Glossary of Terms ...................................................................................................................... 2
Afghanistan Maps ...................................................................................................................... 4
Provincial Map ....................................................................................................................... 4
Ethnolinguistic Map ............................................................................................................... 5
Abstract: ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 7
Concept Summary.................................................................................................................. 7
Research Question ................................................................................................................. 8
Research Methodology .......................................................................................................... 9
Objectives of the Study .......................................................................................................... 9
Limitations of the Study....................................................................................................... 10
Definition of Terms.............................................................................................................. 12
Tribes ............................................................................................................................... 12
Democracy ....................................................................................................................... 14
Tribal Engagement ........................................................................................................... 14
The Insurgents .................................................................................................................. 15
Victory ............................................................................................................................. 17
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................... 19
Summary .............................................................................................................................. 29
Chapter 3: Research Methodology........................................................................................... 30
Primacy of the Political ........................................................................................................ 30
People’s War ........................................................................................................................ 31
Moral Supremacy ................................................................................................................. 32
Guerrilla Warfare ................................................................................................................. 33
Harnessing the Battlespace Terrain ..................................................................................... 34
Counterinsurgency: Separating the Fish from the Water ..................................................... 35
Securing the Population ....................................................................................................... 36
Determining Success or Defeat ............................................................................................ 38
Research Approach .............................................................................................................. 39
Chapter 4: Findings & Analysis ............................................................................................... 40
The War in Afghanistan ....................................................................................................... 40
Root Causes of Instability ................................................................................................ 40
Insurgent Activity ............................................................................................................ 43
Tribes: The Human Terrain ................................................................................................. 45
Tribalism, Talibanism & Warlordism .............................................................................. 45
Strategic Approaches to Instability in Afghanistan ............................................................. 49
Tribal Engagement ............................................................................................................... 53
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan ........................................................ 54
The Moqbil Project, Paktia Province, 2007 ..................................................................... 55
Kunar Province, 2004 ...................................................................................................... 58
Tagab District, Kapisa Province ...................................................................................... 59
ODA 316, Kunar Province, 2003 ..................................................................................... 60
Summary .............................................................................................................................. 62
Chapter 5: Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 65
Further Issues ....................................................................................................................... 66
Further Research .................................................................................................................. 67
Closing Thoughts ................................................................................................................. 68
References ................................................................................................................................ 69
1
Glossary of Terms
ANA – Afghan National Army
ANP – Afghan National Police
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
Arbakai – Tribal security ‘militia’
CAPs – Combined Action Platoons
CF – Coalition Forces
COG – Centre of Gravity
CORDS - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
COIN – Counterinsurgency
DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
DOS – Department of State (USA)
Durand Line – The Afghan-Pakistan border.
GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
FATA –Federally Administered Tribal Area (Pakistan)
Hazara – Ethnic minority in central Afghanistan, predominantly Shia.
HIG - Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin
HQN – Haqqani Network
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
ISI – Inter-Service Agency (Pakistan Intelligence)
Jihad – Arabic word loosely meaning to ‘struggle,’ in a spiritual sense.
Jirga – Afghan council of tribal elders
Lashkar – Tribal paramilitary militia
Loya Jirga – The supreme jirga in Afghanistan
Malik – Executive leader of a Qawm under the jirga
Mujahideen – Arabic word translates to ‘the stuggelers’
Mullah – Islamic teacher similar to the Arabic Imam.
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP – North Western Frontier Province
ODA- Operational Detachments-A (A-Team)
OODA Loop – Observe Orientate Decide Act
Pashto /Pashtun, Pathan – Ethno-linguistic group that straddles Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Pashtunwali – The Pashtun tribal code
2
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP - Quick Impact Projects
QRF – Quick Reaction Force
QST – Quetta Shura Taliban
Qawm – sub-tribal community
Shia – Islamic sect, a minority in Afghanistan.
Shura – Council of religious figures.
Sunni – Islamic sect, a majority in Afghanistan
Sufi – Mystic Islamic sect, influential in Afghan culture.
Taliban – Arabic word meaning religious students (two), adopted by the fundamentalist
militia under Mullah Omar.
Tajik – Ethno-linguistic group similar to Persian. Ethnic group in Afghanistan.
TTP - Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Ulema - Muslim scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law.
Umma – Arabic word referring to the global Islamic community
Wahhabi – Fundamentalist branch of the Sunni Sect, based out of Saudi Arabia
WOT – War on Terror
3
Afghanistan Maps
Provincial Map
(CIA Maps)
4
Ethnolinguistic Map
(CIA Maps)
5
Abstract:
Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been in Afghanistan
waging war against a protracted insurgency for some nine years. Central to the US-led
international effort to bring stability to the region has been the creation and promotion of the
centralized institutions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).
Problems arise when policy and strategy place all their support into creating such centralized
governance structures in a state that has no history of such institutions, within a culture where
legitimacy lies within de-centralized tribal affiliations. Corruption and a lack of capacity all
further undermine the image of the central government. In the tribal rural provinces of
Afghanistan, efforts to promote the hierarchical structures of the central government do not
spread ‘democracy’ as much as they serve to further alienate the population by undercutting
traditional sources of power and legitimacy, the tribal jirgas, councils of elders and other
egalitarian tribal structures. After thirty years of continuous war, instead of alienating such
sources of power and legitimacy, efforts should focus on restoring the tribal infrastructure to
bolster governance, security and bring stability. If long lasting solutions to Afghanistan’s
instability are to be found, then there will have to be a practical incorporation of
Afghanistan’s traditional societal and political fabric within national government.
6
Chapter 1: Introduction
Concept Summary
Afghanistan has a long and troubled past as a stage for the passing of history. It has
often played host to the vying of regional powers and their spheres of influence, all pursuing
their own version of the ‘Great Game’ that has often destabilized the country, to which the
US has in recent history been no exception.
The current US led intervention centres on securing Afghanistan to provide regional
and global stability within the context of the War of Terror. Within US and NATO policies
towards Afghanistan, there is a realization by most vested actors that there is no military
solution to the security problem. Policy emphasises that regional and global security cannot
be achieved until Afghanistan is able to stand on its own two feet and is no longer a safe
haven for terrorist organizations. This has called for all elements of diplomatic, information,
military and economic (DIME) tools to be utilized in state building as well as ongoing
counterinsurgency operations.
Since the intervention in 2002, the primary state building effort has focused around
establishing a highly centralized GIRoA as the focal point for governance, reconstruction and
eventually security. Early assumptions worked on the basis of transporting a flourishing
electoral democracy into Afghanistan. Likewise, and in somewhat contradictory fashion to a
healthy democratic society, focus has been on a strong army and police force to control the
‘lawless’ provinces of Afghanistan and quell insurrections.
Security strategy within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has varied
from one nation to the next. Dominated by the US however, it has swayed from its initial
stages when killing and capturing Al Qaeda was the only concern, to enemy-centric
operations focused on the Taliban after its resurgence in 2005, to the current population
7
centric strategy of today that seeks to win over the population and spreading the influence of
GIRoA’s centralized institutions.
Now, some eight years down the line, the results have been looking doubtful. The
strength of the Pashto dominated insurgency amongst the rural populace has risen throughout
the entire country, not only in the south. In contrast, the power of the central government is
increasingly weak and ineffective the further one goes from Kabul, and once more is riddled
with corruption.
Since the Taliban’s resurgence, there has been a growing realization that things need
to change. The end state will not be the European style democracy everybody had hoped it
would be, but what will the face of victory will look like in the seemingly illusive quest for
an ‘Afghan solution for an Afghan problem’? Unfortunately the ideas of what that means are
as unsure and varied as the coalition partners vested in their delivery.
US policy laid out by the administration of President Barack Obama is to support a
military surge in Afghanistan, coupled with plans to start drawing down forces in 2011. This,
the weakness of GIRoA and its security forces, desires of many CF nations to have a
comprehensive ‘exit strategy,’ and the US’s lessons learnt from Iraq have started to turn
attention for solutions away from the Afghan government, towards traditional tribal
institutions, with the hope that such engagement will have as profound an effect as the Anbar
Awakening and the subsequent Sons of Iraq program, driven by Sunni tribes, did in bringing
stability to Iraq.
Research Question
The US is currently testing ideas for incorporating traditional tribal structures as
levels of informal governance and security. They are in effect attempting to transfer the
8
successes of the Sons of Iraq Programme to Afghanistan. It has been described by those
involved as a wake up to the tribal reality of Afghanistan in search for solutions.
Thus this paper seeks to assess to what extent and what structure should tribal
engagement take and how can traditional tribal structures in Afghanistan provide mechanisms
for governance and security. As such this study will also explore some of the implications
and benefits as well as challenges.
Research Methodology
There are many complex aspects to the current situation within Afghanistan.
Activities are often broken down into two parts, the war, and the reconstruction. Whilst one is
invariably interlinked with the other, there are divides amongst the institutions tasked with
their execution, orientated along very different directions, even if the long terms goals are the
same. This in itself is an issue hindering progress.
Counterinsurgency approaches can be broken down into enemy-centric focusing on
disrupting and eliminating insurgent opposition, or population-centric approaches focusing
primarily on securing the support of the people from the insurgents. Both can employ direct
and indirect methods. For this paper, tribal engagement shall be analyzed primarily through
the ideas laid out in theories that formed the current strategy, a population-centric pacification
counterinsurgency strategy (Kilcullen, 2007). Research is predominantly qualitative, with use
of a number of case studies highlighting successful tribal engagement initiatives conducted
within the past decade in Afghanistan.
Objectives of the Study
The primary objective of this paper is to assess value of tribal engagement to both
short and long term stability in Afghanistan, whilst highlighting more constructive paths for
9
its utilization. As part, one has to try to see Afghan culture and society through Afghan eyes
and break down our foreign assumptions. In short, one has to also draw the distinctions
between Talibanism, tribalism and warlordism, highlighting their key differences that can be
utilised, whilst also drawing the connections.
This paper seeks to address if tribal engagement, recognition and empowerment, in
the correct cultural context, could enhance the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations
and potentially provide more stable and long lasting security and governance solutions. It is
not so much a pacification strategy but an empowering one, and is the only way to secure the
rural population and forge a lasting model of governance.
Limitations of the Study
There are a number of issues that will not be considered variables for the purposes of
the paper that are also key issues. From the time of the 2008 US election up to Obama’s
decision to meet ISAF commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s request with 20,000 more
troops, there was debate in Washington about what path the future of the war in Afghanistan
should take. The debate focused primarily around the US’s broader objectives in the WOT as
Al Qaeda was believed to be shifting from Afghanistan to other regions of instability. For
Afghanistan, this boiled down to whether or not the US should pursue a comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan to ‘defeat’ the Taliban and rebuild the country, or
scale back and focus on special operations forces efforts to capture and kill Al Qaeda. The
debate occurred primarily in political circles and not within the military, for good reasons – it
was highly impractical. The scale back argument pushed the use of Special Forces a as silver
bullet. The approach over-estimated their capacity to dominate a completely hostile
environment without support, whilst practically abandoning the responsibility of
reconstructing Afghanistan. It flew in the face of military and political wisdom on how to
10
defeat terrorism and insurgency and was more the preference of some in Washington looking
for expedient answers.
There is of course the 300 pound gorilla in the room, Pakistan. One cannot talk about
security in Afghanistan without talking about the entire Pashto tribal belt on that is dissected
by Afghan-Pakistan border that was drawn up by the British 1893, known as the Durand
Line. This is not a paper about policy towards Pakistan or pertaining to the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the
incorporation of which is half of the strategic pie.
Pakistan shall be looked to for contemporary examples of tribal engagement. Lessons
from the Pakistan side of the Durand Line can aptly apply on the other, and vice versa to
some degree. The problems faced within Pakistan are similar and different at the same time,
necessitating a study of their own.
For the purposes of this paper, it is recognized that for many rural Pashto the Durand
line is arbitrary in comparison to tribal or sub-tribal divisions and boundaries. Pakistan policy
shall be considered a constant — engaging in offensives against factions of the Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) that threaten security in Pakistan with a newly discovered vigour,
whilst co-opting groups who wish to use the Pakistan side as a safe haven for cross border
activities into Afghanistan, in support of its strategic interests of a controllable, pro-Pakistan
neighbour to the north (Haqqani, 2005).
Similarly, whilst this paper incorporates many aspects of the current debate on
negotiations with the Taliban, they are not the primary subject. Tribal engagement will at
some stage result in contact with the insurgents as there are some communities who have
interconnected relations with the insurgency. Likewise, whilst this paper recognizes problems
posed by internal corruption within GIRoA and the ANSF from the central administration
down to the district level, it will not cover internal reforms to address that corruption directly.
11
Rather, this paper seeks to explore alternate, tried and tested Afghan solutions to governance
problems.
