PERU’S 2006 SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM
The Beginning
In 2001, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) suggested that Peru’s ratio of credit to GNP could almost double from approximately 28% to 55% if laws regarding creditor protection were enhanced
1
. During the same year, the government of Peru acknowledged the problem the country was facing with respect to lending to the private sector. “Although the Peruvian banks grant 90% of the financing for businesses, [the funds] that they input in the financial system only represent 26% of the GDP. This percentage is very low compared to the 70% in Chile or the 150% in the United States and Canada” 2
, stated the Minister of Economy and Finance of Peru in 2001. In practice, it meant that Peruvian banks were granting much less credit than their foreign counterparts (Appendix I). Interestingly, the 2001 IADB study had concluded that most of this difference in size between credit markets in Latin America and the more developed countries, such as Canada and the United States, came from institutional issues. Clearly, inadequate collateral laws stood among the most important of these issues. With study groups pointing to problems in the country’s system of collateral law, and the Inter-American Development Bank’s insistence on reform as part of a loan package, the Peruvian government moved to implement a new law in June, 2006.
Prior to the 2006 reform, creating, registering and executing security interests in Peru presented many difficulties. For example, the government had noted that: “for producers, moveable properties represent, on average, two-thirds of their capital”
3
. This was also the case for many other types of businesses. Yet, prior to the reform, the law would not allow the use of most types of moveable property as collateral.
3
In other words, small and medium businesses could not use the largest share of their assets as collateral. This state of the law was limiting access to credit for small businesses.
1 In comparison, the study demonstrated that in OECD countries, the credit-GDP ratio increase would only be approximately 7 points if effective creditor protection were enhanced. According to the authors, the results of this analysis came from a regression that controls for growth, the size of the economy, and additional macroeconomic imbalances such as inflation and fiscal deficits. Arturo Galindo, Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand?, Prepared for the Seminar: “Towards Competitiveness: The
Institutional Path”, Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, Inter-American Development Bank and
Inter-American Investment Corporation, Santiago, Chile, March 16, 2001.
2 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Documento de Trabajo “Facilitando el Acceso al Crédito mediante un Sistema Eficaz de Garantías Reales”, Lima, julio de 2001. For further information on the situation of
Peru in 2001 relative to other countries, please see Appendix I.
3 Ibid
, p. 36. “For producers, moveable properties represent, on average, two-thirds of their capital, and
60% of their gross investment, while for the agricultural sector, it represents 75% of the gross investment.
For merchants, and non-industrial small and medium-sized companies, for every dollar invested in immovable property, 10 to 20 dollars of investment in moveable goods is required.”

