THE BALTIC STATES: IN SEARCH OF SECURITY
AND IDENTITY
__________________________________________________________
Gražina Miniotaitė
Border
Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and
Sociology
E-mail: grazinam@ktl.mii.lt
Contents
1.
Introduction…………………………………………………………3
2. The Baltic States - Allied or Separate?…………………………..6
3.
Security Conceptualizations………………………………………9
3.1. Lithuania: Basics of National Security of Lithuania,1996..12
3.2. Latvia: Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia,1997..15
3.3. Estonia: Guidelines of the National Defense Policy of
Estonia, 1996…………………………………………………17
4.
Security Policy Options of the Baltic States……………………19
4.1. Neutrality……………………………………………………..20
4.2. Regional Security Arrangements: Alliance of the Baltic
States…………………………………………………………23
5.
The Western Option………………………………………………24
5.1. NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States……………….27
Territorial disputes……………………………………………….28
Ethnic disputes………………………………………………….33
Military capability………………………………………………..35
5.2. NATO Membership and the Public Opinion…………… 37
6.
Concluding Remarks……………………………………………..38
7.
Notes and References……………………………………………40
2
1. Introduction
In September 1991 the three Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania - became members of the United Nations. After 50 years'
interruption the Baltic dimension returned to European security
politics. However, from the beginning the assessment of the fact
both in the Baltic states, as well as in the West and in Russia has
been marked by divergent or even opposite tendencies. The Baltic
states themselves saw the fact as the restoration of historical
justice, as getting back to Europe from which they were brutally cut
off in 1940. Yet on one interpretation this return is here conceived
as the restoration of former states, while on the other interpretation
it is conceived as joining the Europe of liberal democracies. Initially,
both in domestic and foreign policy of the Baltic states the former
interpretation was dominant. Interwar constitutions were the guiding
posts; exclusionist laws on citizenship were enacted, with the aim of
restoring the inter-war ethnic composition of the states.
In the West, the return of the Baltic states to the map of Europe was
at first conceived primarily as a fact testifying to the power of the
West, symbolizing Western victory in the Cold War. However,
another view now comes into prominence, according to which the
end of the Cold War and the accompanying geopolitical changes
testify to the power of ideas and normative factors in historical
development.1 Specifically, the prevalence of liberal values and the
development of the security community is emphasized.
In Russia, too, one can notice the ambivalence. The idea now
dominating there is that the independence of the Baltic states meant
the loss of strategically important territories and Russia's weakening
as a state power. Accordingly, in Russia’s foreign and security
policy efforts are being made at preserving some influence over the
Baltic states; and they are characteristically referred to as the zone
of Russia's special interests. The competing idea, now the much
less popular (yet on the basis of which Russia recognized the Baltic
states’ independence in 1991), is that the recognition of the
independence of the Baltic states is a way of overcoming the
3
consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and is in itself
important for Russia's democratization and westernization.2
Since 1994, with the Baltic states joining the PfP program and
declaring their wish for full-fledged membership in NATO and the
European Union, the Baltic dimension has become an important
part of the European security debate. At the same time the so-called
Baltic security dilemma comes to be recognized, and the ability to
solve it is being described in terms of the litmus test metaphor.
What is the dilemma and what is the litmus test supposed to show?
In the words of Carl Bildt, former Swedish Prime Minister:
"Foremost, Russian conduct toward these states will show the true
nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and
principles. If Moscow fully accepts the independence of the Baltic
States and fully respects their rights, one can be sure that Russia
has entered the family of the nations. But if Moscow questions their
sovereignty or undermines their independence, that would signal
that Russia might once again become a threat to the international
system. Second, the European Union's attitude toward the Baltic
States will be a gauge of its ability to pursue the integration process
while also establishing a working relationship with Russia. Third, the
security concerns of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will test the
readiness and ability of the United States to influence Russian
policy and contribute to the new security order in Central and
Eastern Europe.”3
Since then the Baltic security dilemma has not lost its urgency and
the character of a litmus test, even though its contents have
changed. Now, in the 21st century the litmus test are the attitudes
towards Baltic States membership in NATO. In January 2000
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in his speech in Estonia
made the following statement: "For Americans, the fate of the Baltic
States is nothing less than a litmus test for the fate of this entire
continent where the US has such deep and abiding interests. It is
not just a test for you to pass but for us to pass together. We will do
so when three distinctive and deserving nations - Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania - are secure, stable, prosperous democracies
integrated into all the broader structures of the Euro-Atlantic
community.”4 In 2001 Ronald Asmus, speaking in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, called the Baltic states' right to
choose their security direction "a question of political principle": "We
4
have said that states should be able to join their own alliances, that
security in Europe is indivisible, that NATO has created a Europe
whole and free. We've said that Russia will not have a veto. The
Baltic issue is a litmus test of all those principles and whether we
really mean it."5
The Baltic security dilemma has had an impact on the whole North
East European region, with consequences for Scandinavia,
continental Europe, the European Union, Russia and NATO. This
region is a kind of historical laboratory, a meeting-point of modernity
and post-modernity where new principles of international relations
are being formed and put to test. In analyzing the peculiarities of the
region and the role of the Baltic states the two tendencies
mentioned above can be interpreted in terms of the contrast
between interpretations based on rationalism (realism) and
reflectivism (constructivism). On the former interpretation the
security issues of the Baltic States are conceived in an objective
way, in terms of the balance of power, of threats to state security
and national interests. On the latter interpretation, security is
conceived as an intersubjective phenomenon, as a social construct;
it is analyzed not in terms of strategy and stability, but rather in
terms of identity creation.6
The paper is an attempt at interpreting the security and foreign
policy of the Baltic states as the constitution of their developing
political identity. It is attempt to show that in the Baltic states
themselves the Baltic security dilemma is an expression of "the
tension between the demands of identity and the practices that
constitute it."7 As Peter van Ham and Przemyslaw Grudzinski note,
this tension is characteristic not only of the Baltic states, but also of
other CEE states: "With the end of the East-West divide, Central
European countries have gone through a phase of nationalist
celebration, "rediscovering" their original identity after decades of
communist domination. Public opinion in these new, and in same
instances still rather delicate states, clings to attractive abstractions
such as national sovereignty and independence. It should be clear
that the popular revolutions of 1989 did not call for postmodern
celebration of difference and hybridity, but for recognition of their
national identity and culture. However, Central European political
elites have now committed themselves to joining Europe's key
institutions (NATO, EU and WEU), realizing all too well that this
5
implies compromising and sharing their recently reclaimed national
sovereignty."8
In the paper we will attempt to show that the model of the nationstate identity of the Baltic states, when applied to integration with
Western security and political institutions, can easily lead to
misunderstandings and inadequate assessment of the situation in
practical politics by creating tensions between domestic and foreign
policies. The analysis is based on the hypothesis that political reality
of the Baltic states may be conceptualized as an interplay at least of
two competing discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the
integration discourse, with each of these reflecting different
discursive practices. The sovereignty discourse is related to nation
state identity and to the politics of exclusion; even integration with
West is considered in security terms. The integration discourse is
tied to the globalization and integration processes in the Baltic
states.
We shall first briefly review the historical and cultural preconditions
that help (or sometimes hamper) the identification of the Baltic
states region as a specific object of analysis. Next, we consider the
peculiarities of security conceptualizations in Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia. Finally an attempt is made to comprehend the link between
security conceptions and security policy options of the Baltic States.
2. The Baltic States - Allied or Separate?
Despite a number of historical and cultural differences between
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in the context of international
relations they are usually not differentiated and are treated as a
whole, the Baltic States. Admittedly, at least the history of the 20th
century provides some reasons for this treatment. Starting their
sovereign existence at approximately the same time (1918), that is,
at the time of the break-down of the great European empires, they
embarked on similar roads of development. They had a relatively
short period of independence, though very important for the building
of their respective national identities. They were treacherously
incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, occupied by the Hitlerite
coalition during the Second World War and reemerged as Soviet
republics since 1944. In the 1980s the three countries effectively
used the opportunities opened up by Gorbachev's 'perestroika' and
ultimately became sovereign members of the international
6
community. Contemporary security and foreign policies of the Baltic
states seem to be essentially similar: they share the same proWestern orientation, they seek membership in NATO for the hard
security it would guarantee, they are actively involved in attempts of
joining the EU for soft security and, finally, they are cautious and
distrustful in their relations with Russia.
However, one should not be misled by this apparent similarity. In
judging the nature of this similarity one should heed the opinion of
the British historian David Kirby:
"the term 'Baltic' is essentially an outsiders' construct and this may
have hindered the development of a strong sense of common
regional identity... After Russia's revolution Lithuania was grouped
with Estonia and Latvia as the Baltic States, in spite of obvious
cultural and historical-political differences. Since late 1980s, when
the Western world learnt once more to know these peoples, they
have increasingly been lumped together as 'Balts', or even 'Baltics',
a term with which none of these states are particularly happy to be
associated. Integration in the west and disintegration in the east
may if anything have jeopardized the chances of creating a firm and
viable Baltic identity."9
This is confirmed by statements made and metaphors used by the
political and cultural elites of the Baltic states. They are indeed
inclined to distance themselves from the common Baltic identity, to
emphasize each country's peculiarities and to seek historical and
geopolitical reasons allegedly confirming these peculiarities. The
tendency is perhaps most clearly expressed in pronouncements by
Estonia's Minister of Foreign relations, Tomas Ilves. In 1998 he
made this declaration: "I saw that for years Estonia had suffered
from the unsuccessfully planned policies of the other Baltic states.
Estonia is a post-Communist Nordic country, not a Baltic country.”10
Later he repeated the declaration to many different audiences.
Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament
(1996-2000), in a speech in 1997 compared the three Baltic States
to mushrooms in a basket and urged the Baltic people to break free
from the 'Baltic ghetto'.11 Even more outspoken was the Lithuanian
Minister of foreign affairs Algirdas Saudargas; in 1996 he called the
unity of the Baltic states a mere fiction that only exists in Western
politicians' minds. They both preferred the definition of Lithuania as
a Central European or Central Baltic European country. Doubts
7
concerning the common Baltic identity have been repeatedly voiced
by Estonia's President Lennart Meri and Latvia’s politicians.
Let us briefly review the historical and cultural distinctions of the
Baltic states that lend support to these pronouncements. They are
firstly related to the history of their statehood. The story of Estonia's
and Latvia's statehood begins in the 20th century, while Lithuania's
statehood reaches back to the 13th century.12 The history of the
Baltic countries before the period of Russia's rule (beginning in early
18th century) testifies that Estonia and Latvia were more influenced
by Northern Europe (Sweden, Denmark and Germany), while
Lithuania, because of its union with Poland, was more subject to
influences from Central Europe.13 In Estonia and Latvia
Protestantism was firmly established, while Lithuania remained a
Catholic country.
