SOMALIA: TERRORIST HAVEN AND PROXY WARS
Laura Khor
PhD Candidate
University of St Andrews
Arts Faculty Building, Library Park
The Scores, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland
KY16 9AX
E-mail: lk74@st-andrews.ac.uk
Work in Progress
1
Introduction
Anarchy. Chaos. Terrorists. Safe havens. Warlords. Ungoverned Spaces. Arc of
Instability. Humanitarian problems. All of these words have been used to describe the
phenomenon of “Failed States”. The reality of “Failed States” poses a challenge for
conceptual frameworks, political norms and social construction and reconstruction of the
amorphous term and idea. Failed states are hard to categorize, as numerous studies and
debates have highlighted the problem of state weakness, failure and collapse. These are
all terms used to describe anomalies in the state system. One country in particular,
Somalia, can be considered a failure among failed states for the length and durability of
its failed state status. Somalia is a country that has been in a state of collapse since 1991
with the complete disintegration of the central government. The political rhetoric and
images of insecurity associated with the term “Failed States” are often images of violence
and complete anarchy. Images from the movie Black Hawk Down and the everyday
chaos reported in Somalia, the casebook example of a “Failed State”, are the first
associations of the “Failed States” for American Foreign Policy makers. 1 Lawlessness
and crime rule in failed states where governments, judiciary, and laws once operated and
reigned. Public policy, particularly the United States, was affected by a “Mogadishu
effect” that lasted for several years until transnational security issues and the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted a rethinking of failed states and security.2
Methodology
The methodology utilized in this paper will be focused on second hand resources,
interviews with military personnel from UNISOM 1 and UNISOM 2. In particular,
1
Mark Bowden Black Hawk Down (Great Britain: Bantam Press, 1999).
A term used by the author Jean Germain Gros, “Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World
Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti”, Third World Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 461
2
2
interviews with military personnel and policymakers, such as Brigadier General Latiff
who headed the Malaysian troops for the United Nations in UNOSOM 1 and 2 will
highlight the conceptualization and engagement with “Failed States”. The use of
process-tracing key events and American foreign policy responses will focus on the post9/11 security environment and the rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union. There are
several challenges to the use of the case study of Somalia, as few researchers have been
to the state and information can be sporadic due violence and other security issues and
concerns.
Constructing a Definition
The term “failed states” is a relatively new analytical term used to describe a
state, but the term and its definition and theory may not reflect political reality. These
terms have been used to describe virtual states in the international state system. The
definitions of “Failed States” are amorphous in academia and public policy, presenting a
contested issue for scholars, researchers and political actors. The complexity of defining
and constructing the threats “Failed States” become and pose is the foundation for the
broader issue of state failure and (in)security. The conceptualization of “Failed States” is
necessary to understand why the highly securitized construction of failed states represents
a shift in assessing and understanding transnational security threats. Author Robert I.
Rotberg argues that state failure is described as,
Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease
delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose
credibility, and the continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes
questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens.3
3
Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 1.
3
This definition does not define “failure” in delivering positive political goods. In
other words, how do we interpret a level for failure?
The Causes of State Failure
The use of the politically constructed term “Failed States” entered policy and
political rhetoric in the early and mid-1990s to describe the post-Cold War world.4 In
particular, the mainstream International Relations concept of “Failed States” is not an
analytically effective tool for fully comprehending the dynamism of state failure. The
dynamic causes and consequences of state failure and policy responses have been limited
to neorealist and neoliberal thinking which has resulted in mixed policy responses.
This short introduction to classifying such causes and indicators leading to state
failure hopes to highlight the complexity behind this terminology. The variety of
indicators used to determine state failure can vary from the simple to the complex. The
Failed State Index by Foreign Policy Magazine and the Fund for Peace utilizes 12
indicators as part of a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) when ranking 148
states.5 The 12 social, economic and political indicators for state vulnerability range from
“Chronic and Sustained Human Flight” to “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of
Helman, GB and Ratner, SR, ‘Saving failed states’, Foreign Policy, 89, 1992-1993, pp. 3-20 and Lymon,
Princeton, ‘The rise and fall and possible revival of international trusteeship’, Journal of Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics, 31 (1), 1993, pp. 96-110.
5
Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index”, May/June 2006,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420&page=8
CAST is “. . . is a flexible model that has the capability to employ a four-step trend-line analysis, consisting
of (1) rating 12 social, economic, and political/military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core
state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic factors and
surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the risk history of countries being
analyzed.”
Foreign Policy, “The Failed States Index” May/June 2006,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420&page=8
4
4
the State”6 The variety of indicators to identify a weak, failing, failed and collapsed state
illustrates the depth of the challenge of defining state failure.