Before it all Started
Prior to the reform, Peru’s laws on secured transactions were burdensome and inefficient on all levels, from the creation of a security interest to its execution. For example, parties needed to specifically describe in their agreement the limited number of movable assets that they were allowed to use as collateral. The requirement to include specific description of assets in the collateral agreement limited the use of key classes of business assets -such as inventory or accounts receivables- as collateral. Peru also had over 20 different types of secured interests, making creating a security agreement even more confusing and complicated for lenders and borrowers
4
. “Transaction costs rise when much time and effort must be devoted to determining whether the law permits taking a security interest in a particular item.” 5
With regards to the registration of security interests, Peru used to have 17 different registries for different kinds of assets 6 , each one having its own regulations and requirements. This system created a lot of confusion and uncertainty. For example,
“should the pledge of a fishing company’s boat be registered in the boat registry, the company registry, or the registry of inventory? And if more than one pledge is filed in more than one place, which has priority.
7 ” In addition, having to consult a number of registries would translate into increased transactions costs.
Finally, when the debtor defaulted, the procedure for the creditor to enforce on the collateral was slow and onerous. “Oftentimes, the execution of the security interest would take a time longer than the economic life of most moveable goods, to the level that the
4 1. Regular Pledge (Civil Code); 2. Commercial Pledge (Commercial Code); 3. Stock Pledge (General
Societal Laws and Stock Market Laws); 4. Pledge on interest in outstanding credit (Civil Code and
Securities Code); 5. Agricultural Pledge (Law No. 2420 of 1916); 6. Industrial Pledge (General Industrial
Law of 1982); 7. Mining Pledge and Mortgage (General Mining Law); 8. Warrants (General Law of
Warehouse Inventory); 9. Real Property Mortgage (Civil Code); 10. Vessel Mortgage (Maritime Mortgage
Law); 11. Aircraft Mortgage (Civil Aeronautic Law); 12. Fishing Vessel Mortgage; 13. Rural property mortgage; 14. Antichresis (Civil Code); 15. Trust in security (General Finance Laws); 16. Financial Lease;
17. Sale with no transference of title (Civil Code); 18. Right to withhold (Civil Code); 19. Floating pledge
(General Finance Laws); 20. Engines and aircraft pledge (Civil Aeronautic Law); 21. Stock Security
(General Societal Law); 22. Pledge in debtor’s intangible rights (INDECOPI: National Institute for the
Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property); 23. Pledge in a credit to a third party (Credit
Instruments)
5 For example, “fish meal can be pledged as collateral because it can meet Peru’s legal requirements for specific identification through the identification number stenciled onto each pallet. But fruit concentrate, stored in containers of no standard size and with no identification, cannot meet those requirements and so cannot serve as collateral.” Heywood Fleisig, Mehnaz Safavian, Nuria de la Peña , Reforming Collateral
Laws to Expand Access to Finance, The World Bank, Washington D.C., August 2006
6 1. Agricultural Pledge Registry; 2. Motor Pledge Registry; 3. Industrial Pledge Registry; 4. Mining Rights
Registry; 5. Registry of Assets represented by book-entries; 6. Fiscal Registry of Installment Sales; 7.
Registry of Urban Property; 8. Special Registry of Rural Property; 9. Naval Vessel Registry; 10. Aircraft
Registry; 11. Motor Vehicle Registry; 12. Real Estate Registry; 13. Registry of Global and Floating
Pledges; 14. Trademarks Registry; 15. Patent Registry; 16. Copyright Registry; 17. Fishing Vessel Registry
7 Ibid.

depreciation of the asset would reduce the value to zero at the time of collection.” 8
According to the Minister of Economics and Finance, the judicial execution of a security interest in Peru in 2001 took between 18 and 24 months. “If the creditor could recuperate his money in a period of three months from the date of non-compliance, the applicable interest rate could reduce to up to three percentage points.
9 ”
How it all Started
In 1996, the Centre for the Economic Analysis of the Law (CEAL) carried a study, illustrating how the shortcomings in the Peruvian secured transactions laws limited access to credit.
10
. This motivated the IADB to subordinate the provision of loans to Peru to the country’s reform of its secured transactions rules. The main challenge, at this point, was that the “Banking community and friends in counterpart agency (Ministry of
Economy and Finance – MEF) did not understand the idea very well and did not like what little they understood.
11 ”
Following the IADB’s requirement, in August 2000, the government held workshops to examine the draft report established by the CEAL consultants
12
. At these meetings, various business groups provided very positive responses, identifying how moveable property guarantees could benefit their particular businesses. According to the IADB, although the MEF was invited to all workshop meetings, it showed “minimal interest
13 ” at this stage.
Following these workshops, the consultants at CEAL distributed their final report, which ultimately was published by a local university in December, 2000
14
. The turning point in the local attitude towards the reform occurred in January, 2001 when the Lima Bar
Association endorsed the main recommendations of the consultants’ report.
Subsequently, in June, the MEF formed a Commission to review the issue. In July, the
MEF Cabinet of Advisors released a “white paper”. This document restated the principal criticisms formulated against the current system and proposed changes in the law as well
8 Mr. Mario Castillo Freyre, a legal expert in this field mentioned that this was one of the concerns of the advocates of reform. Mario Castillo Freyre, Analisis de la Ley de la Garantia Mobiliaria, Palestra Editores,
Lima, Peru, 2006, referring to studies done by other experts such as Cantuarias Salaverry, Fernando Nuria de la Peña, and Haywood W. Fleisig, Trabas Legals al Credito en el Peru: Garantias Mobiliarias. UPC,
Lima, 2000.
9 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Documento de Trabajo Facilitando el Acceso al Crédito mediante un
Sistema Eficaz de Garantías Reales, Lima, July, 2001.
10 Heywood W. Fleisig, Nuria de la Peña, Peru: How Problems in the Framework for Secured Transactions
Limit Access to Credit, Centre for the Economic Analysis of the Law, May 1996, http://ceal.org/cealorg/publications/peru22.pdf
11 Implementing a Secured Transactions Framework in Peru: Utilizing the Tools of Policy Based Lending,
August 10, 2005, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=574550
12 These meetings included all major private-sector stakeholder groups: Colegio de Abogados de Lima,
Camara Nal. Forestal, Assoc. Empresarios Agrarios, Cámaras de Comercio, Asociación de Exportadores
(ADEX), Bolsa de Valores, Asoc. De Bancos, etc.
13 Implementing a Secured Transactions Framework in Peru: Utilizing the Tools of Policy Based Lending,
August 10, 2005, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=574550
14 Cantuarias Salaverry, Fernando Nuria de la Peña, and Haywood W. Fleisig, Trabas Legales al Crédito en el Perú: Garantías Mobiliarias. UPC, Lima, 2000.

