A research proposal.
Multilevel governance and public accountability in Europe:
Which institutions, which practices, which deficit?
Prof. dr. M.A.P. Bovens (M.Bovens@usg.uu.nl)
Prof. dr. P. ‘t Hart (P.tHart@usg.uu.nl)
Prof. dr. D. Curtin (D.Curtin@usg.uu.nl)
Dr. M. van de Steeg (M.Vandesteeg@usg.uu.nl)
Utrecht School of Governance
Utrecht University
Bijlhouwerstraat 6
3511 ZC Utrecht
The Netherlands
Draft, made for CONNEX, Research group 2: Democracy and accountability in the EU
2
1. Introduction
This paper contains a research proposal on multi-level governance and public accountability
in relation to EU decision-making. The proposal has been accepted, and will be funded by the
Dutch Scientific Council, NWO. Soon, a post-doc and two Phd-researchers will start
analyzing the extent to which European Council decisions, expert input and European
agencies are matched by public accountability arrangements. The paper on public
accountability presented at this CONNEX workshop by Mark Bovens provides the research
project with a conceptual framework. At this stage, any comment would be helpful in further
improving the research design. We are currently working on an operationalization of the
public accountability concept.
2. Backgrounds and aims
The so-called displacement or diffusion of national, state-based `politics’ is one of the crucial
contemporary `shifts in governance’ (Kohler-Koch, 2003). The diffusion and perhaps erosion
of state-based politics proceeds along different paths (see Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden,
2001), but in this programme we focus on the trend towards regionalisation of public
policymaking, in particular within the framework of the EU. In recent decades much of the
agenda of European studies in various social science disciplines (IR, Political Science, Public
Administration, Law) has been firmly focused on the trend toward European policymaking.
Researchers have sought to document, explain and evaluate emerging practices of multilevel
governance, both conceptually/theoretically (Marks et al, 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet,
1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Wiener and Dietz, 2004) and empirically (see Quermonne et
al, 1996; Soetendorp and Hanf, 1998; Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000a, b).
Among these scholars, there has long been concern that this development is not being
matched by an equally forceful creation of appropriate accountability regimes (Schmitter,
2000). Accountability deficits are said to be a key cause of the low public visibility and
legitimacy of the EU (Scharpf, 1999). The new `constitution’ addresses some of these
problems, but it is doubtful whether it will also tackle the large and growing non-legislative
component of European governance: i.e., technocratic and intergovernmental arenas such as
comitology, the European Council/Council of Ministers, as well as the many non-majoritarian
agencies. Gaping accountability deficits may continue to exist and even grow, compromising
3
the legitimacy of the European polity (Curtin, 2004; Bergman and Damgaard, 2000). In
contrast, others, such as Moravscik (2002, 2004), claim that compared to the way national
democracies operate in practice, the EU does not suffer from a fundamental democratic deficit
precisely because some of its critical institutions are relatively insulated from the vagaries of
direct political interference.
Which of these competing claims is right, and what does this imply for institutional (re)design
of existing and new accountability regimes? At present there is very little in the way of robust
empirical findings that deal with these issues. This gap needs to be filled, and in a way that
does justice to the full scope of the issue, and not just concentrates on the most visible and
most intensely debated part of it. For that reason, we discern in this programme different
distinct manifestations of `politics’ (defined as processes of deliberation and decision-making
regarding the binding allocation of values for a community, Easton, 1965): the three core
stages of the public policymaking process (design/preparation; choice; implementation), plus
the increasingly salient category of crisis management, i.e. responding to unscheduled events
and acute threats (cf. Howlett and Ramesh, 1995; Boin et al, 2005). These are not exhaustive
(agenda-setting, electoral politics, and social mobilisation are not included), but nevertheless
essential faces of politics in any governance process.
Policy choice and crisis management tend to be situated in frontstage, elite politics, in highly
visible and classic arenas such as cabinets, parliaments and news conferences populated by
elected representatives and politically appointed executives. Public policy design and
implementation are more likely to involve civil servants, public organizations, experts and
lobbyists operating in backstage bureaucratic arenas. In many national systems, specific
accountability regimes have evolved over decades/centuries to accommodate these various
modes of political choice and action. But how do these regimes adapt, now that at least part of
the political action in each of these fields has been moving to the European level?
A full understanding of the extent and consequences of this dispersion of politics and
governance requires insight into all of its manifestations. Scholarly attention has been
overwhelmingly devoted to the classic politics of multilevel policy choice and law making.
Much less effort has gone into studying the other manifestations of the europeification of
politics. The politics of `crisis management’ has only just begun to draw attention as a
substantive dimension of multilevel governance (cf Jorgensen, 1996; Kelstrup and Williams,
4
2000; Gronvall, 2001; Van Ham and Medvedev 2002; Olsson, Larsson and Ramberg, 2004).
Likewise, the `backstage’ politics of policy preparation (committee processes and
bureaucratic politics) in Europe remain underexplored relative to their importance in shaping
the process and content of European public policymaking (see Peters, 1992; Van Schendelen,
1998; Richardson, 2000; Rhinard, 2002; Kassim, 2003; Page, 2003). The same goes for
European-level implementation of EU policy (as opposed to `europeanisation’ of national
policies, e.g. national transposition and implementation of EU law at the national level, see
e.g. Featherstone and Radaelli (2003).
