Christian Psychological Research and the Post-Postmodern Future
P. J. Watson
Christian scholars constantly confront the new challenges of a relentlessly
changing intellectual environment. The Christian theologian Millard J. Erickson (2001)
essentially offered a sketch of that challenge when he recently recommended, “We must
work toward a postpostmodernism, not simply ignoring the phenomenon of
postmodernism, and reverting to a prepostmodernism, but also not merely halting with
postmodernism” (p. 293). The Christian writer Robert C. Greer (2003) has similarly
argued that Christians should work toward a “newly developing paradigm [of] postpostmodernism” (p. 229).
What would a Christian post-postmodernism look like? Pre-postmodern options
are ruled out by definition. Any simple reassertion of premodern Christian traditions,
therefore, seems to be precluded. For many, the broader cultural viability of that option
collapsed with the failure of premodern Christianity to avoid the violence of the
Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War (Toulmin, 1990). The trauma of those times
apparently demanded the creation of “a vocabulary whose sense did not depend upon
prior agreement about the nature of God and the structures of cosmos and society
ordained by him” (Stout, 1988, p. 161).
Modernism sought to supply that “vocabulary.” Beginning with the Cogito that
Descartes discovered at the foundations of his doubt, the modernist hope was to achieve
order through the clear and distinct ideas of a rational self that could see the world with a
vision undistorted by traditional commitments. “Good sense is the most evenly shared
thing in world” is how Descartes began his Discourse on Method (Descartes, 1637/1968,
p. 27). He then went on to conclude “that the diversity of our opinion does not spring
from some of us being more able to reason than others, but only from our conducting our
thoughts along different lines and not examining the same things” (p. 27). The violence
produced by differences presumably could be eliminated through a “modern” reliance
upon reason proceeding along the same lines and examining the same things.
This modernist confidence in the universal and unifying rationality of the self
expressed itself politically in the rise of democracy and epistemologically in the scientific
methods of disciplines that came to include psychology. Psychology, nevertheless, went
on to put limits on any Cartesian optimism about the rational self, and whereas his clear
and distinct ideas led Descartes to “rationally” prove the existence of God, later
modernist thought increasingly moved the self away from any theistic belief at all
(Taylor, 1989, pp. 401-410).
For some, the bloodshed of the 20th Century was as powerful in falsifying the
modernist paradigm as the Thirty Years’ War had been in overturning a supposedly
Christian cultural order. Rather than eliminating violence, modernist rationality had made
the killing more technologically efficient (Appleyard, 1992). Actually, the philosophical
movement away from modernism had already begun during the previous century.
Nietzsche (1887/1967) at that time began to articulate the postmodern argument that the
seeing and rationality of every self is always positioned in history and thus operates from
a perspective that is invariably “distorted” by one tradition of understanding or another.
No trans-historical framework could ever be identified for definitively adjudicating
among the diverse perspectives of humanity. The modernist scientist was as naïve as the
medieval Christian in believing in “truth.” Postmodernists concluded instead that all so-
called “truth” is always as much a social construction of power as of so-called “reality”
(e.g., Foucault, 1972).
For those wedded to the “truth” of some pre-postmodern perspective, postmodern
skepticism will necessarily be met with skepticism. Some of the conceptual problems will
perhaps be almost too obvious in that they could lead to overly facile rejections of
legitimate postmodern insights. If the postmodern dismissal of “truth” is the “truth,” for
instance, then the position must be rejected as self-refuting. If the postmodern dismissal
of “truth” makes no appeal to some notion of “truth,” then no obvious grounds can be
supplied for supporting the position. Moreover, any rigorous postmodern reduction of
social life to the dynamics of power seems to result in a radical relativism that in no
obvious way brings humanity closer to solving the problem of violence. For many, and
not just for Christians, commitment to “truth” will require some post-postmodern
response (e.g., Kahn & Lourenço, 1999).
Christians clearly will be among those wedded to a pre-postmodern idea of
“truth.” Though unable to fall back to any simple premodern position, a Christian postpostmodernism obviously must remain committed to Christian traditions. The advantages
of modernist political and epistemological innovations presumably must be defended as
well, but without the loss of faith that can develop out of Cartesian skepticism. A
postmodern sensitivity to diversity and pluralism also seems essential in a world of
increasing globalization, but without embracing radical relativism. A Christian postpostmodernism, therefore, seems to require a premodernism that is not premodern, a
modernism that is not modern, and a postmodernism that is not postmodern.
