Blood transfusion and religious beliefs in the Cypriot legal system
Theodora Christodoulidou
The paper will address the circumstances under which in the Cypriot legal system the
parental rights over a child may be overridden when parents object their children
receiving necessary blood transfusion.
According to the Social Welfare Department there have been numerous cases regarding
Jehovah Witnesses parents objecting their children receiving blood transfusion however
life threatening their children’s condition is. Not many have ended up in court though,
since most of them are successfully dealt by the Social Welfare Department out of Court.
There has been one reported court case in the last few years in relation to this issue: Titos
Charalambous v. Director of the Social Welfare Department in 1994 (Civil Appeal
number 8207).1
In this case the parents of a young girl, being Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused to give their
consent for their child to have blood transfusion due to their religious beliefs and put the
child’s life at risk. The Director of the Social Welfare Department, via an administrative
act, received the child into his care, assumed the rights and duties of the parents and
instructed the doctors to proceed with the necessary blood transfusion.
His competence to do so was based on Sections 3 of and 4 of the Children Law CAP 352.
According to Section 3, the Director of Social Welfare Department may temporarily
receive - via an administrative act, the child into his care.2 After receiving the child into

Paper presented at the conference on “Blood Transfusion and Religious Beliefs” at the Department of
Law of the University of Nicosia (February 26-27 2010).

LLB (Athens), LLM (University of Bristol), Ph.D (King’s College London), Counsel of the Republic.
1
Επί τοις αφορώσι τον Τίτο Χαραλάμπους ν. Επί τοις αφορώσι το Διευθυντή του Τμήματος Υπηρεσιών
Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας (Civil Appeal 8207), judgment of 20 May 1994.
2
Section 3 states: (1) Where it appears to the Director of the Department of Social Welfare Office with
respect to a child appearing to him to be under the age of sixteen – (a) that he has neither parents nor
guardian or has been and remains abandoned by his parents or guardian or is lost; or (b) that his parents or
guardians are, for the time being or permanently, prevented by reason of mental or bodily disease, or
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his care and provided that the child has no parents or guardian or the parent or guardian
has abandoned, or neglected the child or suffers from some disability rendering him
incapable of caring for the child or is of such habits or mode of life as to be unfit to have
the child into his care, all rights and powers which the parents would have had shall vest
in the Director.3 Therefore, there is no need for the Director of the Social Welfare
Department to go to court in order to receive any child into his care or get permission to
allow the doctors to offer the child the necessary treatment. According to Section 4 if the
parents object to the assumption of parental rights and inform accordingly the Director,
he can apply at the District Court and request an order to continue exercising the parental
rights of the child. Meanwhile, and until the court issues its judgment, the Director
continues to have the parental rights of the child. The Court may, on hearing the
complaint, order that parental assumption shall not lapse. The parent objecting to the
assumption can appeal to the Supreme Court.
In the relevant case, the parents of the young girl objected to the assumption of parental
rights and as such the Director had to apply to the District Court in order to be able to
continue exercising the parental rights of the child.
The District Court decided that the conditions for the Director to receive the child into his
care referred to in Section 3 have been met since the child’s life was at risk and the
parents were prevented due to their religious beliefs from providing proper maintenance
to the child.4 Furthermore, according to Section 4, since the child was in the Director’s
infirmity or any other circumstances from providing for his proper accommodation, maintenance or
upbringing and there is no available person or persons capable, fit or willing to undertake the care of such
child; and (c) in either case, that the intervention of the Social Welfare Office under this section is
necessary in the interests of the welfare of such child, it shall be lawful for the Director to receive the child
into care under this section.
3
Section 4 states: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the Director may assume with respect to any
child in his care under section 3 in whose case it appears to him – (a) that his parents are dead and that he
has no guardian; or (b) that a parent or guardian of his (hereinafter referred to as “the person on whose
account the assumption was required”) has abandoned or neglected him or suffers from some permanent
disability rendering the said person incapable of caring for the child, or is of such habits or mode of life as
to be unfit to have the care of the child, […]”.
