The Effect of Political Advertising on Voter Participation in Judicial Campaigns, 2000 – 2004.
Frederick S. Wood
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics and Geography
Coastal Carolina University
fwood@coastal.edu
Jeremy F. Duff
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Midwestern State University
jeremy.duff@mwsu.edu
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between campaign information derived from television
advertisements and voter participation in state judicial elections. Using a unique dataset of
elections from 2000 – 2004, we conclude that information provided to the voter in the form of
television advertising has a positive effect on rates of voter participation, which is measured by
ballot roll off. This study suggests that the modernization of judicial election campaigns may
alleviate some of the concerns of low voter participation.
Democracy is often touted as a preferred form of government because of the opportunity
of each citizen to have an equal voice in choosing their representatives. However, there is an
implicit assumption that citizens will be active participants in the democratic process. For the
votes cast, the election outcomes, and the laws propagated by the government to be considered
the legitimate will of the people it is assumed that votes cast are true expressions of the
electorate’s preference for one representative over the other candidates in a contest. When voters
appear to fail to live up to their obligation, for any reason, the force of the government is
diminished and the viability of democracy is called into question.
Institutions and practices have been developed to reduce the costs of participation and
allow democratic government to function in practice. For example, political parties were created
to reduce the considerable time and expenses required for political campaigns and to organize the
government in a more efficient manner (Aldrich 1995). The initial successful experiences with
democratic elections led to the extension of elections to more offices. The proliferation of
democracy extended to offices that were previously removed from popular control because
democracy was thought to have a potentially negative influence on the function of the offices.
One such office that underwent these democratic reforms was the state judiciary. The
selection and retention methods for trial and appellate courts were altered to popular elections in
an effort to increase the amount of control the public has over the composition of its judiciary.
However, for decades critics have assailed judicial elections as perverting the integrity of the
judicial system and have called for reforms to restore legitimacy to the adjudication process (e.g.
Pound 1962). The previous conventional view of scholars was that judicial elections suffer from
a number of ailments including lower amounts of information, salience, competition, and voter
participation. However, judicial elections have been gradually transformed to resemble the
traditional notion of democratic elections. This change has been in large part to an observed
increase in the amounts of campaign spending by judicial candidates (Bonneau 2004; 2005;
2007). The evolution of judicial campaigns was further aided by the United States Supreme
1
Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota et al. vs. White (2002) that removed the
ethical canons that limited the speech of candidates for judicial office.
Another facet of recent judicial campaigns is an increased reliance upon television
advertising as part of their campaign strategy. In this paper, we evaluate the manner in which
political advertising influences voter participation in partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court
elections. Specifically, we use a dataset of campaign advertisements from the 2000 – 2004
elections to determine the role that information plays in a voter’s decision whether to vote in
judicial elections after voting in the most salient race. The results show a clear link from
advertising to turnout. The more candidates advertise, in state supreme court elections, the higher
the turnout in those elections. As Downs (1957) suggests, advertising lowers informational costs
to potential voters, helping them acquire the necessary information about candidates that allows
them to make a more informed vote choice. This, in turn, appears to help mobilize these voters to
participate in judicial elections.
Information and Voting
With the introduction of survey research, scholars were able to turn to the individual as a
unit of analysis. Although the findings of these studies typically indicated a small influence of
campaigns on final vote choice, We will examine the influence that information can have within
the framework of these models. One of the first questions that was asked was why people vote
the way they do (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee
1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). These studies generally found that an
individual’s decision of whether or not to vote and whom to vote for was largely a function of an
individual’s personal characteristics and interests. More important to this project was the
conclusion that campaigns and the mass media were believed to have a minimal effect on voters.
2
The Columbia School published one of the first studies of individual voting behavior
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). These
scholars found evidence supporting their sociological approach to voting behavior in their
examination of voters’ intentions in presidential elections. According to this model, voters are
influenced by a number of individual characteristics, including ethnic identity, family tradition,
attitudes towards salient issues, and organization membership. The voter’s membership in a
group provides the opportunity for information to be passed on to the voter by other members of
the group concerning how to vote in an upcoming election. The authors found that campaign
propaganda served to reinforce previously held viewpoints but did not act to change a person’s
vote choice. However with an increased amount of mass media employed by campaigns today,
candidates may also provide these cues to a voter on their own behalf by providing information
concerning the endorsement by specific groups (such as labor unions or law enforcement
organizations) or elected officials (governor or legislative leaders), or by relaying their own
personal experiences (religious affiliation, ethnic heritage, or educational background).
Additionally, candidates when presenting themselves to the voters also discuss issues and
positions that allow the voter to create a perception of what the parties and candidates stand for.
These perceptions help to reinforce the voters’ membership in the group while also creating
distinctions between the candidates.
