Procedure
PRIMARY INDUSTRIES
Biosecurity
Locked Bag 21, Orange NSW 2800
Tel: 02 6391 3100 Fax: :02 6361 9976
HENDRA VIRUS - MANAGING OPERATIONS ON
QUARANTINED PROPERTIES
NUMBER
PRO- 2012/7
AUTHORISED BY
1
Director Animal Biosecurity
AUTHORISED DATE
ISSUED BY
VERSION
16 December 2013
EFFECTIVE DATE
19 December 2013
Primary Industries, Biosecurity
REVISION HISTORY
VERSION
DATE
AMENDMENTS
SECTION
1
16/12/2013
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DETAILS
New procedure
19/12/2015
Purpose
The purpose of this procedure is to describe the actions to be taken by Department of Primary
Industries’ (DPI), Livestock Health and Pest Authority (LHPA) staff and others in relation to premises
under quarantine for Hendra virus infection, (including both known and suspected infection).
DPI/LHPA staff are responsible for implementing disease control measures in line with Policy TI-O-112
Hendra virus on these premises to:
•
prevent further spread of Hendra virus from infected terrestrial animals,
•
tracing at risk animals, animal products or potentially contaminated equipment,
•
identify and monitor animals that may be incubating infection,
•
identify, euthanase and supervise the safe disposal of animals that are infected, and
•
decontaminate contaminated land, fixtures and equipment.
Scope
This procedure applies to confirmed or suspected cases of infection with Hendra virus in terrestrial
animal species (i.e. it does not apply to flying foxes).
This procedure applies to:
• all staff of the Department of the Department of Primary Industries (DPI)
• all Livestock Health and Pest Authorities (LHPA) staff (this procedure has been separately
approved by the State Council of the LHPAs)
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
1
•
any contractors, subcontractors or other persons involved in Hendra virus response activities
who are engaged by or acting under the direction of DPI, or the LHPAs.
When signed as a Written Instrument it applies to staff of LHPAs in their role as Stock Inspectors
enforcing the Animal Diseases & Animal Pests (Emergency Outbreaks) Act 1991 (‘ADAP(EO) Act’) and
the Stock Diseases Act 1923.
Warnings
Hendra virus is a Biosafety level 4 zoonotic agent. Flying foxes are the natural hosts for Hendra virus.
The virus can spread from flying foxes to horses. Very rarely, the virus can spread from horses to
humans. As at the effective date of this policy:
• no humans have contracted Hendra virus by any means other than horse-to-human spread
(there have been no cases of human-to-human, human-to-horse or bat-to-human spread of
Hendra virus);
• dogs, cats, pigs, guinea pigs and ferrets have been shown to be susceptible to infection with
Hendra virus in laboratory conditions;
• two dogs, resident on infected properties have shown evidence of infection probably acquired
from close contact with clinical horses or their discharges .
Although Hendra virus does not transmit readily from horses to humans it can cause very serious
illness or death and there is no known treatment or vaccination for humans. Stringent biosecurity, work
health and safety and infection control measures are therefore essential to deal safely and effectively
with Hendra virus. Minimising contact with Hendra virus infected horses (or any other Confirmed Cases
or Suspect animals) will reduce the risk of human infection.
Sharps such as scalpel blades and needles present a risk of "needle stick" injuries. Where these items
must be used, management options to reduce the risk of injury include:
• kevlar gloves
• disposable single use items that do not require removal/changing,
• direct disposal of sharps into sharps containers (Sharps must not be put directly into plastic
waste disposal bags)
• retractable needle blood collection systems
The following persons must undergo an induction process to the level applicable to their role, prior to
commencing any Hendra virus response activities:
• all staff of DPI
• all staff of the LHPAs, and
• any visitors to any property that is subject to a Quarantine and/or Infected Place Order or that
might in any way be or be seen to be under the control of DPI and/or the LHPAs,
• contractors engaged by DPI or the LHPAs, and
• any persons to whom DPI or the LHPAs supply substances and equipment, including PPE e.g.
owners.
Users are reminded of the need to follow safe work practice when applying any techniques described in
this publication. This includes identifying, assessing and managing any work health and safety risks.
Safe Work Method Statements that refer to activities included in this procedure must be used in
assessing and managing risks.
PROCEDURE
Contents
1.