The period of Russian rule (since 1721 in Estonia and Latvia and
since 1795 in Lithuania) in the Baltic countries was particularly
unfavorable to Lithuania; serfdom was here abolished much later
than in Latvia and Estonia, and Russia's efforts of assimilation were
particularly brutal here (colonization, suppression of Catholicism by
closing churches and monasteries and forcing the population to
adopt Orthodoxy, a ban on Lithuanian alphabet and press,
abolished only in 1905). In the 20th century, in the interwar period,
the Baltic states failed to develop a common foreign policy. Because
of the territorial conflict with Poland Lithuania's foreign policy as
defined by Minister for foreign affairs Augustinas Voldemaras ‘fighting Poland with the help of Germany and Soviet Union’ - led to
Lithuania’s isolation from other Baltic states and to a rapprochement
with the Soviet Union.14
After the annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 they were
immediately cut off from the West and made 'Soviet socialist
republics'
suffering
pre-war
and
post-war
deportations,
collectivization and "Russification." There was resistance to the
sovietization in all Baltic states, the strongest in Lithuania. Partly
because of this and partly due to the relatively slower
industrialization Lithuania's ethnic composition has not changed
much during the 50 years of Soviet rule (67,9 per cent Lithuanians
in 1923; 79,6 per cent in 1991). By contrast, Estonia and Latvia,
ethnically nearly homogeneous in the inter-war period (86 per cent
8
indigenous population in Estonia and 75.5 per cent in Latvia
(1935)), became multinational republics during the Soviet rule. In
1995 Estonia's indigenous population was 62.5 per cent, while in
Latvia it was only 52.0 per cent. These facts did and do have
repercussions for the Baltic states' relations with Russia.
While considering the differences between the Baltic states it might
be worthwhile to mention the issue of state borders. With the
declaration of independence their territorial boundaries were defined
on the basis of the administrative division of the former Soviet
Union, i.e. by the borders of former Soviet republics. This solution
was favorable to Lithuania, less so to Latvia and least of all to
Estonia. In comparison with the inter-war period Lithuania has
increased its territory, and for the first time in the 20th century it
brought both the Vilnius and the Klaipeda regions under its
sovereignty. Estonia, comparing its present territory with its territory
according to the 1920 Tartu Treaty with Russia, lost approximately
2000 sq. km east of the Narva river and the Pechory (Petseri)
district, now part of the Pskov region. Latvia lost the town of Abrene
(Pytalovo) and six districts of Abrene (Russia's Pskov Region). This
accounts for the territorial disputes Estonia and Latvia had with
Russia in 1991-1994.
These historical facts relating both to the unity and the diversity of
the Baltic states do not prove anything if taken by themselves. They
come to be seen as reasons only in arguments concerning the kind
of dominant political identity that is being constructed: either a
modern nation-state with its characteristic blend of the nation and
the state, or the liberal democratic multinational state. The dominant
identity emerges from a multitude of other possibilities and is
articulated as a specific narrative of belonging and solidarity which
defines a group in space and time. The narrative of a nation state is
being created by the settled oppositions of inside/outside,
identity/difference. "Identity requires difference in order to be, and it
converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own selfcertainty."15 The way "the Other" is identified determines what
security policy is employed. In the modern nation-state the
difference becomes conceptualized as a threat or danger. On the
basis of these premises we shall now try to reveal the connections
between the nation-state identity constructions, security
conceptualizations and security policies of the Baltic states.
9
3. Security conceptualizations
The Baltic states, just like other post-communist states, "are
implementing a triple transition in which they are attempting
simultaneously to create a new state and nation, to establish new
political institutions based on the rule of law, and to build the
foundations for an effective and productive market economy."16 In
this triple transition process the issue of the formulation and
reformulation of the problems of security (i.e. their construction and
reconstruction) has a major role. The way security is conceptualized
and institutionalized is the fixing point in the process of constituting
political identity.
When trying to identify the ways security is being conceptualized in
the Baltic states one is confronted by the indefiniteness of the very
concept of security. A study of security in the post-Cold War era
concedes that "there is no agreement on what constitutes
security."17 .One can only be sure of the various attempts to
redefine security from a broad spectrum of theoretical perspectives
(positivist / post-positivist; modern / post-modern; rationalist /
reflectivist). In this paper we base our reflections on the rationalist /
reflectivist dichotomy.18
Rationalism (realism/neorealism, neoliberalism/neo-institutionalism)
in its realist / neorealist version "centers on the state's capacity to
protect its territorial boundaries and its sovereign ability to act as it
sees best, with respect to both internal and external issues."19
Rationalism is essentially an expression of the modern conception
of the state and is closely related to the Enlightenment’s ontological
and epistemological premises: to its conception of social reality as
an unambiguous whole of constant essences and its belief in the
instrumental power of reason.. On this view, security is conceived
as nation-state security that is to be achieved by identifying the
objective threats faced by the state and neutralizing them.
With the fall of the bipolar world order and the spread of
globalization the entrenched concept of security, associated
primarily with state security and military conflicts has come under
critical scrutiny. First, attempts are being made at expanding and
10
deepening the concept. The expansion means supplementing the
concept of military security by political, economic, societal and
environmental aspects of security.20 Deepening of the concept
refers to different levels of security - identifying the individual, state,
regional, international, global levels of security. One should note,
however, that these attempts at the redefinition of security usually
remain within the rationalist theoretical paradigm.
Reflectivist theories (postmodern constructivism, post-modernism,
feminist approaches, normative theories, the critical theory and
historical sociology) conceive security as a social construct that
acquires specific meaning only in a particular social context. The
problem of security studies becomes mainly that of finding an
answer to the question: “How do ideas about security develop, enter
the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually,
become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles and
practices?" The analysis is mostly focused on particular
conceptualizations of security/insecurity (giving birth to policy and
practice). "There are not only struggle over security among nations,
but also struggle over security among notions. Winning the right to
define security provides not just access to resources but also the
authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as
well."21
Security is being analyzed as the dynamics of securitization /
desecuritization, as a process of an intersubjective actualization and
de-actualization of environmental, economical, societal issues as
threats.22 As Ole Waever puts it: "use of the security label does not
merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a
political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special
way"23, namely, "the issue is presented as an existential threat,
requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the
normal bounds of political procedure."24
However, "the desired
end-point should not be security but a desecuritization of relations,
moving conflicts into civil political society."25
The subject matter of the securitization analysis are the political
discourses of the state. A discourse is to be understood as "a
relational totality which constitutes and organizes social relations
around a particular structure of meanings".26 Each discourse is an
attempt at conferring relative stability and dominance to certain
11
meanings by way of excluding certain other meanings. As already
noted, in the Baltic States’ political thinking we identify two main
overlapping discourses: that of sovereignty and that of integration.
Accordingly, the contents of the security conceptions employed will
be analyzed in terms of the contrast and the interplay of the
sovereignty and the integration discourse.
The sovereignty discourse is related to the logical, the ontological
and the ethical characteristics of the modern state. The organizing
principle of modern state system is that of sovereignty which is
based on the congruence between the state, the nation and
territoriality. As Jens Bartelson has emphasized, a modern state is
being realized through a dialectic of conflict that establishes an
inside out of the outside, an identity out of a difference, "it treats
identity and difference as qualities that implicate each other logically
as well as temporally."27 Discursive practices construe meanings
which entrench the differentiation between the inside (self) and
outside (the threatening Other). Security is identified with the
security of the inside (the nation state). The principal distinction
drawn between the secure inside and the threatening outside is the
precondition for the securitization of the outside and the inside (in
so far as its integrity is threatened).
In this paper we consider the integration discourse as comprising
those discursive practices and meanings that are related to
integration processes and to a partial abandonment of sovereignty
conceived as the supreme legitimate authority within a given
territory. The nodal points, at which the two discourses meet each
other are the ideas of the nation, the state and security. The
sovereignty discourse conceives the nation and the state as real
ontological essences, while the integration discourse grants no prediscursive existence to the nation and treats the state as merely
instrumental in respect of human rights. We shall try to analyze the
security conceptualizations in the Baltic states by addressing the
following questions:
1) What are the referent objects for security or 'what is being
secured'?;
2) How are the main 'dangers, risks and threats' for security being
identified?
3)
How
security
conceptions
are
related
to
the
securitization/desecuritization processes?
12
The subject matter of the analysis are mainly official documents
defining security and foreign policies. In Lithuania this is the "Basics
of National Security of Lithuania" (1996). in Latvia, “Security
Concept of the Republic of Latvia” (1997) and in Estonia,
“Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia” (1996).
3.1 Lithuania
Basics of National Security of Lithuania, 1996
Lithuania's political life presents ample material for the analysis of
conceptualizations of security. In the period between the declaration
of Lithuania’s independence in 1990 and the enactment of the main
document defining Lithuania’s security and defence policies, there
were at least four other drafts of the security conception which were
widely discussed. The Basics of National Security of Lithuania
(BNSL), adopted by Seimas in December 1996, was prepared by a
task group created at the end of 1994. The group consisted of
representatives from all the parties represented in Seimas, and so
the final document expressed the common attitude of Lithuania's
political elite towards the issue of national security. During the years
between the first draft of the conception and the document adopted
by Seimas Lithuania's foreign and security policy acquired a
distinctly pro-Western orientation. Membership in NATO, WEU and
the EU came to be seen as the main means of ensuring national
security.
The referent objects for national security are "human and citizen's
rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; the cherished
values of the nation, its rights and conditions for a free
development; state independence; constitutional order; the integrity
of the state's territory; environmental and cultural heritage." 28 In this
list one can easily identify the three levels of security, that of the
individual person, the nation, and the state, with preferential
treatment of the nation.
The definition of the "risks and threats" is based on a clear-cut
dissection of political reality into the inside ('We') and the outside
(‘Other'). The ‘we' in the document are the Lithuanian state, "an
integral part of the community of European nations", the Baltic
states, the European Union, the countries of Central and Northern
Europe and the United States of America. The relations between
13
states within 'Our' space are characterized in terms of integration,
co-operation and collaboration. The 'Other' are "states of unstable
democracy”, such as Belarus and the territory of the Kaliningrad
district . Their threatening character is presented as an objective
reality, as a result of "the specific geopolitical environment, hardly
predictable due to the existence of militarized territories." 29
Relations with the 'Other' are characterized in terms of threat
prevention, including the prohibition of “joining in any form any new
political, military, economic or any other inter-state alliances or
commonwealths established on the basis of the former Soviet
Union"
and the endeavor “to demilitarize the Karaliauèius
(Kaliningrad) Region and to encourage its development, provided
this development does not contradict the interests of Lithuania."30
In defining the threats to the state’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty security is subdivided into political, military, economic,
ethnic and criminal sectors; that is, the document is based on an
extremely wide yet detailed concept of security.31
The most prominent feature of the document is the partition of the
security space into the zone of peace and the zone of potential
conflict. The concept of security that is employed is clearly within
the field of meanings of the sovereignty discourse with its
characteristic "dialectic of conflict". Membership in EU, NATO and
WEU are seen as the main means of ensuring Lithuania’s security
and the country’s habitation in the zone of peace.