This same imbalance also exists in the field of accountability studies (cf. Harlow, 2002;
Curtin, 2004), and that is where this programme seeks to make a contribution. The general
aim of the programme is to investigate to what degree and how trends towards multilevel
policymaking and implementation in Europe have been matched by correspondent changes
and innovations in public accountability regimes and practices. In keeping with the
distinctions made above, it undertakes research on accountability practices in four domains of
politics. It entails systematic comparative empirical research on accountability regimes
surrounding: European heads of government in both regular policymaking and crisis
management (project 1); experts and/in committees engaged in policy preparation (project 2);
European agencies engaged in policy implementation (project 3).
3. Conceptual and theoretical foundations
Before we present these three projects in greater detail, we briefly discuss the analytical
agenda of the programme as a whole. Based on the applicants’ ongoing research into public
accountability (Bovens, 1998, 2005a, b; ‘t Hart, 2005), EU constitutional architecture and
accountability processes (Curtin, 2005), comparative political evaluation (Bovens, ‘t Hart and
Peters, 2001), and the multilevel governance and public accountability literatures, the projects
within the programme will be given a common conceptual foundations for empirical research.
a. Multi-level governance theory and research
The concept of ‘multilevel governance’ has arisen in opposition to conceptualisations of the
EU that assume hierarchical relations between clearly delineated ‘levels’ of government (EU
– national government – local government). By contrast, multilevel governance is
characterised by: (a) the existence of decision-making centres at multiple levels of
5
government; (b) that are not clearly hierarchically ordered (even though there may be formal
relations between them); ad (c) whose decision-making processes are mutually intertwined
(cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch 2003; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). As a result,
the EU harbours a complex system of intergovernmental relations on different ‘levels’ of
government that has profound consequences for policy-making and implementation, as well
as for accountability norms and practices.
b. Accountability theory and research
‘Public accountability’ is not just another political catch phrase; it also refers to legally and
otherwise institutionalised practices of account giving (Bovens, 1998, 2005b). Accountability
refers to a specific set of social relations that can be studied empirically. This raises
taxonomical issues: when does a social relation qualify as ‘public accountability’?
Accountability can be defined as `a social relationship in which an actor feels an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other’ (Day & Klein
1987:5; Romzek & Dubnick 1998:6; Lerner & Tetlock 1999:255; McCandless 2001:22; Pollit
2003:89). After having heard and questioned the actor on her or his conduct, the significant
other comes to a judgement that might have consequences for the actor (Mulgan 2003,
Bovens 2005c). This relatively simply defined relationship contains a number of variables.
The actor, or accountor, can be either an individual or an agency. The significant other, i.e.
the accountability forum or the accountee (Pollitt 2003), can be a specific person or agency,
but can also be a more virtual entity (‘the public’).
It is important to distinguish the concept of public accountability from other concepts
such as responsiveness and transparency that are often used in the same context (Mulgan
2003: 21; Harlow 2002: 185; Bovens 2005c). What distinguishes accountability from
responsiveness, participation, or the legislative function of Parliament is that rendering
accountability entails a justification of conduct. While participation takes place when a
decision is being prepared, accountability comes in when decisions have been made.
Transparency is also insufficient as an indicator of accountability (Schillemans & Bovens
2004: 28; Bovens 2005c). In order to be considered as an accountability arrangement, the
information obtained via practices of transparency should be taken one step further. For an
actor to be accountable, information is given to a forum, which then comes to a judgement
that may have consequences for the actor in case it is negative.
Focusing mainly on more formal, institutionalised accountability relationships, this
programme shall, where appropriate, include and compare the operation of not only political
6
(specifically democratic, see Gustavsson, 1999), but also hierarchical, legal, and professional
accountability types (Romzek, 2000). Hence in each project we shall specify the nature and
locus of various accountability modes that together constitute an accountability regime by
asking basic descriptive questions: who is rendering account, to which forum, by which
means, and with which purposes? We can then situate them in a broader grid/typology of
accountability regimes (see further Bovens, 2004).
Furthermore we open the black box of the accountability process. The relationship
between the actor and the forum, the account giving, usually consists of at least three elements
or stages. First of all, the actor must feel obliged to inform the forum about his conduct, by
providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about
procedures. Secondly, the information can prompt the forum to interrogate the actor and to
question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct (debating phase).
Thirdly, the forum usually passes judgement on the conduct of the actor. In case of a negative
judgement the forum may impose some sort of sanctions on the accountor. These may be
formal, such as fines, disciplinary measures, or dismissal, but they can also be implicit or
informal (such as negative publicity). The three projects will ascertain to what extent the
various accountability regimes entail each of these stages of an accountability process, and
will study the relevant processes to examine how they unfold, and what pattern of relations
between accountor and accountee exists.
Each project will answer the following three questions:
1. What are for the object of study the formal structures and actual practices of (public)
accountability? A map of accountability arrangements will be developed for the European
Council, European agencies and experts in committees.
2. How can the accountability arrangement be assessed from a democratic, constitutional and
learning perspective? These perspectives are developed further Mark Bovens’ paper for this
workshop. From a democratic perspective, the question is whether the accountability
arrangements offer enough incentives to the accountor to commit himself to the agendas of its
democratically elected accountees. From a constitutional perspective, an accountability
arrangement should create the checks and balances needed for a balance of power. From
learning perspective, the assessment is based on the degree to which an accountability
arrangement stimulates administrative bodies and officials to achieve a higher awareness of
the environment, increases self-reflection and induces the ability to change.