as the creation of a unified registry
15
. Pursuant to this paper, the MEF set up a
Commission to draft a Proyecto Ley de Garantia Mobiliaria (Bill on Guarantees based on Moveable Property) 16 .
The Commission on Economy and Financial Intelligence, the consultants who were hired to critique the first draft of the law, as well as the National
Forum on Competitiveness (Foro Nacional de Competitividad) -which held nine seminars in February, 2003- modified the text of the law. Eventually, the executive power presented the Bill to the Congress on December 19, 2003.
Meanwhile, in November, 2003, the IADB, as part of a Competitiveness Reform
Program, turned the reform of collateral law into a condition of its new loan to Peru.
After further negotiations and concessions made to the notaries who wished to maintain a role in the new system, and some politicians who were reluctant to give absolute priority to secured creditors over salary claims by workers 17 , the law was promulgated on
February 10, 2006, published on March 1, 2006, and entered into force on May 30, 2006.
This was achieved after almost five years of discussions at various levels.
The final cost of the reform is not yet known. The reorganization of the registry will not be completed before May 30, 2007. Professor Ronald Cardenas Krenz pointed to the two options that were put forward: either to create an entirely new registry, or to unify the current multiplicity of registries electronically. According to the projections, the first solution would cost $5 USD million, while the second could reach approximately $2.9
USD million. The reformers selected the second option
18
.
Reform and Changes
15 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Documento de Trabajo Facilitando el Acceso al Crédito mediante un
Sistema Eficaz de Garantías Reales, Lima, July, 2001.
16 Bill Number 9388/2003
17 The concessions made during the negotiations were mainly aimed at the notaries, who did not wish to become irrelevant as a result of the new law. As a consequence, the new law maintained some responsibilities for the notaries during the perfection and execution process of a security interest.
According to Professor Castillo Freyre and Doctor Eduardo Laos de Lama, Vice Dean of the College of
Notaries of Lima, the position of the notaries was that the excessive freedom in creating a security could debilitate the execution in case of non-compliance. In a country with judicial insecurity and a shaky culture of compliance, such liberalization (that, they argued, in economic terms signifies a nominal reduction in transaction costs) could lead to the instability of the system. On the other hand, CEAL experts argue that enforcement by notaries “will not be as efficient as self-help repossession. Their fees are not competitive and their services are not readily available in all areas.” Moreover, the involvement of notaries will limit the type of property that may be used as collateral. This is because “the depreciation time and risk time of the collateral in the hands of the debtor before a notarial enforcement would take place, could render worthless much highly depreciable collateral” for example in the agricultural sector.
In addition, in the drafting of the new law, the government refused to give absolute priority to secured creditors (ahead of wages), as it believed that this will have negative repercussions for the workers. The
IADB, understanding that this was a deal-breaker or maker issue, accepted these concessions set forward.
18 Interview by Doing Business with Ronald Cardenas Krenz, the Director of the Legal Department at the
Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazon, and the former Superintendent of SUNARP. November 17,
2006.