Finding deficiencies in the approach of treating political attitudes as a reflection of group
affiliations, Campbell et al. (1960) hypothesized that the voting process is a result of the direction
and intensity of attitudes towards the perceived objects of national politics. Campbell et al. used
a psychological approach to explain what influences an individual’s political decision making
process and described a funnel of causality that incorporates broad historical influences, social
background, party identification, and partisan attitudes into the voting process. Voters use their
attachment to political parties, which has been shaped by an understanding of history and
influenced by their social background, to supply cues that allows the individual to evaluate and
3
answer political questions. The stronger the attachment an individual has to a political party, the
better the screen or filter through which the voter can evaluate events and arrive at an opinion of
whether or not to vote and whom to vote for. According to this theory of voting behavior, voters
need information about candidates in order to determine whether they should support them. It is
not sufficient to know the partisan affiliation of the candidates, as the voter needs to have
knowledge of the candidates’ positions to compare them to the political attitudes that the voter
holds on issues of importance. It also follows that candidates in non-partisan elections need to
provide voters with additional information to activate their partisan attachments.
While these studies signaled the importance of the individual’s personal characteristics,
other scholars employed older methodologies to this new unit of analysis. As described in an
economic model, Downs (1957) posited that in order to make a decision on whether or not to vote
and whom to vote for, voters require information about an election and the candidates involved.
A rational voter will seek out information to determine which candidate they prefer. When
information is limited, it is more difficult for a voter to make a decision. Therefore, the
differences between the candidates need to be displayed to get the voters to participate in the
election. Furthermore, a rational voter will seek out information that is free and campaign
advertisements are the most visible means by which a candidate can provide information to the
voters. If the theory presented by Downs is correct then the candidate that provides the most
information should have a higher probability of winning an election and the races where greater
information is broadcast should produce higher levels of voting participation as it will be easier
for voters to determine which candidate to vote for.
Following from this economic perspective, V.O. Key posited that voters act
retrospectively, more specifically they “are moved by their perceptions and appraisals of policy
and performance” (Key 1966 at 150). Key separated voters into three distinct categories:
“standpatters” are those who continuously vote for the same political party, “switchers” move
4
across party lines, and new voters whom have not yet formed a lasting attachment to a political
party. Though a large number of voters are “standpatters”, the victor is determined by the
number of “switchers” and new voters that are persuaded by the campaign. Fiorina (1981) sought
to combine the work of Key and Downs by incorporating the voter’s concern over the outputs of
government with the calculation of future expectations of results. According to this theory of
voting behavior, information is needed by the voters to determine not only what evaluation to
make of an officeholder’s past behavior but also to know what future policies to expect from a
successful candidate.
The success of forecasting models for the U.S. presidency emphasize the problems of an
individual based approach to studying vote choice, namely a largely pre -determined vote. If
information that is measured before the campaigns begin can reasonably predict the outcome of a
future election, then what influence does a campaign have on the electorate? In their review of
forecasting models Gelman and King (1993) conclude that “voters decide, based on their
preferences, as formed by the information they have learned during the campaign, as well as basic
political cues such as ideology and party identification, which candidate to support eventually” (at
409). In other words, Stimson (2004) argues that campaigns are information flow. At the
beginning most voters will know very little about the candidates and what’s going on. They will
not know much about the issues or where the candidates stand on those issues. Campaigns can
provide that information. Political scientists typically have that information in the beginning, and
can make reasonable predictions based on that information. Voters, however, learn the facts as
the campaigns go on, particularly from ads, debates, and the party conventions.
By focusing primarily on presidential elections, the research on campaigns and vote
choice have been mixed. Generally, experimental research has found that campaigns have the
potential to influence vote choice, issue preferences, candidate evaluations, and likelihood of
voting (see for example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996). Alternatively, survey research appears
5
to consistently show minimal effects from campaigns on vote choice (Campbell, et. al. 1960; Key
1966; Bartels 1992; 1993; Finkel 1993; Markus 1992)1. However, there are some unique
features to these studies that warrant further examination, particularly when considering the
generalizability of their findings to the voting behavior of individuals in elections at multiple
levels of government. First, these studies were based on an individual’s vote choice for President
of the United States, a national event. Given the importance of the position, the candidates’
activities are typically covered by print and television journalists. With the expansion of national
news broadcasts from lasting minutes to a dedicated 24- hour a day cable channels the amount of
free campaign exposure provided to presidential candidates has not only increased, but even a
casual observer of American politics would agree that the amount is often more than for any other
elected position in the United States.
Secondly, the features of campaigns expand as the role of technology in citizens’ lives
changes. When Truman became the first presidential candidate to air a campaign advertisement
in October of 1948, less than 10% of the nation’s households possessed a television set. Today,
not only does nearly every household have at least one television set (98%), but in 2004 over 67%
of households with television were subscribed to cable television and the amount of television
viewing is increasing.2 The decline in social capital in general and political participation and
partisan attachments more specifically (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Miller 1992; Nie, Verba,
and Petrocik 1976; Putnam 2000; Wattenberg and Wattenberg 1994) signals a decrease in the
informal sources of information that voters were believed to rely upon.
Third, campaign television advertising has become an accepted and expected part of
campaigns. As technology has advanced, campaigns have altered the manner in which the
candidate communicates with the voters. Campaigns can afford to rely on mass communications
1
But see Huber and Arceneaux (2007) and Franz and Ridout (2007) for research using survey
methods to show that campaign advertising does have a persuasive impact on vote choice.
2
Data Source: Nielsen Media Research. Statistical Abstract of the United States.