It should be noted that the research has been limited to literature on South Asia,
Islam, development and humanitarianism as well as counterinsurgency and tribal
engagement. All of the sources have been carefully chosen due to their experience or first
hand knowledge on the subject they address. Most of the sources that pertain to Afghanistan
directly, for example, are journalists, military officers or diplomats, both Afghani and
foreign, with a wealth of experience in region. Literary research has been supplemented by
personal field research in Kabul and whilst subsequently embedded with US Marines of the
2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand, Farah and Nimruz provinces in February and
March of 2010. Information was drawn through observations and contact with many
experienced individuals within the military as well as the Department of State (DOS), other
ISAF partners, aid workers, and countless Afghan citizens from the urbanites of Kabul to the
rural population of the south whilst on patrol with the Marines.
Definition of Terms
Tribes
Tribes are the most common form of identity in Afghanistan after that of ethnicity.
For many, their sense of ethnic and tribal identity far supersedes that of the national identity
(Blatt, 2009). A rural Pashto for example could consider himself Pashto first, Muslim second
and Afghan as an afterthought (Elliot, 2001). Due to the Pashto domination of the insurgency,
this paper focuses on those very tribes of the south. Similar structures do still exist for the
other Afghan ethnicities, all-be-it with slightly different names.
The Pashto tribes are large and spread over vastly remote areas through southern and
central Afghanistan to northern Pakistan. Because of the dispersed and isolated nature of the
12
tribes, common day to day power lies not in any large centralized, hierarchical tribal
structure, but in decentralized sub-tribal ones that word along egalitarian lines. Dynamics
vary somewhat in each region of Afghanistan, but the basic social unit after the family is the
Qawm. This is a collection of local communities and families, headed by a council of elders.
Key decisions within the community are debated by the primary sources of social power, the
elders, the mullahs and the community in a jirga. Broader, regional and spiritual matters can
be covered locally in a shura, which is usually headed by the ulema, the local mullahs and
other Islamic scholars.1 “Because the shura exists to deal with issues as they arise, they are
flexible in membership as well as in scope” (Brick, 2008).
As they are not permanently standing bodies, day to day matters and running of the
Qawm is conducted by a Malik. The Malik is appointed by the community’s jirga to be the
representative and chief executive, disputing conflicts and keeping the balance. Traditionally,
the jirga issue decrees and can stand up militias for policing and defence known as Arbakai
or Lashkars. Their decision making is adaptive to the situation whilst rooted in the legal and
ethical codes that govern Pashto society, Pashtunwali.
There are traditionally different levels of jirga. Within the Qawm stands the maraca.
At the tribal level stands the qawmi, whilst, traditionally at the national level Afghanistan had
been governed by the Loya Jirga. Whilst there are many levels to tribal structures in
Afghanistan, power and influence lies in the decentralized sub-tribal structures. The Qawm is
where all things begin, and thus is where governance and stability will begin.
1
The term shura is an Arabic word which literally means “council” and is commonly used to refer to local
council of Ulema, or Islamic scholars. Jirga is a Pashto term that also means “council”, although it translates
literally as “circle”, which reflects the seating arrangements participants take in the countryside.
13
Democracy
Within this paper one should look at the definition of democracy with the results and
nature, not the specific western style structures in mind. Democracy is a process, not an
institution. As such, in search for the ‘Afghan solution’ one should view democracy from
outside of the western cultural box and conceptualize Afghan equivalents that derive the
desired result. The process should include accountability through a system of representation.
This should, in theory, be the case with GIRoA. Aside from corruption and a lack of capacity
within the government, there is a disconnect between the majority of the population who live
within the framework of their tribal structure and the installed government that has in its
design attempted to supplant some of the tribe’s traditional authority. To try and transfer and
instil our rigid definitions of democratic institutions can, and has yielded less than democratic
results thus far, whereas tribal jirgas work in a more open, egalitarian and democratic form.
Tribal Engagement
Current debate and testing around tribal engagement is occurring primarily at the
community level and occasionally at the tribal level. At the national level, the Afghan
legislator has appropriated the role of the Loya Jirga, but not its structure or formation. In his
re-inauguration speech, Karzai alluded to calling a Loya Jirga as a measure to tackle
corruption within the Afghan central government, recognizing the important role and
accountability of the traditional tribal structures, yet the purpose or structure of this new Loya
Jirga has yet to be announced, if indeed it will happen.
What exactly constitutes tribal engagement can vary greatly depending on the social,
economic, political and geographic dynamics of the tribe as well as those who are seeking to
engage with them. In short, tribal engagement is a way of engaging with the rural population,
through the power of the traditional structures. Tribal engagement seeks to incorporate
14
traditional tribal structures as part of the problem solving, as opposed to forcing outside
mechanisms upon the population and alienating these sources of legitimacy. Whatever the
means, it is an attempt to fill the void in the deficiencies of a highly centralized government
in a land with no working history of such a thing.
The Insurgents
When one refers to the insurgents in Afghanistan they are actually referring to three
separate yet affiliated Pashto networks.
The Taliban: The Taliban sprang up in Kandahar during the civil war as a grassroots reaction
against exploitative warlordism produced by the predominantly US and Saudi funded antiSoviet Jihad. Originally initiated by thirteen Islamic students, or Taliban2, from the Ghilzai
tribal group, their popularity as Robin Hood figures able to deliver peace, security and justice
rapidly spread, as did their power. As the group expanded with scores of fundamentalist
students from Pakistan as well as the Afghan refugee camps, it drew the support of Pakistan,
wishing to pursue its own regional interest in securing its northern border with an Islamic
neighbour it could control, as well as opening trade routes to Central Asia (Rashid, 2001).
The group’s strict enforcement of its tribal interpretation of Sharia, enforced conscription,
economic mismanagement and inability to successfully govern Afghanistan, as well as its
discrimination towards non-Pashto ethnic groups all made it increasingly unpopular. In
addition, the rise of foreign influence over the Taliban, be it Pakistani, Saudi or from Arab
jihadist groups, was all seen as very un-Afghan.
Having fled from Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban’s leadership, including Mullah
Omar, is believed to be operating out of Quetta in Baluchistan, Pakistan and is often referred
2
Taliban is Arabic for religious students. Singular: Tulab, Duel: Taliban, Plural: Tulab.
15
to as the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). They comprise the biggest force fighting CF troops
through their main power base in southern Afghanistan and draw most of their funds through
the opium trade. The group runs its own shadow government, known as the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan that is infiltrating villages levying taxes and dispensing justice under its
interpretation of Sharia, which, in the face of government corruption and ineffectiveness, is
gaining the Taliban support once more. The group is believed to have an interest in recapturing Kandahar city, the de-facto capital during its rule, and is already increasing its
attacks there in anticipation of a proposed ISAF offensive to clear the region in 2011
(McChrystal, 2009).
Haqqani Network (HQN): Headed by the veteran Mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin
Haqqani, HQN operates along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, the Durand Line. It
maintains a power base in Pakistan’s FATA province of North Waziristan and projects its
influence across the border into its tribal region through the provinces of Khost, Paktia and
Paktika (Reuters).
It claims to fall under the overall leadership of the Quetta Shura and is believed to
draws most of its funds from support in Pakistan, the Gulf Arab networks and through ties to
Al Qaeda (McChrystal, 2009).
Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG): Hezb-I-Islami is the group of Pashto warlord Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. He was the favoured choice of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency
for receiving US and Saudi funds during the anti-Soviet Jihad. During the civil war, he
rotated through a number of alliances, aligning with different factions as one of the three
major warlords who contended for control of Kabul (Rashid, 2001). His power base comes
amongst the historically dominant Durrani tribal group of the Pastho in eastern Afghanistan’s
16
provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kapisa and Kunar. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar represented
Pashto interest amongst the warlords; yet, it was against his warlordism that the Taliban’s
influence spread into Eastern Afghanistan until he created an alliance with them, falling
under Taliban control. Since the Taliban have lost their position of dominance, he has reasserted his authority and distances himself from Mullah Omar. His goals are believed to be
power, and not territorially orientated (McChrystal, 2009). In March 2010, reports indicated
that clashes had broken out between HIG and Taliban fighters in Baghlan Province and since
then delegations from HIG have entered talks with GIRoA (McGirk, 2010 & BBC, 22 March,
2010).
Victory
Victory, or more purposefully, a desirable end state, constitutes a stable Afghanistan
both politically and economically. That is fairly simple. The devil is in the detail. From a
military standpoint of counter-insurgency and conflict resolution, ‘victory’ is not defined in
the conventional terms of having vanquished one’s enemies and caused them to submit. In
2008, British Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith stated, much to everyone’s shock, that the
public should not expect “a decisive military victory” in Afghanistan. “We’re not going to
win this war. It’s about reducing it to a manageable level of insurgency that’s not a strategic
threat and can be managed by the Afghan army” (Gammel, October 5, 2008). Indeed, as this
paper will argue and demonstrate, progress in Afghanistan is more about solutions than it is
victories.
One cannot kill their way out of an insurgency. It is a near futile task to attempt to
destroy an insurgency militarily once its ideas and causes have taken root among the
consciences of the populace. Lessons of such conflicts yield that military measures act to
whittle down or contain the violence to a manageable level, under which the conflict turns to
17
dialogue and root grievances underpinning instability can be addressed. In Brigadier
Carleton-Smith’s words:
“We want to change the nature of the debate from one where disputes are settled
through the barrel of the gun to one where it is done through negotiations... If the Taliban were
prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that’s
precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this. That shouldn’t make people
uncomfortable” (Gammel, October 5, 2008).
18
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Most literature written directly about tribal engagement has been fairly recent, as
academics, strategists and tacticians alike attempt to thrash out ways forwards. Many
historical precedents do, however, exist from similar scenarios. These examples, namely from
European colonial experiences, have in turn been reviewed by some of the thinkers of today
as a source of solutions and a facet of counterinsurgency strategy. 3 Counterinsurgency, poses
many troublesome dilemmas for the traditional, conventionally orientated military. Every
nation and military that has faced an insurgent problem has churned out a good amount of
literature about it afterwards, some more constructive than others.
The brand of modern counterinsurgency strategy adopted by ISAF was born primarily
out of the jungles of Malaya during British endeavours to quell the communist insurrection in
the 1950s and 60s. The strategy, utilizing a broad scope of tools at its disposal and not
military means alone, relies upon the fostering of three consecutive pillars of governance,
development and security. It is currently referred to as population-centric as all decisions
evolve around their impact upon the populace, with the objective of winning over the will of
the people and alienating the insurgents, rendering them ineffective and isolated. One element
of this is ‘hearts and minds’, which entails projects conducted by counter-insurgent forces
that are humanitarian in nature, and seen as a quick way to earn the trust and goodwill of the
targeted population, such as through quick impact projects (QIPs).
In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lt. Col. (Ret) John Nagl, co-writer of the
current Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, analyzes some of the problems faced by
3
Whilst all European colonial models engaged in some degree of tribal engagement, the British model offers
the most pertinent examples. This is due to the British approach of leaving traditional structures within the
colonies intact, and using them where appropriate. Other imperial powers, such as the French, and the Spanish
before them, worked along a basis of forced assimilation rather than adaptation, working opposed to, instead of
with, traditional political and social structures.
19
British forces in the Malayan Emergency, and US counterparts in Vietnam as they tried to
adapt with varying degrees of success. A key emphasis of his research is the resistance of
some militaries to adapt away from their standard procedures to more appropriate means.
British responses in the Malaya Emergency evolved into the foundations of modern
counterinsurgency strategy. British military ethos, which does not formalize set doctrinal
responses in manuals in a similar manner to the US, holds that one does not fight by the
doctrine one trains by. Instead, the core values of any doctrine have to be transferred to the
unique contexts of every operational environment. The context can vary from country to
country or, as is proving in Afghanistan, from one province, district or even village to the
next.
Naturally, there are potential flaws within the traditional hearts and minds approach to
counterinsurgency when one takes them as hard and fast rules rather than guidelines. This is
noted by Fitzsimmons in his analysis of counterinsurgency that “the premise of most Western
thinking... is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy for the ruling
regime among some critical portion of the local population” (Fitzsimmons, 2008).
Under this guideline, approaches to ‘legitimacy’ have been guided by western
dominated ‘modernizing theory,’ that whoever can provide the better path to economic
growth, political representation and efficient administration maintains legitimacy
(Fitzsimmons, 2008).
Fitzsimmons argues there is a need for “greater focus in counterinsurgency strategy
on the role of ethnic and religious identity” as sources of conflict. (Fitzsimmons, 2008)
“However good governance is not the only plausible basis for claims to legitimacy
amongst contending political factions, especially in environments where ethnic or religious
identities are politically salient. Experience in Iraq suggests that in environments where the
ethnic or religious identity of the ruling regime is contested, claims to legitimacy may rest
primarily on the identity of who governs, rather than how whoever governs governs.”
