AFTERWORD
July - August 1995
While preparing this thesis for submission, my supervisor and I asked an academic in
Bath University's School of Education to read a draft and comment on possible
difficulties which might arise at examination. The response was interesting as well as
helpful, in that it raised questions about what I see as the relationship between an
academic, university-based view of knowledge and a practitioner-based view, 1 as
well as making valuable points about the form in which I have made my
communication, which I have taken account of in the way I presented the final thesis.
I feel that I need add an afterword, to engage with the questions raised by the reader in
his comments, in order to defend my thesis, and to reassert the two contributions
which I believe I have made. I also need to engage with the reader's comments since,
as a participant in a dialectical form of knowledge which I believe has the potential to
constitute a professional knowledge for teaching, I must be true to my beliefs and
reflect on my own practice with the intention of improving it in the light of dialogue. I
will then explain the present state of my understanding and actions, to bring my thesis
to a conclusion.
I'm going to refer to the academic who read and commented on my thesis as Anthony
Evans, because with the limited time I've got left I doubt whether I'd have the
opportunity to show him what I've written before I submit my thesis at the end of
August. Anthony questioned five 'assumptions' which he believed I had made:
1. It is assumed that teachers' professional knowledge is dialectical and not
propositional.
See, for example, the questions raised on this point by John Elliott and Charles Sarland in their study
of teachers as researchers, and the relation of such research to more conventional, academic forms.
(Elliott, J. and Sarland, C. (1995) 'A Study of 'Teachers as Researchers' in the Context of
Award-bearing Courses and Research Degrees' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 21 No 3,
especially pp. 371 - 373, 376 - 377.
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2. It is assumed that teachers' professional knowledge is of low status, and that this
low status is due to (1) above, given the high status of academic propositional
knowledge.
3. It is assumed that this thesis is more accessible and relevant to teachers than most
theses.
4. It is assumed that 'educational' necessarily implies 'moral'.
5. It is assumed that 'educational' differs from 'about education'.
I am not convinced that any of these should be taken as assumptions.2
I'd like to take these points in order, and reply to them.
Point 1. It is assumed that teachers' professional knowledge is dialectical and not
propositional.
Anthony explains further:
There is deliberate avoidance of an in-depth discussion of dialectics. Yet if the reader
is to be convinced that educational knowledge is indeed dialectical rather than
propositional, this needs to be argued much more fully. According to Bakhtin, for
example, all communication is 'dialogical', not just communication of the type used
here. If this is the case, then propositional knowledge (as defined - very loosely - in
this thesis) forms part of a dialogue. In this case, all theses, employing whatever
paradigm, are pieces of discourse; in effect, extended conversational turns. This
would be as true of a thesis in nuclear physics as of an action research
teacher-researcher's thesis.
When Anthony states that I assume teachers' professional knowledge to be dialectical
and not propositional, he has judged my thesis from within an inappropriate
(positivist or interpretational) epistemological position, since he believes that I have
assumed teachers' professional knowledge to be either dialectical, or propositional. It
can't, he implies, be both. In fact, I specifically state in my discussion of what I see as
teachers' professional knowledge (Chapter Ten) that such knowledge, while it is
dialectical, draws on propositional knowledge to provide challenge, stimulus, or
illumination. From the experiences I have described, therefore, I believe the
2
From the 'Reader's Report on Thesis' written by Anthony Evans.
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propositional form and the dialectical form can not only co-exist, but can co-exist in a
productive relationship.
Furthermore, even if he were correct on this point he has failed to notice that I have
given evidence for my view from a range of writers and from my own practice. What
I actually said was that the dialectical form of action-research-based educational
knowledge had the potential to constitute a form of professional knowledge for
teachers. Rather than basing my argument on an assumption, I referred to a wide
range of academics and teacher-researchers who have claimed that action research is
based on a dialectical form of knowing and acting (particularly in Chapters Three,
Four, Five and Nine). I then showed how characteristics of a dialectical form were
discernible in my own practice as a teacher, since I believed that, although in the
opinion of many writers the logic underpinning action research was dialectical, there
were no practical explorations of this view. Also, those who held the view expressed
it in a propositional form, and I wished to explore the dialectical nature of
action-research-based knowledge from within a dialectical form. Finally, I believe
that I have shown how my understanding of dialectics developed when I engaged in
dialogue with varying communities of academics and teacher-researchers, embodying
my account in a dialectical form of knowing and acting. I consider, therefore, that my
view of the dialectical nature of action-research-based educational knowledge is not
an 'assumption', but is supported by reference to a wide range of sources, and
illustrated by the account I have given of my own educational development.
I also believe that Anthony is mistaken in his own assumption that I have deliberately
avoided an 'in-depth discussion of dialectics', and that, from his own epistemological
perspective, I could have argued the case more fully. My intention in this thesis was to
show how the claim made by a wide range of writers - that action research is
underpinned by a dialectical form of logic - works in practice, from the standpoint of
a teacher-researcher reflecting on his own educational development. I certainly did
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not intend (as I said in Chapter Nine) to undertake a purely theoretical examination of
dialectics, for this had already been carried out by writers such as Richard Winter,3
Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis.4
The originality of my contribution, as I saw it (and as I still see it), was to relate an
exploration of my own practice to my growing understanding of how that practice
could be called dialectical. In the early part of my narrative, therefore, I looked at the
account I had given of my work with Stephen, and showed how dialectical features
were discernible, in relation to the concepts of dialectics held by Comey, Engels,
Ilyenkov and Collingwood. I then explored the dialectical features which were
discernible in the way my account was used within a community of educators, relating
this discussion to the work of other writers on dialectics, such as Gadamer,5 or Bohm
and Peat. 6 From Chapter Seven onwards, I engaged more fully in dialogue with
groups of colleagues. This process enabled me to develop my own practice as an
action-researcher in accordance with what I had learned, and to relate my practical
understanding to writers from within Marxist and Thomist traditions of dialectics.7
I therefore believe that Anthony's implied requirement - that I should engage in what
he understands by a detailed, theoretical discussion of dialectics - is inappropriate,
since to do so would have moved me away from my own epistemological position, as
expressed in my demonstration of the dialectical features discernible in my practice as
an action researcher. However, I have conducted a theoretical discussion in my own
terms by relating my work to other writers in the field of action research who have
Winter, R. (1987) 'Action Research and the Nature of Social Inquiry: Professional innovation and
educational work' Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company.
4 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) 'Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research'
Sussex: Falmer Press.
5 Gadamer, H.G. (1979) 'Truth and Method' London: Sheed Ward.
6 Bohm, D. and Peat, F. D. (1987) 'Science, Order and Creativity' London: Routledge.
7 Gramsci, A. (1967) 'The organisation of education and culture' in 'The Modern Prince', New York:
International Publishers; MacIntyre, A. (1990) 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry' London:
Duckworth.
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written about dialectics, or who have written within a dialectical form, as it was
necessary to clarify the original contribution which I believe I have made in this area.