All states are not the same in capacity, capability and political will. The variety
of states in the international system illustrates the difference between strong, weak,
collapsed and failed states. These labels are not interchangeable as they denote different
levels of states in the international political system. Authors Pinar Bilgin and Adam
David Morton argue that, “[T]he notion of a ‘failed’ state, for instance, is used to describe
the internal characteristics of a state, whereas ‘rogue’ states are labeled as such because
of their foreign policy behaviours.”7 A variety of terms, referring to a continuum of
troubled states in the international state system.
States are the “building blocks of world order”8 and are why the concept of state
failure is troubling to conceptualize and resuscitate. Throughout human history, nations,
regimes and empires have risen and fallen. Nation-states are the normative framework in
international relations theory and are the political reality that governs people, law, and
security. Nation-States are the political actors that are ascribed with specific rules and
expectations associated with sovereignty, but not all states have the political will or
capacity to fulfill their state obligations, political goods or sovereignty expectations.
State capacity and capability differ from country to country. Author Robert H.
Jackson introduced the concept of “quasi-states” to highlight the global political systems
dependence on such a unit of analysis and paradigm. Jackson was concerned with weak
The Fund for Peace, “The Twelve Indicators of CAST”,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindicators.php
7
Pinar Bilgan and Adam David Morton, Historicising representations of ‘failed states’: beyond the coldwar annexation of the social sciences? Third World Quarterly,Vol. 23, No 1, 2002, 56.
8
Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 1.
6
5
states that did not fulfill the traditional concept of state sovereignty. Jackson argues that,
“[T]he problem is that underdeveloped states claim both security rights and development
rights and the international community desires to acknowledge both claims but classical
rules of sovereign states-systems get in the way.”9 States that should not be considered
states, in the classical legal sense, are operating on two different definition levels of a
nation-state and are surviving due to stronger states aid and the flexibility of the “new
sovereignty game.”10 A “Failed State,” then, is a member of the international system but
the political reality is strikingly different from conceptual reality. State security is
complicated with the security issues and failure indicators of patrimonialism, warlordism,
poor economies, lack of or deteriorating civil society, and weak government institutions
exploited by elites.
State performance based on deliverance of political goods is pivotal to
understanding the difference between failing, failed, and collapsed states. States and state
performance should be conceptualized as a continuum of government effectiveness
described as strong states, weak states, failing states, failed states, and collapsed states.
Strong states and weak states have key differences. Author Robert I. Rotberg articulates
that strong states outperform weak states in performance of political will by delivering
political goods.11
9
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44.
10
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40.
11
Political goods defined by Robert I. Rotberg as:
“There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as critical as the supply of security, especially human
security . . . The state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security—to prevent cross-border
invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the
national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security;
and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without
6
Strong states unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full range and a
high quality of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to
indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House’s
Freedom of the World Report. Strong states offer high levels of security from
political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and
create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. The rule
of law prevails. Judges are independent. Road networks are well maintained.
Telephones work. . .Overall, strong states are places of enviable peace and
order.12
Strong states provide security within their borders to their citizens. In comparison,
weak states do not provide such levels of political will. The defining characteristics of
weak states, articulated by Rotberg, are:
Weak states (broadly states in crisis) include a broad continuum of states: they
may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental
economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but temporarily or
situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed,
despotism, or external attacks. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious,
linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet
thoroughly, become overtly violent . . . In weak states, the ability to provide
adequate amounts of other political goods is diminished or is diminishing . . .
Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach. They harass civi
society. Weak states are often rules by despots, elected or not.
All weak states do not necessarily slide into failing, failed or collapsed categories.
The threshold between state weakness transforming into state failure has additional
indicators tipping a state into failure. There are significant differences between a
failed and a collapsed state. “Failed States” do not remain fixed in their status or
history and can exhibit more than one failed state characteristic at once. 13 Specific
recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion. The deliver of a range of other desirable political
goods becomes possible when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained.
Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 3.
12
Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 4.
13
Jean-Germain Gros, “Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia,
Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti”, Third World Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 461.
