Metaphysics of Mind Workshop
Kyung Hee University, May 30-31 2012
Itay Shani, KHU
Part I: Context
What’s the issue?
 A boundary debate:
 Is intentionality the mark of the mental? Or is it the mark of the
dispositional?
 Since Brentano (1874), intentionality has been conceived as a
unique feature (if not the unique feature) of mental life. It has
often been claimed that it is that which separates the mental
from the physical.
 However, a small minority of philosophers specializing in
disposition research (in particular Place 1996, and Molnar 2003)
have challenged this dogma ⇒ They argue that intentionality has
a much broader scope: it is characteristic of all dispositional
properties (powers, potencies). ⇒ does not separate M-P
Why it is an issue?
 It is customary to characterize intentionality in terms of certain
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formal criteria such as:
1) Directionality (or aboutness)
2) Inexistence*
3) Non-truth-functionality
4) Referential opacity
5) Indeterminacy*
These (and possibly others) are interpreted as adequacy
criteria, which (almost) every intentional state must manifest.
 Advocates of the thesis of dispositional intentionality (ID) argue
that all of these criteria are equally met by simple
physicochemical dispositions (e.g., acidity, viscosity, etc.).
On the significance of ID
 1) Significance for disposition research:

 ID is seen by some as vital for constructing a non-
counterfactual account of the connection between
dispositions and their manifestations.
 2) Broader metaphysical significance:

 If intentionality is ubiquitous in the physical world then:
 A) It does not distinguish the mental from the physical.
 B) It significantly alters our world-image.
Questions to bear in mind
 While we engage in the debate concerning ID, we
would do well to pay heed to the following questions:
 1) Degree of similarity: To what degree is it true to
say that dispositions satisfy the criteria for
intentionality?
 2) Metaphysical significance: What metaphysical
implications are embedded in the degree of similarity
(or lack thereof) we identify between IM and ID?
Part two: The parallelism between
IM and ID
Directedness and inexistence
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Directedness:
IM: Mental states are directed towards their intentional objects.
ID: Dispositions are directed towards their
manifestations.
 Inexistence:
 IM: Mental states are directed at their intentional objects
regardless of whether such objects exist in actuality.
 ID: Dispositions are directed towards their
 manifestations regardless of whether such potential
manifestations actualize.
Non-truth functionality
 IM : (Ascriptions of) propositional attitudes are NTF

 S1. ‘The weatherman predicts that the drought will break’
does not entail:
 S2. ‘The drought will break’
 ID. Ascriptions of dispositions are NTF

 S3. ‘The cloud seeding apparatus has the capacity to bring
it about that the drought will break’ does not entail:
 S2. ‘The drought will break’
Referential opacity
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IM: Ascriptions of PA’s are referentially opaque:
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S4. ‘Doolittle believes that all Pelicans are feathered’1
does not entail:
S5. ‘Doolittle believes that all Pelicans have intertarsal joints’2
(although 1&2 are coextensive).
ID. Ascriptions of dispositions are referentially opaque:

S6. ‘Acid has the power to turn this litmus paper red’3
Does not entail:
S7. ‘Acid has the power to turn this litmus paper the color of Post
Office Pillar boxes’.4
 (although the color of POPB’s is red)
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Anscombe’s indeterminacy (optional)*
 IM: We can think of an object (say a man) without thinking
of some of its attributes (say its precise height).
 ID: A disposition (e.g., of a certain substance to dissolve in
an aqua regia solution) leaves indeterminate some of the
conditions of its manifestation (e.g., the precise location
of the dissolution event).
 Caveat: ‘Underdetermination’ seems a more appropriate
term – both thoughts and dispositions specify certain
conditions while leaving others unspecified.
Part III: Critical investigation of the
parallelism between IM and ID
A preliminary caveat
 Each of the criteria for intentionality just mentioned
ought to be addressed with the following concerns:
 Formal: How robust is the similarity between IM and
I D?
 Genetic: Can the observed similarity be traced to a
common cause or origin?
 <Analogy/Homology>
More on intentionality
 Our evaluation of the parallelism should also take into
consideration the following criteria for IM:
 Normativity: IM is fundamentally normative. It involves the
possibility of representational error and error detection.
 Aspectual shape: IM is aspect-relative. Mental states represent
their intentional objects under specific aspects, or modes (of
presentation).
 Intrinsicality: There is an indispensible sense of ‘content’ in
which mental states are endowed with intrinsically meaningful
intentional content ⇒ content which is not thrust upon them
from without.
Dispositional directedness
 ID directedness: Dispositions are (a) projective, or outward-
oriented (OO), (b) with respect to particular kinds of effects
relative to particular types of dispositional partners. (Martin
and Heil, 1999).
 
 Such projectivity is (the idea goes) a primitive form of
aboutness (“of-ness, or for-ness”)
 Skepticism: Projectivity attests to the intrinsic connectedness of
D’s to M’s; it indicates that they are internally related.
 
