AntePodium
An Antipodean electronic journal of world affairs published by
the School of Political Science and International Relations at
Victoria University of Wellington [2/02]
Democratic Visions, Commercial
Realities?
The Corporate Domination of Cyberspace and the
Prospects for Online Deliberation
Dr. Lincoln Dahlberg, FRST Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Sociology,
Social Work, and Social Policy, Massey University, New Zealand
Abstract
In recent times much has been said about the possibility of online discourse revitalizing
democracy by extending the public sphere at large. However, many commentators now fear
that this democratisation is being restricted by the Internet’s privatisation and
commercialisation. This paper provides a general assessment of the threat presented by
corporate power to the extension of the public sphere through cyberspace. I first establish the
extent of corporate ownership and control of the Internet. I then examine the limitations that
this ownership and control poses to online democratic interaction by looking at issues of
access, monopoly formation, commercialisation, and the development of the Internet’s form.
The most negative effects of privatisation and commercialisation on democratisation through
cyberspace are found to be the exclusion of many voices from discourse and the
marginalisation of much rational-critical deliberation. However, discursive spaces remain in
cyberspace and I conclude this paper by making some general recommendations of how such
spaces could be protected and resourced so as to further extend the public sphere through the
Internet.
Introduction
Critics of modern consumer society such as Richard Sennet (1977), Jürgen Habermas (1989),
and Carl Boggs (2000) argue that public discursive spaces necessary for the development of a
strong democratic society have been increasingly displaced by spaces of private consumption.
In the process, subjects are constituted as consumers with the right to purchase from an array
of commodities, rather than as rational citizens oriented towards reaching mutual
understanding. The mass media are seen as part and parcel of this colonization of public life
by instrumental rationality. While containing the potential to engender critical public debate,
the mass media have been overrun by corporate interests and largely reduced to producers of
entertainment products.
Under these conditions, political programming has increasingly
taken the form of representative publicity, the powerful selling their images before a passive
and ill-informed audience (see Habermas, 1989; Herman and McChesney, 1997; Kellner,
1990; Schiller, 1989).
In contrast to this ongoing commodification of civic culture, a number of commentators see
the Internet’s two-way decentralized communications as offering the possibility of
revitalizing and expanding public spheres (or the public sphere in general) of rational-critical
discourse1 – discourse involving inclusive, respectful, and reflexive deliberation of political
problems.2 There are indeed numerous spaces of political debate online. Thousands of
people discuss public issues every day through e-mail, e-mail lists, Usenet groups, chat
groups, Web forums, and Web publishing. Much of this interaction involves aspects of
rational-critical deliberation, supporting the vision of the Internet extending the public sphere
and enhancing democracy.3 However, many cyber-democracy enthusiasts also warn that the
recent privatisation and commercialisation of the Internet is leading to the commodification of
online culture. There is much concern that the Internet will simply go the same way as
Habermas and others argue the mass media largely has, with spaces of rational-critical
discourse becoming ever more incorporated or marginalized by instrumental rationality (see,
in particular, Barney, 2000; McChesney, 1999; Schiller, 1999).
In this paper I investigate how privatisation and commercialisation impacts upon the
possibility of the Internet facilitating public spheres of rational-critical discourse. I approach
this problem by way of the critical political economy tradition.
This means, broadly
speaking, undertaking a socio-historical evaluation of the interplay between the Internet,
economics, and politics, with democracy as normative backdrop.4 My evaluation begins with
a consideration of the history of corporate involvement in cyberspace, highlighting the central
factors that have given rise to the increasing ownership and control of the Internet by big
business. I then contrast the radically divergent views of neo-liberals and critical political
economists about the impact of this corporate colonization upon online democracy. This
contrast highlights four overlapping aspects of the corporate domination of cyberspace that
need attention with respect to the extension of the public sphere through the Internet: access
restrictions; oligopoly control over network and content; the expansion of online commerce
and the subsequent domination of attention by powerful media conglomerates; and the
commercial direction of the Net’s form. I investigate each of these issues in turn. My
intention is to identify general social, political, and economic logics at work, rather than
produce a detailed survey or inventory of the ever dynamic technical developments and
practices.5
Throughout the paper I aim to take into account the broader socio-political
environment within which Internet developments are taking place, demonstrating that the
prospects for democratisation through cyberspace are very much dependent upon social
relations rather than technological necessity. I conclude by making a number of general
recommendations as to how the public sphere can be extended through the Internet in the face
of privatisation and commercialisation.
The Privatisation and Commercialisation of Cyberspace
The major impetus for the Internet came from government research initiatives. Political
leaders in advanced capitalist nations saw computer networks as strategic technologies for
advancing military and economic advantage (Abbate, 1999:8). It was by way of government
contracts that powerful corporate interests became involved in the development of the
medium. The US Government directly pumped millions of dollars into private corporations
during the network’s early days, sponsoring research that was too costly or too risky for the
private sector to undertake.
Although this contracting subsidized private network
developments and helped secure certain corporates a place in the eventual Internet, the
network remained in the public domain. Its form was largely shaped by (US) militaryindustrial strategy and the publicly-oriented interests of scientific researchers, rather than
through ‘commercial goals such as low cost, simplicity, or consumer appeal’ (ibid).