20
An example of this would be US approaches in Iraq, broken down into three distinct
stages. Firstly “taken somewhat by surprise by the fact of the insurgency and its intensity, the
US military reverted to its organizational and doctrinal propensity to address hostile action
through the application of overwhelming force” (Fitzsimmons, 2008). Subsequent approaches
emphasized the “centrality of winning hearts and minds in its traditional sense, focused on
provision of security and good governance” (Fitzsimmons). Finally, approaches adopted a
mixture of traditional hearts and minds as well as sectarian power shuffling to the specifics of
the Iraq problem. As another academic, Stephen Biddle, notes:
“The current struggle is not a Maoist ‘people’s war’ of national liberation; it is a
communal civil war with very different dynamics... Economic aid or reconstruction assistance
cannot fix the problem: would Sunnis really get over their fear of Shiite domination if only the
sewers were fixed and the electricity kept working?” (2006)
Whilst the US is now attempting to transfer the tribal engagement successes of Iraq
and the ‘Sons of Iraq’ framework to Afghanistan, Brigadier (Ret.) Justin Kelly of the
Australian Army, argues that Afghanistan’s south is more akin to Basra than Al Anbar.
Whilst in Anbar, Sunni militias, who considered themselves the epicentre of Iraqinationalism, were co-opted; in Basra, the Shia Mahdi Army had to be whittled down by
security forces to bring them to the negotiating table under favourable terms.
Kelly emphasises the primacy of security as the first action, that “security allows law
and order, it does not follow it” (Kelly, 2009). Examples of hearts and minds development
and reconstruction projects, without security, result in shows of weakness.
“Unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace then the
man with the gun at your door at midnight is your master” (Kelly, 2009).
As others constantly re-affirm, tribes in the Pashto south understand strength and
power as sources of control, if not also legitimacy (Gant, 2009).
21
Whilst British political weakness to take on the insurgency proved problematic in
Basra, Kelly identifies similar incidents in Afghanistan, such as the major fifteen day convoy
operation in 2007 to move a new turbine to the Kajaki Dam. CF forces had to use a difficult
route after having been denied permission by local tribes to use stretches of roads through
their territory. These tribes refused as they understood the Taliban’s authority over them, and
its capacity to exact retribution. Indeed it is a common story that CF troops conducting
‘quick-impact’ projects designed to win over a population along the lines of Mao’s ‘people’s
war’ to correct injustices, find that elders first have to seek permission from the insurgent
groups who rule over them to cooperate with such programs as well as usually hand over a
sum of the aid monies distributed (Ferguson, 2010). Such actions strengthen the insurgent’s
position whilst undermining the CF.
Kelly also identifies how a highly centralized and western structured GIRoA is
abrasive to the traditional tribal structure. It would be foolhardy of CF to expect rural
Pashtuns to willingly “cut themselves off from their cultural roots [and] subject themselves to
an equally foreign incomprehensible form of government” with offers of “some new
buildings, some cash and more reliable electricity — none of which has been important to
them so far in their history” (Kelly, 2009).
Likewise, he sees development and hearts and minds as slow and ineffective ways to
defeat an insurgency and “attempting to fit square Malayan pegs into round Middle Eastern
holes”4 (Kelly, 2009). Instead he presents victory as the “removal of the insurgent and the
extension of the coercive authority of the Afghan state into the Pashto areas” (Kelly). In
short, GIRoA should force its will over the rural population and defeat the insurgency by
enemy-centric means — “we should be doing more fighting and fewer good deeds” (Kelly).
This is an approach that would probably work no more effectively for ISAF than it did for the
4
Afghanistan is in fact in South Asia, not the Middle East.
22
Soviets and goes against the political reality that “you cannot kill your way out of an
insurgency” (FM 3-24). “The large sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area and the poppy trade
make the insurgency resilient” (Malkasian & Meyerley, 2008) whilst the damage inflicted by
such strategies risks alienating the very population the government should be trying to
represent and inflicting high civilian casualties. Under Pashtunwali, such actions “will oblige
a Pashtun and his immediate relatives to seek revenge. The Taliban thrive off such vendettas”
(Malkasian & Meyerley).
Whilst Kelly has identified two critical failings within counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan, his solution, however, seems even more ill suited and fraught with cultural
generalizations. Although he recognizes the strength of the tribal system in contrast to the
lack of appeal of GIRoA, and the importance of security to maintain legitimacy, he casts the
rural Pashto as somewhat backwards and fails to separate tribalism from insurgency or the
need to harness social forces to generate stability. He assumes them to be one and the same as
“in Afghanistan the coercion is coming from within the community and so ‘defensive’
protection is impractical” (Kelly, 2009). Whilst the insurgency may need to be ‘whittled
down’ to a more favourable position of negotiation, as has been the case in many
insurgencies from Northern Ireland to Colombia, a traditionally dominant sense of Pashto
supremacy is not synonymous with the insurgency but easily harnessed by such groups when
the broader population feels their traditional ways are under threat. Instead, this crack is
something that could be harnessed via tribal engagement, versus its continued alienation and
suppression via Kelly’s proposed strategy of imposition, domination and attrition.
Steven Metz, of the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College,
proposes an altogether different and multifaceted model of counterinsurgency, based off
‘modern’ insurgencies in which a host of negative actors are involved for their own gain. He
23
states that what US counterinsurgency doctrine there has been is built around the El Salvador
model, which involves a low unconventional footprint to strengthen host state security forces
and overpower any insurgency, much as Kelly would propose. Partly as such,
counterinsurgency is viewed as a political problem solved primarily through the military by
bolstering the host state’s security capacity. This analysis can be laid in comparison to the
British Malaya model which sought an economic and law enforcement solution.
As Nagl noted, military institutions tend to stereotype insurgencies and thus
counterinsurgencies based off the collective memories of their previous experiences.
America’s prevailing counterinsurgencies experiences are ones of interventionism in support
of overarching policy agendas, whereas Britain’s have primarily been ones of colonial
maintenance or national transition.
These binary models, argues Metz, fall increasingly short in multi-faceted communal
conflicts as he describes the increasing trend, from Colombia, to Iraq and Afghanistan. Metz
proposes a conflict model in which the threat is not the insurgency, but instability itself.
Whilst political grievances may instigate an insurgency, as the conflict progresses economic
motives can begin to play a greater role (Metz, 2007-2008).
“Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance.
If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting
from the conflict and these groups, therefore, have some interest in initiating and sustaining
it” (Collier, 2000).
Any actors, who create instability to support their objectives, be they insurgents,
criminals or even elements within the host government, are classed as negative. After all, it is
within the instability of the civil war that Al Qaeda found a safe haven in Afghanistan.
However, bringing host governments under scrutiny is not as new within
counterinsurgency thinking as Metz would like to suggest. John Paul Vann, an American
advisor in Vietnam dedicated to changing how America waged its war there, could readily
24
identify with the motives of the Vietnamese peasantry to join the Viet Cong due to the levels
of government corruption and a lack of justice. A direct parallel can be drawn from this to
GIRoA in Afghanistan, and the need to combat internal corruption and provide adequate
levels of dependable justice for the populace.
Thus, insurgency is not the primary problem, but the symptom, facilitated by a clash
of socio-political, cultural conditions and actors who wish to gain from instability.
“Contemporary insurgencies flow from systemic failures in the political, economic, and
social realms. They arise not only from the failure or weakness of the state, but from more
general flaws in cultural, social, and economic systems” (Metz, 2007-2008).
Blindly promoting a host government and ignoring its potential shortcomings for the
sake of not wanting to appear to undermine an ally in which all hopes are invested, as had
initially happened in both Iraq and Afghanistan, does not gain traction when the said
government has no legitimacy amongst the population, is involved in abuses against them, or
feeding into instability and insurgency. Thus, CF loyalties should remain with the primary
operational centre of gravity, the population, rather than imposing an unjust system upon
them.5
Thus, success in counterinsurgency can be seen in terms of de-escalating and
resolving the conflict rather than ‘fighting through’ with operations such as the American
offensives in Fallujah. Metz states that if the current systems that are in place are failing, then
“counterinsurgency cannot succeed unless it finds alternative sources of power and worth”
(Metz, 2007-2008). Whilst his idea might be of more progressive or modern forms of
governance, security, economic or cultural systems, progress may not always be looking
forward. Certainly in the case of Afghanistan, more reliable sources of worth could be found
5
A clear example of this would be Shia Death Squads within the Iraqi police conducting extra-judicial killings
amongst the Sunni population, who went unchecked for several years by coalition forces, despite it being very
aware to them, as they wished not to undermine what they had thus far built.
25
amongst traditional structures that have otherwise been overlooked in favour of failing
recently developed ones.
What was true for Iraq may not be true for Afghanistan. Whilst the general themes
may transfer, the devil is in the details of their execution.
A report compiled by field
researchers through the Defense Technical Information Center emphasizes how for
Afghanistan, “factors that loom large in any counterinsurgency campaign – politics, society,
economics, and outside support – bear only passing resemblance to Al Anbar” (Malkasian &
Meyerley, 2008).
The pair identifies that “neither sectarian nor ethnic conflict is a major source of the
insurgency... the political problem is government misrule” (Malkasian & Meyerley, 2008).
Security measures are arbitrary, unless to create an atmosphere in which better governance
can extend, as per ink-blot strategic doctrine. Likewise the tribes in Afghanistan are far more
dominant in society yet less unified, whilst there are only minor rifts within the insurgency
versus the major rifts between Sunni militias and Al Qaeda in Iraq. All these make a
sweeping revival similar to the ‘Anbar Awakening’ highly unlikely. Instead “the creation of
small-scale tribal movements centred on villages and districts appear to be the more feasible
objective” (Malkasian & Meyerley).
Whilst Kelly and a few others cite the failings of a population centric approach that
has emphasized hearts and minds, developed in response the Maoist style people’s war
against perceived injustice, they are forgetting that even within Mao’s framework, armed
force is still a strong tool of persuasion, as “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”
(Mao Tse-tung, 1964). It is to be remembered that hearts and minds measures are part of just
one of the three interdependent pillars of governance, development and security. The current
failings of hearts and minds are not so much in the strategic framework, but with its
26
implementation. As Karl Slaikeu, a member of the Human Terrain Teams, puts forth in his
“Oil Spot Plus Strategy,” hearts and minds ‘quick impact projects’ deployed to win over a
population in new areas, without the creation of some level of security or permanent CF
presence, fail to create sustainable solutions or to secure the population, whilst undermining
CF objectives. Slaikeu readily realizes that there are “ample and persuasive human needs to
meet in winning hearts and minds” (2009) but in the logical order of “security first, services
second” (2009). He recognizes the need to provide security as one of the facets of legitimacy
as “data from the Afghan villages reveal a tangible desire for security” (2009). This has to be
in partnership with the tribal communities.
For approaches to tribal engagement, many junior and senior officers alike are turning
to their institutional histories. Andrew Roe, a major in the British Army, recognises the lack
of cultural awareness amongst the bulk of CF and how it acts as a decided hindrance to
operations, further alienates the population whilst the insurgents move freely amongst them.
The insurgents are winning the information war. Thus harnessing that cultural knowledge is
described as a ‘force multiplier’ that would drastically increase the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency operations (Gant, 2009).
Maj. Roe suggested in 2005 that CF adopt a strategy similar the British in dealing
with the North-West Frontier of British India (now Pakistan). Here, due to the remote nature
of the terrain and autonomous strength of the tribal structures the British authority
“recognized the need to delegate responsibility... to achieve security, whilst still maintaining
political primacy” (Roe, 2005). The British achieved this through a crop of highly trained,
educated and motivated frontier officers who “successfully controlled [the NWFP] using a
mix of incentives and force to encourage tribes to control themselves” (Roe, 2005). These
officers had a deep cultural knowledge and mastery of regional languages, as well as
27
schooling in law and politics. They were likewise supported by an extensive and competent
Indian Civil Service.
Likewise, some within the US have turned to the often ignored positive lessons of
Vietnam. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) ran successful Combined Action Platoons
(CAPs) that saw highly qualified volunteers embedded within civil defence groups, living
within the villages. These groups were responsible for local security and pacification in a
similar way to the NWFP. Instead of trying to form local forces into a conventional style
force to which they were ill-suited, the local inhabitants’ skills, their knowledge of both the
geographical and human terrain, were used to their advantage. Simultaneously, Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) groups took a population first
approach to pacification, attempting to work within the social context and out-revolution the
revolutionaries similar to the vision of John Paul Vann. These efforts all aimed to work
within, not against the cultural framework. “The population’s interests must be first
considerations in all decisions made by CF and should be the prism through which all
decisions are considered” (Holt, 2009).
“Any attempt by the Kabul Government to displace Pashtunwali and traditional cultural
institutions and replace them with imposed institutions that do not operate quickly and
efficiently (and do not meet with Pashtun notions of justice) will end in rejection of the
government” (Holt, 2009).
