The Treaty of Versailles
After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919 officially
ended the war. Included in the 440 articles of the treaty were the demands Germany officially accept
responsibility for starting the war, and pay heavy economic reparations. The treaty also included a clause
to create the League of Nations. The US Senate never ratified this treaty and the US did not join the
League, despite President Wilson's active campaigning in support of the League. The United States
negotiated a separate peace with Germany, finalized in August 1921.
Germany
With Imperial Germany heading for defeat, on October 28, 1918, the German constitution was finally amended to
make the Reich a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. Civil unrest broke out the following
day, later giving way to city and provincial uprisings and revolution attempts led by elements of the opposition
Social Democratic Party and communist groups. In November Kaiser Wilhelm II was driven into exile. A new
constitution was eventually signed into law on August 11, 1919, marking the start of the Weimar Republic under its
first President.
With the war ended, under the Treaty of Versailles, nearly 15 percent of the land area of the German Empire was
ceded at Allied insistence to various countries. The largest confiscated part of Germany was restored to Poland,
that claimed most areas that had been part of Poland before partitions 1772–1795. Those provinces were in 1871
incorporated into Germany; the part of it was sometimes referred as the " Polish Corridor" because of its position
between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. Britain and France occupied the vast majority of former German
and Ottoman colonies as " League of Nations mandates".
The peace terms were very harsh, including confiscation of great amount of German property (not only that of
German government, but also of German citizens, including those living abroad) and regular reparations in money,
coal and other goods for over 10 years. In comparison, the reparation imposed on France by Prussia in 1871 (See
Franco-Prussian War) were paid after only 2 years. While Americans made some effort to apply the Fourteen
Points of Woodrow Wilson, Great Britain and especially France were interested in causing greatest possible
damage on Germany and receiving greatest possible reparations from it, and it's their vision that formed the basis
of the peace treaty.
Despite the perceived humiliations of the peace (or perhaps because of it), Germany honoured its war heroes and
commemorated its victories, notably with the construction in 1927 of a massive monument at Tannenberg to their
victory there over the Russians. German militarists soon invented theories about the revolutions at home that they
claimed prevented German victory in the Great War. Many Germans came to believe that they could have won the
war but for the treachery of politicians on the homefront.
Treaty of Versailles
After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28
1919 officially ended the war. Included in the 440 articles of the treaty were the demands that
Germany officially accept responsibility for starting the war and pay heavy economic reparations.
The treaty also included a clause to create the League of Nations. The US Senate never ratified
this treaty and the US did not join the League, despite President Wilson's active campaigning in
support of the League. The United States negotiated a separate peace with Germany, finalised in
August 1921.
An indirect action of the treaty, the division of Germany's colonies throughout Africa and Asia,
would not be seen for decades. The United States, while not happy with the terms of the treaty,
pressed European nations that were accepting Germany's old colonies to have the native citizens
there treated with the same respect they got when Germany was there. This was not the case.
Modern History Sourcebook:
Treaty of Versailles, Jun 28, 1919
On June 28,1919, the Allied powers presented the Treaty of Versailles to Germany for
signature. The following are the key territorial and political clauses.
Article 22. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached
a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a
Mandatory [i.e., a Western power] until such time as they are able to stand alone. The
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the
Mandatory.
Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the
left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the
East of the Rhine.
Article 45. As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France
and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage
resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with
exclusive right of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any
kind, the coal mines situated in the Saar Basin....
Article 49. Germany renounces in favor of the League of Nations, in the capacity of
trustee, the government of the territory defined above.
At the end of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the
inhabitants of the said territory shall be called upon to indicate the sovereignty under
which they desire to be placed.
AlsaceLorraine. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing the moral obligation to
redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the
wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country
in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux, agree
upon the following....
Article 51. The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the
Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, and the Treaty of
Frankfort of May 10, 1871, are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the
Armistice of November 11, 1918.
The provisions of the Treaties establishing the delimitation of the frontiers before 1871
shall be restored.
Article 119. Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.
Article 156. Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges . . .
which she acquired in virtue of` the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6,
1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.
Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilised and reduced as prescribed
hereinafter
Article 160. By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army
must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.
After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting
Germany must not exceed 100,000 men, including officers and establishments of depots.
The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory
and to the control of the frontiers.
The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their
composition, must not exceed four thousand....
Article 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the
Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.
Article 232. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of
Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such
resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete
reparation for all such loss and damage.
The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes,
that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the
Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency
of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany.
In World War I
The most important treaty signed at Versailles (in the Hall of Mirrors) was that of 1919. It was the
chief among the five peace treaties that terminated World War I. The other four (for which see
separate articles) were Saint-Germain, for Austria; Trianon, for Hungary; Neuilly, for Bulgaria;
and Sèvres, for Turkey. Signed on June 28, 1919, by Germany on the one hand and by the
Allies (save Russia) on the other, the Treaty of Versailles embodied the results of the long and
often bitter negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
The outstanding figures in the negotiations leading to the treaty were Woodrow Wilson for the
United States, Georges Clemenceau for France, David Lloyd George for England, and Vittorio
Emanuele Orlando for Italy—the so-called Big Four. Germany, as the defeated power, was not
included in the consultation. Among the chief causes of Allied dissension was Wilson's refusal to
recognize the secret agreements reached by the Allies in the course of the war; Italy's refusal to
forgo the territorial gains promised (1915) by the secret Treaty of London; and French insistence
on the harsh treatment of Germany. Wilson's Fourteen Points were, to a large extent, sacrificed,
but his main objectives, the creation of states based on the principle of national selfdetermination and the formation of the League of Nations, were embodied in the treaty.
However, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and the United States merely declared the
war with Germany at an end in 1921.
The treaty formally placed the responsibility for the war on Germany and its allies and imposed
on Germany the burden of the reparations payments. The chief territorial clauses were those
restoring Alsace and Lorraine to France; placing the former German colonies under League of
Nations mandates; awarding most of West Prussia, including Poznan and the Polish Corridor, to
Poland; establishing Danzig (see Gdańsk) as a free city; and providing for plebiscites, which
resulted in the transfer of Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, of N Schleswig to Denmark, and of
parts of Upper Silesia to Poland. The Saar Territory (see Saarland) was placed under French
administration for 15 years; the Rhineland was to be occupied by the Allies for an equal period;
and the right bank of the Rhine was to be permanently demilitarized. The German army was
reduced to a maximum of 100,000 soldiers, the German navy was similarly reduced, and
Germany was forbidden to build major weapons of aggression. Germany, after futile protests,
accepted the treaty, which became effective in Jan., 1920.
Later German dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty traditionally has been thought to have
played an important part in the rise of National Socialism, or the Nazi movement. While Gustav
Stresemann was German foreign minister, Germany by a policy of fulfillment succeeded in
having some of the treaty terms eased. Reparations payments, the most ruinous part of the
treaty, were suspended in 1931 and were never resumed. In 1935 Chancellor Adolf Hitler
unilaterally canceled the military clauses of the treaty, which in practice became a dead letter; in
1936 he began the remilitarization of the Rhineland. A vast literature has been written on the
Paris Peace Conference and on the Treaty of Versailles, and controversy continues as to
whether the treaty was just, too harsh, or not harsh enough.
Treaty of Versailles
Wars and Battles, World War I
Representatives of the German government were summoned to Paris and on May 7,
1919, presented with the fruits of the peace negotiations. After examining the more than
200-page document, the Germans were outraged. They believed that they had been
lured into an armistice with the promise that the Fourteen Points would serve as the
backbone of the peace treaty. What they found instead bore little resemblance to
Wilson’s even-handed proposals. Thus, the stage was set for two decades of German
poverty, hunger, privation and World War II.
Peace with Germany, like most complicated issues, required compromise. Despite
German anger, the result of the negotiations was much more moderate than the harsh
terms of Brest-Litovsk, but still far from the spirit of the Fourteen Points.
The treaty contained more than 400 articles, but the major issues can be summarized by
the following:
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Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France.
German colonies were assigned to victorious nations as ”mandates” under the
League of Nations.
The Saar Basin was assigned to France for 15 years, then a plebiscite was to be
held to determine the area's allegiance.
Poland was reestablished as an independent nation and granted access to the sea
through a strip of land that came to be known as the Polish Corridor.
The amount of German reparations was to be determined by a Reparations
Commission.
Germany was forced to accept responsibility for all losses and damages in the
conflict in what was termed the "war guilt clause" (Article 231).
Germany was required to disarm, specifically:
o The drafting of military personnel as prohibited.
o The Rhineland was demilitarized.
o The German army was limited in size to 100,000 men.
o The German navy and air force were severely reduced.
o The German general staff was abolished.
o Restrictions were placed on the manufacture and importation of war
matériel.
The Covenant of the League of Nations was included as part of the treaty.
Wilson’s victories included the creation of a modern Poland, the pledge of support for
disarmament, the establishment of colonial trusts and, of course, the creation of the
League of Nations. However, in order to obtain these provisions, he acquiesced to the
demands of the Allies on reparations, stripping Germany of its colonies and the near
total destruction of the German military — all of which contributed to an undercurrent
of anger in the defeated nation.
Wilson was well aware of the objectionable features of the treaty, but believed that they
could be overcome in the future by actions of the League of Nations.
The formal signing of the treaty took place on June 28.
Treaty of Versailles (1919)
The Treaty of Versailles officially ended World War I. The treaty dealt specifically with
Germany, and the other defeated powers had to negotiate their own separate treaties.
Once the armistice was signed in November 1918, which provided for a cease fire so that
peace could be negotiated, a peace conference began in Paris at the Palace of Versailles.
In addition to the British and French delegations, the United States also had
representation at the peace conference. President Woodrow Wilson personally led the
American delegation at Versailles. It soon became apparent that Wilson had a different
view of the treaty than did the British and the French. These two countries had fought a
long, bitter war against Germany. Both Great Britain and France had suffered tremendous
casualties during the war and faced serious economic problems because of the war's
costs. The two countries' leaders wanted to see Germany pay reparations for the cost of
the war and accept the blame for causing the war. Wilson's intentions were very different.
The American president desired to create a system that would keep future wars from
happening, as well as promoting an American vision of democracy and peace. He
believed that the best way to accomplish this goal was through the creation of an
international organization called the League of Nations. Countries that belonged to the
League would work together to stop potential wars in the future.
Ultimately, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) required Germany to accept responsibility for
World War I and imposed reparations. It also called for the establishment of the League
of Nations, as Wilson had envisioned. The treaty failed to create a long-term environment
favorable to peace. Germans resented the treaty's provisions, and that resentment helped
to fuel support for the Nazis in the 1930s and a return to war in World War II. Although
Americans were happy to see an end to World War I, the United States Senate refused to
ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Republicans in the Senate were unhappy that Wilson had
not included them in the negotiations and refused to vote in favor of the treaty. The
United States never joined the League of Nations, and that organization failed to be
."successful in its attempts to prevent future wars.