Government (largely military) goals of ‘survivability, flexibility, and high performance’
became central aspects of the Internet while members of the academic research community
‘incorporated their own values of collegiality, decentralization of authority, and open
exchange of information into the system’ (ibid:5). As the Internet grew it linked up with
other national state-owned and independent not-for-profit computer networks, networks that
often came with a strong public networking ethos, further reinforcing the non-commercial
orientation of cyber-culture.6
For a long time the private sector showed little interest in the developing Internet. In fact,
managers of the network ‘had tried as early as 1972 to persuade a commercial operator such
as AT&T to take over the ARPANET [the predecessor of Internet], but they had been
unsuccessful; in 1972 it was not evident that the market for data network services was big
enough to interest a giant corporation’ (Abbate, 1999:195). However, commercial interest
rapidly picked up in the early 1990s as a result of the rapid growth of Internet users
worldwide and the advent of personal computers that had vastly expanded the potential
market for network services. The increasing pressure for commercial use, along with the
dominance of neo-liberal discourse within industry and policy circles, led the Internet’s
managers to conclude that private ownership was the best solution to meeting the diverse
needs of corporate and public users (ibid:195-9). A plan was devised to privatise the Internet
in 1991. This plan began to be implemented from 1994. By the end of April 1995 ownership
and control of the Internet’s infrastructure had been transferred from the US Government to
private network providers including MCI, GTE, AT&T, and BBN (Abbate, 1999:199; Baran,
1998:126-7; Schiller, 1999:12-13).7 The Internet became just another commodity, marketed
and metered out to network consumers. The ‘acceptable use’ policies which had ruled out
commercial activity dissolved once the Internet was privatised. Cyberspace rapidly turned
into an online market and commercial applications are now driving the Internet’s
development.
Despite privatisation and commercialisation, the claim that ‘no one owns or controls the
Internet’ is still prevalent. For instance, Cairncross (1997:95) asserts that ‘nobody owns the
Internet, runs it, maintains it, or acts as gatekeeper or regulator.’ Selnow (1998:72) argues
that ‘Nobody owns it, nobody keeps its gates, nobody controls it, nobody regulates it, and
therefore it suffers no limitations on who can access it or who can stock it with information.’
This argument is partly drawn from the fact that some aspects of the network remain in the
public domain, particularly the data transfer protocols and some software. The idea that
nobody controls the Internet also stems from the fact that no single organization controls
Internet access and developments, and that explicit attempts to control use have largely failed
due to the distributed nature of the network.
Furthermore, the Internet’s management
continues to operate through a non-profit organization – the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), which was created in October 1998 as a neutral body to take
over many of the administrative and technical tasks previously carried out by organizations
under contract to the US Government.8
However, these facts do not mean that the Internet is owned and controlled by ‘no-one’ or
even by ‘everyone’.
One must consider the ownership and control of the underlying
infrastructure of the Internet: the transmission conduits, network instrumentation, and
computing facilities. Although the infrastructure is not owned by a single entity and there is
no central command, it is owned and controlled by certain organizations, governments,
universities, and (pre-dominantly) corporations. The front end of all this is seen by the
consumer in Internet Service Provider (ISP) charges. As well as paying for access, an
Internet user must purchase or hire certain computer networking hardware and software.
Furthermore, the technical management of the Internet is not completely open or democratic.
Only five of ICANN’s 19 strong board are presently elected by the general online public; the
other members of the board are elected largely by Internet industry groups. Furthermore the
election process is biased in favour of those individuals (by-in-large citizens of wealthier
nations) who not only have Internet access but are informed about the election. ICANN’s
proceedings have also been criticized for secrecy and favouring large corporations,
particularly in relation to cyber-property disputes.9
While it is very difficult to determine the extent of ownership and control of the Internet that
any single entity has or will have, it is clear that the main players are now the large
telecommunications, media, and computing corporations, with support from the US
Government and other wealthy capitalist states.
It is important to emphasize that the
unfolding corporate ownership and control is not the result of technological and economic
imperatives but, rather, stems from market-oriented policies driven by powerful corporate
interests wielding neo-liberal discourse and ‘information economy’ rhetoric. The role of
nation-states is now seen as facilitating the development of the Internet as a central means of
expanding and deepening the global free-market economy. Governments have already taken
a number of steps to ensure that cyberspace fulfils this commercial end. Their efforts have
included extending intellectual property rights and policing powers so as to guarantee ‘safe’
online commerce, liberalizing Internet related industries in the name of maximizing consumer
choice, technological advancement, and economic growth; and intervening in corporate
affairs when absolutely necessary to ensure at least some semblance of market-competition,
as in the case of Judge Jackson’s (7/7/00) ruling to break up Microsoft (overturned a year
latter by a US appeal court). The neo-liberal vision of the Internet as a zone of global freemarket commerce is also being driven with some success by US Government backed
corporate interests at transnational forums such as the WTO (Schiller, 1999:75-88,
McChesney, 1999:134).
What does this privatisation and commercialisation of the Internet mean for the possibility of
the Internet facilitating rational-critical deliberations? Those commentators who adhere to
neo-liberal economic philosophy argue that a market-oriented Internet will optimise
democratic participation.10 They contend that the privatisation of the Net, together with the
liberalization of related industries, fosters competition between network operators which
brings down prices of Internet equipment and services, enabling more people to participate
online. Moreover, this competition between network providers combines with competition
between content suppliers to enable the Internet to develop efficiently and democratically.
The type of network that develops, in terms of both form and content, will be dictated by
consumer demand rather than by innovatively and democratically obstructive centralized
authority.
This argument, that a privatised and consumer-oriented Internet will facilitate democratic
interaction, is strongly contested by critical political economists. These critics argue that
rational-critical discourse is displaced by instrumental rationality when communications
media are privatised and commercialised.
Far from providing greater inclusion, the
privatisation of the network will simply contribute to the exclusivity of the online world.
Moreover, the privatisation and liberalization of industries will not lead to greater competition
but rather to the convergence of communications industries and the concentration of capital.
This puts control ever more in the hands of an elite group of industrialists with corporate
profits as their sole goal. Even if monopoly control does not eventuate, argue these critics,
commercialisation means that the online world develops (in terms of both form and content)
as a space for individualized consumption rather than democratic discourse. The choices that
neo-liberals talk of in reference to an online market represent those of a private consumer and
not a publicly-oriented citizen.
