Mihnea Constantinescu, Ambassador at large for Energy Security, Romania. “Towards
a more assertive CFSP/CSDP role in Energy Security”
Almost a decade has passed since the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS).
This basic framework for strategic action is today in need of updating; new steps towards its
consolidation are required to reflect the rapidly emerging challenges on the global stage.
Let me recall that Romania has prepared and circulated earlier this year a position paper,
convergent with the communication adopted last July by the European Commission, dealing
with ways to enhance the efficiency of Europe's defense and security sector. One of the
specific areas we strongly support as a new dimension of CSDP action is energy security.
Problems in energy security could severely affect the functioning of our Union, of our
economies and even of overall European stability – and as such they are beyond the ability
of any single state to solve.
I commend Lithuania’s proposals included in the Non paper on Energy Security in the EU
CSDP framework and welcome the initiative to debate today. Romania supports the
implementation of the Lithuanian proposals and is ready to contribute to their consolidation.
I come from a region where our first instinct is to connect energy security to the geostrategic
mappings of energy resources – which means that, somehow inevitably, it may imply a
contentious agenda.
This is only one example of the preconceptions surrounding the debate on CSDP’s role in
energy security. I will shortly mention another three.
One main preconception labels CSDP’s way ahead on Energy Security as too cautious
in front of the challenges we are facing today.
The immediate, instinctual reference is to the expectation of “nervous winters”. It is often
argued that the EU should take a bolder stance to address disruptions of the energy supply,
whatever their cause. Actually, such an approach can only discourage the emergence of a
common view on the CFSP missions.
A second preconception is that the EU MS have a divided approach on energy security
issues.
We must be clear on this: energy security is indivisible in the same way EU security is
indivisible.
The natural EU response to this is therefore more integration and a strengthened energy
market. Investing to achieve the goal of completing the EU internal energy market by 2014
should be also seen as a fundamental contribution to a sustainable and assertive CSDP. We
need to reflect on this in the preparation of the Lithuanian Presidency progress report for the
December Energy Council.
The solidarity sense in an EU energy policy must accordingly be seen as a practical
reflection of CSDP. For this is reason I think that the proposed trans-European priority
corridors and areas covering electricity and gas networks, oil infrastructure and smart grids
based on the Connecting Europe Facility will prove to be a rewarding task.
The same solidarity should be reflected in the North-South plan for Interconnections in
Central-Eastern Europe adopted earlier this year. And we hope a similar cohesion and
solidarity should apply in the ongoing debate on creating a Gas Market Optionality in South
East Europe.
The third preconception is the existence of a conceptual gap between the EU and
NATO when addressing Energy Security.
A strong Transatlantic partnership and deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU
remain the main pillars of European security.
Vulnerabilities on the global energy map require a more resolute EU approach and
coordination with NATO’s capability to assess risks and project stability.
The EU can adopt uniform and ambitious legal standards and regulations to strengthen the
national governments’ ability to promote energy security or to fight cyber-crime. This would
complement NATO’s unique operational capacity, especially when it comes to protecting
communications and information equipment and infrastructure.
We must not forget that, while we continue to build a strong global profile, the vast majority of
the threats and opportunities confronting us originate in our immediate vicinity. This brings us
directly to the common links between CFSP/CSDP’s and NATO’s role at a global level when
we assess energy security challenges.
The relevant documents adopted by the European Council and the Commission over the last
three years rightly mention a few common priorities.

EU shall have the necessary monitoring capabilities to provide early warning and
enhance its capacity to respond to energy security challenges. We are also striving to set
similar common grounds within the Alliance.

EU shall extend its own energy market to include its neighbors within a common
regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules. We are also trying to
engage our partners of cooperation with the Alliance.