The document’s belonging to the sovereignty discourse is also
indicated by the underlying conception of the nation and the state.
The nation is credited with a constant identity and the protection of
its purity is one of the essential tasks of security policy. The state is
to protect the nation from "factors weakening the nation's power of
survival and sense of identity”, from “neglect of national values”; it
should ensure the "natural development of national culture"
(emphasis mine, G.M). The state is conceived as territorial nationstate with the conspicuous features of a welfare state wielding
nearly unlimited control over the society.
One can say that in the triple transition mentioned above (nation
and state building; establishment of new political institutions based
on the rule of law; building the foundations for an effective and
productive market economy), security is mostly tied to state building
14
and preservation of the nation. The document is revealing of the
tension present in Lithuania’s political life, namely the orientation to
the nation-state in domestic policies and orientation to integration
with the West in foreign policy. Yet the former orientation is the
dominant one. The conception is expressive of the political
discourse that was predominant in 1992-95 and it provided for a farreaching politicization of society.
The conceptualization of security in the document is essentially
based on the paradigm of realism. Security is conceived as
preservation of the permanent and unchanging entity (the nation,
the state) by discovering the threats it faces and neutralizing them
by political and military means. These ideas are squarely within the
sovereignty-based discourse. This is only natural, since the goal of
the documents is the justification of the nation-state security and
nation-state foreign policy. The goal of integration with the West is
still based on the meanings of sovereignty discourse. In justifying
the integration process the meanings, which have been shaped in
the sovereignty discourse are being transferred to the emerging
integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the
relations between ‘inside' and ‘outside', when applied to the
integration process, can easily lead to misunderstandings and
inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.
3.2. Latvia
Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia (1997)
The Security Concept of Latvia belongs to the same period as
Lithuania’s Basics of National Security and it can be treated as a
stage in the construction of Latvia’s political identity. The document
starts with the statement: "Latvia’s national security is protection
and preservation of its state sovereignty, territorial integrity,
language and national identity, democratic regime as provided in the
Constitution, market economy and human rights, and protection of
public and private interests."32 The list of the referent objects of
security is a mixture of the sovereignty and the integration
discourses. References to state and the nation ('language and
national identity') can be attributed to the sovereignty discourse,
while the claims concerning the protection of market economy and
human rights are expressive of integrating and globalizing
15
tendencies. The emphasis on language as a special concern of
security can be interpreted as determination to pursue certain
nationalist policies, despite unfavorable international reaction to the
country’s laws on citizenship and language.
The section dealing with threats reads: "Threats to Latvia that can
be considered real are: activities aimed against Latvia’s
independence and its constitutional system; the political or
economic subjugation to or other types of dependence on other
countries; hindering Latvia's integration into European and
Transatlantic structures, the unification of different social and ethnic
groups into one nation, impeding economic and social development
in Latvia, as well as delaying the improvement of its defence
capabilities. The threats can emerge in political, military, economic,
social and ecological spheres, individually or in combination.
External pressure, the unfavorable development of international
political processes, can destabilize internal political situation,
aggravate conflicts between political forces and social groups within
the country and lead to a crisis. External and internal threat factors
are closely related as they interact and combine" (emphasis mine,
G.M.).
The list of threats mirrors the position Latvia occupies as the middle
Baltic State. Situated between Lithuania and Estonia the country
has no borders with any Western state, but has a long border with
Russia and Belarus. The threats, as listed in the document, are not
explicitly associated with any particular state, yet their quality is
such that one can easily identify some sensitive points in Latvia’s
relations with Russia. These are Latvia’s economic dependence
(particularly for energy resources) on Russia, Russia’s opposition to
Latvia’s integration with transatlantic structures, the tension
between Latvia and Russia caused by the alleged violation of
Russian speaking minorities’ rights in Latvia.
Like other Baltic states, after fifty years of occupation Latvia was
faced with the choice: either to get reconciled with the fact that "the
injustices inflicted on them have turned them into binational states
and there is no way of turning the clock back"33 or to make an
attempt at rebuilding the nation-state grounded on national values.
Specifically, the first alternative could have meant the adoption of
the so-called zero-option law on citizenship (adopted in Lithuania in
16
1989), according to which all those resident in the country at the
moment of the declaration of independence acquire citizenship
rights; recognition of two official languages, etc. The other
alternative would imply some mixture of the ethnopolitics of
exclusion and recognition of certain universal human rights. The
choice of the Baltic states was essentially the latter alternative. So it
is no wonder that the Latvian language has become the referent
object of security. It is namely this direction of state and nation
building that finds expression in Latvia’s security conception.
In comparing security conceptions of Lithuania and Latvia, as
manifested in the documents considered, one can easily notice their
basic similarity and their rootedness in the realist/neorealist
theoretical paradigm. Both conceptions are characterized by the
concern with the security of the nation-state and the consequent
instrumental treatment of the integration with Western political and
security structures. There are some differences, too: Lithuania’s
conception is far more detailed (e.g. the section dealing with threats
is only several lines’ long in the Latvian document, while in the
Lithuanian one it is more than two pages long with a detailed listing
of threats) and it manifests stronger tendencies towards
politicization and securitization. It should also be noted that Latvia’s
conception pays more attention to the co-operation between the
Baltic states considered as "one of the main preconditions and
means for integration into European and transatlantic structures, as
well as a guarantee for political and economic autonomy. Latvia's
security policies are founded on the belief that a threat to one of the
Baltic nations is a threat to all three." Though no one Baltic state
ever denied the idea of co-operation, only Latvia has included it in a
document defining security policy.
3.3.Estonia
Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia (1996)
In contrast with Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia has no official national
security conception, and is contented with the statement of national
defence principles. This fact alone indicates a different approach to
security. In the transition process Estonia’s state and nation building
went along with rapid free market economic reforms and the
establishment of new political institutions based on the rule of law .
The remarkably successful macroeconomic and structural reforms
17
in Estonia were recognized when the decision was made to include
Estonia in the first group of countries to be invited to start the EU
membership negotiations in 1997. Estonia's successful economic
development has been the result of consistent and resolute
economic policies and actions. Estonia pursued a very liberal and
open external economic policy, a tight monetary policy and a fast
and open privatization policy. Estonia was the first of the Baltic
states to enter the process of integration with the West and is the
most advanced in this respect. Estonia’s specific approach to
security is related to these developments.
In 1996 Estonia’s Riigikogu (Parliament) adopted the "Guidelines of
the National Defence Policy of Estonia". Some of the statements of
this small document help clarify the details of the security concept
employed in Estonia’s official political discourse. The document
asserts that "the security of all states is indivisible and the security
of no one state can be achieved at the expense of another state." 34
Estonia adheres "to generally recognized principles of international
law and customs". The document relates Estonia’s security to
general security conditions both in the Baltic Sea region and in
Europe; Estonia "will develop political and defence related cooperation with states in the Baltic Sea region" and also "close
defence-related co-operation with Latvia and Lithuania". Full
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
Western European Union (WEU) "is the main political and practical
vehicle by which Estonia can develop and strengthen its security
and national defence".
The document lists the following objectives of security and defence
policies: "independence and sovereignty of the state, the indivisible
integrity of its land area, territorial waters and airspace, its
constitutional order and the vitality of its people". The threats are
defined in one sentence: "the main sources of danger threatening
state security are aggressive imperial aspirations and political and /
or military instability". The definition, as in the case of the two other
Baltic states, clearly relates to the problems in Estonia’s relations
with Russia.
The general approach of the document indicates that in the official
Estonian political discourse the meaning of security is more akin to
that of global, rather than national security. Specifically, this means
18
that the sensitive issues in Estonia’s transition process are not
being conceptualized only in terms of state or nation security, but
are rather made issues of civil political society. This understanding
of security counteracts the usual tendencies of securitization in the
state building process.35
A comparison of the security conceptions employed in official
political discourse of the three Baltic states leads to the conclusion
that Lithuania’s and Latvia’s conceptions of security with their
emphasis on the nation and the state belong to the sovereignty
discourse. The analysis of the documents shows that their security
conceptions are based on the neorealist assumption that the state’s
priorities and threats can be easily and unambiguously defined and
that they remain the same despite interactions with other states and
institutional dynamics. Security thus conceived incites enmity in
foreign policy and lays the grounds for the practice of securitization
in domestic policy. By way of contrast, Estonia’s conception of
security is more guided by the idea of co-operative, rather than
national security.
Recentlly this orientation to co-operative security is noticeable in all
Baltic states and it is manifested in the National Defence Concept of
Latvia (1999), Military Defence Strategy of Lithuania (2000) and
National Military Strategy of Estonia (2001). In all of them it is
emphasized that Baltic states’ system of national security and
defence is to be developed as part of common European and
transatlantic arrangements.
Let us now consider the way these conceptions have been
reflected in security policy options of the Baltic states.
4. Security Policy options of the Baltic States
Theoretically, in terms of political and military security arrangements
the Baltic states had the following menu for choice:
1) non-alignment, or neutrality;
2) an alliance of two or several small states;
3) membership of a multilateral alliance around one or more major
powers;
4) a bilateral alliance with a major power of the region.36
19
The Baltic states belong to the politically identifiable Baltic Sea
region. It is composed of ten states, with four of them being NATO
members, three aspirants for membership, four members of EU,
plus Russia with the Kaliningrad enclave. All of them are members
of the Council of Europe. For several centuries the major power of
the East Baltic region was Russia. In the wake of recent changes in
the environment of the Baltic States "they became three small
elements in a situation whereby one pole had collapsed and the
other - as represented by the core element of NATO, the European
Communities and Germany - was comparatively stronger."37 This
is why in security and policy debates only the first three options
came into consideration, namely (1) neutrality, (2) alliance of the
Baltic states; (3) integration into Western security and political
structures: NATO and EU membership.
4.1. Neutrality
We employ the traditional concept of neutrality, according to which
"neutrality precludes membership in military alliances and prohibits
ties with other countries beyond a low threshold of integration.”38 All
three Baltic states have experienced a period of a positive attitude
towards neutrality. Although it was never officially adopted,
neutrality was quite a popular idea in the political discourse of 198991 and it remained a live option until 1994. Even in 1996, at the 9th
session of the Baltic Assembly in Riga neutrality was an important
issue of debates. However, it was judged a dangerous policy.
Presently, the idea of neutrality exists only at the remote periphery
of the political spectrum of the Baltic states. In Lithuania it is
supported by the coalition "Uz teisingà Lietuvà" (“For a Just
Lithuania”) comprising several nonparliamentary parties. In Estonia
and Latvia it is supported by Russian political organizations.