This contrast of neo-liberal and critical political economy positions highlights four issues that
need to be confronted when investigating the impact of privatisation and commercialisation
on the possibility of the Internet extending the public sphere. First, how does privatisation
and commercialisation impact upon access to online discourse? Second, what is the effect of
privatisation, liberalization, and convergence of Internet related industries upon the autonomy
of cyber-discourse? Third, what is the impact of the commercialisation of cyberspace upon
participation in online public deliberation? Finally, what effect is corporate control of the
developing technology having on the democratic form of the Internet? I will investigate each
of these questions in turn, comparing the neo-liberal and critical political economy arguments
along the way. It is the critical political economists that I find more convincing, not only
because I ally with their stronger commitment to democratic values but because of the
superior substance of their arguments. This superiority results from the evaluative strength of
their socio-historical methodology, a methodology that, as noted above, I am roughly
following in this paper.
Network Access
Many cyber-enthusiasts claim that the Internet is essentially democratic on the basis that it
offers everyone the ability to take part in communication with whomever they wish.
Cairncross (1997:95), for instance, argues that ‘[a]nybody can send a message across it [the
Internet] or create a “site”.’
expansive claims.
However, access restrictions to cyberspace negate such
The majority of the world’s population do not even have access to
telephone let alone e-mail. Neo-liberal commentators often reply to such concerns by arguing
that the privatised and commercialised Internet is leading towards universal access. The early
Internet was restricted to a very select, officially approved group of well-educated, largely
male Americans housed within a narrow range of institutions. With privatisation restrictions
to access are (in most countries) less formal. To network, a person needs only to pay the
associated financial costs, have the necessary networking skills, and have sufficient spare
time. The Internet has become ever more open and inclusive as cut-throat competition
between ISPs (together with technological advancements) has rapidly reduced access costs to
the point where in many cases it is free. This reduction in access costs may be seen as one of
the main reasons for the increasing representativeness of Net users in relation to offline
populations: the ratio of women to men online has steadily risen and is now approximately
equal in many Western nations, and the average income levels of online users are steadily
moving down towards mainstream levels.
Certainly for the middle-class Western consumer the Internet has become a relatively cheap
means of communication. However, the pre-privatised Internet was free and there is no
evidence to suggest that public provision would not have allowed for at least an equally rapid
growth rate than that which has occurred since privatisation. Moreover, commercial network
provision may be restricting access to some people as much as it is expanding inclusion to
others. While access costs are now low in many countries, the costs of computer software
and hardware adds to other costs of networking – notably education, technical and community
support, and available time – to prevent many people from participating online. Despite the
rapid growth of the Internet population, research continues to confirm a pronounced gap in
US and European Internet usage based upon age, income, and ethnicity.11
Furthermore, with the commercialisation of online communications, free Internet connection
does not guarantee free information access. Information is increasingly commodified, its
status as private property offline and online is being secured through international patent and
copyright rules (see May, 2000).
Transnational media corporations, who already have
massive stocks of media products to draw upon, along with corporations new to the media
content area such as Microsoft, are investing great sums of money buying control of the
digital rights and archives of the most popular images, movies, books and music that they do
not yet own. Furthermore, privatisation does not ensure universal service: infrastructures and
network software are developed and deployed for wealthier clients and populations,
bypassing low-income, minority, and rural communities (Schiller, 1999:52-5; Wilhelm,
2000:113). Although cyber-libertarians continue to promote ‘information wants to be free’
rhetoric, information access online, as offline, is becoming increasingly dependant upon
wealth.
Restrictions to participation in cyberspace are even greater in the South. As well as greater
poverty and lower levels of networking skills, inadequate media, telecommunications and
computing infrastructures impede networking in many nations.12
With transnational
corporations now largely in charge of global communications, these infrastructures will not
improve without sufficient consumer demand. Participation is further restricted if a person
does not have working knowledge of English or one of the other dominant online languages.
In fact, the domination of online culture by US and Western voices, as Wresch (2000) points
out, adds a ‘content divide’ to the ‘connectivity divide’, which means that groups in the South
are being both excluded from hearing and being heard. These exclusions reinforce the
extreme inequalities in the distribution of information and communications resources that in
turn intensify the structural inequalities of global capitalism and contribute to the widening
gap between the traditionally powerful and those who need empowerment the most: between
rich and poor, North and South, educated and illiterate, urban and rural (United Nations
Development Program Report, 1999).
According due consideration to these growing cyber-stratifications is now commonplace in
electronic democracy writings. Neo-liberal commentators argue that technological innovation
and market competition will continue to force prices down, proliferate points of access, and
expand opportunities to develop Internet skills (see, for instance, Ness, 1997). However,
suspicion by many commentators that the free market will not extend access to all, combined
with the success of ‘information society’ rhetoric, has led to a growing number of national
governments pursuing some form of universal Internet provision (see Kahin and Wilson,
1997). At the local level, many cities around the world have provided public Internet access
ports, placing them in schools, hospitals, shopping malls, and libraries.13 On the International
stage, high-level government and corporate bodies have made significant noises about the
need to achieve universal Internet access.