The Ley de la Garantía Mobiliaria – Ley N° 28677 redesigned Peru’s rules on collateral, although it did not remedy all the shortcomings of the system. Since the reform, almost any type of moveable asset, tangible or intangible, present or future can be used to secure a loan. The new law abandoned the requirement to describe assets specifically
19
. In addition, the more than 20 specific legal pledge regimes were aligned under one common system of “guarantee based on moveable property”. A single law now makes it easier for businesses to understand the rules. In addition, pledges on movable property now come under a single registry that centralizes the activities that 16 registries used to handle.
20
Finally, the law allowed parties to agree on organizing a sale of the asset without court intervention in case the debtor defaults. Appendix III includes a table of the most important changes to the law.
Feeling the Impact
The new law came into force on May 30, 2006. So far, the impact of the reform on lending rates, and the volume and nature of loans granted to the private sector have been limited. However, there has been a steady increase in the number of pledges registered.
Many in the banking and non-banking financial sector have commented that the rate and nature of their lending has not yet changed in the aftermath of the new law. For example, a representative of Confianza, a small regulated microfinance institution in central Peru notes that “Currently, we are in the process of training our personnel on the new law, and promoting the new system to our clients, by informing them about the new law. In addition, the impact of the new law has not yet been felt, since the new law will only have an impact on formal security agreements. The majority of the clients of nonbanking financial institutions such as Confianza cannot fit into the formal security agreement structure.
21 ” The banking sector also has not yet observed an increase in lending to the private sector resulting from the new law. This is mainly due to the problems associated with the registration system, which will not be fully implemented before June, 2007.
Despite these views by the financial sector, there has been a higher amount of private sector lending by both banks and other financial institutions in the trimester following the implementation of the law as compared to the same period in 2004 and 2005 (Appendix
IV)
22
. The increase in lending to the private sector in 2006 can be more directly attributed to a steady annual growth that the economy has been experiencing, a decline in
19 The most important exceptions include remunerations, pension funds, warrants, and deposit certificates.
20 The registry set-up under the law is an integrated system of registration for moveable assets and contracts.
21 Interview by Doing Business with Confianza, November 20, 2006. http://www.edpymeconfianza.com.pe/
22 The information as to how much of the increase in private sector lending can be attributed to an increase in commercial lending in 2006 is not yet available.

the government’s deficit and a subsequent decline in government lending by banks, three factors that had commenced before the implementation of the new law (Appendix IV)
23
.
On the other hand, lending rates have for most of the year 2006 remained lower than in
2005, but higher than in 2004
24
(Appendix IV). The expectation is that once the new law is fully implemented, interest rates will further decrease. Indeed, the possibility for lenders to use extra-judicial remedies should reduce their risk of not recovering the amounts loaned to their customers. With faster and more reliable recovery instruments, lenders will no longer need to transfer the risk to the debtors by charging higher interest rates.
In the aftermath of the enactment of the reform there has been a steady growth in registering new collateral agreements on moveable property. As the National Report of
Registrations Related to Moveable Properties demonstrates,
25
in June, 2006, the rate of registrations was at a low (103 registrations only for the month of June)
26
. This was the result of the uncertainty about the workability new system. Following that period, the rate of registration has gradually and steadily increased, and reached the level of 5,078 for the month of November alone.
The 2006 reform of secured transactions has been an obvious step forward, as it helped
Peru jump from rank 164 (in 2006) in the Doing Business report to 93 (in 2007). Had
Peru put in place its unified system of registry immediately, it would already rank 59 th
.
The new law, although well-intended, has faced a number of obstacles in the implementation phase. These difficulties are part of the reason why the economy has not yet significantly felt the impact of the reforms.
The Struggles of Change
The Chamber of Commerce of Peru has been the law’s most vocal critique since its implementation. It claimed that the law should be suspended until the registry becomes fully operational. In a press release issued on June 8, 2006, the Chamber of Commerce of Peru called for the suspension of the new law based on the argument that “the lack of technological interconnection at a national level between the various registries guarantees
23 The economy in Peru has been performing better in 2006 than in the previous two years. For example, as the graphs in Appendix IV indicate, the level of government deficit is lower in 2006 than in the previous two years, and the level of lending to the government has been steadily decreasing in 2006. This change has made more capital available for lending to the private sector. In addition, overall, the economy has been performing better. For example, the Central Bank of Peru has reported a 6.5%-7% growth rate for the economy in 2006, and internal demand has been growing at the rate of 9.3%. Therefore, the combination of these factors has caused the 2006 lending rate to the private sector to start at a higher rate than the preceding two years.
24 Lending rates as calculated for new businesses in the non-financial industry for short and medium term loans.
25 See appendix IV
26 It is important to mention that the number of registrations on moveable properties prior to June, 2006 cannot be compared to the post-June period, since SUNARP did not keep count of the number of registrations on “movable properties” as one category prior to the reform.

