PROJECTOS DE INVESTIGAÇÃO
A DIMENSÃO INTENCIONAL – RESUMO DO PROJECTO
PROJECT’S SUMMARY
1. The problem of intentionality – our beliefs and desires are always about
something – is a fundamental problem in contemporary philosophy of mind.
In certain aspects, contemporary discussions are a revival (though, of
course, in a different context) of late nineteenth and early twenty century
controversies concerning phenomenological problems (Brentano, Husserl)
and the metaphysical nature of relations (Bradley, Moore). One of the main
aims of this project is the study of these early contributions in the light of
modern developments (e.g. John Searle).
2. What is the kind of relation between thought and its objects? The
controversy concerning the nature of relations was one of the main subjects
of British philosophy from Bradley to Moore. Internal or external relations? If
all relation is an internal relation, it affects the very essence of the objects.
If all relations are external relations, the nature of the related objects is left
untouched. A real understanding of these problems can only be achieved
through a study of the works of the “British idealists” (Bradley, McTaggart,
Bosanquet) and the confrontation of their defence of internal relations with
the powerful critics of their main adversaries, like Russell and Moore (and
also, in a certain sense, Frege).
3. An analysis of the notion of intentionality, both from an historical and a
conceptual point of view, also requires a reappraisal of Brentano’s work and
an inquiry into the meaning of the «intentional (or mental) non-existence»
of the object, or content relation, or immanent objectivity. According to
Brentano, «intentional non-existence» generates a peculiar relation between
the subject and the object of his psychical action. What is the nature of this
relation, a relation in which one of its terms is «non existent»? An answer to
this question can only be achieved through an investigation of the
ontological characteristics of the concept of relation. Once again: external or
internal relations? Is the “intentional object” something which can be said to
be intrinsic to the thought, an attribute of the thought? Or is it an object in
the traditional sense, with an ontological consistence of its own, as Meinong
argues? A comparison between Brentano and Meinong is a precondition to a
conceptual analysis of the relational nature of intentionality and of the
ontological modality of the objects of thought.
4. The re-evaluation of the early XXth Century positions, through a careful
study of the works of the previously mentioned authors, is of significant
importance to the elucidation (both historical and conceptual) of some
important questions of contemporary philosophy of mind, namely those
which are directly related to the discussion of the topic of intentionality.
8.3. Project's description
8.3.1. Objectives
a) Through the study of these authors (Bradley, McTaggart, Bosanquet,
Russell, Moore, Frege, Meinong, Brentano) it will be presented a general
view of the main discussions concerning intentionality in the early years of
the XXth Century. Those discussions are deeply relevant to an effective
appraisal of many arguments in contemporary philosophy of mind.
b) Our proposed inquiry into the roots of the notion of intentionality is not
conceived as a purely historical one. We intend to pursue our investigation
through an analysis of the conceptual effects of the intentional dimension in
specific areas of thought: ethic, aesthetics, epistemology.
c) It is our aim to include the concept of intentionality in a large categorial net:
the context of the logic and ontology of relations.
d) This inquiry should lead us to the heart of some of the main problems in
contemporary philosophy of mind, namely the question of the possible
reduction of intentional states to non-intentional ones (as proposed by a
number of authors: Daniel Dennett, amongst others). Our point of view is
that no such reduction is possible: the intentional dimension of the mind
cannot be elided.
8.3.2. The project and the long term objectives of the PI
Our proposal may be seen as a prologue to a broader analysis of the intentional
dimension of the psychic structure (intellectual, perceptual and emotional
phenomena, etc.). There are certain specific problems in the view of
intentionality as a relational property of the mind. Some authors propose to
isolate the subjective aspects of the conscience – the qualia – from the
intentional dimension, as represented by the propositional attitudes (belief,
desire, etc.). The qualitative aspects would form a nucleus of non-intentional
features of the mind. It is an open debate. One of the possible ways to tackle
this problem is by studying the phenomenon of perception: as against
traditional empiricist theories, it is arguable that perception has an active,
dynamical, relational, and, therefore, intentional character. We shall try to trace
the roots of the notion of intentio back to Aristotle and to analyse its
developments from Aristotle up to Brentano and Husserl, and from Brentano
and Husserl up to contemporary philosophy of mind. This view we intend to
purpose is that there is an «intentional identity» between consciousness and
the known object. This is an essential element in the theory of perception, as
seen from an intentional point of view.