Signing the Treaty of Versailles,
1919
The Paris Peace Conference began on January 18, 1919, with 21 nations in attendance. The
representatives of Germany and the other defeated Central Powers were not allowed to sit at
the conference table. The "Big Four" - President Wilson of the United States, Prime Minister
Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France and Prime
Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy - dominated the conference and made the important
decisions. Wilson pushed for inclusion of his Fourteen Points especially the League of Nations.
Many of his proposals, however, clashed with the secret treaties and territorial
rearrangements already made by the other three European powers. The three European
leaders found it difficult to hide their contempt for what they saw as Wilson's naivete and
superior attitude.
France's primary objective was to ensure her security. In
1814, 1815, 1870, and again in 1914, German armies had
swarmed across France's borders. France sought a peace
treaty that would assure that her homeland would never
again be invaded by her German neighbor. Additionally, as
the war had been fought on French soil, the French looked
to the Germans to pay for the restoration of her
devastated homeland.
The political wrangling became intense. At one point
Wilson had to step between Lloyd George and Clemenceau
to prevent a fist fight. At another time Wilson threatened
to leave the conference. Orlando did leave for a time.
Finally, agreement was reached and a treaty presented to
The Big 4 at Versailles - Lloyd George,
Orlando, Clemenceau, and Wilson
the German representatives on May 7, 1919. The terms were harsh. Germany was stripped of
approximately 13% of its pre-war territory and all of its over-seas possessions. The Ruhr Germany's industrial heartland - was to be occupied by allied troops. The size of Germany's
military forces was drastically reduced. The treaty further stipulated that Germany would pay
for the devastation of the war through annual reparation payments to its European neighbors.
The victors ignored the bitter complaints of the German delegation.
On June 28, two rather obscure German representatives signed the treaty. Celebration
erupted. The signing ceremony brought the curtain down on the final act of the Great War. No
one present was aware that it also signaled the opening act of a conflict that would erupt
twenty years later with even more terrible consequences.
The End of One War, Prelude to the Next
Sir Harold Nicolson was a member of the British delegation to the Treaty of Versailles. He
offers his observations of its signing on June 28, 1919: "We enter the Galerie des Glaces (Hall
of Mirrors). It is divided into three sections. At the far end are the Press already thickly
installed. In the middle there is a horse-shoe table for the plenipotentiaries. In front of that;
like a guillotine, is the table for the signatures. It is supposed to be raised on a dais but, if so,
the dais can be but a few inches high...There must be seats for over a thousand persons. This
robs the ceremony of all privilege and therefore of all dignity.
...the delegates arrive in little bunches and push up the central aisle slowly. Wilson and Lloyd
George are among the last. They take their seats at the central table. The table is at last full.
Clemenceau glances to right and left. People sit down upon their escabeaux but continue
chattering. Clemenceau makes a sign to the ushers. They say 'Ssh! Ssh! Ssh!' People cease
chattering and there is only the sound of occasional coughing and the dry rustle of programs.
The officials of the Protocol of the Foreign Office move up the aisle and say, 'Ssh! Ssh!' again.
There is then an absolute hush, followed by a sharp military order. The Gardes Republicains at
the doorway flash their swords into their scabbards with a loud click. 'Faites entrer les
Allemands,' says Clemenceau in the ensuing silence.
Through the door at the end appear two huissiers with silver chains. They march in single file.
After them come four officers of France, Great Britain, America and Italy. And then, isolated
and pitiable, come the two German delegates. Dr. Muller, Dr. Bell. The silence is terrifying.
Their feet upon a strip of parquet between the savonnerie carpets echo hollow and duplicate.
They keep their eyes fixed away from those two thousand staring eyes, fixed upon the ceiling.
They are deathly pale. They do not appear as representatives of a brutal militarism. The one is
thin and pink-eyelidded. The other is moon-faced and
suffering. It is all most painful.
They are conducted to their chairs. Clemenceau at once
breaks the silence. 'Messieurs,' he rasps, 'la seance est
ouverte.' He adds a few ill-chosen words. 'We are here to
sign a Treaty of Peace.' The Germans leap up anxiously
when he has finished, since they know that they are the
first to sign. William Martin, as if a theatre manager,
motions them petulantly to sit down again. Mantoux
translates Clemenceau's words into English. Then St.
Quentin advances towards the Germans and with the
utmost dignity leads them to the little table on which the
Treaty is expanded. There is general tension. They sign.
There is a general relaxation. Conversation hums again in
Signing the Treaty in the Hall of Mirrors
an undertone.
The delegates stand up one by one and pass onwards to the queue which waits by the
signature table. Meanwhile people buzz round the main table getting autographs. The single
file of plenipotentiaries waiting to approach the table gets thicker. It goes quickly. The Officials
of the Quai d'Orsay stand round, indicating places to sign, indicating procedure, blotting with
neat little pads.
Suddenly from outside comes the crash of guns thundering a salute; It announces to Paris
that the second Treaty of Versailles has been signed by Dr. Muller and Dr. Bell. Through the
few open windows comes the sound of distant crowds cheering hoarsely. And still the
signature goes on.
We had been warned it might last three hours. Yet almost at once it seemed that the queue
was getting thin. Only three, then two, and then one delegate remained to sign. His name had
hardly been blotted before the huissiers began again their 'Ssh! Ssh!' cutting suddenly short
the wide murmur which had again begun. There was a final hush. 'La seance est levee' rasped
Clemenceau. Not a word more or less.
We kept our seats while the Germans were conducted like prisoners from the dock, their eyes
still fixed upon some distant point of the horizon.
World War I Ended With the Treaty of Versailles
June 28, 1919
World War I (1914-1918) was finally over. This first global conflict had claimed
from 9 million to 13 million lives and caused unprecedented damage. Germany
had formally surrendered on November 11, 1918, and all nations had agreed to
stop fighting while the terms of peace were negotiated. On June 28, 1919,
Germany and the Allied Nations (including Britain, France, Italy and Russia)
signed the Treaty of Versailles, formally ending the war. (Versailles is a city in
France, 10 miles outside of Paris.) The United States did not sign the treaty,
however, because it objected to its terms, specifically, the high price that
Germany was to pay for its role as aggressor. Instead, the U.S. negotiated its
own settlement with Germany in 1921. Do you know what triggered the conflict,
sometimes called the "Great War"?
World War I Ended With the Treaty of Versailles
June 28, 1919
Disagreements in Europe over territory and boundaries, among other issues,
came to a head with the assassination by a Serbian zealot of the Archduke
Ferdinand of Austria on June 28, 1914. Exactly one month later, war broke out,
and by the end of 1915, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman
Empire were battling the Allied Powers of Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium,
Serbia, Montenegro and Japan. In 1917, the U.S. entered the war after the
British passenger liner the Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine, killing
128 Americans.
World War I Ended With the Treaty of Versailles
June 28, 1919
The Treaty of Versailles imposed very rigid restrictions against Germany,
including limiting its army to 100,000 members. President Wilson, who opposed
the treaty, had developed his own form of reconciliation, called the "Fourteen
Points." The Points included a provision for a League of Nations to prevent "the
crime of war." Wilson also wanted all terms of settlement to be openly negotiated.
But the actual terms of the treaty included secret arrangements for distribution of
conquered German territories among the Allied Nations. Many historians believe
these terms eventually led to World War II.
The Treaty of Versailles - the Peace to end all Peace
Written by Alan Woods Monday, 13 April 2009
The Versailles Treaty of 1919 was one of the most outrageous and predatory treaties
in history. It was a blatant act of plunder perpetrated by a gang of robbers against a
helpless, prostrate and bleeding Germany. The proceedings at Versailles are highly
enlightening because they reveal the inner workings of imperialist diplomacy, the
crude reality of power politics and the material interests that lurk behind the
flowery phrases about Liberty, Humanitarianism, Pacifism and Democracy.
90 years ago the representatives of the triumphant imperialist powers gathered in Paris to
determine the fate of the entire world. The Treaty of Versailles formally ended the state of war
between Germany and the Allied Powers (also known as the Entente). It took six months of
wrangling at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. It was finally signed on 28
June 1919, exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
The Versailles Treaty was one of the most outrageous and predatory treaties in history. It was a
blatant act of plunder perpetrated by a gang of robbers against a helpless, prostrate and bleeding
Germany. Among its numerous provisions, it required Germany and its allies to accept full
responsibility for causing the war and, under the terms of articles 231–248, to disarm, make
substantial territorial concessions and pay reparations to the Entente powers.
The proceedings at Versailles are highly enlightening because they reveal the inner workings of
imperialist diplomacy, the crude reality of power politics and the material interests that lurk
behind the flowery phrases about Liberty, Humanitarianism, Pacifism and Democracy. In the
secrecy of the negotiating chamber, the leaders of the “civilized world” haggled like merchants in
a medieval fair as to how to carve up Europe and divide the entire world into spheres of interest.
This prepared the basis for later conflicts that led directly to the Second World War.
The German Revolution
The actual fighting had already ended with the armistice signed on 11 November 1918. What
forced the German High Command to end the hostilities was the outbreak of the German
Revolution. After four years of horrific slaughter, all along the Western Front, the war-weary
German army began to dissolve. Discipline broke down, soldiers refused to obey their officers and
desertion became epidemic.
Fighting in Berlin during the German Revolution in 1919. Photo by Bundesarchiv.
The most serious mutiny took place among the sailors—traditionally the most militant and
proletarian part of the armed forces. In November 1918 the German High Seas fleet mutinied
because of a rumour that the ships, and their crews, were to be sacrificed in an all out battle with
the combined British and American navies. The German seamen mutinied and went ashore to
link up with the revolutionary workers in Kiel and other
In the moment of truth the mighty German Empire collapsed like a house of cards. The workers
and sailors established the Kiel Workers’ Council—the equivalent of the Russian Soviets. By
November 4th Kiel was in the hands of the mutineers who arrested the officers and disarmed
them. Delegations of workers and sailors went to other ports: Hamburg, Wilhelshaven, Rostok,
Luebeck, Brubsbuttel, Cuxhaven, Rundsberg, Bremerhaven, Warnenberg and Geeestemunde. No
ship was allowed to enter harbour unless it was flying the red flag.
The officer caste was impotent, the state was hanging in mid air and power was lying in the street
waiting for somebody to pick it up. The German ruling class immediately understood that
resistance was impossible. Instead, they decided to ditch the Kaiser and lean on the Social
Democratic leaders as the sole remaining bulwark of “Order”. The German General Staff staged a
palace coup. The Kaiser was packed off in a train to Holland.