I also wish to take issue with Anthony's view that such a discussion of dialectics is
needed to convince 'the reader' that 'educational knowledge is indeed dialectical rather
than propositional'. As I have pointed out above, I am not claiming that such
knowledge is dialectical and not propositional. Rather than attempting to convince by
entering into a purely theoretical discussion which I consider inappropriate, what I
have actually offered as evidence is a description of my developing educational
understanding as an action researcher, and of the dialectical characteristics which are
discernible in that developing understanding. I have not attempted to claim that all
knowledge in the field of education is like this. I have said, first, that my own
action-research-based understanding has dialectical characteristics, and I believe that I
have demonstrated this to be the case in my account overall. Second, I have said that
this kind of dialectically-constituted, action-research-based knowledge has within it
the potential to stand as a form of professional knowledge for teachers.
My two claims are thus limited, and are not rooted in the epistemology which
(judging by his opening comment) Anthony seems to feel should provide the
standards to be applied to my own work. As he feels that I have so far only given a
'loose' definition of what I mean by 'propositional', I'd like to use this chance to
explain briefly what I understand by the term, how it relates to my own view of the
claims I have made, and what Anthony seems to want from me.
He appears to be asking me to supply propositions which are either located in the
positivist research paradigm (theoretical, context-free, and generalisable), or in the
interpretive paradigm. 8 Within the educational world, such propositions are often
Hoyle, E. and John, P.D. (1995) 'Professional Knowledge and Professional Practice' London: Cassell,
pp. 54 - 55.
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associated with the 'disciplines' approach, and are seen as 'value-free', 'law-like' and
employing a 'scientific method (to create) undisputed knowledge.' 9 There have, of
course, been many questions raised about the direct applicability of such knowledge
to the complex, context-specific, practical situations in which individual
teacher-researchers work and take action based on their values. 10 The interpretive
paradigm, on the other hand, accepts these limitations in the positivist approach, and
focuses on the social processes through which the 'subjective meanings' of individuals
are produced and constitute educational realities.11 The relationship between theory
and practice in this paradigm is 'illuminative', in that it reveals to the participants, and
to other interested parties, a deeper perception of understandings, actions and values
which may lead to wiser, more informed action and understanding in the future.12
However, the positivist and the interpretive paradigms are similar, in that both aspire
to express their findings as propositions which exclude contradiction. To fail in this,
Karl Popper asserts, would mean '(giving) up any kind of scientific activity; it would
mean the breakdown of science'13 Although Popper was focusing on natural sciences,
rather than on social sciences, the 'common methodological aim' of the positivist and
interpretive paradigms shares the scientific concern to '(describe)...reality in a neutral,
disinterested way.'14 'In both approaches, the researcher stands outside the researched
situation adopting a disinterested stance in which any explicit concern with critically
evaluating and changing the educational realities being analysed is rejected.'15
Hoyle, E. and John, P.D. (1995) op. cit, p. 54.
E.g. Schön, D. (1983) 'The Reflective Practitioner' New York: Basic Books; Schön, D. (1987)
'Educating the Reflective Practitioner' San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Reason, P. and Rowan, J. (1981)
'Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research' Chichester: John Wiley; Carr, W. and
Kemmis, S. (1986) 'Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research' Sussex: Falmer
Press; Winter, R. (1989) 'Learning from Experience: Principles and Practice in Action Research'
Sussex: Falmer Press; Eames, K. (1988) 'Evaluating a Teacher-Researcher's Choice of Action Research'
Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education, Vol 13 No 3.
11 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., pp. 83 - 101; Hoyle, E. and John, P.D. (1995) op. cit., p.
55.
12 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., pp.91 - 94.
13 Popper, K. (1963) 'Conjectures and Refutations' London: Routledge, p. 316.
14 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., p. 99.
15 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) ibid.
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On the other hand, the critical paradigm emphasises the involvement of researchers in
gaining 'knowledge that will help them control their world', in 'act(ing) and
perform(ing) judgements about their immediate environments',16 and in developing
an emancipatory, 'self-reflective understanding that will permit individuals to explain
why the conditions under which they operate are frustrating and will suggest the sort
of action that is required if the sources of these frustrations are to be eliminated.'17
Within this critical paradigm, 'participants explore...contradictions and seek to resolve
them' through the 'concrete transformation of real educational situations'.18
On the face of it, this paradigm is where my view of teachers' professional knowledge
is located. Rather than outside researchers expressing meanings in purely linguistic
propositions which avoid contradiction, the critical paradigm defines its claims to
validity through the reflective exploration of contradictions in practical situations, by
which participants reach an enlightened understanding, decide on appropriate courses
of action, take action, and learn from that action within a self-critical community of
researchers who are committed to improvement.
19
The growth of my own
professional understanding has shown these features, I believe, and I would argue that
Anthony should have taken this into account in the judgements he made on my work.
Indeed, the standards of judgement, derived from the natural sciences, which are
associated with propositional knowledge seem to me entirely inappropriate for a study
such as my own, which is practical, individually-based, and context-specific.
My argument that teachers' professional knowledge is dialectical should not be
judged, I believe, by the standards of a form of knowledge which demands
Hoyle, E. and John, P.D. (1995) 'Professional Knowledge and Professional Practice' London:
Cassell, p. 55.
17 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., p. 136.
18 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., p.158.
19 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit., p.158, p. 184.
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context-free generalisations, or neutral, disinterested statements, but by the extent to
which my developing understanding embodies a dialectical form which is
values-based, is initiated and sustained by contradiction, engages with practice, enters
into dialogue with a community of action researchers, and focuses on my own
educational development. The kinds of questions which would be appropriate in
establishing the validity of what I have done might be along the lines of: 'Have I taken
action to solve the contradictions which I have experienced? Have I learnt from my
actions? Have I submitted my account to the questioning of a community of action
researchers, and have I taken action as a result of their comments?' Anthony's
reference to Bakhtin, and his suggestion that 'all theses, employing whatever
paradigm, are pieces of discourse - in effect, extended conversational turns' seems to
me to miss the point that within the critical paradigm, understanding is not developed
through linguistic discourse alone, but through a dialectical process of action and
self-reflection within a community.
To conclude my response to Anthony's first point, I acknowledge that the description
which I have just given suggests that the relationship between these epistemological
positions is oppositional, and I have no wish to do that, for I believe that the three
main epistemologies which underpin the variety of knowledges in education can
contribute to each other, and I have discussed and demonstrated this matter in Chapter
Two and in Chapter Ten, in particular. Thus, if I am fully to embody my claim that
my professional knowledge is dialectical within this response to Anthony's comments,
I must show what I have learnt from the propositions he has advanced, and how I
have attempted to improve my own practice as a result.