7
indicators identify “Failed States”. Author A.J. Christopher highlights the
disintegration of central and local administrations as one cause leading to state
failure.14 “Failed States” may have regimes that target their own citizenry, encourages
or is even the cause of conflicts, which results in escalating criminal violence within
state borders. The legitimacy of the state is lost as the state infrastructure deteriorates
or is completely destroyed; the economy falters then collapses, key indicators to
identifying state failure.15 Overall, “Failed States” are either unable or unwilling to
carry on with the Hobbesian Social Contract. The collapse of the state infrastructure
and societal failure are viewed on a continuum that are interconnected and
interrelated to one another. One stage of failure inevitably leads to the other.16 All
failed states cannot be researched as the same entities. State failure can be understood
not as one level, rather a variety of levels. Scholar Jean Germain Gros proposed five
types of failed state categories or stages:
Five types of failed states are thus identified. First, there are anarchic states,
which by definition have no centralized government whatsoever . . . A close
cousin of the anarchic state is the phantom or mirage state, of which today’s Zaire
is an excellent example. The difference between an anarchic state and a phantom
one is that while all anarchic states are ipso facto phantom states, not all phantom
states are anarchic. . . Third, there are anaemic stats whose status stems from two
sources. States may be anaemic because their energy has been sapped by counterinsurgency groups seeking to take the place of the authority that is formally in
power. . . States may also be anaemic because the engines of modernity were
never put in place; as a result as population growth puts increasing demands on
archaic structures, state agents are in no position to assert effective control. . .
Fourth, there are captured states, which typically have a strong centralized
authority but one that is captured by members of insecure elites to frustrate—and
in the extreme eradicate—rival elites. . .Fifth, and finally, there are states that are
A.J Christopher, “‘Nation-states’, ‘quasi-states’, and ‘collapsed-states’, in contemporary Africa”,
GeoJournal, 1997 p. 92.
15
Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 6-9.
16
Timothy Raeymaekers, “Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa”, Conflict Research
Group, May 2005, p. 3.
14
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failed in vitro (they are called aborted states), meaning that they experienced
failure even before the process of state formation was consolidated.17
Gros’ failed state typology argues that state failure is subtly nuanced and occurs
in different stages.18 States can simultaneously exist within the five stages described by
Gros or go through various stages rapidly or begin an agonizing descent. State weakness
and failure are not terminal definitions. States can become strong states and reverse the
causes and indicators of their security situation.
Collapsed states have a variety of explanations from scholars, but the theoretical
framework to explain this phenomenon has also challenged academics and politicians.
Robert I. Rotberg describes a collapsed state as,
. . . is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political good are obtained
through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A
collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical
expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is a dark
energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto
provided some semblance or order and other vital political goods to the
inhabitants (no longer citizens) embraced by language or ethnic affinities or
borders.19
Rotberg emphasizes the lack of or excess of political goods to explain a collapsed state.
This is one perspective on state collapse. Author I. William Zartman defines state
collapse as,
Jean-Germain Gros, “Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia,
Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 458-461.
“To summarise, in the typology just presented five types of failed states may be identified on the world
scene: the anarchic (Somalia and Liberia), the phantom (Zaire), the anaemic (Haiti and Cambodia under
different circumstances), the captured (Rwanda), and the aborted (Bosnia).
Jean-Germain Gros, “Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia,
Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 461.
18
Jean-Germain Gros, “Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia,
Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti”, Third World Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 461.
19
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10-11.
17
9
State collapse is both the cause and the result of internal or civil wars, as weak
and illegitimate order permits violence and violence consumes legitimacy and
order. Although no two cases of state collapse are the same and “collapse” can
take on a variety of specific manifestations, the fundamental fact of the
disappearance of state institutions, law, and order creates inhumanities and
insecurities that affect the surrounding countries.20
Zartman focuses on state violence as the main impetus to cause state collapse.
While Author Douglas Dearth describes the shift from a weak state to a collapsed state
as,
[f]irst institutions fail to provide adequate services to the population. Second,
improperly channeled ethnic, social and ideological competitions erode the
effectiveness of these weak institutions and even more. Finally, the cumulative
effects of poverty, overpopulation, rural flight and rapid urbanization, as well as
environmental degradation, overwhelm the weak state to the point of collapse.21
All of these definitions and conceptions of the causes of state collapse illustrate
the variety in approach and construction of state weakness, failure and collapse.
In order to understand state failure, one must understand the structure that allows
such states to exist. States are the units of power and sovereignty for a people. A state has
a clear definition and function. Quasi-states, those states with “limited empirical
statehood”, have been operating in an international system that allows them to operate
without fulfilling the bare basics of positive sovereignty.22 In the Westphalian system, all
20
I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State
Collapse, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2005), 7.
21
David Carment, “Assessing state failure: implications for theory and policy”, Third World Quarterly Vol.
24, No. 3, p. 414.
22
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21.
Jackson describes positive sovereignty as, “Positive sovereignty likewise presupposes capabilities which
enable governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively
sovereign government is one which not only enjoys rights of nonintervention and other international
immunities but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens.
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 29.