The German ruling class realized that the main danger was on the home front. A half-hearted
attempt was made to hand power to Prince Max. However, the real power was in the hands of the
Workers’ Councils. In order to prevent the workers from establishing a revolutionary government,
the General Staff called on the services of the right wing Social Democrat, Gustav Noske, who
went to Kiel in order to take control of the situation and divert the revolutionary workers and
sailors into “safe” (that is bourgeois) channels. The imperialist robbers assembled in Paris were
equally alarmed, since all history shows that revolution is contagious.
The Talks begin
Negotiations between the Allied powers started on 18 January 1919 in the luxurious surroundings
of the Salle de l'Horloge at the French Foreign Ministry, on the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. To begin
with there were no fewer than 70 delegates from 27 nations in the negotiations. All had their own
agenda and all demanded a slice of the cake. However, there were two major absentees: the
defeated powers, Germany, Austria, and Hungary. They were excluded from the negotiations.
In reality, the Conference was a sham. Most of the 70 delegates had absolutely no say in the
proceedings, which were determined by a handful of Great Powers: Britain, France and the
United states. The smaller nations behaved like the poor relatives who stand, cap in hand, at the
door of a wealthy man, who they hope will give them something for their patience and good
behaviour Until March 1919, the real business was conducted by the so-called Council of Ten
composed of the five victor nations: the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.
The Big Four (from left to right): David Lloyd George (Britain), Vittorio Emanuele Orlando
(Italy), Georges Clemenceau (France) and Woodrow Wilson (USA) in Versailles. Photo by
Edward N. Jackson.
However, as even this body proved to be inconvenient for the manoeuvres of the big powers. The
rising Asian power of Japanese imperialism already had its eyes set on further expansion in
China, which brought it into direct conflict with the ambitions of the United States and Britain.
The Japanese attempted to insert a clause proscribing discrimination on the basis of race or
nationality, but this was rejected, in particular by Australia. Japan and others left the main
meetings, so that only the Big Four remained.
Italy, the smallest and weakest, had entered the War late and played a very minor role. Now it was
making a lot of noise over its territorial claims to Fiume. As usual, when a little dog makes too
much noise and annoys the big dogs, the latter snarl and show their teeth and the former slinks
away with its tail between its legs. When these claims were rejected, the Italian Prime Minister,
Vittorio Orlando indignantly walked out of the negotiations (only to return to sign in June).
The proceedings were completely dominated by the leaders of the "Big Three": of Britain France
and the USA. David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and the American President Woodrow
Wilson decided everything. The final conditions were determined by these men and the interests
they represented. However, it was virtually impossible for them to decide on a common position
because their war aims conflicted with one another. The result was a botched compromise that
satisfied nobody and thus prepared the way for new explosions.
Consequences for Germany
On 29 April the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von
Brockdorff–Rantzau arrived in Versailles. It seems that they naively expected to be invited into
the Conference for some kind of negotiations. After all, after the defeat of France in the
Napoleonic Wars, the Frenchman Tallyrand was invited to participate in the Congress of Vienna,
where he used his considerable skills to extract concessions for France. But this was not 1815!
The German representatives were systematically humiliated before being brought into the Hall,
where they were confronted for the first time with the stony-faced victors. The terms of the Treaty
were then read out to them. There was no discussion—not even questions were allowed. On 7 May
when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "War Guilt Clause",
Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff–Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd
George: “We know the full brunt of hate that confronts us here. You demand from us to confess
we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie”.
Signing of the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles.
Such protests were of no avail. The Germans were forced to drink the cup of humiliation to the
last dregs. Soon afterwards, they withdrew from the proceedings of the Treaty of Versailles—a
despairing and futile gesture. In vain the German government issued a protest against what it
considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour". In a theatrical act, the newly
elected Social Democratic Chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann refused to sign the treaty and
resigned. In a passionate speech before the National Assembly on 12 March 1919, he called the
treaty a "murderous plan" and exclaimed:
“Which hand, trying to put us in chains like these, would not wither? The treaty is unacceptable.”
But this was just so much empty rhetoric. Germany was effectively disarmed. The army had
dissolved and the Allies were preparing to advance. It was an untenable situation. The National
Assembly voted in favour of signing the treaty by 237 to 138, with 5 abstentions. The foreign
minister Hermann Müller and Johannes Bell travelled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of
Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on 9 July
1919 by a vote of 209 to 116.
This is the origin of the black legend of the “stab-in-the-back”. Right wing nationalists and exmilitary leaders began to blame the Weimar politicians, socialists, communists, and Jews for a
supposed national betrayal of Germany. The November Criminals and the newly formed Weimar
Republic were held to be responsible for the defeat. This was a theme that the Nazis and other
right wing nationalists harped on continually in the next period, blaming foreigners, Jews and
“traitors” for the miseries and sufferings of the German people.
France’s war aims
The most belligerent of the Big Three was France, which had lost more than Britain and the USA:
some 1.5 million military personnel and an estimated 400,000 civilians. Much of the western
front had been fought on French territory. Now the French ruling class wanted revenge. The press
whipped up the public into a frenzy of anti-German chauvinism, and the Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau was implacable.
Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France (1917 – 1920).
Clemenceau was determined to cripple Germany militarily, politically, and economically so as
never to be able to invade France again. He naturally wanted the return of the rich and industrial
land of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been stripped from France by Germany in the FrancoPrussian War of 1870–71. But the French General Staff wanted to go a lot further than this: they
wanted France to have the Rhineland, which they had always regarded as France’s “natural”
frontier with Germany.
Britain's war aims were different because her interests were not those of France. The wily
British Prime Minister Lloyd George supported reparations but less than the French. He wanted
to bleed Germany in the interests of British capitalism, and reduce its economic and military
power. But he did not want to destroy Germany utterly. He was well aware that if France got its
way, it could become the most powerful force on the continent, and the balance of power in
Europe could be upset. This did not suit British imperialism, which wanted to play Germany off
against France to keep them both in check.
Apart from these strategic considerations, there were also British economic interests. Before the
war, Germany had been Britain's main competitor, but also its largest trading partner, and
therefore the French proposal for the destruction of German industry did not suit the long-term
interests of British capitalism. However, the prospect of plundering a defeated Germany was too
tempting to resist. So Lloyd George managed to increase Britain's share of German reparations by
demanding compensation for the huge number of widows, orphans, and men left unable to work
through injury, due to the war.
Always the supreme political opportunist, Lloyd George supported the slogan "Hang the Kaiser"
in order to make his people happy and gain votes at home. Lloyd George was irritated by
Woodrow Wilson's so-called idealism. The French and British supported secret treaties and naval
blockades, which Wilson opposed. In particular, the American President’s proposal for "selfdetermination" did not please Lloyd George. The British imperialists, like the French, wanted to
preserve their empire. If the idea of self-determination was applicable in Europe (Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia), why should it not be applicable to British and French colonies?
The leaders of Europe were not to be fooled by the likes of Wilson. They were sufficiently
experienced to read between the lines and distinguish between fact and fiction. They could see
that behind the gaseous screen of idealism there lay very solid interests. They knew that the rising
power of America was flexing its muscles and would one day have to test its strength against
theirs. The worldwide struggle for markets would bring them into conflict, just as it had with
Germany.
Behind the fine words about self-determination lay a threat to break up the old European empires
to the benefit of the United States. Now it was interfering for the first time in the internal affairs
of Europe and was taking the side of Germany against Britain and France. But what did these
Americans know about war? They had come in at the last minute and tipped the balance against
Germany. But they had not sacrificed as the British and French had done. Their lands had not
been invaded. Their cities had not been shelled and bombed. And they lecture us on justice and
humanity! It is intolerable!
United States' war aims
The USA was becoming the most powerful nation on earth. It had already embarked on its career
of imperialist expansion in its wars with Mexico, but the process experienced a qualitative leap
with the war with Spain and the seizure of Cuba and the Philippines at the end of the 19 th century.
However, being a vast country with a huge internal market, one section of the American
bourgeoisie, and a big section of the petty bourgeoisie, remained inclined to isolationism.
There was a powerful non-interventionist sentiment before and after the United States entered
the war in April 1917. When the War ended, many Americans felt eager to extricate themselves
from European affairs as rapidly as possible. The United States took a more conciliatory view
toward the issue of German reparations, which brought them into collision with the British and
particularly the French imperialists.
Amidst the bloody wreckage of Europe, many people looked to the transatlantic giant for some
signs of hope. Woodrow Wilson’s woolly pacifist and democratic rhetoric struck a cord in the
hearts and minds of millions of war-weary people in Europe, particularly in the defeated countries
and in small nations struggling to assert themselves. So, in the beginning, Wilson was regarded as
a hero— much the same as Barak Obama now.
The similarity between their speeches is striking: a combination of high-sounding phrases,
idealism and populism that sounds very good and is completely empty of any real content. When
he first arrived in Europe, Wilson was greeted by huge crowds of cheering people. But this
enthusiasm did not last long. Behind the wonderful phrases the same old great power interests
and sordid diplomatic wheeling and dealing continued as usual.
David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Britain (1916 – 1922).
Even before the end of the War, Woodrow Wilson put forward his Fourteen Points which he now
presented in a speech at the Paris Peace Conference. It is interesting to speculate to what extent
Wilson believed in his own rhetoric. He seems to have been nothing more than a provincial
academic with a narrow and formalistic mentality coloured with a large dose of sentimentality
and Christian moralizing. His manner of speaking, which resembled that of a small town
preacher, must have had the same effect on the ears of the hard-bitten Clemenceau and the
smiling cynic Lloyd George as the sound of a dentist’s drill.
At first they listened in silence as he lectured them on the need for morality in world affairs,
justice and humanity for defeated enemies and the right of self-determination for small nations.
They did not know who Wilson was, but they knew that America was the country that held the
fate of Europe in the palm of its hand, and therefore they swallowed their pride and contained
their indignation, confining themselves to ironic comments in the corridors.
America wanted peace and stability in Europe in order to secure the success of future trading
opportunities and hopefully collect some of the huge debts owed to it by the Europeans.
Destroying the economic life of Germany did not enter into these plans. Most of the reparations
would go to France, Britain and Belgium anyway. So America could afford to be magnanimous to
the Germans. They did not have to rebuild their shattered towns and cities!
In the United States, disillusionment with the war caused a backlash against Wilson. The
isolationists, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, launched an offensive against the treaty in the Senate,
which voted against ratifying. An old, sick and embittered man, Wilson refused to support the
treaty with any of the reservations imposed by the Senate. He died shortly afterwards. Wilson's
successor Warren G. Harding continued American opposition to the League of Nations. His
administration later collapsed in the midst of an unprecedented corruption scandal.