6
to replace the direct forms of communications previously employed. While candidates still make
public appearances and distribute printed materials, they are spending more of their budgets on
the more expensive forms of mass communications and less time on whistle-stop train tours of
the country. In addition to television commercials, candidates have moved towards
communicating with voters through electronic mail and their internet websites that contain
downloadable audio and video files and solicitations for campaign funds. As technology has
advanced more campaigns are able to adopt it. The methods of communication that were
primarily used for the largest campaigns are trickling down to races for smaller posts.
Advertising on television has become prominent enough to have been used in primary campaigns
for county level lower courts.
Fourth, the effects of campaigns have been found when the voters’ preferences are also
examined during the election, as opposed to the end of the election with their final vote.
Holbrook (1996) sought to examine campaigns as a process that creates the vote choice as its
product. To understand the effect of a process on the product he suggests that studying only the
product does not produce an accurate understanding of the process employed. Holbrook used
time series data on candidate support of presidential candidates to find that the major events of
the campaign, such as the conventions and debates, produced significant changes in candidate
support and ultimately influenced the outcome of the election. Hillygus and Jackman (2003)
employed Holbrook’s process conceptualization at the individual level during the 2000
Presidential election. The authors found that the effect of a campaign event on the individual’s
preference was influenced by their partisan disposition, prior preferences, and political context.
Stated in another way, different voters have different responses to campaigns. Those who were
most susceptible to campaign effects were those voters who were undecided or had absent to
weak partisan attachments.
Finally, even where the effects of campaigns are smallest, they still may be the deciding
factor in a competitive race. The 2000 Presidential election was decided in Florida by 537 out of
7
nearly 6 million votes cast for a margin of victory of 0.009%. Elections for local offices have
ended in ties with the winner determined by a game of chance such as tossing a coin, drawing
straws or picking a card.3 Given the significance that is attributed to democratic election results,
and the large amounts of money and resources expended by political campaigns, the impact of
this process should be examined further.
Information not only has an impact on an individual’s decision of whom to vote for but
also the decision of whether or not to vote at all. When looking at presidential elections, Hillygus
(2005) finds that campaign efforts considerably increase the likelihood of voting for both those
who originally intend to vote and those who od not intend to vote prior to the beginning of a
campaign. Others (Gerber and Green 2000; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)4 have also found that contact from political elites,
total number of campaign expenditures, and advertising increase turnout. Particularly relevant to
this paper, Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein (2004) show that “exposure to campaign advertising
can produce citizens who are more interested in a given election, have more to say about the
candidates, are more familiar with who is running, and are ultimately more likely to vote (723).”
Their results also suggest that these effects are greatest on individuals who begin with less
political information.
When eligible citizens do not participate it is generally thought to have a negative effect
on democratic government (Lijphart 1997). Democracy may be skewed by those who do
participate and thus will not be reflective of the collective desires of the populace (Althaus 2003).
This problem of low turnout in the United States is amplified when compared to other
industrialized democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993). While some focus on participation in
the United States (Wattenberg 2002), others examine the problem in an international setting
3
See http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2004/Nov-04-Thu-2004/news/25170219.html or
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/11/fife.township/
4
Also see Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko (1985), Cox and Munger (1989), and Jacobson
(1983) for a look at Congressional elections.
8
(Franklin 2004; Norris 2004). The benefits of a comparative analysis can be extended to an
examination of participation within the United States by analyzing elections for state offices. A
comparative analysis allows for the control of institutional and contextual influences on levels of
voter participation. For example, the diversity of judicial selection methods in use at the state
level provides an interesting opportunity to examine the impact of campaign advertising on
turnout.
Judicial Selection in the States
The selection and retention of justices on state courts has historically been a controversial
topic. The discord is due to two competing ideals. On the one hand, the American democratic
tradition asserts that the electorate should select those who are to govern. Subsequently,
officeholders are to be held accountable to the public for their performance. On the other hand,
one of the pillars of justice is that those who are passing judgment should be impartial and
uninterested in the outcome. It is believed that to create an impartial judiciary, it should be
independent from the political arena. Yet, in order for the government to be democratic, the
people need to be allowed to elect justices to the judiciary thus making the judiciary a political
institution. However, if justices must compete for their office, then the negative aspects of
campaigns and elections may subject the justices to questions about their impartiality. For
example, judicial candidates can be criticized for accepting campaign contributions from business
interests, special interest groups, and trial lawyers that may appear in cases before them.
The desire for increased accountability in government was first extended to the judiciary
in 1832 when Mississippi switched to popular elections for all of its judges. Haynes (1981) posits
that a combination of factors contributed to the movement towards a democratically elected
judiciary. First, a common reaction to the assertion of judicial review was to cast doubt on the
necessity of judicial independence and impeachment proceedings were brought against a number
of judges who declared legislation invalid. Additionally, increased immigration and the
expansion of suffrage rights was thought to have resulted in a citizenry that sought a greater
9
influence upon the control of government. Finally, the need to develop an American alternative
to the English common law resulted in the judiciary appearing more legislative in function and as
a result should be subject to popular control. This perspective of previous law as foreign is also
believed to have been extended to the distrust of the legal community in general.