At its annual meeting in 2000 at Davos,
Switzerland, The World Economic Forum launched a major initiative – the Global Digital
Divide Task Force – to address ‘the challenge of bridging the global digital divide.’14 This
task force developed a framework for action which was submitted to the G8 Kyushu-Okinawa
Summit 2000. Most of the proposals were adopted during the Summit and subsequently the
G8 set up a ‘Digital Opportunity Task Force’ (DOT Force) to explore ways in which ‘to
bridge the international information and knowledge divide.’ It is unlikely that the rhetoric of
the DOT Force findings and recommendations, reported to the G8 in July 2001, will be
translated into any significant reduction in the global digital divide given that it has largely
been left up to the ‘stakeholder’ groups to come up with the necessary resources.15 More
promising is the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) Internet Training Centres
Initiative
for
Developing
Countries
(ITCI-DC)
launched
in
2001
on
World
Telecommunication Day (18 May). This ‘multi-million dollar project, aims at closing the gap
in Internet and “new economy” skills in developing countries’ by establishing ‘50 training
centres to provide skills in Internet Protocol (IP) networking and services by July 2003 in
existing non-profit institutions in developing countries. It is expected that the centres will also
function as incubators to help small and medium-sized enterprises to develop Internet-related
services.’16
However, under global capitalism, universal access – where all have sufficient access to
empowering information resources – will probably never be realized. Many developing
nations struggle to provide food and shelter let alone Internet connection for their populations.
Even in wealthy nations significant disparities in Net use will remain due to costs, time, and
lack of skills. Needless to say, the exclusion of the poverty-stricken from cyberspace is not a
significant problem for those corporates who dominate control of the Internet’s
infrastructures. Driven by profits, corporate network providers are focused upon providing
services for those with spending power.
However, even if universal access was to be
achieved through the market, this would not guarantee democratisation through the Internet.
Universal access does not determine what finally goes on in cyberspace – what information is
provided and the form of communication that takes place. We need to also investigate the
impact of privatisation and commercialisation upon online discourse itself. This will be the
task of the next three sections.
Capital Concentration
The most obvious place where online discourse can be controlled is at the point of entry to
cyberspace – where Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can directly censor incoming data. But
what would be the point of censorship for an ISP? Apart from complying with government
regulations, a commercial ISP, like any other corporate media body, may want to censor
online discourse in order to keep content clean of ‘offensive’ material that may otherwise
scare off consumers and advertisers. Such direct commercial censorship, though possible, is
rare and largely ineffective.17 Even when such direct censorship is carried out it does not
severely limit the flow of opinions online as there are thousands of ISPs that provide access to
the Internet for individuals to post and read opinion.
The enormous amount of
communication taking place through the Internet further impedes effective censorship. Given
these limits to corporate censorship, the Internet is often considered a common carrier, a
medium that does not discriminate over content. It is also seen as providing what Pool
(1983:106) describes as the traditional ‘law of the free press’, where the paper, ink, and
presses are in sufficient abundance such that no regulation is needed to allow people to
express themselves freely.
Democratic communication through the Internet thus seems
assured.
Direct corporate control over online discourse would only threaten the openness of the
Internet if somehow the plethora of ISPs presently operating was radically diminished
towards a monopoly situation and there was no legislation to ensure common carriage.
Unfortunately, these conditions are becoming increasingly likely as a few huge media,
computing, and telecommunication corporations expand into cyberspace, rapidly buying up
smaller Internet companies and positioning themselves for control of the emerging multimedia online marketplace. It is, as Bill Gates (1995:227) predicted, a ‘race for the gold.’
This ‘race for the gold’ is being facilitated by neo-liberal policies that are driving the
privatisation and de-regulation of media and communications sectors at national and
supranational levels, a liberalization explicitly aimed at allowing the convergence of Internet
related industries.18 To what extent is this ‘race for the gold’ and convergence of Internet
related industries in fact leading to monopoly control of online discourse?
Libertarian techno-utopians such as Dyson et. al (1994), Gilder (1992), Kelly (1998), and
Negroponte (1995) argue that the technological qualities of the Internet (particularly its
decentralization) will resist capital concentration, moving control from big institutions to
individuals in the converging digital media-scape without social or political intervention.
Against this techno-determinist rhetoric, critical political economists have consistently
pointed to the actual concentration of capital taking place. Moves to open up the digital
communications market for increased competition have encouraged media consolidation,
smaller companies being squeezed out or engulfed by a few dozen giant vertically integrated
media and telecommunications conglomerates. Mergers and acquisitions accelerated over the
1980s and 1990s. By the end of the millennium just a few companies dominated the global
media and communications industries.19 The rate and scale of new media mergers and
acquisitions has continued to escalate. Massive takeovers and mergers have recently taken
place between the likes of Viacom and CBS, AT&T and MediaOne Group, Worldcom and
Sprint, America Online and Time-Warner, and Vodafone-Airtouch and Mannesmann AG.
Then there are the myriad of strategic alliances and joint ventures under way that, together
with mergers and acquisitions, allow corporates to gain greater presence and control in the
emerging multi-media environment while avoiding destructive head-on competition. The
relationships are very complex, but the tendency is clear. A couple of dozen vertically and
horizontally integrated transnational conglomerates are coming to dominate control of
Internet conduits and content, leading toward an oligopoly situation that threatens the ‘free
press’ or common carrier status described above. While these global corporations are largely
motivated by profits and disinterested in the actual content of data flows, communications
that directly call into question their power and the capitalist system in general will
increasingly risk censorship and marginalisation, as occurs in the commercial mass media.
Given the threat to democratic discourse of oligopoly control, many critical commentators
call for legislative measures to ensure the free flow of online communication. Moore (1999)
argues that since the ‘worst aspects of commercialised cyberspace . . . arise from monopoly
concentration’ then the ‘indicated policy strategy would be to focus on preventing
monopolization – both the horizontal and vertical variety.’ As an alternative to regulation to
prevent horizontal integration, he suggests officially according the Internet common carrier
status.20 To restrict vertical monopoly, he advocates strict separation of content owners from
carriers. Miller (1996:247) similarly suggests the separation of suppliers of information
content and services (such as electronic mail, home shopping, and video conferencing) and
communications carriers. ‘[W]e’ve got to enact policies that impose an impenetrable wall
between the business of providing access and that of providing the information that is being
distributed. Control over content must be meaningfully separated from control over conduit.’
