Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions
QUALITATIVE DATA BASE
This template is the basis of the qualitative data base on UN targeted sanctions. Please
complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner,
but with sufficient background and documentation for controversial points. The core units of
analysis are sanctions episodes.
COUNTRY
LIBYA
AUTHOR(S)
Clara PORTELA
1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
Before the UNSC imposed sanctions, sanctions regimes by the US and the EU wielded in response to
Libyan support for international terrorism had been in place for several years.
A record of animosity had developed between the US and Libya well before the Lockerbie incident. The US
started imposing sanctions against Libya in 1973, when certain types of military sales were banned in
response to Libya’s involvement with international terrorism. The US designated Libya state sponsor of
terrorism in 1979, and it remained on that list until 2006. After a mob attacked and set fire to the embassy
in December 1979, US embassy staff member were withdrawn from Tripoli. The US imposed controls on
the export of certain civilian aircraft materials, severed diplomatic relations and ordered its citizens to
leave Libya in 1981. The following year, it imposed a ban on import of crude oil and expanded controls on
most US exports. In 1985, the import ban was extended to refined petroleum products. Two co-ordinated
terror attacks carried out at the airports of Rome and Vienna in December 1985, reportedly by Abu Nidal
with Libyan support, caused the US to conduct aid raids on targets within Libya, including Qaddafi’s
residence, in 1986. US sanctions were tightened subsequently: economic exchange with a list of 48 Libyan
businesses was forbidden – one of the earliest US targeted measures -, and a ban was imposed against
most exports to Libya (Simons 199:146). In 1996, the US Congress adopted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA), a controversial legislation imposing punishments on non-US firms which invested in the Libyan oil
or gas sector (Niblock 2001:32).
Diplomatic relations between the UK and Libya had broken off in 1984 after the assassination of a British
police officer in front of the Libyan embassy in London, who was shot by fire allegedly coming from the
premises of the embassy (Niblock 2001:30). The European Union – then European Community (EC) placed sanctions on Libya for the first time in the context of what was called “the crisis in the
Mediterranean” in one of the few sanctions regimes wielded in the 1980s. The “crisis” referred to the
1985 attacks carried out at the airports of Rome and Vienna - the same attacks that compelled the US to
bomb Libyan targets. The EU then pledged not to export arms or other military equipment to countries
clearly implicated in supporting terrorism. The EU added further sanctions in April 1986 following the
bombing of a Berlin nightclub frequented by US military officers. This attack was allegedly connected to
Libya; yet, later evidence pointed to a Palestinian-Syrian origin. EC sanctions consisted in:
 The reduction of the number of Libyans serving in official capacities in the member states of the EC,
including diplomats, employees of press agencies, airlines, etc.
 a pledge to apply a more stringent review of visas applications from non-diplomatic personnel;
 A revision of elements of the EC trade policy vis-a-vis Libya: a reduction in export credits and a
cessation of sale to Libya of subsidised goods.
European sanctions were superseded by UNSC sanctions in 1992. Following the suspension of the UN
sanctions, the EU decided to continue the application of its arms embargo, which was only lifted in 2004 in
conjunction with the US unilateral embargo (Portela 2005).
2. BEGINNING INCIDENT OR EVENT (of what prompted UNSC action in the first place)
The incidents giving rise to the imposition of sanctions took place in 1988 and 1989: Pan Am flight 103
exploded over Lockerbie (Scotland) in December 1988, killing 259 passengers and crew, including 189 US
citizens and 11 people on the ground. UTA flight 772 exploded over Niger in September 1989, killing 171
passengers and crew. After investigations into the attacks pointed to Libyan intelligence agents, a French
court issued a warrant for the arrest of a Libyan for the UTA bombing in 1991, while the US and the UK
indicted two Libyan security officers (Cortright and Lopez 2000:110). The three countries sponsored
subsequent resolutions jointly, basing the demands on the letters they had directed at Libyan authorities.
3. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS (i.e., counter-terrorism (CT), non-proliferation (NP),
conflict prevention (CP), human rights (HR), democracy promotion (DP))
The main objective of the sanctions can be categorised under “counter-terrorism” (CT). More specifically,
the objective of the sanctions was to end state support for terrorism, which sets it apart from later
measures blacklisting individuals connected to terrorist organizations without making direct reference to
a state. The goal of counter-terrorism was to be advanced by bringing the agents responsible for acts of
aerial terrorism to justice.
Beyond the hand-over of the indictees, the sanctions were meant as a deterrent against future acts of
terrorism and as a means of encouraging the Libyan regime to end its support of terrorist organisations
(Cortright and Lopez 2000:109).
4. IDENTIFICATION OF EPISODES
Three episodes can be identified.
The threat phase (January to March 1992) begins with the issuing of UNSC Resolution 731 condemning
the terrorist attacks perpetrated on the Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 and requesting that Libya
satisfies the request by the US, the UK and France regarding the judicial processes initiated in these three
countries, including the extradition of the two Libyan terrorist suspects for trial in a US or UK court.
The first sanctions episode (March 1992 to November 1993) starts with Resolution 748, imposing an arms
embargo and a travel ban in response of Libya’s failure to comply with the demands of resolution 731.
The tightening of the sanctions (November 1993 to August 1998) reflected in Resolution 883 gives rise to
a second episode.
The third and final episode (August 1998 to September 2003) begins with the Security Council’s decision
to suspend the sanctions once Libya has ensured the appearance of the suspects for trial in a Scottish
court in the Netherlands, and it finishes with the full lifting of sanctions in 2003.