7
3. Does the accountability arrangement respond to the demands put by the practice of multilevel governance? Does multi-level governance create specific problems for the
accountability arrangement identified?
c. Reconstructing accountability practices in multilevel governance
Multilevel governance patterns lead to distinct accountability problems because the
participation of multiple actors at different levels of government leads to a dispersion of
influence and responsibility. Although the literature on democracy and accountability in the
EU still focuses on the European level per se (Harlow 2002; Lord 1998; Moravcsik 2002),
some are studying issues of accountability while taking into account the specific character of
systems of multi-level governance (Papadopoulos 2003; Slaughter 2004).
The fact that the EU is a system of multi-level governance makes the design of
accountability arrangements more difficult. One way of analysing the effect of multi-level
governance on accountability is to distinguish between a vertical and a horizontal relationship
between the accountor and the accountee. A vertical or top-down model of accountability
mirrors a chain of delegation of authority in a series of principal-agent linkages: from voters
to elected politicians to political executives to bureaucratic agencies, both at the national or
transnational level. The key accountability problem is how principals can make sure that the
agents act in line with the principal’s preferences, given that these agents may be motivated to
maximize their freedom from scrutiny and oversight and that they often possess ample means
– such as monopolies on information about performance – to do so (Strom, 2000). European
multi-level governance exacerbates this problem. The EU adds on many occasions another
level between the principal par excellence, namely the voter, and the numerous agents
ultimately active on their behalf in European politics. The distance between principal and
agent increases. Since agents act often collectively with colleagues from other Member States,
it becomes even more difficult to assign clear responsibilities to an agent. In multi-level
governance, agents are likely to have several principals, and each principal might be entitled
to monitor only a part of agents’ activities on the European level. From the principal-agent
perspective, multi-level governance may lead to fragmentation and distance, which could
complicate accountability mechanisms.
This programme asks how given national/supranational accountees (principals) control
the behaviour of national and supranational actors (agents) who operate in European
governance arenas on their behalf. How do these accountees cope with the growing
importance (formal competence and political prominence) and the institutional changes
8
(composition and decision rules) of various transnational arenas in which these actors
operate? And how do they accommodate the emergence of European-level institutions, often
deliberately designed to stay aloof from majoritarian politics?
Some of the problems caused by multi-level governance in a top-down model of
accountability may be overcome by arrangements based on a horizontal relationship between
accountor and accountee. For example, from the constitutional perspective accountability can
be considered as a bundle of rules and principles regarding checks and balances on public
power that may be institutionalised in various ways (Curtin, 2005). The chief design issue
here is to make sure that public power is always matched by public accountability, which can
but need not take the top-down, principal-agent form central to the first model. A horizontal
model is more open to non-hierarchical (such as professional, legal etc.) accountability forms,
and non-delegatory political accountability forms (such as those involving direct, clientelebased accountees). The model’s key analytical question for this programme is which
configurations of existing and new accountability forms and practices have been developed
(and are still emerging) to act as checks upon the evolving politics of multilevel governance in
(and beyond) the European Union system.
4. Relevance
As explained above, this programme is situated at the cutting edge of research in comparative,
multilevel and European governance in political science, public administration and legal
studies, the three disciplines represented by the programme’s three applicants. It addresses an
issue – democratic accountability of and in the European Union - that is not only hotly
debated among scholars but in public and political discourse as well.
5. Project 1: Controlling European leaders in policymaking and crisis management
In the first research project we examine how national government leaders are held
accountable by political accountability forums prior to and following peak `occasions for
decision’ (see, e.g., Paige, 1968) with regard to more or less regular, scheduled processes of
European institution-building and policymaking, as compared to ad-hoc, unscheduled crisis
management episodes. We also try to ascertain the significance (impact) attributed to these
accountability processes for these leaders’ policy stances and political positions.
9
To our knowledge, no prior research of this kind exists. Still its significance is clear. If we
accept that what European leaders collectively agree on and decide in European Council
meetings and other, less formal gatherings, is highly consequential for the development of
European public policy and for the institutional development of the European polity as a
whole, and if we take into consideration that these European leaders do not have to answer
directly to the European parliament or any significant European level public opinion for their
postures and actions on the European stage, then it becomes very important to ascertain to
what extent and effect national accountability regimes monitor, constrain and shape their
behaviour, and lend legitimacy to it.
Our questions are:
a. To what extent and how is heads of government’ performance on the European stage is
subject to democratic scrutiny, both prior to and after major summit meetings?
b. How has this scrutiny evolved over time?
c. What effects does (perceived) good or bad performance (as judged by the relevant
accountees) on the European stage have for leaders’ domestic political position and for the
legitimacy of the EU project at large?
