44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island
Citation: 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
Facts of the Case
Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where
liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did
not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it
would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Question
Is Rhode Island's statute an infringement on the First Amendment right to commercial freedom
of speech? If it is, can Rhode Island still pass such legislation under the Twenty-first
Amendment which limits the dormant Commerce Clause by empowering the states to regulate
the sale of alcohol?
Conclusion
Yes and no. In a fractious opinon for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's
statutory ban on liquor price advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of the liquor
sellers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In response to Rhode Island's claim that it
passed the statutory ban to protect consumers from "commercial harms," Justice Stevens held
that governmental impediments to truthful and accurate commercial messages rarely protect
consumers. On the contrary, courts must take "special care" when considering such
"protective" measures since they often hinder public choice and obstruct necessary debate
over public policy issues. Furthermore, Rhode Island failed to show that its statutory ban would
lower market-wide liquor consumption, must less alter alcohol consumption among abusive
drinkers who are most in need of assistance. Finally, Justice Stevens held that although the
Twenty-first Amendment did empower Rhode Island to regulate the sale of liquor, such
regulatory power is not to be exercised to the detriment of its constitutional obligation to protect
and abide by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association
Citation: 544 U.S. 550 (2005)
Consolidated:
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al., No. 03-1165
Facts of the Case
The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic
beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed
with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of
Agriculture (DEA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising
with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free
speech. The DEA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First
Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with
the DEA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The
district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First
Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.
Question
Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by
requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree?
Conclusion
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for
government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First
Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech
raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does
not.
Allegheny v. ACLU
Citation: 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
Consolidated:
Chabad v. American Civil Liberties Union et al., No. 88-90; City of Pittsburgh v. American Civil
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, et al., No. 88-96
Facts of the Case
Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the
American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the
Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected
each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU
claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together
with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.
Question
Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the crèche inside the courthouse unmistakably
endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the
words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it
supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all
religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the
justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given
its "particular physical setting."
McCreary County v. ACLU
Citation: 545 U.S. ___ (2005)
Facts of the Case
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district
court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public
schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause,
which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion."
The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the
establishment clause.
Question
1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First
Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting
an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to
advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?
Conclusion
Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the
displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance
religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded
that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten
Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other
religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the
"Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a
religious document on the walls of courthouses."
Epperson v. Arkansas
Citation: 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
Facts of the Case
The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools
from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school
teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as
the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated his free speech
rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.
Question
Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech rights of teachers
or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the
beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the
biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material
objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion.
Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public
schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First
Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it
violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was
unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.
Employment Division v. Smith
Citation: 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
Facts of the Case
Two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization,
ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members
of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired
the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government
denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related
"misconduct." The counselors lost their battle in state court. But the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and
returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal
drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal
drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the free exercise clause. The
case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.
Question
Does the state law violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
No. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or
regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory
military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
Citation: 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
Facts of the Case
A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an
advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist
minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an
outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and
was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.
Question
Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently
offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional
distress?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not
recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending
publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court
added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the
state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such
speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.