Geo-economy & Geopolitics Series
Author: John Karkazis
Issue G1, January 2001
THE BRITISH GEO-STRATEGIC DOGMA DURING 19th
AND EARLY 20th CENTURY
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CONTENTS
THE TREATY OF VIENNA AND THE BRITISH STRATEGIC DOGMA
-CONTROL OF ALL STRATEGIC PASSAGES AROUND THE WORLD
-ENHANCED NAVAL SUPERIORITY, FIRM CONTROL OVER SEA ROUTES AND COLONIAL
POSSESSIONS
- BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE POST-NAPOLEONIC ERA: THE
CONGRESS SYSTEM
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle
The Congress of Verona
The Congress of Troppau
THE INITIATIVES OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
THE BALANCE OF POWERS IN EUROPE AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN GEO-POLITICAL
COMPETITION: 1900-1914
THE TREATY OF VIENNA AND THE BRITISH STRATEGIC
DOGMA
After the final defeat of Napoleon in Waterloo a new (second) congress was held in
Vienna in 1815 which imposed more severe terms on France: an indemnity of
700.000 francs and army occupation. The Treaty of Vienna established a Holly
Alliance order of the Christian nations of Europe (with the exception of Britain) and
settled military, political and colonial issues in such a way so as to be considered as
the most far reaching agreement in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia. On the other
hand the Treaty of Vienna failed to solve the problems arising from the national
aspirations of Germans and the republican (anti-monarchic) and reformist aspirations
of European middle classes.
Britain succeeded to set out, through the Treaty of Vienna, a very favorable security
and economic environment, in Europe and world-wide, which maximized the
economies-of-scale produced by the Industrial Revolution in its birthplace and which
highly enhanced its strategic dogma:
1.
CONTROL OF ALL STRATEGIC PASSAGES AROUND THE WORLD:
1a. Gibraltar passage, controlling the sea routes between the Atlantic Ocean and the
Mediterranean Sea. It was ceded to Britain in 1713 under the Treaty of Utrecht.
1b. Singapore passage, controlling the sea routes between the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific Oceang. It became a British colony in 1824.
1c. Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) passage, controlling the sea routes between
the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. It became a British colony in 1806.
1d. English Channel passage, the most important passage for Britain which was put
under its indirect control by creating a barrier state, Belgium, on the other side of the
passage, which separated the two old colonial competitors of Britain, France and the
Netherlands. The creation of this barrier state dramatically reduced France’s geoeconomic and geo-strategic power by taking out of its control the strategic port of
Antwerp, the port in which Napoleon was planning to build his great armada to
conquer Britain. Note that today Belgium accommodates some of the most important
geo-economic gravity centers of Europe.[1]
1e. Edge of Iberia Peninsula passage (Portugal) which dominated the sea-routes
between Britain, North Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. Britain secured this
passage by the oldest in Europe alliance treaty, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373,
which is still in force. Note that securing this passage was of vital importance for the
protection of the Gibraltar passage and the strategic sea route axis Gibraltar – English
Channel.
1f. Falkland Islands passage which dominated the sea-routes between the south
Atlantic and the south Pacific Ocean. The British first settled in there in 1765. Their
colonial presence in Falkland Islands, during the period 1765-1833, was often
militarily disputed by Spanish Argentina and France but since 1833 the British have
been firmly established there. The construction of Panama Canal by the Americans in
the beginning of 20th century weakened the significance of this passage.
2.
ENHANCED NAVAL SUPERIORITY, FIRM CONTROL OVER SEA
ROUTES AND COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
A military dogma according to which the naval forces of Britain should exceed the
combined naval forces of the second and third ranking naval power. During the
Napoleonic Wars the second and third biggest naval powers were France and Spain
whereas in the beginning of World War I were Germany and France. This dogma
protected Britain against all combinations involving two naval powers leaving out the
highly in-probable case of three naval powers confronting Britain which could be
rather easily delt by the extremely skilful British diplomacy at least as power
balancing is concerned. Also, the issues of the freedom of the seas and of its colonial
possessions around the world were forming a “red line” for British diplomacy during
19th century which barred out any such discussions (going beyond this red line) in the
Vienna congress and the three tail-congresses.
3.
BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE
The Treaty of Vienna and the British diplomatic efforts established in Europe an
intricate power balancing system. The power of France was checked in the
administrative level by the re-establishment of Bourbons and in the geo-political level
to the east by the highly enhanced power of Prussia, to the south by the highly
enhanced powers of the Italian Peninsula and to the west by re-establishing in Spain
Bourbon’s dynasty which was friendly to Britain. The power of the fearfully
emerging Tsars was checked by the powerful Prussia, the consolidated and expanded
power of Austria-Hungary and by the relatively very small portion of Poland offered
to them. Finally the power of Austria was checked to the west by the considerable
power that France was permitted to enjoy, to the north by Prussia and also by the
skilful exploitation of its internal problems arising from its multi-ethnic composition
and the repressive and counter-reforming policies of its ultra conservative
monarchical regime. In the case in which Austria was dangerously interfering with
British interests and the British strategic dogma then these internal problems could be
rather easily exploited by Britain to weaken it. Britain, after the Treaty of Vienna, was
left alone as the only power of Europe enjoying a constitutional monarchy, strong
parliamentary institutions and the ability to undertake reforms without resorting to
revolutionary violence and practices. The above facts placed Britain in the for-front of
Europe as the champion of constitutional parliamentary monarchy offering it valuable
ideological weapons to be transformed by Britain diplomacy into geo-political
weapons with the help also of two new players in British politics: the British Press
which was becoming rapidly very influential in Europe and also the propaganda
apparatus which became, during Napoleonic Wars, an advanced (and in some cases
lethal) diplomatic weapon. Note that, in the forthcoming years the British security
dogma was extended geographically to the East to protect the arising British interest
in the Ottoman Empire.
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE POSTNAPOLEONIC ERA: THE CONGRESS SYSTEM
At the Congress of Vienna the great powers of Europe agreed to hold meetings in
order to settle arising issues and to further enforce treaty clauses. Central theme of
these tail-congresses was the introduction and enforcement of an international
regulation mechanism for European affairs resembling somehow the League of
Nations which was established a century later. Three such congresses were held in the
period 1818-1822 known collectively as the Congress System.
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle
The first tail-congress was held in 1818 at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). The main issue
of the congress was the withdrawal of the allied occupation army from France which
was contributing to an unpopular profile for the King of France. The British
considered Bourbon dynasty as a safety valve of great importance for checking both
the revolutionary and reforming grassroots movements in France and at the same time
the possibility of aggressive grand plans at the upper levels of the government and the
society. As a consequence they agreed on the withdrawal of the allied army from
France. Tsar Alexander raised also the issue of establishing an international military
force to protect monarchic regimes against revolutionary actions. The argument of the
Tsar was going further down to the establishment of constitutional rights for the
people of Europe in the sense that the security offered to the monarchs by this
international force would make it easier for them to introduce constitutional reforms.
The British refused the idea of safeguarding central and eastern European powers
against a serious inherent weakness which could be exploited (if the situation arose)
to their benefit. Two more issues were also discussed: the slave trade and the
problems caused to the Mediterranean trade by the Barbary pirates. Besides the
wishful thinking discussions no concrete actions were decided on these issues. With
reference to the second issue, there was a proposal by the Tsar to establish an
international naval force in the Mediterranean to act against the pirates but the British
rejected them since they did not want to weaken the freedom of action and the
flexibility of their naval forces diplomacy putting part of them under international
control.
The Congress of Troppau
The second tail-congress was held in Troppau (modern Opava) in Austrian Silesia, in
1820. This congress was called by Metternich in order to deal with the issue of
uprisings in southern Europe which were caused by endemic problems of corruption,
administrative inefficiency and autocratism characterizing the repressive regimes of
Spain, Naples and the Ottoman Empire. Note at this point that Metternich was paying
a particular attention to southern Europe for two reasons: he considered the Italian
power complex after the Vienna Congress as belonging to the Austrian sphere of
influence and also that the Ottoman Empire, in its European domains, was inhabited
by predominantly slavic populations the uprising of which (in the context of the
growing pan-slavic movement) could be easily extended to the Slavic populations of
his empire (Czechs, Slovaks etc). Britain and France, although led by conservative
governments (Britain by Torries), objected the idea of establishing an international
anti-revolutionary force in Europe and as a consequence sent only observers to the
congress. During this congress Metternich, with his diplomatic skills, succeeded to
change the pro-reforming attitude of Tsar Alexander to an anti-revolutionary one.