However, neutrality as a means of ensuring the country's stability
and security has been favorably treated by a substantial part of the
population. A public opinion survey in 1998 showed that in Latvia
the largest group of population believed that neutrality was the best
guarantee for Latvia’s security and stability (29 per cent). In Estonia
neutrality as a means of security was considered second best
option (29 per cent) next to membership in both NATO and EU (30
per cent). In Lithuania the largest group considered membership in
NATO the best way (26 per cent), followed by neutrality (23 per
cent) and membership in both NATO and EU.39
20
The question arises, why the idea of neutrality has lost its vitality
and is not considered seriously as a security policy option?
Neutrality was an alternative to the allied status during the reign of
the bipolar power structure. It is based on the realist concepts of
sovereignty and independence of policy and on the idea of
objectively identifiable threats The conditions which facilitated the
maintenance of neutral policies no longer obtain. As traditionally
conceptualized, neutrality has come to be seen largely irrelevant in
the post-Cold era, unable to contend with the highly interdependent
nature of the contemporary international system and the diffuse
nature of threats it harbors.40 In the new unipolar Europe, with the
EU as the pole, neutrality has changed its content. The conclusion
is well supported by the contemporary security policy of such
traditionally neutral states as Finland and Sweden.41 In 1995 Finland
and Sweden joined the European Union committing themselves to
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. Neutrality
was replaced by membership in the EU and cooperation with NATO.
In the Baltic states neutrality was first associated with the
peculiarities of the construction of nation and state identity. In early
1990s, when constructing their political identities, the Baltic states
still conceived themselves as situated in bipolar world, in between
the two cultural and political poles: the East and the West.
Geopolitically, they considered themselves as small and weak
states on the borderline between two different cultural traditions:
European Catholic and Protestant culture (the West) and the
Slavonic-Byzantine cultural tradition (the East). In this context
neutrality was quite naturally associated with the metaphor of the
Baltic states as the bridge between the East and the West. In 1992
Estonia’s President Lennart Meri emphasized in a foreign policy
statement: “We are convinced that Estonia's geopolitical location,
historical ties and current political situation enables Estonia to
become a bridge, or a land of contacts.”42 Early in 1993 Lithuania’s
President Algirdas Brazauskas, relating the image of the bridge to
the idea of Lithuania as mediator between the interests of the East
and the West, made it a major principle of foreign and security
policy. Along with the idea of neutrality of each Baltic state the idea
of a demilitarized neutral Baltoscandia entered discussions
(especially in Estonia).43
21
It is quite natural that neutrality as a security policy option was
popular at the time of liberation movements and immediately after
the restoration of independence. For this was the period when the
problem of national and political identity, closely related to issues of
foreign and security policies, became most urgent. Identity issues
were urgent not only for the Baltic states but also for Russia and
NATO. For the Baltic states neutrality meant the continuity of foreign
and security policies of the re-established states with those of the
interwar states. In the 1930s all of them adopted a policy of
neutrality. In re-constructing their identities the Baltic States focused
on particularity and differentiation. Some aloofness from both the
East and the West was considered important for the preservation of
pre-given identity. The positive attitude to neutrality was also
encouraged by Russia's progress in 1991-92 towards a liberal
state's identity.
The idea of neutrality was finally discarded in 1993-94. This was
influenced by the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic
States, by the results of the Duma elections in Russia in 1993, and
by a more active NATO policy towards the CEE states. After Duma
elections Russia’s quest for a liberal state's identity was superseded
by the ideology of “return to the empire.”44 The ideas of a Baltic
security alliance and of integration with Western security structures
soon became predominant in the Baltic states.
The issue of neutrality of the Baltic sates was raised once again by
Russia in 1997-98. Early in 1997 Moscow came up with the 'Baltic
Concept" which can be considered as Russia’s response to Baltic
States’ declared intention to join the NATO. The document was
explicit about Russia's interests: non-allied status of the Baltic
states, economic and cultural co-operation, border co-operation and
the citizenship issue. The document envisioned the traditional role
of the Baltic States as Russia's cordon sanitaire. A trade-off was
proposed: the Baltic states’ renouncement of NATO membership in
exchange for the guarantees of their security needs. The border
treaty with Lithuania was signed in October 1997. After NATO
Madrid meeting (July 1997), and with the Baltic states’ intention to
sign the US-Baltic Charter declared, Russia’s officials emphasized
that the only basis for Baltic security was “the preservation of their
status outside blocs.”45 In exchange for non-alliance President Boris
Yeltsin proposed Russia’s guarantees for the security of the Baltic
22
states through the establishment of regional security arrangements,
the so-called “cross-security guaranties.”46 Russia also proposed to
establish a Regional Security and Stability Pact based on the
principles of the OSCE.
All of these proposals were rejected by the Baltic states and the
West. At the end of 1997 presidents of the three Baltic states
announced in a joint communiqué that unilateral security
guarantees do not correspond to the spirit of new Europe and that
such guarantees, as well as regional security pacts, had never been
on the agenda of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Similar attitudes
were voiced by Western commentators: "The creation of ... a neutral
or non-aligned zone would be of no security value to either the West
or the Baltic States. Such a demilitarized zone would leave the
Baltic states exposed and vulnerable and allow Russia the
advantage to station forces in the geographical proximity without a
counterbalance from the West."47
4.2. Regional Security arrangements: Alliance of the Baltic States
By 1994 all Baltic States recognized that the idea of neutrality was
dangerous and unacceptable. So it was natural that in January 1994
Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas emphasized co-operation
between the Baltic States as a top priority of Lithuania's foreign
policy. In 1994 in Tallinn the Baltic countries signed the Agreement
on Baltic Parliamentary and Government Co-operation between
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.48 The Agreement includes the
following frameworks for co-operation: the Baltic Assembly (founded
in 1991), the Baltic Council of Ministers (established in 1994) and
the Baltic Council as a joint body for governments and parliaments.
In addition, the three Heads of State meet regularly at least once a
year, and there are frequent contacts between the ministers.
The issue of building the Baltic defence alliance was raised at the
6th session of the Baltic Assembly (Riga, April 1995). Later in
August 1996 a group of Estonian politicians issued a joint statement
calling for a Baltic Security Pact that would help maintain the
security of the Baltic States till their admission to NATO. According
to the data of the 'Baltijos tyrimai' (Baltic Survey) of January 1996,
more than half of the population of the Baltic countries supported
the creation of a military alliance of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia;
23
the percentage in Lithuania was 69%, in Latvia 67%, in Estonia
64% of those surveyed. However, the idea did not receive sufficient
support by the political elites of the Baltic states; Lithuania was
particularly reserved about the idea.49 The idea is nearly forgotten
now.
One can say, in retrospect, that the whole idea was a rehearsal of
the past, an attempt to ‘remake’ history by restoring the failed
interwar defence alliance of the Baltic states. It can also be seen as
a response to both Russia’s opposition to Baltic states’ membership
in NATO and the Western reservation and skepticism concerning
this membership. However, the fact that the idea did not take root in
the political discourse of the Baltic states can be explained not only
by external causes, but also by the fact that the idea of a Baltic
identity did not resonate with core elements of older narratives of
their political identities. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania being 'put in the
same basket' by fifty years of the common Soviet past are united
not so much by a positive self-identification, but rather by a
construction of a common danger. That explains the similarity of
their key security policy option - integration into Western security
and political structures.
5. The Western option
The pro-Western orientation of the Baltic states’ security and foreign
policy is unambiguously demonstrated by their quest for
membership in the main Western intergovernmental organizations EU, NATO, WEU. As has been noted, because of the dominance of
the sovereignty discourse related to the construction of the nationstate identity and to the neorealist conception of security the
justification of such membership is primarily instrumental (Article 5
on security guarantees). Thus, on the one hand, the Baltic states’
endeavor of becoming part of the West is a clear instance of
bandwagoning.50 However, on the other hand, the very process of
integration with the West is “an act of identity construction - creating
the limits within which 'members' must fit in order to be 'inside', in
order to be defined as 'Self' in the NATO context, rather than
'Other.”51 A major question here is how the actors’(the Baltic States,
NATO, EU, Russia) identities are being (re)constituted by the
practices of enlargement. Yet this is beyond the scope of the
present paper; here we confine ourselves to the question how the
24
Baltic States’ identities and their security policies are being changed
by the practices of enlargement.
In the constructivist perspective, NATO and EU can be defined as
"constitutive institutions that contribute to shaping actors' identities,
values and interests"52 by imposing "definitions of member
characteristics and purposes upon the govermnents of member
states."53 The enlargement of an international organization is
primarily conceived as a process of international socialization. At an
institutional level, a successful internalization of an applicant state is
indicated by the integration of the fundamental community norms
into the state constitution and their translation into (stable) domestic
laws.
Thus, the enlargement process can be analyzed as “a
process of teaching and learning community values and norms.”54
As Wendt argues, "by teaching others and themselves to cooperate
... actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other - to
see themselves as 'we' bound by certain norms."55 In this context
the pro-Western security option of the Baltic States’ is an
institutionalization of their identification with Western values and
norms.
After regaining their independence the Baltic States have been
constructing their political identities in terms of the East/West
opposition. They have been creating narratives of a belonging to the
West and a narrative of the East as the Baltics' threatening other.
The narratives legitimize their foreign security policy of integration
with the West and differentiation from the East. The concepts of the
East and the West are highly value-loaded, with the West being
associated with prosperity, security and democracy, whereas the
East linked with poverty, unpredictability, insecurity. Geopolitically,
the West is associated with the EU and the NATO countries, the
East with the CIS, mainly with Russia and Belarus.
Identification with the West is manifested by active participation in
many Western political, economic and security organizations. The
Baltic states are full members of UN, Council of Europe,
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, and World Trade Organization. The Baltic
states have been invited to commence talks for joining the EU
(Estonia in 1997, Latvia and Lithuania in 1999); they are Associate
partners of Western European Union. In 1994, after the withdrawal
25
of Russian troops, the Baltic states applied for full membership in
NATO. NATO’s response to the aspirations of the candidate
countries came in early 1994 in the form of an invitation to
participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The first
Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) was signed between
Lithuania and NATO in November 1994. The Baltic states expect to
be invited to full NATO membership at the NATO summit in 2002.