Without common carrier status (or restrictions on horizontal integration) and restrictions on
vertical integration, the Internet may end up as a centrally-operated broadcast medium, like
radio has become.
McChesney (1999) agrees, but argues that vertical and horizontal
integration have already gone too far. Affirmative action now needs to be taken to break up
the big media and Internet companies that have developed.
However, even if corporate convergence is halted and common carrier status granted, the
domination and thus ‘structuring’ of the online world by commercially driven interests may
severely limit the extension of the public sphere through the Net. I will now explore how this
structuring is impacting upon cyber-discourse, first by looking at the expansion of online
commerce and second by investigating the corporate ‘writing’ of the evolving Internet’s form.
Online Commerce and the Corporate Domination of Online Attention
The vision of the Internet as the basis for the rapid expansion of unbridled commerce is being
strongly supported and successfully driven by the US Government, with support from other
powerful capitalist states and transnational corporations.21 Despite arguments that the Net
will support ‘friction-free capitalism’ without state intervention, promoters of online
commerce have turned to legislative mechanisms at regional, national, and supranational
levels to ensure the online commons of free exchange turns into an online free market ruled
by the owners of private property (Barbrook, 2000). On the one hand, agreements are being
worked out to keep online commerce free of taxes, tariffs, and any other regulations
(McChesney, 1999:134). On the other hand, legislation is being developed to establish
information property rights. Patents, trademarks, and copyright law, along with mechanisms
to safeguard electronic transactions are being developed to transform the free exchange of
information online into the free trade of commodities (Lessig, 1999:125-6; McChesney,
1999:133; Schiller, 1999:78).
Neo-liberal Internet enthusiasts such as Bill Gates (1995) argue that the development of an
online free market will not only realize a ‘shopper’s heaven’ but will spread democracy by
enabling greater individual choice. Liberal techno-utopian politicians like Al Gore (1994)
agree that democratisation will go hand-in-hand with the development of a global online free
market. However, this assumption is mistaken. The expansion of consumerism will not
facilitate democracy. Not only is consumer choice dependent upon an individual’s spending
power, but commercialism advances instrumental action as opposed to the rational-critical
discourse that constitutes the public sphere.
Although instrumental rationality has a
legitimate and useful role in economic communications, it is antithetical to democratic
interaction. Here I want to look at what impact the spread of commerce through the Internet
is having upon spaces of rational-critical discourse. Has online public deliberation been able
to survive and even prosper since the Net’s privatisation and commercialisation?
The Internet is popularly described as a capitalist’s dream medium. In terms of business-toconsumer (B2C) online ventures, the Internet enables more extensive and intensive marketing
and cost-effective, interactive, customized sales.
It is not surprising, then, that cyber-
commerce has rapidly expanded since the privatisation of the Internet in the mid-1990s. The
Web now hosts hundreds of thousands of points-of-sale and is dense with advertising.
However, making online sales and attracting high paying advertisers, the two main ways B2C
sites make money on the Web, require capturing the most scarce and sought after resource in
cyberspace, audience attention.
Despite neo-liberal celebrations of an online level playing field, large corporations have a
number of advantages in the competition to capture the Internet’s audience attention,
including established branding, well developed customer loyalty, extensive product lines, and
substantial marketing budgets. Large media corporations like AOL-Time Warner, Disney,
Microsoft, and News Corporation (in alliance with Yahoo) are rapidly expanding their B2C
operations, building enticing Web sites by bringing their offline content online and by buying
up complementary and competing sites (McChesney, 1999:91-9, 180-1).
As well as a
diversity of media content, major corporates have the resources to build (often through
acquisitions) sites with extensive customer services such as e-mail, chat rooms, information
managers, and online shopping and entertainment directories. The most ambitious of these
corporate Web ventures are attempting to capture online audience attention still further by
developing Internet hubs or portals that, through Net access and/or search engine services,
provide users with a starting point for all their online journeys. But these sites do not want
people simply to move through them into cyberspace, as the word portal suggests: ‘They
want users to stay, not go’ (Shapiro, 1999:99). Not only are participants confronted by
enticing services each time they start their online experience, but the portal site ensures
participants remain within the corporate’s sphere of influence by linking advertising banners
to participant’s search results. For instance, Amazon.com has a comprehensive arrangement
with Yahoo! in which a search on Yahoo! for a book will bring up an Amazon banner with
the search result (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000:175).
The capturing of attention by these big corporate sites is becoming very effective. A JupiterMedia Matrix Research Center report of July 2001 entitled The Internet Playing Field Tilts
Further Toward Big Names shows that the total number of companies controlling 50 percent
of the US online user minutes shrank from 11 to four from March 1999 to March 2001. The
number of companies controlling 60 percent of all US minutes spent online fell from 110 in
March 1999 to 14 in March 2001, an 87 percent swing. The online properties of one
company, AOL-Time Warner, accounted for almost one third (32 percent) of all time spent
online by US Internet users. The ‘data show an irrefutable trend toward online media
consolidation and indicate that the playing field is anything but even’, according to Aram
Sinnreich, Jupiter senior analyst. ‘So far a major share of the market is being absorbed by a
handful of companies, with those same companies continuing to direct traffic across their own
networks of sites. Media companies competing for the attention of consumers must consider
that while the key barrier to online entry and success used to be infrastructure, it has shifted
dramatically to advertising and marketing.’22
Participants often do not even get beyond a portal’s immediate zone of influence. Fully 80
percent of American Online (AOL) users, accounting for 60 percent of US home users, never
venture beyond AOL controlled sites (McChesney, 1999:166).23 This attention capturing
allows these corporates to act as distribution sites. This poses a major problem for the
Internet extending the public sphere. Although there are hundreds and thousands of diverse
non-commercial sites online, including sites of rational-critical discourse, they will become
increasingly bypassed by much of the online audience unless they secure good positions on
one of the big corporate hubs. As Herman and McChesney (1997:124) note, the situation is
analogous to magazine and newspaper publishing, where there are a plurality of means of
publication available but attention is dominated by deep-pocketed commercial interests. The
right to publish means little without distribution and publicity, and this largely depends upon
financial resources. Big money is increasingly needed to be noticed online. For instance, The
Fragrance Center payed $12 million to AOL for a prominent place on its site (McChesney,
1999:166). Even online search engines offer priority to those who pay higher fees. As well
as selling banner advertisements that track key word searches, some search engines invite
sites to bid for the top rankings of search results (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000:175).