Austria, Prussia and Russia authorized Metternich to dispatch an Austrian army to
Naples to suppress the revolution there. Austria’s campaign was successful but a
plethora of revolutionaries fled the Holly Alliance terror imposed in Italy and moved
to Spain making the revolutionary movement in the Iberia Peninsula more intense.
The Congress of Verona
The third tail-congress was held in 1822 in Verona. When this congress was taking
place, revolutionary uprisings were gaining momentum in Spain, in Greece and in
Latin America. Regarding the issue of Spain, the congress authorized France to send
an army to suppress revolution there. Note that Spain was considered by the Holly
Alliance as belonging to the sphere of influence of France. France dispatched an
expeditionary force of 200.000 men which easily succeeded to re-impose Bourbon’s
authority there and savagely suppress revolutionaries. Tsar Alexander proposed also
to the Congress the dispatch of an international naval force to South America to deal
with revolutionary movements there but his proposals were rejected because they
were interfering with the British strategic dogma at two points: firstly the British
opposed placing their naval forces under international control and secondly the
strategic interests they possessed in this area. Note that during the first two decades of
the 19th century the colonial system of Spain in Latin America was extremely
weakened and in great disarray and at the same time the British economic influence in
the area (Britain almost monopolized the trade during Napoleonic Wars) was rapidly
increasing. Thus the British rejected the proposal and by non-offensive (neutral)
tactics allowed for a quicker collapse of Spanish rule in Latin America. Regarding the
third issue, the Greek revolution, Tsars’ policy in the past was to exploit religious and
cultural ties with Greeks and Armenians to their benefits by the undercover (or nonofficial) support of the grand plans of Greeks (”Megali Idea”), some times (Catherine
the Great) even flirting with the idea of a Greek Empire subordinate to them. On the
other hand, during the last two tail-congresses (1820-1822) an understanding had been
developed between Metternich and Alexander as to the significance of checking
revolutionary activities in southern Europe and in particular in the Ottoman Empire.
This understanding prevented Alexander from openly supporting Greek revolution in
the Balkans. On the other hand, the need for anti-revolutionary actions in southern
Balkans was not imminent since the Ottoman army was able for some time to handle
this issue without assistance.
THE INITIATIVES OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
British diplomacy, functioning in the context of the most advanced and stable sociopolitical system of Europe, was confronted with a highly unstable order in continental
Europe which was inflicted by a multitude of complex and conflicting national,
political, social and economic problems, narrow-sighted and incompetent leaders and
backward constitutional and socio-economic institutions. In confronting the European
socio-political chaos, British diplomacy exhibited a powerful geo-strategic vision and
implemented clear, firmly oriented and well-studied policies which methodically,
persistently and innovatively exploited to the British advantage the inherent
weaknesses of the unstable (continental) European order and the equally unstable and
short-sighted political (and not only) minds (of some) of its monarchs. Consequently,
as early as in 1914 (and even earlier) the outcome of World War I could be expected
with a high probability to be in favor of Britain, leaving only two fuzzy factors
(strategic question marks) to influence the possibility of a negative for it outcome: (a)
the geo-political and tactical exploitation of the hastily built naval power of Germany
by the unstable and short-sighted political minds of Kaiser and general Lundendorff
and (b) the interference of the American anti-colonial policies with the British
interests in Europe and the Middle East. The first and most crucial strategic question
mark reached a favorable for Britain answer with the naval battle of Jutland, in the
summer of 1916, giving it the opportunity and enough time to tackle the second
question mark (the theory of provocation of an American isolationism by staging
or exploiting the horrific events of the battle of Somme to create a repulsive
mood in the American public just before the Autumn 1916 presidential elections,
see next section).
Sixty more years later, with the end of World War I, Europe experienced the complete
collapse of the old order and the temporary triumph of nationalism which produced a
plethora of national states, as a rule competing to each other, and at the same time
repressing existing ethnic or religious minorities within their borders. This repression
in some cases (Germany, Ottoman Empire and Russia) reached a climax when
unprecedented ethnic cleansing policies and tactics were applied (the holocausts of
Jews in Europe and of Christians in Asia Minor). The new order emerging in Europe
and the Middle East after World War I was quite unstable and unable to offer to its
citizens the sense of a sustainable security, a fact that led to World War II.
The British diplomatic initiatives undertaken during 1900-1914 were carefully
studied. In 1902 Britain established a military alliance with Japan in order to secure
its interests in the Pacific, especially in China, and possibly to counter-balance the
geo-strategic ambitions of USA in this area.
