ILO/SAMAT Discussion Paper No. 14
STRATEGIES TO COMBAT YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND MARGINALISATION
IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA
Godfrey Kanyenze
Guy C.Z. Mhone
Theo Sparreboom
International Labour Organization
SOUTHERN AFRICA MULTIDISCIPLINARY ADVISORY TEAM (ILO/SAMAT)
HARARE, ZIMBABWE
2000
Copyright © International Labour Organization 2001
First published 2000
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Printed in Zimbabwe
ii
ILO/SAMAT Discussion Paper Series
_________________________________________________________
1.
Labour Standards in Export Processing Zones: A Southern African Perspective
Joost Kooijmans, David Tajgman and Aurelio Parisotto, 1996
2.
Shaping a Labour Market Based Training Policy for Lesotho
Torkel Alfthan and Theo Sparreboom, 1997
3.
The Social Protection of Migrant Workers in South Africa
Elaine Fultz and Bodhi Pieris, 1997
4.
Labour Migration to South Africa in the 1990s
ILO/SAMAT, 1998
5.
Industrial Relations in Southern Africa: The Challenge of Change
Tayo Fashoyin, 1998
6.
Definitions and Legal Provisions on Child Labour in Southern Africa
Joost Kooijmans, 1998
7.
Employment Injury Schemes in Southern Africa: An Overview and Proposals for
Future Directions
Elaine Fultz and Bodhi Pieris, 1998
8.
Occupational Health and Safety in Southern Africa: Trends and Policy Issues
Rene Loewenson, 1999
9.
Agriculture, Employment and Poverty in Malawi
Thandika Mkandawire, 1999
10.
Improving Labour Market Information in Southern Africa
Theodore Sparreboom, 1999
11.
Social Security Schemes in Southern Africa: An Overview and Proposals for Future
Development
Elaine Fultz and Bodhi Pieris, 1999
12.
Enclavity and Constrained Labour Absorptive Capacity in Southern African
Economies
Guy C.Z. Mhone, 2000
13.
The Impact of Globalization on Local Communities: A Case Study of the Cut-Flower
Industry in Zimbabwe
Robert Davies, 2000
iii
14.
Strategies to Combat Youth Unemployment and Marginalisation in Anglophone
Africa
Godfrey Kanyenze, Guy C.Z. Mhone and Theo Sparreboom, 2000
iv
Table of Contents
_________________________________________________________
Foreword ...............................................................................................................................vii
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Nature and Extent of the Problem ................................................................................... 2
3. The Labour Market and Youth Unemployment ............................................................ 9
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Limits of current economic reforms.......................................................................................... 10
Structure of the labour market and the status of youth ............................................................. 11
Labour absorption and youth unemployment ........................................................................... 13
Labour market inefficiencies and youth unemployment ........................................................... 14
4. Policy Frameworks and Institutional Structures ......................................................... 19
4.1
4.2
Policies and institutions ............................................................................................................ 19
Employment and labour policies in the formal sector .............................................................. 21
5. Interventions and Programmes...................................................................................... 23
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
Reforms of the educational and training systems ..................................................................... 24
Programmes for the provision of training and other services for enterprise development ....... 29
Active labour market policies ................................................................................................... 42
Direct employment creation programmes ................................................................................. 44
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ................................................................... 46
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
Economic reforms and youth unemployment ........................................................................... 46
Developing a national employment strategy ............................................................................. 47
Addressing youth unemployment and marginalisation ............................................................. 48
Interventions and programmes .................................................................................................. 49
References ............................................................................................................................... 52
v
List of tables
1.
2.
3.
Key economic indicators for selected countries in anglophone Africa.......................... 5
Youth unemployment in selected countries in anglophone Africa ................................ 6
Namibia: Youth unemployment rate by definition of unemployment, age, area and
sex, 1997 ........................................................................................................................ 7
List of boxes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Recent economic reforms in selected countries: Successes and failures ....................... 8
National Open Apprenticeship Scheme in Nigeria ...................................................... 24
Reforming the training system in Zambia .................................................................... 26
Poverty alleviation and microcredit in Uganda ............................................................ 36
Entandikwa Credit in Uganda ...................................................................................... 38
The YWCA and the youth in Zambia ......................................................................... 39
vi
FOREWORD
_________________________________________________________
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a member of the United Nations family of
organizations whose special mandate is the promotion of safe and decent work in all
countries of the world. Unlike other specialised UN agencies, the ILO is a tripartite
organization, and each country is represented not only by its government but also by the
representatives of its workers and employers. Similarly, ILO services are provided to trade
unions and employers associations as well as to governments. Over the eight decades since its
establishment in 1919, the ILO has promulgated a large body of Conventions which deal with
labour and social issues. The general thinking behind these Conventions is that, as stated in
the Preamble to the ILO Constitution, “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions
of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in
their own countries”. The Conventions establish benchmarks for all governments in their
efforts to promote decent and safe working conditions, and can also discourage backsliding
by member States.
In the global economy, the fulfilment of the ILO’s mandate requires new and innovative
approaches. To better equip the organization to pursue its mandate in the next century, the
ILO Director-General has formulated four strategic objectives. These are:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
promoting and realising fundamental principles and rights at work;
creating greater opportunities for women and men to secure decent employment and
income;
enhancing the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for all; and
strengthening tripartism and social dialogue.
These objectives will focus ILO activities in the coming years, providing complementary and
mutually reinforcing approaches to ensuring decent work for all people.
In the mid-1990s, the ILO sought to move even closer to its constituents through a major
decentralisation of staff, resources, and authority. Under its Active Partnership Policy, it
established multidisciplinary advisory teams in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Central and
Eastern Europe. These teams include specialists in areas such as labour standards,
employment and labour markets, small enterprise development, occupational safety and
health, social security, industrial relations, labour administration, workers’ and employers’
activities, statistics and training, as well as in such cross-cutting issues as gender. Demand
driven, the teams respond to requests from ILO member States, trade unions, and employers
associations for advice on policy issues and assist governments in the design and
implementation of development programmes and projects. The Southern Africa
Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (SAMAT), based in Harare, Zimbabwe, provides these
services to nine countries in Southern Africa.
As one of its services, SAMAT publishes a series of discussion papers on labour and social
issues of which this paper is a part. Through this series, SAMAT seeks to create an ongoing
dialogue with governments, workers and employers by promoting the ratification and
vii
application of the ILO Conventions in a regional context, presenting ideas for new labour and
social policy directions, and providing regional statistical data and comparative analyses
which enable the member States to learn from others' experiences.
I am pleased to present this latest contribution to the ILO/SAMAT Discussion Paper Series
entitled ‘Strategies to Combat Youth Unemployment and Marginalisation in Anglophone
Africa’. The paper was prepared in the context of ILO’s Action Programme on Strategies to
Combat Youth Marginalisation and Unemployment whose aim was to develop a coherent and
systematic method of intervention to combat youth unemployment and exclusion that could
be adapted to specific national situations and integrated into employment policies. The main
output of the Action Programme was a comprehensive and practical strategy document that
drew on the experiences of both developed and developing countries to guide the formulation
of future youth employment policies and programmes. The strategy document is intended
primarily for the use of ILO constituents and its multidisciplinary advisory teams in the field.
The strategy document was based in part on a series of Regional Papers that sought to review
the nature and assess the success of policies and programmes aimed at reducing or resolving
unemployment, underemployment and marginalisation of youth. These reviews and
assessments were intended to help identify best practice measures in various regions that
could be disseminated for possible replication elsewhere. Among these regional papers is the
present one on anglophone Africa. The paper draws on the literature on the evaluation of
relevant programmes and projects addressing unemployment in anglophone Africa, as well as
fieldwork in Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
This paper was prepared by ILO/SAMAT based on contributions from Dr. Godfrey
Kanyenze, Chief Economist, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Professor Guy C.Z.
Mhone, Director, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, Mr. Theo Sparreboom, formerly Associate
Expert, ILO/SAMAT, and now a development consultant based in Mozambique, as well as
from the ILO’s North Africa Multidisciplinary Advisory Team in Cairo.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleagues, in particular Mr. Rizwanul
Islam, in the ILO’s former Development Policies Department, for requesting SAMAT to
undertake the study and providing the necessary resources. I would also like to express our
gratitude to other colleagues in the ILO and among ILO constituents who facilitated the
implementation of the project in various ways.
Ullrich H. Flechsenhar,
Director,
ILO/SAMAT
viii
1.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the development of coherent and systematic
methods of intervention to combat youth unemployment and exclusion that can be adapted to
specific national situations and integrated into employment policies. It reviews the nature and
assesses the success of policies and programmes that are aimed at reducing or resolving
unemployment, underemployment and marginalisation of youth. The paper draws on
literature on the evaluation of relevant programmes and projects addressing unemployment in
anglophone Africa, as well as fieldwork in selected countries. These countries are Egypt,
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Their selection is intended to reflect
the diversity of anglophone Africa, varied experiences with different types of programmes,
geographic balance as well as time and resource constraints. Table 1 provides data on a few key
economic indicators of these countries to highlight their diversity in terms of level of
development, economic performance and labour force growth and structure. Additional countryspecific information may be found in Box 1 regarding economic performance under adjustment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relies on available empirical information to
assess the nature and extent of youth unemployment and marginalisation in anglophone
Africa.
Section 3 is concerned with the general economic policy framework in the 1990s and how it
has affected the labour market and the youth. The limits of the current economic reforms will
be discussed, followed by a review of structural features that account for the persistence of
the (youth) unemployment problem. Particular attention will be given to the marginalised
status of youth in the labour market.
Section 4 considers the overall employment policy and institutional frameworks that have
been put in place in selected anglophone African countries to develop and implement
employment and labour policies, and how these have been affected by the economic policy
framework discussed in Section 3. A brief review of labour market policies directed at the
formal sector and their implications for youth is also presented in this section.
Section 5 presents a typology of interventions and programmes concerned with the promotion
of youth unemployment. Examples of various types of interventions and programmes will be
discussed with a view to assessing their success or lack thereof and drawing lessons from
them. The assessment relies on (a) the existing literature on the evaluation of relevant
programmes and projects in Africa, and (b) in-depth assessment of specific programmes and
projects identified on the basis of prior information and knowledge. Data and information for
in-depth analysis were gathered from secondary sources, interviews with key informants and
participants of programmes and projects, as well as from contacts with ILO constituents
during field visits to the selected countries.
Section 6 contains conclusions and policy recommendations. It starts with elaborating on the
necessary broader enabling policies within which specific polices to promote youth
employment may be located. Subsequently, the main lessons from the examination of
programmes and projects will be highlighted. Finally, several Boxes provide more specific
information or illustrations of some points made in the text.
1
2.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of youth unemployment and underemployment in Africa poses complex
economic, social and moral policy issues. It is also well known that this problem is part and
parcel of the overall problem of unemployment and underemployment that afflicts almost all
African countries. In its generality, the problem affects the majority of adults in both rural
and urban areas, even if its incidence may be higher among youth, women and rural folk. In
attempting to devise policies to alleviate the plight of youth in this regard, it is important that
the foregoing aspects of the problem (its multifaceted nature and its being part of a larger
problem) are explicitly recognised and taken into account.
Currently, Africa’s population is about three-quarters of a billion. African countries continue
to have high rates of population growth averaging about 2.6 per cent per annum for the first
half of the 1990s (World Bank, 1997, Table 4; see also Table 1 in this paper). The world rate
of growth in population is much lower, at about 1.5 per cent (ibid.). High population growth
places an unusually severe burden on African economies to produce adequate income earning
opportunities if per capita incomes are not to fall.
The active population in Africa comprises up to half of the total population. A large part of it,
including the youth, is employed in agriculture and the informal sector, both of which are
characterised by the prevalence of underemployment. Although hard data on time-related and
other forms of underemployment are generally lacking in Africa, the seasonal character of
agriculture, the low incomes in the informal sector, and various structural factors (discussed
in the next section) all point to the inadequate utilisation of labour in most countries.
Another part of the active population in Africa is openly unemployed. In southern Africa,
unemployment rates exceeding 20 per cent are not uncommon. In much of the rest of Africa,
too, unemployment rates are relatively high, though perhaps not as high as in some southern
African countries where the formal sector tends to be large. Youth unemployment rates,
where the youth are defined as those 15-24 years of age, are even higher. Table 2 assembles
data relating to overall unemployment and youth unemployment in a number of anglophone
African countries in the 1990s. These data permit several observations concerning youth and
youth unemployment.
The first has to do with the diversity in the definition of “youth”. It is clear that the definition
of who is included in youth very much depends on which dimension of “youth” takes
precedence: demographic (e.g. age); cultural (notions of adulthood); biological (attainment of
puberty); social (attainment of maturity or marriageability); or economic (e.g. ability to
sustain oneself). The spectrum of youth has been variously defined to range from the ages of
10 or 11 years (as in some cultural traditions), to as high as 34 years (as in South Africa for
instance). More generally the age range between 12 and 25 years is presupposed, which may
even be narrowed to 15-24 years. The age ranges in Table 2 do not necessarily reflect any
official definition of who constitute the youth. In the case of Uganda, the National Youth
Council Statute 1993 defines the youth to be those persons of either sex between the ages of
18-30. In other cases, the specified ranges merely reflect the age disaggregation available in
the sources of data. Whether or not these ranges reflect any specific national definition of
“youth” is not known.
Secondly, despite all the problems of consistency that afflict employment statistics in Africa
(data in Table 2 are generally comparable within countries but not necessarily across them),
2
youth unemployment rates are consistently higher than overall unemployment rates. The ratio
of the former to the latter varies from 1.5 to as much as 4 or more, although in most cases the
rate of youth unemployment is about twice as high as the overall unemployment rate (Table
2). This pattern of unemployment rates can be found in many countries, developed as well as
developing (see e.g. O'Higgins 1997 and UNDP 1998, Table 33 on industrial countries).
Thirdly, the youth unemployment problem is exacerbated by the demographic structure of the
population. The combination of high population growth and low life expectancies implies
that the populations in Africa are comparatively youthful, with the age dependency ratio
(ratio of dependants to the working population) close to one, as compared to a ratio of less
than one for many countries elsewhere in the world. Population dynamics and labour market
conditions in anglophone Africa are such that, more often than not, the youth comprise more
than half of the total number of the unemployed, although their share in the labour force is
typically of the order of 20 to 40 per cent (Table 2). The youth thus bear the brunt of the
unemployment problem in many African countries.
Finally, although data are more scarce and what data are available can only be illustrative, it
is probably valid to suggest that, in general: (a) youth unemployment rates are higher in urban
areas than in rural areas (as is the case of Nigeria in Table 2 and Namibia in Table 3); (b)
youth unemployment rates are higher among females than males (see Table 3 for Namibia);
and (c) the relationship between the rate of unemployment and level of education of youth is
generally curvilinear, i.e. the rates of unemployment of youth with the least (or no) education
or with the most education are lower than the rate of unemployment of youth with
intermediate levels of education, as in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 1998, p. 27).
Labour force participation in Africa has historically been in favour of men with women
representing less than 40 per cent of the labour force. It is also estimated that children
between the ages of 10 and 14 may constitute as much as 30 per cent of the labour force in
the continent. Thus, not only is female labour under-utilised, but also many children and
youth are in general mis-utilised in a manner that undermines their development as human
beings and human capital. The increasing labour force participation of youth, especially of
those (children) below the age of 15 years, poses both moral and social questions that are not
easily resolved by simply providing adequate employment opportunities for the youth. First,
youth are compelled by circumstances to engage in job search, survival activities or work
when they are at their most vulnerable physically, morally and socially. Second, they are
forced to participate in the labour force when they should be undergoing socialisation to
make better citizens in their communities. On both these accounts the problem of youth
unemployment and underemployment poses moral and social questions for which household
and public resources are needed which are currently lacking or inadequate, but for which
work may not necessarily be the solution. To these must be added the economic
consideration, which requires that youth be invested in as future human capital for which
there are well-known long term private and social benefits. It is clear therefore that when
youth as a resource are mis-utilised, the society compromises it moral, social and economic
objectives, and this increasingly is the case in much of Africa.
How can high rates of unemployment among youth in anglophone Africa be explained? One
reason is clearly the high rate of population growth, which has resulted in a relatively young
population and a large proportion of youth in the population of working age. However,
demographic factors can only explain part of the youth unemployment problem. An ILO
contribution to a Workshop on the Formulation of the National Programme of Action for
3
Youth in Zambia highlights three issues in this context that are relevant in many other
African countries as well (Ministry of Sport, Youth and Child Development – MSYCD –
1996).
-
The slow growth, or lately decline, in formal sector employment. This points
to slow economic growth – or worse, stagnation or even economic contraction
– in the recent past which has depressed overall demand for labour. There are
no new jobs coming up. This is by far the most important reason behind the
unemployment crisis. Any strategy to combat youth unemployment must be
based on boosting labour demand on a sustainable basis through economic
policies that improve the conditions for enterprises to do business and hire
people. Although employment growth in the formal sector can only be a
partial answer to the problem, a general revival of the economy should, by
establishing linkages to informal activities, also boost demand and economic
activity in the informal sectors.
-
As far as formal sector employment is concerned, the skills that job seekers
possess do not match the need and demand of employers. The education
system, with its liberal bias, does simply not produce the type of skills
demanded in formal employment, with its strong dominance of mining and
manufacturing. But there are also other reasons, [including] the underlying
perception among policy makers – and also among the ultimate beneficiaries,
the youth – that employment means a job with a wage or salary and working
for somebody else. These perceptions have strongly influenced those
institutions that provide skills training. Training programmes and curricula are
eminently biased towards preparing for formal sector wage jobs. Since these
jobs simply do not exist, there is a serious mismatch between
expectations/skills of job seekers on the one hand and available job
opportunities on the other.
-
Finally, among policy makers there has been a strong assumption that the
main cause of unemployment among the youth has been the absence of
artisanal and vocational skills. This has led to the continuous expansion of
training supply in such areas as carpentry, auto-mechanics, bricklaying, etc.
This has been an eminently supply-driven response to training, ignoring the
demand for these skills and the absorptive capacities of communities to
effectively make use of them. Market saturation has been the result. Training
in these skills now leads to unemployment. The fundamental lesson of these
programmes is that any training intervention should be based on a careful
assessment of available job opportunities and opportunities for production that
would require skills and therefore create a demand for training.
These two factors – the low growth rate of the economy and the limited relevance of the
education and training system – have been identified in many African countries as key issues
in the explanation of youth unemployment. Both issues are also subject to policies and
programmes addressing youth unemployment, and these will be examined in subsequent
sections of the paper.