 But, is the Projectivity of powers really of the same kind as the
Projectivity of mental states?
Mental directedness
 There is no consensus on what constitutes MD. Yet, I share
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Place’s (1996) sympathy for the “cybernetic” model (Anderson
and Rosenberg 2008; Shani 2011).
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Feedback loop: Intentional tracking (say, of a moving prey)
consists of repetitive coordination of: (a) information inflow (b)
internal states indicating possible future outcomes, and (c)
behavioral outflow.
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Outcome: (1) Focused action; (2) the directedness of thought is
inherited from the role it plays in directing focused action.
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If so:
IM directedness is non-linear and cyclical in a manner
unparalleled by ID.
⇒ (but wait…)*
Revisiting NTF
 What lies behind the NTF of intentional and dispositional
ascriptions?
 ID: “X has the power to effect Y” does not entail Y because
possibility does not imply actuality.
 IM: “X believes/predicts, etc. that P” does not entail P
because beliefs/predictions, etc. can be frustrated.

 ID – NTF: Modality
 IM – NTF: Normativity
is N the missing criterion?
Revisiting referential opacity
 IM: Ref. Op. is due to the aspect-relativity of mental representations.
 
 Doolittle represents pelicans qua feathered creatures, but not qua
creatures with intertarsal joints.
 ID: Ref. Op. is due to… the aspect-relativity of dispositions.
 The failure of substitutivity between ‘red’ and ‘the color of POPB’ is
because powers are aspect-relative.
 
 A substance X (e.g. vinegar), qua being P (an acid), has the power to
transform a substance Y (a litmus paper), qua being Q (having a
certain color), in a certain way R (shift to the red).
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 But not in another way S (even if S & R are correlated contingently)
Revisiting Anscombe’s
indeterminacy* (optional)
 Anscombe’s indeterminacy, too, is a consequence of
aspect-relativity:

 IM: X is represented under certain aspects (A1… Ak) but
not under (Ak+1… An) → the latter remain unspecified,
hence underdetermined.
 ID: X (gold) has the power to dissolve in Y (aqua regia)
qua being P (having a certain molecular structure), but
not qua being Q (the time being T1) → the latter is
accidental, hence underdetermined.
Part IV: Proto-intentionality?
Where do we stand?
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Logically, our options are:
1) To accept ID and admit intentionality as the mark of the dispositional.
2) To reject ID altogether.
3) To opt for a third way, for example, to argue that dispositions are
proto-intentional.
 Affirming ID: (a) The 5 criteria are definitive of intentionality; (b) and
they are sufficiently met.
 Denying ID: The similarity to IM is superficial. When we dig deeper, we
find crucial features -- e.g., normativity and loop-like directedness -which separate IM from ID.
 Proto-intentionality: Yes, there are differences, but the similarity and
continuity is, nevertheless, ontologically deep.
Why proto-intentionality?
 Powers exemplify: Projectivity, internal relatedness, modality
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(potentiality), aspect-relativity, and intrinsicality.
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all are crucially operative in IM. Could this be an irrelevant accident?
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Or is it rather that such features are ontological scaffolds which enable
the eventual emergence of full-blown (psycho-social) intentionality?
 Notice: The point is not that IM is a composite-aggregate of ID’s. Rather,
it is that ID is (a) continuous with, and (b) necessary for, IM. (Pace Bird
2007)
 
 Could we expect IM to be possible in, say, a world (atomistic, or
Humean) lacking projectivity, internal relatedness, aspect-relativity,
etc.?
But there is more than that…
 First, even when IM seems to differ significantly from ID,
there are still intriguing connections, for example:
 ID – NTF: Modality
 IM – NTF: Normativity
 But notice: Ought → Can→ Is

 Only a world of potentialities (of can-do) could be a
world of (emergent) normativities (ought-to-do)
Content, affordances, and
dispositions
 The connection between IM and ID is even more intimate, at
least on the following picture:
 (Narrow) Intentional content is specified as anticipatory
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indications of interaction potentialities ⇒ i.e., of
affordances.
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Affordances are potentialities of the environment for the
agent ⇒ A function of the match-up between external and
internal potencies.
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(e.g., the surface of a pond affords walking-on for little
insects but not for normal humans)
Enter normativity
 The organization of living creatures is such that its stability and
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growth depends on recurrent regeneration and maintenance.
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Asymmetry: Some processes on which the system can exert a
degree of control contribute to stability and growth while others
are destabilizing.
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Normativity: Emerges from this asymmetry ⇒ Some processes
must be maintained; others counteracted.
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Representations: Contribute to successful action by indicating
how external potencies reciprocate with internal potencies in
light of the imperative to satisfy certain functional norms.
Meta-dispositions?
 If so, representations play a role in inhibiting the manifestation
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of some powers while enabling, or instigating, the manifestation
of others.
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Meta-dispositions: Thus, perhaps intentional properties can be
viewed as meta-dispositions (cf. Ellis 2002) – dispositions to
transform dispositions.
On this picture:
IM: Meta-dispositions; holistic agency; full-blown intentionality
 ID: Dispositions; atomistic potency; proto-intentionality
 
 The differences are real, but the framework continuous…