By 1904 the Britain reached a strategic understanding (entente cordiale) with France
by recognizing their colonial interests in northwestern Africa with the French, on the
other hand, recognizing the British occupation of the strategic outpost of Egypt and
the Suez Canal. Britain carefully avoided to upgrade this understanding to a military
alliance with France which would force the British to offer military support to France
in the case of a war. Three years later the British settled their differences with the
Russians in the context of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which was heavily
focused on Persia by establishing two spheres of influence there, a Russian one in the
north of it and a British one in the south and eastern part of it (Beluchistan). This
clause of the Anglo-Russian Convention secured two strategic interests of Britain: (a)
its vital economic interests in Persia, that is the exploitation of the vast oil resources
there in order to modernize and expand its naval forces and (b) its vital interests on
the geo-strategic sea route connecting Egypt with India and the Far East.
During this period the British, being quite fearful of possible American reactions to
their imperialistic policies, were engaged in secret discussions and secret agreements
regarding European, Middle East and colonial affairs. By the end of the first decade of
20th century the British should have acquired an advanced and clear understanding of
the anti-colonial and ‘open-sea’ attitudes of the American presidential circles and
especially of Wilson who was elected president in 1912 and again in 1916.
THE BALANCE OF POWERS IN EUROPE AND THE ANGLOGERMAN GEO-POLITICAL COMPETITION: 1900-1914
Britain’s diplomatic behavior towards Europe in the second half of 19th century was
characterized as a ‘glorious isolation’. According to a proposed alternative
consideration, Britain, during this period, was taking a wisely calculated distance
from diplomatic European affairs waiting for the dust of the socio-political storm,
which tormented continental Europe for more than fifty years, to come down before
deciding for its next movements in the diplomatic chessboard. Britain’s strategic
options had been already established and were guiding the careful steps of British
diplomacy:
(a) UNOBSTRUCTED RULING OF THE SEAS
to further enhance and expand its colonial system (by introducing among other
arguments the theory of ‘governing and governed nations’) and to strictly
abstain from international discussions and agreements that might lead to the
restriction of its hegemony over the seas and its colonial system.
(b) THE GOLDEN RULE OF MULTIPLE NAVAL ENGAGEMENT
to retain a naval superiority against even the worst case scenario by keeping a
ready for war naval force at least equal to the combined naval forces of the
second and third strongest naval power
(c) THE PROTECTION OF THE BELGIAN BARRIER
to consider the violation of Belgium’s integrity as a cause of war
(d) THE PROTECTION OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
(e) THE PROTECTION OF THE EGYPT-INDIA STRATEGIC SEA-ROUTE
in particular to protect Suez Canal and its vital and fast expanding economic
interests in the Persian Gulf.
On the other hand, Britain would gain very little (or even lose) by being involved
in European affairs, becoming part of the problem during a period in which the
general geo-political trends were working to its favor:
(a) In the Austro-Hungarian Empire the national, social and political divisions
were firmly rooted in a governing system which was inefficient and incapable
of being adjusted to the new socio-economic realities with the internal order
being in an advanced state of disarray. Furthermore, during the AustroPrussian War the Empire proved to be militarily backward and incompetent.
As a consequence this empire would have little chances to survive the socks of
a long global war.
(b) The Russian Empire was tantalized by intensifying radical ideological
movements and it was inflicted by continuous violence and insurrections
organized by ideologically highly focused and persuasive radical circles with
the authority of the regime (mainly of Tsar and his inner circle) continuously
and seriously questioned. On the other hand Russia was humiliated during the
Russo-Japanese War with its main naval forces being destroyed in the Pacific
Ocean in 1905. The socks of a global and prolonged war would only
accelerate and magnify internal problems by exposing more convincingly to
its citizens the incompetence of its governing system and its backward military
power. Furthermore, the incompetent and the ultra conservative aristocracy of
Russia was imposing a suffocating order in the armed forces of the country
which could not keep high the moral of the soldiers and exploit their fighting
capabilities in the case they were faced with the extreme pressures of war with
a morally and technically superior enemy.
(c) In the German Empire, although the general socio-economic trends were very
dynamic (by 1913 it had become the most powerful economic power of
Europe) and its armed forces (especially its naval ones) were in a phase of fast
modernization and expansion, it was the negative aspects of the personality of
its ruler and absolute decision maker (Wilhelm II) that would put in test and
possibly counter-balance the positive trends of the country.
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