neither compliance with the law nor the judicial security of the transactions.” A few members of Parliament as well as scholars have also raised the question of whether allowing out of court enforcement and thereby allowing debtors to renounce the benefit of a trial was constitutional in a civil law system
27
(See details in Appendix IV). CEAL, after having provided advice during the initial stages of the reform process has also been critical of certain aspects of the new law. The most serious challenges to the reform are discussed below.
The Registration System
The main problem associated with the implementation of the new law stems from the registration system. The new law granted the National Superintendent of Public
Registries (SUNARP) 60 days to develop the necessary regulatory system of logistics and informatics to merge all registries on movables and centralize them at a national level.
This deadline was not realistic since 6 months later the necessary regulatory system is not yet in place.
28 In addition, the law requires that the new registry to only become operational by May 30, 2007. In the meantime, although the new law allows the use of more assets as collateral, and requires a unified registration system for it to function well, the system of registration still faces many of the same shortcomings as prior to the reform. For example, upon submission of a collateral agreement to SUNARP, the information does not become immediately available to the public. During the resulting time lap, a debtor may secure several loans from different creditors with the same asset.
Moreover, the current lack of centralization allows a debtor to register several collateral agreements on one same asset in different provinces.
Moreover, the system of registration may discourage users as a result of its rigidity.
According to Mr. Alonso Rey, a lawyer at the reputable law firm of Payet Rey Cauvi in
Peru, “the problem with the registry is that it is very complicated, and people do not know how to use it yet. If you spell the name incorrectly, your interest will not be
27 For a more detailed analysis of the criticisms raised against the new law, please see Appendix IV.
28 In an interview with Doing Business on December 7, 2006 , Ms. Nuria de la Peña, the Director of Legal
Operations at the Centre for the Economic Analysis of the Law stated that “With respect to SUNARP, technical and administrative legislation, setting out a notice filing archive that can be operated by the private sector in competition under government supervision has not been implemented”. In other words,
Ms. De la Peña advocates a privatized system of registration in competition, and under the supervision of the government (similar to the system in Romania) as the optimal system for Peru. In addition, in an interview with Doing Business on November 20, 2006, Mr. Mario Castillo Freyre, a lawyer from the
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú noted that, despite the signals to the contrary, the logistics and informatics necessary for the implementation of the unified and nationally interconnected registry on movables have not been yet achieved. It is important to note that SUNARP has enacted two Resolutions
(Resolucion No. 142-2006-SUNARP/SN, and Resolution No. 147-2006-SUNARP/SN), and there are two
Supreme Decrees (Decreto Supremo No. 012-2006-JUS and Decreto Supremo No. 013-2006-JUS) with respect to the new law, which are meant to facilitate the application of the new law. Resolucion 142-2006-
SUNARP/SN approves the regulations for the registration of movables and contracts; Resolucion No. 147-
2006-SUNARP/SN announces the start of the operation of the Registry on Movables and Contracts;
Supreme Decree No. 012-2006-JUS establishes the norms for the notaries with respect to the new law;
Supreme Decree No. 013-2006-JUS approves the applicable rates for registration. However, none of these resolutions and decrees spells out the technical steps and the logistics that need to be followed in establishing this unified and inter-connected system.