How is that even possible? Again, Erickson (2001) suggests one answer, “We
must transcend postmodernism, in part by not tying ourselves too closely to the ideology
of any given period” (p. 293). This recommendation captures exactly the underlying
implications of the Ideological Surround Model of the relationship between psychology
and religion (Watson, 1993). This model assumes that all religious and social scientific
perspectives are unavoidably “ideological.”
As defined by MacIntyre (1978), an “ideology” is a somewhat non-empirical,
normative, and sociological system of belief. The Christian assumption that God created
the universe and the naturalistic assumption that He did not are both somewhat nonempirical because each can find support in empirical observations, yet neither can be
falsified scientifically. Ideologies, nevertheless, have normative implications in that they
have an impact on “morals, politics, and other guides of conduct” (MacIntyre, p. 6).
Christian commandments and the naturalism of evolutionary psychology, for example,
have very different ethical implications in at least some circumstances. Finally, an
ideology is sociological in “that it is not merely believed by the members of a given
social group, but believed in a way that it at least partially defines for them their social
existence” (MacIntyre, p. 6).
Within an ideological surround, a Christian post-postmodernism will understand
that premodern Christian traditions will have to “speak” within a pluralistic postmodern
culture that has no common “vocabulary.” In a postmodern world, followers of all
traditions will tend to dismiss other traditions as “merely” ideological, without seeing
their own somewhat non-empirical, normative, and sociological foundations. Still, for all
pre-postmodern traditions that believe in “truth,” the effort to communicate will be
essential. For these people, words of different ideological languages will not be trapped
in an infinite regress of definitions that make no contact with reality, as postmodernists
sometimes argue. Among other things, words instead will signify human problems that
require “truthful” languages that can discover “truthful” solutions. Violence will be just
one of those problems.
With their work framed within an ideological surround, Christian psychological
researchers can use modernist social scientific methods to empirically demonstrate the
somewhat non-empirical assumptions of both Christian and non-Christian perspectives
(e.g., Watson, 1993, 1994). Empirical procedures can illustrate, for example, how the
modernist psychological language of self-actualization can be translated into a more
orthodox language based upon Christian norms (Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood,
1995). Modernist and postmodernist languages of rationality can also be evaluated
empirically within a Christian ideological framework. As this research has made clear,
psychological and Christian “rationalities” exhibit many commonalities; but in some
instances, Christian “rationality” is superior (e.g., Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood,
1994). Behind all of this research activity, Christian commitment will be seeking to
understand how to articulate itself in a faithful and compelling manner within the
ideological complexities of postmodern pluralism.
More generally, a Christian post-postmodernism will need to be interdisciplinary,
ecumenical, and inter-ideological. The community of Christian scholars will need to be
responsive to Christian understandings of history, including historical insights into
violence and other problems. Christians in many other disciplines, including for example
literary criticism, will have important contributions to make as well. Moreover, the entire
post-postmodern enterprise will need to rest upon clearly articulated Christian
assumptions. Attempts to interact with other ideological perspectives, for instance, could
perhaps be justified in terms of a Christian epistemology of love (Watson, in press), but
this and all other suggestions that address the challenges of post-postmodernity will need
to be tested by the theology and philosophy of all Christian traditions. And of course, the
effort to develop a common vocabulary of “truth” will require cooperation with other
traditions, even in what seem to be difficult inter-ideological circumstances (Watson &
Ghorbani, 1998; Ghorbani, Watson, Ghramaleki, Morris, & Hood, 2002).
In short, Christian psychologists could confront a post-postmodern future with the
intention of offering a culturally sensitive reassertion of Christian traditions. The
challenges of present circumstances presumably will require cooperation with other
disciplines, interactions among scholars representing the full range of Christian traditions,
and efforts to make connections with advocates of completely different ideological
perspectives. Pre-modern commitment and post-postmodern innovation presumably will
be essential as Christians work to develop a “vocabulary” that will allow them to speak
Truth to the powers of modernity and postmodernity.
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