10
states are treated equal even though many states are stronger than others in delivering
positive goods to their citizenry. Author Timothy Raeymaekers argues that,
The discussion on state collapse thus seems to be placed in a growing deadlock
between classical state-centrist approaches-which keep pointing at functional
problems-and more society-oriented insights that try to explain other political and
economic loyalties that have emerged in the context of weak state performance.23
The theoretical approaches and policy implemented focus on a complete rebuilding of the
failed state institutions and legitimacy. In the case of Somalia, the terms are used to refer
to a virtual state, it exists on a map but the physical reality of security, sovereignty and a
centralized government does not exist. As Brigadier General Latiff described the situation
in the early 1990s, and the government situation in Somalia during UN operations. In an
interview, Brigadier General Latiff highlighted the spoiler agendas challenging the UN’s
mandate of reconstruction and stabilization efforts for Somalia.
At that point in time, there was no proper government, there was no proper
government in the sense, you know, there was no government in Somalia
There was a interim President, interim President, by the name of Ali
Mahdi and that was a temporary sort of arrangement that we had and we
moved in . . .That particular operation to me was a success but in terms of
overall time we were there but unfortunately we did not manage to do
what we were suppose to do to build up and to help form a government
because the people, to my mind, there are a lot of agendas different
agendas especially the locals everybody wants to become the leader,
everybody wants to become president, everybody wants to become
ministers. So how do we do? How do we start from there? They got a lot
of clans every clan wants a representative in the council to me they have
not succeeded to form a government. . .24
There have been numerous attempts to form a centralized government in Somalia;
the current government is the Transitional Federal Government which has been operating
since October 2004.
Timothy Raeymaekers, “Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa”, Conflict Research
Group, Working Paper No 1 May 2005, p. 1.
24
Interview by author, Kuala Lumper, Malaysia, August 2007.
23
11
Somalia: Terrorist Paradise or GWOT Proxy War?
Somalia gained independence on June 1, 1960 when British and Italian colonies
were combined to form the Somali Republic. Independence on June 26, 1960 from
British Somaliland and July 1, 1960 from Italian Somaliland when the two were united to
form one united post-colonial rule country. The Somali people in these two colonial
countries share a common language, religion of Islam and customs and traditions.
Somalia has five major clan25 groups: the Dir, the Hawiye, the Isaq, the Darod, and the
Rahanweyn.26 The country had a multi-party clan-based political system that broke down
resulting in the 1969 military coup of Mohammad Siad Barre.27 As Hussein M. Adam
argued,
A foreign-expert-drafted ‘democratic’ constitution for Somalia turned out to lack
the sensitivity of the Issa elders; it overlooked, for example, electoral mechanism
necessary to minimize resilient clan loyalties and channel parochial interests
toward national objectives. . . As the years passed, nation oriented political parties
degenerated into clan, subclan and even one-man parties. By the end of the
decade, Somalia was suffering under a general atmosphere of cutthroat
competition, corruption, incompetence and irresponsibility.28
In 1969, Commander of the Somali National Army Mohamed Siad Barre led a
coup against the government and was President of Somalia for twenty-two years until the
collapse of the central government in January 1991.29 Barre was guided by socialist
25
A clan is defined as:
A large group of people believed to be descendents through males of a common ancestor whose name is
also the name of the clan. Several clans constitute a clan-family (q.v.), and each clan is divided into a
number of lineages (q.v.).
Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2002, p. 75.
26
Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2002, p. 1.
27
I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State
Collapse, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005, p. 77.
28
Hussein M. Adam, ‘Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?” Review of African Political
Economy, No. 54, (Jul 1992), pp. 16-17.
29
Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), pp. 16-17.
12
policies throughout his Presidency until the 1980s, when he sought the financial aid of
the United States. Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, a country with geo-strategic
value in both the Cold War and in the Global War on Terror. The Cold War found
Somalia being supported by both the USSR and the United States. As John Predergrast
asserted,
During the Cold War, the official deference accorded to state sovereignty was an
important element in Western aid-related sponsorship of anti-communist alliances
in the Third World. The effects of internal war were as real then s they are now
but donor states were inclined to disregard evidence of human rights abuses on
the part of allies and potential client states while highlighting those of
adversaries.30
The United States and Somalia have a complicated history of political and
military engagement from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror. Somalia’s
connections with Al-Qaeda and the rise and fall of the Islamic Court Union are a few
examples of the security threats present in and from Somalia. The use of the Somalia
state in direct connection to United States Embassy bombings complicating the security
interests in the Horn of Africa for the United States. In particular, the policies and
military strategy utilized to respond to the collapsed state of Somalia.
This paper will address the questions of state collapse and the challenge of
engagement for state-centric policies and frameworks, focusing on Somalia and
American engagement in the post-9/11 era. Authors Boas and Jennings argue, “‘[s]tate
failure’ assumes all states are constituted and function in the same way: on a spectrum
from good to bad.”31 In short, if a country is a liberal democratic state then you are
positively perceived, but if a country is defined as a “failed state” that represents a weak
Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, “Sovereignty and Intevention after the Cold War: Lessons from the
Emergency Relief Desk”, Middle East Report, No. 187/188, (Mar.-Jun., 1994) p. 10
31
Morten Boas and Kathleen M. Jennings, “Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the ‘Failed
State’”, The European Journal of Development, p. 385.