Integration with the West has been followed by political, economic
and cultural distancing from the East. In Lithuania the process was
boosted by the Constitutional Act of June 8, 1992 which prohibits
Lithuania entering any new political, military, economic or any other
alliances with the states or commonwealths formed on the basis of
the former USSR. The Baltic States' economies are switching from
markets in the East to those in the West. A restitutionist
interpretation of independence has legitimized the ethnopolitics of
exclusion in domestic politics and intensified the construction of
danger from the East (Russia) in the legitimization of foreign
security policy.56
The image of Russia as the “ontological other of Europe”, in the
words of Iver Neuman, has a long history.57 Contemporary Baltic
politicians carry on the historical tradition. Thus in 1995 Lennart
Meri referring to the West and Russia remarked: “They thought that
by feeding a tiger more and more meat, it would eventually turn into
a vegetarian.”58 Vytautas Landsbergis, former Chairman of the
Seimas of Lithuania used a similar metaphor. In a speech delivered
at the international conference 'The Role of NATO in a Changing
Security Environment of Europe' held in Vilnius (May 2000) he
compared living near Russia with living at a volcano: "Those who
live at a volcano should keep in mind the danger and plan the steps
to be made in case of an emergency. ‘Do not worry, stop talking
about the danger, for this may irritate the volcano’ - heeding such an
advice would be a grave mistake; security should be your constant
concern, in particular when you live close to a volcano."59
However, in Lithuania’s political discourse there is also present a
very different view of Russia, which is lucidly expressed in the
following quote from a speech of Lithuania’s President Valdas
Adamkus (2000):
26
"The threat of Russia is put forward as a key argument for our
membership in NATO and the EU. This is the old policy of barricade
building. It is negative and inflexible. It returns us to the circle of
states causing problems and incapable of a constructive dialogue
with neighbours. Such behaviour in politics distances us from the
principles of the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. (emphasis mine, G.M.).
It distances us from the community of Western nations. Lithuania
cannot remain a hostage of history and geography. Lithuania's
Euro-Atlantic aspirations and good relations with Russia are
compatible.The development of democracy in Russia is rather
controversial and we cannot fail to notice it. But we should not
create ourselves a threat to Lithuania. Today we must search for
common interests and areas of potential agreement. This is the only
way to reach agreement with Russia on the issues, which still divide
us today."60
The two quotes are indicative of the difference between conceptions
of security employed, respectively, in the sovereignty and in the
integration discourse. In the former case, with Russia compared to a
tiger or a volcano, the familiar image of the Russian bear is being
exploited.61 The emphasis is on Russia’s irrationality and
unpredictability; Russia can only be endured, but never changed.
This is the geopolitical view of the situation, with agents imputed
pre-given and permanent identity. In the latter case, by contrast,
one is urged to view the relations with Russia in terms of mutual
interests. Inability to do so would mean distancing "from the
principles of the Euro-Atlantic mainstream ", "from the community of
Western nations". Integration is thus related to learning “the
principles of the Euro-Atlantic mainstream”.
Now let us consider how the Baltic states’ Euroatlantic integration
“shapes state practices by establishing, articulating, and
transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and
legitimate state behaviour.”62
5.1 NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States
The main normative documents defining the Alliance's principles for
accessing new members are the Partnership for Peace Framework
Document (1994) and the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995).
They are based on a broad concept of security, "embracing political
27
and economic, as well as defence, components."63 The condition for
the acceptance of new members "into the existing community of
values and institutions" is their commitment to "the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". The Study also
specifies some problem areas which should be of particular concern
for those seeking membership in the Alliance: "States which have
ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist
claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes
by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution
of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a
state to join the Alliance.”64 An important condition is applicant
countries’ military capability to contribute to NATO's collective
defence.
Thus NATO enlargement is a deliberative project, based on certain
normative principles, with stated ways of its implementation and
supervision of the whole process.
One can say that this is "a process of teaching and learning
community values and norms."65 Let us now consider the changes
that have taken place in the Baltic States as a result of their
attempts to meet NATO membership criteria concerning territorial
and ethnic disputes and defence capabilities.
5.1.1. Territorial disputes
Baltic States and Russia
All Baltic states have borders with Russia. After ten years since their
declaration of independence only Lithuania has signed a border
treaty with Russia (1997), though it is still not ratified by Russia
(Lithuania ratified it in 1999). Border disputes between Russia and
Estonia and between Russia and Latvia began immediately after
their declaration of independence. As noted above, the two
republics wanted to get back the territories which were assigned to
them by the 1920 Peace Treaties with Russia. They assumed the
treaties were still valid, despite the annexation of both republics by
the USSR in 1940, while Russia considered them a matter of
bygone history. Strained relations with Russia continued till 1994.
An important factor in this was the enactment in 1991 in Latvia and
in 1992 in Estonia of citizenship laws.
28
Estonia in November 1996 and Latvia in February 1997 gave up
their demands for the inclusion of reference to the 1920 peace
treaties in border agreements with Russia. Since
1997 it was
agreed by foreign ministers of Latvia and Russia that the border
agreement was ready for signing. The Estonian-Russian border
negotiations were concluded on March, 1999 and now also formally
ready to be signed, yet by 2001 they are still not signed.
Undoubtedly, the drawn out story of border agreements is partly due
to Baltic states’ endeavor of joining the NATO. Even if this was a
reason for the abandonment of their territorial claims against
Russia, this was also an excuse for Russia’s delay in signing and
ratifying border agreements and thus creating an obstacle (beside
the minorities’ problem) to their membership in NATO.
Lithuania has no border disputes with Russia at the official level.
The interwar Lithuania did not border Russia at all, and
contemporary Lithuania has no common border with mainland
Russia. But it has a long border, 247 km long, with the Russian
enclave - the Kaliningrad region. The region is an enclave of
15,100 sq. km with a population of some 930,000.66 It is the
northern half of the pre-war German province of East Prussia with
the center in Konigsberg. It was annexed to Russia in 1945. Since
1991 it has been separated from the rest of the Russian Federation
by Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus. The region is wholly dependent on
transit from/to mainland via Lithuania. The legal framework of
Russian transit via Lithuania is based on bilateral agreements.67
The railway and airborne military transit is regulated by a temporary
agreement which is prolonged each year. The lack of a permanent
agreement on military transit and Lithuania’s alleged right to allow or
disallow it is a source of squabbles concerning Lithuanian-Russian
border. Since the declaration of independence the legitimacy of
Lithuania’s borders with Russia and Belorus (the Vilnius region and
the Klaipeda region) has been often disputed in Russia’s media.
The latest flow of publications on this issue was incited by
Lithuania’s President Valdas Adamkus visit to Moscow in March
2001.68
In the ten years of independence there have been considerable
changes in the treatment of the Kaliningrad problem in Lithuania from the view of it as a direct threat to Lithuania’s security to the
view that it is a common problem of the Baltic Sea region, to the
29
solution of which Lithuania might contribute a great deal. These
changes are undoubtedly related to Lithuania’s integration with the
West.
Lithuania and Poland
After the declaration of independence Lithuania’s relations with
none other country have undergone such contradictory dynamics,
as the relations with Poland. The two countries have old historical
ties. One can speak of their common history starting with the Lublin
Union (1569) which brought the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
into existence. The common history includes both joint uprisings
against the Russian Empire in the 19th century and also the Polish
occupation of Vilnius in 1920. The territorial conflict between
Lithuania and Poland constituted the leitmotif of the foreign and
security policy of inter-war Lithuania.
One can distinguish three phases in the dynamics of LithuanianPolish relations: the first phase (March 1990 - August 1991) was
characterized by Poland’s unconditional support for Lithuania’s
quest for independence (short of the official recognition); the second
(till 1994) was characterized by growing tension and animosity
reaching its climax at the end of 1991 and early 1992; close cooperation, political and military, that began in 1994 and Poland’s
support for Lithuania’s membership in NATO are the main features
of the third phase.
At the end of 1991 Lithuania’s Minister of Defence Audrius
Butkevicius referred to Poland as the greatest threat to Lithuania’s
security, while Poland’s President L. Walesa, in a letter to Vytautas
Landsbergis, described Lithuanian-Polish relations as “on the verge
of crisis.”69 It was even argued that the relations between the two
countries at that time were in some respects “worse that in pre-war
times.”70 The discord originated mainly from two problems: that of
Lithuania’s demand for Poland’s official recognition of Vilnius region
as part and parcel of Lithuania and that concerning the status of the
Polish minority in Lithuania. The quarrel about Vilnius was related to
different interpretations of the past. Lithuania’s politicians insisted
that any treaty with Poland should include a clause on Polish
occupation of Vilnius in 1920 and a renunciation on Poland’s part of
any territorial claims to Vilnius and Vilnius region. Poland,
contending that the present situation and the historical past should
30
be kept separate, refused the inclusion of such a clause. Thus the
signing of the proposed Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was
delayed for several years.
The problem of the Polish minority in Lithuania came into the open
at the end of 1980s, with the liberation movement acquiring a
nationalist character. The Polish minority (about 9 per cent of
Lithuania’s population) is located in mostly rural area in the southeastern part of Lithuania (which was occupied by Poland in 192039). In this area the Poles comprise from 63 per cent (Vilnius
district, with the exclusion of Vilnius city) to
90 per cent (Salcininkai district) of local population. The Polish
minority was particularly distressed by the constitutional amendment
of November 1988 enacted by Lithuania’s Supreme Soviet making
Lithuanian the official language. In April 1989 the "Polish Union in
Lithuania" was established. Besides the issues of social and cultural
problems of the Poles in Lithuania, the agenda of the Union
included the demand of political autonomy
for the south-eastern region of Lithuania.
Since Lithuania’s declaration of independence in March 1990 the
problem of the Polish minority has mostly expressed itself in the
conflict between central and local authorities. For example, while
most of Lithuania’s population boycotted the USSR referendum on
the preservation of the Soviet Union (March 17, 1990), the
Salcininkai local council decided to uphold the referendum. Despite
the increasing tension between central authorities and local councils
of the predominantly Polish areas, the problem of the Polish
minority remained essentially a domestic policy problem till
Lithuania’s international recognition. Openly nationalist publications
appearing both in Lithuania’s and Poland’s press did not undermine
Poland’s support for Lithuania’s quest for independence.71 It should
be noted that the first to congratulate the Lithuanian people with a
"return to the family of free nations" were the deputies of Poland's
parliament.
After Lithuania’s international recognition in 1991 the problem of
the Polish minority became transformed from a domestic issue into
an international problem of the Polish-Lithuanian relations. The
relations between the two countries became especially strained
after Lithuania’s Supreme Council (the Parliament) imposed direct
31
rule over Vilnius and Salcininkai districts on 5 November 1991.
Although the parliament justified the act as a response to the local
councils’ support for the leaders of the attempted coup d'état in
Moscow in August 1991, Warsaw accused Vilnius of using this as
an excuse for the persecution of national minorities because of their
desire for greater autonomy. Thus, immediately after Lithuania’s
international recognition the problem of the Polish minority was
conceptualized in terms of threats to the nation and the state, i.e. it
was securitized both in Lithuania and Poland.
The year 1994 was the turning point in Polish-Lithuanian relations.