5. SANCTIONS TERMINATION?
Sanctions were terminated by resolution 1506 in 2003, four years after the suspension of the measures.
The Security Council noted that Libya had satisfied the demands of the Security Council, particularly
through its acceptance of responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, payment of appropriate
compensation, renunciation of terrorism, and a commitment to cooperating with any further requests for
information in connection with the investigation.
6. REFLECTIONS (i.e. distinctive or unique aspects of the sanctions, potential lessons)
The mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against Libya from 1992 to 2003
present several features which make this case unique. Along with the sanctions against Sudan, it
constitutes one of the first instances of targeted sanctions. It also represents one of the first attempts by
the UN Security Council to address the problem of state support for terrorism using tools under Chapter
VII. The sanctions regime remains one of the longest in post-Cold War UNSC practice, second only to Iraq:
seven years elapsed from imposition to suspension, and four years more from suspension to lifting of
sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2000). Furthermore, its successful outcome makes its study more relevant.
In Elliot’s assessment, this feature makes the case of Libya unique: ‘‘with the exception of Libya, the
results of UN targeted sanctions have been disappointing’’ (Elliott 2002:171). Drezner considers Libya an
“exemplar case” which “demonstrates the utility of targeted sanctions” (Drezner 2011:103).
At the same time, a singularity of the Libyan sanctions is that the targeted leadership managed to rally
sufficient international support from Arab and African countries to compel the UNSC to settle for
concessions slightly inferior to their initial demands. The Libyan case illustrated what Cortright and Lopez
labelled a “reverse bargaining dynamic” (2000:109): the successful negotiations that led to the resolution
of the crisis were precipitated by the action of neighbouring states and regional organisations which
applied pressure on the permanent members of the Security Council to relax their approach or face and
end to sanctions compliance.
7. TIMELINE (provide a general timeline for each case, identifying the origins, episodes, and where
relevant, the termination of the sanctions)
September 1989: UTA flight explodes over Niger
December 1989: Pam Am flight 103 explodes over Lockerbie, Scotland
November 1991: The UK, US and France issue a tripartite declaration formulating their demands: France demanded
full cooperation with judicial investigations; the US and UK demanded hand-over of suspects to US or British courts
December 1991: letters are issued by the UK, US and France addressing several requests to the Libyan
government
January 1992: Security Council passes resolution 731 announcing that investigations implicated Libyan officials in
the terrorist attacks on PanAm flight 103 and UTA flight 772 and urging Libya to co-operate with the request from
the UK, US and France in connection with the legal procedures related to the attacks.
February 1992: Libya offers to hand over the UTA suspects to a French court and the Pan Am suspects to an
international court
March 1992: Security Council passes resolution 748 imposing an arms embargo and selective travel ban and
establishing a Sanctions Committee
June 1992: Libya offers to hand over the suspects to a court monitored by either the Arab League or the UN
November 1993 : Security Council passes resolution 883 widening the travel ban and imposing financial sanctions
February 1994: Libya proposes that the suspects be tried at the ICJ under Scottish law
October 1995: Security Council Committee considers Libyan request for repatriation of foreign nationals
February 1996: Libya Sanctions Committee adopts transparency measures and medical decisions
March 1996: Libya Sanctions Committee approves pilgrimage flights
April 1996: Security Council claims flight of Libyan aircraft to Jeddah is a violation of resolution 748
May 1996: Libyan Sanctions Committee rejects request from Libya to transport humanitarian aid to Lebanon on a
Libyan Arab Airlines flight
July 1996: The Libya Sanctions Committee determines that the return flight Tripoli to Cairo by a Libyan aircraft of
June 1996 constituted a violation of the sanctions and it threatened that if a further violation occurs, it will consider
recommendations to the Security Council on ways to increase the effectiveness of the measures contained in
resolution 748 (1992)
March 1997: Libya Committee approves pilgrimage flights
September 1997: Arab League announces that it would allow more medical evacuations out of Libya
October 1997: UK invites the UN to send observers to trial of suspects in Lockerbie bombing
February 1998: ICJ rules that it has jurisdiction to hear Libyan claim over Lockerbie
March 1998: Libya Sanctions Committee sanctions reiterates willingness to facilitate travel of Libyan Haj pilgrims
June 1998: the Organisation of African Unity allows its members to ignore the flight ban unless the US and the UK
agrees to trial in a neutral country
August 1998: The US and the UK propose that the two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 be
tried before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands
August 1998: Security Council passes resolution 1192 announcing that sanctions should be suspended if the two
suspects appear for trial in front of a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands
December 1998: Secretary-General holds meeting with Qaddafi on question of possible transfer of Lockerbie
bombing suspects
March 1999: Security Council welcomes Libya's letter concerning suspects in Lockerbie bombing
April 1999: Secretary-General reports to the Security Council of arrival in Netherlands of two Libyans charged with
Pan Am Flight 103 bombings; UN sanctions are suspended
November 2001: Burkina Faso, Cuba, Laos, Malaysia, South Africa and Zimbabwe send a letter addressed to the
President of the Security Council calling for the lifting of sanctions
December 2001: Cameroon, Ghana, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe send a letter addressed to the President of the
Security Council calling for the lifting of sanctions
September 2003: Security Council passes resolution 1506 lifting the sanctions and dissolving the Sanctions
Committee
EPISODES
On the following pages we provide a table for each episode you identified. Please complete
all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner.