4
Table 1. Key economic indicators for selected countries in anglophone Africa
GNP per
capita
Country
US$ 1995
Growth of GDP
1980-90
Population
1990-97
Total
(millions)
1997
Share of labour force in
1990 (%)
Labour force
Ave. annual
growth (%)
1990-97
Total
(millions)
1997
Ave. annual
growth (%)
1990-97
Agriculture
Industry
Egypt
790
5.3
3.9
60
2.0
22
2.8
43
23
Nigeria
260
1.6
2.7
118
2.9
47
2.8
43
7
3,160
1.2
1.5
38
1.7
15
2.0
14
32
Uganda
240
3.1
7.2
20
3.1
10
2.7
93
5
Zambia
400
0.8
-0.5
9
2.8
4
2.8
75
9
Zimbabwe
540
3.4
2.0
11
2.3
5
2.3
69
8
490
1,780
4,880
1.7
0.4
3.1
2.1
2.6
2.3
614
283
5829
2.7
2.5
1.5
269
92
2784
2.6
3.2
1.6
68
36
49
9
24
20
South Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East & North Africa
World
Sources: World Bank 1997 and 1998.
5
Table 2. Youth unemployment in selected countries in anglophone Africa
Total
Country
Year
Botswana
1991
1993
1995
Labour force
No. unemployed
% unemployed
(years)
Ratio of
unemplyment
rates:
Youth
Youth age
range
Labour force
No. unemployed
% unemployed
% of youth in
Youth/overall
Labour force
No. unemployed
441,203
61,265
13.9
21.6
21.5
15-24
15-24
15-24
122,871
31,463
25.6
41.2
37.9
1.8
1.9
1.8
27.8
51.4
17,118,000
1,768,000
10.3
15-30
5,992,000
1,652,000
27.6
2.7
35.0
93.4
1990
1995
483,958
47,646
5.6
9.8
20-24
15-24
103,881
24,693
11.3
23.8
2.0
2.4
21.5
51.8
Namibia
1991
1997
479,780
498,324
91,765
97,121
19.1
19.5
15-24
15-24
118,730
97,418
45,200
36,062
38.1
37.0
2.0
1.9
24.7
19.5
49.3
37.1
Nigeria
Urban
Rural
1998
1998
1998
3.9
5.5
3.5
15-24
15-24
15-24
15.5
23.4
13.8
4.0
4.3
3.9
South Africa
1997
22.9
15-30
35.0
1.5
Tanzania, U.R.
1990
11,294,930
405,722
3.6
15-24
Uganda
1997
9,050
668
7.4
18-30
Zambia
1990
1996
2,296,000
4,037,000
285,000
644,000
12.4
16.0
12-24
12-24
Zimbabwe
1990
1992
1994
3,501,798
764,199
11.3
21.8
Egypt
Mauritius
?
3,297,161
237,395
7.2
2.0
29.2
58.5
868,000
1,347,000
181,000
435,000
20.9
32.3
1.7
2.0
37.8
33.4
63.5
67.5
1,164,973
516,083
27.0
44.3
2.4
2.0
33.3
67.5
62.1
Sources: SamatData (ILO/SAMAT, 2000) for all countries except Egypt (ILO/NAMAT, 1999, Table 17), Nigeria and Uganda (Kanyenze tables).
6
55.0
48.4
56.4
Table 3. Namibia: Youth unemployment rate by definition of unemployment, age, area and sex, 1997
Age group (years)
Both sexes
Labour
Unemp.
Unemp.
force
rate
(No.)
(%)
Females
Labour
Unemp.
force
(No.)
Unemp.
rate
(%)
Males
Labour
Unemp.
force
(No.)
Unemp.
rate
(%)
Broad definition of
unemployment
National
15 - 19
20 - 24
39,288
101,052
23,965
55,019
61.0
54.4
20,386
54,442
13,337
33,546
65.4
61.6
18,902
46,610
10,628
21,473
56.2
46.1
All ages
612,618
211,416
34.5
305,165
123,410
40.4
307,453
88,006
28.6
12,131
46,384
8,686
24,990
71.6
53.9
6,395
23,781
4,733
13,965
74.0
58.7
5,736
22,603
3,952
11,025
68.9
48.8
27,157
54,668
15,279
30,029
56.3
54.9
13,991
30,660
8,603
19,581
61.5
63.9
13,166
24,007
6,675
10,449
50.7
43.5
15 - 19
20 - 24
23,653
73,765
8,330
27,732
35.2
37.6
11,817
35,841
4,768
14,945
40.3
41.7
11,836
37,924
3,562
12,787
30.1
33.7
All ages
498,324
97,121
19.5
230,000
48,245
21.0
268,324
48,877
18.2
7,979
38,196
4,534
16,801
56.8
44.0
4,136
17,868
2,475
8,051
59.8
45.1
3,842
20,328
2,058
8,750
53.6
43.0
15,675
35,570
3,796
10,931
24.2
30.7
7,680
17,973
2,292
6,894
29.8
38.4
7,994
17,596
1,504
4,037
18.8
22.9
Urban
15 - 19
20 - 24
Rural
15 - 19
20 - 24
Strict definition of
unemployment
National
Urban
15 - 19
20 - 24
Rural
15 - 19
20 - 24
Source: Adapted from Namibia, Ministry of Labour, 2000, Annex Tables A.13 and A.14.
7
Box 1: Recent economic reforms in selected countries: Successes and failures
EGYPT
The Egyptian economy grew at the fast pace of nearly 10 per cent annually during the 1970s, primarily driven
by the growth in oil production and revenues. The annual growth rate of GDP fell to about 5 per cent in the
1980s and 4 per cent in the 1990s (Table 1), in part due to adverse terms of trade related to the price of oil.
The Egyptian economy continues to be an enclave economy in nature with a large section of its labour force in
non-formal sectors. As with Nigeria (see below), Egypt has yet to take full advantage of its export earnings for
purposes of economic diversification. Its economy also lives under the threat of 'Dutch Disease' in that reliance
on lucrative export earnings distorts resource allocation by discouraging alternative productive activities and
encouraging rent seeking forms of economic behaviour.
NIGERIA
Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has been in the grip of an economic crisis for the past two decades
or so, in spite of its oil bonanza and various attempts at economic reform under the tutelage of the Bretton
Woods institutions. Between 1975 and 1980, Nigeria’s GDP was growing at the phenomenal rate of about 16
per cent per year due to oil boom. However, from 1980 onwards GDP growth has plummeted to about 2-3 per
cent per year (Table 1). The share of gross domestic investment in GDP declined from an average of about 24
per cent during 1975-79 to about 12 per cent in mid-1980s.
Nigeria embarked on structural adjustment in 1986 and proceeded to implement the required economic reforms
through the 1990s. The results, however, have been disappointing as suggested by the meagre growth of the
economy. The Bretton Woods institutions attribute Nigeria’s lacklustre performance to poor and inconsistent
implementation of reforms, especially in the context of changing political regimes, poor forms of governance,
pervasive corruption and resistance from civil society. Others have also mentioned the country’s inability to take
advantage of the oil boom for purposes of transforming the economy. Indeed, the oil bonanza appears to have
reinforced the enclave nature of the formal economy, exacerbated corruption and plagued the economy with the
'Dutch disease syndrome'. Thus by the late 1990s the economy was far from creating an enabling environment
for labour absorption, and hence both adult and youth unemployment and underemployment continued to
increase, as did poverty.
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa emerged from apartheid rule in 1994 with an economic legacy of relative isolation, and an inward
looking policy regime that had been pursued over a number of decades. The economy embedded racial
inequalities in economic assets and access to jobs and social services, and was dependent on primary production
and primary export in spite of its relative diversification.
During the 1970s, the rate of growth of GDP was about 3 per cent per year, and formal employment was
increasing. Economic growth began to falter in the 1980s (Table 1). Since the democratic transition 1994, the
economy has not performed as well as anticipated, in spite of the adoption of a macroeconomic framework
endorsed by the World Bank and the IMF. The South African economy has been plagued by a combination of
high rates of open unemployment and low employment elasticities. The economic reforms appear to be resulting
in a net short-term contraction of employment at the same time that the economy is failing to attract adequate
foreign investment.
UGANDA
After years of political and economic mismanagement, Uganda began to stabilise politically under the Museveni
government in the mid-1980s. It also resolutely embarked on Bretton Woods inspired economic reforms.
Agriculture accounts for about 75 per cent of the labour force, and the formal sector for less than 20 per cent.
The country, with a per capita income of US$240 in 1995 is also one of Africa’s poorer.
The economy has made remarkable progress since embarking on economic reforms, with GDP increasing a 7
per cent annually in the 1990s (Table 1). Agricultural exports have grown faster than population growth in spite
of adverse terms of trade. Thus, notwithstanding the low base from which economy had to start and the fact that
the majority of the labour force is in the non-formal sector, Uganda has established an enabling environment for
economic growth and employment creation. The country has implemented economic reforms with a unique
8
form of decentralised and participatory form of governance, which has so far provided the government with a
relative degree of support and legitimacy, even though pockets of political resistance continue to prevail. If
current rates of economic growth are sustained, it is possible that the Ugandan economy will be able to begin
systematically to reduce levels of unemployment and underemployment in the country.
ZAMBIA
Since the economic shocks in the 1970s, notably the sharp fall of the price of copper, economic policy in
Zambia has been characterised by a series of policy regimes that alternated between 'controlled regimes' and
liberalisation of the economy (Seshamani and Kaunga 1996). The initial response from government to the rapid
deterioration of a range of economic indicators was to move further towards controls (Chiwele and Chinganja
1997). During the 1980s, however, a number of attempts were made to liberalise the economy, which was
dominated by the State and an extensive network of parastatals, under the philosophy of African Socialism. The
State determined agricultural producer prices, the exchange rate and the interest rate. It was not until the change
of government in 1991 that full-fledged structural adjustment programmes were implemented in earnest and the
economy was put on a path of sustained market liberalisation.
Current economic reforms in Zambia centre around public sector reform, massive privatisation and export and
investment promotion. Some 223 state enterprises out of a total of 280 in the working portfolio of the Zambia
Privatisation Agency had been privatised by December 1998 (Budget Address 1999). Financial markets and
services, trade and transport have increasingly been liberalised. However, unlike the Ugandan economy, the
Zambian economy has continued to experience decline at the rate of 0.5 per cent a year in the 1990s in spite of
the reforms. In 1998, the economy contracted by 2 per cent, thus lowering income per capita by around 5 per
cent.
The Zambian economy has over the years failed to diversify away from its reliance on copper, which, together
with the public sector, have defined the enclave nature of the economy. The rationalisation of the extensive
public sector has resulted in a secular reduction of employment, exacerbating the unemployment problem. The
incidence of poverty is around 70 per cent (CSO 1997b). By African standards, the country has a high rate of
urbanisation in spite of declining opportunities in the urban formal sector, leading to increasing problems of
urban youth unemployment and street children.
ZIMBABWE
With a per capita income of US$540 in 1995, Zimbabwe has one of the largest and most diversified formal
sectors in southern Africa. Given the inequitable distribution of land, the controlled nature of the urban
environment and the restricted development of the non-formal sectors rooted in colonial policies, the country
manifests relatively high levels of open unemployment.
During the first decade of majority rule (from 1980 to 1990), the economy was managed under a professed
socialist regime even if this was not as extensive as that in Zambia. During this period economic growth was
erratic primarily influenced by the recurrent droughts and the availability of foreign exchange. The general
stance in favour of socialism discouraged foreign investment. The country nevertheless made major strides in
the provision of social services such as health and education.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the country embarked on economic reforms in line with World Bank and IMF
prescriptions, but these reforms have been implemented inconsistently, in part because of political resistance to
some of the measures. The stalemate over land redistribution has continued to paralyse relations with donors and
prospective investors while the state of governance has deteriorated. The growth rate of GDP has faltered and
per capita income has been declining in the 1990s. Meanwhile, unemployment has continued to increase. There
is clear evidence of low elasticities of employment with respect to output and investment, and of constraints to
the transformation of the non-formal sectors in which the majority of the labour force still works.
3.
THE LABOUR MARKET AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
This section begins by briefly commenting on the lacklustre performance of African
economies in spite of the implementation of economic reforms recommended by international
bodies, particularly with respect to the inability to resolve the problems of unemployment and
9
underemployment. This is followed by a discussion of structural features that account for the
persistence and pervasiveness of unemployment and underemployment, with a view to
informing on the broader enabling policies within which specific polices to promote youth
employment may be located.
3.1
Limits of current economic reforms
While the other major regions of the world continue to benefit from what the World Bank
refers to as ‘these revolutionary times’ of increasing globalisation, Africa continues to be
largely marginalised. So far, this continent does not appear to be benefiting much from the
opportunities presented by current developments in the international economy. If anything,
much of the evidence suggests that the continent is very much beset by the risks these new
developments entail. Both the World Bank’s World Development Report (1995) and the
ILO’s World Employment Report (1995) conclude as much, even if it is recognised that some
African countries such as Uganda and Ghana have, by embracing market forces and outward
orientation, managed to resuscitate their economies quite viably (see Box 1, Uganda).
The plight of the African continent is more fundamentally reflected in the state of its labour
force in that the majority continues to be primarily underemployed with low or survival
incomes. Indeed, the state of the labour market very much reflects the nature of the African
economic crisis. The persistence of the exclusion of the majority of the labour force from
productive activities of a dynamic and sustainable form, of the underdevelopment of rural and
urban non-formal economies, and of the inability of the formal economies to generate
adequate employment opportunities is a salient characteristic of the African economic crisis.
Africa is caught in a number of vicious traps which continue to be self-reinforcing, and
which, for some countries, ultimately have led to the disintegration of their economies,
polities, and societies. First, Africa economies are unable to generate adequate growth rates in
gross domestic product (GDP) and enough employment and income generating opportunities
to absorb the majority of their labour forces. Poverty has been increasing, thereby bringing
the state into disrepute and threatening its legitimacy. Second, the very inability of the private
sector of the economies to generate sustainable livelihoods has given prominence to rivalry
over the control of the state as a primary means for attempting to share in whatever fruits of
the economy that there may be, thereby further exacerbating the possibility of unrest. Finally,
the inability of the economy to generate adequate growth implies that the capacity of the state
to govern and deliver with respect to social services and security is also compromised. In the
face of the foregoing vicious traps it is not surprising that many African countries are caught
in grave political instability and civil strife.
Since the early 1980s, following the publication of the Berg report by the World Bank
(1981), it has generally been the conventional diagnosis that African countries are in an
economic crisis as a result of pursuing unsustainable inward or statist economic policies, and
that the requirements for the resuscitation of growth lay in the pursuit of market and outward
oriented economic policies. As a consequence, a plethora of economic reform programmes
has been embarked upon by almost all countries except perhaps Libya. These reforms have
coincided with the increasing globalisation of the world economy, and the expectation has
been that sustainable growth would result, leading to increasing per capita incomes, declining
income inequalities and poverty, and rising employment. Reality has been different. For the
majority of the countries the era of reform has been associated with low real rates of per
capita growth in incomes, if not actual declines, persistent unemployment and
underemployment, increasing poverty, and for some, increasing levels of inequality as well.
10
Thus the World Bank concludes that Africa’s vulnerability has increased and that the
continent remains ‘largely disconnected from international market opportunities’ (World
Bank 1995, p. 4). A very brief review of the recent economic experiences of selected
anglophone African countries is summarised in Box 1. These experiences underscore the
immensity of the overall problem of effecting economic transformation, even in the face of
economic reforms, and implicitly point at the need to address the structural factors that may
impede employment growth generally as well as with particular reference to youth.
It may be that African countries have failed to adequately implement the reforms that their
erstwhile benefactors from the international community proposed (see Box 1 on Nigeria and
Zimbabwe), but it may also be that many of the past and current economic policies are
misdirected, or informed by a paradigm of the nature of the economic challenge facing
African countries that is too restrictive. The performance of these countries with respect to
the implementation of economic reform programmes, and the reasons for their poor level of
implementation, have been adequately analysed elsewhere, and very much so by the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund. While the general conclusion from such analyses was
initially that African countries were not implementing recommended reforms
comprehensively or not sequencing them properly, after a decade and a half of experience
with these reforms, there is an increasing realisation that while these measures may well be
necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient for the task at hand.
3.2
Structure of the labour market and the status of youth
In Africa the majority of the labour force continue to eke out a living in low-productivity,
low-income survival pursuits in agriculture and the urban informal sector. Formal sector
employment represents only a small part of the labour force, with only a few countries in
North and Southern Africa employing large segments of their labour forces in this sector.
Even within the formal sector the majority of the workers is employed in low-skill and lowincome occupations. Thus the labour force is characterised by a high degree of
underemployment, both from the point of view of the pervasiveness of low productivity
activities and the persistence of low incomes, despite high levels of exertion.
The problem of youth unemployment and underemployment needs to be situated within the
above context. With respect to the formal sector the youth problem is manifested in at least
two outcomes. First, youth find themselves at the tail end of a queue for jobs in the formal
sector. If, on the one hand, formal sector employment is regulated or relatively organised as
in South Africa and Zimbabwe, youth will tend to be virtually excluded from reasonably
paying formal employment, and the incidence of youth unemployment will tend to be high
(see Section 2). But if, on the other hand, the labour market is fairly unregulated and labour is
relatively unorganised, there will be a tendency for the development of a division between
adult and youth workers with the latter being relegated to residual, atypical or vulnerable
forms of formal employment with low pay.
While this latter form of employment for youth may be economically rationalised by
reference to their low skills, if any, and their excess supply relative to demand, it cannot be
argued that it reflects an efficient allocation of labour, especially in the long term. Most
importantly, while this form of employment substitutes youth labour for adult labour, it does
not result in significant addition value to the economy, given the overriding structural
constraints that face the African economies of this nature (those with ‘flexible’ labour
markets). Further, the long-term private and social costs of utilising youth in this manner
generally are not factored into the assessment and may be quite high.
11
While youth employment in the formal sector may be the preferred option, the inadequate
employment opportunities in this sector compel most youth, just like adults, to make a living
of sorts in the informal sector. Youth will generally again find themselves relegated to easy
entry activities prone to lateral expansion, low returns and long hours of work. In addition,
such forms of work may compromise the safety and security of the youth while working.
Thus youth will be found in the vending, street type activities such as car washing and car
watching, making and selling simple crafts and in menial forms of housework or other forms
of service activities for which their being viewed as children is used as a pretext for paying
them low wages or treating them paternalistically by embracing them as part of the family
(when in fact they are very much like bonded servants). This latter phenomenon is
particularly true of recently recruited youth from rural areas who are then employed by urban
households. Again, the lateral and involutionary growth of the informal sector implies that in
the face of the slow growth in productive employment opportunities in both the formal and
informal sectors, youth are subjected to increasing impoverishment. Thus the informal sector
under current circumstances cannot be seen as a panacea for youth unemployment and
underemployment.