Roles and responsibilities .......................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Person’s in charge of animals........................................................................................... 4
1.2 Event organisers ............................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Incident manager (RVO or DV)......................................................................................... 4
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
2
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.4 Hendra virus Response Manager (HRM) ......................................................................... 4
1.5 Senior Veterinary Officer (horse biosecurity coordinator) ................................................. 4
1.6 DPI and LHPA response staff........................................................................................... 5
1.7 NSW Health ...................................................................................................................... 5
Work health and safety .............................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Post operations................................................................................................................. 5
Privacy ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Issuing of legal instruments ....................................................................................................... 6
4.1 Declaration and revocation of a Hendra ‘outbreak’ ........................................................... 6
Movement resrictions ................................................................................................................. 6
5.1 Quarantine Order.............................................................................................................. 6
5.2 Hendra Virus Acknowledgement and Undertaking ........................................................... 7
5.3 Infected Place Order ......................................................................................................... 7
5.4 Entry/Exit Notice and Movement Permit ........................................................................... 7
5.5 Resolved Premises and lifting of restrictions .................................................................... 7
Veterinary Investigations............................................................................................................ 8
6.1 Collection of Property Information .................................................................................... 8
6.1.1 Surveillance Forms ............................................................................................... 8
6.1.2 Tracing information ............................................................................................... 8
6.1.3 Animal identification .............................................................................................. 9
6.1.4 Property Map......................................................................................................... 9
6.1.5 Photographic records of environment in which animals have become infected .... 9
6.2 Epidemiological assessment .......................................................................................... 10
6.3 Surveillance .................................................................................................................... 10
6.3.1 Sampling of animals for Hendra virus testing...................................................... 10
6.3.2 Sample collection ................................................................................................ 10
6.3.3 Submission of samples to the laboratory ............................................................ 10
Infected premises operations ................................................................................................... 10
7.1 Implementing biosecurity controls .................................................................................. 10
7.1.1 Identification of high risk areas ............................................................................ 10
7.1.2 Assessment and segregation of susceptible animals in like status “risk groups” 11
7.1.3 Classification of land or other items that that require decontamination ............... 11
7.1.4 Securing close contact animals ........................................................................... 11
7.1.5 Definition of Contaminated areas ........................................................................ 11
7.1.6 Contact with animals on the declared Premises ................................................. 12
7.1.7 Vaccination of close contact horses .................................................................... 12
7.1.8 Monitoring of animals .......................................................................................... 12
7.2 Euthanasia ...................................................................................................................... 13
7.2.1 Elective euthanasia ............................................................................................. 13
7.2.2 Euthanasia under a destruction order ................................................................. 13
7.2.3 Autopsy of euthanased animals .......................................................................... 14
7.3 Disposal .......................................................................................................................... 14
7.3.1 Onsite disposal.................................................................................................... 14
7.3.2 Offsite disposal.................................................................................................... 14
7.4 Decontamination and management of contaminated land and fomites .......................... 15
7.4.1 Access to and identification of contaminated land .............................................. 15
7.4.2 Decontamination ................................................................................................. 15
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
3
1.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1.1 Person’s in charge of animals
• Remain responsible for the provision of food, water, shelter and veterinary care for all
animals including on premises controlled by the DPI unless otherwise agreed by the DPI.
• Monitor the health and welfare of animals on the premises and advise DPI/LHPA staff of
any changes.
• Cooperate with any directions or instructions from response staff
• Provide accurate and complete information to investigating staff.
1.2 Event organisers
• Assist DPI and LHPA staff to investigate and manage disease risks where HeV is suspected or confirmed at an event. • Assist NSW Health to trace persons who may have been exposed to Hendra virus where a
suspect or infected animal is identified at an event.
1.3 Incident manager (RVO or DV)
• Primary contact point with owner or person in charge
• Manage the implementation of operational procedures for IPs as described in this document. • Ensure that staff or contractors entering the IP or DCP are inducted and familiar with WHS
requirements.
• Ensure that staff and contractors undertaking activities on IPs follow recommended WHS
policies for Hendra virus
• Reports results of laboratory testing to animal owners
• Arrange for veterinary sampling of close contacts and suspect response animals
• Arrange for veterinary examination or treatment of quarantined animals as required
1.4 Hendra virus Response Manager (HRM)
• Coordinating with legal the drafting and issuing of regulatory instruments
• Authorising media comments and reports ( e.g. Sitreps)
• Reporting progress to Director and Executive Director Biosecurity NSW.
• Monitoring and authorising operational expenditure of response
• Liaison with State public health unit
1.5 Senior Veterinary Officer (horse biosecurity coordinator)
• Preparing Sitreps and other reports as required
• Coordinating epidemiological site assessments
• Communicating with horse industry stakeholders
• Provide logistical support for sample transport to SVDL or other laboratories
• Liaison with local public health unit
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
4
1.6 DPI and LHPA response staff
• Undertake operational response activities as specified in this and other related documents
• Follow WHS policies to ensure operational activities do not compromise safety.