8.3.3. Ethic, social and environment impacts
The possible ethic and social impacts of this kind of project – as those of any
philosophical inquiry – tend to be remote. Even if the subject of the inquiry is
the human mind and its relation to the world, both social and natural.
8.3.4. Relationship with the state of the art
The decision of analysing the phenomenon of intentionality as an essential
feature of the psychic is tantamount to the adoption of a point of view which
has important consequences in what concerns certain fundamental problems in
the philosophy of mind. One of this problems is that of the nature of
consciousness. The controversies on this subject are vivid, even ebullient, these
days.
The main interest of these discussions lies in the fact that the concepts of
consciousness and intentionality tend to be unpalatable to some of the authors
who try to “naturalise” the mind (but not to all of them: cf. John Searle or
Galen Strawson). The notions of consciousness and intentionality are
sometimes considered, from the viewpoint of physicalists (J. C. Smart),
“computer functionalists” (D. C. Dennett) or “eliminative materialists” (Paul and
Patricia Churchland), as mere fictions.
The question of intentionality, at the semantic level, can be treated in a
systematic form, through a logical-linguistic analysis of propositional attitudes
(“X beliefs that p”, “X desires that p”). The subordinated proposition p
expresses the intensional (with s) content, and generates the so-called
“referential opacity” (the terms which occur inside these subordinate
propositions are not directly referential, and therefore they do not obey the
logical law of the substitution of the identical salva veritate). A logical analysis
of these propositions requires a particular treatment of the intensional (with s)
contents, which some logicians reject in favour of a strictly extensional logic
(Quine, amongst others, considers “referential opacity” as a difficult obstacle to
a logical programme in which the law of the substitution of the identical is a
settled and undisputed principle). The intensional contexts will be studied in
contraposition to the extensional principle of substutivity salva veritate.
Another proposal for an autonomous theory of intentionality is Fodor’s
Representational Theory of the Mind, that is the thesis of a “language of
thought”. According to Fodor, every propositional attitude is a computational
relation between an organism and a formula in the internal code of this very
same organism. The formula – the object of the propositional attitude – is a
piece of information represented, in the case of human subjects, in the brain’s
language of thought). The main problem here is to know to what extent any of
these theories can provide us with a global picture and a persuasive explanation
of the particular features of intentionality.
Some authors (Ned Block, Sidney Shoemaker) suggest that the predicate
“intentional” can only be attributed to certain psychical acts, like beliefs,
thoughts and desires (that is, propositional attitudes), excluding thereby the
perceptual aspects of consciousness. The phenomenological (subjective,
qualitative) dimension of consciousness is another topic of contemporary
debate. Subjective phenomenona are intrinsic qualities of consciousness
(qualia), they belong to the first person authority, and authors such as Daniel
Dennett or Paul and Patricia Churchland try to dismiss them as mere fictions,
since they are not supposed to fit a scientific, third person, approach to the
mind. But some powerful arguments have been developed against the
elimination of qualia (John Searle, Thomas Nagel, Roger Penrose, Fernando
Gil). (For bibliographical references, see 8.5).
8.3.5. Relationship with other projects
This project is, in a certain sense, a continuation and a development of a
previous project (which was sponsored by the Fundação para a Ciência e para a
Tecnologia) on the Epistemological and Anthropological Foundations of the
Medical Act. A collective volume containing several contributions on this topic,
has recently been published: Maria Luisa Couto Soares, ed., Hipócrates e a Arte
da Medicina, Lisboa, Colibri, 1999. The philosophical journal Análise also
published a number (number 20, 1998) on the notion of intelligibility, which
deals with questions not unrelated to those of the Medical Act project. Both of
these publications (which contain contributions by the participants in the actual
project) strongly emphasise the need of developing certain positions in the
philosophy of mind which are coherent with the ones we want to consider here.
8.3.6. Diffusion of results
It is our intention to publish a number of articles in philosophical journals on
the main themes previously referred, as well as editing a collective volume on
these topics. (For more details, see 8.3.13).