The final major sector of employment is the smallholder or subsistence agriculture. This, as
indicated earlier, is a residual sector and in much of Africa has continued to remain
underdeveloped. Youth in this sector are bound by traditional requirements, which may entail
their being required to work at an early stage in their lives once they have reached puberty.
While such requirements may be relevant and valid for the rural community, given the
irreversible transformation of much of Africa toward market based forms of resource
allocation, the tying of youth in such traditional activities of a primarily subsistence nature
represents a misallocation of resources.
This is also an illustration of the conflict between cultural and economic imperatives with
respect to youth and how they are defined for purposes of policy. Rural youth have not only
been subjected to the paternalism of tradition, but in many respects they have borne the brunt
of the many internal and cross-border conflicts that have emerged across Africa. A large
number of youth have been uprooted from their families and homes and forced to act as foot
soldiers to fight wars. This aspect of human wastage has yet to be adequately accounted for in
Africa, but represents a major scourge and moral outrage in so far as it compromises the
social and economic interests of youth on the continent. With the inability of African
countries to transform their rural economies, youth who find themselves compelled to work
in rural environments generally find themselves as trapped by circumstances, hence their
desires to migrate to urban areas at the earliest opportunity. Such migration, in turn, merely
enlarges the number of adults and youth queuing for formal sector jobs and the number of
survivalist participants eking out a living in the informal sector.
Thus the plight of youth in the labour market, while very much similar to that of adults, is
intensified by their status as a residual category in formal, informal and rural labour markets.
The development of youth as human capital has also been further compromised in recent
years by the cuts in social and education expenditures occasioned by economic reforms,
levying of cost recovery measures for various social services (health and education for
instance) and the de-control of prices of basic commodities in some countries.
These features of African labour markets have continued to be manifested, indeed
accentuated, over the past couple of decades, in spite of the economic reforms or the changes
12
in the global economic order. Essentially, notwithstanding the many salutary improvements
in economic management that may have occurred since the 1980s, labour markets in Africa
continue to be characterised by extreme forms of marginalisation and deprivation
underpinned by gross structural inefficiencies. The plight of the labour force continues to be
what it is today partly because African countries have failed to drastically overcome the
legacies they have inherited with regard to their economic structures. This trend is unlikely to
be reversed by conventional economic reforms, including the impact of globalisation, in the
absence of bolder measures. Indeed, the structural legacy of African economies tends to
pervert the impact of current reforms and global trends, external factors notwithstanding.
3.3
Labour absorption and youth unemployment
In order to design appropriate interventions for youth it is necessary to recognise that the
problems of both adult and youth unemployment and underemployment are associated with
the inability of the economies to integrate formal and non-formal sectors virtuously; with the
inability of non-formal sectors to uplift themselves by their boot-straps; with the inability of
the market to encourage labour absorbing activities; with the inability of African economies
to penetrate the global market in non-traditional markets; and with the inability of African
countries to engage in appropriate forms of physical and human capital investment in the face
of economic reforms and the debt burden. The structural and self-reproducing nature of the
low income and low labour absorption trap African countries are in is worth pinpointing
further in order to clarify the enabling context within which interventions aimed at youth may
be located. This is important in that policy interventions aimed at promoting youth
employment, if undertaken in the absence of other complementary, economy-wide measures
may prove to be unsustainable or may have the perverse effect of merely substituting youth
for adult labour without any net gains in efficiency, productivity and output.
It is generally assumed that the formal sector is the engine of growth and transformation.
Most academic analysts and policy makers tend to assume that if markets are allowed to play
their dominant and dynamic role, this process will more or less be automatic, with perhaps
only minimal facilitative interventions by the state. Indeed, the conventional analysis often
assumes that if barriers arise at all to this transformation, these will be a result of illconceived actions by the state. The role of structural barriers other than those induced by the
actions of the state tends to be assumed away, or regarded as insignificant. However, there
are endogenous factors in the nature of the interface between formal and non-formal sectors
that tend to militate against their virtuous integration onto a dynamic path of growth and
transformation that more or less obliterates the traditional sector.
Since the 1970s, very few African economies have experienced rates of output growth and
employment elasticities that generate formal sector employment rapidly enough to absorb net
increases in the labour force, let alone reduce the number of those employed in the informal
and subsistence sectors. Thus the growth and transformation requirements of the underlying
model are inherently quite challenging in the absence of any other interventions outside of
market processes. If the growth of the formal sector falls short of the ideal rates required to
absorb additions to the labour force, then the economy could be easily stuck in what
Hirschman (1958) called a quasi-stable, low-income equilibrium trap at less than full
employment with no automatic forces to move it beyond this point, especially if external
demand is constant or limited, as the demand for Africa’s primary products has generally
been historically.
13
Essentially, when output growth is so low that formal sector employment creation is
insufficient to absorb the increase in labour force, formal sector wages cannot be lowered
beyond a certain point to induce the absorption of surplus labour. Below a certain reservation
wage equivalent to the subsistence income plus a certain premium, labour to the formal sector
would not be forthcoming since such economies rarely have open unemployment in the
classical sense. Non-formal labour is generally underemployed or supported by those in
employment so that there exists an average level of positive income that translates into a
reservation wage at which formal sector employment will be accepted. It is here that the
emergence of the urban informal sector plays a complementary role to that of the subsistence
sector as a waiting station for potential recruits to the formal sector even if autonomous
activities might arise as well in this sector that cater to low wage demand.
Further, if external demand is limited by external income elasticities of demand for primary
products, or by competition from other producers world-wide, then internal demand is not
likely to play the role of a stimulant either. Here Say’s Law applies in that since supply
should create its own demand and a large segment of the labour force is underemployed, this
depresses aggregate demand. In other words, there is a vicious cycle or trap which implies
that aggregate demand for formal sector output aimed at internal consumption is low because
not enough labour is employed to earn the incomes needed to purchase such additional
output. Thus new investment is discouraged internally in non-traditional export activities that
would change the structure of production and thus provide a basis for increased employment.
In the absence of qualitative increases in demand for existing exports or the discovery of new
income elastic exports, the prospects for increased employment, enough to absorb additional
increases to the labour force, are remote. It should be noted that this eventuality is likely to
arise in the absence of government induced distortions and is not likely to be resolved by
market forces alone. This is what is meant by referring to this quasi-stable, low-income
equilibrium trap as a structural phenomenon.
The ability of an economy to get out of the trap depends on the nature of external demand for
exports of the formal sector; on the elasticity of employment with respect to output,
investment and wages in the formal sector; on the growth in internal demand; and on what
happens in the subsistence sector as labour exits to the formal sector. Now, all of the
foregoing can be influenced by government policies to affect, positively or negatively, the
rate of growth of output and employment in the economy. Government policies can either
reinforce the low-income trap, or assist the economy to move toward greater integration and
transformation. African governments, as is now generally conceded, have done much to
reinforce enclavity and the marginal status of the subsistence sector through distortionary
policies. Most such policies relate to those policy distortions that stabilisation and structural
adjustment measures are meant to resolve or reverse and are quite familiar. Among them are
policies that have had the effect of discouraging exports, of encouraging capital intensity, of
ignoring the transformation of the subsistence sector, and of biasing policies in favour of
large scale enterprises at the expense of small scale ones. In addition, any policies of intent or
omission that may have encouraged urban and formal sector bias may also be included.
3.4
Labour market inefficiencies and youth unemployment
The legacy of enclavity is common to all African countries although its manifestations may
differ as a consequence of various country-specific factors such as resource endowment,
relative size, post-independence policies and development strategies pursued, and political
and economic heritage. But in spite of all such differences African economies are caught in a
low-income, low labour absorption trap and manifest similar labour market inefficiencies to
14
one degree or another. These inefficiencies relate, first, to the structure of economy and the
growth path it has assumed, and second, to the nature of the constraints to labour absorption
in each of the major sub-sectors of the economy.
Enclavity has imparted to these economies distorted production structures, which, on the
basis of market behaviour, are likely to yield perverse outcomes. The first aspect concerns the
failure to follow a normal developmental path. For countries of normal size (not so small in
terms of population), the normal growth path begins with a process based on primary
production and on the transformation of traditional agriculture and rural non-farm activities
into activities organised along, and driven by, market imperatives. The development of
mining and other primary forms of production would be part of this process of absorbing
rural labour. This process is generally accompanied by the growth of secondary industry such
as manufacturing and processing which increasingly begins to absorb the greater part of the
labour force, given the low income elasticity of demand for agricultural products and the
higher income elasticity of non-agricultural goods. Thus, as labour is released from primary
production such as traditional agriculture it is absorbed into secondary industry, which
becomes the major employer in the second stage. The final stage is the development of the
tertiary sector, which begins to play an increasingly important role in terms of its contribution
to output and employment.
Generally, the enclave economies not only fail to develop an inclusive primary based
capitalist structure, they also fail to develop into the secondary production phase due to
limited demand unless conscious efforts at import substitution are made, as was the case in
Latin America and in South Africa and Zimbabwe to a large degree. However, as some
growth takes place, there is a tendency for the tertiary sector to expand faster since the
distribution of income tends to favour the formal sector insiders whose demand increasingly
shifts towards services as incomes increase, while many manufactured goods are imported.
Thus a cursory review of the pattern of growth in many African countries shows an unusually
faster rate of growth of tertiary production, even before the other forms of production have
exhausted their output and employment potential. This poses a major problem for the labour
market in that since the majority of the labour force is involved with primary and secondary
production in the non-formal sectors, the precipitate jump to tertiary production, which tends
to be skill and capital intensive, further marginalises them.
The second aspect of the production structure which acts as a barrier concerns the
relationship between the mainly subsistence smallholder sector in the rural areas, the informal
sector in urban areas, and the formal sector which encompasses formal primary, secondary
and tertiary production. This relationship is characterised by labour market inefficiencies in
the distributive, allocative and microeconomic (technical and economic) spheres.
Distributive inefficiencies refer to the unequal distribution of what Sen (1981) has called
asset and exchange (or market income) entitlements among the labour force. Asset
entitlements concern the relative distribution of capital assets that are useful for present and
future production such as land, credit, human capital, social capital (health, amenities, social
security), and physical and economic infrastructure. The existence of the enclave model
implies that asset entitlements are concentrated in the formal sector of the economy, with the
majority of the labour force in the non-formal sectors lacking adequate asset entitlements to
allow them to participate in the market economy fully. The same applies to exchange
entitlements, the primary one of which is wage employment. Exchange entitlements are nonexistent for most of those in the rural economy and in the urban informal sector engaged in
15
survival activities. The unequal distribution of assets reinforces the marginalisation of the
majority and defines an enclave growth path for the economy since the initial distribution of
assets is essentially defined by non-market forces. The market primarily reinforces and
reproduces this initial state. In much of Africa, the degree of inequality with respect to land,
income and financial assets has been increasingly in favour of the formal sector, and a few
within this sector. In addition, access to social and economic capital provided by the state has
been diminishing for the majority.
It goes without saying that youth are particularly disadvantaged with respect to asset and
exchange entitlements. This is so by virtue of the fact that (a) they have not had the time to
accumulate such entitlements; (b) social and cultural norms are such that asset and exchange
entitlements are formally transferred to youth as they grow older; and (c) youth are generally
expected to be engaged in acquiring the social and economic skills to enhance their future
participation in society and in the economy, hence they are not normally expected to have
such entitlements. Thus the need to impart asset and exchange entitlements, other than social
and human capital, to youth entails a trade-off between enhancing the economic versus the
social needs of youth. It is important that an appropriate balance is struck by ensuring that
economic and exchange entitlements are provided to youth in a manner that ensures that the
long term social and human capital needs of youth are not compromised.
Allocative inefficiency concerns the fact that labour is misallocated across the economy. The
formal sector tends to be relatively capital intensive given the surplus labour available, while
rural areas and the informal sector tend to be saturated with labour, hence the
underemployment. In addition, because of the limited ability to generate adequate
employment opportunities through the market, the public sector tends to be overextended.
The resulting allocative inefficiency in the labour market suggests that the formal sector
could be made to be more labour intensive, that public sector employment could be reduced,
and that both the informal and the subsistence sectors could stand to have fewer economic
participants. More generally, at the aggregate level, the economy needs to shift labour from
the non-formal sectors to the formal sector through the expansion of new activities based on
both external and internal demand.
The foregoing suggests that in order to resolve the problem of youth as a residual category it
is necessary to expand the overall labour absorptive capacities of the African economies. This
could be done by enhancing productivity in the formal, informal and rural sectors through the
transformation of these sectors and the way in which they interact within the domestic
economy and with the global economy. Such a transformation, by resulting in increased
employment and incomes and an increase in private and public resources, allows the society
to withdraw youth at the lower end of the age spectrum for purposes of their socialisation,
education and training, while at the same time providing for increased opportunities for the
employment of youth at the upper end of the spectrum.
The allocative inefficiency is also reflected in the manner is which wages are unable to
reallocate labour as required above given discontinuities and rigidities in the operation of the
labour market. An illustration of this aspect is the fact that there are relatively high wages in
capital intensive industries and in the public service, in spite of the fact that the existence of
surplus labour would demand lower wages and higher employment. Another illustration
relates to the fact that wage determination in the economy is unable to resolve the duality
implied by the coexistence of the formal and subsistence sectors at markedly different income
levels for members of the labour force with similar endowments.
16
The structure of wages and unemployment can lead to some perverse effects on youth
perspectives in the labour market. First, high unemployment rates, especially if they extend to
those with education, may discourage youth from investing in education and training as the
investment appears wasted. Second, the association of increasing age with increasing
probability of employment may result in a passive approach to job search. And third, youth
who are fortunate to have relatives in wage employment may develop a dependency that
makes them have a high reservation wage for entry into formal employment. All these
situations would lead to a lengthening of the unemployment spell or withdrawal from the
labour force in the form of the discouraged worker phenomenon.
The last type of inefficiencies relates to the fact that each of the three sectors (formal,
informal and subsistence) is characterised by constraints and inefficiencies in the utilisation
of labour (technical inefficiency) and in the static, dynamic and competitive economic
viability (economic inefficiency) of the enterprises which use such labour. The technical
inefficiencies in the formal sector are reflected in the inappropriate factor combinations
utilised and in the presence of overemployment in the public sector. In addition, many
industrial enterprises have had a tendency toward excess capacity and labour redundancy,
mostly as a result of previous policy distortions. Most such technical inefficiencies are
currently being rectified by economic reform measures. The economic inefficiency is
reflected in the relative uncompetitiveness of many formal sector enterprises and particularly
the non-viability of public enterprises, which account for a significant share of employment
in the formal sector. These inefficiencies would suggest the need for labour shedding in the
wake of structural adjustment measures. In some countries where the degree of collective
bargaining has advanced appreciably, there have been short to medium term gains by
workers, which, however, have often been dissipated by inflation in the long run. The
outcome, nevertheless, has been sub-optimal in that some enterprises have resorted to
relatively capital intensive methods to avoid the ‘harassment effect’ of managing large
amounts of labour.
In the face of a slow growth of employment in the formal sector and the retrenchment of
labour in the course of implementing structural adjustment, the non-formal sectors have not
only acted as residual sectors, but as labour absorbers of last resort. Increasingly, as
recessionary trends have taken their toll, African households have been compelled to
diversify their income sources by deploying their members into various activities in the
formal, informal (rural and urban) and subsistence sectors. Generally, formal sector
employment has been the prized option but as employment opportunities and incomes in the
formal sector have declined, the non-formal sectors have been the last resort, even for some
with jobs in the formal sector as a way of supplementing their incomes. Currently labour is
being released from both the formal and subsistence sectors into the informal sector.
In Africa, as in other less developed regions of the world, many hopes and expectations have
been placed on the urban informal sector given the limited labour absorptive potential of the
formal sector. Nevertheless, both from the point of view of policy and survival or economic
viability the informal sector has proved quite elusive. The sector has been seen from
developmentalist, welfarist and romanticist perspectives but any focus on its promotion
individually as a sector has yielded very indeterminate results, even if examples of success in
individual activities have been cited.
17
The informal sector in Africa consists of various types of activities: (a) those that subsidise
the formal sector by providing wage goods, housing and amenities, intermediate inputs and
so on, thereby lowering formal sector wages; (b) some that autonomously compete with
formal sector activities; (c) some that complement formal sector activities in a chain of
backward and forward linkages; (d) others that have locality advantages vis-à-vis the formal
sector by focusing on particular neighbourhoods not adequately served by the formal sector;
and (e) still others that play a welfare role for those queuing for formal sector jobs or
retrenched from it. In general, even if there may be a small core of activities with a
comparative advantage vis-à-vis the formal sector, many informal sector activities tend to be
saturated by participants and new entrants due to the ease of entry.
Given the ease of entry, the viability of the informal sector and its establishments very much
depends on the cyclical and secular trends and levels of income in the formal sector, on the
economic viability of the subsistence sector, on the rates of migration from rural to urban
areas, and on the rates of population growth. Generally, this sector has been expanding in
Africa and in countries torn by civil strife, where the formal sector has more or less ceased to
function efficiently, there has been a tendency toward the informalisation of the whole
economy. The sector has tended to grow through lateral expansion and involutionary growth,
with an increasing number of people sharing a given total income. The sector has failed to act
as an alternative engine of growth, or to define a different path to development, since it is
encumbered by various constraints and burdens which are now well known. Its dynamic
growth as an efficient absorber of surplus labour is in particular limited in part by the slow
growth of the formal sector which limits the demand for informal sector goods and services,
and in part by the non-viability of the rural economy. Thus the informal sector is caught in an
allocative efficiency trap, as well as a microeconomic inefficiency trap, hence its tendency
toward involutionary growth.
An interesting but vicious aspect of these traps is that participants and households have had to
resort to self-exploitation by overly exerting themselves, utilising unpaid family labour, and
in particular child labour, and deploying children as individual participants. These processes
internalise the negative costs of restructuring in the formal sector and unnecessarily burden
and depreciate human and social capital. Mention may also be made of the generally poor
working conditions for the majority of non-formal sector workers, especially the absence of
adequate health and safety standards. The non-formal sector then has acted as shock absorber
of the economic system in times of crisis and recession without being able to provide a viable
basis for sustainable growth or viable livelihoods.
The subsistence or smallholder sector in rural areas remains a residual and marginal sector.
Outside of South Africa where it has been forcibly diminished in size, the majority of the
African population continues to live and work in this sector in spite of a century of exposure
to capitalist development. So far, African countries have failed to transform this sector to
enhance its productivity and contribution to gross domestic product in a dynamic manner. Its
lack of integration with the formal sector has hampered improvements in overall allocative
efficiency in the economy. Indeed, the ultimate barometer of development in African
countries should be the degree to which per capita incomes in this sector can be seen to
increase over time. Unfortunately this has yet to transpire.