Both Roe and Holt suggest approaches that utilize the Arbakai to shore up deficits
within the Afghan security structure, mentored by energetic teams of CF. Roe also suggests
that Afghan civil service structures are created and brought in to support the strategy and
promote provincial government – jirga relations.
There is a lot of basic literature on such approaches experimented with by junior
officers, usually from special forces units that have the breadth of skill sets and leverage to
28
think outside the box in a ‘full spectrum of operations’ mindset. The problems with such
framework are twofold: First, as Nagl identifies, such innovations often have to work against
the bureaucratic momentum of their institutions. Then, once they are adopted by the
institution wholesale, the quality and innovation usually drops drastically, as was the case
with the CAPs in Vietnam.
Summary
From the literature, we can draw the importance of an Afghan-specific strategic
approach where rather than the problem, the insurgency can be seen as a symptom along with
government corruption, crime and other de-stabilizing factors. Secondly, the insurgency is
neither sectarian, nor ‘revolutionary’ in the traditional sense, but it does feed off of economic
factors as well as a sense of infringement upon the traditional Pashtun way of life that have
grown out of a broader instability of failing economic and governing systems in the forms of
abusive warlords and then an ineffective central government. Thirdly, strategy will have to
take into consideration the political, social and economic dynamics of rural Afghan society –
the tribes. On top of this, a population-centric pacification strategy may not go far enough to
turn the tide in the limited timeframe that current policy allows. Last of all, security is a
critical component of maintaining legitimacy in any counterinsurgency, and more so in
Afghanistan where, after 30 years of war, people tend to back the strongest faction. Local
forces, the Arbakai, could be of great support towards this if they mirror the insurgency and
not conventional western forces in their tactics and organization (FM 3024).
29
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
Within the realm of international politics, many theoretical approaches to war have
traditionally been dominated by realist paradigms that emphasize the state as the sole
legitimate actor. The challenges of insurgency, on the other hand, necessitate the recognition
of non state-actors in politics, as well as the free nature of people-based power.
Primacy of the Political
“The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history”
(Mao, 2008)
The rise of politically sensitized populations in the last two centuries has altered the
political landscape irreversibly. This can be epitomized by the French Revolution, of a people
throwing off the shackles of their former selves, transforming from subjects under a monarch
to citizens of a republic. States, with the tools of nationalism, have sought to harness this
power towards national goals in much the same way Napoleon Bonaparte harnessed the
revolutionary fervour of the young republic to seek a conquest of Europe as an Emperor.
Theoretical models of states formed to manage this newly realized power, and secure
it firmly under government rule in a mutual agreement between a state and its citizenry- the
social contract theory. A dominantly influential concept in Western thinking, argued by
Thomas Hobbes, is the necessity of the supreme authority of the state. Here, citizens
unequivocally submit all their individual powers and freedoms over to the state in return for
various services. Core to this is a monopoly over the use of force, a realization, as Mao put it,
that “political power flows from the barrel of a gun” (2008). Thus, it is important that both a
population and a state’s armed forces submit to government rule whilst those who challenge
the state’s sovereignty are often demonized as ‘dissidents,’ ‘rebels,’ ‘terrorists’ or ‘bandits.’
30
Yet social contract theory can be far more fluid than Hobbes interpretation. What if a
sizeable portion of the population wishes not to conform to this model, or feels that the social
contract by which a state governs has been broken?6
People’s War
An insurgency in effect wishes to harness that same power of a politicized population,
albeit that has become alienated and sympathetic to dissident causes out of some sense of
grievance or injustice, be it economic, political, social or religious (Hammes, 2006). Relevant
to these concepts on people-based-power as an independent force are the political thoughts of
Karl Marx, in form of the industrial proletariat, and more so Mao Tse-Tung, in analyzing the
Chinese peasantry’s revolutionary potential.
Mao is of particular importance as he contributed much to the theoretical framework
of insurgency, or at least in defining it. ‘Revolutionary potential’ or sympathy and sensitivity
of a population to relate with dissident causes is perhaps the most critical element of an
insurgency as it is with any other form of political movement.7 Guerrilla8 warfare is perhaps
the oldest, most proliferated form of warfare, but until it met with political will to become
political action, it was held at the periphery of warfare.
6
The question of sovereignty has caused much debate. Under the UN charter aggression against a state’s
sovereignty is unlawful. Under codes for intervention in International Humanitarian Law, a state is understood
to not have sovereignty over its people if it cannot provide for their basic needs, or is persecuting them. This
remains contested by some states (usually those that would be deemed no longer sovereign). Likewise, whilst
the precedence of a state’s sovereignty in terms of accountability to its population exists, challenges to this are
usually brought by another state or regional international governmental organization, and not a non-state actor.
7
In Cuba, the widespread unpopularity of the Batista regime meant that revolutionary groups who formed the
basis of the guerrilla army received widespread support. In contrast when commondante ‘Che’ Guevara took his
revolutionary ideals to The Congo and later Bolivia, his inflexible revolutionary vision met with disaster and
alienation as the populations had a relatively low ‘revolutionary potential’ or willingness and related less to the
foreign lead insurgency.
8
Guerrilla – Spanish for ‘little war’
31
Moral Supremacy
What ensues in an insurgency, whether one realizes it or not, is in fact not just an
armed struggle, but a struggle of ideas, and of legitimacy, in the eyes of a salient portion of
the population. The insurgent group seeks to offer solutions to public grievances, supplanting
the sovereignty of the state with its own. To achieve this, insurgents ideally work closely with
the people, on which they rely for most of their material and logistical support as well as
intelligence and refuge, as epitomized by Mao’s edict that “the guerrilla must move amongst
the people as a fish swims in the sea” (2009). In contemporary military terminology, the
population is the insurgents’ centre of gravity (COG) around which all decisions evolve.
Thus, in an otherwise stereotypical brutal form of warfare, the conduct of the
opposing forces towards their target population becomes crucial to securing their goodwill,
later dubbed their ‘hearts and minds.’ Such rules can be seen as those in the Revolutionary
Code used by the Cuban Rebel Army, or Mao’s adaptation of the Eight Route Army’s ‘Three
Rules and Eight Remarks’9 to the Taliban’s book of rules for Mujahideen in the Islamic
emirate of Afghanistan in 2009.
Government security forces that may lash out by conventional and brutal means
against the illusive insurgents amongst the population only further undermine their moral
9
1.
2.
3.
Rules
All actions are subject to command.
Do not steal from the people.
Be neither selfish nor unjust.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Remarks
Replace the door when you leave the house.
Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
Be courteous.
Be honest in your transactions.
Return what you borrow.
Replace what you break.
Do not bathe in the presence of women.
Do not without authority search those you arrest.
32
supremacy and alienate the populace.10 The same can occur for the insurgent. Groups such as
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Al Qaeda in Iraq, for example, lost
their moral supremacy and ultimately, their support amongst the population by the
increasingly indiscriminate use of bombings. Lose the moral supremacy, lose the war (FM 324).
Guerrilla Warfare
Mao set forth three phases for a protracted war. In the first stage, the guerrilla
concentrates on recruitment, training and consolidating support. He avoids confrontation and
remains illusive.
In the second stage, the guerrilla takes on the offensive, raiding the numerically
superior enemy’s weak points and undermining their will, epitomized in the Chinese phrase
of “Sheng Tung Chi Hsi” or “Uproar [in the] East; Strike [in the] West” (Mao, 2009). With
every small victory, the insurgent becomes stronger and the security forces weaker. A
successful guerrilla likewise understands the political nature of his actions, and so can
appreciate the value of military operations to support an indirect political objective, as
opposed to a direct conventional military objective.11
In the final stage, once the security forces are weaker than the insurgents, the guerrilla
army transforms into conventional force. It then confronts and defeats the government forces
in a final coup de grâce.
10
Among other examples, such was the experience of French forces in Algeria, whose use of torture alienated
an otherwise loyal Algerian population (Campbell, 2005). American efforts of ‘forced urbanization’ in Vietnam
to ‘drain the water from the sea’ had a similar effect.
11
For example, the 1968 Tet offensive in the Republic of South Vietnam by the Viet Cong (VC) and the
Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN), failed to capture and hold terrain, which prompted America commanders to
label it a failure, yet its mastery was in attacking the centres of power for the American and South Vietnamese
forces, undermining their image of success.
33
Harnessing the Battlespace Terrain
Whilst conventional warfare may focus on the geographical terrain, insurgency relies
as much upon the political, cultural and psychological aspects of the human terrain. Success
in warfare is guided by who holds the initiative. In an insurgency, the ability to hold the key
human terrain is critical to this (O’Niel, 2005). The variables that affect insurgent and
counterinsurgent operations can be analyzed by Samuel Griffith’s set of determinants that are
applied in comparison to all participating sides (Mao, 2009):12










Appeal of program
Popular Support
Quality of Leadership
Quality of Troops
Military Efficiency
Internal Unity
Equipment
Base Area Terrain
Base Area Communication
Sanctuary
Here it should be noted that in actuality Mao’s stages of guerrilla operations are not
solely a one way process. By and large, the more support the insurgency receives and the
weaker the government security forces, the more conventional and aggressive the insurgency
will be. Visa-versa, the more successful counterinsurgent operations are by security forces, or
the less appeal the insurgency holds amongst the population the more illusive and retracted it
becomes.13
Therefore, it can be seen that guerrilla warfare and even terrorist means are merely
tactics, similar to conventional means, applicable under certain circumstances under what the
US Army Operations manual refers to the spectrum of conflict (FM 3-0). Guerrilla means are
12
These determinants are variables that are considered in operational planning. They are similar the US Army’s
format of METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Time, Terrain and the later addition of Civilians).
13
For example, growing success of British security efforts in Northern Ireland hampered IRA operations,
forcing them underground to rely on bombings and other terrorist tactics which only further undermined their
moral legitimacy.
34
usually most favourable for an insurgency due to their limited material strength and size
versus security forces usual technological and numerical superiority. They are best suited to
arduous terrain, mountains or jungles that inhibit vehicle and air support whilst breaking up
lines of communication from one unit to the next. Thus, such warfare has been labelled as
asymmetrical by US analysts, in that the conventional technological advantages of their
armed forces are negated by ‘primitive’ tactics that maximize advantages of both the
geographical and human terrain. In short, stealth bombers do not do much in a war of ideas
(Galula, 1964).
The capacity of a force to react and harness the battle space terrain is contemporarily
often analyzed through the cycle of Observe – Orientate – Decide – Act (OODA Loop) as
devised by Col. Larry Boyd of the USAF. Originally devised for fighter pilots, the central
concept is that one utilises his existing knowledge synthesized with information drawn from
his surroundings to go through a continuous decision making cycle. In essence, the shorter
one’s decision making cycle is, or the tighter the loop, the more rapidly one can act, allowing
one to outthink the opponent and seize the initiative. In a dogfight, the primary factors are
that of special awareness and aircraft performance. In a counterinsurgency, the key factor is
awareness of the human terrain, one’s ability to understand the cultural, religious, social and
political complexities to break within the insurgents’ thought process.
Counterinsurgency: Separating the Fish from the Water
Contemporary counterinsurgency strategy, taking a population centric approach,
attempts to control the battle space through the same dynamics as an insurgency. For the
counterinsurgent, it becomes an issue of legitimacy, and of control (Kilkullen, 2009).
The concept is to pacify an area, denying that terrain, both geographical and human,
to the insurgency. Once occupied, the real or perceived grievances that underpin support for
35
the insurgency can be addressed to nullify or even “harness the revolution” (Sheehan, 1988),
and secure the moral supremacy. As such, collaborating efforts of all government and state
powers are required, and not the security forces alone.
Key components that underlay counterinsurgent success were laid out in 1966 by Sir
Robert Thompson, a Senior Civil Servant in Malaya. Thompson outlined the requirements for
successful counterinsurgency, that remarkably mirrored Mao’s organizational structures, as
the need (1966):14
1. For government to have a clear political aim.
2. To function within the law.
3. To establish an overall plan, whereby all political, socioeconomic and military
responses are coordinated.
4. To give priority to the elimination of political subversion.
5. To secure the government’s base area before conducting a military campaign.
Securing the Population
It is often forgotten, and vital to remember that the actions taken to build legitimacy,
maintain moral supremacy, and address support for an insurgency depend on the nature of the
underlying grievances, be they ethnic, economic, political, religious or so on. More often than
not, causes are a mixture of many different aspects (Fitzsimmons, June 2008).