Reparations
The terms of the Treaty were draconic indeed. Much of the rest of the Treaty set out the
reparations that Germany would pay to the Allies. The total amount of war reparations demanded
from Germany amounted to a staggering 226 billion Reichsmarks in gold. This was an impossible
amount for Germany to pay, a fact that was later tacitly accepted by an Inter-Allied Reparations
Commission. In 1921, it was reduced to 132 billion Reichsmarks (£4.99 billion). But even that
figure was ruinous for Germany.
Reparations were paid in a variety of forms, including coal, steel, agricultural products, and even
intellectual property (for example, the patent for aspirin) and, in no small part because currency
reparations of that order of magnitude would lead to hyperinflation, as actually occurred in
postwar Germany (see 1920s German inflation), thus decreasing the benefits to France and the
United Kingdom. Germany has still not finished paying off her World War I reparations, which
will occur in 2020.
The young John Maynard Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at
the Paris Peace Conference. Angry that his suggestions about reparations had been ignored, he
published a damning account of the Conference, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919).
In this famous book he referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian peace". His
argument was that the burden of reparations would ruin Germany and drag down the rest of
Europe. From a capitalist point of view he was quite right.
The conditions of the treaty were so vicious that it was seen unanimously as unacceptable by all
political parties. The Social Democrat Philip Scheidemann refused to sign and stepped down. But
other Social Democrats accepted it. The main victims, as always, were the working people. The
shattered German economy was so weak that only a small percentage of reparations were paid in
hard currency. Even the payment of a small percentage of the original reparations still placed an
intolerable burden on the German economy, and was the cause of the hyperinflation that
subsequently plunged it into a bottomless pit.
“Germany’s guilt”
An attempt was made to shift all responsibility for the sufferings of the war onto the shoulders of
former German Emperor, Wilhelm II. The British and French ranted and raged. He was to be
tried as a war criminal. However, in the end, nothing was done and the former Kaiser lived out his
days in comfortable exile in Holland. But if Wilhelm escaped unscathed, the German people were
not to be let off so lightly. Article 231 (the "War Guilt Clause") laid all responsibility for the war on
Germany, which would be accountable for all the damage done to civilian population of the allies.
There were military restrictions. The preamble Part V of the treaty states: "In order to render
possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany
undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
German armed forces were to number no more than 100,000 troops, and conscription was to be
abolished. Enlisted men were to be retained for at least 12 years; officers to be retained for at least
25 years. German naval forces would be limited to 15,000 men, 6 battleships (no more than
10,000 tons displacement each), 6 cruisers (no more than 6,000 tons displacement each), 6
destroyers (no more than 800 tons displacement each) and 12 torpedo boats (no more than 200
tons displacement each). No submarines were to be included.
The manufacture, import, and export of weapons and poison gas was prohibited. Armed aircraft,
tanks and armoured cars were prohibited. Blockades on ports were prohibited. These decisions
would render Germany defenceless against external attack. Its territories were placed at the
mercy of a vengeful France in the West and a thrusting newly independent Second Polish
Republic in the East.
However, in view of the growing threat of Revolution in Germany, the Allies decided to allow the
Reichswehr to retain 100,000 machine guns for use against the German working class. These
weapons were used by the fascist Freikorps to suppress the revolutionary movement in Germany.
Then there were the territorial claims, mainly aimed at weakening Germany and strengthening
France. In order to do this, an independent Poland was necessary. Clemenceau was convinced
that Germany had "20 million people too much". So West Prussia was ceded to the Poles, thus
giving Poland access to the Baltic Sea via the "Polish Corridor”. East Prussia was separated from
mainland Germany. In addition, Germany was compelled to hand over all its colonies. Germany
was also forbidden to unite with Austria to form a larger Nation to make up for the lost land
Northern Schleswig was returned to Denmark following a plebiscite on 14 February 1920, while
Central Schleswig opted to remain German in a separate referendum on 14 March 1920. AlsaceLorraine was restored to French sovereignty without a plebiscite as from the date of the Armistice
of 11 November 1918. But on the question of the Rhineland, Clemenceau suffered a defeat. The
French General Staff made it clear that they expected the Rhineland to be handed over to France.
But Lloyd George would have none of it. The Rhineland was to become a demilitarized zone
administered by Great Britain and France jointly.
Most of the Prussian province of Posen (now Poznan) and of West Prussia, which Prussia had
annexed in Partitions of Poland (1772–1795), were ceded to Poland. The Hlučínsko (Hultschin)
area of Upper Silesia went to Czechoslovakia (area 316 or 333 km², 49,000 inhabitants) without a
plebiscite. The eastern part of Upper Silesia also went to Poland. The area of the cities Eupen and
Malmedy were given to Belgium, which also received the track bed of the Vennbahn railway.
The area of Soldau in East Prussia was given to Poland. The northern part of East Prussia, known
as Memel Territory, was placed under the control of France, and later occupied by Lithuania. The
province of Saarland was placed under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years, after that
a plebiscite between France and Germany was to decide to which country it would belong. During
this time, the coal produced in that region would be sent to France.
The port of Danzig with the delta of the Vistula River at the Baltic Sea was made the Free City of
Danzig under the permanent governance of the League of Nations without a plebiscite. The
German and Austrian governments had to acknowledge and strictly respect the independence of
Austria. The unification of both countries was strictly forbidden, although a big majority of both
populations were known to be in favour of it. There were other smaller “adjustments” at the
expense of Germany and its allies.
The Bolsheviks and Versailles
Soviet Russia was naturally excluded from the Paris peace talks. The formal reason was because it
had already negotiated a separate peace with Germany. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March
1918) Germany had taken away a third of Russia's population, one half of Russia's industrial
undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coalmines, coupled with an indemnity of six billion
marks. But although physically absent, Russia’s presence made itself felt in all the deliberations at
the Peace Conference.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks based themselves on the perspective of world revolution that would
move westward, across Central Europe to Germany, France and the whole of Europe. Nowadays it
is fashionable to portray this as a utopian idea, but the victors at Versailles took it very seriously.
The Russian Revolution had a powerful effect on the German working class, which rose in
revolution exactly twelve months after the October Revolution. We have already described the
German Revolution of November 1918. This was followed by a revolutionary wave that swept over
Europe. In Hungary and Bavaria Soviet Republics were proclaimed.
The real reason for the exclusion of Russia was that all the imperialist powers were the sworn
enemies of Bolshevism, which they correctly saw as the most dangerous threat to their interests.
Even while the Great Powers sat around the negotiating table, fighting over the map of the world
like dogs fighting over a bone, the flames of revolution were spreading to Germany, a soviet
republic had been declared in Hungary and also Bavaria, and Trotsky’s Red Army was beating
back the counterrevolutionary White forces. British, American, Japanese and French forces were
intervening actively on the side of the Whites in an anti-Bolshevik crusade.
This explains the haste with which the German ruling class capitulated to the Allies. However,
they hoped that a reasonable deal could be reached. After all, the Kaiser was gone and Germany
now had a democratic government. Moreover, the Germans, and especially the Social Democratic
leaders had high hopes on the American President Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points.
In 1919 Lenin was still hoping that Soviet revolution in Vienna would support Soviet Hungary. All
his hopes were placed on a revolution in Germany. In Left Wing Communism Lenin wrote:
“The Soviet revolution in Germany will strengthen the international Soviet movement, which is the strongest bulwark (and
the only reliable, invincible and world-wide bulwark) against the Treaty of Versailles and against international
imperialism in general.”
But he sharply castigated the German Left Communists for their idea of “No Compromise”—
including the rejection of the Versailles Treaty and a so-called German People’s War against the
Entente. Lenin placed his hopes firmly on revolution in Germany:
“To give absolute, categorical and immediate precedence to liberation from the Treaty of Versailles and to give it
precedence over the question of liberating other countries oppressed by imperialism, from the yoke of imperialism, is
philistine nationalism (worthy of the Kautskys, the Hilferdings, the Otto Bauers and Co.), not revolutionary
internationalism. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie in any of the large European countries, including Germany, would be
such a gain for the international revolution that, for its sake, one can, and if necessary should, tolerate a more prolonged
existence of the Treaty of Versailles. If Russia, standing alone, could endure the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for several
months, to the advantage of the revolution, there is nothing impossible in a Soviet Germany, allied with Soviet Russia,
enduring the existence of the Treaty of Versailles for a longer period, to the advantage of the revolution.
“The imperialists of France, Britain, etc., are trying to provoke and ensnare the German Communists: ‘Say that you will
not sign the Treaty of Versailles!’ they urge. Like babes, the Left Communists fall into the trap laid for them, instead of
skilfully manoeuvring against the crafty and, at present, stronger enemy, and instead of telling him, ‘We shall sign the
Treaty of Versailles now.’ It is folly, not revolutionism, to deprive ourselves in advance of any freedom of action, openly to
inform an enemy who is at present better armed than we are whether we shall fight him, and when. To accept battle at a
time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy, but not to us, is criminal; political leaders of the revolutionary class
are absolutely useless if they are incapable of "changing tack, or offering conciliation and compromise" in order to take
evasive action in a patently disadvantageous battle.”
It goes without saying that the Bolsheviks regarded it as an act of imperialist plunder, like the
even more vicious Treaty of Brest Litovsk. But they understood that the imperialists (especially
the French) were looking for an excuse to invade Germany, which would have been a setback for
the revolution. By flirting with German nationalism, the German Left Communists were
abandoning the policies of revolutionary proletarian internationalism in favour of “national
Bolshevism”, which Lenin considered an abomination.
Social Democrats like Noske, Scheidemann and Ebert (picture) placed themselves on the side of
the German ruling class and imperialism. Photo by Bundesarchiv.
Whereas the right wing Social Democrats like Noske, Scheidemann and Ebert placed themselves
on the side of the German ruling class and imperialism, and the Left Social Democrats (the
Independents) took up a vacillating and ambiguous position, Lenin and Trotsky approached all
questions from the standpoint of the international revolution. For Lenin the question was not for
or against the Treaty of Versailles, but how to prepare the most favourable conditions for the
German workers to come to power.
Lenin’s perspectives for Germany were confirmed in 1923, when Germany stopped paying the
reparations “agreed” upon in the Treaty of Versailles. As a result, French and Belgium forces
occupied the Ruhr, the heartland of German industry. German workers launched a campaign of
passive resistance, refusing to work the factories while they remained in French hands.
The German currency was now useless: a wheelbarrow full of notes was necessary to buy a box of
matches. The middle class was in a revolutionary mood and the Social Democrats were
discredited. The Communist Party was growing by leaps and bounds and the question of power
was posed. Even the fascists were saying: let the Communists take power first, then it will be our
turn.