18
4.
POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
The previous section examined the effects of the overall structural constraints and policy
environment on youth unemployment. In response to the large and often growing problem of
youth unemployment, governments as well as private organisations have initiated a variety of
policies, programmes, projects and schemes that aim to provide direct support to the youth by
generating more and better jobs, and by improving their skills to better meet the needs of the
labour market. This section starts with an examination of policy frameworks and institutional
structures that have been put in place to develop and implement such initiatives. The section
continues with a discussion of whether labour market policies or outcomes primarily directed
at the formal sector act as a constraint to employment promotion in general and to youth
employment more specifically. Specific interventions and programmes will be examined in
Section 5.
4.1
Policies and institutions
In general, few African countries have an explicit employment policy context within which to
situate their youth programme interventions. The structural adjustment and stabilisation
policy packages have often been considered as sufficient as a policy context. In this respect,
the standard policy package has consisted of measures to promote prudent macroeconomic
management, measures to unleash the role and functioning of the private sector and markets
in the various sectors of the economy, and the reform of the public sector. More recently the
need to preserve and enhance human capital has also been given emphasis. This policy
package primarily relegates a passive role to the state, apart from providing an enabling
environment for the domestic and external private sectors to play their role by exploiting this
economic environment. Employment generation is then seen as a derivative of the overall
economic resuscitation that is expected to take place as the economy restructures.
While this enabling environment is indeed desirable and necessary, African governments
have more or less refrained from embarking on active strategic planning and active measures
aimed at facilitating the restructuring and economic transformation. The lack of explicit,
comprehensive employment strategies, in turn, has meant that various institutions concerned
with labour market issues had no proper policy guidance, and very often operated in ad hoc
and uncoordinated manner. In the absence of a clear division of labour between institutions,
wasteful practices such as duplication and competition can easily creep in. Furthermore, the
capacity to design, implement and monitor active policies and measures has been neglected
and accorded relatively low priority, including budgetary priority. This is reflected in the
dreadful state of labour market information systems in much of Africa, thus further
hampering an effective proactive strategy to address labour market issues (ILO/SAMAT
1998 and 1999).
South Africa is an exceptional case in this regard, as this country embarked on an exercise to
formulate an Employment Strategy Framework at the same time that it was adopting
macroeconomic reform measures along the lines of the Bretton Woods institutions. The
South African government contended that proactive measures by the state, in co-operation
with social partners, were needed to complement structural adjustment and stabilisation.
Through a process of consultation and negotiation the country arrived at a set of employment
friendly policies and programmes that were cemented at a Presidential Jobs Summit in
October 1998. Programmes and projects specifically aimed at youth were located within
these broader interventions.
19
The Jobs Summit Declaration contains various measures to promote labour intensive forms of
production and to accelerate the absorption of the unemployed in general and youth in
particular through public works and special employment programmes encompassing all the
sectors of the economy. The tourism sector in particular was identified as an employment
generator that was compatible with South Africa’s emerging comparative advantage. Not
only has government allocated increased funding for existing programmes focussing on
employment creation in general and on youth employment in particular, but it has also
created special funds for employment generation and poverty reduction. At the same time, the
social partners have created a Business Trust Fund and Labour Trust Fund to contribute to the
financing of employment projects. While it is too early to assess the actual impact of this
proactive approach to policy, it is clear that it provides a possible way to complement current
economic reforms. Details of some specific programmes are discussed in Section 5.
South Africa has also established a relatively effective institutional structure to address labour
market issues in a co-ordinated manner. The Chief Directorate on Labour Market Policy in
the Department of Labour was created to facilitate the development, co-ordination and
monitoring of labour market policy. In addition, it facilitates the harmonisation of labour
market policies with overall government policies, including macroeconomic, trade and
industrial policies. The Directorate also has the responsibility of developing a system for the
consolidation, analysis and dissemination of labour market information and statistics. To
reflect these functions, the Chief Directorate of Labour Market Policy comprises of the
Directorate of Research, Planning and Policy, and the Directorate of Labour Market Statistics
and Information. The Directorate had been charged with developing an Employment
Strategy, which formed the basis of the Presidential Jobs Summit of 1998.
The experience in Nigeria provides a contrast. In the late 1980s, the National Directorate of
Employment (NDE) was established in the Ministry of Labour and Productivity to: (i) design
and implement programmes to combat mass unemployment; (ii) articulate policies aimed at
developing work programmes with labour intensive potential; and (iii) obtain and maintain a
data bank on employment and vacancies in the country with a view to acting as a clearing
house to link job seekers with vacancies in collaboration with other government agencies.
The NDE currently operates four main programmes: vocational skills development
programme, small-scale enterprise promotion programme, rural employment promotion
programme, and special public works programme.
Although a Board of Directors comprising the social partners was meant to direct the
activities of the NDE, the Board has not been functioning. Apart from the NDE, several other
institutions are involved in various types of activities to help generate (self-) employment in
the country. Notable among these are the Ministry of National Planning and its parastatals
such as the National Manpower Board and the Federal Office of Statistics, the Industrial
Training Fund under the Ministry of Education, the federal government departments, and
funding organisations such as the People’s Bank. The National Manpower Board is
responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of manpower development and utilisation
policies.
In practice these institutions have operated in an isolated, non-integrated manner. As an ILOstudy found, '… there are a large number of institutions often working in competition with
each other, and without the needed complementarity and co-ordination in their activities to
obtain better results for the nation'. The study also found that initiatives are fragmented, with
many institutions which are very differently managed. The absence of a comprehensive
20
employment policy has deprived the various institutions involved of policy guidance and the
lack of a clear division of labour among them has led to wasteful duplication and
competition. Furthermore, as the NDE itself admits, 'Until recently, the implementation of
NDE programmes [was] based on political considerations rather than specific needs of the
people in a geographical area'. There is, however, hope that with democratisation following
the transition from a military to a civilian government, more space will be created for
stakeholder participation in the governance and implementation of such initiatives. A draft
employment policy document has been prepared and is under discussion.
The institutional setting in Zimbabwe closely resembles that of Nigeria. Several ministries
have some employment or labour function. These include the Ministry of National Affairs,
Employment Creation and Co-operatives; Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social
Welfare; Ministry of Industry and Commerce (which is concerned with the development of
small and medium scale enterprises) and Ministry of Higher Education (which is responsible
for technical vocational education and training). Although labour issues largely fall under the
mandate of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, overall responsibility
for employment creation in government lies with the Ministry of National Affairs,
Employment Creation and Co-operatives (MNAECC).
To achieve its objectives, the MNAECC created an intersectoral National Consultative
Committee on Employment Creation comprising of a broad range of stakeholders, including
employers’ and workers’ organisations, universities, financial institutions, local authorities
and NGOs. The Committee was meant to meet every quarter to discuss issues related to
employment creation but it has in fact never met. The MNAECC also developed an
employment creation action plan, which was approved by the Cabinet in August 1995. The
plan focuses on education and training, rural development, promotion of the informal sector,
and facilitating access to capital and finance. The MNAECC also created the Youth Services
and Youth Training Section to (a) mobilise, initiate and plan youth programmes and
activities; (b) promote, co-ordinate and mobilise resources for youth development; and (c)
develop, implement and monitor policies concerning the youth. In order to co-ordinate and
supervise the achievement of these objectives, the Zimbabwe Youth Council was created
through an Act of Parliament (1997). The Council is made up of 15 members: a chairperson,
seven members appointed by the Minister, and seven others elected by registered national
associations.
Notwithstanding the recent establishment of such structures, the problems have essentially
remained the same. These include the fragmented and non-integrated approaches that are
competing with each other, as well as the lack of a co-ordinated approach, resulting in
duplication, and inadequate resources.
4.2
Employment and labour policies in the formal sector
A priori, policies that raise minimum wages, encourage collective bargaining, protect formal
sector workers (through, for instance, restraints on dismissals) and restrict labour market
flexibility may be seen to constrain overall employment and youth employment in particular.
A review of minimum wages in manufacturing, for instance, shows that while governments
in Africa have tended to promulgate minimum wages more or less as a political imperative,
they have been slow in ensuring that nominal minimum wages keep up with inflation. Thus,
as reported by the ILO (1997), the real value of minimum wages in Africa has either stayed
the same or declined between 1985 and 1995. Only Mauritius experienced an increase of
about 31 per cent in real minimum wages over this period, due to the increasing tightness in
21
its labour market as result of a fast and sustained pace of growth. And only South Africa and
Zimbabwe have more or less maintained the real value of minimum wages over this period,
while in many countries the declines have been quite drastic. Thus, to the extent that
minimum wages may act as a constraint on employment promotion, this may not be a
generalised phenomenon in Africa, and may actually be restricted to Mauritius, South Africa
and Zimbabwe. In the latter two countries, given the high rates of open youth unemployment,
the level of minimum wages may be an important consideration for employment promotion
purposes.
The degree of unionisation is usually an indicator of the degree to which labour markets may
be seen to be restrictive. Currently only Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and
South Africa have union density rates above 20 per cent (ILO 1997); Cape Verde, Nigeria
and Tanzania have rates between 15 per cent and 20 per cent; and Zambia and Zimbabwe are
among the countries that have rates between 10 per cent and 15 per cent, while Uganda has
less than 10 per cent. Thus, for countries under discussion, only Egypt and South Africa may
possibly have labour market outcomes that may protect existing workers in organised
enterprises. In South Africa this may have been reinforced by labour policies that have had a
pro-organised labour bias as a deliberate policy stance of government.
Within the formal sector the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements can also be seen as an indicator of the degree of labour market rigidity. Only
Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa have high coverage rates of more than 40 per cent, while
for Zambia the coverage rate is between 30 per cent and 35 per cent, and for Zimbabwe and
Uganda about 25 per cent. Essentially the combination of union density rates and collective
bargaining coverage rates appears to suggest that in much of Africa labour markets are not
unduly biased in favour of organised labour. Among the countries under discussion South
Africa may be an exception in which the combination of union strength and pro-union labour
market policies may combine with other constraints to unduly restrict job creation.
Now while the recent international trend in collective bargaining is toward decentralised
bargaining at company or enterprise levels, African countries show a mixed trend with some,
like South Africa and Zimbabwe, moving toward centralised collective bargaining, while
others tend to move toward decentralised forms of bargaining. The latter forms are often seen
to be more accommodative of employment creation and overall responsiveness of enterprises
to changing economic circumstances.
The above discussion needs to be qualified, however, in that the issue of the role and impact
of the architecture of the labour market regulation and organisation with respect to economic
efficiency and job creation may not be as straightforward as indicated above. First, in many
African countries there are efficiency gains to be made resulting from an improved regulatory
environment, especially when the absence of regulation and organisation may undermine the
quality of labour through undue exploitation. Second, regulation and worker organisation
have tended to stabilise industrial relations thereby raising efficiency at the level of the
enterprise as well as of the economy as a whole. Third, some degree of worker protection
promotes investment in human capital and efficient jobs search. And finally, minimum wages
may contribute to a redistribution of income that may redefine the growth path by expanding
demand at the lower end of the income spectrum and thus encourage efficient import
substitution in commodities with low import elasticities. Thus, some types of labour market
regulation and organisation may be beneficial to economic growth and employment creation,
while others may be detrimental. The issue is one of arriving at a labour market policy regime
22
that combines worker protection and worker rights with active labour market polices in a way
that enhances overall economic efficiency and job creation.
5.
INTERVENTIONS AND PROGRAMMES
This section is concerned with some of the various interventions and programmes that have
been initiated in the selected countries to support the youth (and in many cases, other
vulnerable categories as well) with the aim of improving their prospects in the labour market.
Although similarities exist among the programmes and projects addressing (youth)
unemployment, the institutional arrangements vary across countries in line with the overall
institutional framework for employment creation as discussed before. Furthermore, variations
exist even within individual countries, with some initiatives wholly government-driven, while
others are driven by the private sector, with the NGOs, employers' or workers' organisations
playing a leading role. Yet others have institutional arrangements drawing from both the
public and private sectors (dual arrangements). Some are large, nation-wide programmes,
while others are much smaller and community based. Within those based in the public sector,
they fall under a number of ministries or in different departments within the same ministry. In
most instances, these programmes have undergone revisions and transformations, based on
lessons from experience concerning what works and what does not. The objective of the
examination that follows is to tease out, to the extent possible, ‘best practice’ arrangements
based on actual performance.
At a general level, a distinction can be made among the following four types of interventions
and programmes:




Reforms of the educational and training system;
Programmes for the provision of training, capital-based assistance and other services
for employment creation through self-employment and enterprise development;
Active labour market policies, including placement and subsidised employment
schemes; and
Direct employment creation programmes.
This categorisation is made for analytical purposes, as in practice programmes may not be
mutually exclusive. Reforms of the educational and training system generally aim to increase the
relevance of education and training system, making it more 'demand-driven' and better geared
towards the demands of the labour market. Such reforms may at the same time entail an
expansion of business support services that are linked to the provision of education and training
for new or existing entrepreneurs. Indeed, the current trend is to integrate formal training with
entrepreneurship development and enterprise promotion, thus making a clear distinction
between programmes difficult. By the same token, direct employment creation programmes
through public infrastructure works often have a training component that aims to improve labour
market prospects for participants after the programme has been completed. Furthermore,
programmes are often targeted in practice and address themselves to different groups
(sometimes exclusively to youth) according to different selection criteria. It is consequently
important to assess the effectiveness of various types of schemes with potentially significant
impact on youth employment.
23
5.1
Reforms of the educational and training systems
It was noted in Section 3 that the development of youth as human capital has been
compromised in recent years by the cuts in education and other expenditures occasioned by
economic reforms, and by levying cost recovery measures for social services. These measures
are particularly harmful at the lower levels of the educational pyramid, to the extent that they
result in high dropout rates and increasing levels of illiteracy. But even if the youth reach
higher levels of the pyramid, reflecting an advanced level of educational achievement, their
prospects may be far less glamorous than expected. They may well find that their knowledge
and skills are not appreciated in the labour market, as the relevance of much of their
education and training is widely perceived as limited. One major shortcoming of training
strategies in many developing countries has been their exclusive concentration on the needs
of the formal sector, and many African countries are reforming their training systems
accordingly (ILO 1998, ILO/SAMAT 1997). Reform programmes range from fairly specific
interventions with relatively limited scope, to an overhaul of the educational and training
system in terms of institutional structure, organisation and content of the courses. Examples
of such reform programmes in Zambia and Egypt are discussed below. [A further example
from Nigeria is briefly described in Box 2.]
Box 2: National Open Apprenticeship Scheme in Nigeria
Another example of an attempt at linking education and training and the workplace is the National Open
Apprenticeship Scheme in Nigeria (NOAS). NOAS is under the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) in
the Ministry of Labour and Productivity. Under this scheme, vocational education and training is provided to
unemployed youth in over 100 occupations. The programme utilises production facilities such as workshops and
technical instructors of private industries, government institutions and, by way of a sub-contracting
arrangement, way-side craftsmen and tradesmen (informal sector operators). Unemployed youth and schoolleavers are given an opportunity to train for a period of 6 months to 3 years under reputable Master Craftsmen.
To enhance trainees’ theoretical understanding of the trade in which they are involved, theory classes are
organised every Saturday to complement the practical training received. Since its inception in 1987, nearly
600,000 unemployed youth have received training in 80 different trades under the scheme. Around 400,000 of
these started their own micro-enterprises, while an additional 32,000 unemployed youth are currently
undergoing training.
An offshoot of NOAS is the School-On-Wheels (SOW) programme, which is essentially a mobile training
scheme designed to provide vocational training to school-leavers and other unskilled persons in rural areas. The
programme is of a three-month duration, after which the graduates are absorbed into NOAS. Over 21,000 youth
have benefited from the programme since its launch in 1990. Another related scheme is the Waste-To-Wealth
(WTW) Scheme under which youth are trained in the techniques of converting waste material into useful objects
such as snail shells, bamboos and horns into decorative, valuable household goods. At least 8,000 people have
been trained under this scheme since its inception in 1990.
In order to prevent NOAS graduates from falling back into unemployment, NDE launched a resettlement
programme in 1991. Under the project, NOAS graduates are provided with equipment to start their own
businesses. Close to 6,000 graduates of NOAS benefited from this scheme.
Technical education and training in Zambia is provided through public institutions, private
commercial organisations and NGOs, which add up to hundreds of institutions. Out of some
80 public institutions, more than 20 are run by the Department of Technical Education and
Vocational Training (DTEV) of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational
Training (MSTVT), while others fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Sport, Youth
24
and Child Development, and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services.1
DTEV institutions offer programmes in engineering fields, paramedical, commercial,
business and teacher training, ranging from the level of technologists and technicians to craft
level. Enrolment in these institutions is around 4,000 students, mostly males, who are
selected annually from 15-20,000 applicants. DTEV is the major institutional provider of
training in Zambia, while the Department also has regulatory and other functions in respect of
private provision of training, much of which is focused on commercial and business training.
Many of the public institutions are in a deplorable state. Infrastructure has broken down,
equipment and training materials are short in supply, outdated or totally inadequate, and
student services are poor. The institutions have been unable to retain the staff required for an
efficient and effective delivery of the training programmes. Furthermore, few of these
programmes have been reviewed or updated regularly, and they continue to cater for jobs in
the formal sector that are no longer there. Faced by a number of logistical, financial and other
constraints, the leading part of the educational and training system has thus not been able to
respond to the changing labour market conditions and the broader economic environment in
which it is operating.
Soon after the start of the economic reform programme in the early 1990s a review of
education and training policies was initiated (see MSTVT 1996 and Box 3). This review
resulted in the Strategy Paper on the new Technical Education, Vocational and
Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) Policy (MSTVT 1997), which is currently being
implemented. The TEVET Policy aims to facilitate the transition of the education and
training system from a supply-led system providing skills that are increasingly irrelevant, to a
demand-led and flexible approach to education and training. The current strategy in Zambia
has been designed around major institutional and organisational changes. At the central level,
a TEVET Authority will be established to regulate, monitor and co-ordinate education and
training. According to the new TEVET Act, the Authority will consist of more than 20
members drawn from government, employers’ organisations, workers’ organisations and
NGOs, including the Permanent Secretary of MSYCD and a representative of the Small
Enterprise Development Board. The TEVET Authority is not yet in place, although
submissions to Cabinet have been made. At the level of training institutions, Management
Boards will be established to monitor training needs in the formal and informal sectors and
design appropriate responses. The Management Boards are planned to have a large degree of
autonomy in the provision of training and response to local training needs.