1.7 NSW Health
•
Assessment and monitoring of people who have potentially been exposed to Hendra virus,
•
Providing advice on Hendra virus infection control protocols including the use of Personal
Protective Equipment.
2.
WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY
Personnel conducting field work on premises that are potentially infected with Hendra virus must:
• Be trained and assessed as competent in risk assessment, entry and exit procedures and the
use, storage and maintenance of PPE,
• Use a risk based approach and
• Use PPE in accordance with:
o Policy Health and safety precautions for investigating zoonotic emergency animal
diseases
o
o
o
Emergency management procedure SOP ‘Personal decontamination kit and use for
property visits’
the Procedure - OH&S for field operations associated with zoonotic AI and like diseases
including Hendra virus and
the Work Instruction Correct use of PPE for infectious animal disease investigations.
All contact with Hendra virus positive, suspect response animals and close contact susceptible animals
is to be kept to a minimum.
Sample collection, vaccination and health monitoring of animals may on occasions involve significant
safety issues. Under no circumstances should the health or welfare of animals or people be
compromised while undertaking these activities and personnel are expected to follow recommended
safety policies and procedures. Assistance by expert animal handlers and sedation may be necessary
to complete some tasks.
2.1 Post operations
Although correct use of PPE should make exposure to Hendra virus extremely unlikely, it is
recommended that anyone who has contact with:
ƒ
An infected or suspect animal, or
ƒ
A contaminated fomite, or
ƒ
Potentially infected body fluids
should:
ƒ
shower with hot water, shampoo and soap, or
ƒ
swim in a chlorinated pool
as soon as possible after completing operational activities.
3.
PRIVACY
Information that would allow a third party to identify a quarantined premises should not be provided
to third parties except where it is required by law or if it necessary to protect life, health or safety.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
5
4.
ISSUING OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Legal authority for disease control activities is derived from the ADAP (EO) Act 1991. The process and
situations where legal instruments are to be issued are described below; see also Procedure – Legal
Order Issuing. Hendra specific instrument templates are available on the extranet at
http://extranet.dpi.nsw.gov.au/lhpa/animal-directory/animal-species/horse-health or from Legal Branch.
Other property activities and the extent of potential contamination should be considered to minimise
unnecessary restrictions whilst preventing further spread of infection, e.g. family members coming and
going about daily routines should remain unhindered provided contact with all close contact animals,
contaminated land and contaminated fomites can be avoided.
Legal instruments should be issued to the person in apparent control of the premises, this may be the
owner, occupier or a person who is leasing or managing the premises. A copy should also be issued to
all other relevant parties e.g. other occupiers where multiple residences or owners who agist animals on
the premises.
The property owner, lessee and/or manager and other relevant parties listed above must be fully
briefed on the conditions of the Orders.
4.1 Declaration and revocation of a Hendra ‘outbreak’
When one or more premises are confirmed to be infected with Hendra virus, the CVO or Deputy CVO
should:
•
Request legal branch to prepare an Order under section 76 of the ADAP(EO) Act 1991 to
declare that ‘outbreak’ of Hendra virus exists in NSW, and
•
Arrange the drafting of a supporting briefing.
When 28 days have elapsed after the release of a Hendra virus quarantine order without infection being
detected on any further premises, the CVO or Deputy CVO should:
•
Request legal branch to prepare an Order revoking the section 76 Order, and
•
Arrange the drafting of a supporting briefing.
The ‘outbreak’ and ‘revocation of outbreak’ order should be published at
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/about/legislation-acts/animal-diseases-emergency-outbreaks under
a heading of Hendra virus.
5.
MOVEMENT RESRICTIONS
For general information on issuing orders see section 4.
Hendra virus positive or suspect response animals should not be moved to uncontaminated areas on
the property (consequently increasing the contaminated area) unless it absolutely essential.
Hendra virus positive or suspect response animals should not be moved to other premises without prior
permission from the CVO or a Deputy CVO.
5.1 Quarantine Order
When a premises is designated as an IP or a DCP and in some circumstances when Hendra virus is
strongly suspected, a Quarantine Order under section 35 of the AD&AP (EO) Act must be issued by an
inspector as soon as possible to restrict the movement of susceptible animals and their products on and
off the premises.
When completing a Quarantine Order inspectors should ensure:
• the spelling of the person’s name and their address is accurate; and
• the premises is accurately identified and/or described including the DP/Lot number or a map where
possible.
Quarantine signs must be erected on all entrances to the premises.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
6
5.2 Hendra Virus Acknowledgement and Undertaking
Each owner/person in charge of the animal(s) who may have ongoing contact with in contact
animals on the premises while it is quarantined should be asked to sign a Hendra Virus
Acknowledgement and Undertaking. This document will set out how close contact animals are to be
managed and what advice and risk management training has been provided by DPI/LHPA staff.
