May 2009
Epistemology MA Comp EXAM
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Epistemology MA Exam/Spring (MAY) 2009
Answer one question from each part. Time limit: 3 hours
Part I
1.
There is considerable disagreement over whether it is important to solve the
Gettier problem, and attention has shifted to the question of what the existence of
the Gettier problem means for epistemology. What does the existence of the
Gettier problem mean for epistemology, and what direction should epistemology
take in the future as a consequence?
2.
What is the distinction between internalism and externalism as regards
justification and as characterized by Chisholm and taken up by such philosophers
as Bonjour, Goldman, Fumerton, and Sosa? Is there any way to settling the
dispute between internalists and externalists? Is there any way of reconciling
these two points of view?
3.
“No naturalistic criterion for justified belief is possible, for given any naturalistic
criterion, one could still ask whether we are justified in accepting beliefs that
satisfy the criterion, and that question would not be trifling.” Discuss this
argument as a sweeping reply to naturalized epistemology.
Part II
4.
One of the central questions in modern epistemology is whether there are any
incorrigible beliefs. Why has this question been so important? Should it continue
to be? Explain your answer.
5.
Virtually everyone grants that any knowledge achieved in the sciences is
provisional, always subject to revision by future research. Nevertheless, some
would say that ‘provisional knowledge’ is a contradiction in terms, that a claim
can be knowledge only if the possibility of future information refuting it has been
ruled out. Is ‘provisional knowledge’ a contradiction in terms? If you think yes,
explain not only why, but where that leaves the supposed knowledge achieved in
the sciences. If you think not, explain not only why not, but also what criterion a
claim has to meet to be knowledge in place of the criterion of ruling out all
possibility of future refutation.
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May 2009
6.
Epistemology MA Comp EXAM
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Some recent philosophers, most notably John McDowell, have argued that what
we—competent speakers—experience is, even that it must be, always already
‘conceptualized’. Others have argued that it needn’t be, and that in fact it isn’t
conceptualized until we judge or otherwise make up our mind about it. What is
the most plausible understanding of the idea that what we experience is
conceptualized? What is the strongest reason for thinking that experience is
conceptualized, or even that it must be? What is the strongest reason for thinking
that it isn’t conceptualized, or even that it couldn’t be? What is your view? Argue
for it.
Part III
7.
What is knowledge of logic knowledge of?
8.
Words, and what they mean, are human products, and consequently they are
sometimes not made as well as they should be. Consider the word ‘know’.
Perhaps all that the skeptical scenarios, and other philosophical conundrums that
have swirled around the topic of knowledge show is that the word ‘know’ has
been designed badly, and that we should replace it with a better word. Discuss.
9.
Philosophers from Arnauld and Locke on, if not before, have introduced the
analytic-synthetic distinction to handle certain problems in epistemology. In
recent times, however, Quine and others have argued that the distinction is not
tenable and must be abandoned. What is at stake in abandoning the distinction?
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