Magadeev I.E.1
Strength through cooperation:
Soviet-American Relations during World War II
Your Excellency Mr. Ambassador, dear friends and colleagues!
I am very grateful to IRC for its invitation and a chance to address this
audience in such a distinguished company of speakers.
Thinking about different periods in the history of the Russian/SovietAmerican relations, it occurred to me that “strength” and “cooperation”, two words
which figure in the title of our symposium, are not mutually exclusive. Strength
can be achieved and maintained through cooperation.
For the Soviet Union the period of the Great Patriotic War, as WWII is
usually called in Russia, was the crucial time when the international status of the
Russian state was radically transformed – from the rouge of the Versailles system
to one of the leading Great Powers of the world, the super-power along with the
United States. But the price of access to the new status was extremely high.
President John F. Kennedy in his famous American University speech of 1963
(nineteen sixty three) here on this ground put it very clearly: “…no nation in the
history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the Second World
War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and families
were burned or sacked. A third of the nation’s territory, including two thirds of its
industrial base, was turned into a wasteland – a loss equivalent to the destruction of
this country east of Chicago”. The total amount of causalities from all related
causes which is estimated at 26 (twenty six) million and 600 (six hundred
thousand) people is hard even to imagine.
The symbols of these sacrifices and heroic victories which were based on
them are numerous: the battle of Moscow of 1941 (nineteen forty one) when the
German armies in Europe were stopped and beaten for the first time since the
1
Author expresses gratitude to Professor Vladimir Pechatnov for his help and advice during the preparation of this
paper.
2
beginning of the war; the blockade of Leningrad (today Saint-Petersburg) of 1941
– 1944 (nineteen forty one – nineteen forty four) (more than 640 (six hundred and
forty) thousand people died only from the starvation); the battle of Stalingrad
(today Volgograd) of 1942 – 1943 (nineteen forty two – nineteen forty three) – the
“turning point” of the war; the battle of Kursk of 1943 (nineteen forty three), after
which wehrmacht finally lost the strategic initiative in the war; last but not least,
the battles of liberation of Belorussia of 1944 (nineteen forty four) (operation
“Bagration”) – the masterpiece of the Soviet military command, decisive thrust
opening the way to the liberation of Poland and the victorious operations of 1945
(nineteen forty five) on the territory of Germany itself.
During the war even those Western officials, who often were skeptical about
Soviet system or policy, acknowledged the immense scale of the sacrifices of the
Soviet people. One of them, U.S. Ambassador in Moscow William Standley, after
his trip to Stalingrad in August 1943 (nineteen forty three) cabled to Washington:
“I was deeply impressed at what I saw in heroic city which in my mind will always
remain as a testimonial of courage and unflinching tenacity in face of terrible
sufferings and hardships of the Russian Army and people in their war against
German invaders”.
The victory of the Soviet Union was based primarily on sacrifices and heroic
will of its own people, on the resources of the country which were skillfully
mobilized for the war. But in the same time the victory over Germany and its allies
was the result of the common efforts of the “Grand Alliance”, the Soviet Union,
the United States and the Great Britain. It was the victory achieved in the coalition
war, the main theater of which was the Soviet-German front. This cooperation
included not just the lend-lease program but also massive military operations. The
history of the operation “Bagration”, which took place in 1944 (nineteen forty
four) – the peak of the inter-allied cooperation – is especially indicative. Already at
Tehran conference of 1943 (nineteen forty three) Stalin had promised to Roosevelt
and Churchill to start the massive offensive on the Soviet-German front to support
the Allied landing on the North of France – the famous “Overlord”. As revealed by
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recent Russian scholarship, the Soviet planning of “Bagration” including a final
decision about its launching date were closely linked to the information about the
date of beginning of the “Overlord”, which the Western Allies sent to Moscow.
The Soviet readiness to support the Anglo-American action in France was
deeply appreciated by the Western Allies. As Roosevelt wrote to Stalin on the 22
(twenty second of) June 1944 (nineteen forty four), “Your good action (the word
“good” was inserted by Roosevelt himself) together with our efforts on the
Western Front should quickly put the Nazis in a very difficult position”. You can
see the image of this message and Roosevelt’s handwritten insertion on the screen.