The owner/person in charge of the animal(s) should be given a copy of the factsheets, ‘Response
to to Hendra virus infection in animals’ and ‘Waiting for Hendra test results’
5.3 Infected Place Order
When the quarantined premises has been assessed to determine how close contact susceptible
animals on the property should be managed, an Infected Place Order must be issued under section 10
of the Act.
A map of the proposed IP must be prepared which clearly identifies the location of the IP as well as any
hot zones, entry and exit points on or to the IP.
An Infected Place Order should be issued by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) or Deputy CVO
(DCVO). It will be prepared by Legal Branch and must identify the classes of animal, animal products,
fodder, fittings, soil or vehicles to which the declaration applies.
The Infected Place Order prohibits movement of:
• all persons on and off the premises
• all horses, cats, dogs etc (and related animal products, fodder and fittings) on, off and within
the premises
unless authorised by a permit issued by an inspector and through a point specified in a notice by an
inspector.
The instrument will also be used to require use of PPE when entering the contamination area and to
require monitoring of close contact animals.
5.4 Entry/Exit Notice and Movement Permit
A local inspector must:
•
Prepare an Entry/Exit Notice (section 13) and a Movement Permit (section 24) that includes a
copy of the premises map identifying any known or suspected contaminated areas and
entry/exit points
•
Submit the draft to be checked by the CVO or a deputy CVO and Legal Branch.
•
Issue the approved Entry/Exit Notice and Movement Permit at the same time as or as soon as
possible after the issuing of the Infected Place Order.
The movement permit regulates the movement of persons, animals, animal products, fodder, fittings
and vehicles into or out of the infected place as well as within the infected place. Unlike a quarantine
order this means that conditions can be placed on the movement of persons or animals within the
infected place.
5.5 Resolved Premises and lifting of restrictions
All movement restrictions should be lifted when:
• no Suspect Response animals remain on the premises, and
• all Close Contact animals meet the definition for a Negative Case or are no longer present on
the premises, and
• a 10 day decontamination program after the date of the death or removal of the last infected
animal and/or contaminated fomite has been completed.
The Quarantine Order may be revoked by an inspector who issues a Revocation of Quarantine or
allowed to lapse.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
7
The CVO or Deputy CVO must issue a Revocation of Infected Place Order, (an Infected Place Order
continues to have effect until it is revoked).
6.
VETERINARY INVESTIGATIONS
6.1 Collection of Property Information
Complete and accurate property information must be collected as detailed below. This information will
be used to make decisions about possible contact animals and likely contaminated areas.
The local LHPA may already have information including ownership and contact details and the PIC for
the property.
Any information collected during the operations should be recorded in LHMS to enable access by other
LHPA and DPI staff.
6.1.1 Surveillance Forms
All information collected during response activities must be recorded in the property file in LHMS.
The following information must be recorded:
•
Name and contact details of person in charge of premises
•
Name and contact details of any other persons who reside in separate residences on the
premises or reside elsewhere but own/manage animals on the premises
•
Traces as per 6.1.2
•
Animal identification details as per 6.1.3
•
Map of premises as 6.1.4
•
Number and type of each animal species on the property including all pets, and
•
Feral and stray animal sightings.
All susceptible animals that may have contacted an infected animal, contaminated land or a
contaminated fomite must be identified and the details of the known or likely contact or other relevant
epidemiological information recorded e.g. ‘Prince’ nose to nose contact on xx.xx.xxxx, ‘Browny’ shared
paddock with infected horse, ‘Fluffy’ allowed to roam at night, ‘Blackie’ sniffed carcase.
Other relevant epidemiological information e.g. are animals hungry, potential contamination of
feed/water by bat body fluids, which animals in mob are generally dominant, temperament of infected
animal must also be entered on the property file.
6.1.2 Tracing information
Tracing should be undertaken to locate the likely source of infection and any in-contact animals or
product that may be contaminated, infected or infective. This will include:
•
The location/s where an infected animal has been in the 16 days prior to the onset of clinical
signs (to identify where the animal may have been infected),
•
Movements of susceptible animals to and from the above premises for 16 days before the first
observation of unusual morbidity or mortality in the susceptible species (to identify any animal
that may have been infected at or around the same time as the infected animal),
•
Susceptible animals on neighbouring properties that are close contacts,
•
Animals known or likely to stray onto the property that are close contacts, and
•
Close contact fomites (including vehicles, feed or fittings) that have left the property after known
or potential contact with Hendra virus in the previous 10 days.