30
13
security situation for not only the “failed” country but also for other countries’ security,
specifically liberal democratic countries. The realist viewpoint of “failed states” views
such states as an anomaly in international relations. State failure is perceived as an end
and thus the state is viewed through a zero-sum approach that directly impacts analysis
and policy response.32
The post-September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have resulted in failed states being
rediscovered. President George W. Bush’s administration has directly established the link
between failed states and terrorism since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America explicitly states,
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” 33 The
United States Department of State Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) further articulates the threat of failed states that communicates a
clear link between failed states and terrorism threats.
Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international
security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their
neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. Struggling states can provide breeding groups
for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can
destabilize and entire region. Experience shows that managing conflict,
particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a
mainstream part of our foreign policy.34
Fundamental changes in American foreign policy are required for addressing the
complexity of failed states and acknowledging failed states impact on, not only,
Zero-sum approach is defined in this paper as, “[t]echnically, where one party’s gain is the other’s loss
we should refer to constant-sum conflicts, and where both can lose or both can gain, no-constant –sum.
However, the zero-sum and non-zero-sum language has passed into general usage, though it is less
precise.”
Oliver Ramsbotham. Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, (ed.), Contemporary Conflict Resolution
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 332.
33
National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html
34
The United States Department of State, “About S/CRS”
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm
32
14
American security but global security. The “Mogadishu effect” in United States Foreign
Policy has transitioned from Operation Restore Hope which resulted in a lack of
engagement with failed states to the new “transformational democracy” to “today’s
greatest security challenge.”
The Failure of Somalia
The problem of state-failure is one of the greatest political and humanitarian challenges
facing the world in the twenty-first century. . . Although the problem of state failure has
moved to the forefront of international concerns in recent years, we know very little
about what to do in situations where it has occurred.35
.
In the post-9/11 world, the significance of Somalia and the Horn of Africa has
attracted intense scrutiny as a security threat. The Council on Foreign Relations
Independent Task Force reported that, “[t]he U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
recently announced that it anticipates high back-migration into the Horn of trained
jihadists.”36 The appeal of a failed state for operations, Somalia in particular, are porous
borders, political instability offering safe haven, and transit points for terrorists and other
criminal elements. The United States Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism reported:
Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, protracted state of violent
instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian
Peninsula made it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or
launching point to conduct operations elsewhere.37
Jens Meierhenrich, “Forming States after Failure”, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 153.
36
Council on Foreign Relations, “More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward
Africa”, Independent Task Force Report No. 56, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Africa_Task_Force_Web.pdf
p. 55.
37
United States Department of State, “2005 Country Reports on Terrorism”, Chapter 5-Country Reports:
Africa Overview, p. 6,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64335.htm
35
15
Early evidence suggests that Somalia is being used as a terrorist safe haven.38 The
United States State Department has identified numerous terrorist groups operating within
Somalia such as the Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), Majma
Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaaliya (Majma’), Takfir wal-Hijra (al-Takfir), and the alIttihad al-Islami (AIAI).39 The International Crisis Group reported there is a “rise of a
new ruthless, independent jihadi network with links to Al-Qaeda. The group is based in
lawless Mogadishu and led by a young militia leader trained in Afghanistan.”40 This
particular group is linked to the murder of four foreign aid workers in Somaliland. The
combination of Al-Qaeda, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), and a new group associated with
Al-Qaeda operating within Somalia is a pressing issue for security and counter-terrorism
efforts. The AIAI has increased activities throughout Somalia and is gaining influence
through its membership. Scholar Dr. J. Peter Pham argued:
In short, the chaotic situation across the entire former territories of the defunct Somali
Democratic Republic (with the exception of Somaliland) created the conditions for
the advent of the Islamists of al-Itihaad in the same way that the Taliban of
Afghanistan arose out of that country’s anarchy as a force for order amid factious
leaders and their rapacious militias. . . So while these circumstances the Somali
people’s embrace of the undeniable benefits brought by the Islamists does not
necessarily imply approval of the al-Itihaad political agenda, it would be delusional to
believe that they will not become, however gradually, ideologically and politically
Eben Kaplan, “Somalia’s Terrorist Infestation”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10781/somalias_terrorist_infestation.html?