Anthony's comments have revealed to me a contradiction in my practice as an action
researcher, for I now recognise that I should have located my work more clearly in a
specific epistemological paradigm, and established the standards of judgement which
I felt were appropriate in judging what I had done. I have therefore taken
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responsibility for improving the clarity of my communication on this point, by
relating my account to an established and influential discussion of epistemological
paradigms in education,20 as well as to a very recent publication.21 However, what
Anthony said has prompted me to think further about the relationship between the
account I have given of my own educational development, and the critical paradigm
within which the dialectical form of action research is usually located.
What I have claimed to be my professional knowledge as a teacher relates to the
critical paradigm in many ways, in its stress on the exploration of contradiction, the
development of enlightened understanding, and the appropriate ameliorative action
which happens within the overall context of a critical community intended to carry
thinking and action forward. However, much of the academic work that I have come
across within this paradigm22 - and which I have found supportive and stimulating has been expressed in a form that does not accord with my own experiences as an
action researcher. Jack Whitehead puts his finger on it, when he invites academics
such as Jean Rudduck, Colin Henry, Orlando Fals-Borda and Ortrun Zuber-Skerritt to
move away from writing about action research, and instead to give accounts of
themselves as action researchers - to show how they have reflected on contradictions
in their practices, and have taken action, and learned from that action, within a
self-critical community of researchers who are committed to improvement.23
What's missing from the accounts that Jack has referred to, and which I have
mentioned in the examples I have given, is a sense of the individual's educational
Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) op. cit.
Hoyle, E. and John, P.D. (1995) op. cit.
22 E.g. Carr W. and Kemmis S. (1986) op. cit.; Kemmis, S. and McTaggart, R. (eds) (1988) 'The
Action Research Reader' Deakin University Press; Kincheloe, J. (1991) 'Teachers as Researchers:
Qualitative inquiry as a path to empowerment' Sussex: Falmer Press; much of the work presented at the
Second World Congress on Action Learning (University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, July
1992) and at World Congress Three on Action Research, Action Learning and Process Management
(Bath, UK, July 1994).
23 Whitehead, J. (1993) 'The Growth of Educational Knowledge: Creating Your Own Living
Educational Theories' Bournemouth: Hyde Publications, pp. 127 - 137.
20
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development over time - warts, contradictions, actions and all. I believe this element
is present in the accounts by action researchers which I have referred to in Chapters
Nine and Ten, as well as in my present account. It's not an academic/practitioner split,
either, for there is a growing number of action researchers in higher education who
have given such an account.24 The problem I have at present is where to locate such
knowledge, since it doesn't fit with complete congruence into the critical paradigm. Is
it, perhaps, a sub-section of that paradigm which needs clearer acknowledgement? Or
is it even a paradigm on its own - an educative paradigm, which may be the
educational science which Carr and Kemmis were looking for, but which they fail to
embody in their own practice? It's a contradiction that I can't hope to solve at present,
for reasons of time. All I can do is draw attention to it, and hope to learn more about it
in the future.
Point 2: It is assumed that teachers' professional knowledge is of low status, and that
this low status is due to (1) above, given the high status of academic propositional
knowledge.
Anthony explains further:
If teachers' professional knowledge is of low status (and some evidence is offered to
support this assertion) this could be for a number of reasons. The analogy with
medicine is interesting in this respect. In the nineteenth century, I believe, doctors
had low social status; it is now high; it may be lower again in the future - yet it is
unclear whether the nature of doctors' professional knowledge has undergone a
radical qualitative change. Is the relationship of GP to medical researcher very
different from that of teacher to educational researcher? Is there not always a tension
between theory and practice? It could be that teachers' professional knowledge would
be more highly valued if they were paid more, or even if there were more competition
to enter the profession. It could be that the relationship of teachers to educational
researchers could be improved in ways other than the one suggested. The case is not
cut-and-dried. ... .
E.g. Lomax, P. (1994) 'The Narrative of an Educational Journey, or Crossing the Track' Kingston
University; Griffiths, M. and Tann, S. (1991) 'Ripples in the reflection' in Lomax, P. (ed) 'BERA
Dialogues No 5: Managing better schools and colleges: an action research way' Clevedon: Multilingual
Matters, pp. 82 - 101; Somekh, B. (1993) 'Teachers Generating Knowledge: Constructing Practical and
Theoretical Understanding from Multi-site Case Studies' in Day, C., Calderhead, J. and Denicolo, P.
(eds) 'Research on Teachers' Thinking: Understanding Professional Development' London: Falmer
Press as well as Whitehead, J. (1993) op. cit.
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Once again, I feel that there is a clash of epistemologies and perspectives. Anthony
says that I assume teachers' knowledge to be now of low status, owing to its
dialectical nature, 'given the high status of academic propositional knowledge'. He
finds this case not proven, and gives other possible suggestions as to how the low
status of teachers' professional knowledge might be enhanced - suggestions which I
do not disagree with. However, I believe that he has misunderstood the main focus of
my enquiry. I am not concerned with a comprehensive analysis of the variables which
may influence the status of different kinds of professional knowledge, but with raising
questions and
taking action in a dialectical debate concerning the nature and
professional standing of teachers' knowledge.
Consistently, in discussions of professionality, I have encountered the view that
teaching, unlike other professions such as medicine, has no agreement on what
constitutes professional knowledge. This lack of agreement has raised problems
concerning the professional standing of teachers, as I tried to make clear in Chapters
One and Ten, and as Hoyle and John have recently reiterated. 25 In my thesis, I
attempted to answer questions about what such knowledge might look like. How is it
produced? Who owns it? How might it be communicated, or used in practical
contexts? I have also attempted to answer these questions not simply in the form of
linguistic propositions such as 'If this, then that', as Anthony does in making the point
above. Rather, I have tried to embody my meaning, dialectically, in my lived
understanding, as it develops through dialogue, reflection and action. It seems to me
that Anthony's points concerning the status of teachers' professional knowledge have
failed to recognise both the evidence I have offered, and the form in which this
evidence is presented.
25
Hoyle, E. and John, P. (1995) op. cit., p. 46, p. 74.
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However, I feel that Anthony has raised valuable points concerning the relationship
between research and practice, which I need to discuss further. I want to look at the
approach of Gary Fenstermacher, whose views have some similarities to those I have
advanced in my thesis. Fundamentally, Fenstermacher argues that research and
practice are two distinct activities which should be kept separate, although they can
inform each other, in a productive way.26 Moreover, he sees them as 'separate and
distinct traditions...(which are) equal in status, though that is certainly not what most
academics in Western developed nations do.'27 Research is integrated within practice
in what he calls 'practical arguments', which are constructed when teachers reflect on
what they do, with the intention of improving it. In order to explain and understand
what he has done, and in order to improve what he will do, a teacher will draw on
theory and engage in dialogue with a 'critical friend', usually an academic, who will
help him frame a rationale for his actions, and 'construct a revised...practical
argument' as a consequence of the reflective and dialogic process.28
I can see many points of similarity between Fenstermacher's view of practical
arguments, and my own conception of a dialectical, action-research-based form of
professional knowledge. There's a similar sense of reflection on action, with a view to
improving it; there's a similar stress on the importance of putting understanding into
action; there's also a dialogical element in the development of understanding and
action. However, I believe that my thesis has built on Fenstermacher's view in a
number of ways:
* The process of practical argument seems to me to have a dialectical structure, in
the sense that I have tried to explain and embody in my thesis. I therefore believe
Fenstermacher, G.D. (1987) 'A reply to my critics' Educational Theory, Vol 37 No 4, p. 418, p. 419.