Stalin’s reaction to the long-awaited opening of the “second front” on the 6
(sixth of) June 1944 (nineteen forty four) was also warm and friendly. He didn’t
limit himself to expressing confidence in the success of the “Overlord” in the
personal messages to Roosevelt and Churchill but decided to add some personal
touch. He sent to Roosevelt his silver-framed photo in uniform with all
decorations, inscribed as follows: “To President Franklin D. Roosevelt in memory
of the day of the invasion of Northern France by the Allied American and British
liberating armies. From his friend Joseph V. Stalin. June 6, 1944 (nineteen forty
four)”. All words in this inscription were significant: adjective “Allied” before the
“American and British”, the definition of their armies as “liberating” and certainly
the word “friend” in the bottom. The vast scale of human and especially technical
resources used during the “Overlord” (about 7 thousand of ships, 13 (thirteen)
thousand of planes and so on) impressed Stalin. “History of wars doesn’t know
another such enterprise characterized by such breadth of conception, vastness of
scale and mastery of implementation” – he said in the interview to newspaper
“Pravda” on the 14 (fourteenth of) June.
The experience of the Soviet-American relations clearly shows that to
acquire strength is not enough, it is necessary to maintain and develop it in the
international environment where other states have interests of their own.
Diplomacy is the key non-lethal instrument by which power of state is
implemented in decisions which correspond to its interests. The idea that coalition
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victory in the Second World War should lead to the post-war order based on the
continuing cooperation between the United Nations was especially dear to
President Roosevelt. But it was important to Stalin as well. For him good personal
relations with Roosevelt were the vital element of his own grand strategy aimed at
victory over Germany and securing new expanded zone of influence in Europe and
the Far East. The economic and financial power of the United States was also taken
into account: the Soviet Union, devastated during the war, was deeply interested in
the American post-war aid and trade. The personality of Roosevelt was also
important: his initiative in establishing the diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union in 1933 (nineteen thirty three), progressive social and economic policy
(“New Deal”), personal reputation in pushing forward lend-lease and restraining
anti-Soviet attitudes of some American officials – all these facts were well known
and highly appreciated in Moscow. At the same time thanks to the efficiency of
Soviet intelligence Moscow knew about the other side of Roosevelt’s diplomacy –
keeping Anglo-American atomic project in secret from the Soviet ally.
Allied relations are often difficult. As Churchill used to say: “There is only
one thing worse than fighting together with Allies – and that is fighting without
them”. The “Grand Alliance” was no exception and contained serious
contradictions. But the willingness and ability to settle them is perhaps more
interesting and revealing than the mere fact of their existence.
The difficulties between Soviet Union and the Western Allies had different
roots. Strategic realities mattered. Soviet insistence on the opening of the “second
front” – the constant feature of the inter-allied diplomacy during 1941 – 1944
(nineteen forty one – nineteen forty four) – was dictated, especially before the
decisive turn of 1943 (nineteen forty three), by the vital military necessity to divert
enough German divisions from the Soviet-German front to relieve the Red Army.
The Allies’ dragging feet on the “second front” was perceived not only as selfish
but as the deliberate weakening of the Soviet ally. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet
Ambassador to the Unites States, who was viewed as a westerner among the Soviet
diplomats, in June 1943 (nineteen forty three) analyzed the American and British
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policy in the following way: “There is no doubt that military calculations of both
states are based on the intention to exhaust the Soviet Union as much as possible in
order to reduce its role in solution of post-war problems”. Litvinov’s report was
attentively read by Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov: the words “intention to
exhaust the Soviet Union as much as possible” were underlined by his pencil, as
you can see on the screen.
The objective difference of the situation in which Soviet Union, the United
States and the Great Britain found themselves during the war was also a factor of
contradictions, sometimes aggravated by subjective difficulties of mutual
misunderstanding. Stalin represented the country which was heavily attacked by
the mighty enemy, who occupied the substantial and the most developed part of its
territory. The very existence of the country and its people were at stake up to the
“decisive turn” of 1943 (nineteen forty three). To survive in this “total war”
struggle was possible only by extreme efforts and full mobilization of national
resources and will. There was simply no other choice and everything was
subordinated to the ultimate aim of victory. You can see on the screen the draft of
Stalin’s message to Churchill written in October 1942 (nineteen forty two) during
the crucial days of the Stalingrad battle when it seemed that city could be captured
by Germans. The extreme pressure of the military situation is reflected even in its
form – hasty pencil handwritten sentences on small notebook sheets. It was an
appeal to the Allies to accelerate supplies of the much needed aircrafts – ‘Spitfires’
and ‘Aeracobras’.
The strategic situation of the Western Allies was not so grave. For the Great
Britain the real menace of the Nazi invasion had passed with the formation of the
Soviet-German front which absorbed the bulk of German military forces. The price
of the British contribution to the victory and degree of its influence in the post-war
world – that was at stake for London. The United States’ position was even more
advantageous. Invulnerable to direct German assault, having huge economic
capacity and another precious resource– time for its gradual mobilization, America
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could afford to conduct the war in a rather orderly, life saving way. In this sense
the war which was ‘total’ for one side, was not so total for the other.