39
United States Department of State, “2005 Country Reports on Terrorism”, Chapter 5-Country Reports:
Africa Overview, p. 7,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64335.htm
For more detailed information regarding these groups, please refer to the
United States Department of Sate, “2005 Country Reports on Terrorism,” Chapter 8-Foreign Terrorist
Organizations,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65479.pdf
38
International Crisis Group, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?” Africa Report
No. 95, 11 July 2005, p. i.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/095_counter_terrorism_in_somalia.pdf
40
16
influenced by the Islamists’ social programs, which are focused on the long-term,
sustained growth of the movement.41
AIAI began operating as a militia-faction during the Barre regime, but has a key
difference in that the politically motivated Islamist movement has the ability to “construct
a cross-clan and national movement based on the appeal of Islamist ideology as an
alternative to a failed nationalism and divisive clanism.”42 AIAI has consolidated power
through military movement, social, political and economic methods ranging from
establishing Shari’a courts to remittance companies.43 It should be noted that the country
is not completely rife with jihadi militants. The International Crisis Group and scholar
Ken Menkhaus argue that such militant Islamic leanings are among a minority of the
population. The International Crisis Group argued:
The notoriety and effectiveness of these militants has contributed to perceptions
of Somalia as a breeding ground for Islamist extremism and a hub of terrorist
activity. A March 2005 UN report portrayed Somalia as home to an
"army" of jihadi fighters supported by a network of at least seventeen terrorist
training camps.3 In reality, jihadism is an unpopular, minority trend among
Somali Islamists. Al-Itihaad's military wing has been largely dismantled, the new
jihadi network's effective membership probably is in the tens rather than the
hundreds, and ranking al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia probably number less than
half a dozen. Several Western countries host larger and more sophisticated jihadi
networks.44
The Council on Foreign Relations, the United States Department of State and
academic scholars have written extensively on the link between terrorists and
Dr. J. Peter Pham, “Somalia: Expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa” Testimony before the House
Committee on International Relations Subcommittees on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International
Operations and International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, June 29, 2006, p. 5.
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/pha062906.pdf
42
Andre Le Sage, “Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia”, Review of African Political
Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89, p. 473.
43
Andre Le Sage, “Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia”, Review of African Political
Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89, pp. 473-476.
44
International Crisis Group, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?”, Africa Report
No. 95, 11 July 2005, p. 1.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/095_counter_terrorism_in_somalia.pdf
41
17
Somalia. American politicians and analysts have asserted that the attacks on the U.S.
Embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania were launched and planned from Somalia by
those now in power.45 The United States lacks a solid public policy toward Somalia.
The alleged United States Somalia policy was to support the Alliance for the
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, a group formulated by Mogadishu’s
most powerful warlords.46 Newspapers have speculated the suspected link between
the United States and Somali warlords, but have such assertions have not been
confirmed by any United States government official.47 These rumors do not improve
the image of American policy towards Somalia for Somali citizens.
Several newspapers have asserted that the United States has aligned itself with
warlords in Somalia to address the security situation.48 Author Eben Kaplan argues:
The amount of U.S. support for the warlords, if any, is small. There are no U.S
troops in Somalia, and an arms embargo forbids providing weapons. Experts say
the United States is likely communicating with the warlords and possibly
providing them with some money. Even this level of involvement has caused
some discontent within the TFIs. As Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi told the
Washington Post, “we would prefer that the U.S. work within the transitional
government and not with criminals.”49
The Honorable Chris Smith, “Opening Statement”, “Somalia: Expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa”
Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittees on Africa, Global
Human Rights, and International Operations and International Operations, June 29, 2006, p. 1.
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/smith062906.pdf
46
John Predergast, “More than Counter-Terrorism: Rethinking U.S. Policy toward Somalia”, Testimony to
the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and
International Operations, June 29, 2006.
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/pre062906.pdf
47
Joseph Winter, “Is Somalia next for ‘war on terror’?”, BBC News, June 7, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4841170.stm
45
48
Such examples are: BBC News, CNN.com and the Washington Post.
Eben Kaplan, “Somalia’s Terrorist Infestation”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10781/somalias_terrorist_infestation.html?
49
18
In the time period from June to December 2006, a militia run by the Union of
Islamic Courts (UIC) defeated warlords in Mogadishu. The UIC is a body that
includes a range of Islamic ideologies and Islamic groups, but a major concern is that
extremists “have been rapidly consolidating their influence with the courts.”50 The
concern for the United States with these new events in Somalia is the possibility of
terrorists receiving safe havens from the Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and
other areas in the country where the Courts operate. Mogadishu businessmen
financially fund the Union of Islamic Courts, a network of eleven Islamic Courts, but
the funding and military arms of the Islamic courts militia is ambiguous. The BBC
News and CNN report that Saudi Arabia and many other wealthy foreign investors
have supported the Islamic Court militia. The weapons supplied to the Islamic Court
militia are reportedly from Eritrea, while Ethiopia supplies arms to the Somali interim
government.51 The fighting between warlords and the Islamic Court militia has
resulted in the defeat and exile of many key warlords.