Fenstermacher, G.D. (1987) op. cit., p. 419.
28 Fenstermacher, G.D. and Richardson, V. (1993) 'The elicitation and reconstruction of practical
arguments in teaching' Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol 25 No 2, pp. 105 - 106.
26
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that I have elucidated the underpinning logical structure of the process described
by Fenstermacher.
* Fenstermacher's view of dialogue - certainly in his earlier formulation - is very
top-down, with the academic 'inquirer' observing the teacher, encouraging him to
analyse the premises of his practical argument, and questioning him about the
completeness of his argument.29 In Fenstermacher's more recent discussions, he
emphasises the 'mutual respect and regard' that must exist between the partners in
dialogue,30 and the teacher autonomy which is developed once the principles of
practical argument are internalised.31 However, I believe that the view of dialogue
which I have embodied in my thesis shows how teachers can develop their
professional knowledge independently,32 as well as in partnership with academics
and with teacher-researchers. I have also added to Fenstermacher's view of
dialogue by showing how my responsibility to reflect on, justify and develop my
understandings and actions through dialogue with fellow action-researchers relates
to a Thomist dialectics which might suggest the principles for a form of practical
rationality which is appropriate to professional knowledge in education.
* When Fenstermacher argues that academically-based theory and teaching are
separate activities, but that the former can contribute to the latter, 33 I do not
disagree, and I believe that I have demonstrated how theory can challenge and
illuminate my understandings and actions as a teacher. However, I would argue
that when theory modifies a teacher's understandings and actions in this way, a
new synthesis emerges in a dialectical form of professional knowledge. If we
return to Hoyle and John's five 'typifications' (which I suggested at the end of
Fenstermacher, G.D. (1987) op. cit., p. 416.
Fenstermacher, G.D. and Richardson, V. (1993) op. cit., p. 112.
31 Fenstermacher, G.D. (in press) 'The Place of Practical Arguments in the Education of Teachers' in
Richardson, V. (ed) 'A Theory of Teacher Change and the Practice of Staff Development: A Case of
Reading Instruction', to be published by Teachers College Press, New York, Chapter Two.
32 In the work described at Wootton Bassett School in Chapter Six, for example, or in the structures I
set up as part of the Primary Assessment Project, enabling its members to support and challenge each
other at conferences and beyond. I touched on this aspect of the project in Chapter Eight.
33 Fenstermacher, G.D. (1987) op. cit., pp. 413 - 419.
29
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Chapter One should be termed 'knowledges in education', rather than 'professional
knowledge') they are all constituted by academic theory expressed in the form of
propositions. The new sixth 'typification' which I proposed, and which I believe
should be called 'teachers' professional knowledge', would be constituted by a
dialectical form of action-research-based practitioners' knowledge, which can
draw on the propositional form of academic theory, as I have tried to show. I
believe that the dialectical synthesis between academic theory and a teacher's
practically-based knowledge should be more clearly acknowledged, thus
modifying Fenstermacher's view, as expressed in his concept of practical
arguments.
* Finally, I believe that Fenstermacher has not yet explored the full potential of
practical argument in relation to what I see as teachers' professional knowledge. I
like his view that practical argument is a way of thinking - a state of mind - which,
within a staff development programme, will lead to 'reflection, deliberative
examination of one's beliefs and the fostering of autonomy'. 34 However, the
similarities between practical argument and my own view of a dialectical form of
action-research-based professional knowledge make me feel that Fenstermacher is
being unduly unassuming in his claims for the impact of such a process. I believe
that the way of thinking and acting he suggests not only has the potential to
contribute to staff development, and to 'honor' the 'intelligence and...insights' of
teachers,35 but to constitute a form of professional knowledge. I believe that my
thesis has proposed and demonstrated how this might be a practical possibility.
Point 3: It is assumed that this thesis is more accessible and relevant to teachers than
most theses.
Anthony explains further:
Fenstermacher, G.D. (in press) 'The Place of Practical Arguments in the Education of Teachers' in
Richardson, V. (ed) 'A Theory of Teacher Change and the Practice of Staff Development: A Case of
Reading Instruction', to be published by Teachers College Press, New York, Chapter Two.
35 Ibid.
34
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I do not find the style of writing more accessible than conventional thesis writing. No
evidence is given that it is, in fact, more accessible.
The evidence within my thesis suggests that parts of it are actually inaccessible to
teachers, for the presentation I gave and described in Chapter Seven succeeded only in
alienated the teachers among the group to which I was speaking. Even when I adapted
my form of presentation, in Chapter Eight, I was unable to elicit a written response
from the teachers to whom I was writing; as I pointed out in Chapter Nine, we spoke
on the telephone, and I talked to Gill at meetings, but we were unable to meet as a
group to discuss in detail what I had written. Ostensibly, this was because of time
pressures, but it could just as easily have been because Chris, Deirdre and Gill were
still not happy with what I had said - or still didn't understand the terms I was using,
or the ideas I was dealing with. I don't know.
However, my failure in this case to communicate doesn't invalidate my point that a
dialectical form of action-research-based educational knowledge has the potential to
constitute a form of professional knowledge for teachers. Anthony has confused 'style'
- the way I've written this thesis - with 'form' - the underlying rationality. If we look at
at the thesis as a whole, I believe I have given evidence that a dialectical form of
action-research-based educational knowledge might offer solutions to what I called in
Chapter Ten the Problems of Ownership, Practice and Epistemology. It's not the style
that makes what I've argued relevant for teachers in terms of professional knowledge;
it's the way that the action-research-based form I'm using has within it a
publicly-expressed commitment to improving the quality of my practice, and crucially - to taking action so that I do something about it.
Point 4: It is assumed that 'educational' necessarily implies 'moral'.
15
Anthony explains further:
It is surely questionable to assert that 'educational' must mean 'moral'. What about
physical education? An argument could be constructed to the effect that all education
could be construed as moral, but no effort is made to construct such an argument.
In Chapter Nine, when I was discussing the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the
relationship between a Thomist form of dialectical rationality and a possible form of
professional knowledge for teaching, I said that I didn't want to pursue the concept of
'moral', since I couldn't do justice to such a big idea in my present text. I still feel that
a detailed discussion of morality and education is beyond the scope of what I am
concerned with, apart from my stated belief (in Chapter Nine) that to improve the
quality of teaching a learning was a moral action. (In other words, it's better to help a
pupil attain a higher level of understanding, - whether in English or in physical
education - than to prevent that attainment, or to do nothing about it.)
