Functionalism is just a fancy way of saying that we have no idea

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Functionalism is just a fancy way of saying that we have no idea what the answer to
the mind-body problem is. Discuss.
Functionalism is a theory of the mind designed to solve the mind-body problem in a
way consistent with a materialist view of the world. The mind-body problem attempts
to reconcile the unique, subjective experience, constantly available to every one of us,
with the vivid, constant world outside which can be objectively studied by science.
These two realms seem to have very different properties; having the first idea how
they can be cohered into a consistent whole is no small task for any theory.
Functionalism holds that mind states are not reducible to brain states; that is, there is
no one-to-one mapping between the state of your mind and the state of your brain.
Your mind contains something else that cannot be explained by even the closest
examination of the brain. It is, however, compatible with materialism – there is no
other substance needed in this world view.
Functionalism derives its name from its functional description of the mind. It holds
that there are input (sensory information and memories) and output (actions,
decisions) and that the mind is the process by which outputs are reached. This view
has the advantage of being specific enough to extend to others cases: functionalism
means minds can be multiply realizable – they could exist in things very different
from our brains, if the same functional processes could take place. This could in an
alien head or a computer, in theory.
However, while this seems like a reasonable view, there are various problems arising
from its materialist foundation, and from the specifics of functionalism. The first is
the idea of intentionality, or ‘aboutness’. A property of thoughts in our subjective
mind is that they are always about something – about a person, about a car. Nothing in
the material world has that property. Our brains aren’t about anything, but
functionalism says that our mind’s functional behaviour comes from the brain, so
where does the aboutness in our mind come from? Functionalism has no answer.
A similar, quality based argument is that of qualia. There are the sense experiences we
constantly perceive while awake – the colour red, for instance. While in the objective
world the causes of the colour red can be investigated, photons with a certain
wavelength, and the firings in the brain can be seen, where in the brain produces the
experience of the colour red in our mind? There is no clear route to a solution.
Worse, for functionalism is that that two people with different minds might act the
same. My twin brother John is identical to except that when a red photon hits his eye,
he experiences the quale I would call blue, and vice versa when he sees a blue photon.
Now John will act in a completely alike way to me, he is functionally identical. When
I point at a letter box he will agree with me that it is red, even though different things
are appearing in our minds. Functionalism can take no account of that difference.
Against this is the idea that qualia inversion is not as simple as it seems. John can
experience a bluey – green colour with no problem, but his red is my blue, and no
reddy-green colour exists. The existence of these in-between shades comes from the
physical wavelength of the light – reddy-green is actually the wavelength for yellow.
So inversion doesn’t work quite as simply as it appears.
Another charge laid against functionalism is that it takes no account of the instant
access we have to our senses. We cannot stop perceiving, or thinking and there is
nothing in functionalism to say why this is so. It also does not explain why we are not
aware of our mind as a purely functional thing. However, neither of those points is a
knock-down argument.
A further problem with functionalism is how little it says. When even a theory that
says as little as ‘the mind produces outputs from inputs’ is riddled with difficulties, it
might seem as though we have no idea what the answer to the mind-body problem is.
But while it is true that all attempts at a solution have major objections, these
objections are clearly defined and well known. Progress can be made. Functionalism
is a vital step in stripping away unnecessary additions to the mind-body solution and,
far from showing that we have no idea, it shows that we have a foundation on which
to build a solution.
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