Unfortunately, the leaders of the German Communist Party vacillated and failed to take decisive
action. They looked to Moscow for advice but Lenin was incapacitated by his final illness and
Trotsky was also ill. The German leaders instead saw Stalin and Zinoviev, who advised them not
to try to take power. And so an exceptionally favourable opportunity was lost. The masses were
disappointed and turned away from the Communist Party.
The crisis was over and German capitalism began to recover, benefiting from the economic revival
in Europe and aid from the USA. But fundamental contradictions were gnawing at the entrails of
the Weimar Republic. The German bourgeoisie, alarmed at the growing strength of the Socialists
and Communists, began to prepare for the final showdown with the working class. The end result
was the rise of Hitler, the destruction of the mighty German labour movement and the Second
World War.
The effects on France
The Treaty of Versailles was at the expense of the German people, but the people of Britain and
France derived no benefit from it. At that time in the Resolution on the Versailles Treaty, which
he wrote for the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, November–December 1922, Trotsky made the
following prophetic analysis:
“The appearance is that France, of all the countries, has grown most in power. But in reality the economic basis of France,
with her small and steadily diminishing population, her enormous domestic and foreign debt, and her dependence on
England, does not provide an adequate foundation for her greed for imperialist expansion. So far as her political power is
concerned, she is thwarted by England’s mastery of all the important naval bases, and by the oil monopoly held by
England and the United States. In the domain of economy, the enrichment of France with the iron mines given her by the
Treaty of Versailles, loses its value inasmuch as the supplementary and indispensable coal mines of the Ruhr Basin remain
in German hands. The hopes of restoring shattered French finances by means of German reparations have proved illusory.
When the impracticability of the Treaty of Versailles becomes apparent, certain sections of French heavy industry will
consciously bring on the depreciation of the franc in order to unload the costs of the war on the shoulders of the French
proletariat.”
Despite all his stubbornness, Clemenceau had failed to achieve what he had promised. Field
Marshal Foch did not hide his bitterness about the failure to get the Rhineland. He complained
that Germany had been let off too lightly (!!) and declared, "This is not Peace. It is an Armistice
for twenty years.” The French press stoked the feelings of resentfulness and disappointment and
Clemenceau was voted out of office in the elections of January 1920.
Even at the Peace Conference differences emerged between Britain and France. As we have seen,
it was not in Britain’s interests to bleed Germany white. The ruin of Germany had negative effects
on the British economy, which experienced a slump, with mass unemployment and a sharpening
of the class struggle. The same was true of France, which eventually led the French imperialists to
seize the Ruhr in 1923. This did nothing to solve the problems of France but merely created the
conditions for further explosions.
It is now a banal statement to say that the strangling of Germany prepared the way for the rise of
Hitler. In fact, a new world war could have been prevented by revolution. But the leaders of the
mass organizations, by preventing revolution, made a new war impossible. The policies pursued
by both the Social Democrats and the Stalinists rendered the powerful German Labour Movement
impotent and allowed Hitler to come to power in 1933.
From that point onwards, a new war was inevitable. The worst fears of the French ruling class
were confirmed as Hitler launched a programme designed to rebuild Germany’s economic and
military might. In 1934, five years before the outbreak of the Second World War, Trotsky declared
in the theses, War and the Fourth International: “The collapse of the League of Nations is
indissolubly bound up with the beginning of the collapse of French hegemony on the European
continent. The demographic and economic power of France proved to be, as was to be expected,
too narrow a base for the Versailles system.”
The national question and Zionism
It is a matter of speculation to what extent Woodrow Wilson actually believed in his idealistic
plans. What is certain is that his demagogic appeals for self-determination were aimed at
breaking up the old European empires, and that this was in the interest of American imperialism.
Every time the imperialists proclaim self-determination, the result is new injustices, new
contradictions, new oppressions and new wars. This is a classical case. The Versailles Treaty
signified the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of new states like
Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But the national question has always been used by
imperialism for its own selfish ends. In the hands of the Great Powers the right of selfdetermination is just so much small change, to be bartered away.
The creation of new states in Europe was accompanied by new injustices, cruelty and national
oppression. Millions of Germans in the Sudetenland and in Posen–West Prussia were placed
under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by
authorities are documented. Out of 1,058,000 Germans in Posen–West Prussia in 1921, 758,867
fled their homelands within five years due to Polish harassment. This later served as a pretext for
Hitler's annexations of Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland.
Although the main sphere of operations was in Europe, this was indeed the First World War, and
was fought on a global scale. There were serious repercussions in Asia. Article 156 of the treaty
transferred German concessions in Shandong (which was part of China) to Japan instead of
returning it to China. This outrage led to demonstrations and a cultural movement known as the
May Fourth Movement, which was the starting point for an upsurge of the revolutionary
movement in China.
Since Turkey had been an ally of Germany, it also suffered the loss of many of its old possessions.
The former Ottoman Empire was divided among the victors, who had been watching its decay for
a long time like hungry vultures waiting for a wounded animal to die. The British and French
imperialists had their eye on the Middle East. They encouraged the Arabs to rise in revolt against
their Turkish masters (this is the sordid reality behind the exploits of Laurence of Arabia),
offering them independence in order to seize their lands after the War.
The World Zionist Congress attempted to influence the policy of the British and American
governments toward the Ottoman Empire, and especially Palestine, in the interests of the
Zionists. The result was the Balfour Declaration. With its habitual cynicism, British imperialism
promised Palestine to the Jews —and to the Arabs. One can trace the bloody history of the
struggle between the Palestinians and Jews to this piece of imperialist treachery, the
consequences of which are still being felt today. This is the crude reality that lies behind the
demagogy about self-determination.
Postscript: The Thieves’ kitchen
The Treaty of Versailles led to the creation of the League of Nations, an organization intended to
arbitrate international disputes and thereby avoid future wars. This was mainly agreed to by
Britain and France in order to placate President Wilson and pander to his pacifist prejudices. It
also had the advantage of casting the victors of Versailles in a most favourable light before world
public opinion. These predatory imperialists were presented to the public opinion of the world as
“men of peace”, at the very time that they were plundering Germany and engaging in a bloody
intervention against Soviet Russia.
The Covenant of the League of Nations was
designed to produce the impression that this organization’s aim was to combat aggression, reduce
armaments, and consolidate peace and security. The League's goals included upholding the new
found Rights of Man disarmament, preventing war through collective security, settling disputes
between countries through negotiation, diplomacy and improving global quality of life. Wilson
claimed that he could "predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be
another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method by which to prevent it."
To begin with, as a result of the growing mood of isolationism, the United States did not join the
League of Nations.
In practice, however its leaders shielded the aggressors, fostered the arms race and preparations
for the Second World War. Lenin denounced the League of Nations as a “thieves’ kitchen.” The
subsequent history of the League of Nations showed that Lenin was right. It did not prevent
Mussolini’s invasion of Italy or Franco’s war against his own people. Nor did it do anything to halt
Japanese aggression against China or Hitler’s expansionist plans in Europe.
The League of Nations accepted Mussolini's bullying of Greece and failed to stop him invading
Abyssinia. The Italian fascist army used chemical weapons like mustard gas against undefended
villages, poisoning water supplies and bombing Red Cross tents. When the League complained,
Mussolini replied that, since the Ethiopians are not fully human, the human rights laws did not
apply. The Italian dictator stated that, "The League is very well when sparrows shout, but no good
at all when eagles fall out." These words admirably expressed the real situation.
Naturally, the existence of the League of Nations did nothing to stop the Second World War. In
March 1935 Adolf Hitler introduced compulsory military conscription in Germany and rebuilt the
armed forces in direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In March 1936 he again violated the
treaty by reoccupying the demilitarised zone in the Rhineland. He followed this by annexing
Austria in the Anschluss in March 1938. These steps paved the way for the annexing of the
Sudetenland and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which led to the invasion of Poland and the
World War II.
The League of Nations could serve as a forum for discussion as long as the interests of the major
powers were not involved. But when serious matters were involved, it was utterly useless. The
same is true of the UN today. Lenin aptly described the League of Nations as “a thieves’ kitchen.”
The Soviet Union was not a member of the League, and for good reasons. To the question “Why
does not the Soviet Union participate in the League of Nations?”—Stalin replied in 1927:
“The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations and does not participate in its work, because the Soviet Union
is not prepared to share the responsibility for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for the ‘mandates’ which are
distributed by the League for the exploitation and oppression of the colonial countries, for the war preparations and
military alliances which are covered and sanctified by the League, preparations which must inevitably lead to imperialist
war. The Soviet Union does not participate in the work of the League because the Soviet Union is fighting with all its
energy against all preparations for imperialist war. The Soviet Union is not prepared to become a part of that camouflage
for imperialist machinations represented by the League of Nations. The League is the rendezvous of the imperialist leaders
who settle their business there behind the scenes. The subjects about which the League speaks officially, are nothing but
empty phrases intended to deceive the workers. The business carried on by the imperialist ring-leaders behind the scenes,
that is the actual work of imperialism which the eloquent speakers of the League of Nations hypocritically cloak.”
(“Questions and Answers, A Discussion with Foreign Delegates” by J. Stalin. Moscow. November 13, 1927.)
This answer is more or less correct and reflects the attitude of Lenin to the League. However, later
on Stalin changed his mind. After the victory of Hitler he tried to get the support of the so-called
European democracies and joined the League. It did him no good. Weak and indulgent in the face
of German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism, the League was brave enough to expel
the Soviet Union in December 1939 after it invaded Finland. This was its last significant action.
The Second World War signified the ignominious collapse of the League of Nations—and the even
more ignominious dissolution of the Communist International.
Imperialist wars are fought over very concrete questions: the control of markets, colonies, raw
materials and spheres of influence. Over the past century there have been many such wars, and
two of them were world wars. The second one resulted in the deaths of 55 million people, the big
majority of them civilians. Of course, the imperialists can never openly admit the true causes that
motivate them. They possess a vast propaganda machine designed to convince public opinion that
all their wars are just wars, for the defence of peace, civilization, democracy and culture. It is
sufficient to remind ourselves that the First World War was presented as “the War to end all
Wars”! Ninety years after the Versailles Treaty there are valuable lessons to be drawn from a
Marxist analysis of these events, which cuts through the fog of propaganda and lies and exposes
the reality of the class interests that lie behind the slogans and the propaganda. Wars will
continue to plague humanity until capitalism is overthrown. That was the position of Lenin, and it
remains true today.
Versailles 1919
Copyright © 2005-6, Henry J. Sage
The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, and the Treaty of Versailles
When the Germans surrendered, President made a fateful decision—he himself would go to
Versailles to help write the terms of peace. (He had earlier declared it unthinkable that
America should have no role in that great enterprise.) He wanted a “peace without victory,” a
generous peace, but the allied leaders who had suffered so fearfully would have none of it.