Moreover, those who can afford the services of Net savvy Web designers, specifically those
designers who are able to ‘work’ the search engine ranking algorithms, can get their sites
ranked higher and displayed more frequently (ibid).
Thus, money can help considerably in getting one’s message noticed online. Even without
fee payment, certain sites and content are more likely to be promoted by commercially driven
hubs. To gain advertisers it is advantageous for Web directories and search engines to
prominently display sites that are popular and commercially exploitable, sites that advertisers
want to have their products linked to. For example, when there is a search for the key word
‘sexuality’, it is advantageous for a search engine’s ranking system or algorithm to be
developed so as to bring up pages of sex site links (pages upon which banner adds can easily
be sold) ahead of pages of sexual politics links (pages which are unlikely to provide great
commercial interest). In addition, information provided on major media hubs is affected by
commercial imperatives. Not only are product placements becoming ever more subtle,24 but
content on commercial sites ends up protecting and promoting the interests of corporate
backers and customers which often translates into support for liberal capitalism in general.
This corporate capture of online attention steers users away from spaces of democratic
discourse and towards sites of privatised-commercialised participation. Such participation
means that users are largely being constituted in cyberspace as consumers rather than
reflexive citizens. As Gates (1999:131) declares, ‘The Web produces a true consumer-centric
world.’ This commercial structuring of experience is reinforced by the corporate dominance
of the ‘writing’ of the Net’s form, dominance which threatens to transform the Internet from a
public, interactive, and distributed technology into something more private, one-way, and
centralized.
The Corporate Writing of the Internet
The development of portal sites is one example of how corporate ownership is structuring the
online environment for commerce.
Internet software, hardware, and infrastructure
developments are now dominated by the demands of business clients, demands which lead to
the technology being inscribed with commercial rather than democratic uses in mind. This
corporate structuring of the Net is clearly seen at the level of Internet applications software.
Interactive sales software, data protection mechanisms, new forms of entertainment, and
information management systems are being developed that privatise online space and limit
communication flows. A very significant instance of this, as Lessig (1999:124-7) and Shapiro
(1999:80-1) point out, is how commerce is developing systems that neutralize copying,
systems that protect intellectual property in cyberspace far more tightly than does copyright
law (which can not only be easily subverted but also makes allowance for ‘fair’ public use).
Lessig (1999:139-140) argues that the commercial regulation of access to online information
through secure systems will undermine the public nature of the Internet. As Jeremy Rifkin
(2000) warns, a culture of hypercapitalism is developing in the age of networks where all of
life will be a paid-for experience. Lessig (1999) argues for legislative intervention to keep
cyberspace open.
But rather than enacting laws to ensure the public use of online
information, governments are moving to support systems that turn cyberspace into a sphere of
private property. The US Government is leading the way, in 1998 passing the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act to prohibit the writing, sale, and use of software that could
circumvent copyright management systems.
A more blatant assault on the democratic nature of cyberspace is the attempt by media
corporates to domesticate the Internet by moving it from a decentralized, computer-based
platform to a centrally controlled, television-like platform (Cunningham, 1998).
This
transition is well under way, facilitated by Webcasting (video streaming on the Net) and
WebTV (basic Internet access through television). The next step in the convergence is
interactive Digital TV (iDTV). For the commercial media and telecommunications interests
who are currently ploughing large sums of money into Internet-TV convergence, iDTV
promises to combine the control and audience pulling power of centralized broadcast TV with
the Internet’s interactive marketing and shopping.25 This move threatens the democratic form
of the Internet. Commercial control of an iDTV system, especially given the vertical and
horizontal convergence of industry presently under way, is likely to offer non-controversial,
commercially-oriented content and individualised-privatised interaction. In terms of politics,
commercial iDTV will at best offer push button interactivity for plebiscite politics (Wilhelm,
2000:45).
However, it is likely that an interactive Internet will survive alongside whatever iDTV has to
offer.
Furthermore, we must not forget that technologies normally have a certain
‘interpretative flexibility’ and thus can be appropriated for uses other than those that they are
designed for. While its developments are driven by commercial interests, digital television
offers some potential for an expansion of online deliberation by adding new sites of public
discourse to what the Internet presently offers.
And, despite its commercialisation, the
Internet continues to be open to re-definition and extension by users. Its basic architecture –
most importantly its protocols such as TCP/IP and HTML – remain in the public domain.
This means that there are no formal restrictions upon users developing or modifying
applications for their own purposes. The hope that this openness will be preserved and
extended is today kept alive by advocates – such as those who belong to the free software and
open source movements – who hold onto the fair use, open standard, “information must be
free” ethos of the original Net developers.26 Indeed, public applications continue to develop,
including some specifically oriented towards online deliberation, including Steven Clift’s
opengroups.org initiative, Weblab.org’s ‘small group dialogue technique’, The Berkman
Center for Internet and Society’s Web-based messaging system, and the HyperForum
computer software developed by researchers at The California Institute of Technology.27
However, Internet developments are dominated by the building of commercial applications
that increasingly privatise cyberspace. The possibility of an expansion of the public sphere
via online rational-critical discourse is under increasing threat as commercialisation moves
the Net ever more towards a closed, centralized system that captures audiences for
instrumental-rational (market-oriented) activities. Without legislation to preserve democratic
openness, the corporate domination of the Internet will turn cyberspace largely into an
interactive marketplace and advertising centred infotainment medium.