Our central hypothesis is that as European Council summits and policies have become more
conspicuous and consequential over the last 20 years or so, national parliaments and mass
media have become more (pro-)active and critical in holding national leaders accountable, and
that the political impact of their judgments about pre-meeting policy positions and postmeeting degree of success has grown. Our modifying hypotheses are: a. that any pre-summit
effect is much more likely to occur for type 1 politics, whose more or less predictable issues
and rhythms allow mass media and parliaments to develop adequate information positions and
plan their interventions, than for type 2 (crisis) politics, where accountability forums are more
likely to be overwhelmed by the course of events and less likely to proactively question and
constrain leaders; b. that the reverse holds true for the post-summit extent and impact of
accountability regimes, since ad-hoc, stand-alone crisis management measures (or lack of
same) are likely to be more controversial than more or less regular `package deals’ concluded
by European leaders. These hypotheses, if borne out, serve to at least qualify the
accountability deficit argument, yet at the same time show that there may be good reasons for
reconsidering and strengthening particular components of national political accountability
regimes for European political leaders.
10
The study design entails two tracks:
A) Accountability processes in policy making/institution building:
- A comparative content analysis of media coverage and national parliamentary records prior
to and following the Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (2000), Nice (2001) and Dublin (2004)
Council meetings in five selected Member States. These meetings were chosen because they
entailed pivotal intergovernmental negotiations about constitutional changes to the EU
system, and represent variety of the perceived degree of `success’ of these meetings.
Furthermore they encompass a 12-year time span, allowing for some diachronic comparison.
The Member States selected for study are: Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Denmark and the
UK. They have been selected to obtain an adequate variation on three presumably important
intervening variables, i.e. state size (and thus role expectations for the head of government of
these states when it comes to achieving political objectives on the European stage); political
system type (and corresponding `accountability culture’); and relative strength of the head of
government’s formal position (see e.g. Lijphart, 1999; Muller and Strom, 2000). We expect
the five selected Member States to score differently on the extent to which accountability
forums actively control European decision-makers. For instance, Denmark with its tradition of
sovereignty of Parliament and an extensive system of mandating is expected to have the most
elaborate accountability arrangement. Instead, in view of the system of parliamentary
oversight until recently in place in Ireland, this Member State is expected to be located on the
other end of the continuum. Another consideration that guided the case selection is that two of
these five countries held the presidency during three of the four Council meetings selected for
study, allowing for a check upon the degree to which the presidency yields more intense and
substantively different national accountability processes.
- Analysis of Eurobarometer and national polling data to check for post-hoc political impact
of these accountability episodes.
- Semi-structured interviews with relevant (former) heads of government and/or their closest
advisers, MP’s, officials, and experts in all countries to check for pre- and post-hoc political
impact of these accountability episodes.
- A check on the European Parliament’s records for these same cases to examine the level and
thrust of European-level as opposed to national level accountability proceedings (i.e. focused
on the Commission rather than individual heads of government).
B) Accountability processes in crisis management:
11
Similar as study A), but then focused on four major and different types
(endogenous/exogenous; security/policy/political) of crisis episodes:
- The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-3, prompting the sending of peacekeepers);
- The BSE crisis (1996, prompting an EU-wide ban on British beef and beef-related products;
in this case the empirical focus will be on ministers of Agriculture and the relevant sectoral
council meetings, in addition to the heads of government);
- The Austrian election and cabinet formation crisis (1999-2000, leading to sanctions of 14
member states against Austria);
- The 9/11 crisis following the terror attacks on the US (2001, prompting a series of drastic
anti-terrorism measures).
At a later stage, the typology developed on the basis of the analysis of the selected summits
and crises will be applied to cases from the seventies and eighties. This will improve the
longitudinal perspective.
6 Project 2. Controlling the European technocracy: accounting for expert input in
European policymaking
Expertise plays an important role in policymaking in the European Union across a broad
spectrum of issues (e.g. vehicles’ emissions, used of pesticides, safety at work). Many forms
of expert input in policymaking exist: expertise from within the European Commission,
scientific advisory committees, European agencies, experts from member states, from
stakeholders, in ad hoc expert groups and through consultants. Experts play different roles in
the modern policymaking process. We can distinguish experts as scholar-statesmen, as
specialists, as consultants, as government experts, as interpreters and as entrepreneurs (Smith,
1991, 226). The authority and legitimacy of these policy experts are based upon their
knowledge and professional credentials (Fischer, 1990, 149). Professional accountability is
traditionally dominant: experts are called to account by other experts. Professional norms and
standards are important in guiding the actions and decisions of experts.
Political non-/misuse of experts and expert dominance of policymaking are a classic concern
from the perspective of democratic accountability, the EU not excepted (Fischer, 1990; Smith,
1991; Peters & Barker, 1993; European Commission, 2001). According to Smith (1991),
experts as a class have used mystifying jargon and an array of bewildering models and
12
specialized tools to interpose themselves between the citizenry and their elected leaders.
Fischer (1990: 23, 24) states that technocracy is a deep-seated challenge to democracy and its
political form of decision-making and defines the problem as a fundamental tension between
expertise and democracy. The emphasis on professional accountability seems to weaken
hierarchical and political accountability concerning expert input in policymaking. Experts do
not feel a strong obligation to account for their actions to others than their peers.
Increasing the transparency of expert input in policymaking has been advanced as a key
solution to controlling technocracy and enhancing democratic accountability (Brin, 1998;
Bovens, 2003; Meijer and Bovens, 2003). Experts can be expected to act not only in
accordance with professional standards but also in accordance with public standards when
their inputs in policymaking are open to public scrutiny, both by accountability forums and
the general public. Welch and Wong (2001) indicate that transparency not only refers to the
availability of information but also to the opportunities for interaction, actually calling experts
to account. Transparency is an important prerequisite for accountability because it provides
the forum with information that can be used to aks experts to justify their conduct, and for the
forum to form a judgement. In this perspective, existing and perhaps rather loose forms of
professional accountability would then be supplemented by (in)direct forms of political
accountability (Meijer and Bovens, 2003).