However, Anthony has either missed or misinterpreted the point that I made in
Chapter Ten - which is more pertinent to my argument - that, if I am to consider
myself a professional, I must accept a moral commitment to improving and
developing my practice.36 The significance of action research in trying to define a
form of professional knowledge for teaching is that it has within it such a
commitment.
Point 5: It is assumed that 'educational' differs from 'about education'.
Anthony explains further:
I was drawing in particular on Elliott, J. (1991b) 'Action Research for Educational Change' Milton
Keynes: Open University Press, p. 114, and on Sockett, H. (1983) 'Towards a professional code in
teaching' in Gordon, P. (ed) 'Is teaching a profession?' Bedford Way Papers 15, University of London
Institute of Education, p. 28.
36
16
Given that all academic writing forms part of a dialogue between educators, it is
difficult to see how a clear line can be drawn between 'educational' and 'about
education'. Surely it is the effect on the reader, or learner, that matters here. Again,
there is no evidence that this kind of writing has a greater effect on readers or
learners.
I don't think I've simply made an assumption that there is a difference between
'educational' and 'about education', for it's a distinction made by others, not just by
me,37 and it's a useful distinction in clarifying my view of professional knowledge,
particularly regarding the Problem of Ownership. It also clarifies my view of the
'typifications' suggested by Hoyle and John, which I see as being propositional,
outside-in perspectives on education. A sixth 'typification' - teachers' professional
knowledge - is necessary, I believe, to show how an insider perspective differs from
more traditional views of what knowledge in education is assumed to be. Anthony is
correct in saying that the effect on the learner (who I see as an action researcher, not
as a reader) is what counts, and I have shown how I, as an action researcher, focus on
what I have learnt through dialogue and through action - on the educative experiences
I have lived within, which have changed my understanding and my actions.
However, to say that I have given no evidence that 'this kind of writing' (by which I
assume he means a dialectical, action-research-based form of communication) 'has a
greater effect on readers or learners' (than, presumably, writing within a propositional
form of knowledge about education) is to miss two points. First, I said in Chapter
Three that I could not prove a dialectical, action-research-based form of knowledge to
be more useful than academic, propositional knowledge. I could, though, show that it
was 'of use to classroom teachers and other educators within a reflective community'.
Second, I have given evidence, embodied in my thesis, that a dialectical form of
educational knowledge might appropriately constitute a form of teachers' professional
knowledge since: it is produced by and for teachers such as myself; it demonstrates
E.g. Elliott, J. (1989) 'Educational Theory and the Professional Learning of Teachers: an overview'
in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol 19 No 1, p. 84; Cochran-Smith, M. and Lytle, S. (1993)
'Inside/Outside: Teacher Research and Knowledge' New York: Teachers College Press, pp. 12 - 13.
37
17
publicly a commitment to improving practice - and to doing something about it, rather
than making that commitment on a purely linguistic level; it can provide an
epistemological explanation of how such knowledge is produced and used. Once
again, I feel that Anthony has misunderstood what I am saying, because he is making
judgements from an inappropriate epistemological position.
What worries me about Anthony's assumption that his view of rationality is the only
valid one (and it reminded me of the contact I had with Georgina Hendy, another
university academic) is the fact that I have failed to communicate what I consider to
be a strong, and politically important, case for revising our view of what constitutes
teachers' professional knowledge. Because I am an action researcher, and regard
action as a necessary phase in the development of my understanding, I should like to
conclude by looking further at what I see as the importance of the case I have made,
and considering what steps I am taking to advance my view in practice.
CONCLUSION
The most difficult question which I have to answer, which I first asked at the end of
Chapter Three, and which resurfaced in Chapter Ten, when it was asked by Mike
Collins, a member of the Bassett Action Research Group, is, 'So what?' Does it
actually matter whether teaching has a form of professional knowledge (dialectical or
otherwise)? Not surprisingly, after having spent so long exploring this question
through my own practice as a teacher and an action-researcher, and demonstrating
how
I think
dialectical,
action-research-based
educational
knowledge
has
characteristics which make it suitable as a form of professional knowledge for
teaching, my answer is, 'Yes, it does matter - and I feel the issue of professional
knowledge for teaching is, in fact, even more pressing than when I began this
enquiry.'
18
For example, if we look at the current situation in schools as represented by a recent
study, by Alma Harris and Jen Russ, of ways in which the quality of learning for
pupils can be improved, 38 effectiveness is found where the atmosphere and the
management structures enable teachers to be serious about improving their work.39
Staff development, in effective schools, is conceived in whole-school terms, focusing
on teachers' own learning about their classroom practice, and encouraging ownership
of the change process within a collegiate structure which provides both challenge and
support through dialogue. 40 The closeness of this picture to my own view of a
professional knowledge rooted in an action-research-based, dialectical form of
rationality doesn't need to be elaborated - so why am I making such a fuss about
something that's going on already, and is successful, even though it may not carry the
label of 'professional practice', and even though there is no evidence (to put it mildly)
that the teachers involved see themselves as being participants in dialectics, or
engaging in the creation and use of professional knowledge or whatever?
Well, as Harris and Russ point out, such effective and improving schools are not the
whole story. There was a contrasting type of school in their study, where a
commitment to teachers' collaborative learning was absent, resulting in an
individualistic, 'coping' culture. The effect of this culture caused isolated, unsupported
staff to '(divert) attention away from possible inadequacies in their own practice' by
blaming external factors, rather than accepting a professional responsibility for
improving their own work, in the manner of teachers in the effective schools.41 If we
in teaching are genuinely to be seen as professional, I'd argue that we need to do
everything we can to ensure a consistency of approach, so that all pupils, as far as
possible, get the benefit of being taught by those who have a commitment to
Harris, H. and Russ, J. (1995) 'Pathways to School Improvement: identifying principles and practice'
London: Department for Employment.
39 Harris, H. and Russ, J. (1995) op. cit., p. 18.
40 Harris, H. and Russ, J. (1995) op. cit., pp. 10 - 11.
41 Ibid.
38
19
improving the quality of learning - their own and their pupils. The 'collaborative
culture of professional development' 42 achieved by the successful schools must be
spread to all schools, and even those same successful schools need a sense of being
involved in something broader than a single-school activity. All teachers, I'd say, need
to develop a shared understanding of what it means to participate in a professional
form of reflective knowing and acting, and I don't think that, as a whole, they have
that understanding at present.43
As Jan Bengtsson has pointed out, teachers don't need a conscious, reflective
awareness of their own practice to be competent, but if they have got such an
awareness, they can go beyond mere competence to improving their practice and
communicating their developing understanding to others. 44 Although Bengtsson
focuses only on the concept of reflection, without touching on other aspects of a
dialectical form of knowing and acting to challenge and support those who participate
in it, he states effectively my own conviction that meta-knowledge gives power. In
other words (as I'd phrase it from within the analytical frame I've been developing in
this thesis) if we as teachers all shared an understanding of our professionality which
included our commitment to improving our practice, as well as the way we can create,
develop and use our professional knowledge, we'd get things done, as a body, more
effectively, because we'd have a common idea of how to proceed and why we did
things in a particular way. To use the language of my analysis in Chapter Ten, a
solution to the Problem of Practice can be found by solving the Problem of
Epistemology.