Understanding the difficulties of the other side was not easy. As our analysis
of the personal correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill has clearly
proved, they represented two different socio-cultural traditions: Anglo-American
and Soviet-Russian. Stalin’s suspiciousness can be explained not only by his
Marxist frame of analysis (socialist Soviet Union versus capitalist states) but also
by the deep-rooted Russian perception of the West as “cunning” and ‘perfidious’.
Stalin, the contemporary of the First World War, was anxious not to allow the
West to use Russians as cannon fodder. He was determined to obtain such results
of the post-war settlement that corresponded to the Soviet contribution to the
victory over the common enemy. As he said to the U.S. ambassador Averell
Harriman in March 1944 (nineteen forty four), “all think that the Russians are
work-hands. The Russians ought to liberate Poland, and the Poles want to obtain
Lvov. All think that the Russians are fools”. Not to be deceived – this motive was
deeply seated in Stalin’s mind.
Above mentioned factors affected not only actions of the three leaders but
also their perceptions of situation and estimates of actions by the others. It was
difficult for Stalin to understand the slowness of the Western Allies in aiding the
Soviet Union. Roosevelt and especially Churchill underestimated how critical the
situation on the Soviet-German front was in 1941 – 1942 (nineteen forty one –
nineteen forty two), they criticized Stalin for little attention he paid to the
difficulties of the United States and the Great Britain in war with Germany and
Japan on the other battle fronts.
Roosevelt, however, was more empathic than Churchill. In a number of
cases the President showed ability to put himself into Stalin’s shoes, to
demonstrate tact and respect – this indispensable quality in any relations. His
message to Churchill of 29 (twenty ninth of) July 1942 (nineteen forty two) during
the heavy wehrmacht assault on the Soviet-German front deserves the quotation:
“We have got always to bear in mind the personality of our Ally and the very
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difficult and dangerous situation that confronts him. No one can be expected to
approach the war from a world point of view whose country has been invaded. I
think we should try to put ourselves in his place”.
Given all these complicating factors, the common achievements of the
“Grand Alliance” were very significant and not guaranteed. Despite mutual
suspicions and differences, the three leaders and their countries managed to
cooperate and achieve the victory over Axis powers. These days, 70 years after the
epic event, it is easy to forget what kind of evil was represented by that
combination and what was at stake for the whole world in that great battle. In fact,
some of your students, as we hear from American history teachers, have problems
understanding why on earth Americans were fighting Germans in WWII. For the
war generation on both sides of the Atlantic there was no such question. Back then
it was crystal clear what the war was about. “Time” magazine in its first editorial
after V-Day put it well: “This war was a revolution against the moral basis of
civilization. It was conceived by Nazis in conscious contempt for the life, dignity
and freedom of individual man and deliberately prosecuted by means of slavery,
starvation and the mass destruction of noncombatants’ lives. It was a revolution
against the human soul”. There was also no doubt then about who contributed the
most to destruction of this hellish evil. “Russians have deserved eternal gratitude
for having been willing to shed more blood to crush it than any other nation, –
“Time” went on. – For people who after centuries of suppression had barely tasted
or even realized the blessings of civilized life it was especially great a
contribution”.
The experience of Soviet-American cooperation during WWII is certainly
significant for our days as shown by continued interest of scholars and society in
its history. In commemoration of the 70 years anniversary of the victory in the war
many new publications are coming out in Russia. I would like to draw your
attention to two of them. First, the documentary research concerning the
correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt / Truman, Churchill / Attlee during the
Second World War. This two-volume study was conducted at MGIMO University
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by Professor Vladimir Pechatnov and myself as a junior co-author. Based on multiarchival research in all three countries, it represents a new look on the main
channel of personal communication between the ‘Big Three’ and their personal
relations. The Russian edition is due by early May and there are plans for its
English-language version. So, I hope that many of you will have the opportunity to
read it.
Another and most ambitious research project was conducted under the
auspices of the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is a twelve-volume collective
undertaking under the title “The Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945 (nineteen forty
one – nineteen forty five)”. It is a new comprehensive analysis covering all main
aspects of war history from its origins and conduct (policy, economy, military
strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, home front, etc.) to its results and lessons.
Professor Pechatnov and myself were among its many authors. There is a special
volume on the Allies which in my view is very balanced and respectful of their
contribution. I would like to present the electronic edition of this fundamental work
to the American University with hope that it will find its readers. Thank you very
much for your attention.