Classical counterinsurgency, dubbed the Malay Strategy for obvious reasons, focuses
on addressing the primarily economic and political inequalities that underpin revolutionary
insurgencies, through three consecutive pillars of security, governance and development. The
implementation of this is achieved by focusing on one small area at a time. An atmosphere of
security is created within which effective governance can spread and development initiatives
start. Once one region is secured in such a way, it positively impacts surrounding areas, like
14
Perhaps one of the greatest contributors to the success of British Forces in the Malay Emergency was the
developed clarity of mission and co-ordination between all branches. The entire civil-military campaign was, in
its final stages controlled by just 12 senior officers and civil servants (Nagl, 2002).
36
an ink spot spreading on paper. The ink spot strategy is replicated in neighbouring areas until
the whole region is effectively pacified.
It is important, however, to note that the Malay strategy was formulated in response to
one set of grievances, mainly economic. Other insurgencies evolve around a different set of
problems that required different approaches, such as the sectarian divisions in Iraq and
Northern Ireland. This is something that has proven at times problematic for CF attempting to
implement classical counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Strategically, the concept of a population centric strategy is to secure the population in
support of the government, through long-term projects and governance initiatives.
Operationally, short term civil-military relationships and quick QIP’s are utilized to gain the
trust of the population in the hope that such efforts will yield intelligence on insurgent
activity.
Force levels required for pacification can vary greatly, however an accepted rough
standard stands at around 25 counterinsurgents per every 1000 population (Gale, 2009). Force
levels are a facilitating factor to allow the creation of secure environments for governance
and development to spread. This relies heavily on the moral conduct of the troops and their
understanding of the operation, as well as the local human terrain. Troop surges in Vietnam,
for example, did not bring any improvements whilst the predominantly conventional enemycentric strategy of Search and Destroy alienated the population. Thus, a large amount of
capital is placed upon regional expertise. Things such as cultural knowledge are seen as
‘force multipliers,’ in that they drastically enhance the productivity of the counterinsurgent.
As part of this, indigenous forces are a critical component to counterinsurgent efforts, as they
understand the geographical, political and human terrain better than any foreign force.
Tactically, counterinsurgent forces focus on moving amongst the population,
interacting and sharing risk with them to foster relationships of trust. The more embedded
37
counterinsurgent forces are within the communities, the generally more successful they are.
QIPs can range from anything from medical care to building a well.
A population centric approach focuses primarily, but not solely, on the population.
Aggressive counterinsurgent action is still called for, albeit weighed primarily through the
consideration of how it impacts the counterinsurgents hold on the populace, the COG. Large
operations are counterproductive against small mobile guerrillas and can produce unintended
collateral damage that alienates the very population the counterinsurgent wishes to secure.
More productive is to use forces that employ guerrilla style tactics in highly mobile small
units. This again requires highly professional and intelligent soldiers. Such units have been
used throughout countless counterinsurgencies, such as the British Malay Scouts or US Long
Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) during the 1960s. Again, this is another area where
indigenous forces have a decided advantage, which has been utilized on many occasions,
such as the US Special Forces-trained Montagnard during the Vietnam War or the Hmong in
Laos.
Determining Success or Defeat
Conventional logic that the stronger force, will, over time, prevail through attrition
does not apply. Time, if anything, is often on the insurgent’s side. The population remains the
COG for domestic insurgent and counterinsurgent, whilst the foreign expeditionary force has
the added difficulty of maintaining support for its military adventure within its domestic
population, its second COG. This is a particular weak point vulnerable to attack, and was
something that ultimately undermined American efforts in Vietnam. Thus, it is said, that it is
easier for the insurgent to win than the expeditionary force. The insurgent only has to not be
defeated, and eventually the staying power of the foreign force will erode as it spends more
blood and gold lunging for shadows, and eventually withdraws. In effect, an insurgent wins
38
against domestic forces by supplanting their sovereignty, and against foreign forces by letting
them defeat themselves.
Success, on the other hand, cannot be quantified in the conventional measuring sticks of
strategic areas taken, or enemy killed. A better method of evaluating the impact of population
centric operations, that epitomizes such a strategy, has been devised by Fotini Christia, a
political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This evaluates progress in
terms of impact upon the human terrain by political, military and developmental efforts via
(Christia, 2009):





The number of district officials living in the district.
The cost of transporting goods to and from market.
The number of stores open.
The number of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) reported.
The number of children going to school
Research Approach
From the above theoretical groundwork, as well as previous historical examples, the
necessary tools can be drawn upon which the war in Afghanistan can be accurately assessed.
For the purposes of the paper, Griffith’s criteria give a good model on which to analyze the
balance of insurgent versus counterinsurgent and the various variables that govern the
dynamics of the conflict. Likewise, the OODA Loops are often used in analyzing forces
capacity to react and act within a counterinsurgency, and provide a useful paradigm through
with to assess different forces. Both of these are valuable in assessing the effectiveness of
tribal engagement initiatives in altering the balance of the conflict and generating stability
towards a desirable end point as measured by Christia’s framework.
39
Chapter 4: Findings & Analysis
The War in Afghanistan
Root Causes of Instability
The conflict in Afghanistan can be seen along Metz’s lines of having grown out of
root power fissions in failing economic and governance systems, instigated by foreign
intervention over the past three decades. This has perpetuated instability and fuelled internal
warlord, ethnic, religious, tribal and criminal power struggles that see opportunity through
such instability. The international community has, in effect, attempted to place the selflegitimizing foreign concept of centralized statehood upon existing rival internal power
blocks within a society that still evolves around decentralized tribal power, and chosen that
creation, GIRoA and its warlord proxies, as a legitimate ally to dominate the other factions in
support of their strategic aims. Such an approach has applied old models to new forms of
complex, multi-faceted insurgency, with the assumption being that the new status-quo that
the international community has created whole-heartedly supports their goals.15
That instability is the primary problem out of root economic and judicial dilemmas is
reflected in a 2009 national poll, where 36 percent stated insecurity as the most prominent
national problem, whilst 35 percent answered unemployment and only 17 percent corruption
(The Asia Foundation, 2009).
Despite President Karzai being a Durrani Pashto, the insurgency has partly come to
represent traditional, dominant aspirations of Pashto power, as well as individual greed, as
seen through the resistance of Durrani warlord Hekmatyar in the east (Malkasian &
Meyerley, February 2008). Similarly, the traditionally weaker Ghilzai Pashto of the south,
15
This year, Durrani HIG militants have clashed with Gilzai Taliban militants highlighting minor rifts within
the insurgency as well as the overriding nature of power politics and tribal affiliations (Time, 2010).
40
from whom the Taliban sprung, have become disenfranchised under state systems dominated
by the Durrani (Harding, 2010). There are those within GIRoA that were amongst the
warlords to initially welcome Osama Bin Laden to Afghanistan, just as there are those
amongst the insurgents who were former US proxies against the Soviets (Gannon, 2005).
Thus pouring in aid dollars by the billion to bolster these institutions can actually exacerbate
the problem and feed corruption, which in turn feeds instability.16
Supports for the insurgencies can also be seen as the breakdown of traditional society.
“Traditional tribal mechanisms have been weakened by brutal and deliberate campaigns of
assassination, intimidation, and co-optation – first by the Soviets, then by the warlords, now
by the Taliban” (Gant, 2009). The attitudes of GIRoA and its international backers towards
these founding structures of Afghan society have not helped either. “Youth oppose the
current tribal system because they know it is not harnessing its potential” (Giustozzi, 2008)
and in turn join the insurgency for a sense of empowerment and economic gain (ICSD, 2010).
Thus the traditional tribal structures would seem a practical means by which to engage with
the civilian population and re-enforce stabilizing structures within society.
Instead, presently much of the population and the tribes are held secondary to, and
subjected to, the demands of the competing power blocks. After 30 years of war, most
Afghans are highly pragmatic. Support for the insurgencies within Afghanistan comes
predominantly from limited elements amongst the mostly rural Pashto, who comprise 42
percent of the population (CIA).17 Often, support from rural Pashto tribal elders is tacit, out of
16
Of 180 countries polled in a 2009 corruption index, Transparency International placed Afghanistan as 179 th,
surpassed only by Somalia.
17
The vast majority of non-Pashto, as well as many of the Pashto, are in favour of the international presence.
This is greatly out of a sense that the Afghan state cannot yet stand on its own two feet, and that after so many
years of war at the hands of foreign influences, the international community has an obligation to help.
A Taliban joke: The Pashto will have Afghanistan. The Tajiks can go to Tajikistan, the Uzbeks to Uzbekistan,
and the Hazara can go under the ground (Kougl interview, 2010).
41
a desire for security and stability to ensure the sanctity of their Qawm, thus the description of
them as sitting on the fence, to back whoever seems to be winning. Most of all, people want
stability, security, and often to be left alone. “Ten percent of the people are with the Taliban,
10% are with the government and 80% of the people are angry at the Taliban, the government
and the foreigners” (Mercille, 2010). Most do not want any intruding presence causing
instability, whether that is insurgents in an ISAF-held area, or ISAF in an insurgent-held area.
Likewise, there is the realization that no matter how much ISAF may achieve, its presence is
limited in scope and time, that it “may have all the clocks, but the Taliban has the time.”
Even if the numbers were available, too many foreign forces may become too abrasive, and
do not provide long term solutions. Too few security forces and the power vacuum can be
filled with further destabilizing actors. Thus, a CF driven pacification strategy can only go so
far. The pressure is on to find sustainable Afghan solutions to limit instability.
Pressure for political reform and better governance within GIRoA is necessary, but
alone not sufficient. Similarly, traditional hearts and minds strategies, whilst nurturing
support amongst the population, do not adequately secure, nor harness them (Sedra, 2010).
“Issues such as electricity, running water and the lack of progress being made by central
government are not primary concerns. Most of the population is trying to survive, making do
as their ancestors have for generations” (Blatt, 2009). Instead “a comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy requires the simultaneous raising of the economic and
psychological costs and risks for those participating in the insurgency (or other forms of
conflict) while providing alternatives” (Metz, 2007-2008). Relying solely on a highly
centralized government alienates large portions of Afghan society. ISAF needs the most
pragmatic, not the most idealistic, solutions.
As Metz identifies, if these systems are failing, other sources of worth that hold more
appeal as along Griffith’s criteria are required. Within the Afghan context, the more grounded
42
in traditional society these sources of power and worth are, the more successful their
implementation will be. If the defective political, economic and social systems can be seen as
the product of 30 years of war and foreign influence that has worn down Afghanistan, then a
possible solution can be found through returning to more traditional power structures that
provide adequate levels of sustainable stability. This is in effect to heal the wounds cut into
Afghanistan by conflict.
Insurgent Activity
The insurgency has adapted at an alarming rate, and more critically inherently
understands the important role of the tribal structures. Characterized by tactical incompetence
during the 1990s, the new generation of Taliban fighters are highly proficient in guerrilla
warfare (Rashid, 2001). It would appear the years of re-organization in Pakistan before their
resurgence were very formative.18 Under increasingly larger and more effective ISAF
pacification, insurgents seldom engage against such odds. The number of firefights has
dropped whilst the use of IEDs risen. With large areas in a semi state of pacification, the war
is more commonly fought along more subtle lines of control over the population, rather than
direct military confrontation (Kougl, 23 Feb, 2010).
More important than the insurgency’s tactical innovation, are its strategic ones. The
Taliban is winning the information war (Gant, 2009). When ISAF announced its population
centric strategy, the Quetta Shura released a book of rules to govern the conduct of Taliban
fighters in ‘protecting the population,’ similar to other insurgencies of the 20th century. The
change was seen in the reduction of bombings that indiscriminately target civilians and a
focus on international and government facilities.
18
For example the use of light infantry guerrilla tactics, in particular ambushes, on par with the tactical
dexterity of the mujahideen of the 1980s. Also, as ISAF deploys better armoured vehicles to counter IED
threats, the insurgents deploy larger and more sophisticated IEDs.
43
The insurgency likewise maintains certain clear advantages. It knows the terrain, and
it knows the tribes. ISAF, a foreign force, does not. ANSF units, who consist of a mix of
soldiers from across the provinces, to represent a unified Afghanistan, do have a decided edge
in understanding the local dynamics over ISAF forces, yet not in comparison to the local
insurgent groups. The insurgents’ increased synthesis with their environment allows them to
wield a greater element of control. In short, their OODA cycle is more in tune with the
ground realities and thus often quicker than that of the CF, allowing them to maintain a
certain amount of the initiative over harnessing the battle space.
This is achieved despite the stark differences between Taliban ideology, warlordism,
and traditional Pashtunwali. The insurgency has embraced traditional power structures, in
contrast to GIRoA’s alienation of them. “The Taliban is exploiting our major strategic… and
tactical weakness: an inability to connect with the people (the tribes)” (Giustozzi, 2008). The
Taliban has infiltrated many villages, weeded out pro-Kabul elements and set up shadow
governments that gain footholds amongst the population “by dispensing justice, adjudicating
disputes and acting as judges” (Gant, 2009) where there otherwise are none.