As more states turned to popular elections, another method of judicial selection was
proposed to balance the ability to hold justices accountable with elections while increasing the
perceived legitimacy of the original selection of the justice. Merit selection, today also known as
the Missouri Plan, utilizes a non-partisan selection committee to submit a list of qualified
candidates for approval by the political branches. A justice who wishes to remain in office after
their initial term has expired must gain the approval of the electorate by participating in a
plebiscite.
Merit selection has gained the endorsement of a number of legal interest groups. The
American Bar Association’s Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary espoused the position that
the popular selection of judges to state courts politicizes the judiciary and reduces its legitimacy
with the public (ABA 2003). Among the evidence the report references is a 2001 survey
commissioned by the Justice at Stake Campaign. When asked “[h]ow much influence do you
think campaign contributions made to judges have on their decisions,” only 5 percent of the
respondents stated that they thought there was “no influence at all.” Furthermore, 67 percent of
respondents agreed with the statement: “[i]ndividuals or groups who give money to judicial
candidates often get favorable treatment.” These figures led the commission to declare “[t]he
time has come to inoculate America’s courts against the toxic effects of money, partisanship, and
narrow interests” (ABA 2003 at 1). By removing judges from popular selection, the ABA
believes the public’s confidence and trust will be restored in the judiciary. The absence of
elections will remove the need for candidates to raise campaign funds, respond to the
questionnaires of interest groups, and participate in public debates and should result in higher
levels of public support for the judiciary.
10
To date there has been no study of how the campaign process affects the public’s view of
the judiciary.6 A study of individual support for state supreme courts did find a substantively
small but statistically significant difference (0.01 – 0.04 change in predicted probability) in the
level of confidence expressed by those survey respondents who lived in states with partisan
elections compared to all other selection methods (Benesh 2006). While merit selection preferred
by the legal community, research has found that the pressures of partisan politics are not removed
from the retention process (Hall 2001).
Another criticism of popular judicial elections is that the public does not care to
participate in this process because they are insufficiently informed about the justice system and
candidates running for office (ABA 2003; Dubois 1980). Lower levels of participation, measured
by ballot roll off, call into question the ability of the public to hold justices accountable. The
logical result of this assertion is that if the public is unable to hold justices accountable, then the
negative influences of campaigns and elections should be removed to restore some of the lost
legitimacy of the justice system. However, Dubois’ (1980) study of judicial elections found that
differences in turnout levels between judicial races and other offices were generally due to the
conditions in which judicial elections are held.
The process of finding a method of judicial selection that satisfactorily creates an
accountable and legitimate judiciary is ongoing. In 2002, North Carolina removed partisan labels
from judicial ballots, began publishing a voter’s guide containing a picture, biographical
information, and a personal statement about each candidate for its appellate courts, altered its
campaign finance laws, and offered public financing to appellate court candidates. South
Carolina moved to a merit plan in 1996, while Alabama and Arkansas also switched to
nonpartisan elections in 2000 and 2001 respectively. Moreover, many states have recently
rejected or are currently considering reform proposals.
However, it may be forthcoming. Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira. nd. “Campaign
Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be
Rescued by Recusals?” The Journal of Politics.
6
11
While in this paper we do not measure the effect that the use of television campaign
advertisements are having on the public’s attitude towards the judiciary, we will examine the
influence that informative campaigns have on the participation of voters in judicial elections.
Given previous research on the importance of information to voters, we should see an increase in
the proportion of voters who cast their vote in judicial elections in judicial campaigns that
actively attempt to inform the electorate with the use of television advertisements. This inquiry
may yield material empirical evidence for a positive effect of judicial campaigns and inform the
continuing debate of judicial selection in the American states.
DATA & ANALYSIS
The amount of information communicated between candidates and voters is often
measured by the amount of money spent by a campaign. However, there are potential problems
with this measure that may result in biased estimates of its influence. Most important to this
paper is the expectation that all candidates spend equal proportions of their total funds on
activities that communicate with the electorate (Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994). This is
primarily due to the need for challengers to allocate more of their funds towards raising their
profile with voters and overcoming the other incumbency advantages. We believe that an
alternative and more appropriate measure of the amount of information provided to voters is the
number of television advertisements broadcast.
The Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), a subsidiary of TNS Media
Intelligence/CMR, continuously records the broadcast of each political advertisement on over 600
cable and network stations. This composes the 100 largest media markets in the United States
and covers over 86% of the national population.7 Each unique advertisement is recorded and a
transcription of the audio track is combined with video screen captures at a regular interval to
create a storyboard for each advertisement using technology that monitors satellite transmissions
7
There were 75 media markets monitored in 2000 covering 80% of the national population.
12
of television broadcasting. Subsequent airings of a previously captured advertisement are
recorded to determine the number of times each unique advertisement has been aired. CMAG
captures ads aired by candidates and independent groups.
The information captured by CMAG has been previously used in the study of
gubernatorial elections (Cooper and Knotts 2004; Freedman and Goldstein 1999), U.S. Senate
elections (Goldstein and Freedman 2000; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006), elections for the U.S.