Harris, H. and Russ, J. (1995) op. cit., p. 10.
E.g. Butler, J. (1992) 'Reflective teachers in action: a critical review' in Bruce, C.S. and Russell,
A.L. (eds) op. cit., p. 349.
44 Bengtsson, J. (1995) 'What is reflection? On reflection in the teaching profession and teacher
education' in Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice, Vol 1 No 1, p. 31.
42
43
20
The present set-up, though, doesn't inspire me with confidence, and we're a long way
from the ideal circumstances that I've just sketched out. If we return to the study by
Alma Harris and Jen Russ, we run into issues I raised when discussing what I called
the Problem of Power. From their description, the existence of good practice is at best
patchy, and no genuine profession would find such patchiness acceptable. What
worries me most is that a future government - of whatever political colour - will
attempt to impose from above a solution of some sort, taking advantage of what John
Elliott sees as:
...the special vulnerability of the traditional craft culture (of teaching)...which largely
supported a non-reflective, intuitive and highly-routinized form of practice which was
executed in the private world of the classroom in isolation from professional peers.
The growth of a technocratic system of surveillance and control over practice is a
difficult thing for members of an individualized and esoteric craft culture to resist.
One form of resistance is simply to engage in various kinds of oppositional conduct to
protect the sense of esoteric expertise embedded in the culture. It is a 'no change'
protectionist scenario which elicits little support from pupils, parents and the general
public. In the absence of such support the oppositional conduct legitimates the very
thing it was intended to resist; namely a technocratic system of hierarchical
surveillance and control over teachers' practices.45
The paradox is that if the government (present or future) attempts to impose such a
'technocratic system of surveillance and control', it wouldn't work, except by turning
teachers into alienated, demoralised drudges, who did as they were told in order to
survive the workload and the consequences of non-compliance with the targets that
had been set for them. And under such conditions, there would be no incentive (or no
opportunity) for teachers to take on a commitment to improve their practice, to reflect
Elliott, J. (1991b) 'Action Research for Educational Change' Milton Keynes: Open University Press,
p. 55. See also Westgate, D., Batey, J., Brownlee, J. (1990) 'Collaborative Action Research:
professional development in a cold climate' in British Journal of In-Service Education, Vol 16 No 3, pp
167, 171; Kincheloe, J. (1991) 'Teachers as researchers: qualitative enquiry as a path to empowerment'
London: Falmer Press, pp. 13, 14, 19, 24, 83; Smyth, J.(1991) 'Teachers as collaborative learners',
Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp. xii - xiii; McKennarley, K. (1992) 'Improving professional
knowledge and practice through action research: teacher development and appraisal' in Bruce, C.S. and
Russell, A.L. (eds) op. cit., p. 368; Kydd, L. and Weir, D. (1992) 'Initial teacher training: the
professional route to technician status' in the British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol 40 No 4, pp.
400 - 411
45
21
on what they were doing, to develop their understanding through dialogue with
colleagues - or to display any other features of a form of professional knowledge, as
I've embodied it in this thesis. They'd have no stake in the process of creating and
using their own knowledge, and without such power would renounce all claims to
professional status, autonomy and satisfaction in their work. Standards overall would
even out, I'd guess, but to a level of uniform mediocrity, with no prospect of
improvement except on the orders of those above. The alternative, for which I have
argued in this inquiry, is 'the professionalisation of teachers...(which) must lie at the
heart of the educational process as a whole - pointing the way to better schools (and)
to the improvement of practice...'46
But what can I do, practically? It's easy enough to advance a theoretical argument, as
I've done above, and to say that we should do this, or we must do that, but it's not so
easy to do it. However, if I'm to be consistent with my claim to be within a dialectical
form of professional knowledge, I've got to accept responsibility for taking action. It
can't be the sort of oppositional, 'no-change' approach which, as John Elliott says, will
lose the support and understanding of pupils and parents; it's got to be positive about
developing a common and widespread professional culture, based on a view of
rational, professional knowing and acting, as I've argued in this thesis. But when I
think about how to do it, I come up against problems of power and status - two
concepts present in my enquiry since its early days.
An interesting perspective on the question of power and status was opened up for me
in a research group meeting at Bath University on 20.5.95. It was pointed out to me
that teaching might be considered a low-status activity - unlike medicine or law, for
example - because there were many more women than men who were teachers
(although the proportion of women in senior positions was much smaller). It was also
46
Simon, B. (1992) 'What Future for Education?' London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 89.
22
pointed out to me that action researchers seemed often to be women, although the
'important' authors and theorists were 'predominantly male'47 - hence, possibly, the
low status of action research in relation to research within a propositional,
technical-rationalist form of knowledge.48 It was also pointed out to me that my work
seemed to have links with a growing tradition of feminist research, and I was
questioned as to why was there no reference to such research anywhere in what I had
written. After initial feelings of panic and disorientation (as if I had suddenly found
myself in the wrong changing room at the sports centre) I began to see the validity of
the points that had been brought to my attention. For example, it struck me for the
first time that all those I had written to in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten were women.
Why? Was it simply a coincidence that the teachers who were alienated by my
propositional form of presentation (described in Chapters Seven and Eight) were
women? Was it a coincidence that it was a woman (Moira Laidlaw) who volunteered
to act as my response partner for Chapter Nine? Was it a coincidence that Pat D'Arcy,
to whom I addressed Chapter Ten, had been such a consistent supporter, reader - and
critic - of my work for so long?
Perhaps it wasn't a coincidence, in fact; perhaps it was that action research is a
rational form of knowing and acting that women feel more comfortable with, than
with
the
alienating
language
and
power-structures
of
propositional,
technical/rationalist research?49 I haven't yet asked any women specifically about this
Weiner, G. (1989) 'Professional Self-knowledge versus Social Justice: a critical analysis of the
teacher-researcher movement' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 15 No 1, p. 47.
48 I'm aware that it's not the whole story. In Chapter Nine, I mentioned Peter Scrimshaw's point that
those who control funding for research in the field of education tend not to be action researchers
themselves, which creates practical difficulties for the way in which research proposals are conceived
and assessed. (Scrimshaw, P. (1993) 'What I would like to discuss with you' a response to Burton, J.
and Mickan, P. 'Managing action research' in 'CARN Critical Conversations: The role of self in action
research' Bournemouth, Hyde Publications, p. 100) Christopher Day also summarises usefully the
problematic position of teacher educators in the academic world, with its predominantly propositional
view of research-based knowledge. (Day, C. (1995) 'Qualitative Research, Professional Development
and the Role of Teacher Educators: fitness for purpose' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 21
No 3, p. 359.)