HOW MANY EPISODES DID YOU IDENTIFY?
3
THREAT PHASE
CONTEXT
An indictment was issued in November 1991 simultaneously in the US and the UK specifically naming
the two Libyan suspects, Amin Fhimah and Abdelbaset al-Megarahi. Requests were address to the
Libyan authorities by France, UK and US. Libya responded to the indictment suggesting that the issue
should be referred to the International Court of Justice (Niblock 2001:37). In November 1991, the three
countries issued a tripartite declaration formulating their demands. Notably, there was a difference in
the demands by France, which fell short of an extradition request, and those by the US and the UK,
which required the hand-over of the two suspects for trial in the UK or the US. The French demands
were that Libyan authorities should produce all material evidence in their possession and facilitate
access to documents, contacts and meeting and authorise Libyan officials to respond to requests. The
tripartite declaration also demanded that Libya take responsibility for the actions of the Libyan
officials, that it disclose all it knows about the crime and that it pay compensation.
Libya challenged the legality of the Security Council’s demands. The Libyan government contested the
requirements of the UNSC arguing that sanctions were imposed before the matter had been fully
investigated “through judicial channels”. The central procedural violation on which Libya supported its
contestation of the UNSC demands was their inconsistency with the Montreal Convention of Civil
Aviation of 1971, to which all states concerned were parties. The US, the UK, France and Libya were all
signatories to this Convention, enacted under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organisation. The Convention protected the Libyan right not to extradite the two suspects. Article 7 of
the Montreal Convention stipulates that “the contracting state in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged…to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. However, there is no obligation on the state to extradite
the suspects – the choice on extradition lies with the state holding the suspect. Article 8(2) of the
Convention reads: “if a contracting state which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty receives a request for extradition from another contracting state with which it has no
extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition”.
Since Libya had no extradition treaty with either the US or the UK it was under no legal obligation to
surrender the two suspects (Simons 1999:91). Libya argued that the dispute was of legal nature and
that the UNSC was not the competent forum to consider the question (Hurd 2005:511).
UNSC DECISION MAKING
On 21st January 1992, the UNSC passed Resolution 731, which characterised the terrorist acts
simultaneously as a “criminal act” and as a “threat to international peace and security”.
The resolution formulated the following demand:

-
It urged the Libyan Government “immediately” to “provide a full and effective response” to
the “request to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts” against
Pan Am flight 103 and Union de Transports Aériens flight 772. However, no deadline was
specified for compliance with these demands, neither were sanctions threatened.
Atypically, the demands formulated in the requests were not reproduced in the UNSC
resolutions. These entailed that the government of Libya:
a) surrender for trial all those charged with the bombing crimes and accept complete
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials;
b) disclose all it knew about the crimes, including the names of the those responsible, and
allow access to witnesses, documents, and other material evidence;
c) pay appropriate compensation to the victims’ families, and
d) commit itself to cease all forms of terrorist action and support to terrorist groups.
The first three demands were contained in a joint US-UK statement, and the forth in the tripartite USUK-France statement (Hurd 2005:504).
POLITICAL WILL
The resolution was sponsored by France, the US and the UK and was adopted unanimously.
Security Council composition and voting record:

Yes: UK, France, Russia, US, China, Venezuela, Belgium, Hungary, Japan, Ecuador, Austria,
Cape Verde, Morocco, India, Zimbabwe

Abstentions: none
The absence of negative votes and of abstentions reflects a strong political will, but this resolution did
not prove controversial because it did not agree or threaten measures. The fact that there was no
mention in the resolution of further action should Libya fail to comply reflected the inability of the
sponsors to negotiate a more direct reference to chapter VII, according to Hurd (2005:505). In the
subsequent resolution imposing sanctions, a number of countries which had voted yes to this
resolution would abstain: Morocco, China, India, Zimbabwe and Cape Verde, as elaborated in the
following section. As they would announce in their explanations of vote for Res 748, they agreed to Res
731 in order to express their full rejection of terrorism.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
As the resolution did not entail any sanctions, its purpose can be considered as signaling.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The primary addressee was the Libyan leadership.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
No measures were adopted or threatened.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with
IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The UN Secretary General was entrusted with the task of seeking co-operation of the Libyan
government to provide an effective response to resolution 731. In this capacity, he held various talks
with Libyan representatives.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
A US Court issued an indictment that was attached to the “letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991”,
while the UK attached an arrest warrant issued by a Scottish court.
For its part, Libya filed a case in front of the International Court of Justice on the 3rd of March 1992.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
N/A
DIRECT IMPACTS
Efforts by Libyan authorities to avoid sanctions were a direct impact of this Resolution, even though no
sanctions were explicitly threatened. Libya arrested two suspects in the bombing of PanAm flight 103
in December 1991. It refused to extradite them to the US or the UK, but offered to surrender them to
an international tribunal. Libya’s decision to file a case in front of the International Court of Justice on
the 3rd of March 1992 was also a direct impact of the resolution.