House of Representatives (Goldstein and Freedman 2002a), Presidential elections (Goldstein and
Freedman 2002a; Goldstein and Freedman 2002b) and the evaluation of campaign finance reform
legislation (Krasno and Goldstein 2002). The estimates provided by CMAG have been matched
with campaign documents from the 1996 Presidential campaigns (Goldstein and Freedman 2002b
at 728) and invoices of television stations (Ridout et al. 2002) and they were found to be highly
accurate. The National Institute on Money in State Politics and the Brennan Center for Justice
employ these data in their series of “The New Politics of Judicial Elections” reports (Goldberg,
Holman, and Sanchez 2002; Goldberg et al. 2005; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004). CMAG began
observing judicial elections in 2000 and they are the best estimates available to measure the
amount of television advertising in state supreme court elections. Furthermore, campaign
advertisements should be the primary source of information about state supreme court candidates
due to low levels of media coverage (Hale 1999).
Empirical Model and Results
Information on state supreme court elections held during the years 2000, 2002, and 2004
was collected. Two states, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, hold state supreme court elections in
odd-years along with municipal elections. This results in an inability to measure voter
participation and as a result these states are not included in this analysis. Elections in Louisiana
have also been excluded due to that state’s election calendar and the inability to measure voter
13
participation in open elections. Two states with judicial elections, Montana and North Dakota,
are not monitored by CMAG and are not included in the study.8
Number of Advertisements Aired
The amount of information transmitted by a judicial campaign and outside interests was
measured as the number of campaign advertisements aired during an election. To control for
population differences among the states and districts, we have divided the number of
advertisements by the population of the state. This creates a measurement of the number of
advertisements aired per 1,000 people residing in the state or district. We would expect that if
information is important to the electorate in deciding whether to vote in a state supreme court as
the number of advertisements aired increases, the proportion of voters who participate in the
election will also increase.
Competition
The competitiveness of elections is a factor in electoral participation (e.g. Caldeira and
Patterson 1982). Dubois (1980) found that ballot roll off rates were lower in races that were more
competitive. Therefore, the margin of victory, measured as the difference in the proportion of
votes cast for the first and second place candidates, was included in the multivariate analysis.
There were two states, Michigan and West Virginia, that held a single election for multiple seats
on the supreme court and the margin of victory was calculated in a manner consistent with the
literature on multi-member districts (Jewell 1982). When there is no alternative candidate or
choice on the ballot, the margin of victory was measured as 1.00. Excluding these observations
would censor the range of values for this measurement and lose the information contained in
8
This results in a loss of 13 races from these 5 states in which at least one candidate appeared on
the ballot.
14
approximately15% of the observations.9 We expect that as the margin of victory increases, the
amount of voter participation will decrease.
Partisan Labels
The inclusion of partisan labels on a ballot provides the voter with additional information
about the differences among the candidates. Previous research has demonstrated that when voters
are supplied with partisan information about nonpartisan candidates they are more likely to
participate in a judicial election and form an opinion of a candidate (Baum 1987; Dubois 1980;
Klein and Baum 2001; Squire and Smith 1988). This additional information should have a
positive effect on the amount of participation in an election.
District Constituency
One decision of consequence that is made during the creation of a government is the size
of a representative’s constituency. Smaller constituencies are thought to have a positive influence
on the quality of representation that is provided because it is easier for the representative to learn
the needs of the district. Furthermore, voters may feel a greater personal connection to the
representative if they share a local bond. Although, the representative function is not often
associated with the judiciary, a number of states have allocated seats on their supreme court based
on this desire. If district elections have their intended influence, then we expect that participation
will be higher for these justices than those running in statewide elections.
Number of Seats
Unlike other offices, voters sometimes have the opportunity to cast votes for multiple
seats on a state supreme court. This should have a positive effect on voter participation as it
allows for the electorate to have a greater impact on the composition of high courts. The total
number of state supreme court positions on the ballot for each state or district was included to
control for any potential effects.
9
An attempt to include a dichotomous variable indicating no opposition was made. However, the
bivariate correlation between this measure and the margin of victory was 0.86 and ultimately it
was removed due to multi-colinearity concerns.
15
Incumbency
Candidates who are incumbents have a number of advantages over their electoral
challengers. The largest of which is increased name recognition. Previous research on judicial
vote choice has found that incumbents with previous electoral victories and those who were
appointed to their position have been treated differently by the electorate (Hall 2001). To control
for an incumbency effect on levels of voter participation, we have included one dichotomous
variable indicating whether one of the candidates has been previously elected to their seat and
another dichotomous variable for those observations where one of the candidates was previously
appointed to their seat. Elections for an open seat are the baseline category in which these
variables will be compared to. We would expect that having an incumbent as a candidate would
provide voters with additional information and should increase the proportion of voters who
complete their ballot.
Term Length
Another difference in the institutional design of state supreme courts is the length of term
that a justice serves on the bench. Shorter terms are used for some offices to reduce the amount
of damage that an unfit officeholder can inflict on the administration of government. Terms of
service for elected state supreme court justices range from 6 to 12 years. We expect that more
voters will participate in the election as the length of the term to be served increases. Elections
for the completion of a partial term were identified and noted in the dataset.