49 I discuss this issue in Chapters Seven and Eight, but without the awareness of gender issues that I'm
only just starting to struggle towards.
47
23
point, because I'm only just starting to understand it myself, but it could explain the
positive responses of the action-researchers - mainly women - I've worked with at
Wootton Bassett (quoted in Chapter Six) and during the Wiltshire Primary
Assessment Project (in Chapter Eight), and who felt that action research had enhanced
their sense of professionality, and their classroom practice.50 My brief dip into the
waters of feminist research suggests that the view of epistemology and methodology
held by Morwenna Griffiths is related to my own conception of professional
knowledge. Although we use different terminology, and bring different emphases and
life experiences to the meanings we create, I feel that we share concerns for a moral
commitment to social justice, for the value placed on local, subjective understandings,
for establishing the validity of a non-propositional form of knowledge, and for
(dialectical?) conversation as a means of developing understanding.51 Gaby Weiner,
similarly, outlines a number of assumptions which are close to the principles I have
argued and embodied in this thesis. If you take Weiner's assumptions about 'women'
to include 'teachers', the closeness becomes clearer, particularly in the following
assumptions that:
...changes need to be made in the social/economic/political position of women
(teachers),
...women (teachers) and their experiences should be made visible,
...feminist research (teacher research) need not necessarily be about but should be
for women (teachers),
...feminist research (teacher research) should be concerned with improving the
situation of girls and women (understanding and practice of teachers).52
I'm not trying to argue here that our purposes are the same, and I know I've tweaked
the end of the last assumption so that it will fit, but I've had my attention drawn to
something that was new to me, and in trying to make sense of it, I've come to feel
The present research group is 60% women; the one featured in Chapter Six was 75% women; the
Wilts Primary Assessment Project was predominantly female, but I can't put a figure on it.
51 Griffiths, M. (1995) 'Making a Difference: feminism, post-modernism, and the methodology of
educational research' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 21 No 2, pp. 231 - 233 in particular.
52 Weiner, G. (1989) 'Professional Self-knowledge versus Social Justice: a critical analysis of the
teacher-researcher movement' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 15 No 1, p. 47.
50
24
that, although we may be coming from different standpoints, feminist research and my
own view of professional knowledge are moving in a similar direction.
But - coming back to my problem of what to do - where does that leave me in
practical terms? Still in a state of contradiction, I suspect, for although I see feminist
researchers as potential allies, they may not feel that my arguments and actions fit
their agendas (and I'm certainly not trying to subvert or colonise what they're trying to
do). They may even dismiss the main practical solution which I am exploring as
patriarchal and bureaucratic, and I agree that my present intention to put my energies
into the further development of The Education Council may seem to be so on the
surface. John Quicke, for example, points out that the action research movement has
criticised the bureaucratic, organisational structures which are the 'accompaniments'
to a positivist, 'foundational position', and which 'constrain' rather than 'enable' the
'development of an autonomy-enhancing and democratic education system'.53 Such a
criticism echoes the 'suspicion of foundational positions' voiced by Morwenna
Griffiths54 - so how can I, as an action researcher, claim that by helping to set up an
organisational structure like The Education Council, I am promulgating the view of
educational knowledge which I have outlined in my investigation? Won't it be just
another bureaucratic and authoritarian structure to hedge in teachers and prescribe for
them what they should think and do?
I'd defend myself here by picking up John Quicke's point that an organisational
structure can be enabling rather than constraining, as long as the underlying values are
appropriate to the 'just organisation of education in a complex society.' 55 The
Education Council's Code of Practice seems to me to embody values which I have
Quicke, J. (1995) 'Democracy and Bureaucracy: towards an understanding of the politics of
educational action research' Educational Action Research, Vol 3 No 1, p. 77.
54 Griffiths, M. (1995) 'Making a Difference: feminism, post-modernism, and the methodology of
educational research' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 21 No 2, p. 231
55 Quicke, J. (1995) op. cit., pp. 84 - 87.
53
25
been concerned with throughout my inquiry, and which are closely linked with the
view of professional knowledge which I have developed. For example, part of the
Code of Conduct states that 'a professional educator' should:
* (develop) the knowledge, skills and attitudes of self-management;
* (accept) responsibility for (his or her) own quality, examining strengths and
weaknesses, and seeking improvement;
* (keep) knowledge and skills up to date and develops competence;
* (accept) co-operative responsibility for the effective performance of an institution
and the wellbeing of the individuals within it.56
This statement implies values, I feel, which clearly support the individual practitioner
in her/his professional commitment to reflect on and improve practice, and to develop
autonomy in relation to the community within which s/he works. Such a view would,
I hope, be shared by teacher-researchers and feminist researchers, who seem from
what I have learnt recently to have much in common. A professional body based on
the values manifested in these statements which I have selected from the Code of
Conduct - and which I believe are consonant with the view of professional knowledge
I have developed in my inquiry - ought to have at least a moral authority, which
would grow into real power as the organisation increased in size. I hope, too, that a
professional body with such moral authority, in which members committed
themselves to reflection and practical improvement, would be acceptable to feminist
researchers, for it could provide another way in which (returning to Gaby Weiner)57
women-as-teachers and their experiences might be 'made visible', and their situation
improved if the influence of this body were powerful enough.58
However, size does matter, and The Education Council's power is limited because
we're not yet big enough. It's partly because, with no access to finance beyond
Constitution of The Education Council, p. 18.
Weiner, G. (1989) 'Professional Self-knowledge versus Social Justice: a critical analysis of the
teacher-researcher movement' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 15 No 1, p. 47.
58 The membership of The Education Council is at present 40% female.
56
57
26
membership subscriptions, we are at present unable to publicise our existence widely,
relying mainly on personal contact to attract members. At the moment I am working
on a second issue of 'The Education Journal', which is intended as a means of
publicising The Council and what it stands for. 59 I also see it as a means of
developing and promulgating the view of professional knowledge which I have
formulated in my thesis, and I have written in Chapter Nine about how I am trying to
integrate dialogue within the format of the journal. I have also tried to emphasise in
notes I have written for contributors how accounts should draw upon writers' own
experiences, showing how they have changed - have been 'educated' - as a result of
the actions and experiences described.
But I keep getting educated by my own experiences and actions. The first issue was
conceived as a refereed journal, and I quickly found that the teachers who looked at it
were put off by the 'academic' trappings of references and bibliographies - just as the
teachers to whom I wrote Chapter Eight were alienated by the form in which I
presented my thinking about dialectics and professional knowledge. The second issue
will, I hope, make less use of academic power-language, and place greater emphasis
on teachers' reflective narratives, which will then provide the starting point for a
continuing process of written dialogue. Even then, the task of going public with my
view of professional knowledge will not be straightforward.
For example, Chapter Ten failed to convince Pat D'Arcy of my argument that a
dialectical form of action-research-based educational knowledge could constitute a
form of professional knowledge for teaching. Briefly, her present position (which we
didn't capture on the tape from 27.3.95, owing to technical problems) is that she
accepts my view on the dialectical nature of the knowledge created by action research,
but she feels that to claim it as professional knowledge is unnecessarily restrictive.