Wilson’s goals, outlined in his Fourteen Points, called for a lasting peace based on national
self-determination among the nations and a League of Nations, and that was partially realized.
Wilson was unable, however, to prevent the victors from saddling Germany with enormous
reparations and restrictions which in retrospect can be called at best unfair.
Wilson took no Senators with him to Paris, nor any Republican leaders, a serious flaw in his
desire to achieve his goals, as the United States Senate was controlled by the Republican
Party. Thus while Wilson was in Europe for the best part of six months, having been greeted
by the European people as a conquering hero, if not a modern Messiah, Republican leaders in
the Senate fretted and stewed and awaited his return with bated breath.
Woodrow Wilson and the other negotiators arrived at the great palace of Versailles outside
Paris amid great fanfare. all the warring powers were represented and hundreds of diplomats
and their staffs crowded into the great hall of mirrors as the press hovered outside. the
negotiations last in almost 6 months; about halfway through President Wilson had to travel
back to the United States to take care of presidential business, but he returned to France as
soon as he was able.Wilson flied diligently for the principles in which he believed and tried his
best to steer the delegates in the direction of what he would've considered a lasting peace.
Negotiating by day, and in the evening working diligently on his draft for the plans of the
league of Nations Wilson worked himself nearly to exhaustion. His 14 points gradually slipped
away, and following his brief absence back in United States, he found that even more had
eroded upon his return.
On the day when the treaty was signed, the 28th of June 1919, the mood was somber. Harold
Nicholson described the scene:
We enter the Galerie des Glaces [Hall of Mirrors.] It is divided into three sections. At the far
end are the press already thickly installed. In the middle there is a horseshoe table for the
plenipotentiaries. In the front of that, like a guillotine, is the table for the signatures ... There
must be seats for over a thousand persons. This robs the ceremony of all privilege and
therefore of all dignity. ...
The delegates arrive in little bunches and push up the central aisle slowly. Wilson and Lloyd
George are among the last. They take their seats at the central table. The table is at last full.
Clemenceau glances to right and left. People sit down upon their escabeaux but continue
chattering. Clemenceau makes a sign to the ushers. They say 'Ssh! Ssh! Ssh!' There is then an
absolute hush, followed by a sharp military order. The Gardes Republicains at the doorway
flash their swords into their scabbards with a loud click. “Faites entrer les Allemands,” says
Clemenceau in the ensuing silence. His voice is distant but harshly penetrating. A hush
follows.
Through the door at the end appear two huissiers with silver chains. They march in single file.
After them come four officers of France, Great Britain, America and Italy. And then, isolated
and pitiable, come the two German delegates. Dr. Mueller, Dr. Bell. The silence is terrifying.
Their feet upon a strip of parquet between the savonnerie carpets echo hollow and duplicate.
They keep their eyes fixed away from those two thousand staring eyes, fixed upon the ceiling.
They are deathly pale. They do not appear as representatives of a brutal militarism. The one is
thin and pink-eyelidded: the second fiddle in a Brunswick orchestra. The other is moon-faced
and suffering: a privat-dozent. It is all most painful.
They are conducted to their chairs. Clemenceau at once breaks the silence. “Messieurs,” he
rasps, “la seance est ouverte.” He adds a few ill-chosen words. “We are here to sign a treaty
of peace.” Then St. Quentin advances towards the Germans and with the utmost dignity leads
them to the little table on which the treaty is expanded. There is general tension. They sign.
There is a general relaxation. Conversation hums again in an undertone. The delegates stand
up one by one and pass onwards to the queue which awaits them by the signature table. It
goes quickly.
Suddenly from outside comes the crash of guns thundering a salute. It announces to Paris that
the second Treaty of Versailles has been signed by Dr. Mueller and Dr. Belll. Through the few
open windows comes the sound of distant crowds cheering hoarsely. And still the signature
goes on. ... There was a final hush. “La seance est levee,” rasped Clemenceau. Not a word
more or less.
We kept our seats while the Germans were conducted like prisoners from the dock, their eyes
still fixed upon some distant point of the horizon.
The Treaty itself, as it turned out, was no peace treaty. It was an indictment of Germany that
not only blamed her for having caused the war, in article 231; its stripped her of many of her
possessions, limited the German army to 100, 000, internationalized German rivers and
provided for the delivery of capital goods and raw materials to the Allies, in addition to
enacting huge financial operations. the tree he was bound to cause resentment and invite
retribution, and all that came to pass.
The treaty did include what Woodrow Wilson had worked hard for, namely, the inclusion of the
League of Nations, an organization designed to prevent another calamity like the Great War.In
the end, the world was not ready for a League of Nations with teeth, Despite the fact that it
attempted to calm the turmoil which began in the decade following the war, when nations
refused to obey its restrictions, the League had no power to act. The United States never
joined the League of Nations.
When Wilson presented the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate, they balked. Wilson was tired
and in poor health from his exertions in Europe, and was in no mood to compromise. Neither
was Senate later Henry Cabot Lodge. It soon became apparent that Wilson would not accept
the treaty with the reservations which the Senate proposed, and the Senate would not ratify
the treaty as presented to them, and thus a standoff existed. Wilson decided, unwisely as it
turned out, to take his show on the road. He set off on a train trip around United States
designed to take his case to the American people in the hope that they would pressure the
Senators to accept this treaty without reservations. While on the trip, Wilson became ill and
was rushed back to Washington, where he suffered a serious stroke. For weeks Wilson was
unable to conduct his business, and for several months, his wife, Edith Galt Wilson, became
for all practical purposes the acting president of the United States. She controlled access to
her husband, told him what to read and what to sign, and delivered all communications to and
from the ailing President.
In the end, the United States never ratified the treaty of Versailles and concluded a separate
peace with Germany in 1921.
The Treaty of Versailles
by WD Staff Writer, Sadiq Jaffer
In 1914 a world war broke out. A war that would crush millions of lives, destroy lifetimes of work
and cause hate that lasted for generations. On 1918, an armistice was signed. This did not put
the blame on any of the nations for the war but just called a stop to the war until a peace treaty
was agreed upon. This peace treaty was created and signed by Germany in 1919, in the hall of
mirrors in the palace of Versailles.
At the time of the signing of the treaty, Germany's army was ruined, its people exhausted and its
government collapsing. Three countries out of the 'big four' (The big four being the countries that
drew up the treaty: Britain, USA, Italy and France.) were greatly affected by the war causing them
to have a vengeful intention whilst drawing up the treaty. Germany was defeated; the treaty of
Versailles was the final blow.
I intend to explain and answer the question: "Were territorial changes the main reason why the
Germans were angered over the treaty of Versailles?" I do not think that they were the main
reason. There were other parts of the treaty that affected and humiliated Germany greater. I shall
prove this as we go through the essay. I am now going to give and explain certain parts of the
treaty, their causes, their affects and their relevance.
There were many territorial changes to Germany after the war due to the treaty of Versailles. The
most relevant one was the decision to give Poland a coastline, the Polish Corridor. This was a
piece of land running through the center of Germany, splitting it in two. By seperating the rest of
Germany from East Prussia, Germany was severely weakened. East Prussia had been a source
of great revenue and the political elite for Germany. This humiliated, weakened and angered the
Germans. Getting the land back was going to be a source of national pride for a long time.
Another territorial change that the Germans did not expect (Alsace-Lorraine was originaly French
land and the Germans expected it to be returned to the French) was that the Saar coal fields
were to be given to France for fifteen years. This was a great source of coal for the Germans and
losing it meant that the Germans didn't have a supply of coal and raw materials for its industries.
The Germans also had to de-militarize an area of their country called the Rhineland that was in
between them and France and acted as a buffer zone. This was humiliating for the Germans as
their military was not allowed in their own land.
Another term of the treaty was that the Germans had to reduce the size of their army and
armaments. This limited their army to 100,000 voluntary soldiers (This later was an advantage,
since those 100,000 soldiers became Elite)and they had to melt down their armaments and
where not allowed to have any submarines. This had the affect of making the Germans feel weak
and humiliated and thirsty for revenge. This was one of the biggest reasons the Germans were
annoyed and angered at the treaty of Versailles. Germany also had to pay £6.6 Billion in
reparation to the winning countries; this badly affected their economy and was more money than
the Germans were able to give. This eventually led to hyperinflation, but this is irrelevant to the
topic at hand. This could possibly have been the point that angered the Germans the most, it
made them pay for the debts of the war even though they did not start it on their own.
The other point that could possibly have made the Germans angry the most, was article 231 "The
Guilt Clause" which said that the Germans were responsible for the whole first world war. The
Germans could not say or do anything and just had to keep quiet as they were blamed for
everything. The Germans had expected better treatment from the treaty of Versailles as they
expected it too be based on Wilson's 14 points. In the end only a few of the 14 points were
actually included in the treaty of Versailles which annoyed the Germans immensely. The
Germans also felt misled by the Kaiser. He started the war and then as they were looking like
they might not win, he fled to Holland. The German people had changed their government from
Monarchy to a Democracy and had also complied with all the allies conditions, yet they had still
been treated harshly and in their eyes, unfairly. The Germans were also annoyed at the way in
which they were represented at the signing of the treaty of Versailles. The name for this is called
Diktat which is the German name for dictated. Dictated peace they called it, since they did not
have any say in the peace process.
Altogether, looking at the different terms of the treaty and the effects and consequences of
different parts of it (e.g. Reparations, polish corridor ) I have come to the conclusion that the
winners really bashed Germany solely because they were the biggest country in the losing side.
In answer to the question the territorial changes angered the Germans although not as much as
the reparations, article 231 and the way in which they were treated (Diktat).
President Wilson's Fourteen Points
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World War I Document Archive > 1918 Documents > President Wilson's Fourteen
Points
Delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918
Gentlemen of the Congress:
Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated
their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace.
Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russsian representatives and
representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents have
been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these
parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.
The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the
principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally
definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of
the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less
definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of
practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the
sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it
dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory
their armed forces had occupied -- every province, every city, every point of vantage -- as
a permanent addition to their territories and their power.
It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first
suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men
who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the
concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought
but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian
representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of
conquest and domination.
The whole incident is full of significances. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the
Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires
speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the
minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their
whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt
obliged to become their associates in this war?
The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit
of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and
Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has
been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who
speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of
July last, the spirit and intention of the Liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those
who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or
are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction?
These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the
peace of the world.
But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of
counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they
have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again
challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they
would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not
be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not
once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world,
not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what
sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last
week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the
people and Government of Great Britain.
There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no
uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only
lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the
war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these
definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a
moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and
treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are
part and parcel of the very life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think
them right and imperative as he does.