The long delayed Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was
signed. The change was related to Central European states’
movement towards closer association with NATO. Poland came to
be seen as a bridge linking Lithuania with the EU and NATO. From
that time the idea that Lithuania belongs to Central Europe rather
than to the Nordic or the Baltic countries began its circulation in
Lithuania’s political discourse. The two countries’ co-operation gets
stronger both at the parliamentary and the executive levels. During
the visit to Lithuania in 1996 by Poland's president Kwasniewski it
was agreed to prioritize military co-operation. The two countries
endorsed common projects on airspace control, joint military
exercises and peace-keeping. The decision to establish the
Lithuanian-Polish peacekeeping battalion (LITPOLBAT) was
confirmed by an intergovernmental agreement that came into force
on 3 December 1997. A bilateral working group has been
established, and an agreement has been reached on the battalion's
structure and training schedule.The exchange of air space
surveillance information is another significant area of co-operation
with Poland.
However, in examining the particulars of Lithuanian-Polish relations
in Lithuania and in Poland we can find some causes for
misunderstandings and tensions. The latest example is an episode
related to the law on the official language dating from 1995. The law
states that languages other than Lithuanian can only be used at
non-state institutions. In January 1998 the Vilnius district
municipality proclaimed Polish the second official language
of the region The decision was annulled by the governor of the
district. In a conciliatory gesture, Lithuania's Seimas adopted an
amendment to the law allowing for dominant regional minority
32
members to make appeals and to communicate in their own
language. Still, the only official language remains Lithuanian.
Despite some mutual concessions,
the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania and of the
Lithuanian minority in Poland are still live issues. In order to tackle
them a bilateral commission was created in May 1999.
In summarizing the development of Lithuanian-Polish relations one
can observe that the major factor in changing the character of these
relations was the two countries’ involvement in the integration
processes which fostered the sense of collective Western identity.
The Lithuanian-Polish rapprochement since 1994 cannot be
explained by the disappearance of the causes of former tension. For
neither the convoluted history of their relations, nor the problem of
the Polish minority in south-east Lithuania have disappeared.
Lithuania and Poland express mutual complaints about their
educational policies. However, neither Lithuania, nor Poland do
consider these facts as security threats.
Baltic States’ Border Agreements
Estonia and Latvia concluded an Agreement on the Reestablishment of the State Border in 1992. The agreement reconfirmed their land border. However, the sea border agreement
was signed only in 1996. This delay was related to the conflict of
interests over commercial fishing rights. The problem was solved in
1997 by signing a separate agreement on fishing rights.
Even more prolonged was the signing of the sea border agreement
between Latvia and Lithuania (the land border agreement was
signed in 1993 and was put in force in 1995). It was signed only in
1999, and it is still not ratified by Latvia’s Parliament. Just as in
Estonian-Latvian case, the sea border dispute is related to the
conflicting economic interests: oil and fishing rights. The heart of the
matter is that in the disputed area of the Baltic Sea shelf there is a
promising oil deposit claimed by both Latvia and Lithuania. Latvia
started negotiations with foreign companies on the exploration and
possible exploitation of the deposit. In Lithuania this was perceived
as injurious to her economic and political interests. The positive turn
in the negotiations was reached when the legal and the economic
aspects of the issue were separated. This, in turn, was influenced
33
by the EU requirement making membership in EU conditional on
signing of a treaty on border delimitation. Nevertheless, in the words
of Latvia’s President Vaire Vyke-Freiberga, the ratification of the
treaty is being delayed by Latvia because of the “concern for the
preservation of traditional fishing areas.”72
The analysis of Baltic states’ border disputes leads to the
conclusion that their common source is the orientation to the nationstate identity and its institutionalization in foreign and security policy.
Positive changes are usually prompted by integration processes and
the requirements for membership in NATO and EU. One can easily
discern the connection between NATO summits and Baltic States’
attempts at solving their border disputes. In 1994 NATO Brussels
summit encouraged the revision of Lithuanian-Polish relations. In
1997 NATO Madrid summit was a stimulus to Estonia and Latvia to
drop their demands of including the treaties of 1920 in border
agreements with Russia. In 1999 NATO Washington summit was a
stimulus for Lithuania and Latvia to sign the sea border agreement.
The conclusion is equally valid in relation to the ethnic disputes in
the Baltic states.
5.1.2 Ethnic disputes
Ethnic unrest in the Baltic states is mostly associated with Latvia
and Estonia. As already noted, during the Soviet period Estonia and
Latvia were transformed into multi-ethnic states. The percentage of
Latvians in Latvia decreased from 77 per cent in 1935 to 52 per cent
in 1989, while the number of Russians grew from 8,8 to 34 per
cent.73 In Estonia, during the same period, the percentage of
Estonians decreased from 86 to 61,5 per cent, while that of
Russians grew from 8 to 30,3 per cent.74 After the restoration of
independence this demographic situation led to the problem of
ethnic minorities, with the involvement of UN, Council of Europe,
OSCE, European Commission and Russia.
The problems of national minorities in the Baltic states are related to
post-communist transition and nation-state building. The crux of the
matter is the question: "Who should be counted as members of the
new states? Should immigrants who moved to the Baltic states in
the Soviet era be counted as citizens on the same terms as the
indigenous population even thought their loyalty towards the new
34
states may be in question? Or should they be excluded from the
political community and be granted political rights only after having
proven their loyalty? A choice is between solidarity based on a
community (or nation) and solidarity based on respect for certain
liberal values and procedural norms."75 The political elite of the
Baltic states has tried, with the assistance of international
organizations, to strike a balance between these two bases of
solidarity.
Latvia in 1991 and Estonia in 1992 enacted some of their legislation
on citizenship; it was based on the idea that because of the coercive
incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union the right to
citizenship could only be automatically accorded to the citizens of
the previous inter-war polity and their descendants. Others, mostly
Russian-speakers, who settled in Latvia and Estonia during the
period of Soviet rule could be admitted to the citizen-polity only
upon meeting certain conditions. As a result, one third of the
population of Estonia and Latvia found themselves without
citizenship.76
The resulting situation had wide repercussions both in the East and
in the West. In November 1992 Boris Yeltsin appealed to the UN
condemning human rights’ violations in the Baltic states. In 1993 an
economic embargo was imposed on the Baltic States. In 1994
Andrei Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs, declared the Baltic states
a source of threat and emphasized the possibility of using force for
the protection of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia and
Latvia. Early in 1997 Russia’s foreign minister Yevgheni Primakov
proclaimed that Russia would not sign border agreements until the
situation of the Russian-speaking minority was improved.
In the West, too, the Latvian and Estonian legislation on citizenship
was met with little enthusiasm. The West tried to improve the Baltic
citizenship legislation through the activities of the EU, the OSCE
and the Council of Europe. In 1993 the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities established missions first in Estonia and then
in Latvia. The recommendations by the high Commissioner to the
Estonian and Latvian governments were responsive to Russia's
concerns with Russian-speaking minorities’ rights and related to
such problems as citizenship, naturalization, stateless children, and
aliens' legitimization.77 Estonia accepted most of the HSNM
35
recommendations. On December 1998 the EU issued a statement
acknowledging
Estonia’s
compliance
with
the
OSCE
recommendations on citizenship. In recent years the main emphasis
has been on their implementation. Latvia, too, accepted most of the
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on national
minorities. These recommendations include the radical acceleration
of naturalization rates, the granting of citizenship to the children of
the permanent residents, and the easing of the language and
constitution tests.78
However, in Russia’s view, Estonian and Latvian authorities have
failed to improve the situation of Russian-speaking minorities and to
comply with recommendations by international experts. The view
found its expression in the Concept of National Security of Russia of
January 2000 which declared the determination to protect legitimate
rights and interests of Russian citizens staying abroad, by using
political, economic and other means.
As this short review of ethnic problems shows, minority problems in
Estonia and Latvia remain a source of strain in the relations with
Russia (particularly in Latvia). Besides, the convoluted process of
minorities’ naturalization raises the question of the role international
organizations can ultimately play in domestic policies and of the
relation of that role to the nation-state identity construction.79
5.3 Military Capability
An important criterion for NATO membership is "the capability of
each member state to come to the defense" and aid of the other
Alliance members as provided by Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. It should perhaps be granted that so far "none of the Baltic
republics currently possesses a credible military force capable of
adequately defending its own territory or of effectively contributing to
NATO's collective defense.”80 Yet one should also recognize
substantial progress made by the Baltic states since they began
building their defence forces from "zero base line" immediately after
the restoration of independence.81 The building of national defence
forces proceeded in two closely linked directions: independent
defence based on the defence structures of the state, and
36
international defence co-operation aimed at developing collective
security in Europe.
Having joined the Partnership for peace program in 1994 the Baltic
States made sustained efforts at meeting NATO requirements for
the interoperability of their defence forces with whose of NATO.
Since 1995 they have participated in the Planning and
Reviewing Process (PARP) submitting every two years detailed
reports on their defence policies and defence structures. They have
given a lot of attention to defence related Baltic co-operation aimed
at strengthening self-defence capabilities and contributing to the
NATO integration process. Baltic defence-related co-operation is
based on defence co-operation agreements and on a set of joint
defence co-operation projects.
Observers of the developments in the Baltic states are certainly
familiar with the four major co-operative projects of the Baltic states
- Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT)82, Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON),
Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and Baltic
Defence College (BDC). Besides, a major joint BALTSEA project of
Baltic, Nordic and other partner countries has been launched with
the aim of coordinating defence and security assistance to Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. The Swedish-Baltic joint project to modernize
the military registration system and mobilization database, called
BALTPERS, has been established.
At the NATO Summit in April 1999 the Baltic States were
designated as NATO candidate states and were subsequently
involved in the Annual Membership Action Plan (MAP). The Action
Plan for 2001 has five main sections: political/economic issues;
defence/military issues; resource issues; information security
issues; legal issues. In accordance with these sections, the Baltic
States, like other aspiring members, elaborate Annual National
Programs which reflect their preparations for Alliance membership
and specify planned undertakings. In March 2001 Lithuania was the
first of the Baltic states to deliver a report to the NATO Council in
Brussels on the country’s progress in implementing the Membership
Action Plan. The report was favorably evaluated.
The former Defence Attaché of Denmark to Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, brigadier General Michael Clemmesen predicted that "in
a couple of years time the armed forces of the Baltic states will have
37
a higher average level of NATO interoperability than any other
forces in Central and Eastern Europe."83
5.4. NATO Membership and Public Opinion
As public opinion surveys show, popular attitudes towards
membership in NATO are far from settled. A public opinion survey
on security issues conducted in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in
March 1998 showed that Lithuania’s population was mostly
supportive of the country's efforts to join NATO: 55 per cent of
Lithuania’s, 47 per cent of Latvia’s and 54 per cent of Estonia’s
population fully supported or rather supported these efforts, while 26
per cent of Lithuania’s population, 32 per cent of Latvia’s population
and 31 per cent of Estonia’s population did not. Almost one out of
six Lithuanian, one out of five Latvian and one out of seven
Estonian residents had no opinion on the matter.84
In 1999 with an upsurge of anti-West propaganda in Lithuania
(related to the Kossovo events) and with actions against the
increase of public spending on defence, popular support for
Lithuania’s integration with NATO decreased. According to the
survey of the Public opinion research center "Vilmorus" (conducted
in September 1999), 36,2 per cent of the respondents were “for”
membership in NATO, 30 per cent were "against", 21,6 per cent
were undecided and 12,2 per cent would abstain from voting on the
issue. (The results of the Vilmorus survey were not published.)