(Note tracing for the 10 days before unusual morbidity or mortality was observed on the infected
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
8
premises will primarily relate to items contaminated by moderately invasive procedures of the
nasopharyngeal area of horses (e.g. stomach tubing or dental work)
6.1.3 Animal identification
Accurate identification details are required for all susceptible animals (except those classified as low
interest animals). Identification records should include the:
•
Registered name,
•
Stable or pet name,
•
Current location of animal on property
•
Brands, eartag number, collar number and/or microchip number.
•
Description including markings.
•
HeV vaccination status ( need vaccination certificate or database printout)
On properties with multiple animals of one species photographs (both near and off sides) should be
taken of individual animals.
Where individual animals cannot be readily identified by operational staff, including incoming staff
rostered or contracted for field duties, the animal should be fitted with suitable identification devices e.g.
numbered head collars.
6.1.4 Property Map
A property map identifying the following should be developed to assist response decision making:
•
Boundary and internal fences,
•
Known or suspected contaminated areas
•
Possible entry and exit points and a decontamination area,
•
Gateways,
•
Waterways/dams and water points,
•
Stables and yards,
•
Location of animals including where infected animals have been located in the 16 days prior to
exhibiting clinical signs,
•
Roads and laneways,
•
Buildings/feed sheds/storage areas,
•
Residences,
•
Potential and known disposal areas,
•
Immediate neighbours including type of enterprises if known, and
•
Potential hazards and other considerations which could impact operations.
Approximate distances and building dimensions should be included.
6.1.5 Photographic records of environment in which animals have become infected
Where possible, a dated photograph record should be made as soon as practical of the environment in
which animals are likely to have been infected to assist in epidemiological investigations. It should
record: pasture, shade trees and other vegetation, evidence of bat activity, watering/feeding points and
areas where animals congregate or rest. Include both close up and distant views. The photo should be
saved using a descriptive file name e.g. View south paddock one ‘Glencoe”
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
9
6.2 Epidemiological assessment
The SVO (horse biosecurity) should arrange for an expert epidemiological assessment of risks relating
to Hendra virus infection for the premise. They should:
•
seek permission from the owner/manager of the premise for any site visits by experts;
•
liaise with staff in the animal biosecurity epidemiological and surveillance unit to identify and
contact recognised experts with experience in bat ecology and/or Hendra epidemiology;
•
facilitate arrangements for the assessment as soon as is practical after the premise is confirmed
to be infected; and
•
request that the completed report be copied to DPI animal biosecurity manager.
6.3 Surveillance
6.3.1 Sampling of animals for Hendra virus testing
Suspect Response animals should be sampled as soon as practical to confirm if they are infected.
Close contact animals without a current HeV vaccination status should be sampled:
•
As soon as is practical after they are identified as a close contact, and
•
21 days from the date of last suspected or known infectious contact.
Low interest animals (including close contact animals with a current HeV vaccination status) do not need to be sampled. If test results are not definitive, the relevant animals should be re-sampled as soon as practical. 6.3.2 Sample collection
Samples should be collected by or under the supervision of a registered veterinary practitioner who is
experienced in the care or handling of the relevant species. The private practitioner who is usually
responsible for the animal/s may be tasked to collect the samples.
Animals should be sampled in accordance with the DPI laboratory manual. Where possible, duplicate
samples should be collected so that one set of samples can be stored at the laboratory for review
where initial laboratory results require clarification.
6.3.3 Submission of samples to the laboratory
Samples will usually be dispatched to the State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (SVDL) at Camden.
Samples from an IP or DCP should not be dispatched to a Queensland laboratory as they not be
accepted and will be forwarded straight to Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) for any testing.
7.
INFECTED PREMISES OPERATIONS
7.1 Implementing biosecurity controls
Effective biosecurity controls must be implemented immediately as detailed below to prevent spread of
the disease to susceptible species including humans.
7.1.1 Identification of high risk areas
Any areas of the property that are high risk for a spill over of Hendra virus from flying foxes should be
identified (e.g. fruiting fig trees or feed or water troughs under blossoming trees ).Where practical
susceptible animals should be excluded from these areas to minimise the chance of another spill over
event.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
10
7.1.2 Assessment and segregation of susceptible animals in like status “risk groups”
Using the property map and tracing information all susceptible animals should be rated for risk of
infection as per Hendra virus case definitions as a:
•
Confirmed case,
•
Suspect response animal
•
Close contact animal
•
Low interest animal.
Animals should then be segregated individually or with animals of like identified risk to prevent disease
spread to healthy animals. Segregation may be by a physical barrier or separation by a minimum of five
metres from a Close Contact horse or one metre from a Close Contact companion animal.