However, increasing accountability may also have adverse effects. O’Neill (2002) indicates
that beyond some critical threshold further increases in accountability may actually decrease
legitimacy and trust: every glitch in a policy process and every disappointing policy outcome
may become a source of public outrage and political bickering. Brin (1998: 140), who firmly
believes in transparency and accountability, indicates that too strong an emphasis on
criticizing and sanctioning may lead to disdain for government and even paranoia.
Transparency and accountability are beneficial only up to a certain point. Power (1999)
stresses that increased transparency may lead to a call for even more transparency, setting in
motion a vicious circle of control and distrust. In this alternative perspective, firm and fair
systems of professional accountability for experts might be perverted citizen and stakeholder
driven political accountability regimes. These claims for and against enhanced transparency
and accountability of expert inputs in European policy preparation need to be elucidated by
systematic empirical research.
13
In this project, we shall address three research questions:
How transparent is the input of experts in the European system of policy preparation (i.e. the
committee system), in terms of availability of information and opportunities for interaction?
Are there arrangements in which experts account for their role in EU-level policy preparation?
What are the characteristics of these arrangements?
How do the form and the degree of transparency of expert input influence the way that experts
account for their role in EU-level policy preparation? I.e., to what extent are transparency
rules a necessary condition for accountability regimes to function in this domain of politics?
How do relevant stakeholders evaluate the performance of existing transparency rules and
accountability practices?
Our provisional hypotheses are:
The higher the transparency of expert input in policymaking, the more salient existing
mechanisms for public accountability – both objectively (in terms of their manifest use) and
subjectively (in terms of experts and stakeholders’ perceptions).
The higher the transparency of expert input, the higher the likelihood of more political
accountability forums/mechanisms supplementing and `crowding out’ purely professional
ones.
The study design entails:
A construction of transparency rules governing selected expert venues and inputs in selected
Commission DG’s with a high degree of expert input in their policymaking processes. In
order to arrive at a meaningful selection of expert venues in the policy preparation process,
the researcher will first have to obtain insight into the bewildering array and diversity of
committees and related forums (see e.g. Rhinard), classify them and then select cases that
either constitute a fair representation of the entire population, or occupy distinct positions on
one or several theoretically significant dimensions. These dimensions may include issue area
(e.g. different types of technical expertise involved), institutional embeddedness (related to
Commission, Council or otherwise), or proximity/distance to the ultimate decision making
process (for example DG VI’s Scientific Veterinary Committee takes a very hands-on role in
Commission decision making regarding agriculture and food crises, whereas many other
Committees have a much more restricted technical mandate quite aloof from the politics of
policymaking).
14
An in-depth study of the historical evolution of transparency rules and accountability
practices in four selected expert arenas: two that are qualified as `best practice’ (in terms of
institutionalising accountability norms) by key informers with a broad knowledge of
policymaking in the EU, and two characterized as the opposite. The objective of the
comparison is to gain insight in what explains the differential development and valuation of
the rules and practices surrounding these expert arenas.
A representative survey comparing experts’ own views and selected stakeholders opinions
and experiences concerning transparency and accountability of expert inputs in EU
policymaking.
7. Project 3. Controlling European agencies: accounting for non-majoritarian
institutions
The debate regarding the role, powers and accountability of quasi-autonomous institutions is
emerging as a critical component of contemporary debates regarding future governance of the
EU (Flinders, 2004; Magnette, 2004). The EU has creaqted over the years a number of
executive, regulatory and more recently operational agencies in order to undertake a range of
executive, regulatory and implementation tasks (see, the somewhat dated Kreher, 1998). In
recent years the empirical range of such agencies has increased quite considerably as has the
types of tasks (including more “operational” type tasks) being conferred or delegated by the
EU institutions and by the EU Member States. Thus, it is suggested increasingly both in
scientific literature and by the European Commission itself that in a number of crucial policy
areas (transport, energy, financial services etc.) there is an urgent need for new regulatory
mechanisms at the European level and in particular for independent European regulatory
agencies (Everson, Majone et al, 1999; Commission of the European Communities, 2002). At
the same time, in the newer policy fields of justice and home affairs and foreign and defence
policy, a dizzying array of new quasi-independent European agencies are being established by
and under the auspices of the Council of Ministers with little if any debate as to the use and
control of such agencies performing what can be described as more Weberian-type functions
as a tool of European governance (Curtin, 2004).