Also, efforts by regional organisations to avoid the imposition of sanctions intensified: The League of
Arab States passed three resolutions on the matter between December 1991 and March 1992, calling
for the establishment of a joint committee between the UN and the League to resolve the issue and
urging the Security Council to avoid authorizing military, economic or diplomatic actions pending a
decision by the ICC. The Arab Maghreb Union also conducted demarches vis-à-vis the President of the
Council, while the Organisation of the Islamic Conference called for averting any military or economic
action against Libya.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
EVASION
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
EFFECTIVENESS
Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Libya made several unsuccessful attempts to avoid them in
February and March 1992. It suggested that the case should be handled by Libyan courts and
suggested that the Secretary General could invite international observers, and it offered to pay
compensation if the accused citizens were unable to. A month later, Libya suggested that it was open
to handing over the suspects to a third party, such as to the Arab League (Cortright and Lopez
2000:111).
EPISODE 1 (3/92 – 11/93)
CONTEXT
Two months after the release of the 731 resolution, the Security Council considered that the Libyan
side had failed to comply with its demands and adopted a new resolutions imposing mandatory
sanctions.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
Resolution 748 was adopted on 31 March 1992 under Chapter VII, directing the following demands to
the Libyan leadership:

the Libyan government must “provide a full and effective response” to the “request to
cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts” against Pan Am flight 103
and Union de Transports Aériens flight 772; and

to “commit itself definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to
terrorist groups and that it must promptly, by concrete actions, demonstrate its
renunciation of terrorism”.
Resolution 748 referred to Res 731, which in turn referred to the “Letters dated 20 and 23 December
1991”. These letters included a Tripartite Declaration by the US, UK and France (S/23309), a (S/23306),
a Joint Declaration issued by the US and the UK (S/23308) accompanied by an indictment issued by a
US Court (S/23317) and Scottish arrest warrant (S/23307). The Tripartite Declaration urges Libya to
cease its support of terrorism, while the other demands were formulated separately by France on the
one hand and the US and the UK on the other. Only the Joint Declaration contained a demand for
surrendering the suspects for trial, along with accepting responsibility for the actions and payment for
compensation. Thus, the demand that the Libyan government must provide a “full and effective
response” must be understood as comprising the request for extradition.
POLITICAL WILL
The resolution was adopted by 10 votes in favour with 5 abstentions.
Security Council composition and voting record:

Yes: UK, France, Russia, US, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Japan, Ecuador, Venezuela

Abstentions: China, Cape Verde, Morocco, India, Zimbabwe
The resolution created a sanctions committee with a mandate to consider the approval of flights on
humanitarian grounds. The measures affected contracts entered into before the adoption of the
resolution. A review was foreseen every 120 days or sooner.
During the UNSC session on the 31st of March, the members of the Security Council which abstained
justified their vote as follows:
 China did not support the imposition of sanctions against Libya because it claimed that
sanctions would “not help settle the question but would rather complicate the issue further,
aggravate regional tension and have serious consequences for the countries concerned in the
region”.
 India pointed to some “differences in methods and means” with the cosponsors, lamenting that
“more time and patience would have yielded better results”, that the circumstances under
which sanctions would not come into force or would be lifted were unclear and that the
resolution did not contain a commitment to address problems of third countries arising from
their carrying out enforcement measures. India also stated that, given that the judicial process
had not yet run its full course, “a little delay on that account in the Security Council’s moving on
to the next stage of its action would...have merited positive consideration”.
 Cape Verde claimed that it would be more appropriate “if the Council were to act after the
International Court of Justice had decided on what is the applicable law, if any, as to issue of
jurisdiction”. Given that the Constitution of Cape Verde does not allow the extradition of own
nationals, endorsing measures that run counter to this constitutional principle posed a
difficulty. Finally, it pointed to the fact that sanctions should only be adopted by the Council as
a last resort, whereas in the case at hand, if more time had been devoted to a negotiated
solution might have been worked out for the surrender of the two individuals.
 Similarly, Zimbabwe complained that peaceful diplomatic means in the sense of Chapter VI of
the Charter had not been exhausted before resorting to Chapter VII, and held that the Security
Council should have awaited the outcome of the judicial proceedings at the ICJ first.
 Highlighting the efforts it had undertaken to avoid the deterioration of the situation, Morocco
abstained claiming that it could not “serve both a judge and as factor for rapprochement”
(S/3063).
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The resolution imposed some measures that were meant to constrain, coerce and to signal.
The main purpose of the resolution was coercive: The UNSC demanded primarily to comply with the
demands. In the evolution from Res 731 to Res 748 there was an increasing emphasis on the goal of
general renunciation of terrorism. While the previous resolution had merely urged the Libyan
government to provide a full and effective response to the requests by the UK, US and France in
connection to the aerial attacks, resolution 748 demanded that Libya must “commit itself to cease all
forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups” and “by concrete actions, demonstrate
its renunciation of terrorism”. Secondly, the resolution was meant to take effect only on the 15th of
April provided that Libya had not complied with the demands by then. This signifies an intention to
coerce.
The measures had a constraining dimension: Banning the international aviation activity of Libya was
intended to curtail the capacity of Libyan agents to conduct and support terrorist activities.
Finally, the measures had a signaling intention: they were meant to visibly stigmatise Libya as a violator
of international norms and deter third countries from following its example and supporting terrorism.