In January 2000 a survey by "Baltijos tyrimai" commissioned by the
Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Lithuanian Association for the
Atlantic Alliance showed that Lithuania’s efforts at joining NATO
were fully approved by 38,6 per cent of the respondents, totally
disapproved by 14,3 per cent, rather disapproved than approved by
30,7 per cent, and 16,3 per cent of the respondents had no opinion
on the issue. According to a later survey by "Baltijos tyrimai"
(January 2001), membership in NATO was approved by 46 per cent
and disapproved by 35 per cent of the respondents.85
According to "Latvijas Fakti" public opinion survey of 2000, the
majority (53,4%) of the respondents in Latvia approved or rather
approved of Latvia's membership in NATO, 32,6% disapproved or
rather disapproved; 21,3% of the respondent fully approved Latvia’s
efforts at joining NATO, 32,1% rather approved, 16,4% rather
38
disapproved, 16,2% wholly disapproved, and 14% gave no
answer.86
Latest public opinion surveys in Estonia (February 2001) indicate
that support for joining NATO has grown to 63% among Estonians
(compared to 56% in the last poll in October 2000), but has
somewhat diminished among non-Estonians. To leave aside people
with no clear position on the matter (20% of respondents), the
balance for "yes" and "no" is 77,5:22,5 among ethnic Estonians,
68:32 among Estonian citizens and 60:40 in general public. Among
younger people the support is higher than on the average both
among Estonians and non-Estonians.87
Thus there is a growing support for membership in NATO in the
popular opinion of the Baltic states. Yet it is still not settled. The
NATO involvement in the Kossovo conflict in 1999 led to a decrease
in the number of supporters. E.g. in Lithuania, according to the
survey by 'Vilmorus' in May 1999, those 'against NATO'
outnumbered for the first time those 'for NATO' (32% and 31%,
accordingly). Popular attitudes towards NATO became again more
favorable after the Kossovo issue was closed. An influential, even if
not the dominant factor in the Baltic states was Russia’s mass
media interpretation of the Kosovo events presenting NATO
involvement as a violation of international law and an encroachment
on Yugoslavia’s sovereignty. This shows that a substantial part of
Baltic states’ population consider NATO primarily as a defence
alliance ensuring member states’ sovereignty rather than collective
European security. Thus the motivation for membership in NATO is
still mostly based on the sovereignty discourse.
6. Concluding remarks
Basing ourselves on the constructivist perspective we have tried to
review the Baltic states’ nation state building story of the last ten
years as a continuous search for security and identity. With the end
of the Cold War the quest for a new identity became a pressing
issue for other actors in the Baltic security space as well, namely for
Russia and for the West. Conceiving themselves as the meeting
point of Eastern and Western civilizations, or as the outskirts of the
39
West, the Baltic states have been constructing their narratives of
‘return to Europe’ and of Russia as their threatening Other.
The West, by contrast, have made a sustained endeavor of revising
the traditional model of their relations with Russia. In supporting the
democratization processes in Russia the West has aimed at
creating a common security space encompassing both Russia and
the Baltic states. As for the majority of Russia's political elite, they
have held that Baltic states are part of Russia’s sphere of influence
and that problems in relations with them should be resolved on the
bilateral basis, without direct or indirect interference on the part of
third parties. The active and unswerving Baltic quest for
membership in NATO was perceived in Russia as a challenge to its
national interests.
The ‘Baltic dilemma’, or the attempt at reconciling different and
sometimes conflicting interests of the Baltic states, Russia and the
West, finds its reflection in Baltic states’ security conceptualizations
and security policies. Their security conceptions, based on the idea
of nation-state building, are dominated by an instrumental
interpretation of the integration with the West. While Western
decision-makers saw NATO as becoming “more of a co-operative
security organization in its relations with Russia", politicians in the
Baltic states used to treat it as a "collective defence organization
against Russia.”88 This view on the role of NATO in Baltic security
conceptions was particularly prominent till NATO Madrid summit in
1997.
The process of integration with the West proceeding via
international socialization of Western values has been leading the
Baltic states ever closer to Western security community. Their
potential membership in NATO which they associate with NATO
Summit in 2002 has substantially boosted their efforts at meeting
formal criteria for membership. Particularly successful has been the
process of adjusting their armed forces’ to NATO standards, a
process encouraging their defence-related co-operation.
Yet despite the ongoing integration processes the sovereignty of the
nation is here still mostly associated with that of the nation-state,
while in the West there is a tendency to separate the nation and the
state.89 The Baltic states’ integration with the West proceeds in a
40
highly competitive way, and the idea of one’s country’s success
(such as membership in NATO or EU) as success for all, though
proclaimed in official documents, is rarely made good. Estonia
hopes to be the first to be admitted to EU, while Lithuania has
similar hopes concerning membership in NATO. Thus the
integration proceeds mostly at the institutional level without making
much tangible effect on the building of their common identity. The
same conclusion holds concerning Baltic states’ membership in EU.
As the Study for NATO Enlargement notes, the expansion of EU is
"a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to
extending security and stability to the new democracies in the
East.”90 However, this is a topic for separate analysis.
Notes and References

I gratefully acknowledge the help and comments of Algirdas Degutis, Pertti
Joenniemi, Charles Krupnick, egidijus Vareikis, and Vaidotas Urbelis
1
See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), The
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1996.
2
The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (German-Soviet NonAggression Pact, 1939) authorized Soviet expansion into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, part of ethnic Poland, and Bessarabia. All these
annexations were 'legalized' by subsequent treaties. The liberation movements of the
Baltic States, emerging in the wake of Gorbachev’s ‘perestoika’, started as demands to
annul the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. In 1989 the resolution
adopted by the Congress of the Peoples' Deputies of the Soviet Union declared the
secret protocols of the pact "legally null and void from the moment of their signing".
(Files of the Congress of the Peoples' Deputies of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, No 29, 27 December 1989, Article 579, pp. 833-834).
Carl Bildt, “The Baltic Litmus Test”, Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1994), p.
73.
3
4
Strobe Talbott. "A Baltic Homecoming, the Frasure memorial lecture, Tallinn, Estonia,
24 Jan. 2000. Quoted in: Martin Walker, "Variable geography: America's mental maps
of a Greater Europe", International Affairs , 76/3 (2000), p.470.
5
Federal News Service (Panel I of a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, European Affair Subcommittee), February 27, (2001).
6
Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies (London: UCL
Press, 1997); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 7.
7
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p.11.
41
Peter van Ham and Przemyslaw Grudzinski “Europe’s New ‘Sphere of Affluence’”,
The National Interest (Winter 2000).
9
David Kirby, ‘Locating the Baltic. Keynote address delivered at the 16th conference
on Baltic studies’. Baltic Studies Newsletter, 22/3 (December 199), p 2.
8
See Zaneta Ozolina, ‘The Impact of the European Union on Baltic Cooperation’.
Working Papers, 3 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999), p.15.
11
Ibid.
12
In the first half of the 16th century, before the union of Lithuania and Poland in
1569 (the Lublin Union) Lithuania, judging by the size of its territory and population,
was the fourth power in Europe (after Moskovia, the European part of Turkey, and
Sweden with Finland. At the time Denmark with Norway rated 8th and Poland the 11th.
13
In 12th century the territories of modern Estonia and Latvia (known as Livonia) were
conquered by the Germans. The German rule continued till the end of the 15th
century. In 16th century Estonia was ruled for longer or shorter periods by Lithuania,
Russia, Denmark; in 1629, by the Truce of Almark all Estonian lands came under
Swedish rule. Latvia's territory was partitioned in 1561. It was partly incorporated into
the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. In 1721 by the Peace of Nystad
Sweden ceded to Russia all its Baltic provinces. The whole of Lithuania became part of
Russia later, in 1795. Russian rule continued in the Baltic countries till the First World
War.
14
The territorial conflict between Lithuania and Poland was the 'leitmotif' of the foreign
and security policy of inter-war Lithuania. The goal of Lithuanian political leaders was
the restoration of independent Lithuania in its ethnic boundaries with Vilnius as capital.
The goal clashed with Poland’s endeavors to re-establish Poland within the boundaries
of 1793. Thus, it claimed the same territories as did Lithuania, the Vilnius and the
Klaipeda (Memel) region. In an attempt to strengthen its position in the negotiations
with Lithuania, Poland seized Vilnius on October 9,1920. Lithuania refused to establish
official relations with Poland until Vilnius remained in her hands. Internationally, the
Polish occupation of Vilnius was qualified as illegal only in 1931, when the international
court in the Hague decided that in seizing Vilnius Poland violated international law.
Diplomatic relations with Poland were established in 1938.
15
Williams E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political
Paradox, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.64.
16
Roger E. Kanet, "Towards the Future: The Emergence of a New Security Order in
East-Central Europe and Eurasia", in William E. Ferry and Rogert E. Kanet (eds.)
Post-Communist States in the World Community, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc,
1998), p. 293.
17
Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies
Today, (Malden: Polity Press, 1999), p.1.
18
Some authors identify three metatheoretical positions: constructivism, rationalism
and post-modernist approaches (reflectivism). Yet one should be aware that none of
the approaches is finally settled . See Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and
Antje Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy,
6/4. (1999, Special Issue); Gerard J. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on
International Institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Steve
Smith, “New Approaches to International Theory”, John Baylis, Steve. Smith (eds.),
The Globalization of World Politics ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 165190.
19
Terriff, p.175.
10
42
See Barry Buzan, Ole Wǽver & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework
for Analysis ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997 ).
21
Ronny Lipschutz, ‘On Security’, in Ronnie D.Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, ( New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.8.
22
See Buzan…, pp 23-29.
23
Ole Wæver “Securitization and Desecuritization”, Lipschutz (ed.), p.65.
24
Buzan …, 23-24.
25
Terriff, pp.27-28.
20
Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Immigration and National Identity: Constructing the Nation’,
Review of International Studies”, 22/3 (1996) p. 239.
27
See Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press, 1995), p.211.
28
Basics of National security of Lithuania (Vilnius: 1996), p.2.
29
Ibid, p.10.
30
Ibid, p.6.