Any Close Contact animal showing clinical signs consistent with Hendra virus infection is to be
reclassified as a Suspect Response animal, segregated and tested.
Where insufficient paddocks are available to provide a 5 metre buffer around close contact horses
temporary fencing can be used for segregation to create a minimum 5 metre buffer. It is important that
susceptible animals on adjoining properties are also not able to come within 5 metres of higher risk
groups. Moving them away from boundary areas is recommended.
7.1.3 Classification of land or other items that that require decontamination
The following land should be classified as contaminated (ie. part of the contamination area):
a. All land on which an infected animal has been located in the period from the onset of clinical
signs,
b. Any land contaminated with bodily fluids/stable waste from an infected animal,
c. Any land contaminated with nasopharyngeal fluids/blood from an infected animal in the 10 days
prior to the onset of clinical signs
d. All the land within a one metre buffer around the land specified at a,b and c above that has held
a companion animal and
e. All the land within a five metre buffer around the land specified at a,b and c above that has held
a horse.
Fixtures and equipment known or likely to have directly contacted:
•
Blood or nasopharyngeal secretions secreted or excreted from a Hendra virus positive animal in
the 10 days prior to the onset of clinical signs (i.e. pre-clinical), or
•
Body fluids (including nasopharyngeal secretions, urine, blood) or faeces from a Hendra virus
positive animal, or a suspect response animal (NB: this may be by contacting the infected
animal or carcase) for up to 10 days after secretion or excretion.
should be classified as contaminated fomites.
7.1.4 Securing close contact animals
Fences should be checked and repaired where necessary to prevent horses from straying.
Close contact companion animals must be confined separately from humans and other animals until
monitoring and testing is complete e.g. dogs should be held in a secure yard or run or tied up and cats
confined to a cage or other secure area.
7.1.5 Definition of Contaminated areas
Contaminated areas within the premises should be defined as soon as practical to identify operational
risks relating to their proximity to infected animals and or animal products.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
11
These zones can only be enforced via a section 10 Infected Place Order and the associated section 24
Movement Permit. A section 35 Quarantine Order cannot define contaminated and clean areas
because it cannot regulate movements within the quarantine area.
A physical identifier such as hazard tape and signs i.e. “Caution - Do Not Enter” or “Danger” should be
used to distinguish the line between the contaminated and clean areas.
Entry to the contaminated areas should be via designated entry/exit points.
A premises specific work instruction should be developed and entry/exit should be in accordance with
this instruction.
Personnel and equipment entering the contaminated area(s) should be recorded in a log.
7.1.6 Contact with animals on the declared Premises
To limit risks to human health, contact with Hendra positive animals, suspect response animals and
close contact animals should be restricted to essential tasks.
Essential tasks include:
•
Provision of food and water,
•
Critical veterinary care,
•
Daily health monitoring,
•
Exercise required for animal health and welfare purposes,
•
Emergency situations to address animal welfare obligations e.g. horse caught in fence.
•
Hendra virus operational tasks e.g. testing, euthanasia.
DPI/LHPA officers will facilitate these tasks to fulfil the duty of care to animals under DPI/LHPA control.
Owners must be issued with personal protective equipment (PPE), trained in its use and advised to
wear PPE if going within:
•
Five metres of a horse that is a Confirmed Case, a Suspect Response Horse, or a Close
Contact Horse, or
•
One metre of a Confirmed Case companion animal, a Suspect Response companion animal or
a Close Contact Animal.
Advice and training should be documented on a completed and signed Hendra Virus
Acknowledgement and Undertaking form.
7.1.7 Vaccination of close contact horses
Close contact horses who do not have current HeV vaccination status will be vaccinated against HeV to
reduce the chance of transmission of infection. The label requirements must be followed when
administering the vaccine including microchipping the horse if that has not already been done and
details of the vaccine batch number and horse identification details recorded on the HeV database. The
vaccine can only be administered by an accredited veterinarian.
If a second or booster dose of HeV vaccine is required for full immunity then that will usually be the
responsibility of the horse owner.
7.1.8 Monitoring of animals
It is preferable for owners or persons in charge of the high risk groups undertake health monitoring as
part of the ongoing care of the animal. In grazing animals health monitoring may be possible from
outside the contamination area and at a minimum 5 metre distance precluding the need to use PPE. In
situations requiring closer contact such as grooming, feeding, feet trimming, etc PPE must be used.
Temperatures should not be measured if PPE has to be donned for this task alone.
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
12
Suspect Response animals and infected animals should be monitored at least twice a day to identify
potential emerging animal welfare issues.
