Issue Date: August 03, 1984
Iran-Iraq War:
Lull in Shipping War Reported



Kuwait Buys Soviet Missiles
Saudis Widen Air Defense Limits
U.S. Seeks No Victor in Gulf
The war on commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf subsided for more than three weeks in late
July and early August. After a flare-up in June, there had been no confirmed serious incidents
after July 10. [See 1984 Iran-Iraq War: Iraqi Ship Attacks Resume after Lull]
The lull was reflected in shipping insurance rates, as Lloyd's of London, the international
insurance brokers, July 25 and Aug. 1 announced reductions in war-risk insurance for oil cargoes
loaded at Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal.
(As recently as June 11, it had been reported that Lloyd's was considering terminating war-risk
coverage for Kharg Island shipping because of the increasing pace of the attacks. In a related
move, the six members of the Saudi Arabian-led Gulf Cooperation Council announced June 11
that they had agreed to compensate buyers of their oil for any losses due to Iranian reprisals
against shipping.)
Iranian oil exports rebounded to an estimated 1.9 million barrels a day in July from around
900,000 barrels a day the month before, according to oil industry sources cited in a July 26
Reuters dispatch. Shipping traffic in the gulf was described as virtually normal. [See 1984 U.S.
Sells Stinger Antiaircraft Missiles to Saudi Arabia, Citing Grave Concern Over Persian Gulf
Escalation; President Invokes Emergency Powers]
Iran June 29 was reported to have adopted a novel tactic to counter Iraq's use of radar-guided
Exocet missiles in the shipping war. According to a Washington Post story citing U.S.
intelligence officials, the Iranians had built and launched a number of small barges equipped
with reflecting surfaces designed to present a brighter radar image than that of an oil tanker. The
officials speculated that the use of such radar decoys might help explain why Iraq repeatedly
claimed more "hits" than Western shipping officials could account for.
In recent developments:

Iraq July 1 announced that its warplanes had destroyed "five naval targets" in the Khor
Musa channel at the extreme northern end of the Persian Gulf. Iraq said its jets had also
shot down an Iranian F-14 that was defending the convoy, and that two other ships had
been hit by mines. Shipping sources identified two of the ships as a South Korean cargo
vessel and a small Greek bulk container. The Korean vessel was said to have been


destroyed, and the Greek ship damaged "with loss of life." The other Iraqi claims were
not confirmed.
An Iranian jet firing missiles July 5 attacked and damaged a Japanese-chartered
supertanker carrying Saudi Arabian oil in the Persian Gulf. The attack was believed to be
in reprisal for a June 24 Iraqi raid against Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal. Iran July 5
confirmed that the Kharg facilities had been damaged in the raid. [See 1984 Iran-Iraq
War: Iraqi Ship Attacks Resume after Lull]
A warplane, believed to be Iranian, July 10 attacked a British oil tanker on a salvage
mission in international waters in the Persian Gulf. The ship, the British Renown, was
only slightly damaged. The incident occurred northeast of Bahrain.
Subsequent Iraqi claims of successful ship attacks July 13 and 19 were not confirmed.
Kuwait Buys Soviet Missiles
After a rebuff by the U.S., Kuwait July 11 announced that it had reached agreement on a $327
million arms deal with the Soviet Union. The announcement was made in Moscow by the
Kuwaiti defense minister, Sheik Salim Al-Sabah.
Officials in Kuwait said the deal included surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, tanks
and other military hardware.
The Kuwaitis added, however, that the purchase did not include the shoulder-fired SAM-7
antiaircraft missile, the Soviet equivalent of the U.S. Stinger missile. Although the U.S. had
announced a controversial sale of 400 Stingers to Saudi Arabia, it had refused repeated Kuwaiti
requests for a similar deal. [See 1984 U.S. Sells Stinger Antiaircraft Missiles to Saudi Arabia,
Citing Grave Concern Over Persian Gulf Escalation; President Invokes Emergency Powers]
Kuwait in May had abandoned its long-held opposition to greater superpower influence in the
Persian Gulf region and had quietly asked the U.S. for permission to buy the missiles for defense
of its oil shipping. Although the Kuwaiti defense minister June 1 announced that the U.S. had
given "initial approval" to such a deal, the U.S. Defense Department insisted that the proposal
was still under review.
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Al-Sabah June 18 made an unusual public appeal to the U.S.
Congress to approve the sale. But U.S. State Department officials June 19 said the U.S. had
informed Kuwait that the U.S. could not offer the Stingers "at this time." Administration officials
cited political opposition from Congress over fears that the missiles could fall into the hands of
anti-Israeli guerrillas.
Pentagon officials June 19 said the U.S. was prepared to take other "immediate" steps to improve
Kuwaiti air defenses. They also confirmed that Kuwait had begun receiving information gathered
by U.S. electronic surveillance planes in the Persian Gulf.
The administration June 27 notified Congress that it intended to sell Kuwait $82 million worth of
military equipment, centered on improvements to Kuwait's U.S.-made Hawk antiaircraft missile
system. The deal did not include Stingers. By the time Congress was notified, the Kuwaiti
defense minister had already announced his plans to go to Moscow.
Kuwaiti Defense Minister Al-Sabah July 13 said the Soviet deal was a "straight commercial
deal," not a reprisal against the U.S.
A U.S. State Department spokesman the same day noted that Kuwait in the past had bought arms
from a number of countries, including both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. "We would be
concerned," he said, "were Kuwait's purchase of Soviet arms and equipment to be on such a scale
as to upset. . . the existing balance" among Kuwait's "sources of military supply."
Saudis Widen Air Defense Limits
Saudi Arabia had widened its air defense perimeter and had resolved to intercept threatening
aircraft beyond its territorial waters, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said June 21.
U.S. officials said the Saudis had announced the new policy to the U.S. and to their Persian Gulf
allies about two weeks earlier, after Saudi jets June 5 had downed an Iranian fighter-bomber over
the gulf. (The U.S. Defense Department June 12 said that it now believed the Saudis had downed
only one Iranian plane, not the two originally claimed.) [See 1984 2 Iranian Jets Downed by
Saudis Over Persian Gulf; U.S. Planes Assisted Action]
Weinberger said the June 5 incident had occurred within the Saudis' so-called "air defense
interception zone" after Iranian planes had made three attacks on Saudi shipping.
Saudi Arabia May 22 had announced a $3.9 billion air defense buildup involving ground-to-air
missiles, radar installations and improved command communications.
U.S. Seeks No Victor in Gulf
Richard W. Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, told
Congress June 11 that the Reagan administration believed "a victory by either side" in the IranIraq war was "neither militarily achievable nor strategically desirable."
A victory by either Iran or Iraq would have a "destabilizing effect" on the entire Persian Gulf
region, Murphy said. Murphy made his remarks in an appearance before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.