At the same time, the sanctions were geared towards supporting the emergence of a new international
norm, that of criminalising state-sponsored terrorism, which was not fully established at the time.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The primary addressee was the Libyan leadership. However, one can also claim that the sanctions were
meant to help establishing a norm that state-sponsored terrorism was an international crime relevant
to the action of the UNSC, and by the same token, to deter other states from supporting international
terrorism.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
The measures adopted consisted in:
 Aviation ban and ban on supply of spare parts and technical assistance
o “all states shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their
territory if destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Libya”,
o “prohibit the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, the provision of
engineering and maintenance servicing”, “certification of airworthiness for Libyan
aircraft, the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the
provision of new direct insurance for Libyan aircraft”,
o “prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices”
 Arms embargo
o “all states shall prohibit any provision to Libya...of arms and related materiel of all
types”, “technical advice, assistance or training related to the[ir] provision,
manufacture, maintenance, or use”
o
“all states shall withdraw any of their officials or agents present in Libya to advise the
Libyan authorities on military matters”
 Reduction of Libyan diplomatic representations
o “All states shall significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Libyan
diplomatic missions...and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all
such staff who remain”
 Revision of visa policy, consisting of expelling or denying entry to Libyan national who
have been involved in terrorist activities
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with
IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
N/A
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
The US placed a unilateral oil embargo on Libya.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
The case Libya filed at the ICC was still under consideration.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
Resolution 748 obliged member states to report on implementation measures.
The flight ban and other provisions were generally well-respected until mid-1998 (Conroy 2002).
Three annual reports were released by the Sanctions Committee on implementation during this
episode.
In its report submitted in December 1995, the Sanctions Committee noted that it had approved 21
emergency medical evacuations by air from Libya in 1994, 42 in 1995 (Security Council 1996a:6) and 63
in 1996 (Security Council 1996b:3).
The Sanctions Committee also granted approval for 45 flights requested by Egypt for the purpose of
transporting 6,000 Libyan pilgrims to perform the Haj, subject to a number of conditions such as the
absence of stopovers, and the prohibition that Libyan public authorities benefited financially from the
flights (Security Council 1996a:6). Authorisation for identical requests by Egypt was granted also the
following year (Security Council 1996b:6) and in 1997 (Security Council 1997).
DIRECT IMPACTS
Estimations of aviation-related losses vary. In 1997, Libya claimed have lost over 2 billion US$.
Independent sources pointed to 2,5 US$ (Cortright and Lopez 2000).
The oil company Shell reportedly abandoned business in Libya because of travel difficulties (Cortright
and Lopez 2000:113).
Other disruptions claimed by Libya include costs incurred by the Airport Company and General Board
for Civil Aviation, the Posts and Cables Communications Company, the due to the cessation of air
traffic and delays of in the receipt of incoming mail (Security Council 1992:8).
INDIRECT IMPACTS
The impact on the medical sector claimed by Libya entailed the death of 150 urgent cases while being
transported by land routes to airports in Egypt and Tunisia; non-arrival of medical supply orders for
drugs and medical equipment as well as specialist to provide treatment, surgery and training, and the
resignation of medical and paramedical personnel (Security Council 1992:4). In the report submitted in
1993, Libya claimed that the number of incurably ill patients that could not be sent abroad for
treatment was 8,525, and that 230 of them died while travelling by overland routes (Security Council
1993:2).
According to Libyan claims, the aerial embargo caused a severe decline in food production and
delivery, agricultural and livestock production and a decline in export earnings. Yet, the Food and
Agricultural Organisation disconfirmed data provided by the Libyan authorities. Part of the losses
purportedly resulted from the halting of supplies of veterinary drugs and seedlings (Security Council
1992:6).
The delay in the arrival of spare parts needed by factories caused a delay in the production process.
The reduction of personnel in foreign offices and airlines offices gave rise to workers compensation in
the amount of US$ 2 million (Security Council 1992:7).
Libyan military spending is reported to have decreased as a result of lower revenues (Cortright and
Lopez 2000:114). Empirical data confirm this assessment while adding also an important nuance:
Absolute levels of spending during the sanctions year was lower than after the suspension of the
sanctions, effective as from 1999. However, a higher percentage of the GDP was devoted to military
spending during the sanctions period than after their lifting. The following table illustrates this trend
(SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).
Military expenditure in Libya expressed in constant (2009) US$ m.:
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
468
528
408
437
427
549
683
892
879
773
728
Military expenditure in Libya as a percentage of the GDP:
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
4.1
5.3
3.8
3.1
2.7
2.2
1.9
1.9
1.4
1
0.9
Thus, the percentage of the GDP devoted to military expenditure has been in constant decline since
1999, while the total amount has increased steadily.
The slowing of the military chemical and ballistic missile programmes is also ascribed to the sanctions.
In its 1992 report, Libya stated that the ban on obtaining spare parts, had “paralysed the defensive
capacity of the country” – a complaint that was however dropped in the 1993 report (Security Council
1992:8).
The shortage of aviation spare parts created fears among the Libyan travellers that the safety of
internal flights had been downgraded, which contributed to a decrease in internal air travel (Niblock
2001).
In its 1992 report, Libya indicated that the rate of operation of the Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft
dropped 64% from the previous figure, while the rate of domestic operation fell by 40 percent
(Security Council 1992:7).
EVASION/ VIOLATIONS
As the Libya Sanctions Committee only started providing reports in 1995, its contents are reflected in
the discussion of episode 3.
Restrictions on the provision of aviation services were violated several times by European companies,
which openly supplied aircraft parts and services to Libya arguing that sanctions did not affect preexisting contracts. In the original text of the Res 748 no explicit provision was made regarding preexisting contracts. These instances mainly involved companies based in Switzerland, the Netherlands,
France and Malta delivering supplies to Libyan oil companies.