Conclusion
The Internet provides a myriad of online spaces of interaction that promise to contribute to an
extension of the public sphere of rational-critical deliberation. However, this extension is
threatened by the privatisation and commercialisation of the Internet.
The corporate
domination of the Net places barriers to universal Internet access and increasingly
marginalizes online non-commercial deliberative spaces. Online experience is becoming ever
more commodified. Attention is increasingly being captured by commercial offerings and
participants are ever more constituted as individualized consumers rather than publiclyoriented citizens.
However, extensive online discourse is taking place on the back of the privatised and
commercialised Net. A US nationwide survey conducted by The Democracy Online Project
in November 2000 found that 10% of those who go online in the US (55% of the population)
said that they participated in a live chat or web-based discussion forum during the Presidential
election while 39% discussed the election with friends or family by e-mail.28 This discourse
offers a starting point from which to further develop online rational-critical participation and
to expand the public sphere at large. A number of Internet-democracy projects have already
had some success in fostering online public spaces.29 Moreover, the Internet is providing a
space of communication for the growth and coordination of a global culture of resistance to
the corporate takeover of cyberspace and of public life in general. The success of this culture
in pushing back corporate colonization of everyday life can be seen in online activities that
have been central to the derailment of the MAI and the recent disruptions of the closed
meetings of the WTO, IMF, G8, and other self-appointed transnational governing bodies.
Cyberspace thus remains not only a space for deliberation but a site of ongoing struggle for
expansion of the public sphere at large.
This rational-critical online culture needs to be protected and resourced if it is to survive the
corporate driven Internet developments that are rapidly turning the Net into a space of private
consumption. Government policy must shift from simply promoting and protecting the
Internet as a means of market expansion and start to promote and protect democratic spaces
online. First, legislation is needed to restrict corporate domination of applications, content,
and uses. To ensure freedom of expression online some form of common-carriage principle
should be applied to both network service providers and dominant portals. It would be
particularly useful to follow up on the ‘public Net’ ideas of the likes of Shapiro (1999:204-7),
where Internet hubs would be required to prominently display links to public interest sites.
Legislation is also required to keep public sites free from state and corporate coercion and
surveillance.
As well as preserving spaces for deliberation online, those governments that claim to support
democracy have a responsibility to critically promote the expansion of online deliberation.
This promotion means more than developing universal access initiatives. It also means a
commitment to subsidizing online public spaces. Financial resources are urgently required to
develop and publicize online deliberative initiatives. In this regards, Blumler and Gurevitch’s
(2001) call for the forging of a ‘civic commons’ in cyberspace by creating a public service
body (or bodies) with the responsibility for backing up online democracy initiatives with
resources and publicity in timely. Without financial help, such initiatives will not be able to
attract broad based public participation given the increasingly competitive online
environment.
More detailed proposals on how to secure and expand online public deliberation require
further in-depth research. To identify the best legislation and forms of support for online
democratic practice we need specific analysis of network developments and uses, particularly
those relevant to the expansion of rational-critical deliberation. Such research needs to be
supported by a general political environment that promotes the extension of democracy
through the Internet.
Presently, a techno-determinist ideology that serves neo-liberal
economic agendas dominants policy and commentary on the Internet. The Net is seen as
inevitably developing as a space for consumption and business transactions. This ideology
has pushed to the sidelines of public debate questions of the effect of the Internet’s
privatisation and commercialisation on the hopes and potential for democratisation through
cyberspace. Supporters of democracy must work to extend critical commentary beyond
academic circles to put paid to this technological determinism and draw attention to both the
possibilities and problems surrounding the expansion of the public sphere through the
Internet. Political decisions will determine the Net’s future. The question is whether these
decisions will be driven by democratic ideals or by big power and big money.
Notes
1
Proponents of the idea that cyberspace may (given the right social conditions) enable a renewal and
expansion of the public sphere include Aikens (1997), Fernback (1997), Hauben and Hauben (1997),
Kellner (1999), Moore (1999), Noveck (1999), Rheingold (1993), and Slevin (2000).
2
While there is much debate amongst democratic theorists regarding the value of the concepts of
rational-critical deliberation and the public sphere, there is also much agreement about the need for
inclusive, respectful, and reflexive discourse as the basis for strong democracy.
3
I have elsewhere determined that rational-critical online politically-oriented interactions can and often
do feature rational-critical discourse. See XXXX (forthcoming).
4
For key overviews of the critical political economy approach, see Golding and Murdock (1996) and
Mosco (1996).
5
More detailed political economy-oriented surveys of the Internet in relation to public discourse and
democracy are offered by Barney (2000), Schiller (1999), and McChesney (1999). A comprehensive
social history of the Internet is provided by Abbate (1999).
6
Abbate (1999) details the unusual confluence of military and not-for-profit civilian interests in the
development of the Internet. Rheingold (1993) provides a useful discussion of the interactive practices
found on various civic or computer hobbyist computer networks, many of which eventually connected
with the Internet.
It is important to note that although the Internet’s infrastructure is now largely privatized, the US
7
Government (and many others) continues to massively subsidize network technology developments
(Barney, 2000:260-261).
8
For details on the formation, functions, and makeup of ICANN, see Kleinwächter (2000).
9
ICANN has been criticized for anti-democratic behaviour by a number of organizations including the
Internet Democracy Project (www.internetdemocracyproject.org), the Association for Progressive
Communications (www.apc.org), and ICANNWatch (www.icannwatch.org). All URLs last accessed
on 21/08/01.