The BBC News reports that Mohamed Afrah Qanyare, Bashir Ragge, and Muse
Sudi Yalahow have fled Mogadishu to El Bur in central Somalia. Abdi Hassan Awale
Qeybdid is reported to have fled the city after a defeat by the Islamists. Omar Finish
is reported to have pledged allegiance to the courts and is still in Mogadishu.52 The
Union of Islamic Courts and the Islamic Court militia have succeeded where the
Dr. Saad Noor, “Somaliland: Past, Present and Future” Testimony before the House Committee on
International Relations Subcommittees on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations and
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, June 29, 2006, p. 6.
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/pha062906.pdf
51
BBC News, “Q & A: Somali Islamist Advance”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4760775.stm
The Associated Press, “Somalia says Eritrea sending arms to militants”,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/07/26/somalia.ap/index.html
52
BBC News, “Q & A: Somali Islamist Advance”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4760775.stm
50
19
United Nations and United States failed, defeating the warlords in Mogadishu. The
defeat of warlords affords more security for Somali citizens, but raises political and
security concerns for the region and world.
The rise of the Islamic Courts and the Islamic Court militia with the weak
Transitional Federal Government elevated several security concerns. As scholar Ken
Menkhaus articulated:
There are several distinct threats which radical Islam may pose in Somalia. The
first is the negative impact of ascendant political Islam as an alternative system of
governance. . . A second concern is over the possibility of Somali Islamists
engaging in direct acts of terrorism.53
The permeable political climate of Somalia has made it ripe for an increase in
presence and power by the Union of Islamic Courts in its affairs. This raises a
concern for the legitimacy and power of the Transitional Federal Government. The
leadership of the Islamic Courts is in the consultative council, or majlis al-shura,
which is the political and spiritual body of the Courts. The new leader of the
consultative council is Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a man suspected of being an AlQaeda collaborator by the United States Department of State.54 Somali first minister
Ali Mohamed Gedi has stated that, “Talking to Islamic Leader is like having
discussions with Osama Bin Laden.”55 Aweys is a former army colonel and Muslim
scholar who has denied links to Al-Qaeda. The Chairmen of the Union of Islamic
Courts, Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, sent a letter sent to the international
53
Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and Threat of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), p. 55.
54
The Associated Press, “New Somali Leader Tied to Al Qaeda?”, June 24, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/24/world/main1749340.shtml?source=RSS&attr=HOME_17493
40
55
Shabelle Media Network, “Govt Compares Sheik Aweys with Bin Laden”, July 10, 2006,
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200607100059.html
20
community, stating, “[w]e categorically deny and reject any accusation that we are
harboring any terrorists or supporters of terrorism in the areas where the courts
operate.”56 The letter continues with an explanation of goals such as a system of
governance established, rehabilitation and rebuilding of Somalia and the desire for an
establishment of a relationship with the international community.57 Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys, the leader of the Islamic Courts consultative body, the majlis al-shura,
did not sign the letter. It is unclear whether Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has more
power than Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and is a situation to monitor.58
Sean McCormack, a State Department spokesman, stated that the United States
will not work with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aways. “Certainly, of course, we’re not
going to work with somebody like that,” McCormack said. “And of course, we would
be troubled if this is an indicator of the direction the group would go in.”59 The
challenge facing current policymakers is which political power will be accepted and
successful in Somalia. According to Newsweek, an ICU propaganda video titled
“Punishment of the Converts” features pro-terrorist rhetoric by ICU’s key military
leadership and shows an Islamist training camp in Somalia.60 In an copy obtained by
Newsweek, the Islamic militia’s internal newspaper ran the headline: “TERRORISM,
EXTREMISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM ARE PART OF ISLAM AND
Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, “We Deny That We Are Harboring Terrorists”, Time Magazine, June 06,
2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1201291,00.html
56
Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, “We Deny That We Are Harboring Terrorists”, Time Magazine, June 06,
2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1201291,00.html
58
Joseph Winter, “Profile: Somalia’s Islamist leader”, BBC News, June 30, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5120242.stm
59
Matt Smith and Elise Labott, “U.S. Won’t Deal with Somalia Islamist”, June 26, 2006,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/06/26/us.somalia.index.html
60
Rod Nordland,“Somalia: An African Taliban?”, Newsweek, July 31, 2006, p. 45.
57
21
GOOD.”61 The role of the Islamic Courts, Islamic Court militia and the leadership of
Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys are new security issues in Somalia.