Violations of the arms embargo were perpetrated by an Egyptian company, which supplied spare parts
for tanks and military aircraft in 1993, and Iran, which delivered an arms shipment intercepted in
September 1996 (Cortright and Lope 2000:117).
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The Tripoli embassy of Venezuela, one of the non-permanent members of the UNSC which voted in
favour of the resolution, was attacked on 2nd of April, two days after the adoption of the resolution,
which caused the UNSC to demand that Libya should pay the government of Venezuela full
compensation for the damage caused.
An increase in road accidents took place due to the increased burden on Libyan roads. This was
indicated by various, including Libyan, UN and independent reports (Libya claimed damages worth 2,5
billion US$). In 1992, Libya reported that traffic accidents had increased from 2,401 to 3,788 during the
first four months of the air embargo, with an increase in deaths of 35% (Security Council 1992:5). It
also produced damage to public roads (Security Council 1992:7).
Libya claimed that international organisations such as the World Health Organisation and the Food and
Agriculture Organisation were unable to fulfil their obligations in Libya due to the air embargo (Security
Council 1992:5).
An intended effect was the isolation and decline of the country’s intellectual circles. After the flight
ban was imposed, Libyans stopped studying abroad. Those who had been educated abroad either
stayed abroad or remained locked in Libya (interview 2010). The sanctions gave rise to a gap between
intellectual elites trained abroad in the pre-sanctions period, and the following generation which was
educated in Libya.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that the air embargo increased the cost of refugee
repatriation and created hardship for some 7,000 refugees in Libya (Cortright and Lopez 2000:116).
Impossibility of performing the Haj, with a decline from an annual average of 30,000 pilgrims to 3,500
only (Security Council 1992:5). This effect was however remedied through the authorisation of
humanitarian flights to that effect performed by Egypt.
In its more elaborate report of 1993, Libya complained about the inability of factories to send
representatives abroad to inspect imported goods at the port of shipment (Security Council 1993:8). It
also mentioned that as a consequence of the decline in the agricultural sector “farmers and raisers of
livestock divert their production schedules to other activities that were perhaps not so profitable or
even so appropriate” – however, the nature of such activities was left unspecified (Security Council
1993:6).
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Overall, Libya claimed to be suffering “enormous damage caused by the embargo imposed on the
Libyan people” (Security Council 1992:2).
The impact on the medical sector claimed by Libya entailed the death of 150 urgent cases while being
transported by land routes to airports in Egypt and Tunisia; non-arrival of medical supply orders for
drugs and medical equipment as well as specialist to provide treatment, surgery and training, and the
resignation of medical and paramedical personnel (Security Council 1992:4). In the report submitted in
1993, Libya claimed that the number of incurably ill patients that could not be sent abroad for
treatment was 8,525, and that 230 of them died while travelling by overland routes (Security Council
1993:2).
According to Libyan claims, the aerial embargo caused a severe decline in food production and
delivery, agricultural and livestock production and a decline in export earnings. Yet, the Food and
Agricultural Organisation disconfirmed data provided by the Libyan authorities. Part of the losses
purportedly resulted from the halting of supplies of veterinary drugs and seedlings (Security Council
1992:6).
The delay in the arrival of spare parts needed by factories caused a delay in the production process.
The reduction of personnel in foreign offices and airlines offices gave rise to workers compensation in
the amount of US$ 2 million. (Security Council 1992:7)
Libyan military spending is reported to have decreased as a result of lower revenues (Cortright and
Lopez 2000:114). The slowing of the military chemical and ballistic missile programmes is also ascribed
to the sanctions (US Intelligence Agency). In its 1992, Libya stated that the ban on obtaining spare
parts, had “paralysed the defensive capacity of the country” (Security Council 1992:8).
The shortage of aviation spare parts created fears among the Libyan travellers that the safety of
internal flights had been downgraded, which contributed to a decrease in internal air travel. In its 1992
report, Libya indicated that the rate of operation of the Libyan Arab Airlines aircraft dropped 64% from
the previous figure, while the rate of domestic operation fell by 40 percent (Security Council 1992:7).
EFFECTIVENESS
The resolution was not effective in the sense that it compelled the Libyan leadership to fully conform
to UNSC demands. However, in June 1992 Libya offered to hand over the suspects to a court monitored by
either the Arab League or the UN, an offer that was rejected by the US and the UK (Cortright and Lopez
2000:112). At this stage, the coercive effect can be characterised with a (2): Libya was offering to cooperate, although it did not quite agree to the terms determined by the UNSC. Libya was trying to
negotiate, not directly with the US and UK but through the good offices of the League of Arab states, in
particular its Secretary General.
As far as the constraining effect is concerned, it can be rated as (1) even though the statements by the
targets in this regard were largely exaggerated. However, the aviation ban in particular did have
multiple and far-reaching consequences.
The signalling effect can be rated as (1), given that the norm was well articulated, the message was
fully received and well understood by the target, who remained very active in its campaign to bring
about the removal of sanctions. Third parties were very receptive to the condemnation and
criminalisation of state-sponsored terrorism, but still held reservations toward the extradition
requirement and the relevance of Chapter VII.
EPISODE 2 (11/93-8/98)
CONTEXT
A new resolution was adopted in light of Libya’s failure to comply with demands of resolutions 731
(1992) and 748 (1992), which the Security Council determined to “constitute a threat to international
peace and security”.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The Security Council passed resolution 883 on the 11th of November of 1993 tightening diplomatic
sanctions, imposing a freezing of assets from which the sale or supply of petroleum or petroleum
products and agricultural products, prohibiting the supply of equipment and servicing of the oil
industry and tightening restrictions in the aviation sector. The resolution did not formulate any new
demand, but insisted that the Libyan government comply with resolutions 731 and 748.