The key elements in the new system are a reduced role of government, decentralisation, and
an increased emphasis on flexibility in training provision and on training for selfemployment. The TEVET Authority is supposed to co-ordinate and support the training
system, as opposed to controlling it, through three Departments (Support Services, Standards
and Finance). A special unit within the Support Services Department will be established to
promote Entrepreneurship and Informal Sector Development (EISDU). EISDU will
collaborate with Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDCs) at the level of existing
institutions. EDCs will have a co-ordinating and facilitating function as regards training for
the informal sector, in particular with respect to other providers of services to the sector.
EISDU and EDCs are key components aimed at ‘integrating’ the informal sector in the new
TEVET system.
1
The fourth Ministry dealing with education and training in Zambia, the Ministry of Education, is mostly
involved in primary and secondary education.
25
Box 3: Reforming the training system in Zambia
In 1968, Zambia established the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training (TEVT) to
revamp the educational system. A plan for TEVT was conceived that essentially addressed the needs of a formal
sector that was supposed to take the lead in economic growth. In the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that the
education and training system catered for a shrinking formal labour market that provided very few job
opportunities for new entrants to the labour market. In 1994, a widely representative national task force was
appointed to review TEVT policies. The task force submitted its recommendations early in 1995, and in March
1996 an outline of the new Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) Policy
was published. This Policy and the arrangements for implementation were detailed in the Strategy Paper for
TEVET in Zambia (March 1997).
The TEVET Policy stipulates two sets of interrelated objectives, economic and social:
-
The economic objectives are to improve productivity in both the formal and informal sectors;
promotion of intrapreneurship, entrepreneurship and economic participation; development of a
Zambian society with people that will be versatile, creative and employable, entrepreneurial and
productive; provision of qualitative training for imparting appropriate vocational skills; promotion of a
rational use of local resources; and to promote the empowerment of women.
-
The social objectives are to provide skills and opportunities that will respond to Zambia's needs such as
poverty alleviation, improved housing and improved health care; to instil a culture of preventive
maintenance and to stimulate the development of quality assurance; to provide access to training
opportunities to all the people in the community; to inculcate a culture of entrepreneurship and promote
self-reliance; and to ensure greater participation of women in the development process.
The key elements of the strategy to achieve these objectives are decentralisation, a reduced role of government,
and an increased emphasis on flexibility in training provision and on training for self-employment. The strategy
is focused on a major overhaul of the institutional structure and organisation of training in Zambia. The
legislation to effect the new institutional structure was put in place in 1998 (the Technical Education, Vocational
and Entrepreneurship Training Act, No. 13 of 1998). According to the Act, the functions of the TEVET
Authority are to regulate, monitor and co-ordinate technical education, vocational and entrepreneurship training
in consultation with industry, employers, workers and other stakeholders. The Authority will consist of more
than 20 members, which are appointed by the Minister of Science, Technology and Vocational Training. At the
level of existing training institutions, Management Boards are to be established that monitor and record local
training needs in the formal and informal sectors and design appropriate responses.
The TEVET Authority will consist of three departments:
DTSS
DTS
DFA
Directorate of Training Support Services (Examinations; Inspection, Registration and Accreditation;
Curriculum Development and Advisory Services)
Directorate of Training Standards (EISD, ILSS, Institutional Management and Human Resources
Planning)
Directorate of Finance (processing of funding applications by training institution, keeping the accounts
of the Authority, etc.)
Each Department is subdivided into several units. Within DTSS, a Unit will be established dealing with
Entrepreneurship and Informal Sector Development, EISDU. EISDU will work closely with the units
responsible for labour market monitoring and curriculum advice, as well as with training and service providers.
Labour Market Monitoring and Analysis is part of the unit for Industrial Liaison and Student Services (ILSS).
LMMA will undertake or commission special labour market surveys in the formal and informal sectors. ILSS
will also monitor local labour market trends and assess labour market needs in collaboration with local industry.
Links will be established between the EISDU at the central level and Entrepreneurship Development Centres
(EDCs) at the level of individual institutions. EDCs can be viewed as the ‘operational end’ of the TEVET
system as regards entrepreneurship development. They will facilitate development of entrepreneurship both
through the TEVET institutions and through linkages with existing microenterprise support institutions. EDCs
26
will develop training materials, collect information on microenterprise support institutions, develop guidelines,
etc.
The implementation of the TEVET Policy has proved to be slow and difficult. The Transition Team that has
been appointed to manage the reform process, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MSTVT, has to draw on
the resources from the Ministry, including the necessary staff. This creates confusion and frictions concerning
tasks and responsibilities. Much of the other requirements for the new TEVET Policy, including staff
development and infrastructure, have also not been met due to insufficient resources. Funding for certain
components of the new policy has however been secured through a number of donors, including the Danish and
Dutch governments.
The implementation of the TEVET Policy has proved to be difficult. The Transition Team
that has been appointed to manage the reform process, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of
MSTVT, has to draw on the resources from the Ministry including the necessary staff. This
creates confusion and frictions concerning tasks and responsibilities. Much of the other
requirements for the new TEVET Policy, including staff development and infrastructure,
have also not been met due to insufficient resources. Funding for certain components of the
new policy has however been secured through a number of donors.2
A number of options to fund the new system are examined in the Strategy Paper. Besides
minimisation of boarding facilities and rationalisation of administration staff and costs, the
document envisages a shift of the responsibility for training costs towards the beneficiaries of
training. These include not only the trainees, but also industry and the informal sector.
Furthermore, special schemes for scholarships and student loans to guarantee access to
training for low-income groups are under consideration. One way to charge industry directly
for training provision would be the introduction of a payroll training levy in Zambia.
However, employers have not yet taken a position on that issue.3
The fundamental flaw in Egypt's training system is the lack of affinity training centres
normally have with the labour market, and the absence of contacts with potential employers.
As a consequence, transition from school or training to work is often difficult. Since the
1950s, a number of experiments have been carried out in Egypt to redress this situation,
mostly in the form of technical co-operation projects. These involved for instance the
establishment of training centres that are closely linked to private or public enterprises.
Though useful at the micro-level, these projects did not have much impact on the country at
large.
A visit by President Mubarak to Chancellor Kohl in 1991 set the stage for an ambitious longterm programme that is meant to reform the secondary technical education system in Egypt.
The programme, Introduction of a Co-operative (Dual) System in Technical Education and
Vocational Training, is generally known as the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative. The basic
philosophy of this programme is that involvement of employers in the training of youngsters
will ensure that the training — and the concomitant practice in the form of internships –
reflects the real needs of the labour market.
2
The Dutch and the Danish governments contributed funds for the development of the new TEVET Policy and
Strategy Paper. The establishment of EISDU and EDCs is currently supported by a Project funded by the Dutch
government, while CIDA, FINNIDA, and DfID have been or are involved in the development of infrastructure
or training programmes.
3
Further details on the reform of the training system in Zambia may be found in Box 3.
27
The programme would start with pilot projects, to demonstrate the opportunities and
challenges of the dual system of training and practice. It would also help the governmental
Project Policy Implementation Unit, an autonomous unit under the direct supervision of the
Minister of Education, to modify the system to fit the local situation. The main task of the
Unit is to create a pedagogical, organisational, legal, and financial framework for the dual
training system. Further, the expected success of these pilot projects could stimulate the
private sector to co-operate with the Ministry of Education, inducing it to incorporate this
dual approach in training centres countrywide.
Eventually, all types of training would be organised along the lines of the dual system. After
completing preparatory school, all Egyptian children would have the opportunity to enrol in
such technical secondary education and graduate three years later. If possible, they would
find employment in the enterprises where they did their internships, but even if these
enterprises could not absorb them, the graduates would still be able to count on their acquired
skills to find employment elsewhere. Under the supervision of the Minister of Education, the
private sector and its public counterpart (different ministries, depending on the type of
training involved) would, together, manage and fund the training centres. Four years after the
Mubarak-Kohl meeting, the first pilot projects were set up in three of Egypt’s new cities (the
10th of Ramadan City, the 6th of October City, and Sadat City). Although these pilot projects
are costly, this system of dual training would be affordable in the long run, thanks to the
contributions the private sector is expected to be willing to make.
The potential benefits of the initiative are obvious: generation of youth employment,
alleviation of shortages in certain skills, enhanced development and use of human resources
and subsequent increases in production. However, there seem to be a number of practical and
conceptual problems related to the introduction of this dual system. One practical problem
proved to be the lack of transparency in the division of responsibilities among the different
actors. The fact that four years passed by between the conception of the idea and the take-off
of the first pilot project is telling.
The ultimate aim of the programme is to institutionalise the dual system of training and
practice, and the concept of joint public-private management and cost sharing in all technical
education countrywide. The pilot projects that were established to demonstrate in practice the
opportunities and challenges of the dual system would provide knowledge on the local
adaptability of the system and encourage the private sector to participate (i.e. internships,
funding and management). These pilot projects appear to be quite successful. However, they
would seem difficult to replicate countrywide. Their location – the new cities – were not
randomly chosen, as many modern medium and large size private enterprises operate in these
new cities. These enterprises have a very clear interest in the project: they are facing
significant problems in recruiting duly qualified workers. Indeed, a research project among
1,700 enterprises showed that nearly half the medium- and large-scale enterprises are already
involved in training activities, although at present mostly in the form of in-house training
rather than through governmental training centres (Evans-Klock and Lim 1998). The
enterprises that were aware of the Mubarak-Kohl initiative were predominantly of medium
and large size and were often interested in participating in the programme.
In most rural areas, where the majority of the unemployed youth live, there are very few of
such modern enterprises. Small-scale enterprises may well be interested in participation (60
per cent of the small-scale enterprises that were aware of the initiative expressed an interest
in the dual training system), but need to be sensitised. In addition, in order to be viable, the
28
training programmes in the technologically less advanced parts of the country should also
focus on simpler techniques, more basic equipment, less costly and lengthy training, and
should be linked to the informal small-scale enterprises. It should also be borne in mind that
the financial contribution of these enterprises is likely to be minimal. The Project Policy
Implementation Unit needs to considerably adapt the approach to the reality of the poorer
parts of Egypt if a successful nation-wide generalisation of this dual system is desired. It
would be less difficult to generalise the pilot projects to the entire modernised section of the
economy. In itself, this would be valuable progress in terms of human resource development
mechanisms. Although it should be recognised that, for the time being, the absorptive
capacity of this section of the Egyptian economy is limited (Fergany 1997).
Another fundamental challenge is the possible substitution effect. Internships are meant as
learning opportunities, and interns should supplement established employees rather than
replace them. If all training centres operate according to the principles of the dual system,
many thousands of trainees will ‘practice’ in the factories for four days a week, possibly
endangering the position of regular staff.
5.2
Programmes for the provision of training and other services for enterprise
development
Perhaps the most familiar initiatives that have been undertaken in virtually all countries in
Africa are those concerning the promotion of micro-, small- and medium-scale enterprises
(MSMEs), including informal sector development. These initiatives range from small projects
with limited budgets implemented by local NGOs, to comprehensive national programmes
implemented by a range of public and private institutions, often supported by large
international organisations and donors. Several examples of such initiatives will be discussed
in some detail below. First, the INSTARN project in Zimbabwe is an example of a project in
which, in line with the international trend observed earlier, formal training and informal
enterprise development are successfully combined. Subsequently, more comprehensive
approaches to enterprise development in South Africa and Uganda are discussed that each
render clear lessons for interventions elsewhere. Finally, the Youth Action Programme in
Zambia will be examined. The Action Programme and its implementation serve to illustrate
the inherently conflictive nature of many programmes concerned with youth in Africa.
While almost every country in Africa has committed itself to the promotion of MSMEs, it is
not always clear to what extent these programmes cater to the needs of unemployed youth. In
some countries there is a concerted effort to ensure that specific quotas for the promotion of
youth employment are explicitly included in the programmes. Major considerations with
respect to such programmes relate to the following. First, given the high demand for smallscale entrepreneurship, selection criteria for the beneficiaries have to be carefully designed to
ensure success, to avoid corruption and political bickering. Second, the programmes need to
be executed within a holistic policy framework that ensures that all the value chains and
channels related to a particular activity can be developed pari passu with the promotion of the
individual activities. Since economic transformation is on the agenda of most African
economies, the value chains should be able to facilitate economic restructuring and
international competitiveness or penetration on export markets. Finally, the foregoing
analysis suggests that the promotion of youth employment through enterprise development
should be undertaken not as an isolated activity, but as part and parcel of overall economic
restructuring and employment promotion to transform the relationship between formal and
non-formal sectors, rural farm and non-farm activities, urban and rural sectors, agricultural
and industrial sectors, and domestic and international economies. However, as will be shown
29
below, not all of current programmes meet these requirements.
The Informal Sector Training and Resource Network (INSTARN) Programme in Zimbabwe
was started in 1995 as a bilateral project between the German (through GTZ) and
Zimbabwean governments. It is based at Masvingo Technical College under the auspices of
the Ministry of Higher Education. INSTARN’s overall objective is to create employment
through the development of the informal sector. It provides technical training for informal
sector businesses to improve the production skills of participants and the marketability of
their products. It is for this reason that the idea was to link this training to already existing
skills training. At an early stage of project implementation, it was found that it was not
enough to provide someone with a skill without providing business training and funding. In
this regard, it was agreed that the project will provide an integrated approach to resolving the
problems of the informal sector by providing technical training, business training and access
to funding.
The areas of intervention in the project are the reinforcement of traditional apprenticeships,
development of small business advisors, provision of credit for small businesses, promotion
of informal sector associations, and assistance in marketing of informal sector products to the
formal sector. In a paper presented at a NAMACO Congress, the project coordinator
indicated that the focus of these interventions is '...to create an integrated package of informal
sector support, which will result in more, stronger and bigger businesses, creating permanent
jobs'.
The backbone of the programme is the traditional apprenticeship system that has been
adopted by INSTARN. In this apprenticeship system, a young person is taken on and trained
informally by a business owner. Traditional apprentices are recruited from the unemployed.
Apprentices have to find a host business and have to support themselves during the period of
training. Those selected will undergo several weeks of formal training at Masvingo Technical
College or a partner organisation. Typical areas involved include carpentry and joinery, metal
fabrication, dressmaking, hairdressing, radio and TV repair, motor mechanics and
refrigeration. After training the apprentices are placed with a host business. This host
business becomes a client of INSTARN and the owner too receives some business training,
regular support and monitoring from an INSTARN Small Business Advisor. Upon
graduation, apprentices may qualify for business training and benefit from a tool hire-to-buy
scheme which is operated by their local Informal Sector Association. Support for the host
business is designed to create a good environment for training. These traditional apprentices
can opt for trade testing after 12 months to acquire certification. To be effective, however,
official criteria such as length of employment in a formal business should be relaxed.
Since March 1996, 102 people have graduated from the programme, while a further 120 are
undergoing training. Those interested in starting their own businesses are referred to
Zambuko Trust, which received a grant from INSTARN for on-lending to clients
recommended by the project. Efforts at linking these businesses with established ones
through sub-contracting appear promising. The scheme has been successful in creating
employment within the host business, in formal employment or through setting up new
businesses. Owing to its relative success, the project is being extended to other provinces, and
has already started in Manicaland.
Another interesting project of learnership with a different focus is the one proposed (and not
yet implemented) by the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (HCSA) for Zimbabwe. The
30
HCSA has been involved in the recruitment of teachers in Holland (the Netherlands) to assist
secondary schools, technical teachers colleges and technical colleges since 1983. An
evaluation of this programme has suggested that due to the absence of a comprehensive
national training policy for school-leavers, schools are required to provide technical or
survival skills to equip school-leavers for the world of work. The evaluation suggested that
this approach could easily draw on the expertise of the Dutch teachers.
In pursuit of this recommendation, HCSA carried out an extensive review of the problems of
school-leavers. Together with the local partner organisation, the Norwegian People’s Aid,
interviews were held with community development organisations and former HCSA teachers
to explore the extent to which programmes targeted at school-leavers were being
implemented. The final project document (March 1997) found that there was no
comprehensive programme to deal with the problems of school-leavers that hinder their entry
into the labour market. It therefore provided a pilot project proposal to offer O-level schoolleavers the opportunity to get work experience through training on the job as preparation for
working life. Interestingly, a cluster of Dutch companies in Zimbabwe is prepared to take part
in the work experience project along the lines of an earlier agreement between Philips and the
Dutch trade unions signed in 1982.
According to this earlier Employment Plan between Philips and the Dutch unions, Philips
offers school-leavers work experience for a period of one year. The company has been
providing work experience slots equivalent to 1 per cent of the regular jobs, and this was
expanded to 2 per cent in 1996 (involving 800 unemployed persons). This work experience
also includes individual oriented educational training, training on the job, in production
traineeships and general training. From this experience, it has been observed that the success
of work experiences depends on the choice of participants (e.g. motivation), the quality of
work experience place (relevance to the local labour market and the availability of sufficient
supervision and training) and support and guidance provided. To date, in excess of 7,500
unemployed persons have joined the programme in Holland. The success rate is high, with 80
per cent of those involved finding paid employment (a quarter of them at Philips). Most of
these are absorbed by small and medium scale enterprises.
The aims of the proposed training/employment project for school-leavers in Zimbabwe are to
improve the position of O-level school-leavers on the labour market, to assist companies in
selection and recruitment of personnel, and to assess the extent to which the private sector
can be involved in this way in combating unemployment among school-leavers, with a view
to developing a model for more companies in other branches of industry in Zimbabwe (see
Van Unen 1997). According to the proposal document, school-leavers on attachment will be
paid a wage determined by the National Employment Council (NEC) in Zimbabwe. Training
and guidance offered will comprise four parts, namely, training on the job, general skills
training, personal guidance and guidance towards the follow up (self-employment). A
steering committee comprising the social partners and industry in Zimbabwe is proposed to
organise grassroot support for the project.
Although this project is still in proposal form, it is a particularly well thought out. Its
attractiveness lies in that it draws from successful experiences elsewhere, and brings together
many organisations already involved in other initiatives and seeks co-funding from the
Zimbabwe Development Fund which finances the formal apprenticeship scheme.
Furthermore, it will be operated on a pilot basis, with a possibility of extension to other
companies and sectors.
31
The South African approach to the development and support of small business is an example
of a comprehensive, integrated national strategy. It was born out of a national consultative
process, which started with the President’s Conference on Small Business held in March
1995. The conference reaffirmed the importance of micro-, small- and medium-sized
enterprises in economic development and agreed to strengthen and co-ordinate support to
activities of the sector. Following the conference, a white paper was published, resulting in
the promulgation of the National Small Businesses Act of 1997. The Act paved the way for
the setting up of wholesale agencies charged with spearheading a national strategy for
developing and promoting small businesses.