The rise and collapse of the Islamic Courts presents concerns of a possible
regional war in the Horn of Africa.62 The UIC militia advanced to within 60 miles of
Baidoa to establish a Shari’a court causing Ethiopia to send troops to aid the
Transitional Federal Government.63 Francois Lonseny Fall, the United Nations
special representative for Somalia, warned the UN Security Council that, “if
something is not done now, this conflict might have some regional dimension”.64 The
conflict now has regional and international dimensions, with Ethiopia conducting
counter-insurgency operations with the support of the United States. The United
States is supporting a proxy war in the Horn of Africa under the auspices of
combating terrorists in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
The International Somalia Contact Group, the United States, African Union and
Arab League have been encouraging dialogue between all parties, including the UIC
and TFI, in Somalia.65 The dialogue failed resulting in military action being taken by
Ethiopia directly against the Islamic Courts Union. This engagment resulted in the
Islamic Courts losing power and control of Mogadishu in December 2006. The
current security situation is focused on counter-insurgency against Islamist fighters
Rod Nordland, “Somalia: An African Taliban?”, Newsweek, July 31, 2006, p. 45.
BBC News, “Somalia warning for Horn rivals”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5219514.stm
63
The Associated Press, “Ethiopia troops cross into Somalia”, July 20, 2006,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/07/20/somalia.fightering.ap/index.html and
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/07/21/somalia.fighting.ap/index.html
61
62
United Nations Press Conference, “Press Conference by Secretary-Generals Special Representative for
Somalia” June 19, 2006,
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060619_Fall.doc.htm
65
Norway Mission to the United Nations, “Norway chairs the International Somalia Contact Group”,
http://www.norway-un.org/News/20060615_somalia.htm
64
22
still in Somalia. The political situation is ever evolving in Somalia as it represents a
permeable case study. Somalia’s political situation is never stable and sadly looks to
be the case for the near future.66The rise of the Islamic Courts, the Islamic Courts
militia, the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aways, and the fragility of the
Transitional Federal Government makes Somalia a virtual state for the study of failed
states, terrorism and American Foreign Policy.
Implications of Proxy Wars, GWOT, and Failed States
T.E. Lawrence stated that, “. . . to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow,
like eating soup with a knife.”67 Ethiopian troops have been engaged in what has been
described as counter-insurgency against Islamist insurgents. The United States is
supporting this effort, but in limited avenues. The United States has opted to work
with non-state actors as a counter-terrorism strategy. Ken Menkhaus found, “[t]hese
local partners included businessmen and militia leaders, including some who arguably
could be considered warlords…[m]aking matters worse, the various American allies
were local rivals and their militias frequently clashed, so there was little collaboration
among. US agents pressed their local partners to work together.” The lack of
collaboration and developing security situation presents several challenges for
stability and reconstruction efforts.
66
News articles concerning the shift in political landscape have appeared in newspapers almost every day
during Summer 2006.
67
T.E. Lawrence, “Evolution of a Revolt”,
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lawrence/lawrence.asp
23
In an interview, Le Sage argued that Ethiopian troops were facing an insurgency.
Le Sage, an assistant professor for terrorism and counterterrorism at the Africa Center
for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, argued:
And Ethiopian troops, the sooner they get out, in many respects, the better. It will
prevent the Somali people from rising up against the Ethiopians as an occupying
force and the beginning of an insurgency. That insurgency could just be a clan
insurgency, a public insurgency against Ethiopia, but it will definitely be
something that remnants of the al-Qaida cells and the Union of Islamic Courts
would try to take advantage of.68
The resulting proxy war has prompted many to argue that America’s strategy is
losing “hearts and minds” in the Global War on Terror in Somalia. On January 8, 2007
the first United States air strike on three suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Southern
Somalia. This has been the mark of the first projection of American military force in
Somalia since Operation Restore Hope.69 “Failed States” do not present ideal terrorist
safe havens, rather it is weak states with some forms of infrastructure and security. On
the surface analysis, such states are ideal but the chronic instability and shifting political
and security alliances make such states not ideal safe havens for terrorist activities. In the
case of Somalia and the clan system, in order to operate effectively, alliances with clan
leaders must be made which can alienate other clans leading to assured vulnerability.
Somalia has not yet become a terrorist haven and camp, rather the space has been used as
a transit point for terrorist activities in the cases of the terrorist bombings of the US
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August 1998. There have
been no other linked terrorist attacks or acts of terrorism from the geographic space of
PBS Online Newshour, “U.S. Launches Airstrike in Southern Somalia”
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june07/somalia_01-09.html
68
Ken Menkhaus, “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts”, African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 204, p.
368.
69
24
Somalia. The security situation in Somalia, in the case of the rise and fall of the ICU,
presents other nations challenges as the “state” of Somalia exists only on maps, merely a
virtual reality not reflecting reality.
25
Bibliography-Work in progress
26