Once again, this resolution delayed its entry into force by three weeks, allowing the Libyan government
to avoid the imposition of further measures if it took corrective action by a stipulated deadline. In page
2, the text of the resolution states that the agreed measures “shall come into force...on 1st of
December 1993 unless the Secretary-General [...] reports that the Libyan government ensured the
appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 for trial before the appropriate United
Kingdom or United States court and has satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to the
bombing of UTA772”. It was also announced that sanctions would be lifted “when Libya complies fully
with the requests and decisions” in resolutions 731 and 748. This formulation represents new language
with respect to Res 748, which announced that the measures should apply “until the Security Council
decide(d) that the Libyan Government has complied”.
POLITICAL WILL
The resolution was adopted by 11 votes in favour and four abstentions.
Security Council composition and voting record:

Yes: UK, France, Russia, US, Cape Verde, Hungary, Japan, Venezuela, New Zealand, Spain,
Brazil

Abstentions: China, Morocco, Djibouti, Pakistan
The US, which had placed a unilateral oil embargo on Libya, attempted to persuade the Security
Council to do likewise (Cortright and Lopez 2000:112). However, this proposal was rejected by
European states, unwilling to agree an embargo that would have damaged their own energy needs.
Also, little support for upgrading sanctions existed among certain states which regarded the
extradition dispute as an issue concerning the US, the UK and France but not as a matter of global
relevance.
China justified its abstention on three grounds: Firstly, it indicated that it was not in favour of maintain,
let alone intensifying, sanctions against Libya” given that the only effective means that can lead to a
solution of this question was negotiation and consultation: “to intensify sanctions against Libya will not
help to settle the question; on the contrary, it may further complicate the matter, make the Libyan
people suffer more, and create even greater economic difficulties for the neighbouring and other
countries concerned”. Secondly, it pointed to the fact that Libya “has shown certain flexibility and is
willing to encourage the suspects to appear before the Scottish courts”. Finally, it claimed that more
time should be given for the efforts of organisations such as the OAU, the League of Arab States and
the NAM to contribute to the settlement of the crisis.
Pakistan did not give reasons for its abstention in its statement in front of the UNSC, while the two
remaining abstaining members of the Security Council refrained from issuing any statement.
Two non-members of the UNSC put forward additional reasons for protesting the sanctions: Egypt
stated that it would have preferred “further efforts” denouncing that the intensification of sanctions
would have a negative impact on the innocent and not necessarily lead to the truth” regarding the
Lockerbie incidents, and invited the Council to “consider alleviating the economic suffering of Libya
and of its neighbours that would arise from the adoption of the draft resolution under consideration”.
Speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, Sudan posited that Chapter VII, which addresses
situations of aggression that threaten international peace and security did not apply to the current
dispute. It claimed that the dispute at hand was a legal dispute and that it should be dealt with in a
court of law or alternatively under chapter VI of the Charter. Further, Sudan lamented that the
resolution “could shake the confidence of the smaller countries in th[e] Council’s neutrality when
dealing with controversial matters” and complained that “rules of justice and public law are violated
when an adversary is judge and jury and when the accused in to presumed innocent until proven
guilty”.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
The most important goal was that of coercion. The resolution had a marked coercive purpose: The
entry into force of the resolution was postponed until the 1 st of December, again giving a deadline for
the Libyan government to comply.
The resolution had a clear signaling purpose. It announced that the Security Council would suspend
them immediately if the Secretary-General reported that the Libyan Government had ensured the
appearance of the suspects for trial before a UK or US court and has satisfied the French judicial
authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 772, or fully lift when Libya had complies fully with the
requests in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992).
The measures also had a constraining purpose: Because the US had not been able to achieve a ban on
the purchase of Libyan oil, it accepted a compromise package that would progressively affect Libyan oil
production: As equipment fell into disrepair it would be difficult to replace, thus producing a gradual
erosion of oil-producing capacity (Simons 1999:92).
No new goals were added; the demands of previous resolutions were simply reaffirmed.
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The primary addressee was the Libyan leadership. However, with mounting criticism of the sanctions
regime among third world countries, sanctions can be considered to be addressed at the most
skeptical governments which had voiced opposition to the sanctions regime and called for its lifting
(such as Uganda, Algeria or Iran) in collective letters addressed to the UN Secretary General.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
 Freezing of state assets
o all states shall freeze funds and financial resources “owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly by the government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking”
linked to Libyan public authorities and “ensure that neither they nor any other funds or
financial resources are made available...to or for the benefit of the Government or
public authorities or any Libyan undertaking” connected to them.
o Funds derived from the sale of petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas,
agricultural products or commodities are exempted.
