Proseminar in American Politics
Political Science 192-10
Spring 2002
Christopher J. Deering
Office: Funger Hall 524V
Hours: Wednesday and Friday, 10:00 to 12:00
Phone: 994-6564 email: rocket@gwu.edu
In a separation of powers constitutional system like that in the United States interbranch relationships are of utmost importance—and none more so than that between the executive and legislative branches. This seminar will examine key elements of the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch—including presidential/congressional relations. One of the key contemporary “circumstances”—much commented upon and written upon—is the circumstance of politically divided government. U.S. government is constitutionally divided. But, as is necessary for parliamentary forms, it typically had been unified in partisan terms. For a large portion of the post World
War II era, however, the White House and at least one chamber have been controlled by different parties.
We will not concern ourselves with why that is the case; but we will examine research that addresses the impact of such division. In addition, we will look at levels of presidential success, the executive’s use of the veto and executive orders, and at Congress’s attempts to control the bureaucracy.
The following books have been ordered and should be available at the University bookstore:
1. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
Additional assigned readings are indicated in the schedule below.
Since this is a seminar, your participation in class discussions will be essential – both to the success of the seminar and your success (ie, grade) in it. In order to participate, you will need to take the time to read carefully all of the assigned materials prior to class each week. Class participation will account for 20 percent of your course grade. In addition, you will be asked to write several papers during the course of the semester—which will be waited in ascending order at 10, 20, and 30 percent of your grade. The papers will not be long but they will require careful thought and preparation. The first paper will focus primarily on course readings and will require you to synthesize and critique the arguments of the authors we read early on. Let me stress that this means going beyond simply summarizing. As of this writing I do not know what the second paper will be but it may be the introduction for the third paper.
The third paper will require that you select a discreet agency or commission, research its history and current composition, gain a sense of its “caseload,” and then write a “principal-agent” analysis of it.
Finally, you will be asked to take a final examination at the end of the course. This will account for 20 percent of your course grade.
1. Jan. 16 Executive-Legislative Relations and the Separation of Powers

2. Jan. 23 Constitutional Foundations and Development I
Federalist Papers, Nos. 10 (Madison), 47-51 Madison), 70 (Hamilton), and 77 (Hamilton).
Harold J. Laski, “The President and Congress,” Chap. 3,
The American Presidency (New York: Harper &
Bothers, 1940).
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), Chaps. 1-3.
James L. Sundquist. 1988. “Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the
United States,” Political Science Quarterly 103: 613-635.
3. Jan. 30 Constitutional Foundations and Development II
Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History ( New York: Macmillan, 1961),
Chaps. 1-8.
James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1981), Chaps. 1-3.
Charles O. Jones, “Congress and The Constitutional Balance of Power.” In Congressional Politics .
Christopher J. Deering, ed. (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989): 322-337.
4. Feb. 6 Positive Theories of Executive-Legislative Relations
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions.
(New York: W.W.Norton, 1997): 5-35, 299-344, and 380-404.
Keith Krehbiel. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998): Chaps. 1-2.
5. Feb. 13 The Legislative Presidency I
Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, “Presidential Success in Congress.”
The President in the Legislative
Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990): 53-80.
Paul Light, “The Focusing Skill and Presidential Influence in Congress.” In
Congressional Politics .
Christopher J. Deering, ed. (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989): 239-261.
Covington, Cary R., J. Mark Wrighton, and Rhonda Kinney. November 1994. “A ‘Presidency-
Augmented’ Model of Presidential Success on Roll Call Votes.” American Journal of Political Science
39: 1001-24.
6. Feb. 20 The Legislative Presidency II
Copeland, Gary W. 1983. “When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto
Legislation.”
Journal of Politics 45 (August): 698-710.
Rohde, David W., and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. “Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A
Study of Institutional Conflict.”
American Journal of Political Science.
29 (August): 397-427.
Woolley, John T. 1991. “Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto.”
American Journal of Political Science.
35 (May): 279-304.
Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power.
(New York:
Cambridge, 2000): 1-68.

7. Feb. 27 The Administrative Presidency I
Richard P. Nathan. The Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley, 1983): 1-14.
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action," Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 15 (1999): 132-179.
Lyn Ragsdale and John J. Theis, III. The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92.”
American Journal of Political Science 41 (October 1997): 1280-1318.
Brian R. Sala. “In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential “Decree” Powers and Policy
Implementation in the United States.” In Executive Decree Authority.
John M. Carey and Matthew
Soberg Shugart, eds. (New York: Cambridge, 1998): 254-273.
8. March 6 The Administrative Presidency II
Shull, Steven A. (with Brad Gomez). “Presidential Executive Action,” in Steven A. Shull, Presidential-
Congressional Relations: Policy and Time Approaches (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1997).
Cohen, Jeffrey E., and George A. Krause. “Opportunity, Constraints, and the Evolution of the
Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-1996.” (Typescript) 1997
Christopher J. Deering and Forrest Maltzman, “The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power,”
Political Research Quarterly (December 1999): 767-783.
9. March 13 Divided Government and Its Consequences I
Mayhew, Chaps. 1-3, Epilogue, Appendix A, and Appendix B
Sarah A. Binder, “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996,” American Political Science
Review 93 (September 1999): 519-533.
10. March 27 Divided Government and Its Consequences II
Mayhew, Chaps. 4-7
11. March 18-22 Spring Break
12. April 2 Divided Government and Its Consequences III
George C. Edwards III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. April 1997. “The Legislative Impact of
Divided Government,”
American Journal of Political Science 41: 545-563. William Howell, Scott Adler,
Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of
Congress, 1945-94. Legislative Studies Quarterly.
25 (May 2000): 285-312.
13. April 9 Bureaucratic Politics I: Delegation and Agency Problems
Second Paper Due
William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine Atherton, 1971), Chaps
1-4.
Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A. Franklin. 1991. Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy.
Pacific

Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole).
Terry Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,”
American Journal of Political
Science (November) 1984:739-777.
Kiewiet and McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991), Chap. 1.
Mathew D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, “A Theory of Congressional Delegation,” in McCubbins and
Sullivan.
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions.
(New York: W.W.Norton, 1997): 345-379.
14. April 16 Bureaucratic Politics II: Delegation and Agency Problems
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” Congress: Structure and Policy , ed. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,” 91 Journal of Political Economy 1983: 765-800.
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control,” 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Fall) 1987: 243-277.
John A. Ferejohn, “The Structure of Agency Decision Processes,” in McCubbins and Sullivan.
15. April 23 Conclusions
Third Paper Due.