Chief Justice
The position of Chief Justice on a court typically carries additional responsibilities and
abilities and as such should attract greater attention from the electorate. This contrast is perhaps
best reflected in the state of Nebraska, where the Chief Justice is elected by a statewide vote and
associate justices are elected from within judicial districts. Given the differences in regard of the
position, voters may be more likely to cast a vote for this position than an associate justice whose
duties may be considered less important.
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Ballot Fatigue
Democracy in the United States is unique compared to other industrialized democracies
with respect to the large number of elections that voters are asked to participate in (Lijphart
1985). Some reformers have argued that in the United States voters are burdened with too much
democracy. Advocates of a short ballot contended that voters are confronted with ballots that are
too lengthy for voters to realistically complete with an informed decision (e.g. Childs 1909). A
lengthy ballot combined with a time consuming process may result in voters abandoning their
ballots before they have been completed. Previous research on the relationship between the
amount of ballot roll off and ballot length has found that ballot fatigue contributes to roll off
(Bullock and Dunn 1996). A dichotomous variable indicating whether the candidates for the state
supreme court are listed towards the end of the ballot after the county and local level races was
included in my statistical analysis. This information was collected by contacting election
authorities in the states. We expect that a higher position on the ballot will have a positive effect
on voter participation, decreasing the proportion of voters who do not select a candidate for state
supreme court.
Direct Democracy
The initiative and referendum processes were implemented in a number of states to
stimulate participation in the democratic process by expanding the scope of the electorate’s
influence on the laws of their state. A time – series cross sectional analysis of voter turnout in
state elections concluded that voter turnout was higher in states with initiatives than those without
(Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith 2001). Using data obtained from the Initiative and Referendum
Institute at the University of Southern California, We have included the number of direct
democracy items on the ballot in the multivariate model. We expect states with initiatives and
referenda on their ballots to have lower levels of voter participation off due to increased levels of
turnout.
Presidential Election Year
17
The office of the President of the United States is the only position in which all American
voters cast a ballot for. More attention, money, and resources are spent on this position than any
other due to its preeminent role in American government and international relations. As a result
of the office’s high salience, overall voter turnout in the United States is at its highest in
Presidential election years.
We have included a dichotomous measure of the whether the
election took place in either 2000 or 2004 to control for those voters that may only turnout for
this race and subsequently fail to complete their ballot after casting their vote for the President.
For this reason we expect participation to be lower in Presidential years compared to other years.
Murder Rate
Previous studies of state supreme court elections have found that incumbents in judicial
elections receive greater scrutiny as the state’s murder rate increases (Hall 2001). Furthermore,
criminal justice issues have been heavily highlighted in judicial campaigns (Culver and Wold
1993) and television advertisements (Goldberg et al. 2005; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004). The
identification of state supreme court candidates with criminal justice issues should result in
increased participation if voters act in a retrospective manner and criminal justice concerns are
salient in the election. We include the previous year’s per capita murder rate and we expect that
voting participation will be higher in states where the murder rate is higher.
Dependent Variable: Measuring Voter Participation in State Supreme Court Elections
Typically voter participation in elections for lower offices is measured as ballot roll off,
which is calculated as the percentage of voters who voted for a candidate in the office of interest
relative to the maximum number of voters who voted for a significant partisan office such as
President, Governor, U.S. Senator, or U.S. Representative (e. g. Dubois 1980; Hogan 1999). This
method produces a measure that is virtually continuous, with an upper bound at 100% and a
lower bound of – 100%.10 We have employed an alternative method of measuring voter
10
None of the observations in my sample had a negative amount of roll off (where more voters
cast a vote for the state supreme court than a higher office such as governor).
18
participation for statistical reasons. Instead of measuring the percentage of ballot roll off, we
have recorded both the number of votes cast in the judicial election and the maximum number of
votes cast among the significant races on the ballot.
The use of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model would be a parsimonious
statistical method to employ with a dependent variable that is a percentage or proportion. The
resulting linear coefficients are easily interpreted and possess desirable statistical properties.
However, the estimates are only valid if a number of required assumptions are met (Kennedy
1998). The primary assumption is that the dependent variable is a linear function of a set of
independent variables and a disturbance term. This presumption is violated when the distribution
of the dependent variable has a restricted range of values. Incorporating the information
concerning the true range of the dependent variable will result in more precise estimates (King
1998).
A grouped logit model that generates the parameter estimates utilizing weighted least
squares (WLS) was estimated due to the incongruence of the form of the dependent variable and
the assumptions required to evaluate the data in a linear model.11 This method for analyzing
proportions is also known as minimum chi square estimation (Greene 2003 p. 686 - 689). This
process utilizes a logit function by taking the log of the proportion to restrict any predicted values
to the 0.00 -1.00 range in order to avoid nonsensical predicted values. The use of this function
also removes the restriction that the data generating process must be linear in the parameters and
as a result the marginal effect of the independent variable can change in size.
The use of WLS is also needed to correct the heteroskedastic residuals. The residuals
from an OLS performed on the logistically distributed dependent variable can not be normally
distributed due to their restricted range of values. The heteroskedasticity is further aggravated by
11
The model was estimated utilizing the glogit command in STATA/SE version 8.2.
19
the unequal sizes of the electorates.12 WLS has been found to be more efficient than OLS with
robust standard errors when the value of the residuals are mainly due to sampling error rather than
randomness (Lewis and Linzer 2005). Previous research generally confirms the presence of a
non random sample in cases of voting participation (e.g. Wattenberg 2002).