One of the key design issues is indeed the relationship between autonomy and control in the
context of such non-majoritarian agencies (Vos, 2003). As the European Commission notes:
“The criteria for governing the regulatory agencies must be based, on the one hand, on the
15
need to foster their independence, competence and credibility while ensuring that they are
accountable and transparent”. The working hypothesis is that the relationship between
autonomy and control is developed on an ad hoc basis with a different balance being struck on
every occasion that a new agency is created not necessarily tailored to the intensity of its
tasks. Not only is there no authoritative typology of the various kinds of quasi-autonomous
agencies existing at the EU level (see, for example, Geradin and Petit, 2004) on the basis of
their powers and tasks but no in-depth comparative work has taken place as to the manner in
which such agencies are embedded in a public accountability framework, either at the level of
the other European (political) institutions or at the level of national politics and law (although
some literature exists which analyses the American model of independent agencies as a
possible relevant parameter: Yataganas, 2001; Majone, 1996; Shapiro, 1996). At the same
time there is little empirical work done on the manner in which such quasi-autonomous
agencies while being established at the centralised EU level are nevertheless involved in a
complex and differentiated system of multi-level governance and partnership with their
national counterparts (see however Chiti, 2002 and 2004).
Are “insulated institutions” in the context of the EU and its multi-level governance processes
harmless in terms of the overall framework of public accountability and legitimacy of the EU?
And what are the empirical idiosyncrasies of the European case? Prior empirical work has on
the whole focused on for example the ECB which is more independent of political pressure
than any known national example (see e.g. Amtenbrink, 1999; WEP, 25, 1, 2002) but many
other instances of non-majoritarian governance at the level of the EU are grossly
understudied, let alone compared to national accountability regimes. Such general debate as
there is on the use of quasi-autonomous agencies as a tool of European governance has
predominantly been conducted with little reference to related debates at the national level
(Flinders, 2004).
An often voiced hypothesis to be tested is that national (non-majoritarian) governance
institutions are more firmly embedded in public accountability practices than European ones.
A second hypothesis (following Moravscik’s logic) to be examined is that, because of the
greater political sensitivity of Europeanising Weberian policing/judicial (i.e. JHA) functions,
the European institutions in this domain do not only have more restricted mandates compared
to their national counterparts and their counterparts in First Pillar regulatory domains, but are
also subjected to stricter accountability regimes. On the other hand it cannot a fortiori be
16
excluded that the context and practice of multi-level governance across functional and
territorial boundaries may require the evolution of tailored public accountability practices
without direct counterpart in the purely national political and legal systems.
The key research question is: are EU quasi-autonomous agencies embedded in the practices of
public accountability (either at the European or the national political level) and how does this
compare to the treatment of similar agencies at the national level?
In seeking to answer this question what can be termed a legal-institutional methodology will
be adopted which will not only study the legal framework of delegation of powers and the
primary and secondary competence conferring instruments in their legal and constitutional
context but also the manner in which those competences have been exercised in practice by
the agencies and by the accounting institutions concerned (see further Curtin and Dekker,
1999).
The study design entails a 2x2 comparative case analysis of the formal and de facto
accountability regimes of national and EU regulatory (e.g. food agencies) and investigative
(e.g. police/Europol) or enforcement authorities (e.g. EU Border Control Agency). The
research process entails:
1. Collection and comparison of all the pertinent legal and policy documents describing
agencies’ missions, mandates and accountability requirements;
2. Description/analysis of accountability practices, of both agency inputs (appointment
hearings, agency plan presentations, legislative debates) and outputs (annual reports,
legislative oversight, evaluation studies, legal oversight, public accountability
practices etc.);
3. Interviews with key stakeholders within the agencies and the relevant accountability to
assess their experiences and record their assessments.
17
Bibliography
Bergman, T., E. Damgaard (eds.) (2000), Delegation and accountability in the European Union, London: Frank Cass
Amtenbrink, F., (1999) The democratic accountability of central banks, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bovens M., P. ‘t Hart, B.G. Peters, (eds) (2001), Success and failure in public governance: A comparative analysis,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Bovens, M. (1998), The quest for responsibility: Accountability and citizenship in complex organisations, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Bovens, M. (2003), De digitale republiek, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
Bovens, M. (2005a), Publieke verantwoording: Een analysekader, in: W. Bakker, K. Yesilkagit (eds), Publieke
verantwoording, Amsterdam: Boom (in press)
Bovens, M. (2005b), Public accountability, in: C. Pollit et al, Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford: Oxford
University Press (in press)
Bovens, M. (2005c), Public accountability. A framework for the analysis and assessment of accountability arrangements in
the public domain. Unpublished paper for Connex, Belfast 22-23 September 2005
Brin, D. (1998), The transparent society, Reading: Perseus
Chiti, E. (2002), Decentralised integration as a new model of joint exercise of community functions? A legal analysis of
European agencies, Oslo: University of Oslo, Arena Working Paper, No. 31/2002
Chiti, E. (2004), Decentralisation and integration into the Community administrations: A new perspective on European
agencies, European Law Journal, 10, 3: 399-418
Craig P.and Rawlings, R. (2003) Law and administration in Europe. Essays in honour of Carol Harlow, Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Craig, P. (1999), The nature of the Community: Integration theory and democratic theory” in: P.Craig and G.de Burca (eds),
The evolution of EU law, Oxford:Oxford University Press
Curtin, D and Dekker, I. (1999), The EU as a ‘layered’ international organization: Institutional unity in disguise? In: P. Craig
and G. De Burca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-137
Curtin, D. (2001), The Commission as sorcerer’s apprentice? Reflections on EU public administration and the role of
information technology in holding bureaucracy accountable, Social and Legal Studies, 10, 1: 55-76
Curtin, D. (2003), Digital government in the European Union: Freedom of information trumped by “internal security”, in: A.