The Taliban also recognise how to conduct political actions that target foreign forces’
limited staying power through reliance upon ISAF member-states’ domestic perceptions of
strength and security, eroding political support for their intervention. Whilst they may not
tactically achieve much, the ability of insurgents to target guest houses inside ‘fortress Kabul’
where international aid workers live, or the recent attacks against the two largest ISAF bases
at Bagram and Kandahar, send a clear political message to the international community,
fostering the perception that nowhere is safe. Similarly, in the mountains of the east,
insurgents have used the terrain to their advantage, amassing forces in attempts to overrun
small and isolated combat outposts, the successful effects of which would potentially be akin
to a ‘mini-Tet’. Such efforts, assisted by international media focused on sensation, undermine
44
the staying power of ISAF nations under increasing domestic perceptions that the war in
Afghanistan is un-winnable. 19
Tribes: The Human Terrain
When one thinks of an Afghan, particularly amongst the rural population, one should
not think of a citizen, in an individualistic, hierarchical, Western sense, but as tribesman. As
with many traditional societies around the world, this brings with it certain practices, norms
and ethical codes that differ greatly to perceived conceptions of the modern individual (Said,
1979). Since 2001, most international approaches to Afghanistan have remained blind about
the myriad of tribal dynamics, causing unnecessary setbacks, and alienation of the
population. Tribes are important because they are the very founding fabric of Afghan society
and indigenous institutions. To understand the tribal dynamics, at work within the tribes or as
permeated through other institutions, is to understand much about Afghanistan. Any
successful attempts of governance have to recognize, and be built upon this foundation.
Tribalism, Talibanism & Warlordism
Tribal structures have variations from one region or sub-tribe to the next; however
most of the Pashto tribes share general commonalities. Tribal traditions are strongest in the
mountainous provinces of south-east of Afghanistan, where governance has always been slow
to penetrate, and partly why the Durrani have traditionally held more power than the Ghilzai
of southern Afghanistan. Tribes, similar to those across the Middle East, are decidedly anti-
19
To put it bluntly, the media is a business. Sex and violence sells, reconstruction and jirgas do not. Thus
editors frame stories from Afghanistan around what they know will sell, firefights, IEDs and body bags, even
though these are not the defining or central dynamics of an insurgency, what occurs most of the time, or what
really matters most.
45
authoritarian in nature.20 “What maintains order in a tribe is not hierarchy and law, but a code
that stresses mutual respect, dignity, pride and honour” (Ronfeldt, 2006).
Inter-tribal relations are best seen as a balance of power based upon mutual interests,
affiliations and alliances. The moral and ethical bounds of such a society are limited
primarily to their tribe, or even Qawm. Decisions by elders, are based upon how they can
ensure the survival, or advance the interests of their people. In a collective structure, this
results in a balance of power, yet, assimilated into a hierarchical structure, such as GIRoA,
such attitudes can result in what is perceived to be corruption and self-interest.
The Taliban, are in part a product of Pashtun tribalism. Their interpretation of Islam is
described as tribal Islam influenced by Pashtunwali. Yet during their rule, the Taliban
suppressed the traditional tribal structure, targeting tribal elders who opposed them via
assassinations and intimidation, which goes against the core values of Pashtunwali. “In many
cases the Taliban rule of law (Shar’ia law) is in direct conflict with Pashtunwali. We
currently are not using this to our advantage” (Gant, 2009).
The tribal system had in effect kept the local balance of power for large periods of
history. Warlords are, in effect, the by-product of an imbalance of tribal power, usually as a
result of outside influences. “The jihad against the Soviets bred a new social class:
mujahideen commanders with guns and money, dubbed “warlords” in the West. After 2001,
the government supported many warlords. They abused the population and contributed to the
Taliban’s resurgence” (Malkasian & Meyerley, 2008).
20
The closest comparison by Western standards may be to see each Qwam as similar to a city state in Ancient
Greece, built on the Athenian model of direct democracy, each acting in its own interest, yet tied to others
through mutually beneficial alliances and arrangements.
46
Tribal Democracy
Despite misconceptions, tribes are inherently democratic in their internal functioning.
“Application to Jirga membership is based upon requisite skills, knowledge and analytical
power. Potential members meeting these criteria are then considered for election by
tribesmen” (Tariq, 2008). Jirga membership is merit based, not inherited. Elders are judged
by their leadership skills and knowledge of the Pashtunwali codes and its judiciary system,
and are regardless of wealth, social standing or even gender (Tariq, 2008). The jirga itself is a
collective mechanism that ensures transparency. Jirgas (village councils), maliks
(executives), and mullahs (religious leaders) are not only accountable to one another in a
separated system; they are also directly accountable to citizens in the community (Brick).
Thus, in many regards, jirgas are more democratic in practice than GIRoA. Most importantly,
they are accepted by the population.21
Tribal Security Mechanisms
Tribes form their own security forces, namely an Arbakai, or a Lashkar. The strongest
examples lie in Loya Paktia, in the southeast, although other examples occur elsewhere.
Arbakai are predominantly a policing force, whereas a Lashkar is a fighting band (Tariq,
2008). All are unpaid, and work out of a strong sense of social cohesion and responsibility.
Service on the Arbakai is rotated between Mirahs (men) of each Qawm. In case of
emergency, Arbakai may be formed through the Chega (‘common call’) method, similar to
the Lashkar. The responsibility of policing the tribal area is rotated between Qawm every ten
days.
21
This is increasingly evident by Karzai turning to traditional jirgas to address the issues of corruption, and a
reconciliation plan with the Taliban.
47
The responsibilities of the Arbakai include:



To implement the Jirga’s decisions.
To maintain law and order.
To protect the borders and boundaries of the tribe (Tariq, 2008).
The Arbakai are accountable to the jirga, who are in turn accountable to the
tribesmen. As such they hold the respect and trust of the people, in a way no government
agency can.
Traditional Means of Tribal Integration
The precedent for use of traditional tribal structures by the state already exists.
Throughout different periods in the regional history, the jirga has played the key role of
peace broker, mediating local disputes. The decisions of the jirga are then enforced by the
Arbakai who fulfil the role of peacekeepers (Tariq, 2008).
The unsurpassable local knowledge of both human and geographic terrain within the
tribal area has meant that “border security has been the core task of the Arbakai during the
19th and 20th centuries” (Tariq, 2008). Traditionally, Arbakai called upon for border
protection, remained under the authority of their jirga, who was delegated the task by the
Shah (King) or through the Loya Jirga. The Arbakai would remain unpaid, but for any
additional expenses that would be covered by the government. “The state is just the facilitator
and the main security providers are the people” (Gilpin, 2002). “People are more active in
these provinces with regards to their own security, compared to those where the state is the
main security provider” (Tariq, 2008).
48
Strategic Approaches to Instability in Afghanistan
Before one delves into case study examples of tribal engagement in the Pashto tribal
belt, we should first look at the various strategic approaches that have defined the stages of
the war in Afghanistan, and how they demonstrate the need for tribal engagement.
Initial co-option of warlords whilst pursuing an enemy centric strategy against Al
Qaeda provided quick fixes, yet ultimately continued empowering bad actors whilst
alienating the population via use of military force in a manner disrespectful of Pashtunwali.22
With the formation of GIRoA, subsequent strategy implemented facets of classical
counterinsurgency, concentrating primarily on extending the absolute authority of the central
government against a resurgent Taliban. Yet this Hobbesian approach promoted weak and
corrupt institutions that did not hold the people’s trust, at the cost of alienating the
functioning tribal structures. It created relationships of dependency instead of relationships of
co-operation in some areas, and enemies amongst the tribes in others. “Afghanistan has never
had a strong central government. A strategy in which the central government is the
centrepiece of our counterinsurgency plan is destined to fail. It disenfranchises the very fabric
of Afghan society” (Gant, 2009).
Similarly, creation of a strong ANSF as the best way of securing an early exit has had
pitfalls. The ANA have grown slowly in size and aptitude, and can only now conduct
operations in a semi-autonomous sense, whilst the ANP are seen as corrupt and exploitative,
often having their hands in illegal activity.23 “Current policy is to pour more time, money and
22
One small example would be ransoms placed on Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, ignorant to
the Pashtunwali code of Nanawatai- giving refuge and protection from those who seek it, and treating them as
one’s own, on their honour.
23
The ANA generally are more respected amongst the rural population as they have been professionally trained
by UK & US forces. Training of the ANP has, until the past year, been the responsibility of the Germans, which
has not met required standards. The ANP also have more of a presence amongst the population, and so any
49
resources, into the ANA and ANP… [these] are symbols of the central government, which at
present is not trusted by the tribes” (Gant, 2009). The international community, for the most
part, has been placing all their eggs in the GIRoA basket, which could neither provide
effective security nor dispense governance and justice to meet the standards of the people—
the very motives that gave the Taliban their initial popularity in 1994 (Rashid, 2001, 2008).
In effect, a counterinsurgency strategy, aimed at winning over the population by
promoting the central government through the delivery of extensive control and development
projects, has become another, albeit subtle, war of conquest, that in many ways has alienated
the very population wished to be won over. One cannot expect Pashtuns to willingly “cut
themselves off from their cultural roots [and] subject themselves to an equally foreign
incomprehensible form of government” with offers of “some new buildings, some cash and
more reliable electricity- none of which has been important to them so far in their history”
(Kelly, 2009).
With the increase in tribal awareness, the population centric strategy and a supporting
troop surge has had more success. The ability to provide unobtrusive security that does not
infringe too heavily on peoples lives, whilst working with local elders, makes room for
economic prosperity and creates a situation where the population feels protected enough to no
longer tolerate insurgent activity.
This could be no clearer than in the case of Delaram, Farah Province. Previous US
Marine battalions stationed there where highly aggressive. This alienated the population and
resulted in high levels of insurgent activity. 3/4, the follow on battalion, used much less
abrasive means, seeking to work with the population, not over or against it. The difference
was striking. Overall 80 percent of the local population was said to be in favour of the
corruption amongst them is more acutely felt. Thus, as with the Malaya counterinsurgency, training of the ANP
as part of improving law and order and the effective delivery of impartial justice is perhaps more important than
that of security through the ANA.
50
marine’s presence, due to their ability to provide unobtrusive, sustainable security that
allowed the population to continue with their lives. This ability meant that the population
actively wanted the Marines there, whilst the insurgency was unwelcome. As a result, since
October 2009, Marines in Delaram have received tip-offs on every IED placed by insurgents
that the population is aware of. (Sadly, IEDs the local population is unaware of, usually result
in civilian death) (Kougl, 2010, February 19).
There are, however, still drawbacks with pacification. Despite the surge, troop levels
are still far lower than required.24 Current strategy is also running into problems when it
meets policy. The US is adopting strategic approaches that in Iraq took at least two years to
arrive at a point where provinces could be handed over to the Iraqi security forces, which
were well established. Afghanistan, by any standards, requires far more time, yet US policy is
to already start drawing down troops in 2011, just a year after the bulk of the surge arrives.25
Whilst approaches have greatly improved, ISAF forces are hindered by linguistic and
cultural barriers. Similarly, ANA units comprise and ethnic makeup proportionate to the
entire population, and are not drawn from any one region. Whilst this solidified a sense of
national identity over ethnic divisions within the ANA, it can hinder detailed regional
24
Troop levels are surging up to around 140,000 by the summer of 2010 in addition to approximately 100,000
ANA and 90,000 ANP. There are no accurate population figures. Extrapolation from the last census, in 1979,
stands at 29,121,286 people. As 42 percent of the population, the Pashto comprise somewhere around
12,230,940 people. At one of the lower argued standards for effective pacification, of 25 counterinsurgents per
1000 population, just the Pashto alone would require a security force of 489,237. An Army of 400,000 is the
optimistic figure proposed by GIRoA. Once more quality, and what is done with those forces, is always more
important than quantity (reference the detrimental effect of US surges in Vietnam). Similarly this is a military
solution to a complex problem. Large security apparatuses tend not to ensure healthy democracies.
25
Decreasing troop numbers prematurely hinders the capacity to pacify areas and generate stability, and thus
can see an increase in instability. An earlier warning example of this is the limited deployment of British forces
to Helmand Province from 2006 onwards, by a government that underestimated the enemy and wished to fight
on a political ‘economy of force’. The small deployment could only pacify limited areas. This and the British
ethos of a good defence is a strong offence, meant that search and destroy style operations were frequently relied
upon to keep the insurgency on the back foot outside of the pacified areas. These caused significant damage to
the lives of people in such outlying areas, without any tangible permanent benefit. Once more limited boots on
the ground meant that the firepower deficit was made up with the excessive use of air power to support the
overwhelmed ground troops, causing considerable collateral damage. The town of Naw Zad, in Helmand
Province for example, is still having portions reconstructed in 2010, from air strikes called in to support
besieged and overwhelmed British forces in 2006.