10
See, for instance, Barlow (1996), Dyson et al. (1994), Gilder (1992), Gingrich (1995), Gates (1995,
1999), and Kelly (1998).
11
See,
for
instance,
research
in
the
US
by
the
Citizenship
Education
Fund
(http://www.nua.ie/surveys/?f=VS&art_id=905356631&rel=true), the US Department of Commerce’s
‘Falling Through the Net’ study (http://search.ntia.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf), the Pew Internet Project report
‘Who’s not Online?’ (http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=21) and research by The
University
of
Massachusetts
(http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/demographics/article/
1,1323,5901_561201,00.html). All URLs last accessed 22/07/01.
12
Jensen (2001) reports that despite a rapid growth of the Internet in Africa over the last few years,
access is still very limited. While one in three people in North America and Europe have Internet
access, and 1 in 30 have access globally, in Africa only 1 in 200 people have access. Internet access in
Africa also remains prohibitively expensive at US$68 a month for 20 hours access (compared with
costs of US$29 in the United States for the same access). Ipsos-Reid’s survey (released June 14, 2001)
of world Internet use confirms that in lesser developed countries access to the Internet is a significant
problem because of poverty and lack of a modern communications infrastructure. Rural areas of the
poorest countries suffer the most restrictions to access. However, even in urban areas of the more
advanced developing nations few people are regular Internet users. In urban India and urban South
Africa, only one-quarter of the population has any access to the Internet, and fewer than 10% of people
report being recent users. In urban Russia, 83% of respondents reported having no Internet access at
all.
See http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/content/displaypr.cfm?id_to_view=1244 (last accessed
20/07/01).
On the disparities in telephone installations within and between developing nations, see
Schiller (1999:51-3, 65).
See Holderness (1998) for further discussion of Internet access and
developments in the third world. See Golding (1998) for general insights into the inequalities in
communications between first and third world nations.
13
See Tsagarousianou et al. (1998).
14
The World Economic Forum provides information on the work of its Digital Divide Task Force at
http://www.weforum.org/digitaldivide.nsf/index (last accessed 20/07/01).
15
The DOT Force report can be found at http://www.markle.org/DigitalOpportunitiesforAll.pdf (last
accessed 20/07/01).
16
17
Quoted from http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press/releases/2001/07.html (last accessed 20/07/01).
For some rare examples of commercial ISPs directly censoring online content, see Fernback
(1997:48), Newhagen and Rafaeli (1996:12), and Shapiro (1995:11).
18
Liberalization policies with regards to Internet related industries have taken effect at the level of
nation-state legislation and through transnational organizations such as the European Union, IMF,
World Bank, and WTO. This liberalization has been driven by neo-liberal ideology claiming that
global networks are best developed through a free-market system. This claim contains two aspects.
First, the idea that the further development of the Internet and the convergence of media- technologies
into a broadband digital information highway requires companies to be able to compete across the
telecommunications, broadcasting, and computing sectors. Second, the global nature of the Internet
and emerging information highways is seen as putting transnational corporations, rather than
geographically bound nation-states, in the best position to oversee and run the networks. Yet there is
no absolute reason why a global and converged digital medium could not result from public ownership
– as did the Internet – although this would be unlikely in the current political and economic climate.
For further details on the liberalization and subsequent concentration of Internet related industries over
the last couple of decades see Hills (1998), McChesney (1999), Murdock and Golding (1999), and
Schiller (1999).
19
The United Nations Development Program (1999) reported that by 1998 ten telecommunications
corporations held 86 percent of the market. A similar story can be found in the media sector. In short,
‘the global media market has come to be dominated by seven multinational corporations: Disney,
AOL-Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi, and Bertelsmann’ (McChesney,
2001). The convergence of these telecommunications and media giants will further increase the
concentration of capital in the Internet sector.
20
Common carrier regulation normally requires the provision of non-discriminatory access for all. It is
usually imposed in a situation where a single monopolistic network develops that can discriminate
between messages and deny some people the means of communication (Pool, 1983:106). The Internet,
as Lessig (2000) indicates, gained common carrier status in its early days because it utilized the
telephone system which was in most countries regulated by law as a non-discriminatory carrier. This
protection largely dissolves as the Net converges with other mediums (cable, broadcasting, print,
wireless) that are not regulated by common carriage rules.
21
The US intentions for making cyberspace a free-trade zone were set out explicitly in the Clinton
administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce and are central to the Bush
administration’s plans – see http://www.georgebush.com/Issues.asp? FormMode=FullText&ID=1 (last
accessed 20/07/01).
22
Quoted from http://www.jmm.com/xp/jmm/press/2001/pr_060401.xml (last accessed 20/07/01).
23
For discussion of the dominant portal players see McChesney (1999:165-8). For further discussion
on the efforts of portals to dominate Internet ‘eyeballs’ see Miller (2000).
24
The line between editorial and commercial content is rapidly dissolving on the Web (McChesney,
1999:173-5).
25
For further details on the corporate investments in the convergence of Internet-TV see McChesney
(1999:146-154) and Schiller (1999:104-142).
26
Details of the free software movement can be found at www.fsf.org or www.gnu.org and details of
the open source movement at www.opensource.org (last accessed 20/08/01).
27
The Berkman Center can be found at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/projects/deliberation/ (last
accessed 20/08/01).
The HyperForum homepage can be found at http://mars3.gps.caltech.edu/
HyperForum/ (last accessed 20/08/01).
28
29
See http://democracyonline.org/databank/dec2000survey.shtml (last accessed 1/08/01).
See, for instance, Minnesota E-Democracy (e-democracy.org), the Canadian ECommons project
(e.commons.net), and the Hansard Society’s Democr@cy Forum (democracyforum.org.uk). All URLs
last accessed 20/08/01.
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