Roberts (ed.), National security and open government: Striking the Right Balance, Syracuse: Mawell School, Syracuse
University, pp. 101-122
Curtin, D. (2004), Mind the gap? Public accountability and the evolving EU executive, Leuven: Third Walter van Gerven
Public Lecture, University of Leuven, (publication forthcoming December)
Curtin, D. (2005), Public accountability and the evolving EU executive, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Curtin, D. and I.F. Dekker, (2002), The constitutional structure of the European Union: Some reflections on vertical unity-indiversity, in: N. Walker et al. (eds.), Convergence and divergence in European public law, Oxford: 2002, pp. 59-78
Curtin, D. (2003) From governing the EU to guarding the governors? Some reflections on mechanisms of accountability of
executive power in the EU, 26 Collegium Spring 2003, pp.61-74.
Dahl, R. (1994), A democratic dilemma: System effectiveness versus citizen participation, Political Science Quarterly, 109,
1, 23-34
Dahl, R. (1999), Can international organisations be democratic? A Skeptic’s view, in: I. Shapiro, C. Hacker-Cordon (eds.),
Democracy’s edges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.19-36
Day, P., R. Klein (1987), Accountabilities: Five public services, London: Tavistock
18
Dehousse, R. (1997), Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies, Journal of
European Public Policy, 4, 2: 246-271
Easton, D. (1965), A systems analysis of political life, New York: Wiley
Edler, N., E. Page (2004), Accountability and control in Next Steps agencies, Manchester: Manchester University Press
European Commission (2001), European Governance. A White Paper COM (2001) 428 final of 25 July 2001
European Commission (2001), Report of Working Group, Democratising Expertise and Establishing Scientific Reference
Systems, 2001
European Commission (2002), Communication on an operating framework for European Regulatory Agencies , 11 December
2002, 428 final
European Commission (2002), The Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, 718 final
Everson, M. (1995) Independent agencies, European Law Journal, 1, 2: 180-204.
Everson, M., G. Majone, et al. (1999), The role of specialised agencies in decentralising governance, Brussels: Report to the
European Commission.
Featherstone, K., C.M. Radaelli (eds)(2003), The politics of europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Fischer, F. (1990), Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, London: Sage
Flinders, M. (2004), Distributed public governance in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 3: 520544.
Geradin D., N. Petit (2004), The development of agencies at EU and national levels: Conceptual analysis and proposals for
reform, New York University, Jean Monnet Center Working Paper
Gray, P., P. ‘t Hart (eds)(1998), Public policy disasters in Western Europe, London: Routledge
Gronvall, J. (2001), Mad cow disease: The role of experts in European crisis management, in: U. Rosenthal, A. Boin, L.
Comfort (eds), Managing crises, Springfield: Thomas, pp. 155-174
Gustavsson, S. (1999), Reconciling suprastatism and democratic accountability, New York: New York University Jean
Monnet Center Working Paper
Ham, P. van, S. Medvedev (2002), Mapping European security after Kosovo, Manchester: Manchester University Press
Harlow, C. (2002). Accountability in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Hart, P. ‘t (2005), Publieke verantwoordingsregimes vergeleken, in: W. Bakker, K. Yesilkagit (eds), Publieke
verantwoording, Amsterdam: Boom
Hooghe, L., G. Marks (2001), Multi-level governance and European integration, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Howlett, M., M. Ramesh (1995), Studying public policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Joerges C.and Dehousse, R. (2002), Good governance in Europe’s integrated market, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002
Joerges, C. Vos, E. (eds.)(1999), EU Committees: Social regulation, law and politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999.
Joerges, C., Y. Meny, J.Weiler, J. (2001), Mountain or molehill? A critical appraisal of the Commission White paper on
Governance, New York: New York University Jean Monnet Center Working Paper
Jorgensen, K. (ed.)(1996), European approaches to crisis management, Dordrecht: Kluwer
Journal of European Public Policy (2003),10, 6, Special issue: Dynamics of formal and informal institutional change in the
EU.
19
Kassim, H., B.G. Peters and V. Wright (eds)(2000a), The national co-ordination of EU policy: the domestic level, Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Kassim, H., B.G. Peters, V. Wright (eds)(2000b), The national co-ordination of EU policy: the European level, Oxford:
oxford University Press
Kassim, H. (2003), The European administration: Between Europeanization and domestication, in; J. Hayward, A. Menon
(eds.), Governing Europe, Oxford University Press, pp. 132-160
Kelstrup, M, M.C. Williams (eds) (2000), International relations and the politics of European integration – power, security
and community, London: Routledge
Kersbergen, K. van, F. van Waarden (2001), Shifts in governance: Problems of legitimacy and accountability, The Hague:
NWO
Kohler Koch, B. (ed.)(2003), Linking EU and national governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kohler-Koch, B. and R. Eising (eds)(1999), The transformation of governance in the European Union, London: Routledge
Koopmans, T. (2003) Courts and political institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kreher, A. (1998), The EC agencies between Community institutions and constituents: autonomy, control and accountability,
Florence: European University Institute Working Papers, RSC.