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --The overall model performs well, as 59% of the variation in voter participation in state
supreme court elections is explained. The grouped logit WLS approach allows one to predict the
number of successes (judicial voters) even though the observations are of different sized
electorates (see Figure 1 for a display contrasting the actual and predicted values). The model
estimates in Table 2 indicate that four of the explanatory variables, the number of advertisements
aired, partisan labels, district constituency, and the margin of victory, attained levels of statistical
significance. It appears that information, competition, and institutional design are key to electoral
participation in state supreme court elections.
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --It should be noted that the estimation of more efficient and unbiased parameter estimates
resulted in a loss of interpretability of the magnitude of the effects of the independent variables
upon the dependent variable. Each grouped logit WLS coefficient represents the marginal effect
of the independent variable on the log-odds of the proportion of voting in each election. These
estimates can be used to create exponential linear predictions of the percentage of participation in
judicial elections. As with similarly distributed Maximum Likelihood Estimates, the rate of
change of the dependent variable (proportion of voters participating in a judicial election) is
different for each value of an independent variable.
--- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
12
The glogit command incorporates the different sizes of the electoral units by requiring the
number of positive outcomes (votes cast in the judicial election) and the total number of
outcomes (number of votes cast in the top race).
20
Figure 2 demonstrates the positive relationship between campaign advertising and voter
participation in judicial elections. A directional one-tailed test of statistical significance yields a
probability value of 0.039. A one-tailed test is appropriate for this analysis because the
hypothesized effect of advertising on participation is in a positive direction.13 Television
advertising, ranging from its minimum to maximum and holding all the other variables constant,
produced a 0.34 increase in the expected proportion of voters who cast a vote for a state supreme
court election, as this model is specified. These results indicate that increased judicial campaigns
may provide a benefit to democratic participation. Whether or not the public’s trust in the
judiciary is affected by these campaigns is not yet known, however any gains in participation may
have to be measured against the harm to the rule of law.
--- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE --Non-competitive contests decrease the proportion of voters who complete the ballot.
Figure 3 demonstrates the decline in expected voter participation, ceteris paribus. However, it
should be noted that although highly statistically significant (p < 0.000), the substantive effect of
competition is small as a change in its minimum (perfect competition) to maximum values
(uncontested) results in a 0.06 net change of the proportion of voters to participate in a state
supreme court election.
Consistent with previous research, the inclusion of the candidates’ political party
affiliation has a statistically significant (p < 0.011) and positive effect on participation levels in
judicial elections. In this sample and holding other factors constant, partisan labels increases the
estimated proportion of voters who complete their state supreme court ballot by 0.02. The
information contained in partisan labels appears to allow the electorate to cast a ballot regardless
of the amount of information transmitted by the judicial campaigns.
13
Statistically, a one-tailed test has more power than a two-tailed test. The probability of a Type
I error, incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, is the same for either a one-tailed or two-tailed
test since alpha (0.05) is the same. The benefit arises in decreasing the chance of making a Type
II error, incorrectly rejecting the alternative hypothesis, assuming the expected direction of the
coefficient is correct (Agresti and Finlay 1997).
21
Smaller judicial districts have a statistically significant (p < 0.019) and positive effect on
the amount of voter participation in judicial elections compared to statewide elections. The
expected proportion of voter participation increases by 0.07 in district elections, controlling for
all other factors. It appears that when voters have their own representative to a state supreme
court, there are higher levels of participation.
The absence of statistical significance for the other variables does not indicate that they
have no effect on the proportion of voters who participate in judicial elections. In fact they may
have an effect, but it was not found in this sample as modeled. The factors that were thought to
increase the overall voter turnout, such as Presidential elections, the murder rate, and the number
of ballot proposals did not attain the conventional levels of statistical significance. Neither did
seat specific factors such as the designation of the Chief Justice, term length, the number of seats
available, and the position of the judicial office on the ballot. Finally, the electorate as a whole
did not appear to distinguish between incumbents and those running for an open seat.
Conclusions, Caveats, and the Direction of Future Study
If the health of democracy can be measured by the number of citizens that choose to
participate, then the words of Madison ring true in regards to judicial elections. An electorate that
has been in communication with a candidate or other group is more likely to participate.
The finding that television advertising plays a key role in the participation of the
electorate raises a number of questions. What information and issues are judicial candidates and
interest groups discussing? How does negative advertising effect participation levels? How
negative are judicial campaigns compared to other races? Does television advertising have an
effect on a candidate’s vote share? In general judicial elections offer an additional institution to
facilitate research on the reactions of the electorate to executive, legislative, and judicial
candidates.
This is a small sample given that judicial elections have been taking place since the
1800’s. However this is necessary for a number of reasons. First the CMAG technology did not
22
record judicial advertisements before the 2000 election. Also, the use of television advertising
was limited due to the canonical restrictions on candidate communication that were in place
before Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.
