese troops. By 1964, when the actual combat aid of the US
did not improve the South Vietnamese position in the civil war, Johnson prepared a full scale military commitment
of American troops. This was solidified with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by Congress that gave Johnson the
authority to send unlimited military support to South Vietnam, without actually declaring war on North Vietnam. In
1965, American combat troops were deployed to Vietnam, not as advisors to South Vietnam forces, but as men to
fight US planned military missions against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Thus the undeclared war had
begun.
Work Consulted
http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/
Point A- Secondary Document~ The US had to defend South Vietnam by whatever means necessary to stop the spread of
communism.
Primary Document~ THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE SECURITY AND
PROGRESS OF VIET-NAM. Dwight Eisenhower
Primary Quotes by political/military/religious figures of the 1960s
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The US had to defend South Vietnam by whatever means necessary to stop the spread of communism.
In the late 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, the spread of communism posed a threat to democracy and
freedom throughout the world. Communists had recently shown the extent of their threat to peace and freedom in
the world with their actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost brought the world to nuclear war, and the
Berlin Crisis, which showed the world the true oppressive nature of communism. The nationalist government of the
Southern partition of Vietnam was struggling to maintain a system of democracy. While it is true that the majority
of Vietnamese citizen were supportive of Ho Chi Minh, it must also be noted that many of them had no idea what
communism even was. The US believed that if the common citizen of Vietnam actually understood the political
system Ho stood for, support would wane for him.
The US government also believed that it was vital to maintain a democratic South Vietnam for those Vietnamese
citizens who did not believe in communism. While they were in the minority in all of Vietnam, there was a very
large number of South Vietnamese who were willing to fight and die in the name of democracy and anticommunism. When it became apparent that South Vietnam would eventual fall to the North Vietnamese
Communists, the US had no other choice then to send American troops to Vietnam to defend the freedom of the
South Vietnamese.
The freedom of the South Vietnamese represented the freedom of the world. Following Eisenhower’s theory of the
domino effect, if the United States sat back and allowed the Northern forces to overrun South Vietnam, it was
possible that all of Southeast Asia could fall to communism. From there, it could spread to India, the Middle East,
and Africa. If the US did not aid the South Vietnamese, it was quite possible that communism, which had been
spreading since 1946, could overrun the Eastern Hemisphere. It had already seeped into the Western Hemisphere
with Castro in Cuba. The United States, who was the defender of the free-world, could not allow the possibility that
communism might eventually threaten US soil.
It is also important to note that the North Vietnamese were the aggressors in both the civil war and the war with
the US. The South Vietnamese attempted to avoid civil unrest by giving up any claim to North Vietnam. By
forfeiting claim to a unified Vietnam and establishing a democratic nation in the South, the United States and South
Vietnam were attempting to appease Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh could have established his communist nation in
the North and allowed the people of the South freedom. When split into North and South factions, the majority of
people in the South wanted a democratic government. However, Ho would not allow that to happen. Ho would not
allow peace. Instead he waged brutal war against his own countrymen, a war that the South could not defend on its
own. The United States could not in good conscience sit back and allow South Vietnam to fall. President Kennedy
best summed up our duty in his inaugural address on January 20, 1961.
To those peoples in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our
best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be
doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor,
it cannot save the few who are rich.
THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE SECURITY AND PROGRESS OF VIETNAM: Address by President Eisenhower, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, April 4, 1959 (Excerpt)
Let us consider briefly the country of Viet-Nam and the importance to us of the security and progress of that country. It is
located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia, exactly halfway round the world from Gettysburg College.
Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts, like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its 12 million people, is free
but poor. It is an underdeveloped country; its economy is weak, average individual income being less than $200 a year. The
northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two.
To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to south Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense
and economic growth.
Understandably the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations.
This means economic expansion.
For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital
needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions.
This enslavement is the commune system, adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of
freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.
Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside and through
governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.
In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.
And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problem--how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its
economy.
Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the north, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial
numbers of men under arms. Moreover, while the Government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas,
those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.
Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it or, equally important, the
morale--the hope, the confidence, the pride--necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion
within its borders.
Still another fact! Strategically south Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles
into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The
freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously
endangered. The loss of south Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave
consequences for us and for freedom.
Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now--both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts,
military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.
We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the
morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st Session,
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (3d Revised Edition)
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1967), pp. 96-97.
Primary Quotes from political, military, and religious figures during the Vietnam Era
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954
You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that
it will go over very quickly.
Ronald Reagan, 1964
We are at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the
swamp to the stars, and it has been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours,
history will record with the greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent
its happening.
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964
This is not a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.
Francis Cardinal Spellman (archbishop of the Roman Catholic diocese of New York)
This war in Vietnam is, I believe, a war for civilization. Certainly it is not a war of our seeking. It is a war
thrust upon us and we cannot yield to tyranny.
Arthur J. Goldberg (US Ambassador to the UN)
America is not fighting to win a war. We are fighting to give an application to an old Greek proverb, which is
that the purpose of war is not to annihilate an enemy but to get him to mend his ways. And we are confident we
can get the enemy to mend his.
Point B- Secondary Document~ The United States should have never sent combat troops to Vietnam.
Secondary Document~ Excerpt from “Into the Quagmire” by Brian VanDeMark
Primary Quotes by political/military figures of the 1960s
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The United States should have never sent combat troops to Vietnam.
In 1955, the democratic process of open elections in a unified Vietnam was blocked by the Diem regime. Had
democratic elections been held, Vietnam would have united under the communist reign of Ho Chi Minh, the
celebrated liberator of Vietnam. Instead, Diem, encouraged by the United States, declared South Vietnam a separate
country with him as the first president of the new democratic republic. What exactly was democratic about this
process?