4
Επί τοις αφορώσι τον Περί Παίδων Νόμο, Κεφ. 352, Μέρος ΙΙ, άρθρα 3 και 4 και επί τοις αφορώσι το
Διευθυντή του Τμήματος Υπηρεσιών Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας και επί τοις αφορώσι τον Τίτο Χαραλάμπους (αρ.
αίτησης 302/90); Concerning the Children Law CAP 352, Sections 3 and 4 and Concerning the Director of
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care, the Director rightly assumed the parental rights of the child since the child was
neglected and more specifically her parents were incapable of caring for her and were of
such habits or mode of life as to be unfit to have the care of the child. As such the court
decided that the Director’s assumption of parental rights should not lapse.
The parents appealed at the Supreme Court against the decision of the court of first
instance. They argued firstly that Section 3 of the Children Law does not give the right to
the Director to receive a child into his care against the parents´ wishes; secondly that the
word “maintenance”5 used in Section 3 does not include medical treatment. Rather it
means providing the child with material needs, such as food and cloth. Finally, they
argued that the decision of the first instance court violated the appellants´ right to private
and family life enshrined in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court examined whether the wording “receive...into his care” requires the
parents´ consent. The Supreme Court ruled that the word “receive” should be given a
wide meaning covering instances where the parents allow their children to be placed
under the care of the Director and instances where they do not. According to the Supreme
Court such an interpretation is in line with the purpose of the law. Regarding the meaning
of “maintenance” found in Section 3, the Supreme Court stated that the word includes
medical treatment too as “to maintain someone in life” means to also provide the
necessary medical treatment.
Regarding the issue of whether the decision of the first instance court violated the private
and family life of the appellant, the Supreme Court merely stated:
“we consider that in this case the paramount right was the child´s right to life
safeguarded in Article 7 of the Constitution. The provisions of CAP 352 are there
to safeguard the right to life of a child.”
Social Welfare Department and Concerning Tito Charalambous (Application no. 302/90), judgment of 9
August 1990.
5
See supra regarding Section 3.
3
Therefore the Supreme Court held that Sections 3 and 4 of the Children Law do not
violate Article 15 of the Constitution in relation to the right to private life since their aim
is to guarantee the life and the welfare of the child, rights that are also enshrined in the
Constitution.
Subsequently, the Relation of Parents and Children Law (L. 216/90) was enacted.
Sections 5 and 6 of the said law stipulate that the parental responsibility of children is
duty and right of the parents, which should be exercised in the interest of the child.
Section 18 provides that if the father or mother violates their duties, or abuse their duties
or are not able to respond to their duties, at the request of the innocent parent or the
Director of Social Welfare Department, the Family Court can order any appropriate
action. What constitutes violation or inability of parents to meet their duties or abuse of
right under Section 18 has been analysed in case law. The Family Court on appeal stated
as an obiter that “inability to meet the duties” includes the refusal of the parent to agree to
the necessary blood transfusion.6
Since the enacting of the above law there have been no cases of parents objecting their
children receiving necessary blood transfusion that ended up in court. As such, it is not
clear what would be the possible legal basis upon which the religious beliefs of the
parents may be overridden when they object their children receiving necessary blood
transfusion. Would it be Sections 3 and 4 of the Children Law or Section 5 and 18 of the
Relation of Parents and Children Law?
The Supreme Court examined whether the Children Law has been revoked in cases
involving ill-treatment of children by their parents. In a habeas corpus application
(Ioannou application) the Supreme Court as first instance court ruled that Sections 3 and
4 of Children Law have been implicitly repealed and revoked by the Relation of Parents
and Children Law.7 In a subsequent habeas corpus application (Eveline Petrou
6
Director of Social Welfare Department v (1) Foteinis Douma, (2) Andrea Constantinou Pegeioti, (Appeal
no. 139), judgment of 5 December 2001.