The closeness of the 2000 Presidential election has renewed interest in the effects that
ballot design and voting technology have on how citizen’s vote. Previous research on the
differences of ballot design indicated that there was an impact on roll off (Kimball and Kropf
2005; Walker 1966). Electronic voting systems, depending on their design (Nichols 1998;
Nichols and Strizek 1995), are being touted as another alteration that would reduce the amount of
roll off. For partisan elections, the ability of voters to cast their ballots for all of the candidates in
a single party (i.e. straight-ballot option) still exists in a small number of states. The design of the
ballot and the mechanism employed are not included in this analysis.
Studies of individuals have noted that a number of socio-economic attributes have an
impact on types of voter participation. These attributes were not added in this model to avoid the
ecological inference problem that occurs when aggregate data is used to make assumptions about
individual level behavior (e. g. King 1997). As statistical methods are further developed and
more detailed data about where advertisements were aired becomes available, it may become
possible to estimate the individual level effects of campaign advertising.
Thus far, using a dataset of state supreme court elections from 2000 – 2004, we have
demonstrated that the overall participation of the electorate is influenced by the amount of
information that is received about the candidates. Using a number of control variables
concerning the context in which the elections were held, a grouped logit model incorporating
weighted least squares estimated that increasing the number of advertisements aired would
increase the proportion of voters who cast a vote in state supreme court elections.
23
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Proportion of Participation
Ads Aired (per 1000 population)
Margin of Victory
Partisan Election
District Constituency
Number of Seats
Elected Incumbent
Appointed Incumbent
Length of Term
Chief Justice Position
High Ballot Position
Number of Popular Measures
Presidential Year
Murder Rate
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
0.806
0.259
0.337
0.430
0.140
3.440
0.450
0.240
6.660
0.040
0.540
3.450
0.650
5.938
0.128
0.719
0.327
0.498
0.349
2.002
0.500
0.429
1.754
0.197
0.501
4.628
0.479
2.041
0.445
0
0.002
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2.4
0.985
5.876
1
1
1
8
1
1
12
1
1
26
1
9.9
24
Table 2: Grouped Logit Estimates of Voter Participation in SSC Elections
Expected
Direction
Coefficient
(SE)
two-tailed
p-value
one-tailed
p-value
Ads Aired (per 1000 pop.)
+
0.077
0.039
Margin of Victory
-
0.000
0.000
Partisan Election
+
0.022
0.011
District Constituency
+
0.037
0.019
Number of Seats
+
0.173
0.087
Elected Incumbent
+
0.635
0.318
Appointed Incumbent
+
0.525
0.263
Length of Term
+
0.829
0.586
Chief Justice Position
+
0.471
0.236
High Ballot Position
+
0.998
0.501
Number of Popular Measures
-
0.692
0.997
Presidential Year
-
0.219
0.891
Murder Rate
+
0.361
(0.201)
-1.411
(0.154)
0.524
(0.226)
0.852
(0.402)
0.077
(0.056)
0.060
(0.126)
0.105
(0.164)
-0.010
(0.046)
0.192
(0.265)
-0.001
(0.181)
0.006
(0.016)
0.124
(0.100)
-0.038
(0.037)
1.315
(0.479)
0.309
1.019
Constant
Number of Observations
Adjusted R-Square
Root MSE
F(13, 86)
100
0.593
0.458
12.09
25
0.007
0.000
Table 3: Changes in Expected Levels of Voter Participation
Independent Variable
Change from
Net Change
0 to 6
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
+ 36.1 %
+ 2.0 %
+ 2.9 %
+ 4.2 %
+ 6.0 %
+ 8.6 %
+ 12.3 %
Margin of Victory
0.0 to 1.0
0.0 to 0.1
0.1 to 0.2
0.2 to 0.3
0.3 to 0.4
0.4 to 0.5
0.5 to 0.6
0.6 to 0.7
0.7 to 0.8
0.8 to 0.9
0.9 to 1.0
- 6.3 %
-1.1 %
- 0.9 %
- 0.8 %
- 0.7 %
- 0.6 %
- 0.5 %
- 0.4 %
- 0.4 %
- 0.4 %
- 0.3 %
Partisan Election
0 to 1
+ 2.1 %
District Constituency
0 to 1
+ 6.9 %
Number of Advertisements
Aired per 1000 Population
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, the values of the independent variables were set to the
following levels: Ads Aired = Mean; Margin of Victory = Mean; Partisan Election = 1; District
Constituency = 0; Number of Seats = Mean; Sected Incumbent = 1; Appointed Incumbent = 0;
Length of Term = Mean; Chief Justice Position = 0; High Ballot Position = 1; Number of Popular
Measures = Mean; Presidential Year= 1; Murder Rate = Mean.
26
Figure 1. A Comparison of the Actual and Predicted Number of Voters
A Comparison of the Actual and Predicted Number of Voters in SSC Elections
Actual Number of Voters
27
Figure 2. The Effect of Advertising on Voter Participation
0
10
20
30
40
Figure 3: Effect of Advertising on Voter Participation in SSC Elections
0
2
4
Number of Television Advertisements Aired per 1000 Population
28
6
Figure 3. The Effect of Margin of Victory on Voter Participation
2
4
6
8
Figure 4: Effect of Margin of Victory on Voter Participation in SSC Elections
0
20
40
60
Margin of Victory (%)
29
80
100
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