secured. So, the registry system is very rigid. The system should show more flexibility to remain useful for the users.
29 ”
Another issue arises out of the heightened costs of registration that result from the new system. According to Professor Castillo Freyre, today, registering a leasing contract with a financial institution for the acquisition of 20 automobiles costs US$6,000.00. Before the reform, it was not necessary to register this type of contract. The representative of
Confianza pointed that even a $30.00 fee for the registration of a simple collateral agreement would be onerous for small businesses
30
. High costs may negatively affect the capacity of the new system to increase private credit in Peru.
Lack of Training and Knowledge
A further major obstacle in the implementation of the law has been the lack of knowledge on the part of the key actors of the credit market, including the drafters, lenders, borrowers and lawyers about the new system.
At the drafting stage, the lack of training, the failure to incorporate initial recommendation received and to solicit subsequent advice from international experts, resulted in inefficiencies that have significantly hindered the law’s impact. For example, according to CEAL experts, “the new law … will not permit the divisibility of the collateral to allow for the maximum possible use of capital for credit with more than one lender. It effectively raises the cost to the borrower of seeking other lenders.
31 ” Indeed, the new law does not void clauses that require payment of the entire loan if a second priority security interest is created. This defeats most of the potential benefits of broadening access to credit by expanding non-bank lending. In addition, as Professor
Furnish notes, the new law has made the creation of floating loans very difficult.
Floating loans are essential for an industrialized system that operates on a credit model, and under the new Peruvian law, if the debt is paid back, then the registration terminates.
Having to re-register a loan every time the loan is paid off will mean that the creditor may lose its priority in the re-registration process on the same collateral. Repeating the registration process on the same asset seems superfluous.
Regarding the post-reform training for the users of the system, only a few ad hoc seminars have been organized to disseminate information on the new system. As a result, the new features of the law are being used only sporadically and inadequately.
Insufficient knowledge may have serious consequences, especially for the poor and small businesses in rural areas. For example, Professor Ronald Cardenas Krenz, the Director of the Legal Department at the Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazon
32
highlighted
29 Interview by Doing Business on November 14, 2006 with Mr. Alonso Rey from the law firm of Payet
Rey Cauvi.
30 Interview by Doing Business with Confianza, November 20, 2006.
31 Interview by Doing Business with CEAL experts. December 7, 2006.
32 Interview by Doing Business with Ronald Cardenas Krenz, the Director of the Legal Department at the
Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazon, and the former Superintendent of SUNARP. November 17,
2006.

that authorizing parties to consent to out of court enforcement of collateral agreements may prove a double-edged sword. It facilitates enforcement but may also result in abuses when the debtor does not understand the nature of the obligation he subscribes. In other words, it is important to insure that the least educated borrowers still understand that this clause, if implemented, will deprive them of the right to have a court decide on the seizure of their property.
The Lessons
Other countries may, based on Peru’s experience, want to consider the following elements when they reform their secured transactions laws:

Provide the advocates of the reform with sufficient technical assistance to efficiently promote the reform, make sure the most important clauses in the law are included, and secure the timely adoption of the reform;
 Synchronize the start of the new registry’s activity with the coming into force of the law. This will guarantee that the technical and administrative regulations necessary to implement the new system are in place and that the registry is ready to meet the demands of the new law;

Set registration costs at rates that do not to discourage the public, as excessive cost tend to foster informal methods of financing;

Develop, prior to the implementation of the law, a strategy of dissemination and training aimed not only at the financial and legal industry but also at noninstitutional users of the system (small businesses, borrowers in rural areas).
It is also important to remember the positive impacts of the Peruvian reform. Peru ambitiously moved to unify its registration system, simplify the enforcement of collateral agreements and expand the pool of assets that can be used as collaterals. In its current version, the law’s shortcomings with regards to content as well as implementation partly obscure its positive achievements. If Peru makes the necessary adjustments to its system; it can bring the letter of the law in line with its spirit. Because the reformers’ initial intentions were laudable, this realignment would make the Peruvian collateral system a model for other countries.

APPENDIX A – Situation of Private Credit in Peru - 2001 33
Banking Private Credit Relative to GDP - 2001
Position of Peru in Latin America
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Chile Bolivia Brazil Argentina Ecuador Paraguay
Country
Peru Colombia Mexico Venezuela
33 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Documento de Trabajo Facilitando el Acceso al Crédito mediante un
Sistema Eficaz de Garantías Reales, Lima, July, 2001.