Lerner, J.S., P.E. Tetlock (1999), Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, Psychological Bulletin, 125, 2: 255-275
Lord, C. (1998) Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press
Lord, C. (2004) A democratic audit of the European Union, London: Pinter
Magnette, P. (2004), The politics of regulation in the European Union, in: D. Geradin (ed.), Which regulatory authorities in
Europe? (Brussels, forthcoming)
Mair, P. (2004) Popular democrcay and the construction of the European Union political system, Paper prepared for the
ECPR Joint Sessions, Uppsala, April 2004
Majone, G. (2001) Non-majoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance: A political transaction-cost
approach, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157: 57-78
Majone, G. (1996) Regulating Europe, London: Sage
McCandless, H.E. (2001), A citizen’s guide to public accountability: Changing the relationship between citizens and authorities,
Victoria B.C.: Trafford
Meijers A. and Bovens, M. (2003), Public accountability in the information society, in M. Palmirani et al (eds) EGovernment, Laxenburg: IIASS
Moravcsik, A. (1998), The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press
Moravcsik, A. (2002) In defence of the ‘democratic deficit:’ Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union Journal of
Common Market Studies, 40, 3: 603-24.
Moravcsik, A. (2004) Is there a ‘democratic deficit’ in world politics? A framework for analysis, Government and
Opposition, 39, 2: 336-363
Mulgan, R., 2003, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Basingstoke: Pelgrave.
O’Neill, O. (2002) A Question of Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Olsson, E-K, S. Larsson, B. Ramberg (2004), EU crisis management: A decision-making perspective, Stockholm:
CRISMART/Swedish Defence Institute (in press)
Page, E.C. (2003), Europeanisation and the persistence of administrative systems, in: J. Hayward, A. Menon (eds),
Governing Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162-176
20
Paige, G.D. (1968), The Korean decision, New York: The Free Press
Papadopoulos, Y. (2003) Cooperative forms of governance: Problems of democratic accountability in complex environments,
European Journal of Political Research, 42: 473-501
Peters, A. (2004) European democracy after the 2003 Convention Common Market Law Review, forthcoming.
Peters, B.G., A. Barker, (1993), Advising West European governments: Inquiries, expertise and public policy, Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press
Peterson J., M. Shackleton (eds)(2001), The institutions of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Pollitt, C. (2003), The essential public manager, London: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill
Power, M. (1999), The audit society, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Quermonne, J-L., P. Muller, Y. Meny (eds)(1996), Adjusting to Europe: The impact of the European Union on national
institutions and policies, London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
Radaelli, C.M. (1999), Technocracy in the European Union, London: Longman
Rhinard, M. (2002), The democratic legitmacy of the EU committee system, Governance, 15, 2: 185-210
Richardson, J. (ed.)(2000), European Union: Power and policy-making, London: Routledge
Romzek, B. (2000), Dynamics of public sector accountability in an era of reform, International Review of Administrative
Sciences, 66, 1: 21-44.
Romzek, B.S., M.J. Dubnick (1998), Accountability, in: J.M. Shafritz (ed.), International encyclopaedia of public policy and
administration, volume 1, Boulder: Westview Press
Sandholtz, W., A. Stone Sweet (eds)(1998), European integration and supranational governance, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Shapiro, M. (1997), The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union, Journal of European
Public Policy, 4, 2: 276-291.
Scharpf, F. (1999), Governing Europe: Efficient and democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press
Schendelen, M.P.C.M. van (ed.)(1998), EU committees as influential policymakers, Aldershot: Ashgate
Schillemans, Th. & M. Bovens, 2004, ‘Horizontale verantwoording bij zelfstandige bestuursorganen’. In: S. van Thiel (red.),
Governance van uitvoeringsorganisaties: Nieuwe vraagstukken van sturing in het publieke domein, Apeldoorn: Kadaster.
Schmitter, P. (2000), How to democratize the European Union… And why bother? Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Wiener, A., T. Diez (eds.), European integration theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Siedentop, L.(2000), Democracy in Europe, London: Allen Lane
Slaughter, A.M. (2004) Disaggregated sovereignty: Towards the public accountability of global government networks,
Government and Opposition, 39, 2: 159-190
Smith, J.A. (1991), The idea brokers: Think tanks and the rise of the new policy elite, The Free Press, New York
Soetendorp, R.B., K. Hanf (eds)(1998), Adapting to European integration: Small states and the European Union, Addison
Wesley Longman
Stone Sweet, A., Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (2001) The institutionalization of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Strom, K. (2000), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies, European Journal of Political Research, 37
Thatcher, M. (2002), Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and contextual ediation, West
European Politics, 25, 1, 125-147.
Verhoeven, A.(2002), The European Union in search of a democratic and constitutional theory, The Hague: Kluwer.
21
Vos, E. (2003), Agencies and the European Union, in: L. Verhey, T. Zwart, (eds), Agencies in European and comparative
law, Maastricht: Intersentia
Wallace, H. (2002) The Council: An institutional chameleon? Governance, 19, 3, pp.325-344.
Weiler, J. (1999) The constitution of Europe: "Do the new clothes have an emperor?" and other essays on European
integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Welch, E.W, Wong (2001), Global information technology pressure and government accountability: The mediating effect of
domestic context on web site openness, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11, 4: 509–538
WEP (2002), West European Politics, 25, 1, special issue on non majoritarian institutions in Europe
Yataganas, X.A. (2001), Delegation of regulatory authority in the European Union: The relevance of the American model of
independent agencies, Cambridge: Harvard Jean Monnet Working Papers, 03/01.