There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which
is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving
voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian
people. They are prostrate and all but hopeless, it would seem, before the grim power of
Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is
shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or
in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to
accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a
universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of
mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they
themselves may be safe.
They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and
our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish
me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe
it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we
may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and
ordered peace.
It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be
absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret
understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is
also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and
likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact,
now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age
that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are
consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the
objects it has in view.
We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the
quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the
world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore,
is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and
particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own,
wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair
dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the
peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see
very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of
the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program,
as we see it, is this:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and
in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace
and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action
for the enforcement of international covenants.
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an
equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating
themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the
lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based
upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting
Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in
obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a
sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing;
and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may
herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come
will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as
distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any
attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.
No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in
the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their
relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of
international law is forever impaired.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the
wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that
peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable
lines of nationality.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous
development.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored;
Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan
states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines
of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic
independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free
passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories
inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure
access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity
should be guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity
to great and small states alike.
In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel
ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together
against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We
stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight
and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to
prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the
chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of
German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no
achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her
record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way
her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with
hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other
peace- loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We
wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, -- the new
world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of mastery.
Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions.
But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent
dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when
they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men
whose creed is imperial domination.
We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or
question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the
principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms
of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.
Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international
justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and
to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and
everything they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for
human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest
purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.
The Fourteen Points
After over two years of war, the year 1917 saw separate attempts at a compromise peace put forward by
Austria and by the Pope. These came to nothing, however. But the entry of the U.S. into the war in that
same year gave opportunity for a fresh approach to peace by the idealistic president Wilson. Moreover, the
Bolshevik overthrow of the Russian government in October of the same year resulted in peace negotiations
between the new communist state and Germany. Lenin issued his Peace Decre e in November calling for
immediate negotiations among all belligerent countries toward a "just and democratic" peace that would not
be compromised by territorial annexations or infringement of the rights of ethnic groups. The Allies, along
with the Unit ed States, were, of course, anxious to keep Russia in the war (a vain hope given the
ideological estrangement between the two sides) and it was partly in response to Lenin's intervention that
Wilson decided to make a statement on war aims. In a speech to both houses of Congress in January 1918,
he outlined 14 Points as the basis of peace between the contending forces. They made an impact only when
the Central Powers faced certain defeat by late summer of 1918; the Russians already having made their
sepa rate peace with the Germans in March 1918. The Germans then accepted Wilson's terms, hoping that
the moderate tenor of the 14 Points would let them off lightly in the peace to be negotiated. It was not easy,
however, to bring Britain and France to the side of moderation as this would have required certain
adjustments to their war aims that they were unwilling to make (assuring freedom of the seas in the case of
Britain or not forcing severe reparations on the Germans in the case of France). But subjec t to certain
modification and reinterpretation, the Points became the basis of the armistice concluded on Nov. 11, 1918.
The resulting Treaty of Versailles , however, went far beyond the moderate proposal of the Fourteen Poin ts
and left a legacy of bitterness and recrimination among the Germans, whose government had signed the
Pre-Armistice Agreement on November 5 on the presumption that the Fourteen Points would largely shape
the resulting peace treaty.
President Wilson's Address to Congress, January 8, 1918:
. . . . No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment
to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure
unless he is sure . . that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part an d parcel of the very
life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as
he does. It will our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun,
shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret
understandings of any kind. . . . We entered this war because violations of right had
occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible
unless they were corrected and the world secure once f or all against their recurrence.
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the
world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every
peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own
institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as
against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in
this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others
it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and
that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private
international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always
frankly and in the public view.
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in
peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by
international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of
an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and
associatring themselves for its maintenance.
Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to
the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be
determined.
The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations
of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrrassed opportunity
for the independent determination of her own political development and national
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of
every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded
Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their
goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own
interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any
attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free
nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence
among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for
the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the
whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and
the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine,
which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be
righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly
recognizable lines of nationality
The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunityof autonomous
development.
Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the
several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international
guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of
the several Balkan states should be entered into.
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman [Turkish] Empire should be assured
a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule
[i.e., Kurds, Arab peoples, Armenians and some Greeks] should be assured an
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development, and the Darrdanelles [namely, the straits leading from
the Black Sea approaches to international waters] should be permanently opened
as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international
guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a
free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and
territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points were first outlined in a speech Wilson gave to
the American Congress in January 1918. Wilson's Fourteen Points became the
basis for a peace programme and it was on the back of the Fourteen Points that
Germany and her allies agreed to an armistice in November 1918.
1. No more secret agreements ("Open covenants openly arrived at").
2. Free navigation of all seas.
3. An end to all economic barriers between countries.
4. Countries to reduce weapon numbers.
5. All decisions regarding the colonies should be impartial
6. The German Army is to be removed from Russia. Russia should be left to
develop
her own political set-up.
7. Belgium should be independent like before the war.
8. France should be fully liberated and allowed to recover Alsace-Lorraine
9. All Italians are to be allowed to live in Italy. Italy's borders are to "along
clearly recognisable lines of nationality."
10. Self-determination should be allowed for all those living in Austria-Hungary.
11. Self-determination and guarantees of independence should be allowed for
the Balkan states.
12. The Turkish people should be governed by the Turkish government. NonTurks in
the old Turkish Empire should govern themselves.
13. An independent Poland should be created which should have access to the
sea.
14. A League of Nations should be set up to guarantee the political and territorial
independence of all states.
Wilson's Fourteen Points
1918
During the bloody battles of the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson began to
explain his plans for the peace following the war. Most widely known was his message of a
"peace without victory" most completely explained in his "Fourteen Points" speech before
Congress on 8 January 1918. The first five points consisted mainly the idea of an "open"
world after the war. Simply rendered, these represented public covenants between nations,
freedom of navigating the seas, equal trading practices and elimination of protective tariffs,
reduction of armaments, and an end to imperialism. The next eight points focused mainly
upon the idea of granting "self-determination" to national minorities in Europe. Most
significant, however, was point number fourteen which stressed a "general association of
nations" to ensure "political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states
alike." Essentially, these Fourteen Points signaled a generous, non-punitive postwar
settlement.
Back to "The United States" Chronology
Back to "World War I" Chronology
The first point requires "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at."
The second point, "freedom of navigation upon the seas," regards a key reason for US
entrance into the war: Germany's unlimited submarine warfare.
The third is consistent with the liberal argument for economic association to prevent war:
"equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace."
The fourth point calls for arms reduction.
Points five through thirteen address national self-determination, an important issue to
President Wilson. Point five calls for "adjustment of colonial claims" giving equal voice to
the colonial governments.
Russia and Belgium are to be evacuated in points six and seven. France is also to be freed
in point eight, with Alsace-Lorraine returned. Prussia (currently Germany) had taken this
territory from France in 1871, and Wilson "righted" this wrong of fifty years. Italy's borders
were addressed in point nine, to "be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."
Austria-Hungary is "accorded . . . autonomous development" in point ten. Rumania, Serbia,
and Montenegro are to be evacuated in point eleven, and Serbia given sea access. Point
twelve assures Turkey as well as other portions of the Ottoman Empire under Turkish rule
"sovereignty" as well as demands guarantees for free passage through the Dardanelles.
Point thirteen calls for "an independent Polish state."
The final point was the most controversial and yet most important to Wilson: the League of
Nations. The League of Nations was the brainchild of Wilson, a body which would enforce
the peace settlement and international law in general. The theory behind the League was
collective security, described in the Article Ten of the League Covenant of 1919 as
commitment by members of the League "to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the
League."
Congress, wary of losing its sole power to declare war to the League, expressed its fears in
the Lodge Reservations of 1919 . The United States wished to be under no obligation to
enter into another foreign war. In order to get his proposal for the League passed, Wilson
compromised on the issue of German reparations, allowing them to exist in the peace
settlement. This compromise undermined the spirit of the Fourteen Points and lost Wilson
the support of the League advocates.
The League was voted in (though not given powers) by the rest of the Allies, yet it was
never approved by the United States. The US finally voted on the Versailles Treaty, without
the League articles, in 1921.
Woodrow Wilson at 150 – Fourteen Points
By G. John Ikenberry - January 3, 2007, 12:38PM
Woodrow Wilson was born 150 years ago, on December 28, 1856. 88 years ago -- on January
8, 1918 -- Wilson gave his famous Fourteen Points address to Congress, using the occasion of the
Great War to propose ideas to remake the world. Several historical eras later, we still are in the grip of
Wilson’s ideas.
Indeed, most American presidents since Wilson have had to confront his vision – adapting his ideas,
borrowing his rhetoric, learning from his mistakes, pushing off against his fanciful schemes, and
tapping into the American idealism to which Wilson gave voice. George Bush is only the most recent
president to simultaneously draw upon and push off against the Wilsonian vision. Depending on who
you listen to, Bush is either a direct heir of Woodrow Wilson or the ultimate anti-Wilson. Bush’s neocon advisors have been described as “Wilsonians in boots.” But the Bush administration has had no
use for international law and collective security which is the heart of Wilsonianism.
In the quest to untangle Wilson’s legacy today, here are my Fourteen Points on Woodrow Wilson.
1- Woodrow Wilson had a radical liberal vision of world order but, ironically, he did not bring a
developed view of world affairs or an ambitious foreign policy agenda to his presidency in 1913. Nor
did he expect to be consumed by foreign affairs. “It would be the irony of fate if my administration
had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs,” is what he told a Princeton colleague before he went off to
Washington to take the oath of office. (Sound familiar?)
2- Nonetheless, Wilson became the founding father of the liberal tradition of American foreign affairs.
He did it initially with speeches. It began in his justification of war with Germany, speaking before a
joint session of Congress in the spring of 1917 seeking a declaration of war against Germany so that
the world could be “made safe for democracy.”
Indeed, the entering intellectual wedge of Wilson’s liberal vision was the conviction – felt most
emphatically about Germany – that the internal characteristics of states matter most in matters of war
and peace. Autocratic and militarist states make war; democracies make peace. This is the cornerstone
of Wilsonianism and, more generally, the liberal international tradition. As Wilson said it: “A
steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No
autocratic nation could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants . . . Only free peoples
can hold their purpose and their honor steady. . . “
3- Six big ideas make up Wilsonianism. First, as noted above, the foundation of a peaceful order must
be built on a community of democratic states. War was the product of antiquated social systems.