51
knowledge. Once more, pacification does not necessarily harness or utilize existing resources
to their maximum benefit as ‘force multipliers.’
These shortcomings, as well as lessons from Iraq, have spawned various tribal
engagement efforts, predominantly in terms of governance and security. US efforts are
attempting to utilise the traditional jirga system as a level of informal governance, integrated
predominantly on the district level. Similarly GIRoA has turned to a Loya Jirga as well as a
Peace Jirga to tackle corruption and reconciliation. Considering both US command and
GIRoA shot down all such previous efforts by other ISAF partners, most notably the British,
this change is quite important.
Perhaps the most heated debate surrounds initiatives to shore up the ailing security
infrastructure in the face of ISAF withdrawals. The Public Protection Force (PPF), trialled in
Kunar province in 2009, sought to appropriate the tribal Arbakai as a uniformed and paid
auxiliary police force, slightly similar to the Sons of Iraq program. Whilst seeing some
success, Gen. McChrystal dismissed the program because it was not using the tribal
structures in their traditional ways, and thus would not be sustainable in the long term on a
large scale. Afghan tribes are far more dispersed, and stronger than those in Iraq. Once more,
the militias in Iraq had not existed under the centralized and authoritarian rule of the Baathist
party, whilst Afghanistan has never seen a strong central government, and has long
established systems of tribal Arbakai.
As Fitzsimmons notes, whilst insurgencies may last longer than conventional wars,
they are short in comparison to the length of time over which group identities evolve.
Therefore, one should “expect the dynamics of ethnic identity to be more of an environmental
condition, than a pliable object of policy manipulation” (June, 2008). Indeed, previous efforts
to stand up an auxiliary police force resulted in failure, whilst similar ideas to the PPF were
52
scrapped by British commanders in 2006 as not being viable due to the problems caused by
tribal affiliation and competition transferring into a hierarchical, centralized structure.
Instead, former commander McChrystal supported initiatives that planned to empower
Arbakai via their traditional means through the jirga. This would ensure efficient
accountability, and make use of an Arbakai doing what it does best – being a tribal militia
rather than a uniformed police auxiliary. This also gives the people, via their traditional
structures, empowerment over their affairs and a stake in the strategic solution, identical to
British desires for ‘community defence initiatives’ shot down by previous US commanders.
Issues arise, however, over the sovereignty of the state and its security forces that may
be challenged by empowering tribal institutions. As such, the DOD is at loggerheads with the
DOS, under Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, who currently opposes initiating such plans.
The questions on how to best implement the use of traditional tribal structures can be
assessed through various regional examples laid against the cultural framework, and ISAF
objectives.
Tribal Engagement
Whilst tribal engagement is becoming an increasingly large part of current and future
strategy, previous strategies worked largely over or against the traditional tribal structures.
What positive examples of tribal engagement there are were not consistent with the overall
US and ISAF strategy at the time, but rather unique approaches adopted by forward thinking
individuals or groups who had the authority and leeway to do so, and thus do not represent a
linear progression of strategy.
53
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan
In the FATA, Pakistan had long left the tribes to take care of their own affairs,
without involvement or support from government at a local level. This is a carryover from
British policy on the frontier. The British, however, had an extensive corps of frontier
officers and Indian civil servants who kept the tribes engaged with British India. In contrast
the shifting agendas of the Pakistani military and more controversially the ISI, have over a
long period of time empowered militant elements within FATA in support of other policy
agendas (Haqqani, 2005). The army’s offensives against the many factions that form the TTP
who now pose a threat to Pakistan are not sustainable as, as one US official suggested,
Pakistan “is still doing virtually nothing about extending the government's political authority
into the tribal areas, and virtually nothing about economic development” (De Young, 23 Oct,
2008). The result is a case of ‘tribal neglect,’ where the traditional structures have to survive
on their own against empowered negative actors. An Amnesty International report highlights
the social impact this has had in the high number of human rights abuses by warlords and
militant groups against the population, primarily in targeting and assassinating tribal elders
and figureheads who oppose them. This highlights the limits of the TTP’s appeal in
accordance with Griffith’s criteria. The many factions of the TTP lack unity, however, with
the state’s inability to integrate the FATA into its governance structures, the factions retain
their tribal areas as a base area and maintain the support, willing or coerced, from the
population. Similarly, the central government lacks any programs or institutions from which
to gather a basis of support or appeal, or from where to exercise leadership, other than army
offensives that cause high amounts of collateral damage and are often seen as at the bidding
of the USA, further alienating the population.
At the same time there are a number of examples of tribal communities who repel
militant factions entirely on their own, utilizing tribal security and diplomatic tools, or with
54
limited support in the form of arms from the central government. Tribal elders who stand up
to the TTP automatically hold the initiative within their lands as strong leaders. Likewise the
men of the Arbakai have a tactical advantage over TTP from across the region in knowing the
lay of the land around their communities, enabling them to out-think and out-pace the TTP.
As long as they have the arms to stand up against the TTP, they are an automatic source of
legitimacy with instant support within their communities and a high appeal of their program.
What limits the Arbakai against the TTP is their lack of equipment and resources, and
influence only limited to their tribal domain. Similarly they deny base areas and additional
support for the TTP, effectively neutralizing their presence. Without further government
initiatives to capitalize on this, such resistance will remain isolated and with limited means
and equipment to resist.
The case of the FATA highlights the need for greater integration of the tribal
structures on a regional and provincial level to ensure adequate levels of assistance, and
capitalize on the legitimacy of the jirgas as a means of expanding governance. The FATA
also highlights the potential of tribes to counter the influence of hegemonic militant groups,
and the innate advantages that Arbakai hold over the TTP (De Young, 23 Oct, 2008).
The Moqbil Project, Paktia Province, 2007
An example of the roles of internal unity within ISAF, and the ANSF, integrated with
a buy in from local tribal leadership is that of US Army Special Forces A-Teams of
Operational Detachment (ODA) 3321, 3rd Special Forces Group during its deployment in
Paktia Province. Their target group was the Moqbil, a tribe that straddled both sides of the
border.
The region, known for its mountainous, rugged terrain and sternly independent tribes,
has been a major infiltration route for Taliban, Haqqani and HIG fighters from neighbouring
55
South Waziristan. The main CF presence, a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division, was
tasked with primarily protecting re-supply routes along vulnerable mountain passes from
Pakistan. In terms of pacifying the region, a PRT had set up in Gardez and “developed the
city into a centre of commerce, based on the classic ink-blot methodology” (Blatt, 2009). But
for their efforts to interdict insurgent infiltration in the surrounding mountains, “large, ‘clear,
hold and build’ operations were uniquely unsuited to this environment” (Blatt, 2009). This
was greatly due to the rugged, closed in nature of the terrain, the disposition and independent
dynamics of the tribes, who would resist any perceived affronts, as well as the limited
number of forces available (just 330 ANSF and 30 CF), and the strength and ease of which
the insurgency could re-infiltrate the area once ‘cleared’. Instead, ODA 3321 attempted to
coordinate existing security forces into a more efficient counterinsurgent force, whilst
engaging with the local tribes as a force multiplier to influence the population.
A joint communication centre (JCC) was established, “giving all local ANSF
elements the ability to communicate with each other on a daily basis and in time of crisis”
(Blatt, 2009). Coordination through the JCC enabled more integrated planning of operations,
which enabled the CF and ANSF to successfully engage with and coordinate further efforts
with local power brokers. “In eastern Paktia, three centres of gravity are the real power
needed to influence the population: the tribal elder, the local political leadership (the subgovernors; commanders of the ANSF and other IROA/CF-sponsored leaders) and the local
mullah” (Blatt, 2009).
Any aspect of operations involving a local tribe or Qawm was ran bilaterally or
multilaterally through the tribal system; unilateral action would only disenfranchise the
elders, and thus the local population, from GIRoA. “This integration of Pashtunwali into
GIRoA tribal engagement was not lost on the tribes” (Blatt, 2009). Further more, once the
elders saw the clear, mutual benefits on their own terms of working with the local GIRoA and
56
ISAF elements in such a way, the insurgents were no longer welcomed in their villages. 26
Whilst infiltration still occurred, without refuge in the villages, insurgents were easier to track
and target. “If we can shape the operational environment by non-lethal means, the population
becomes more flexible in support of lethal targeting of insurgents” (Blatt, 2009).
In line with Griffith’s criteria, the soldiers of ODA 3321 managed to create strong
internal unity between ISAF and GIRoA elements, enhancing their effectiveness in
organizing against the insurgents. Once more this enabled all elements of counter-insurgent
forces to mobilize the human terrain in their favour, instead of just pacifying it, empowering
local leadership to buy into their own development. Integrating this with district governance
generated a program of higher appeal, gaining more widespread support as in line with
Griffith’s criteria, in short capitalizing on the benefits of tribal integration yet to be utilized
fully in Pakistan. As Maj. Blatt noted, once a community was won over via such initiatives,
that area, those resources and the minds of its people were denied from the insurgency,
reducing their effectiveness. This is something ODA commander Maj. Darin Blatt sees as not
only important for short term security objectives, but for the long term viability of GIRoA.
“Integral to the stabilization of Afghanistan is allowing the tribes to retain their individual
identities while conceding some power to the new system of governance… The elders
represent their villages and tribes; the government must receive their support if it is to
survive” (Blatt, 2009). Efforts such as this provide a basic framework by which the tribal
structures can be integrated into a comprehensive Afghan solution.
26
For example, the ODA lent its bulldozer to the village of Serangur, an insurgent stronghold. The ODA
provided fuel and an operator, whilst entrusting the vehicle to the community elders for three weeks. As a result,
insurgents were no longer welcomed in the village, as they were a liability. This effectively separated them from
the population.
57
Kunar Province, 2004
In addition to integrating jirgas into governance structures, an example of effective
integration of Arbakai within local security mechanisms occurred in Kunar Province. At
various points, since the creation of GIRoA, local Arbakai had been used to provide
additional security, called upon as and when needed, usually in the event of large jirgas or
other unique events. The use of Arbakai in Kunar is an example of tribal engagement
initiatives pursued by provincial governors, on whom, despite the trapping of their new
government positions, the importance of engaging the traditional power structures as key to
securing legitimacy amongst the population is not lost. In short, such GIRoA representatives
recognize the tribal jirgas as the means by which to promote effective governance.
Most importantly the governor’s Arbakai initiatives utilized the tribal structure as the
proven, pragmatic, and traditional means of integration with the young new state. “The
system in Kunar Province was financed by the government through the jirga and not through
direct payment to the Arbakai members… The money given by the government was not
intended to be used as a salary, but was to cover the expenditures of the Arbakai” (Tariq,
2008).
Utilizing the Arbakai through its societal and structural grounding under the Jirga as
part of the traditional tribal structures lent greatly to the initiatives’ success. In a region of
unforgiving instability and changing government, exploitation and corruption, such long
established sub-national methods, rooted within a transparent form of collective
accountability, are pragmatic best practices. The Arbakai once again held a tactical advantage
over the insurgents in having an automatic basis of support amongst the communities,
recognized and respected leadership, and a high quality in their knowledge of the terrain and
populace. The recognition and incorporation of the tribal structures also effectively engaged
the pivotal tribal power brokers with GIRoA, empowering their leadership with a stake sense
58
of involvement in their own destiny, and generating greater appeal of working with the
government amongst the local population.
Ironically, it was off the back of these successes that ISAF sought to shore up the
ailing ANP, by drawing the Arbakai of Kunar, away from the jirgas and under GIRoA
Jurisdiction, under trials of the APPF program. This was road tested in Kunar, with mild
results as it forced the Arbakai to mirror conventional forces, and as a result never received
the full support of McChrystal.
Tagab District, Kapisa Province
A cautionary example of the negative effects of appropriating traditional tribal
structures outside of tribal jurisdiction to the forms of the state, occurred in Kapsia Province,
north of Kabul. Here, GIRoA representatives convened various meetings to recruit
representatives from the sub-tribes to serve on an Arbakai under the chief of police and to
assist in security duties. Those who attended, however, were not real representatives of the
sub-tribes living in the district. Many of those involved in the Arbakai’s establishment were
former combatants of various local militant factions and were included because of their
political affiliations (Tariq, 2008).
The Arbakai, established almost unilaterally without support of the jirgas, fell under a
hierarchical, top down control. This ran counter to the core-principles of the Arbakai, and as a
result it had no moral standing within the local communities. “The security force did not have
the backing of a collective decision making body and of leadership, a Jirga, embedded within
the community. Thus the Arbakai lost their impartiality” (Tariq, 2008).
Many individuals joined for the money, rather than out of a sense of social service and
thus operating standards remained very low. Once more, corruption within the district level
government only compounded problems (Tariq, 2008).
