Question Pool for Epistemology MA Exam, Spring 2011
1. Some linguists and philosophers have argued that our knowledge of the grammar
of our native tongue is “tacit knowledge.” What have they meant by this? Others
have claimed that the notion of tacit knowledge is an oxymoron. Why have they
claimed this? What is your position on this matter, and what arguments can you
offer for your position?
2. Some contemporary philosophers, most notably John McDowell, have argued that
human experience is “conceptualized.” What does he mean by this? What
motivates his claim? What are the most serious objections to the position? Assess
the debate.
3. If we were to treat epistemology from a scientific perspective, which science or
sciences should we appeal to? Quine seems to assume that the appeal should be to
the cognitive and/or brain sciences, but what about the sociology of knowledge?
Are there other possibilities? What, if anything, of epistemological significance
hangs on the choice?
4. “The skeptic repudiates science because it is vulnerable to illusion on its own
showing; and my own criticism of the skeptic is that he is overreacting.” What
objection to skepticism is Quine lodging when he criticizes defenders of
skepticism for overreacting? Explain whether this objection is, or is not, an
adequate response to skeptical challenges.
5. One of the central questions in modern epistemology is whether there are any
incorrigible beliefs. Why has this question been so important? Should it continue
to be? Explain your answer.
6. “No naturalistic criterion for justified belief is possible, for given any naturalistic
criterion, one could still ask whether we are justified in accepting beliefs that
satisfy the criterion, and that question would not be trifling.” Discuss this
argument as a sweeping reply to naturalized epistemology.
7. The conclusion of a valid deductive argument, philosophers have generally
argued, makes no assertion beyond the assertions contained collectively in the
premises. From this one might conclude that knowledge of the premises of any
valid deductive argument implies knowledge of the conclusion. Is this plausible?
8. How are “internalism” and “externalism” understood in the context of epistemic
justification? What are the most fundamental intuitions motivating each of the
two positions? Is there any way of resolving the dispute between the two
positions? Can you think of an analogue in some other branch of philosophy to
the internalist/externalist distinction in epistemology?
9. Philosophers from Arnauld and Locke on, if not before, have introduced the
analytic-synthetic distinction to handle certain problems in epistemology. In
recent times, however, Quine and others have argued that the distinction is not
tenable and must be abandoned. What is at stake in abandoning the distinction?
10. Kripke has suggested that in addition to the problem of epistemological
skepticism about other minds, there is a problem of meaning skepticism. Is he
right? If so, how should this second problem be addressed?
11. What are some of the forms that transcendental arguments can take? What, in
your view, is the most promising? Could a transcendental argument succeed?
12. Wittgenstein remarks, “We just do not see how very specialized the use of ‘I
know’ is. –For ‘I know’ seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what
is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I
knew’.” (On Certainty) How, if at all, do the fundamental problems of
epistemology arise from ways in which the use of ‘I know’ is very specialized,
and what implications does this have for the problems themselves?