59
I discussed the first issue of 'The Education Journal' at the end of Chapter Ten.
27
She argues that her own work60 has contributed to improving practice, and should
therefore be counted as professional knowledge. I agree that her work has influenced
practice (my own included) and I mentioned this in Chapter Ten. More recently, Pat
has convinced me that my current approach to reading over-emphasises
comprehension at the expense of feelings and visualisation. I am now attempting to
put this (re)learning into practice in the series of KS3 units to cover wider reading
which I am planning for the faculty. However, I still believe that Pat's understanding
of professional knowledge is not precise enough, and ignores the Problem of
Ownership which I summarised earlier in this introduction. Also, because her work is,
as I have argued, within the category of knowledge about education rather than
educational knowledge, it shows clearly how those who are not teachers can influence
the improvement of practice. It's up to the individual teacher, though, to take
responsibility for making improvements in his or her own work, and it's that
acceptance of that moral responsibility within an action-research framework which
makes the ensuing knowledge distinctively professional.
The difficulties I have had (and have incorporated within my account) in arguing my
view with Pat D'Arcy suggest that I'm in for a hard time in advancing this case on a
wider stage, for if such a strong supporter of teacher-researchers as Pat is resistant to
what I'm trying to say, what chance is there to convince others who may be less
well-informed, or less supportive? A similar problem has recently surfaced in my
work on 'The Education Journal', in that Ingrid Barbour, a contributor to the edition
which I am currently putting together, has written to me 61 saying that she felt
'constrained' by the guidelines I offered on articles for the journal. Ingrid argues that,
had she integrated what she says in her article with her personal experiences, she
would have ended up with a whole book, rather than with the concise and cogent
E.g. D'Arcy, P. (1989) 'Making Sense, Shaping Meaning', London: Heinemann, or her present
research which is concerned with teachers' responses to pupils' stories.
61 16.5.95.
60
28
statement of possibilities that I feel she has actually made. 62 There's quite a
contradiction for me here, for I don't want to turn down what I feel is a relevant and
well-written article, with a fresh perspective on professional commitment - and I'm
not going to. But in accepting it, am I going back on my own commitment to argue
and embody in my practice the view of professional knowledge which I have
developed in this thesis? I've got no solution at present.
And there are more contradictions within which I exist concerning The Education
Council. For example, it's a small organisation, as I've said before, and we need more
members if we are going to grow into a body with a powerful voice. However, the
membership is mainly drawn from those in education who are already in positions
which have some influence, such as headteachers and deputy heads, HE lecturers, and
advisers. Paradoxically, this creates a problem for me, because younger teachers, and
those on the Standard National Scale, are conspicuous by their absence, and it is to
such teachers - the future of teaching - that I believe we should appeal. With such
members, The Education Council would speak powerfully, for a more representative
cross-section of teachers than it does now. So why aren't they among our members?
One reason may be that our limited publicity has failed to reach them, although there
are other reasons which come to mind. Do they, for example, see a professional body
as an irrelevance? Is it the entrance requirements? 63 Is it that (as some colleagues
have told me) The Council appears elitist? Is it that the many teachers who have
expressed support or interest won't join until the organisation has a powerful voice,
but if they don't join it never will get big enough to develop such power?
I feel that I have come a long way since I first formulated my interest in a dialectical
form of professional knowledge for teaching, and I hope that I have made it clear to
Ingrid has, however, offered to write something using the guidelines I provided. Intriguingly, she
feels that it might take the form of a comic strip!
63 £25 per year, plus a 300-word statement explaining how the applicant has put into action his or her
professional commitment to improving and developing practice.
62
29
you, the reader, how I believe that my view of professional knowledge has made a
fresh contribution to our understanding. However, I also feel that I have revealed to
myself many more contradictions than I have managed to solve. I don't, though,
regard that as a reason for despair, but as a spur to further action in which I can
explore the insights I have gained through this study. I'd like to mention two instances
of educators reflecting on their own professional development which show, I believe,
how close teachers might be to evolving the view of professional knowledge that I've
outlined in my thesis.
In the latest issue of the 'British Educational Research Journal', for example, there is
an article by David Frost on supporting school-based research groups, along the lines
of the work I described in Chapter Six, but on a bigger, inter-school scale.64 One
benefit identified was 'the development of the participants' professionalism',65 and I
feel that this article is yet another example of the growing use of action research in
teachers' professional development. All that's needed is what I see as a small change
in the way that action researchers, and those who support them as part of their role in
higher education, characterise what they're doing, to see it not just as 'professional
development', but as an embodiment of teachers' professional knowledge, and a
contribution to that knowledge.
A second example is to be found in the latest edition of 'Educational Action
Research'.66 At the end of his article, Pete Strauss describes his wish, now that the
research he describes is completed, to 'keep up the momentum' of critical
self-reflection
Frost, D. (1995) 'Integrating Systematic Enquiry into Everyday Professional Practice: towards some
principles of procedure' British Educational Research Journal, Vol 21, No 3, pp. 307 - 321.
65 Frost, D. (1995) op. cit., p. 315.
66 Strauss, P. (1995) 'No Easy Answers: the dilemmas and challenges of teacher research' Educational
Action Research, Vol 3 No 1, pp. 29 - 40.
64
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and suggests that one way of doing this would be to 'perhaps meet together with a
small group of fellow teachers, simply to ask one another awkward, difficult and
unsettling questions every now and then.'67 One way of satisfying Strauss's need for
continuing professional support and challenge would be to involve him in the kind of
dialogical community that I've experienced and described in this thesis. I don't think it
matters whether that community is provided by a professional body like The
Education Council, or by his local university - or by both in partnership. What matters
is that teachers like this have the satisfaction that comes from exercising their
professional responsibility for improving practice, and - ideally - develop a clear,
shared understanding of the epistemology which underpins their professional
knowing. To me, that would be a very exciting prospect!
But let's get back to practical concerns for a final time. I've got a lot to sort out, with
work for The Education Council and its journal, and with my continuing dialogue
with Pat D'Arcy. It's going to be difficult, too, to convince academics such as Anthony
Evans of the potential significance for teachers' professional knowledge of the
perspective I have embodied in this thesis, unless he can modify his view on how the
different knowledges in education relate to each other. I'll leave the last word to Eric
Hoyle and Peter John, who end their chapter on the issue of professional knowledge
with:
Perhaps the problem lies in the tendency of those involved in debates about
professional knowledge (usually academics) to demonstrate a strong preference for
constructing that knowledge according to one or more of the particular
epistemologies. This chapter has shown that such positions have numerous
implications, and that taking too narrow a view could jeopardise any future attempts
at regaining some semblance of control over the educational agenda.68
29.8.95
67
68
Strauss, P. (1995) op. cit. p. 39.
Hoyle, E. and John, P. (1995) op. cit., p. 76
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