Second, free trade and socioeconomic exchange have a modernizing and civilizing effect on states,
undercutting tyranny and oligopoly and strengthening the fabric of international community. Third,
international law and international bodies of cooperation and dispute settlement also have a
modernizing and civilizing effect on states, promoting peace and strengthening the fabric of
international community. Fourth, a stable and peaceful order must be built around a “community of
power.” This was a new concept that Wilson introduced by which he essentially meant a system of
collective security. Fifth, these conditions – democracy, trade, law, collective security – were possible
because the world was moving in a progressive and modernizing direction. A “new order of things”
was emerging. Finally, the United States was at the vanguard of this movement and it had special
responsibilities to lead, direct, and inspire the world – due to its founding ideas, geopolitical position,
and enlightened leadership (read Wilson). America was the great moral agent in history.
4- Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points speech to Congress, delivered on January 8, 1918, is arguably the
most important statement of American foreign policy in the 20th century. (The Atlantic Charter is a
close second in my view). It was Wilson’s statement of America’s war aims – but it was also a
blueprint to reorganize world politics (wielding the ideas mentioned above). The actual drafting of the
speech occurred on January 5, 1918, at the White House when Wilson and Colonel House hammered
it into shape. Colonel House records in his diary: “We actually got down to work at half past ten, and
finished remaking the map of the world, as we would have it, by half past twelve-o-clock.” (Not bad
for one night’s work!)
5- The Wilsonian tradition has dominated 20th century American diplomacy. No less than Henry
Kissinger has suggested so (in his Diplomacy in 1994). “It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian
idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to
march to this day.”
6- Wilson’s vision embodied both impulses toward “liberal imperialism” (or, more politely, “liberal
interventionism”) and “liberal internationalism” – an awkward and problematic duality that continues
among liberals today.
The “liberal imperial” impulse was on display in Wilson’s earlier interventions in Mexico in 1914 and
1916. Wilson said that America’s deployment of force was to help Mexico “adjust her unruly
household.” Regarding Latin America, Wilson said: “We are friends of constitutional government in
America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions. I am going to teach the South American
republics to elect good men.” Indeed, Wilson used military force in an attempt to teach Southern
republics, intervening in Cuba, the Dominion Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
The “liberal internationalist” impulse was articulated later during the Great War in the Fourteen Points
address and in proposals for collective security and the League of Nations. This sentiment was stated
perhaps most clearly in the summer of 1918 as the war was reaching its climax. Wilson gave his July
4th address at Mount Vernon and described his vision of postwar order: “What see seek is the reign of
law, based on the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”
7- Wilson’s vision was deeply progressive. The world could be made anew. The old world of
autocracy, militarism, and despotism could be overturned and a new world of democracy and rule of
law was over the horizon. America had a leading role to play in this progressive world-historical
drama, but the forces of history were already moving the world in this direction. America was God’s
chosen midwife of progressive change.
8- Wilson championed a world ordered by international law (Anne-Marie, he would have liked the
phrase “forging a world of liberty under law,” yes?), but he had a very 19th century view of
international law. That is, Wilson did not see international law primarily as formal, legal-binding
commitments that transferred sovereignty upward to international or supranational authorities.
International law had more of a socializing dynamic, creating norms and expectations that states
would slowly come to embrace as their own. Wilson did not see the great liberal project involving a
deep transformation of states themselves – as sovereign legal units. States would just act better –
which for Wilson meant they would act in less selfish and nationalist ways. So international laws and
the system of collective security anchored in the League of Nations would provide a socializing role,
gradually bringing states into a “community of power.”
9- The popular historical account that America “chose isolation over internationalism” after World
War I is a myth. The Senate rejection of the Peace Treaty was not inevitable. A majority of the Senate
was in fact internationalist. Wilson blew it. A majority of the Senate was willing to buy onto the
treaty, although some wanted clarifying reservations. The “Irreconcilables” (such as Borah,
LaFollette, and Norris) who sought to defeat the treaty were a minority. Wilson would not
compromise and, as a result, he was unable or unwilling to split the mild reservationists off from the
hard-line opponents. (Remember that the mild reservationists included senators like Frank Kellogg
from Minnesota who went on to be Secretary of State under Coolidge and negotiated the infamous
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that “outlawed war.” His later ideas might have been fanciful, but he was
an internationalist.)
The main issue was Article X of the League of Nations Covenant which defined the obligations of
member states to uphold the peace in the face of “external aggression” against “the territorial integrity
and existing independence of all Members of the League.” The worry of some Senators was that the
treaty violated the Senate’s constitutional authority to decide if and when to use force abroad. Wilson
explicitly acknowledged that the treaty did not abridge the nation’s sovereign rights or the Senate’s
prerogatives. The Senate’s constitutional authority was not altered. As such, he did not think the mild
reservationists were subverting the technical commitments and liabilities inherent in the treat. Why
did Wilson resist? I think what was most important was the moral blow that these reservations would
mean to the treaty, as he saw it (enfeebled as he was at this point). Recall his view of international
law. He was not trying to trap America in sovereignty-restricting treaties. He was trying to bring the
U.S. and other states into a community of nations whose views of commitments and collective action
would evolve in a progressive direction.
10- Wilson’s bold proposals at Versailles were premised on a belief that the world was in the midst of
a major democratic revolution. The crowds who cheered him in Europe seemed to be confirmation of
this fast-developing global revolution. Russia’s revolution was initially seen in this light. With the
assumption that Europe and the wider world would embrace American democratic principles, Wilson
could pass over otherwise thorny issues of the postwar settlement. The view in Wilson’s head that a
democratic revolution was gaining strength – not an altogether silly idea when Wilson headed for
Paris in December 1918 – meant that history was on his side and its forces would bring leaders to
power in Europe that would buy into his new vision. Alas, in retrospect, the winter of 1918-19 was a
democratic high tide rather than a gathering flood.
11- Wilson’s liberal vision of order was expanded and deepened in the 1940s when America again had
an opportunity to remake the world. FDR and Truman had both been young Wilsonians during the
first world war. Wilson did not have the last word on how to build liberal international order. Wilson’s
liberal ideas were modified, expanded, and updated.
To be sure, FDR shared Wilson’s vision of an enlightened peace, as he made clear in the Atlantic
Charter in 1941. Truman’s deep belief in the necessity of the United Nations was shaped by his earlier
devotion to Wilson’s proposal for a League of Nations. FDR and Truman also learned lessons from
Wilson. They cared much more about getting the postwar international economic system organized in
an open and orderly manner, and indeed they started working on this part of the postwar agenda even
before the United States entered the war. More importantly, they saw that Wilson’s vision of a world
democratic order was a bridge too far. Postwar order would need to be built around a Western core of
states that formed a natural political community. Atlantic community came first. Collective security
would be built around traditional alliance partnership. Specific strategic bargains – political,
economic, and security – were also part of the post-1945 liberal international order. A broader array of
institutions were built and capacities deployed to manage and sustain liberal order. Finally, American
power – or hegemony – was built into the postwar liberal order. All of these innovations updated the
Wilsonian vision.
12- Wilson was the first American president to wield “soft power” on the global stage. He did this by
speaking not just to other statesmen but to public audiences in Europe and around the world. As the
war ended, he had the extraordinary support of European public opinion as he gave voice to their warweary hopes. When Wilson sailed form Europe in December 1918 aboard the George Washington, he
had a top hat on his head and the world in his hands.
Here is Wilson scholar Thomas Knock’s description of Wilson entering Paris: “Thirty-six thousand
French soldiers held back the crowds as the procession of eight horse-drawn carriages, the first
carrying Wilson and President Raymond Poncare, passed along the avenues. Cannon boomed in the
distance. Bouquets of violets rained down on Mrs. Wilson, almost burying her carriage. The cheers
were deafening, even frightening. ‘I saw Foch pass, Clemenceau pass, Lloyd George, generals,
returning troops,’ wrote one journalist, ‘but Wilson heard from the carriage something different,
inhuman – or superhuman.’” As Knock notes, the same scene repeated itself when Wilson visited
London, Carlisle, and Manchester the next week. “After his entrance into Rome in early January –
where the streets were sprinkled with golden sand, in accordance with ancient tradition, and the
banners read ‘Welcome to the God of Peace’ – it was said that Caesar had never had a grander
triumph. In Milan, the ovations verged on hysteria, and Wilson was moved to tears.”
13- Wilson’s big ideas and ultimate failure in remaking the world after the war was a boon to realist
critics – most famously, E.H. Carr – and the debate that ensued laid the foundation for the modern
discipline of international relations. But the mid-century critics of Wilson were wrong on most of their
big claims.
E.H. Carr’s Twenty-Years Crisis laid out the indictment of Wilson. He and the other liberal utopians
built their grand schemes on false assumptions about states, power, and history. Of course, Carr
looked pretty persuasive when he stepped forward in the 1930s to argue that liberal utopians had it all
wrong; the return of anarchy and war reveals the enduring truth of power politics. But Carr and the
realists had it wrong: (1) Wilson and the liberals were not utopian -- they had a reasonable theory
about how the world worked and, given that, how to build order. (2) Wilson and the liberals were not
idealists – they were actually, at least in part, liberal historical materialists or liberal modernization
theorists who saw democracy, trade, and institutionalized governance as springing from deep
materialist historical forces. (3) Wilson and the liberals did not ignore power politics but saw how it
could be tamed and bound through collective policies and practices. For at least half a century after
World War II, the West and the wider community of democracies pioneered a political order that seem
to confirm the core of Wilsonian thinking – updated and modified as noted above.
14- Wilsonianism has made it into the 21st century -- but it is in trouble. (1) The uncomfortable
duality of “liberal imperialism” and “liberal internationalism” mentioned earlier has worsened. David
Rieff and others have helped us debate this issue on this blog. (2) Bush has wrapped himself in the
first core idea of Wilsonian – championing the spread democracy to promote peace and security. But
his foreign policy has been a disaster and in many political quarters it is deeply discredited.
Wilsonianism and liberal internationalism – which are so much more than Bush understands – will
also take a hit. Bush did not get into trouble in foreign policy by embracing Wilsonianism. He got into
trouble in foreign policy and sought refugee embracing aspects of it. But the political hit will be
sustained nonetheless. (3) The liberal breakthrough after World War II – updated Wilsonianism –
required a form of American hegemony to make it work, and that postwar liberal, rule-based
hegemony is now at risk, at least in the hands of the Bush administration. (4) the 21st century version
of Wilsonianism is actually much more radical than anything Wilson proposed. The rights and
obligations of the “international community” has moved way beyond anything Wilson foresaw. He
talked about a “community of power” but this was really just a highly socialized democratic state
system in which members made security commitments to each other. The more complex and extensive
forms of collective action and interventions that are embedded in today’s international order have
generated an authority crisis that liberal international theory itself cannot explain or solve.
Wilsonianism is in crisis but it is a crisis of success. The historical success – or triumph – of
Wilsonanism has brought us to this crisis. Not bad for a President who came down to Washington
from Princeton largely uninterested in foreign affairs!