One such agency is the Centre for Small Business Promotion (CSBP) which was established
to spearhead, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the national small business
development strategy. CSBP is funded by government within the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). A range of support services such as entrepreneurial training, line training,
provision of development finance and marketing support (including export marketing) are
available from CSBP. Other functions of the CSBP include donor co-ordination, provision of
business information through walk-in centres, national small business regulatory reviews,
counselling services, access to markets and business linkages.
The Act also provided for the establishment of three other bodies, namely, Khula Enterprise
Finance Ltd., Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency and the National Small Business Council.
Khula is a not-for-profit company set up by the government through which finance for
MSMEs is channelled from the budget, from donors and from other sources. Khula does not
disburse funds itself, but does so through the existing network of banks and financial
institutions such as the Small Business Development Corporation, Industrial Development
Corporation, and the Development Bank of South Africa. Ntsika Enterprise Promotion
Agency coordinates non-financial services for MSMEs, especially training. As with Khula, it
provides such assistance through intermediaries such as NGOs and large business
corporations. CSBP finances Ntsika’s services in the areas of training, project planning,
business linkages, counselling, information marketing and the establishment of local business
service centres. Without the assistance of other stakeholder agencies, the CSBP could not
fulfil its mandate.
The National Small Business Council is a lobby body grouping all stakeholders in the
MSMEs sector. The overall responsibility for research and planning of support packages and
programmes rests with the DTI, together with the Small Business Development Agency,
provincial government and support agencies. The National Small Business Council is the
political or pressure group that comments on the outputs. CSBP co-ordinates all the inputs
from the stakeholders.
Other new programmes targeted at developing MSMEs include the Export Marketing and
Investment Assistance Programme (EMIA), the Technology and Human Resources for
Industry Programme (THRIP), the Short-term Export Finance Guarantee Programme, the
Small and Medium Manufacturing Development Programme, the International Tourism
Marketing Assistance Scheme (ITMAS) and the Feasibility Support Scheme. The 1998
Presidential Jobs Summit proposed the adoption of two additional programmes that are
geared towards promoting MSMEs: a Mentorship Scheme and business incubation.
Mentorship Scheme: In the light of the observed shortage and cost of assistance to MSMEs, it
32
was suggested that a national Mentorship Scheme be introduced to augment the existing
support network. It was agreed that Khula should establish new lending programmes and
extend existing ones. This can be achieved by developing the capacity of the Retail Financing
Intermediaries (RFIs). New ones such as Tourism Sector Financing Scheme targeting
disadvantaged entrepreneurs, the Small Contractor Industry Programme, small and medium
business projects under the Spatial Development Initiatives and pilot projects to establish
micro-credit outlets in rural areas targeting women, will be formed. The Fisheries Fund,
which caters for historically disadvantaged entrepreneurs between the ages of 18 and 35, and
the Nations Trust Youth Enterprise project covering entrepreneurs in the same age range will
be expanded. In addition, venture or equity capital will be explored.
Business incubation: To minimise failure of new businesses, a programme to provide
MSMEs with access to technical and business skills was proposed. In this regard, it was
agreed that business incubator centres be established. These business incubators would
provide support services such as on-site technical assistance and training, business skills
training facilities for common equipment usage, public procurement and business linkages, as
well as market access. The Job Summit also agreed to set up 11 pilot business incubation
projects (at least one in each province) by end of 1999. Each incubator is expected to
accommodate 20 businesses.
Given that these initiatives are at an early stage of implementation, we may only comment on
the features of the interventions that make them promising. One interesting aspect of the
South African approach is the central role accorded stakeholder participation. In the above
initiatives for instance, the issues were negotiated and agreed upon and an Implementation
Committee formed that comprises the Department of Trade and Industry, Khula, Ntsika,
Business South Africa, the Black Business Council, individual private sector companies,
MSME service providers and membership based associations. With such wide-ranging
participation, the initiatives have a greater chance of being sustainable, and this attempt to
create a well-co-ordinated structure of all stakeholders is commendable. As noted in the
Declaration of the Presidential Jobs Summit, the extent to which the MSME sector can
contribute towards employment creation depends on the establishment of an enabling
environment, as well as a supporting framework.
Another important aspect of the initiatives is that social partners contributed to the financing
of the job creation programmes. Business established a fund to support training, education
and the tourist sector. Labour offered to raise funds for jobs campaign on the basis of one
day’s pay. Everyone would contribute a day’s wage to the fund and employers would be
approached to contribute a matching sum. Government set aside resources for poverty
alleviation and infrastructure. In addition, government will establish a Umsobomvu Trust,
with the initial funds coming from proceeds from the demutualisation process. The Trust will
fund key Jobs Summit programmes, especially those involving training and youth
employment projects.
Finally, it is necessary to point out that as the programmes currently stand they are not
specifically targeted at youth, but as a result of the Jobs Summit the relationship to youth
employment has been more clearly specified. First, the above programmes will be required to
indicate specific targets for youth as beneficiaries. Second, given the difficulties of promoting
self-employment among youth, especially the younger ones, the employment framework
adopted at the Summit provides for the integration of youth oriented public works and special
employment programmes with MSME projects such that they would benefit form each other.
33
Thus, for instance, public works and special employment programmes will be encouraged to
source their inputs from MSMEs, while the programmes themselves will have to be executed
in a manner that provides infrastructure support to MSMEs. In this way both the MSMEs and
the special employment and public works programmes will be made sustainable in the long
run. Initially, the approach to integrated programme execution will be undertaken in what are
called Spatial Development Initiatives, which are located in various provinces in the country.
Another example of an integrated approach to private sector development is the programme
on 'Support to Poverty Eradication through Decentralised Governance and Private Sector
Development' in Uganda. The programme, which is part of the UNDP/Government of
Uganda Country Co-operation Framework for the period 1997-2001, started in October 1997
and is under the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. It underscores the
importance of efficient decentralisation of governance through the promotion of the private
sector.
The Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP) is based on the following guiding
principles:







self-help: stakeholders share responsibilities as well as the costs of programmes;
integration and inclusiveness: programmes are designed to reinforce each other in a
cost-effective manner to meet common goals;
collaboration: stakeholders collectively mobilise resources to meet the challenge at
hand;
capacity building: building and strengthening capacities in both the public and private
sectors in order to improve competitiveness, efficient and effective utilisation of
resources;
effective delivery mechanisms: through a judicious mix of credit, training, managerial
and technical advice;
continuous private-public dialogue: through the creation of a forum allowing civil
society participation in policy dialogue;
people’s participation: use of interactive and consultative processes in the formulation
and implementation of policies and programmes.
The PSDP covers the economic, physical, legal, regulatory and institutional framework under
which businesses function, emphasising an integrated approach. The support programmes
ensure that all ingredients essential for a business to start, operate and expand are available
and accessible. It assists enterprises to continuously improve their efficiency and
effectiveness. The activities include business advisory services, research and technology
development, standardisation and quality control, and strengthening private sector
associations, among others. These activities are targeted at unemployed educated youth by
encouraging sub-contracting, licensing and franchising arrangements. The strategy for
implementation hinges on harnessing local expertise and capabilities (such as financial
intermediaries, training institutions, private sector associations, university and vocational
training students and graduates, retrenchees, etc.). Youth are provided with internship,
apprenticeship and other programmes.
The national programme office provides only the framework for the programme, leaving the
district offices to identify their own issues. National level training is provided to build
capacity at the district level. Each district has its own governance structure, with the District
Private Sector Development Promotion Centre co-ordinating all activities. So far, eight
34
centres have been established, and two more will be added soon out of a total of 45 districts
in the country. The focus is on micro-finance, where village banking is being promoted (two
other initiatives in the area of micro-finance in Uganda are summarised in Boxes 4 and 5).
The concept of village banking is based on the establishment of community banks through
which community resources are mobilised within a savings-first approach. The village banks
are legally registered under the Co-operative or Company Law. Thus, necessary institutions
are by the people themselves.
A typical district office has a staff of seven members: a promotion officer, a micro-finance
specialist, a finance officer, programme adviser (who is usually an expatriate) and support
staff. All private sector associations in the districts together constitute the Steering
Committee of their Promotion Centre. Wherever possible, local resources are utilised.
Trainers are drawn from the local pool of available technical skills, to which business skills
are added. This way, local resources are used to create local businesses, which are in turn
used as part of the resource base. The national office is now working towards standardising
the framework.
A unique aspect of this project is that it has moved away from the traditional top-down
approach, to a grassroot-based approach. One clear advantage of such an approach is that it
engenders ownership of programmes and hence promotes self-reliance and sustainability.
Interviews with PSDP officials and the UNDP programme officer suggest that the
programme has been successful. Officials interviewed recommend it highly for adoption in
other countries. It is a self-generating programme which is sustainable. It takes development
to where the people are and empowers them to own the processes and outcomes.
The reforms of the training system in Zambia discussed before primarily affect formal
vocational education and training. Institutions in that part of the system cater for a very small
proportion of the youth in Zambia as well as elsewhere in Africa. Most youngsters drop out
of the educational system at an earlier stage, upon completion of primary education or even
before. Various factors contribute to the high proportion of out-of-school youth in Africa,
among which are the inadequate capacity of the educational system, the low incomes and
living standards in most families, and the introduction of cost-recovery measures at the level
of basic education. Many countries in Africa are also severely affected by the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, which results in an increasing number of AIDS related orphans, many of whom
lack the necessary guidance and support to be able to complete their schooling.
A number of NGOs, including certain church groups, donor organisations and local councils
run various programmes to support disadvantaged children and out-of-school youth. These
programmes include activities that range from purely social (provision of information on
health-related issues, or food and shelter for street children) to those that are much more
focused on economic self-reliance (development of microcredit, skills training). Especially
among the latter the pressure to become sustainable is mounting. Donor funds are shrinking
in most countries, and donor organisations are increasingly reluctant to fund recurrent costs
of activities that lack prospects of surviving on their own.
One of the bigger organisations that has been relatively successful in combining social and
more economic type of activities is the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA),
particularly in Zambia (see Box 6 and YWCA 1997). Although most of the income of the
YWCA comes from international donors, activities in the field of training have attained some
degree of self-sufficiency. However, this combination of social and economic objectives may
35
easily become conflictive, as will be discussed below in the context of Zambia’s National
Action Programme for Youth.
Box 4: Poverty alleviation and microcredit in Uganda
The Poverty Alleviation Action Project in Uganda was established in June 1994 as a semi-autonomous project
under the Office of the Prime Minister to provide credit directly to targeted beneficiaries or via Intermediary
Entities (IEs) at district level. The funds were to be used to establish income and employment generating micro
projects identified by the beneficiaries. These were to include small scale farming, apiary (bee keeping), oil and
grain milling, carpentry, bakery, brick making, handicrafts, cloth manufacturing, trading and other activities
were beneficiaries have proven skills and where there is demand. The over-arching objective of PAP is the
alleviation of poverty among the vulnerable and impoverished communities of Uganda. The target population
includes women, widows, orphans, youth, the disabled, retrenched civil servants and demobilised soldiers.
To fulfil these objectives, the project was expected to provide institutional support to the executing agency and
technical assistance to the IEs in delivering the micro projects. The expected outputs of the programme were:
viable micro-enterprises owned by beneficiaries, the introduction of group-based lending and the establishment
of village-based credit schemes. To achieve the set objectives, PAP had to establish a mechanism for generating
micro-enterprises and group-based credit schemes. The projects had to be identified by beneficiaries themselves
or with the help of IEs (e.g. NGOs, credit institutions, established community groups or local co-operatives)
operating at the district level. The funding of viable income generating activities was expected to account for 77
per cent (reduced to 70 per cent in 1995 following a review) of the total project cost. In order to minimise
administrative costs of screening projects, IEs were to assist beneficiaries in identifying and preparing project
proposals. They were also given the mandate to screen, review and put together viable projects.
To ensure sustainability of the micro projects, the programme also financed training and provision of extension
services. IEs were expected to identify beneficiaries’ training needs. IEs were also to be sub-contracted to
provide training on motivation, leadership, group organisation, savings mobilisation, project implementation,
basic financial management and maintenance of physical facilities. The project was also to provide institutional
support involving secondment of a technical advisor, short-term consultancy and training. The training and
institutional building component of the project was allocated about 8 per cent of total costs. A grant amounting
to at most 10 per cent (increased to 15 per cent following a review in 1995) of each micro project cost was
earmarked for IEs for the their role in identifying, preparing and implementing projects. The residual 15 per cent
of total costs was set aside for operating costs and contingencies.
To co-ordinate activities, supervise Project District Area Offices and IEs and assess their performance, an
Income Generating Support Unit (IGSU) was created at the national level. The IGSU would also periodically
review the sizes of loans approved by the Area Project Co-ordinator and make recommendations to the National
Steering Committee as well as administering project accounts, disburse funds to IEs and establish the Revolving
Fund. The national centre would screen and approve projects above US$ 3,000 and below US$ 6,000. IGSU was
to be run by a Co-ordinator who reported directly to the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime
Minister, who chairs the National Steering Committee. To ensure flexibility and close supervision of projects,
four Project District Area Offices were created, with each office covering several districts. These screen and
approve projects below US$ 3,000 and liaise with and supervise the IEs at district level and send monthly
reports to the IGSU. These are headed by an Area Project Co-ordinator.
As at October 1998, the project had disbursed US$ 10,908,392 to micro projects in the four areas, with an
average recovery rate of 93 per cent. Of the total amount disbursed, 34 per cent went into crop production, 26
per cent into livestock production, 8 per cent to small scale manufacturing (carpentry, metal fabrication, hammer
mills, etc.), 28 per cent to commerce/trade and 4 per cent to services. The mid-term review by an independent
consultant and the Project Completion Report (February 1999) expressed satisfaction with the project, with the
latter observing that '… there is consensus among the stakeholders that PAP has succeeded in expanding its
outreach by reaching 23,877 beneficiaries of the poorest communities in remote rural areas and has significantly
contributed to improving their standard of living' (1999, p. 1). This was also confirmed by the Federation of
Uganda Employers, National Organisation of Trade Unions (NOTU) and government ministries visited during
the mission to that country. The Project Completion Report also observes that apart from the tangible benefits
36
derived, the project had a psychological impact on recipients, with the beneficiaries (especially women)
exhibiting “… high levels of self-esteem, confidence and economic empowerment” (ibid, p. 3). Out of the
23,877 beneficiaries, 14,774 were women and 9,103 were men. An estimated 20 per cent of beneficiaries are
youth. It has been estimated that PAP supports about 20 per cent of the total 125,000 clients served by microfinance industry and more than 30 per cent of the total loan portfolio of about US$2,8 million. PAP is reported
to having build the capacity of 58 mostly indigenous micro-finance institutions, representing at least 60 per cent
of micro-finance institutions serving the poor in Uganda (Project Completion Report, 1999).
The National Action Programme for Youth (NAPY) in Zambia was developed in 1996 and
early 1997 with broad-based participation from government, the youth, NGOs, the UNDP,
the ILO and the donor community. The NAPY, which has been officially endorsed, is a
comprehensive strategy to support out-of-school youth with low educational attainment
(mostly grade 7). The strategy is built around an expansion of training opportunities provided
by Youth Skills Training Centres.
The NAPY consists of five principal components that aim to support out-of-school youth to
become self-employed in the non-formal sector. These components are: (i) skills training
responsive to local needs; (ii) enterprise training for small-scale businesses; (iii) small startup loans; (iv) availability of infrastructure; and (v) mentor support to young entrepreneurs.
These components reflect the integrated, holistic approach to youth issues that has been
adopted by the Ministry of Sports, Youth and Child Development. International experience
indicates that programmes aiming to increase productivity and incomes in the informal sector
cannot be limited to upgrading technical skills. They should be viewed in conjunction with
other necessary conditions such as access to credit and institutional support (ILO 1998).
Consequently, the Action Programme aims to develop the current Youth Skill Training
Centres into fully-fledged Youth Resource Centres.
In 1997, 15 Youth Skills Training Centres were operational with a total enrolment of 650
students (MSYCD 1997), including King George VI National Youth Training Centre which
is mainly concerned with training of trainers. Most of these centres provide training in
tailoring and carpentry, with some centres providing additional courses in brickwork,
metalwork or agriculture. Many of the curricula that are used have been developed centrally,
and have become (inferior) copies of the courses provided in the formal training system.
The Action Programme envisages an expansion of the number of training centres, 4 as well as
a drastic revision of the courses offered. A policy document related to the Action Programme
suggests that each centre would offer a range of five courses per year, with a bi-annual intake
of 25 trainees per course (MSYCD 1999). This would result in an annual enrolment of 250
students per centre, as compared with the current average of 25. The content of the courses
would be based on a survey of local labour market needs, and the duration would be reduced
to 3-9 months (from the current 18 months in most cases). Furthermore, a six-week
Enterprise Course would be offered separately at each centre, with an annual enrolment target
of 120 students.
4
Annex H of MSYCD 1997 shows plans to build 13 new centres between 1998 and 2002 at a cost of US$ 3.2
million.
37
Box 5: Entandikwa5 Credit Scheme in Uganda
The Entandikwa Credit Scheme was launched in March 1995 by President Museveni. Initially, the Scheme was
under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. However, following restructuring, the Scheme was
moved to the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. The scheme, which is funded by
government, has the following objectives:





to provide accessible, collateral free revolving credit to the poor in rural and urban areas;
to support the establishment of income and employment generating enterprises at the household level;
to encourage the development of indigenous grassroot institutions to deliver credit to the poor;
to mobilise household savings, especially among the rural poor; and
to facilitate the participation of the poor in the development process.
The scheme supports small-scale ventures in areas such as farming, carpentry, tailoring, brick making, apiary,
agro-processing etc. The operational structure consists of a three-tier set-up. At the national level, there is a
secretariat, which co-ordinates all activities. It has no board. The District Steering Committee, which is the
technical arm of the District Development Committee, overseas and co-ordinates the implementation of the
project in that district. The District Steering Committee comprises of technocrats from government at district
level representing different ministries (e.g. agricultural officers, veterinary officers, trade development officers
etc) and is chaired by the district’s chief administrative officer who heads that district. Below the district are
counties.
At each county is a County Steering Committee chaired by the assistant chief administrative officer. Projects to
be funded are proposed by the beneficiaries through the Intermediary Agencies (IA). The IAs (approved NGOs)
carry out the initial screening of projects before consideration and approval by the County Steering Committee.
The IAs, in collaboration with extension officers, provide technical support and advice to beneficiaries. The IAs
are expected to have the capacity to provide logistic support, supervise beneficiaries, disseminate information
and recover loans. The County Steering Committee will inform the District Steering Committee, through the
chief administrative officer of the approved projects, which are then forwarded to the Secretariat for funding.
The Secretariat will then disburse the money through the IAs to the beneficiaries.