31
Without listing all the threats envisaged, let us consider their major types and
examples. External threats are classified into political ("political pressure and dictate,
attempts to establish zones of special interest and to claim special rights, preventing
Lithuania from obtaining international security; threats by foreign states to use force
under the pretext of defending their interests; attempts to impose upon Lithuania
dangerous and discriminatory international agreements"); military ("military capability in
close proximity to Lithuanian borders; military transit through Lithuania"); special
("illegal immigration and transit migration, influx of refugees; attempts by other states
to impose on Lithuania the principles of dual citizenship"); economic ("economic
pressure, blockade or other hostile economic actions; politically motivated investment")
(Basics, 10-11). Anyone familiar with the content of contemporary international politics
will easily understand that the source of most dangers is Russia.
Similarly, the definition of "Potential Internal Risks and Domestic Crises" includes the
political ("political instability or crisis of government posing threat to the constitutional
democratic order"), economic ("rise in unemployment, decline in production, decrease
of gross national product beyond a critical level"), social ("excessive differentiation in
wealth threatening to provoke a social conflict"), national ("factors weakening the
nation's power of survival and sense of identity; neglect of national values; spread of
antihuman pseudo-culture of violence"), criminal ("high crime rate, corruption") and
some other risks ("environmental pollution, especially with carcinogenic and mutagenic
substances").
32
See http://www.mod.lv/english/sec-politika/drosibas.htm
33
Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993),
p.159.
34
See http://www.mod.gov.ee/english.
35
However, a wider analysis of Estonia’s political discourse, as represented by mass
media debates, shows that the tendency of securitization is present in economics and
ethnic policy . See Merje Feldman ‘European integration and the discourse of national
identity in Estonia’, National Identities, vol. 3/1 (2001), pp. 5-21; Pami Aalto, ‘Beyond
Restoration: the Construction of Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia’, Cooperation and
Conflict, 35/1 (March 2000), pp.65-88; Gregory Feldman, ‘Shifting the Perspective of
Identity Discourse in Estonia’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 31/4 (Winter 2000), pp.40628.
26
43
See Hakan Wiberg “Security Problems of Small Nations” Werner Bauwens, Armand
Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen (eds.) Small States and the Security Challenge in the
New Europe (London: Brasseys,1996), p.36.
37
Clive Archer “Norden and the Security of the Baltic States”, Security Policy Library ,
4
(1998)
,
p.2
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/sp/98/498_utskrift.htm
38
Michael Cox and Roger Mac Ginty “Farewell to a Beautiful Idea: The End of
Neutrality in the Post-Cild War World”, Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F.
Knudsen (eds.) Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe (London:
Brasseys,1996 ), p 124.
39
Public Opinion and Level of Awareness on security issues in the Baltic countries,
(Vilnius 1998).p.11.
36
40
Cox and Mac Ginty, p.132.
During the Cold war Sweden was actually covered by NATO's security
guarantees. According to the Swedish Commission on Neutrality Policy, Sweden
had secret military cooperation with the United States and NATO. The United
States was prepared to defend Sweden with nuclear weapons. The neutral
status of Finland was not acknowledged by the Soviet Union until 1989 when
Mikhail Gorbachev visited Finland. See Tapani Vaahtoranta and Tuomas
Forsberg "Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?: Finish and Swedish Policies on the EU
and NATO as Security Organizations", UPI Working Papers 29 (2000, The
Finnish Institute of International Affairs).
42
As cited in Eiki Berg 'Writing Post-Soviet Estonia onto the World Map' in Working
Papers, 3 (Copenhagen: COPRI, 2000), p.15.
43
See Marko Lehti 'Non-reciprocal region building. Baltoscandia as a National
Coordinate for the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians' , NORDEUROPA forum, 2
(1998) pp. 19-47.
With the rejection of the neutrality option the metaphor of the bridge was changed into
that of a gateway state. See Berg.
44
Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr and Edward Allworth,
Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.10.
45
See Arkady Moshes “Turn of the Century: Russia Looks at the Baltic Sea Region”,
UPI Working Papers ,12, (The Finnish Institute of International Relations, 1998).
46
See Ziugzda; Ingmar Oldberg, "No Love is Lost - Russia in Relations with the Baltic
States," Gunnar Arteus and Atis Lejins (eds.), Baltic Security: Looking Towards the
21st Century, (Riga, 1997 ).
47
Daniel F.C. Austin, NATO Expansion and the Baltic States (Sandhurst: Conflict
Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, February 1999) p. 7.
48
Regional Baltic co-operation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was formally
established as early as 1934 with the signing the Treaty of Good Understanding and
Co-operation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Geneva. In historians’ view, this
belated Treaty had no effect on the role of Baltic States in the security situation of the
time. See Liudas Truska , Antanas Smetona ir jo laikas (Vilnius: Valstybinis leidybos
centras, 1996).
49
See Grazina Miniotaite "Lithuania", Hans Mouritzen (ed.) Bordering Russia: Theory
and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim, London: Ashgate, 1998), p 176.
50
See Hans Mouritzen “Lessons for Alliance Theory”, Moutitzen, pp.283-294
51
See David Mutimer Making Enemies: NATO Enlargement and the Russian 'Other'.
Unpublished paper.
41
44
Frank Schimmelfennig “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation” Security
Studies, 8-2/3 (Winter 1998 / 99 – Spring 1999), p.211.
53
Connie L. MsNeely, Constructing the Nation-State. International organization and
Prescriptive Action (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995), p.27.
54
Schimmelfennig, 221
55
Alexander E. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”,
American Political Science Review, 88/2 (June 1994), p.390.
52
56
See Aalto, 2000; Feldman, 2000.
See Iver Neumann Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and
International Relations (London: Routledge, 1996).
58
See Lennart Meri, 'The Baltic States' City Paper, 26 (January/February 1997).
59
Vytautas Landsbergis in The Role of NATO in the Changing Security Environment of
Europe, (Vilnius, 2000), pp. 23-24).
60
Address to the Nation by Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania:
(23.06.2000): http://www.lrp.lt/en/one.phtml?id=1338.
61
In the 19th century the British poet Alfred Edward Housman (1859-1936) wrote this:
The Russian bear is huge and wild,
He had devoured infant child
The infant child is not aware
It has been eaten by the bear.
Oscar Williams (ed.) The Mentor Book of Major British Poets (New York: the New
American Library, INC, 1963) p. 412.
62
Adler, p. 419.
63
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Study on NATO Enlargement," September
1995, internet, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm, p.1
57
64
Ibid.
Schimmelfennig, 221.
66
Berryman, p.113.
67
The "Agreement between the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Federation on
Long-term Economic and Sociocultural Co-operation in the Development of the
Kaliningrad Region" was signed on July 29, 1991. The latest agreement on long-term
co-operation between Lithuania and Kalinigrad region was signed on June 26, 1999.
The agreement prescribes that the transit of goods will take place on a nondiscriminatory basis according to the GATT/WTO principles.See Pertti Joenniemi,
Raimundas Lopata, Vladas Sirutavicius, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Impact Assesment on
Lithuania's Integration into the EU on Relations between Lithuania and Kalinigrad
Oblast of Russian Federation, (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2000), p. 17.
65
See an article “The Baltic Knot: What is to be Done by the Kaliningrad Region in
Connection with the EU Expansion to the East?” 28.03.2001. Among other things, the
article nurtures the idea that by re-taking the Suvalkai foreland, conceded to Lithuania
in 1941, Russia would solve the transit problem - there would be a direct route from
Belorus to the Kaliningrad region. (“Бaлтийский узел: Что же делать
Калининградской области в связи с продвижением Евросоюза на восток ?”
Независимая газета, 28032001.).
69
quote from Evaldas Nekrasas “Lietuvos regioninis identitetas: kas mes esame?”
Seminarai. Atviros visuomenes kolegija. (Vilnius: Vyturys,1998), p.99.
68
45
Antanas Valionis, Evaldas Ignatavicius, Izolda Brickovskiene “From Solidarity to
Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 1988-1998”, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review
(1998,No 2), p.13.
70
See Leonidas Donskis “Concepts of Nationalism in 20th Century Lithuania”,
Christopher Williams and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds.) Ethnicity and Nationalism in
Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 347, note 19.
72
See "Latvijos Prezidente prabilo lietuviskai", Lietuvos Zinios (16032001).
73
See Dainis Turlais “Ethnic and Territorial Problems and their Solution”, Baltic
Security: the Long View from the Region (Conflict Studies Research Center, August
1997, G.58) p.9.
71
74
See Peeter Vares and Olga Zhuryari, Estonia and Russia, Estonians and Russians:
A Dialogue (Tallinn: The Institute of International and Social Studies, 1996), p.9.
75
Ole Norgaard with Dan Hindsgaul Lars Johannsen and Helle Willumsen. The Baltic
States After Independence, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1996)
p. 11.
In October 1991 Latvia’s Supreme Council adopted a resolution on citizenship. The
law on citizenship was enacted in 1994. Estonia re-enacted the interwar law on
citizenship in February 1992. New Estonian law on citizenship came into force in April
1995. See Rob Zaagman, Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (Flensburg:
European Centre for Minority, 1999).
77
Zaagman, p.27.
78
In Latvia the 1997 amendments to the Citizenship Law, which went into effect in
1998, allow faster citizenship, while the Language Law, sent back to parliament by
president Vaira Vike-Freiberga, was slightly modified in order to meet basic European
standards of minority rights. However, in May 2000 the Latvian parliament voted down
the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minority Rights, signed in
1995.
79
There have been articles in Estonian and Latvian press accusing the HCNM of
collusion with Moscow. The latest developments are those concerning amendments to
Estonia’s laws on parliamentary and local elections and on the official language. The
proposed amendments introduced the requirement that members of parliament and of
local representative bodies should possess knowledge of the Estonian language in
conformity with criteria enumerated in the law. The amendments were passed by the
parliament despite the appeal by High Commissioner Van der Stoel to reject them
(Zaagman, 45-48).
80
Kent R. Meyer “US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What
Risks?”
(From
Parameters,
Winter
2001-01,
http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/meyer.htmp)p.5.
76
81
On the structure of the defence forces see NATO Nations and Partners for Peace,
(Special Issue The Baltic States, 1999).
82
Since 1998 the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) has been operative in BosniaHerzegovina.
83
Michael Clemmesen, ‘Security and Defence cooperation – a srep forward to a Baltic
Framework’, NATO Nations and Partners for Peace, (Special Issue The Baltic States,
1999), p. 29.
46
84
Public opinion…p.5.
85
Lietuvos zinios, BNS, 21032001.
See http://www.mod.lv/english/sec_darbs/sab.htm
87
See http:www.mod.gov.ee/english/release.17.html.
88
Clive Archer and Jeager Oyvind ‘The Security Policy Doctrines in the Nordic and
the Baltic Countries: Stability and Change”, Lars Hedegaard and Bjarne Lindstrom
(eds) The NEBI Yearbook, (Springer, 1998), p. 459.
89
See Marko Lehti, Sovereignty Redefined: Baltic Cooperation and the Limits of
National Self-Determination, Working Paper, 12 (Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute, 1999).
90
See http: //www. nato.int/ docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm
86
47