Close Contact animals must be observed for clinical signs of illness at least once a day and details
noted in the Hendra Virus –Animal observation checklist.
Monitoring may cease when an animal is reclassified as negative for Hendra.
Low interest animals should be monitored by the owner/manager as per any other animal under their
control.
7.2 Euthanasia
Animals showing clinical signs of Hendra virus infection frequently die or are euthanased before
laboratory results are available confirming HeV infection. In situations on IPs or DCPs where positive or
suspect response animals are alive euthanasia may be appropriate to manage the risk of disease
transmission, address animal welfare concerns or owner anxiety.
Euthanasia activities should only be performed by experienced and competent operators. Plans for the
euthanasia must be developed in conjunction with plans for carcass disposal (see Section 8.14).
All activities surrounding the euthanasia of an animal must be treated with sensitivity.
All team members must be fully briefed prior to the conduct of any destruction actions.
Reference should be made to the:
•
Australian Standards and Guidelines for the Welfare of Animals — Land Transport of Livestock,
and
•
AUSVETPLAN Destruction of Animals Manual.
Factors to consider include:
•
Proximity to the neighbours and the general public,
•
The erection of a temporary structure to screen any activities that may be viewed by neighbours
and the general public,
•
Minimising potential media attention (this may include restricting air space),
•
Notification of immediate neighbours.
7.2.1 Elective euthanasia
The Site Supervisor may facilitate the humane destruction and subsequent disposal of an animal with clinical
signs consistent with Hendra virus. They must ensure that:
•
the animal nominated for destruction is correctly identified,
•
the lawful owner/manager and the supervising veterinarian has signed a completed form
“permission for euthanasia”.
7.2.2 Euthanasia under a destruction order
There may be situations where confirmed HeV cases pose a public health or disease transmission risk
if alive, that euthanasia is recommended by the CVO as the most appropriate action. In those situations
a written case for destruction must be prepared and a related Destruction Order under section 32 of the
ADAP(EO) Act will be issued by the CVO or Deputy CVO. The Destruction order should be drafted in
close consultation with Legal Branch.
The Incident manager must ensure that:
•
the destruction order is served on the owner and that they are given an opportunity to lodge an
objection before proceeding with any destruction operations,
•
the animal nominated for destruction in the Order to Destroy is correctly identified,
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
13
7.2.3 Autopsy of euthanased animals
On occasions valuable scientific information may be gained from post mortem examination of
euthanased positive animals. An example would be infection in companion animals or in species not
previously confirmed in field situations.
However a full autopsy is a high risk procedure and should only be undertaken by experienced
personnel with appropriate equipment and/or facilities to manage the risk.
A written risk assessment that documents treatments to manage safety risks must be endorsed by the
CVO or DCVO prior to the autopsy.
7.3 Disposal
Planning for disposal of carcasses needs to be carefully undertaken in consultation with experienced
staff, the Environmental Protection Authority and possibly local government.
All methods for disposal must be considered as each situation will present different challenges and
options. Disposal must be in accordance with the AUSVETPLAN Disposal Procedures Manual.
Factors to be considered prior to disposal include:
•
soil type,
•
water tables and potential leaching of infective materials,
•
proximity of disposal site to waterways, neighbours and population densities,
•
permission of land owner,
•
ability to perform task on site e.g. bring on machinery or materials for burning,
•
size of property,
•
site security,
•
WHS issues of site.
•
ability to adequately decontaminate equipment brought onto the property,
•
availability of machinery contractors, and
•
public perception.
Contractors need to be
•
fully briefed on the tasks to be performed and potential associated hazards, and
•
competent in the use of appropriate PPE.
Disposal activities must be documented.
7.3.1 Onsite disposal
Relevant authorities should be consulted prior to burial or burning.
7.3.2 Offsite disposal
Potential options include:
•
Commercial waste management providers,
•
Disposal on private land, and
•
Disposal on local government property.
Factors to consider include:
•
Availability of machinery to load carcasses and associated contaminated waste,
•
Availability of biosecure transport, and
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
14
•
Vehicle escort.
For further information on transport see the Procedure “Transport of carcases and contaminated
material”.
7.4 Decontamination and management of contaminated land and fomites
Contaminated land and fomites must be managed to:
•
Prevent the movement of Hendra virus to a new site (including within an existing IP), and
•
Minimise the risk exposure of people and uninfected animals to Hendra virus, and
•
Ensure that live Hendra virus secreted or excreted by an infected susceptible animal is destroyed. 7.4.1 Access to and identification of contaminated land
Animals and people should be moved off contaminated land. Further entry to contaminated areas
should be avoided where possible.