By July 1997, 39,200 beneficiaries had received 9,308 billion shillings (94 per cent of total funds). Of the
beneficiaries, 33.7 per cent were women and 30.5 per cent were youths. Budgetary allocations to the project
initially rose from almost 2 billion shillings during 1994/95 to 5.4 billion shillings in 1995/96, before falling to
2.5 billion shillings during 1996/97. During fiscal year 1997/98, no allocation was made due to budgetary
constraints. A paltry 300 million shillings was allocated in the 1998/99 budget.6
Apart from dwindling budgetary allocations, the scheme has experienced low recovery rates. Although the
recovery rate improved slightly from 50 per cent in 1996/97 to 55 per cent during 1997/98, the level is still
unacceptably low.7 This low recovery rate reflects the high politicisation of the scheme, with beneficiaries
taking it as their share of the national cake. This was exacerbated by the fact that loan disbursements coincided
with periods of political activities, giving the impression that the loans were ‘political gifts.’ Given also that 60
per cent of Entandikwa funds were allocated to agriculturally-based activities, drought adversely affected the
5
Literally translated, 'entandikwa' means 'something to start with', implying it is seed money.
6
It is reported that the failure to allocate resources during 1997/98 encouraged defaulting, since this
gave the signal that the scheme may be coming to an end.
7
Interestingly, in a recent government document on 'Re-organisation of Entandikwa Credit Scheme
Under Micro Financial Institutions', it is argued that '… this recovery rate is no mean achievement given the
friendly methods applied to avoid damage of government image,” (no date, p. 1). The same document alleges
that '… the committees approved loans to mainly their relatives and themselves' (p. 4).
38
scheme. In addition, the Secretariat is grossly understaffed and also lacks financial and logistical resources,
while the IAs are ill-equipped and under-facilitated.8 Although government intends to make the project semiautonomous, it is largely seen as a political scheme, which undermines its sustainability. Moreover, its activities
overlap with those of PAP (see Box 4). Given this scenario, this scheme may not be justifiable as it is clearly not
viable, especially given the sub-market interest rates and high defaults.
Box 6: The YWCA and the youth in Zambia
One of the bigger organisations that has been relatively successful in combining social and more economic type
of activities in Zambia is the Young Women's Christian Association. The YWCA is a relatively large NGO that
started working in Zambia in 1957. The YWCA's Mission Statement emphasises its dedication to the
empowerment of women in order to achieve a better community. The organisation is active in advocacy and
service provision in the area of civic rights, in particular those of women. It also promotes self-reliance through
the provision of business and other skills, as well as through the development of microcredit programmes. The
target of YWCA is that the youth constitute 25 per cent of all participants in its activities. These activities are
mostly funded by a broad range of international donors and implemented by volunteers.
In the 1960s activities expanded to include basic training for out-of-school youth, such as literacy training,
tailoring and typing. Although the current programmes still include traditional forms of skills training for
women, the emphasis has shifted to non-traditional skills such as spinning and weaving, ceramics, fish farming
and oil pressing. One of the current programmes provides the growing number of street children in Lusaka with
an opportunity to learn life skills.
The Small Business Development Project (SBDP) was initiated in 1993. The project aims to alleviate poverty
among vulnerable groups in the Zambian society - women and youth, through the provision of business skills
training. By the end of 1997, a total of 644 persons had been trained, 70 per cent of whom were women. More
than 50 persons successfully completed the ILO-supported 'Improve Your Business Training of Trainers'
courses. Although most of the income of the YWCA comes from international donors, activities in the field of
training have attained some degree of self-sufficiency. Training and related services generated 33 per cent of the
operational costs of these activities in 1997.
The centres would also become more involved in the provision of capital for new enterprises.
Some centres have managed to use funds from the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and
the Constituency Youth Fund to support starting entrepreneurs. The Action Programme
suggests that course graduates should be given priority in the distribution of loans and grants
from these funds. In addition, each centre should develop a range of community-based
recreation and cultural facilities, and incorporate family and environment education into all
training programmes. The Youth Resource Centre should thus become a local base to serve
the needs of the youth in the community.
The Action Programme considers a restructured National Youth Development Council
(NYDC) as the major operational vehicle for the implementation of the Programme. The
Council was discharged in 1996 amidst allegations of misconduct and theft concerning the
properties owned by it. The Action Programme therefore suggests that a new Council be
established, with the main objective of acting as the operating agency for youth programmes.
8
The Secretariat has only 3 officers without support staff such as typists and messengers. Facilitation is
particularly low, with the District Steering Committee, County Steering Committee and IAs receiving 0.5 per
cent, 1 per cent and 6 per cent (increased from 4 per cent) of the money allocated to them respectively. By way
of comparison, IAs under PAP feel the 15 per cent they get for their facilitation is inadequate.
39
In 1997, it was agreed that the Board of Trustees of the King George VI National Youth
Training Centre should be invited to serve as the new Council. The Trustees are nominated
from large companies in Zambia, and contribute to youth programmes in terms of funding
and material support. The advisory functions of the NYDC would then be fulfilled by a new
body, the National Youth Advisory Council, whose membership would draw on a range of
youth organisations in Zambia. These include the Zambia Youth Forum, representing some
30 NGOs.
Implementation of the Action Programme has been slow, which is primarily due to
institutional and budgetary constraints. The restructuring of the NYDC has not been effected,
and appointment of the new Council is awaiting revision of the relevant Act. In the
meantime, a temporary committee has been put in place to oversee youth issues, but this
committee has never actually met. The Programme is thus implemented in an ad hoc fashion,
while an appropriate institutional management structure is lacking.
The establishment of new centres, as well as the upgrading of the existing ones, requires
substantial resources. Similar to the infrastructure elsewhere in the educational system, most
centres have severely deteriorated since their establishment in the 1980s. Budgetary support
from government, which is supposed to cover infrastructure, equipment and staff salaries, has
been minimal. Furthermore, funding has been erratic, as many allocations were not actually
released. Between 1992 to 1996, on average less than 70 per cent of the funds allocated to the
MSYCD were released. Within the budgetary allocation of the MYSCD, the Department of
Youth received on average no more than 46 per cent of its allocation. In 1997, releases were
only 36 per cent of budgetary allocation with the cuts again falling disproportionately on the
Department of Youth.
The problem of erratic funding reflects the general budgetary situation of the government,
which precludes funding of the planned establishment of infrastructure from the public
budget. However, several centres have been 'adopted' by international donors including GDS,
JICA, NORAD and the EU. Much support is provided for the rehabilitation of centres in
terms of physical infrastructure, as well as curriculum development and sometimes staffing
through volunteers. The rehabilitation of a ‘model centre’ in Chioyata was completed in 1998
with support from Australia, which included roofing and plastering of the centre. In
collaboration with the MSYCD, UNESCO has developed a project proposal to support three
centres along the lines set out in the Action Programme. The proposal envisages the
establishment of basic infrastructure and training facilities, support for curriculum design and
initial back-up support to small and microenterprises. Partly in response to the increasing
interest of donors, government increased the capital budget for Construction and
Rehabilitation of Youth Skills Training Centres from 150 million kwacha in 1998 to 200
million in 1999 (there was no such allocation in 1997).
A more difficult issue is the regular staffing of the centres, which donors are generally
reluctant to finance. Expansion of activities and the introduction of new courses require staff
development programmes as well as the creation of new positions. However, many centres
already have difficulties in finding and retaining qualified instructors. In Chioyata, for
example, the instructor for brickwork was laid off under the Civil Service Reform
Programme. Increasing rotation of staff members among centres, as envisaged by the
MSYCD, may well be useful but is not sufficient to make the full implementation of the
Action Programme feasible. The lack of adequate funding has resulted in the introduction of
(low) fees in some of the centres. Many have also attempted to develop so-called income
40
generating activities. This usually takes the form of establishing production units in which
staff, students or graduates produce items for sale.
A recent feasibility study on these income generating activities of youth centres showed that
few centres, if any, successfully combined training and production activities (SGS 1997). The
study recommended a drastic increase of the number of trainers employed, a staff
development programme, revision of curricula as well as various improvements of the
infrastructure and equipment in the centres. These recommendations seem perfectly valid and
are in line with the measures suggested in the Action Programme. However, the study failed
to discuss that the two objectives may be inherently conflictive. The staff responsible for
training students is also supposed to take the lead in the production unit, for which they may
well lack the necessary experience. Certainly, many staff members of training institutions are
involved in paid activities outside these institutions. These activities are however often
undertaken on an individual basis, and are fundamentally different from involvement of
students in income generation as part of the regular curriculum.
Furthermore, the importance of enterprise-based training – as opposed to institution-based
training – is well-accepted (see below). The role of enterprise-based training as part of the
training courses could be strengthened through the use of traditional apprenticeships, which
would also serve to establish links with local labour markets. This form of training has
received relatively little attention in Zambia, in part because apprenticeships are not very
common. Efforts to revamp apprenticeship schemes in the formal training system have not
been very successful, and are unlikely to become so in the current economic environment
where companies are massively shedding labour. Few attempts have been made to use
traditional training practices as a means to prepare for self-employment in microenterprises,
for example along the lines of the INSTARN programme in Zimbabwe.
Offering employment to students or graduates may also create a dependency on the centre
that is difficult to reconcile with the objective of self-employment. Evidence from successful
self-employment programmes suggests that they share a number of principles (Grierson
1997). These include:
-
a consistent focus on self-employment principles and practices throughout the training
process;
considerable emphasis on selection, with selection in most cases being based on a
careful balance of equity and self-employment potential;
extensive use of enterprise-based training and traditional training techniques,
particularly traditional apprenticeships;
extensive and multifaceted involvement with local markets and local communities,
and active membership of local institutional networks;
adoption of a 'minimalist' approach, with relatively little start-up or follow-up support
being provided by the programmes directly.
Apart from enterprise-based training, the selection of trainees on the basis of selfemployment potential does not receive much emphasis in the current structure or the Action
Programme. A large part of the target group of the centres – out-of-school youth – may not
have the potential to start their own microenterprises. Indicators of such potential that could
be checked relatively easily through interviews are if candidates have a clear business idea or
work experience in microenterprises.
41
The holistic approach of the Youth Department discussed before seems to have been
interpreted in such a way that a comprehensive support package should be made available at
each centre. More important than direct provision of services, however, is access to
appropriate support services through networks of providers and local businesses. Microcredit
services, for example, are unlikely to be delivered on a sustainable basis through government
institutions.9 Provision and management of credit and related services could therefore better
be left to other providers, that could be actively encouraged through appropriate policies.
The Action Programme has been designed in recognition of the extremely limited
(institutional) support structure for out-of-school youth. Many of the additional functions that
are envisaged under the Action Programme, such as recreational activities, environmental and
family education, etc. should be viewed from that perspective. These activities serve clear
social needs, but do not have much to do with training for self-employment and have a much
larger target group. Although the centres may be a convenient vehicle to provide a range of
additional services for out-of-school youth, a clear separation of social and other functions
and activities could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the centres.
5.3
Active labour market policies
Active labour market policies have been defined by the ILO as policies which “provide work
to, or increase the employability of, people with certain disadvantages in the labour market”
(ILO, 1992). A later definition broadens the scope and purpose of active labour market
policies to encompass all workers, and not mainly disadvantaged workers (ILO, 1993). But
regardless of the scope of the definition, it is clear that much of what has been covered so far
in terms of interventions and programmes falls under the heading of active labour market
policies. The focus of this section will therefore be more specifically on public employment
services that may provide various services, in particular placement, to the youth in their
search for employment. The topic of subsidised employment schemes is not covered because
we are aware of no such schemes in anglophone Africa.
Public employment services10
According to Article 6 of the ILO Convention No. 88 (1948) on the Organisation of
Employment Services, these services have three major tasks: placement, vocational
information and guidance, and labour market information. Public employment services (PES)
can play a crucial role within the labour markets. As a provider of regularly collected,
comprehensive and up-to-date labour market information they could be the focal point for the
shaping of labour market policies and programmes. With services like information
dissemination on occupations, training institutions and self-employment opportunities, they
could attract a broad range of interested job seekers, in particular the youth. Other
governmental institutions might also have a strong interest in this information. Close contact
with employers and their business associations would not only increase the number of
notified vacancies but it would also enable the employment service to become a major partner
in personnel planning and development. Employment services could thereby build a strong
9
The Action Programme suggests an important role for the Youth Enterprise Development Fund as source of
loans for start-ups. However, both the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Constituency Youth Fund
(which provides grants) did not receive any replenishment in 1997 and 1998. In the case of Youth Constituency
Fund, the rationale is that Cabinet has not yet approved guidelines for disbursement; draft guidelines have been
circulating for some time, but an agreement could not be reached. Both funds have also been the subject of
allegations concerning mismanagement for political purposes.
10
The material in this subsection comes from Schultz and Klemmer (1998).
42
link with the private sector from which both sides would benefit. Vocational guidance and
individual counselling activities would complete the picture of the modern PES.
Unfortunately, however, the situation as described above does not match reality in
anglophone African countries, as a recent ILO study found (Schultz and Klemmer, 1998).
Very few countries provide reasonably good services, while in others the services are merely
noticed by the public or the government institutions. The insufficient capacity of Public
Employment Services and of related institutional and administrative infrastructure hampers
the design and implementation of labour market policies and programmes required to
facilitate market-oriented reform.
Many of the PES in anglophone Africa have always been operating on a very low level of
human and financial resources. Structural adjustment programmes have additionally reduced
the resources, often to a level below the very basic needs to keep up a minimum service of
core functions. Public Employment Services with only one officer are quite common in
English-speaking Africa. With a few exceptions, most of the PES only offer registration
services and perform poorly in their traditional placement function. Under the present
economic conditions in much of Africa there are very few job vacancies available, and even
fewer are notified to the PES as this is either not mandatory or not enforced.11 Suffering from
little support within the government and unable to keep pace with developments in the private
sector, the PES are increasingly under pressure and have already ceased to exist in some
countries.
Schultz and Klemmer make proposals for the reorganisation of PES that are likely to be
relevant to most English-speaking African countries. They are aimed at the evolution of the
existing PES towards a stage in their institutional development at which a basic level of fully
functioning modern employment services is reached. The challenge remains to develop and
reform PES by using little more than the resources currently allocated to them. Under this
condition, organisational changes play an important role. A modern set-up concentrating on
tasks like information dissemination on occupations, training institutions, self-employment
opportunities, and the labour market as such does not necessarily require a large increase in
personnel or finances.
The proposals concentrate on the set-up, the funding and the financial organisation of what
Schultz and Klemmer refer to as “employment information centres”. This terminology is
intended to characterise Public Employment Services that concentrate more on their
information function. This is seen as an attempt to reverse the current trend in which
employment services are shrinking to mere registration offices for the unemployed. Improved
information services in the guidance and counselling function, in the labour market
information function and in the overall promotion strategy of the centre could have a far
reaching impact. Job seekers could be provided with much needed advice on job and training
opportunities. The details of the proposals need not detain us and may be found in the source.
What is useful to note is that the proposals are based on a wide range of practical experiences
and are realistic enough to be implemented by almost all countries in the region.
11
It should, however, also be noted that practical experience has shown that even compulsory systems do not
attract more vacancies to the PES as long as they do not provide a qualified and efficient service that employers
can value.
43
5.4
Direct employment creation programmes
Direct employment creation programmes of one form or another are in existence in virtually
all countries. Two types of such programmes may be distinguished. A first group consists of
public works programmes that provide for food, pay or a combination of both in exchange for
the labour of the beneficiaries. These programmes primarily prevent beneficiaries from
becoming destitute, but could also be designed more creatively to provide infrastructure or
services to complement income-generating activities in rural or urban areas. Thus, from the
economic point of view public works programmes can be executed as part of an overall
strategy that promotes MSMEs as well as labour-intensive formal sector employment and
activities. In the employment strategy policy framework adopted in South Africa, for
example, this approach to integrating public works initiatives targeted at youth and other
special labour segments such as women, rural folk and the disabled has been explicitly
adopted as the way to proceed.
A second set of direct employment creation programmes relates to special employment
schemes for youth in the form of brigades or community service schemes. These schemes
takes advantage of the temporary status of youthfulness as a period during which a
combination of voluntary work, or work at nominal wages and exposure to training is
undertaken in manner that is socially and economically beneficial. This is an approach that is
also being pursued in South Africa with active involvement of youth bodies in their design
and execution.
Labour-intensive, or more correctly labour-based, works programmes have become popular
because of the use of appropriate technology to create jobs for the unemployed and the
underemployed, especially in rural areas. Cost reductions can be achieved by using labourbased as opposed to capital-intensive approaches, which intensively utilise scarce foreign
exchange earnings. In addition, the payment of sub-market wage rates is helpful in targeting
the intended beneficiaries – usually the unemployed – rather than those who are already
employed. With appropriate structures and institutional set-ups, such projects can also foster
community ownership of developmental efforts, which enhances their sustainability in the
long-term.
South Africa, which allocates an estimated R5 billion (over US$800 million) of its current
budget to labour-intensive infrastructural programmes, has probably one of the best public
works programmes anywhere. For example, in terms of technical design standards and the
quality of completed physical infrastructure, its Community Based Public Works Programme
(CBPWP) was regarded as surpassing anything that the ILO members of an evaluation team
had encountered in more than 30 developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific (CASE
and ILO, 1997, p. viii). Even then, however, it has been difficult to assess with confidence the
achievements of the CBPWP in terms of disbursements and employment generated. Thus,
while the National Department of Public Works reported that 2.5 million work-days had been
created by July 1997, those responsible for actual implementation of the programme –
provinces and NGOs – estimated the number of work-days generated at less than 1.4 million.
Such discrepancies in regard to crucial data pertaining to the achievements of one of the bestexecuted public works programmes anywhere points to the practical difficulties of making
accurate assessments of the socio-economic effects of such programmes. Indeed, the
monitoring and evaluation system of the CBPWP was regarded by the evaluators as its
weakest aspect. But as the evaluators lamented, a public works programme which has
employment as central objective must be able to report accurately – at least plausibly – on
what it has achieved (CASE and ILO, 1998, p. 135).
44
The CBPWP, launched in August 1994, is the largest component of South Africa’s National
Public Works Programme. Its broad aims are to reduce unemployment, educate and train
beneficiaries, create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets, and build the capacity of
communities. The CBPWP comprises 599 projects, most of which are situated in and
providing employment opportunities to residents of some of the most impoverished areas in
the country. The main recipients of CBPWP resources are in the Eastern Cape, KwaZuluNatal and the Northern Province, which account for most of the country’s poor. It is
estimated that the CBPWP created at least 1.43 million days of work, at a cost of R134
million (roughly US$15-20 per work-day, depending on the exchange rate used). Work was
mainly short-term, with only eight per cent of workers in employment for more than eight
months.