The main reason generally given for why the United States committed troops to Vietnam is the protection of
democracy and freedom. However, refusing to allow Vietnam to unite under one democratically elected leader
oppressed the majority and gave the minority political power. Diem directly violated the Geneva Accords, and
North Vietnam had some justification in invading the South. North Vietnam and the Vietcong believed that their
rights were being violated by unification elections being cancelled, just as the South Vietnamese feared their rights
might be oppressed if Ho Chi Minh gained power. The situation was not ideal; however, it was a situation for the
people of Vietnam to deal with. It was a civil war. It was not the job of the United States to decide whose freedom
should be protected and whose should be oppressed. The United States had no authority in Vietnam, and the
actions they took there can only be described as imperialistic.
It is not the duty of the United States to protect freedom and democracy for people of another country at the cost
of American lives. As the civil war progressed from 1956 to 1960, it was made very clear that the guerilla warfare
being waged was deadlier than any other warfare in history, save nuclear. The South Vietnamese military who was
trained by the best US soldiers was suffering large casualties in brutal guerilla attacks from members of their own
society. The more the South Vietnamese failed in their attempt to defend the land they claimed, the more the
United States sent American men to help them. However, it never eased the violence or tension. When Green
Berets were sent in 1961, the situation did not get better. In fact, it was at this time the situation seemed to get
worse. Not only was the South Vietnamese military suffering, the South Vietnamese government seemed incapable
of stability of any kind. A corrupt South Vietnamese government only seemed to encourage the leaders in
Washington to get more involved without success.
When US troops were given authority to engage in combat if fired upon, the situation for South Vietnam didn’t get
better. When President Johnson approved combat missions with the men already in Vietnam, the situation STILL
did not get better. Guerilla warfare was not about who had more men; it was about surprise and covert actions. No
matter how many men the US threw at the situation, it was not going to change the fact that they couldn’t tell the
enemy from the ally, and it defeated the purpose to burn a South Vietnamese village to get one Vietcong. The US
was escalating a war that was going to cost American lives, without any indication that American troops could
achieve success. It is not the place of the federal government to risk American lives to possibly secure freedom for
people of another nation, many of whom did not want US help. Robert F. Kennedy best summed up the problem
with the commitment of US troops to Vietnam and the government’s duty to the American people.
Our brave young men are dying in the swamps of Southeast Asia. Which of them might have written a poem?
Which of them might have cured cancer? Which of them might have played in a World Series or given us the gift of
laughter from the stage or helped build a bridge or a university? Which of them would have taught a child to read?
It is our responsibility to let these men live.
Excerpt from Into the Quagmire by Brian VanDeMark, an essay in Taking Sides: Clashing Views on
Controversial Issues in American History Since 1945
Victory in World War II produced a sea of change in America’s perception of its role in world affairs. Political
leaders of both parties embraced a sweeping vision of the United States as the defender against the perceived threat
of monolithic communist expansion everywhere in the world. This vision of American power and purpose, shaped
at the start of the Cold War, grew increasingly rigid over the years. By 1964-1965, it had become an ironbound and
unshakable dogma, a received faith which policymakers unquestionably accepted—even though the circumstances
which had fostered its creation had changed dramatically amid diffused authority and power among communist
states and nationalist upheaval in the colonial world.
Policymakers’ blind devotion to this static Cold War vision led America into misfortune in Vietnam. Lacking the
critical perspective and sensibility to reappraise basic tenets of US Foreign policy in the light of changed events and
local circumstances, policymakers failed to perceive Vietnamese realities accurately and thus to gauge American
interests in the area prudently. Policymakers, as a consequence, misread an indigenous, communist-led nationalist
movement as part of a larger, centrally directed challenge to world order and stability; tied American fortunes to a
non-communist regime of slim popular legitimacy and effectiveness; and intervened militarily in the region far out
of proportion to US security requirements.
An arrogant and stubborn faith in America’s power to shape the course of foreign events compounded the dangers
sown by ideological rigidity. Policymakers in 1964-1965 shared a common postwar conviction that the United States
not only should, but could, control political conditions in South Vietnam, as elsewhere throughout much of the
world. This conviction had led Washington to intervene progressively deeper into South Vietnamese affairs over the
years. And when—despite Washington’s increasing exertions—Saigon’s political situation declined precipitously
during 1964-1965, this conviction prompted policymakers to escalate the war against Hanoi, in the belief that
America could stimulate political order in South Vietnam through the application of military force against North
Vietnam.
Primary Quotes from political and military figures during the Vietnam Era
Lyndon Johnson, Oct. 1964 (Two months after Tonkin Gulf Resolution)
We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys
ought to be doing for themselves.
George McGovern, speech to U.S. Senate, April 25, 1967.
We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh, even if we have to kill them and demolish
their country to do it....I do not intend to remain silent in the face of what I regard as a policy of madness
which, sooner or later, will envelop my son and American youth by the millions for years to come.
Ho Chi Minh
The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of United States aggression
they have risen up, united as one man.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend
from without.
George McGovern
It doesn't require any particular bravery to stand on the floor of the Senate and urge our boys in Vietnam to
fight harder, and if this war mushrooms into a major conflict and a hundred thousand young Americans are
killed, it won't be U.S. Senators who die. It will be American soldiers who are too young to qualify for the
Senate.
John F. Kennedy, speech, New York Times, October 13, 1960.
Should I become President...I will not risk American lives...by permitting any other nation to drag us into
the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time through an unwise commitment that is unwise
militarily, unnecessary to our security and unsupported by our allies.
William Westmoreland (Commander of US Army forces in Vietnam)
War is fear cloaked in courage.