Annotated Bibliography Examples
Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1971. (Primary)
This source is the published memoirs of Robert Kennedy. In it, Kennedy concentrates
solely on those thirteen treacherous days in October and how his brother, John F.
Kennedy, acted and responded to cabinet members and Soviet Premiere Khrushchev.
This source is a valuable resource to gain access to the president’s emotions, worries, and
thinking since John F. Kennedy was very open with his brother. I also appreciate its
brevity. Robert Kennedy gives a detailed account of events but does so in just over one
hundred pages. However, since this was written after the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, this source may have a trace of bias that I will have to be aware of.
Langley, Lester D., ed. The United States, Cuba, and The Cold War. Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1970. (Primary)
This source is a collection of influential speeches regarding American relations with
Cuba. John F. Kennedy’s speeches are most prevalent and are weighted toward
Kennedy’s speeches and responses to Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Along with the speeches Langley also provides a short number of scholarly articles
pertaining to the rise of communist Cuba and its relationship to the U.S. and Soviet
Union. This source should prove useful in understanding just how important the issue of
Cuba was to Kennedy and how often it dominated his thoughts.
Stern, Sheldon M. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile
Crisis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. (Secondary)
For the most part, the scholarly books I have mentioned thus far have been
generalizations and analysis of the crisis in its entirety. That is to say, not very specific.
Stern’s book, however, is a heavily narrowed analysis of the Kennedy tapes and the
“secret” war behind the Cuban Missile Crisis. Stern is considered to be one of, if not the
most reputable scholar in concerns to the Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council. This book presents Stern’s interpretation of these tapes in
order to give the reader a more in-depth look into the mind of Kennedy and his staff on
how to approach and resolve the crisis. Included in the book are the nearly 170 pages
worth of transcribed tapes. Although this source is very scholarly, this area may not be
something that I would like to devote my paper to. I may still use this source, but it will
definitely not be the cornerstone of my research.
A More In-depth Example:
Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: the Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005. (Secondary)
In his book David Murphy provides an in-depth perspective of the actions (or lack there
of) of the USSR in the years and months leading up to the Nazi invasion of the USSR known as
Operation Barbarossa. The main question that Murphy uses in his book is the examination of
what Stalin knew about the oncoming invasion of the Nazis. His purpose is to demonstrate the
sheer amount of evidence that was offered to Stalin about the oncoming invasion and what he
chose to do with it. The book’s thesis is that there was sufficient evidence available to Stalin
about the Nazi invasion and that had he had made us of it, the Nazis may not have been as
successful as they were or may have even persuaded the Nazis not to invaded at all. Therefore,
Murphy argues that it is Stalin who is to be blamed for the catastrophe that was Operation
Barbarossa.
There are numerous evidences that Murphy provides to demonstrate his analysis. These
include intelligence reports from individuals and organizations in locations in Western Europe
such as London, Paris and Berlin as well as from Eastern Europe from places like Bucharest,
Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague. Along with European sources, Murphy also references the
reports from the USSR ambassador Richard Sorge who leaked intelligent information to the
USSR from Tokyo. Murphy also delves into the NKDV foreign intelligence reports, their spies,
and Stalin’s reaction to the information presented to him. It appears that every source of
evidence made available to Stalin was analyzed and described by Murphy in his book.
With all of this evidence that Murphy provides, his list of sources is highly extensive. Of
the numerous sources that Murphy uses, there does not appear to be one central source. They are
spread out over speeches, archived reports, letters, and books. A great majority of the sources
come directly from Moscow, whether in books or archives. However, Murphy also makes
occasional references contemporary books from outside of Russia as well.
This source will be extremely useful in helping me answer my question in that it provides
the evidence of information that was provided to Stalin. Most importantly though, this book also
demonstrates Stalin’s reactions to these sources of intelligence and also brings to light some of
the aspects of why Stalin refused to believe them. There are also some passages that directly
relate to my question of why Stalin acted the way he did leading up to Barbarossa; which is
mostly that Stalin refused to believe that Hitler would invade the USSR.
Bad Examples:
Daniel Rancour-Laferriere’s The Mind of Stalin – This book was essential in formulating and
proving my thesis since it provided me with valuable information on Stalin’s psyche.
Ian Kershaw’s Fateful Choices – This book provided me with the guideline for listing the
mistakes and came in handy in identifying the key decisions/mistakes Stalin made.
Esmonde Robertson’s Hitler’s Turn from the West to Russia – Provided me with important
information of the policies of Hitler, his perception, and his mastery of deception.