EU shall advocate reciprocity in terms of market opening and respect for market rules:
the principles of the Energy Charter, non discrimination, competition, transparency and
enforcement. And we should not lose confidence that sooner or later these rules must
become preconditions for sound partnerships with the North Atlantic Alliance.
From a more practical angle, I would add here the need to promote strategic fuel reserve
stocks and to encourage joint stock holding with partner countries.
It is also highly necessary these days to set out a CSDP action plan complementary with
NATO assessments, to identify the most vulnerable sectors in the supply and distribution
chain.
When we speak about energy challenges at the EU level as well as in the NATO framework,
this means that: we need consultations, we need to perform strategic assessment and
contingency planning and we need to develop resilient capacities to protect critical
energy infrastructures.
EU must extend its support to the creation of robust national expertise in combating cyberterrorism – bearing in mind the need to secure the transmission systems – the SCADA
systems, the smart grids, the large ENTSO-e interconnections, and the nuclear power plants
operating on the EU territory and in our vicinity.
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Changing the way we use and produce energy, and the fallout from climate change, are
fundamentally issues of our security.
Both the EU and the Alliance must work together more closely to enable the necessary
technological leapfrogging – which will result in a cleaner and more efficient use of energy.
How we deal with the ramifications of energy will also have dramatic impacts on our military
capabilities throughout this 21st Century.
For this reason Romania supports the GO GREEN demonstration project on photovoltaic
energy for the European armed forces. This project goes to prove that Defense, even while it
fulfills its mission, can provide a strong pull for innovation and offer a visionary contribution to
our collective energy security.
That is what we have to do with energy for ensuring EU competitiveness – innovate, adapt,
overcome and emerge successful on the other side.
In this context I can not avoid the need for smart partnerships to bridge the technological gap
in the energy sector perpetuated between different parts of Europe.
We expect the EU SET Plan to contribute with higher ambition to achieving this goal. Publicprivate investment in support of research and technological innovation will be the logical
solution to alleviate this gap, having also tangible results for the defense industry.
We should also call for the EU-US Energy Council to be less diffident to the security aspect,
by inviting NATO as well EDA to add its contribution to this beneficial venture.
But we need to determine the right balance between incentives and corporate responsibility
in order to prevent an abusive transfer of the financial burden of new technology into the
operational energy costs. Otherwise energy security will become a paradox for security
itself.
Despite our temptation to sometimes make up some contrived connections between Defense
and Energy Security when addressing CSDP, I am inviting you to consider more natural
ingredients in addressing these topics.
The collective efforts within the EU cannot be a substitute for each MS individual
responsibility for its own national energy sector. I can not imagine a sustainable EU CSDP
without the firm principles defining EU energy policies: accessibility, affordability, and
acceptability.
Increasing investment in energy efficiency, creating new interconnections, building gas
storage capacities and setting contingency planning for energy shortfalls are indispensable to
securing household as well as defense capability.
I have doubts the households’ gas or electricity consumption can be ideological or
strategically oriented. But it was recently proved that this can determine both political choices
and strategic orientation.
In my opinion, national responsibility must be the primary response to any ambiguity
surrounding CSDP’s role in energy security.
This means good governance – actually a pre-requisite for assuming EU membership.
It means responsible and transparent energy policies at national levels.
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It means a reliable national capability to protect critical energy infrastructures (CEI).
The possible connections between CFSP/CSDP and energy security are precisely relevant
for the region I come from. The EU’s commitment for “Engaging with Partners beyond Our
Borders" is an ambitious plan for external cooperation on energy security – one that we
should assertively continue to apply in our neighborhood.
I dare to claim that Energy in the Black Sea region should cease to be seen only as a source
of contentious arguments. It must become a source of emerging cooperation, predictability
and security for EU.
To us it is clear that we are entering what will be a new, different path in terms of the diversity
of gas supplies for Europe in the enlarged Black Sea region.
The central challenge of the months ahead is to get the Southern Corridor up and running in
a flexible way, that reflects current gas availability, prevents new division lines between
markets and avoids the persistence of a zero-sum approach.
On a longer term the Black Sea’s new gas discoveries could offer the perspective of
becoming another source for the Southern Corridor.
The shale gas revolution will also reach the shores of the Black Sea and its surrounding
region.
New interconnections will impact energy security and affordability. And sooner or later the
global reverse of the LNG flows will also reach the gas infrastructure in this region.
Not last, I have a firm conviction that the Black Sea region could benefit from a more evolved
pattern of energy security – including technological advances, energy efficiency, and hazards
prevention – instead of being held hostage to the logic of pipelines and spheres of influence.
Energy security in the enlarged Black Sea area could thus become the litmus test of a more
ambitious and strategic goal: to create a smart EU partnership with our neighbors in the
region, taking advantage of the valuable means CFSP can provide, with three objectives:

Setting up a joint capability for contingency planning.

Setting up a system to share comprehensive crisis management procedures.

Expanding joint programs covering research and innovation.
For example, the environmental hazards posed by industrial, nuclear and resources transport
activities in the Black Sea region also offer an opportunity for providing scientific expertise
through CSDP and NATO partnership programs.
We should not forget that 170 million people from 17 countries live on the rivers that feed the
Black Sea, making it one of the most polluted seas in the world.
Smart CFSP in the Black Sea could generate an alternative to both obsolete hard power and
vague soft power.
Best practices can be shared throughout the area bordering the North, Baltic and Black
Seas, through the Lithuanian Energy Security Centre.
The RACVIAC Center in Zagreb is also ready to include energy security as a new dimension
of its mission in South Eastern Europe.
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When speaking about smart partnership, I can not avoid making the compelling case of the
Republic of Moldova’s energy situation.
I have a strong conviction that the best way to illustrate our discussion about the meaning of
comprehensive energy security is to find the appropriate means for investing in the Republic
of Moldova’s energy inter-connections to Europe.
The Republic of Moldova has courageously committed itself as a member of the Energy
Community. It would be a grave EU responsibility if the result will be a new gas shortage
penalty instead of tangible and long expected benefits.
There will be no better proof of the European commitment to endorse a European path for
Chisinau than a strong and tangible support for its energy sustainability.
I dare to say that helping the Republic of Moldova diversify its energy supply could prove
even more valuable than the decision of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius late this fall.
The Energy Community Treaty, the European Neighborhood Policy, the Energy Charter
Treaty, as well as many other international forums, embody the strategic EU goal to proceed
with and to gain from the implementation of an EU energy policy.
Turkey is our important neighbor, with which we share a common security vision. We must
encourage Turkey to make full use of its potential to become a major energy transit hub and
in particular promote its rapid integration into the Energy Community Treaty.
Ukraine's integration into the Energy Community Treaty is also a strategic achievement and it
is in the EU’s security interest to support the efforts meant to rehabilitate its Gas
Transmission System, while improving transparency and the legal framework.
Reaching further to the East, we should use all opportunities to establish a tri-partite
cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, to ensure stable and uninterrupted gas supplies
through the Eastern Corridor.
As a conclusion I am hopeful that the Strategic Group for International Energy Cooperation,
recently established by the Commission, will take a closer look to the interconnections
between energy security and European security at large, and will bring a bolder contribution
to a future CSDP comprehensive approach.
Without objecting to the strategic nature of the challenges we are confronted with, I would
argue that their solution lies primarily in our own action at national and EU levels, as what
should be seen as a comprehensive Common Energy Security Policy.
Sept. 2013
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