APPENDIX IV – EFFECTS OF THE LAW 34
Deposit Money Banks - Claims on Private Sector
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
2004
2005
2006
0
January February March April May
Month
June July August September
Other banking Institutions - Claims on Private Sector
760
750
740
730
720
710
700
690
680
670
660
January February March April May
Month
June July August September
34 International Financial Statistics
2004
2005
2006

Lending Rate
16
15.5
15
14.5
14
13.5
2004
2005
2006
13
January February March April May
Month
June July August September October
Government Deficit (-) or Surplus
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
January February
-500
-1000
March April May June
Months
July August September
2004
2005
2006

Banking Lending to Government
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
January February March April May
Months
June July August September
2004
2005
2006
35
35 SUNARP

APPENDIX V – SOURCES
Arturo Galindo, Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand? Prepared for the Seminar: “Towards Competitiveness: The Institutional Path”, Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, Inter-American Development Bank and Inter-American
Investment Corporation, Santiago, Chile, March 16, 2001.
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Documento de Trabajo Facilitando el Acceso al
Crédito mediante un Sistema Eficaz de Garantías Reales, Lima, July, 2001.
Heywood Fleisig, Mehnaz Safavian, Nuria de la Peña, Reforming Collateral Laws to
Expand Access to Finance, The World Bank, Washington D.C., August 2006.
Mario Castillo Freyre, Análisis de la Ley de la Garantía Mobiliaria, Palestra Editores,
Lima, Perú, 2006.
Cantuarias Salaverry, Fernando Nuria de la Peña, and Haywood W. Fleisig, Trabas
Legales al Crédito en el Perú: Garantías Mobiliarias. UPC, Lima, 2000.
Heywood W. Fleisig, Nuria de la Peña, Peru: How Problems in the Framework for
Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit, Centre for the Economic Analysis of the
Law, May 1996, http://ceal.org/ceal-org/publications/peru22.pdf
Inter-American Development Bank, Implementing a Secured Transactions Framework in
Peru: Utilizing the Tools of Policy Based Lending, August 10, 2005, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=574550
Nelly Fernández del Castillo, Raul Camacho Gálvez, Estudios Sobre la Nueva Ley de
Garantía Mobiliaria – Ley 28677, Arco Legal Editores, Lima, Peru, September, 2006.
Interviews:
Interview by Doing Business with Professor Castillo Freyre and Doctor Eduardo Laos de
Lama, Vice Dean of the College of Notaries of Lima, November 21, 2006.
Interview by Doing Business with Confianza, November 20, 2006. http://www.edpymeconfianza.com.pe/

confianza@edpymeconfianza.com.pe
Centenario 356 San Carlos - Huancayo - Perú
Telf. (51) (64) 217000- Telefax 212417 Av. Centenario 356 San Carlos - Huancayo - Perú
Telf. (51) (64) 217000- Telefax 212417
Interview by Doing Business with Ms. Nuria de la Peña, the Director of Legal Operations at the Centre for the Economic Analysis of the Law on December 7, 2006.
Interview by Doing Business on November 14, 2006 with Mr. Alonso Rey from the law firm of Payet Rey Cauvi.

Payet, Rey, Cauvi Abogados: arb@prc.com.pe
, + 51 1 612 3202

Interview by Doing Business with CEAL experts. December 7, 2006.
Interview by Doing Business with Ronald Cardenas Krenz, the Director of the Legal
Department at the Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazon, and the former
Superintendent of SUNARP. November 17, 2006.
 ronald@unife.edu.pe
Interview by Doing Business with Sandro Castellares
Añazco, Chamber of Commerce of
Lima, Legal Advisor, Legal Department, November 20, 2006.
Interview by Doing Business with IADB representatives (Mr. Hunt Howell, Ms. Ana
Maria Vidaurre-Roche, Mr. Geronimo Frigerio, October 31, 2006.

Mr. Hunt Howell,
HUNTH@Contractual.iadb.org
or hunth@iadb.org
; ext: 2494 at the IADB
( 202-623-1000)
 Mr. Geronimo Frigerio, ext: 3328 at the IADB
Interview by Doing Business with Ms. Lilian Oliver Palomino from SUNARP,
November 9, 2006.
 loliver@sunarp.gob.pe
, (+ 51-1) central telefonica (221-0125/ 221-1540/ 221-1401/
221-3055/ 221-3062/ 221-3494) Ext: 269
Interview by Doing Business with Mr. John Wilson, Organization of American States,
Legal Affairs Department, November 10, 2006.
Interview by Doing Business with Professor Dale Beck Furnish, Emeritus Professor of
Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, December 5,
2006.