The mandate of the CBPWP is to target the “poorest of the poor”, women and the youth
although no quotas have been set. However, women constitute 41 per cent of workers and
youth (16-25 years) only 12 per cent. They were thus less likely than men to be employed in
the Programme, despite their being the primary target beneficiaries. A similar evaluation of
the Community Employment Programme under the National Public Works Programme found
a similar imbalance with the proportion of youth (18-24 years) and women in the
beneficiaries being identical to that for the CBPWP (CASE and ILO, 1996). This is indicative
of the practical difficulties of realising such targeting, not only because of the need to take
into account the social norms and dynamics of traditionally patriarchal communities, but also
because those most able to contribute to the programme because of their skills and experience
are also those most likely to be in a position to benefit from it. Interestingly, although
representative data were lacking, it appeared that CBPWP wages were higher than local
market wage rates in five out of eleven projects visited by the evaluators. It is therefore
perhaps not surprising that some 44 per cent of the workers were already in paid employment
before joining the CBPWP. Indeed, few CBPWP officials had a clear idea of what the local
wage was or should be.
The public works programme in Egypt was established in 1991, and is the only large- scale
direct job creating programme in the country. The programme focuses on generating jobs for
youth in poor rural areas. Its objectives include:





reducing long-term unemployment through the creation of short-term jobs;
providing workers with new skills through on-the-job training;
creating permanent employment by enabling school-leavers to acquire technical,
managerial and financial skills to enable them to become local small contractors;
supporting the development and use of local resources; and
involving the private sector, the target groups, and the NGOs in the construction and
maintenance activities to ensure sustainability.
The projects cover productive infrastructure (irrigation, drainage, protection of agricultural
land); economic infrastructure (roads, channels); social infrastructure (public building
restoration, potable water provision) and complementary projects (related to health and
education). The Social Fund for Development (SFD) has established a network of regional
offices that assist in identifying potential projects with the help of local authorities and local
communities. At least 25 per cent of the project’s budget is spent on labour and at least half
of the labourers should be locally recruited. Wages are set at a level below local market
wages so as to recruit from the target unemployed group. By 1997, slightly over 42,000 jobs
45
were created, 90 per cent of which were temporary. However, costs per job, at US$ 5,000,
were considered high. The cost effectiveness of the projects, however, can be improved.
Workers were almost exclusively young men.
6.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The discussion in this paper has underscored the structural nature of the overall problem of
unemployment and underemployment in Africa, and the nature of youth unemployment and
underemployment within this context. The youth problem should not be seen as an incidental
or special anomaly of an otherwise employment friendly environment, but as a manifestation
of the overall structural problem that affects adults as well as youth. This is of course not to
deny the fact that, as we have seen, the problem of youth unemployment and
underemployment is generally more severe than that of adults due to certain youth-specific
factors and constraints (relating to age, education, etc.) that need to be addressed as well. The
point rather is that from a policy standpoint, policies aimed at enhancing the welfare and
employability of youth should preferably be undertaken in the broader context of policies
aimed at enhancing the overall labour absorption capacity of African economies. Many of the
current employment promotion policies, interventions and programmes are not targeted
solely at the youth but they are no less relevant than those aimed specifically at them. It is for
this reason that this paper has reviewed a broad range of policies and programmes that bear
on the problem of youth unemployment and marginalisation. The purpose of this final section
is to summarise the main conclusions and highlight some of the key elements and lessons that
must be borne in mind in developing effective strategies and undertaking successful
initiatives to combat the problem.
6.1
Economic reforms and youth unemployment
The plight of youth has to be situated within the labour market inefficiencies examined
before, which, by implication, suggest areas of focus from the point of view of policy
interventions aimed at youth. Increasingly, it appears that some degree of convergence is
emerging in regard to policy measures needed to rescue African economies. This is partly a
result of the continued failure of present reforms to register convincing successes, but it may
also reflect a growing recognition that all too often the economic reform measures that are
clearly necessary have mistakenly been taken for sufficient panaceas. As a result, few
attempts have been made to creatively formulate additional measures that are also necessary.
The most important deficiencies in this respect concern the failure to resolve the enclave
legacy, which would call for redistributive interventions to formalise the rural economy,
while simultaneously restructuring industry to enhance backward and forward linkages with
the rural sector. There is a need to bias government support and interventions towards
rationalisation of production in the rural economy and higher productivity thereby boosting
its demand for industrial final, intermediate and capital goods on the one hand, and its supply
of final and intermediate goods to the industrial sector on the other. In the process, the sector
can contribute to the generation of internal savings and investment funds with appropriate
support for the development of financial intermediaries.
Thus issues of land reform and support for rural farm and non-farm enterprises are important,
as are issues of human and social capital development in favour of the hitherto marginalised
groups. In addition, there is a need for facilitative accommodations of the industrialisation
needs of African countries in the international economy by allowing them concessional
access to markets of industrial countries in non-traditional tradables. More generally, there is
46
a need to bias, even conditionally, policy regimes and supportive measures aimed at
facilitating ‘redistribution with growth’ rather than ‘growth with redistribution’. The latter
presumes that the benefits will trickle down equitably in due course or in the long run, but
under the current circumstances in Africa this long run may never be realised if present trends
continue. In the recent reports of the World Bank and the ILO all of the foregoing types of
policy have been recognised but not appropriately contextualised in an inclusive mode of
transformation that would attempt to resolve enclavity, hence their ambiguity and
abstruseness.
6.2
Developing a national employment strategy
In general, few African countries have an explicit employment policy context within which to
situate their youth programme interventions. The structural adjustment and stabilisation
policy packages primarily relegate a passive role to the state. Employment generation is then
seen as a derivative of the overall economic resuscitation that is expected to take place as the
economy restructures. African governments have more or less refrained from embarking on
active strategic planning and active measures aimed at facilitating the restructuring and
economic transformation. The lack of explicit, comprehensive employment strategies, in turn,
has meant that various institutions concerned with labour market issues had no proper policy
guidance, and very often operated in ad hoc and uncoordinated manner. The capacity to
design, implement and monitor active policies and measures has been neglected and accorded
relatively low priority, including budgetary priority. South Africa is an exceptional case in
this regard, as this country embarked on a process of consultation and negotiation that
resulted in a set of employment friendly policies and programmes that were cemented at a
Presidential Jobs Summit in 1998. Programmes and projects specifically aimed at youth were
located within these broader interventions, which were supported by the social partners and
other stakeholders. Several other anglophone African countries, however, are also moving in
that direction, though not always with the same zeal and conviction (with ILO assistance in
all cases). Namibia has already defined its national employment policy and Nigeria and
Uganda are in advanced stages of doing so. Zimbabwe, too, has recently initiated the process
to develop a national employment policy and an employment creation act. The importance
attached in such policy frameworks to improving the employment situation of youth varies
from one country to another, but the ultimate test of their relevance is the extent to which the
policies identified are actually implemented successfully.
A priori, policies that raise minimum wages, encourage collective bargaining, protect formal
sector workers and restrict labour market flexibility may be seen to constrain overall
employment in general, and youth employment in particular. A consideration of such typical
indicators of labour market flexibility/rigidity as union density rates and collective bargaining
coverage rates appears to suggest that labour markets in much of Africa are not unduly biased
in favour of organised labour. Among the countries under discussion the exception may be
South Africa, in which union strength and pro-union labour market policies may combine
with other constraints to unduly restrict job creation. Similarly, to the degree that minimum
wages may act as constraint on employment promotion, this may not be a generalised
phenomenon in Africa, and may actually be restricted to Mauritius, South Africa and
Zimbabwe. In the latter two countries, given the high rates of open youth unemployment, the
level of minimum wages may be an important consideration for employment promotion
purposes. It should further be noted that the issue of the role and impact of the architecture of
the labour market regulation and organisation with respect to economic efficiency and job
creation may not be as straightforward as indicated above, as various arguments may be
47
raised in favour of an improved regulatory environment in the context of African labour
markets.
6.3
Addressing youth unemployment and marginalisation
The important consideration from the normative point of view of policy at the lower end of
the age spectrum is that the need to maximise the socialisation and human capital
development should take priority over the need to have youth engage in work, unless such
work is compatible with these objectives. This however depends to a large extent on the
ability of the household and/or the public sector to provide for such socialisation, education
and training. Low per capita incomes and low economic growth rates undermine a nation’s
ability to invest in its youth, such that the more pressing need appears to be that of finding
employment for such youth. In addition, declining life expectancy may also have perverse
effects on the need to achieve such a balance as planning horizon is reduced.
Thus, a first category of interventions has to do with the need to provide for the socialisation
of youth at the lower end of the age spectrum (say, below 15 years of age). If such policy
interventions are difficult to finance, then every effort must be made to ensure that the forms
of employment generated for such youth attempt to promote socialisation while imparting
skills as well. This suggests that for the youth at the lower age range, a combination of safety
nets, education and work that provide adequate exchange entitlements would be the most
ideal set of interventions, even though this ideal might be difficult to achieve in practice. The
objectives of the various individual interventions are not necessarily compatible, which may
well result in a programme in which socialisation and human capital development must take
precedence over imparting skills for this category of the youth.
For the unemployed or underemployed youth in the middle group (between the ages of 15
years and 22 years perhaps), who ideally should be in school, but who physically and perhaps
emotionally, socially and culturally can work, the crucial requirement is that there should be a
balance between the need for them to be educated and the need for them to work.
Interventions targeted at this group need to be so designed as to forestall the negative effects
of the various vicious traps discussed above, such as those related to overdiscounting the
future due to low life expectancies, high unemployment rates among those with education, or
high dependency rates on relatives. Then, finally, for the older youth (those above the age of
22 years or so) the appropriate balance would perhaps entail relevant training while on the
job.
The strategic objectives in promoting youth employment may be threefold (Paving Pathways
to Work, 1987). The first is an education objective which seeks to enhance numeracy and
literacy among youth, impart basic life skills, give youth pre-vocational orientation, develop
their personalities and social skills, and impart to them a sense of socio-political awareness.
This calls for strengthening the education systems as well as enhancing access to education at
primary and secondary levels. Currently many African countries are close to meeting this
objective at the primary level but have a long way to go with respect to secondary education
given the low transition rates from primary to secondary school. This objective assumes
greater importance in the context of globalisation and the need to strengthen the international
competitiveness of economies. This first objective is unfortunately often underrated in policy
formulation given that its contribution to employment is rather indirect, but it is important in
ensuring that a basis for future human capital formation is preserved. The constraints imposed
by current economic reforms tend to compromise the attainment of this objective. The second
objective relates to the need to impart to the older youth technical and vocational skills in
48
terms of initial training, up-grading of skills, enhancing employability and promoting selfemployment. It is important that the first objective be promoted in a manner that is
compatible with this second objective. The problem that arises concerns the degree to which
such an objective can be pursued comprehensively and effectively for both the youth and
adults given limited resources. A third strategic objective relates to the need to insert youth
into income generating activities for both welfare and economic reasons. Preferably the
primary aim in this respect has to be the promotion of employment that is compatible with
overall restructuring and economic transformation. Again it is important that all three
objectives are pursued in a manner that is mutually reinforcing.
The range of possible interventions is quite broad given various considerations pertaining to
the way in which they may be targeted, located and financed. The need to ensure that some
programmes are directed specifically at youth can be justified on a number of grounds
including moral grounds, the need to reduce social pathologies associated with youth
unemployment which impose a cost on society, the need to enhance economic performance
and material welfare through the enhancement and preservation of human capital, and the
need to enhance economic efficiency and international competitiveness. On the basis of the
foregoing the financing of interventions targeted at youth may be made through a
combination of increased taxes, shifting the burden of costs onto the beneficiaries, some
degree of deficit spending, the reprioritisation of state expenditures, and through donor
assistance or any combination of all of these measures.
6.4
Interventions and programmes
In the countries covered by this study, various programmes have been initiated that directly
support the youth with the aim of improving their prospects in the labour market. Some are
large, nation-wide programmes, while others are much smaller and community based. In
most instances, these programmes have undergone revisions and transformations, based on
lessons from experience concerning what works and what does not. The objective of the
examination in this paper was, to the extent possible, to tease out ‘best practice’ arrangements
based on actual performance. To that end, an analytical distinction has been made between
reforms of the educational and training system; programmes for the provision of training and
other services; placement; and direct employment creation programmes.
Reforms of the educational and training systems generally aim to increase their relevance by
making them more 'demand-driven' and better geared towards the demands of the labour market.
The limited relevance of the education and training systems has often been identified as one
of the factors contributing to the high rate of youth unemployment in Africa. Current policies
in Zambia are an example of a comprehensive approach to improving the performance and
relevance of the formal training system. The reforms have been designed around major
changes of the institutional structure, management and organisation of training provision.
Key elements in the new system are a reduced role for the government, decentralisation,
flexibility and emphasis on entrepreneurship development.
Although the new legislative and regulatory framework has been completed, implementation
of the new TEVET Policy in Zambia has proved to be difficult. The TEVET Authority is not
yet in place, and much of the requirements of the new policy in terms of staffing and
infrastructure have not yet been met due to insufficient resources. Several funding options are
currently under consideration, while funding for certain components has been secured
through donor support.
49
The Mubarak-Kohl Initiative in Egypt represents an attempt to adapt the successful German
dual education and training system to the Egyptian context. The expected benefits of the
programme include the creation of employment for youth, the alleviation of certain skill
shortages, development and enhanced use of human resources, and increased (and more
efficient) production. A central principle of the programme is the establishment of a
partnership between the public and private sectors in both project management and cost
sharing. The pilot schemes of the Initiative have been started in three of the country’s new
cities and have been quite successful. However, their replicability throughout the country is
questionable. The participating cities were selected mainly because they had many medium
and large-scale enterprises, which were already involved in training. These enterprises were
highly motivated as they were already experiencing some skill shortages and hence had an
immediate interest in the programme. There are, however, very few modern enterprises in
rural areas where the majority of unemployed youth live, making it difficult to replicate the
programme here. There are also fears that the internships may have substitution effects as
interns may displace regular staff (‘bumping effect’).
Perhaps the most familiar initiatives that have been undertaken in virtually all countries in
Africa are those concerning the promotion of micro-, small- and medium-scale enterprises
(MSMEs), including informal sector development. The INSTARN project in Zimbabwe is an
example of a project in this field in which formal training and informal enterprise
development are successfully combined. The areas of intervention in the project are the
reinforcement of traditional apprenticeships, development of small business advisors,
provision of credit for small businesses, promotion of informal sector associations, and
assistance in marketing of informal sector products to the formal sector. The scheme has been
successful in creating employment within the host business, in formal employment or through
setting up new businesses. Owing to its relative success, the project is being extended to the
rest of Zimbabwe.
A comprehensive and integrated approach to enterprise development has been adopted in
South Africa. The approach was born out of a national consultative process, which started
with the President’s Conference on Small Business held in March 1995. Following the
conference, a white paper was published, resulting in the promulgation of the National Small
Businesses Act of 1997 that paved the way for the setting up of wholesale agencies charged
with spearheading a national strategy for developing and promoting small businesses. One
important aspect of the South African approach is the central role accorded to stakeholder
participation. Another feature of the initiatives undertaken is that social partners contribute to
the financing of the job creation programmes.
The programme on 'Support to Poverty Eradication through Decentralised Governance and
Private Sector Development' in Uganda is another example of an integrated approach to
private sector development. The programme covers the economic, physical, legal, regulatory
and institutional framework under which businesses function, emphasising an integrated
approach. The support activities ensure that all ingredients essential for a business to start,
operate and expand are available and accessible. These include business advisory services,
research and technology development, standardisation and quality control, and strengthening
private sector associations, among others. The programme assists enterprises to continuously
improve their efficiency and effectiveness.
The case of Uganda is of interest in that it has established fairly decentralised approaches to
the execution of many of its programmes and projects. The Private Sector Development
50
Project, for example, has clearly moved away from the traditional top-down approach, to a
grassroots-based approach. Such an approach enhances delivery and sustainability of
projects, especially in that local resources are easily tapped in support of the projects. It
engenders ownership of programmes and hence promotes self-reliance and sustainability. The
lessons from the Ugandan approach in the reliance on decentralised forms of delivery and
execution to enhance resource mobilisation, commitment of local beneficiaries and
legitimacy of programmes executed, could be complemented with lessons from South Africa
concerning institutional co-ordination, especially in so far as it calls for sector summits and
provincial implementation plans as well. To achieve greater efficiency in resource allocation
and a better fit between supply and demand for skills, a governance structure involving all
stakeholders is necessary to implement youth employment programmes. In the extreme cases
like Nigeria and Zimbabwe, where government monopolised the running of the major
programmes, problems of inadequate and declining resources, weak capacity, bureaucracy
and political interference have resulted in poor quality inputs and outputs.
The reforms of the formal training system in Zambia are necessary and they deserve support
in achieving their objectives. However, as in many other countries in Africa, the
overwhelming majority of the Zambian youth are not in a position to benefit from these
reforms, as they drop out of the educational system at much earlier stages. The inadequate
capacity in basic and secondary education, together with the introduction of cost-recovery
measures, has resulted in an increasing proportion of out-of-school youth in much of Africa.
The National Action Programme for Youth (NAPY) in Zambia was developed in recognition
of the extremely limited (institutional) support structure for this very large sub-group of the
youth. The Action Programme, and its implementation, serves to illustrate the inherently
conflictive nature of many programmes concerned with youth in Africa.
The NAPY envisages an expansion of the capacity to address the needs of out-of-school
youth. Youth Resource Centres are to be developed that offer a comprehensive package of
support services. This package consists primarily of relatively short courses that prepare
students for self-employment, the content of which would be based on a survey of local
labour market needs. Furthermore, the Programme includes the provision of related services,
for example microcredit and mentor support to youthful entrepreneurs. A range of additional
activities, such as the establishment of recreational and cultural facilities, and the
incorporation of family and environment education in the training programmes, completes the
transformation of the old generation Youth Skills Training Centres into fully-fledged
Resource Centres.
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Action Programme has been slow. Some Youth
Centres have been rehabilitated in terms of infrastructure and equipment, or are in the process
of rehabilitation. A range of donors have ‘adopted’ specific centres and are committed to
improvement of the infrastructure and in some cases also to curriculum development.
However, full implementation is hindered by limited funding from the government, as well as
by the lack of a professional institutional structure to manage the Programme. In recognition
of the need for support of out-of-school youth in many areas, the Programme also risks losing
its focus on training for self-employment. Some of the services are perhaps better left to
private providers, and the role of enterprise-based training through traditional apprenticeship
development could be strengthened. A clear distinction between social and other activities
would contribute to the effectiveness of the centres.
51
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