59
Additionally, the region had no working history of extensive use of Arbakai on which
effective models could be easily established, suggesting that the implementation of Arbakai is
most likely not a blanket solution for all of Afghanistan (Tariq, 2008). In terms of Griffith’s
criteria, the Arbakai here lacked leadership, quality and efficiency. Used outside of tribal
jurisdiction, the Arbakai had little support or appeal amongst the populace and as such did not
promote a good image of local governance by GIRoA, the loss of which would be to the
insurgents’ gain. Examples such as these demonstrate the importance of utilizing traditional
structures within their traditional context to maintain legitimacy, effective organization, unity
and control.
ODA 316, Kunar Province, 2003
The strategy adopted by Maj. Gant and his A-Team of ODA 316, provide an early
example of tribal engagement initiatives developed by CF. Here, in the earlier years of the
war, the ODA had been inserted by helicopter in the dead of the night into the mountainous
regions close to Tora Bora, with the loose objective from the higher command to “kill or
capture anti-coalition members” (Gant, 2009). There was little unity in their mission, the
strategy of which was not intended to, nor would gain little or no basis of support amongst
the populace.
The ODA conducted a number or armed recon patrols to announce “our presence and
invite contact, both friendly and hostile” (Gant, 2009). Despite their high levels of skill and
professionalism, operating in a new, unfamiliar environment, the ODA was at times hard
pressed to hold the initiative in a guerrilla war against insurgents who knew the local
geographic and human terrain like the back of their hand. The ODA rapidly found that the
“tactical reality was we were fighting for our lives every single day” (Gant).
60
The ODA altered the dynamics dramatically, once they managed to build a close
relationship with the village of Mangwel. This was achieved by entering the village as guest,
and controversially deciding to support the elders and Malik in local tribal disputes, by
traditional peaceful means via the jirga, or force if necessary. Both the Special Forces
soldiers and the tribesmen found common ground and as a result the ODA generated a small
but critical basis of popular support in pursuit of their objectives. What developed over the
coming months was a close and personal relationship of trust and comradery between men of
the ODA and the qawm in Mangwel. The ODA had access to superior intelligence and the
community’s Arbakai and Lashkar, operating at high levels of efficiency and unity from a
strong base area with firm popular support and with superior equipment and firepower
support that the ODA and its supporting air assets brought with them. The level of access to
the tribal network, in particular the local knowledge of the Arbakai, and the intelligence
gathered by the Kishakee, enabled the team to gain the initiative from the insurgency. In
effect, with their tribal partners, the ODA was able to operate within the insurgents’ OODA
loop, harnessing all aspects of the battle space terrain in their favour in a way that no CF or
even ANSF force would have been able to independently. This outstripped the insurgents’
capacity to operate within that area. One drawback, however, was the scale of this success
due to ODA 318’s small size. Whilst this enabled the A-Team to retain high levels of
flexibility and initiative, it also meant their reach was not widespread in a strategic sense.
Tribal Engagement Teams
From his experiences, Maj. Gant, deduced that operating through the tribes, on their
own terms, is the only way to truly secure the Afghan population in the support of CF and
GIRoA objectives. To achieve this and address the limited reach of lone ODAs, he argues
that ISAF needs to develop elite, highly proficient Tribal Engagement Teams (TET’s) that
61
integrate within receptive tribal communities in such a manner, similar to the British frontier
officers of former days. Utilizing CF main forces to pacify remote tribal communities at best
is not harnessing the human terrain, generating a basis of support amongst the populace or
promoting the appeal of GIRoA as effectively as it could be and at worst increases the sense
of alienation under foreign occupation that suppresses tribal structures whilst kinetic
operations damage communities. As such, CF main forces should remain focused on securing
urban centres, supply lines, and acting as Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to the TET’s.
The concept of the TET’s is somewhat similar to the CAPs of Vietnam or the former
British frontier officers along the frontier of British India. Such an approach falls in line with
current population centric strategy that focuses CF presence around pacifying areas of
population density and key strategic nodes with the increasing (yet limited) forces available.
CF main forces are too abrasive an entity to operate in many remote and tribal regions,
lacking the tact, dexterity and local knowledge to operate effectively and efficiently and thus
lack a strong capacity to generate a basis of support amongst the populace. Instead, to
promote the appeal of GIRoA, TET’s should seek to harness the local tribal communities,
their jirgas and Arbakai to effectively counter the insurgency in a less intrusive and more
effective manner.
Summary
Nationally, under Griffith’s criteria the insurgency may be edging ahead of GIRoA in
terms of their capacity to project their force into rural Pashto communities and leverage
support. Likewise, the insurgency’s capacity to harness the battle space terrain, both
geographically and psychologically, allows them to have a greater probability of holding the
strategic initiative. Pivotal to this is the insurgency’s capacity to understand Afghanistan and
the local dynamics of Afghan society in which they live. Simply put, the human terrain is the
62
key strategic terrain in Afghanistan. The majority of the population just want to get on with
their lives, with as little friction or conflict as possible. Whilst a population centric
pacification strategy with a focus on partnering with the ANSF goes a lot further than
previous attrition strategies, such solutions do not go far enough, and in fact can alienate the
very human terrain wished to be won over.
The incoming surge of troops to Afghanistan still falls way below an adequate
pacification mark, and once more those troops will be in place for a very short period of time
in contrast to the general course of counterinsurgency campaigns. As with Iraq, the pre-surge
fear that increases in troop numbers will increase resistance to foreign occupation may turn
out to be largely false. Yet under Griffith’s criteria, ANSF and CF can only achieve so much
in terms of their capacity, support and appeal of their objectives. As with Iraq, the real tide
turner will not be the surge in pacification, or even the change in strategy and tactics of those
troops, but the buy-in of elements within the indigenous society and harnessing them as a
pro-active force for stability.
Whilst tribal engagement in Afghanistan’s stronger and more divided tribal landscape
will not produce the same mass switch over as the Sunni Awakening did for Iraq, its benefits
as a ‘force multiplier’ should not be overlooked. If anything, the implementation of tribal
engagement in Afghanistan is more acutely critical in Afghanistan than Iraq due to the
strengths and autonomy of Afghanistan’s tribes and sub-tribal units. They are an instant
source of local legitimacy, support and knowledge. The tribal structure or security forces
alone both lack in different aspects under Griffith’s criteria. Unified together, however, they
carry the capacity to undercut the insurgency and alienate the ‘fish from the water’ by giving
communities control over their own destiny with support of GIRoA and ISAF. Such a
strategy instantly holds more appeal to the population as is relies primarily upon the much
63
respected traditional institutions on which the fabric of Afghan society is constructed, rather
than mistrusted, new institutions from Kabul.
On top of having more popular appeal, drawing support from the insurgency, tribal
engagement can also provide more effective avenues for local governance with reduced
abuses and corruption and increased accountability that will reflect well upon the district and
provincial branches of the national government with whom they are integrated.
In addition, use of the tribal security systems to complement instead of to merely
bolster the ANSF adds a new dynamic capacity to state security in an already functioning
manner. It is in accordance with the counterinsurgency mantra that local indigenous forces
should be constructed to mirror the insurgents, and not government forces. The tribes are key
to breaking inside the insurgents own OODA loop and harnessing the strategic as well as the
tactical initiative away them, as they are denied access to the key element of the battle space,
the human terrain.
64
Chapter 5: Conclusion
From the research and case studies we can see the critically positive impact engaging
with traditional tribal structures has on stability within Afghanistan. Simultaneously, with the
limited timeframe under current policy, the effort cannot be CF led alone. Emphasis has to be
on establishing Afghan counterparts and building that capacity into every action that ISAF
and the international community wishes to undertake in Afghanistan, to allow for an effective
transition or ‘Afghanization’.27
Instead of seeking to pacify the population, and force the passive role of citizenry of a
Western Hobbsian state model, efforts of a population centric, Afghan-first approach should
seek to do as the insurgency, and ‘harness the potential’ of the population as an active force.
The saying ‘all politics is local’ could not be more true in Afghanistan, where government
has always been inherently weak and power decentralized. In terms of the current conflict,
the state of things in any one region depends not so much on national policy or international
strategy as it does the personalities of the local ISAF and ANSF commanders, tribal elders,
insurgent leaders and district sub-governors, and how they all interact. Thus greater power
must move and be harnessed at the district level. Doing so, through the natural route of the
traditional tribal structures both gives people a stake in their local security and development,
and undercuts support for the insurgency, whilst also providing local security forces that can
outthink and outmanoeuvre the insurgency amongst both the geographic and human terrain.
Primary emphasis, however, should be on integrating the jirgas first and foremost into
local governance structures. Only once this has been successfully established could
widespread utilization of the Arbakai as part of the security structure occur, as the Arbakai
would be controlled through their jirga. The lines of effort should maintain governance
27
A reference to ‘Vietnamization,’ the transition of the war to South Vietnamese forces in the early 70s.
65
integration first, and security second. Thus the current policy that emphasizes quick fixes to
shore up the security infrastructure may need some rethinking. Additionally not all areas have
had a strong tradition of Arbakai, and thus may not be suitable for their creation and
implementation into the security infrastructure. Across Afghanistan though, incorporation of
tribal jirgas into local governance is something that can and must occur.
Further Issues
Obstacles to tribal engagement initiatives arise from many actors. There are elements
within GIRoA that do not wish to cede large portions of their power to the provincial and
district level. Intimidation and coercion from insurgent groups can also scuttle efforts if
adequate security guarantees or incentives are provided. The signs, however, are promising.
In February, 2010 for example, Civil Affairs marines along with DOS and USAID
representatives helped hold a regional shura in Delaram, Farah Province, the first of its kind
there in almost two decades and similar to successes conducted in Iraq, to discuss the very
use of tribal structures as informal layers of local governance. Despite threats from
insurgents, and concerns from many of the elders and Mullahs, there was a strong turnout and
positive feedback on the need for such integration. Resistance, however, not only comes from
the Afghani side, elements within the DOS, the UN and other development agencies object to
what they see as a straying from the primary goal of creating a strong Afghan state and only
fuelling tribal divisions and fighting. There are many objections to the funding and supplying
of arms to tribal militias as only fuelling further instability and mini tribal wars (Matthews,
2006). Moving towards widespread decentralization of power and tribal engagement would
be nearly impossible when the key international agencies would be unwilling to put the
required pressure on GIRoA to restructure. Such attempts are not meant to supplant the
government, but to draw structures into the fold that may be more representative and have
66
more authority on the ground” (Malkasian & Meyerley, 2008). Thus it may very much be a
case of working with what has already been established, and doing as much on the district
level as possible, whilst various initiatives such as the Peace Jirga occur at the national level.
An additional concern is the focus of effort on the Pashto within Afghanistan, and
how favouring one ethnicity over the other in that way could fuel further ethnic friction, or
impart something similar to the colonial era martial race theory. Whilst the Pastho have been
traditionally dominant within Afghanistan, tribal engagement is something that can, and does
occur across Afghanistan in terms of governance.
No solution is perfect, and tribal divisions may at times result in conflict; however, it
should be noted that armed confrontation is the last resort of the process of inter-tribal
dialogue. Similarly, as has been demonstrated, the implementation of tribal engagement along
traditional lines is key. As such, tribal militias are not funded or armed by the state. They
already exist. They are instead integrated into the security infrastructure via engagement
through the jirgas, and their expenses paid to cover the costs of any assignments. The gains
of such initiatives, if implemented properly, should outweigh the negative outcome of
alienating such structure, and leaving them prey to manipulation, attack or incorporation by
the insurgency. Such concerns would be more opposed to previous strategies of power
politics amongst warlords, and the funding and arming of destabilizing actors, than they
would be of integrating the traditional tribal structures.
Further Research
This paper has laid out the need for tribal engagement and the positive impact it can
have on stability in Afghanistan, whilst touching on some of the successful models and
means. To address some of the issues raised, however, additional research is required to
identify the capacity and willingness of the international community to pursue such
initiatives, and the finer point of how integration would function on a district level. Similarly,
67
research from this paper came primarily from academic and media sources as well as
personal experiences in Helmand, Farah and Nimruz provinces. Additional field research
throughout Afghanistan would build a better picture of the broad array of tribal dynamics in
Afghanistan and scope for their integration.
Closing Thoughts
Engaging with the population through the existing, and functioning tribal structure is
the most positive way in which Afghanistan can make real progress both in terms of security,
and governance, towards an atmosphere of stability. Likewise such initiatives fit in line with
the reality of international security strategy in Afghanistan that will see CF starting to draw
down and potentially leave by 2015. Something has to be left in that wake, and a strong,
centralized government is not a viable solution within that timeframe or context. Tribal
engagement offers many new solutions as well as challenges, and with the nature of
Afghanistan, will work differently from one region to the next. In the end, the exact
implementation is not for this paper, or even the international community to say. This is an
Afghan solution to an Afghan problem, in which the Afghans ultimately will have to take the
lead for themselves, with international support.
68
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