7
Concerning the application of Andrea Ioannou and other for the return to them of their underage
daughter Andri Ioannou and Concerning the underage Andri Ioannou Concerning the decision of the
4
application) the Supreme Court as first instance court ruled otherwise, that is, that the
Relation of Parents and Children Law has not revoked the Children Law.8 On appeal
though in the Ioannou application referred to above, the Supreme Court upheld the first
instance court but on a different reasoning. The Supreme Court on appeal ruled that
Sections 3 and 4 of the Children Law are inapplicable in instances of ill-treatment since
Sections 63 and 64 of the said law cover instances of ill treatment. Subsequently, in the
Gerolemou application the Supreme Court as first instance court ruled that the act of the
Director of Social Welfare Department to receive into his care five children under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Children Law was illegal since the said law had been repealed and
revoked by the Relation of Parents and Children Law to the extend that they are
inconsistent with the new legislation.9 As an obiter the Supreme Court noted that, even if
Sections 3 and 4 remain in force, the decision of the Director of Social Welfare
Department was still illegal as Section 3 is inapplicable in cases of ill-treatment.
The issue of what would be the possible legal basis upon which the religious beliefs of
parents are overridden when they object their children receiving necessary blood
transfusion remains open, as first it is not clear whether the Supreme Court will follow
the Gerolemou judgment and second, the Gerolemou judgment involves issues of illtreatment. It would be however unfortunate to regard Sections 3 and 4 of the Children
Law as revoked by the Relation of Parents and Children Law especially in cases of
emergency medical operations including blood transfusion because the new law does not
include emergency measures whereby the authorities access the necessity of allowing the
Director of Social Welfare Department dated 19.12.90 regarding the assumption of care and/or parental
responsibility and paternal rights of the underage Andri Ioannou daughter of the applicants and
Concerning the Director of Social Welfare Department, (Application no. 19/95), decision on habeas corpus
application dated 8 March 1995.
8
Concerning the application of Eveline Petrou for the return to her of the underage children, Kyriakou and
Martinou Petrou and Concerning the underage Kyriako Petrou and Martino Petrou, Concerning the
decision of the Director of Social Welfare Department dated 31.08.95 regarding the assumption of care
and/or parental responsibility and maternal rights of the underage Kyriakou Petrou and Martinou Petrou
and Concerning the Director of Social Welfare Department, (Application no. 158/95), decision on habeas
corpus application dated 4 October 1995.
9
Concerning the application of Yiannis Gerolemou for the return to him of his underage children (1)
Aristodimou Gerolemou, (2) Yiotas Gerolemou, (3) Andris Gerolemou, (5) Loucias Gerolemou,
Concerning the underage children above, Concerning the decisions of the Director of Social Welfare
Department dated 30.01.02 regarding the assumption of parental rights of the underage children above,
(Application no. 7/02), decision on habeas corpus application dated 6 March 2002.
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doctors to undergo emergency medical treatments without prior recourse to court, a
procedure that is recognised in the Children Law.10 The issue of what would be the
possible legal basis for emergency medical operations might be resolved by the Supreme
Court on appeal if and when it arises. Alternatively, the Relation of Parents and Children
Law should be amended to provide explicit provisions for emergency medical operations
without recoursing to courts or the New Children Law which is in the process of being
drafted might include such provisions.
10
The Parents and Children Law is largely based on the Greek Civil Code, Part IV. It is unfortunate that
article 1534 dealing with the issues of emergency medical operation without recoursing to courts, was not
included in the Cypriot, Parents and Children Law. Article 1534 reads: “where there is urgent need for
medical intervention to prevent risk of life or health of the child, the first instance attorney may, if the
parents refuse, to provide his consent immediately, at the request of the responsible physician or the
director of the clinic where the child is hospitalised or any other competent health institution.” See also E.
Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law, vol. II, 2nd ed., Sakkoulas Publishers, 1998, pp. 225-229; George
Koumantos, Family Law, vol. II, Sakkoulas Publishers, 1989, pp. 234-236.
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