Where a contaminated area/stable has to be used by other susceptible animals it must be
decontaminated as per the AUSVETPLAN Decontamination Manual. Use of contaminated areas must
be as a last resort and must be authorized by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) or a Deputy CVO.
NB: A susceptible animal introduced into a contaminated area will become a close contact animal.
Where animals cannot be moved out of contaminated paddocks, areas of gross contamination should
be fenced off or decontaminated.
All contaminated areas must be:
•
clearly identified e.g. by hazard tape and/or warning signs
•
clearly identified on the site map. The map should be used to identify other animals that may
have been exposed to infection by potential contact with this land.
7.4.2 Decontamination
Contaminated land, fixtures or equipment must be decontaminated by isolation for ten days or if isolation is
not possible by disinfection in accordance with AUSVETPLAN Operational Procedures Manual,
Decontamination.
The Site Supervisor is responsible for:
•
identifying decontamination requirements and
•
developing or identifying and implementing appropriate decontamination procedures.
All fomites leaving the contaminated area must be decontaminated /disinfected.
All persons leaving a contaminated area must decontaminate and remove contaminated clothing and
PPE before entering clean areas. Persons, vehicles and equipment leaving the contaminated area must be decontaminated/disinfected, see: •
Procedure - Personal decontamination kit & use for property visits
•
Procedures - Decontamination of vehicles and Decontamination of large equipment.
Equipment should be cleaned prior to final decontamination using water and detergents. This initial
clean down should be completed away from (though in close proximity to) the final decontamination
site, then equipment moved to the decontamination site for final treatment. Final decontamination is to
be completed with a disinfectant as per the AUSVETPLAN Decontamination Manual.
Definitions and acronyms
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
15
A detailed list of acronyms and definitions relating to Hendra virus can be found in the resource document
Hendra definitions - technical information.
Legislation
•
•
Animal Diseases & Animal Pests (Emergency Outbreaks) Act 1991
Animal Diseases (Emergency Outbreaks) Regulation 2008
Related Policies and Procedures
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Policy TI-O-112 – Hendra virus
Policy O-052 Health and safety precautions for investigating zoonotic animal diseases
Policy AB&MS O-033 Investigating suspect emergency animal diseases
Procedure 2012/8 Hendra Virus – investigating suspect cases
Procedure – OH&S for field operations associated with zoonotic AI and like diseases including
Hendra virus
Procedure PRO 2009/02/2– Investigating suspect emergency animal diseases
ƒ
Procedure – OH&S for field operations associated with zoonotic AI and like diseases including
Hendra virus
ƒ
ƒ
Procedure – Risk assessment for emergency management
Procedure – Observations of animals to monitor for signs consistent with Hendra Virus
•
ƒ
Procedure - Personal decontamination kit & use for property visits
Procedures Decontamination of vehicles and Decontamination of large equipment
ƒ
Procedure – Entry and exiting an IP/DCP for significant operations ƒ
Procedure – First Aid in an EOC and the Field
ƒ
Procedure – Reporting injuries and fatalities
ƒ
Procedure – Legal Order Issuing
ƒ
Procedure - Transport of carcases and contaminated material
ƒ
Related Documents
ƒ
ƒ
AUSVETPLAN: Response Policy brief Hendra virus infection
AUSVETPLAN: Operational Procedure Manual - Decontamination and Operational Procedure
Manual - Disposal
Biosecurity Qld Guidelines for veterinarians handling potential Hendra virus infection in horses
Forms to be used in Hendra response on Emergency Management Extranet
Resource Hendra Virus technical notes
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Contact
Paul Freeman
Position: Senior Veterinary officer
Contact no. 0409 390402
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
16
INSTRUMENT
BIOSECURITY DOCUMENT Ref: PRO 2012/7
SC Ref: - / - / WI
TRIM Ref: INT11/67060
DV Ref: - / - / -
PROCEDURE - HENDRA VIRUS - MANAGING OPERATIONS ON
QUARANTINED PROPERTIES
The attached document is a WRITTEN INSTRUMENT issued with the concurrence of the DirectorGeneral of NSW Department of Primary Industries under Clause 8.3 of the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Director-General of the NSW Department of Primary Industries and
the Livestock Health and Pest Authorities State Management Council.
I ROTH for M BULLEN
T Johnston
A/DIRECTOR-GENERAL
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
NSW DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY
INDUSTRIES
STATE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
LIVESTOCK HEALTH AND PEST AUTHORITIES
[ APPROVED ]
Date: 16 December 2013
[ APPROVED ]
Date: 19 December 2013
Hendra virus- managing operations on quarantined properties V1
PRO 2012/7
Valid on day of printing: 24/12/2013
17