 Ban on oil industry equipment
o Ban on the provision to Libya of pumps of medium or large capacity, equipment
designed for use in crude oil export terminals or which can be used for this purpose,
refinery equipment and spare parts as well as the provision of any types of equipment,
supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of
such items;
 Aviation sanctions
o Closure of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their territories;
o Ban on any commercial transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines;
o Ban on the conclusion or renewal of arrangements for making available aircraft or
aircraft components, or the provision of engineering or maintenance servicing;
o Ban on the supply of materials, engineering or other services of components destined
for the construction, improvement or maintenance of Libyan civilian or military airfields
and associated facilities and equipment, “except for emergency equipment and services
directly related to civilian air traffic control”;
o Ban on the provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan pilots, flight engineers,
or aircraft and ground maintenance personnel associated with the operation of aircraft
and airfields within Libya;
o Ban on any renewal of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;
o Ban on claims at the instance of the Libyan government, authorities or nationals in
connection with any contract or transaction affected by reason of the measures
imposed.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with
IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a repeal of US laws that impose penalties on
companies and citizens of other countries in November 1996. The relationship with the UN sanctions
regime was tenuous, as this resolution criticised only US extraterritorial measures. The voting record
features 56 votes in favour, 4 votes against and 76 abstentions.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
The US passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in July 1996, which imposed secondary sanctions on
companies that continued to do business with Libya, extraterritorial legislation that created tensions
with European states. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 (ILSA) extended the U.S. sanctions regime
to non-U.S. entities outside the U.S. The provisions of the ILSA become particularly engaged whenever
a transaction is likely to contribute significantly and materially to Libya's ability to develop its
petroleum resources. The U.S. President must impose two of a selection of various specific sanctions
upon any entity that he determines has engaged in an act prohibited under the ILSA, unless he decides
to grant a waiver in the individual case (Smith 2003).
The US reportedly attempted to persuade other UNSC members to impose an oil embargo. However,
European members were interested in continuing the import of energy from Libya. At the time, 90% of
Libyan oil exports went to Europe (Cortright and Lopez 2000:112). Up until the military intervention of
2011, Libya ranked number 11 in EU's imports and ranked number 20 in the EU's major trade partners,
covering 1.2% of EU total trade. Concerning energy, Libya is Europe's third largest supplier (and trade
partner) behind Norway and Russia, covering 6.9% of total EU imports of energy, amounting to € 23.6
bn in 2006. EU imports from Libya consist notably of energy (98.5%), in particular petroleum and
petroleum products (85.2%) amounting to €19.6 billion.i
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
In October 1997, Libya had asked the ICJ to pass judgment on the claim that Libya was not obliged to
surrender the two accused for trial in Britain or the US. The ICJ ruled in February 1998 that it had
jurisdiction to hear the Libyan claim, which run counter to the claims by the US and UK. The final result
of the ruling was never published due to the termination of the sanctions regime.
The Arab League formed a seven-member committee to deal with the issue, which charged the SG of
the League with intensifying his efforts to reach a fair settlement. The Non-Aligned Movement, the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Organisation of African Unity expressed their concern
about the difficulties faced by the Libyan people as a result of the implementation of sanctions.
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
The Arab League called on its 21 members to ease the UN air embargo on Libya in September 1997.
The resolution instructed the sanctions committee to draw up guidelines for the implementation of the
measures, while it included a one-page annex specifying items prohibited under the oil industryrelated sanctions. The sanctions committee approved 21 emergency medical flights in 1994 and 42 in
1995, 70 in 1997, 91 in 1998 and 25 in 1999. It responded positively to a request by Egypt for 45 flights
on Egypt Air from Cairo to Tripoli and Benghazi and on to Jeddah, and an equal number of return
flights, for the purpose of transporting 6,000 Libyan pilgrims to perform the Haj.
However, the sanctions committee did not agree to a Libyan request to authorise the air transport to
enable over a million "illegal infiltrators, nationals of African States, to return to their countries in
order to avoid the hardships and dangers of travel created by the air embargo". The committee
considered that the presence of foreign nationals in Libya and its desire to repatriate them did not
constitute grounds for granting a humanitarian exception to the relevant Security Council resolutions
(Security Council 1996). The 1998 report recorded numerous violations of the air embargo (Security
Council 1998).
DIRECT IMPACTS
Due to the financial sanctions, Libyan assets in the US and other countries were frozen. Cortright and
Lopez report an amount of US$ 996,1 million blocked in the US by 1998. In the run up to the UNSC
Resolution, Libya moved its assets – estimated some $ 3 billion - to sheltered locations such as
Morocco, Egypt and Switzerland. The funds that remained in OECD banks can be identified as
stemming directly from the sale of Libyan oil and Libya could retain access to these funds under UN
sanctions (Niblock 2001:65) as explicitly permitted under the resolution. However, Cortright and Lopez
report that their financial utility to Libya was limited as “most financial transactions are cleared
through banking centres in the West” (2000:115). According to Hurd, the controls of Libya’s overseas
financial instruments did hit at resources of real consequence, even though these controls took effect
after Libya had had time to rearrange its finances (Hurd 2005:515).
Losses in the oil sector are difficult to quantify because since the 1980s the Libyan government had
implemented a conservationist policy aimed at saving the country’s oil resources for the long term. At
the same time, oil prices were falling in the sanctions period, a development unconnected to the
Libyan situation. According to the International Monetary Fund, despite the exclusion of oil from the
sanctions regime, Libya’s total exports fell in the years immediately after the sanctions, by 11% in 1992
and by 24% in 1993 (Hurd 2005:515). However, variations in Libyan oil production were caused by
modifications of the OPEC quota, not by production difficulties on the Libyan side. Indeed, in the mid1990s, Libya was producing and exporting more oil than in the 1980s: only 1997 and 1998 presented a
shortfall on the OPEC quota (Niblock 2001:65). Gas production followed a similar pattern.
With trade in oil-related equipment banned, Libya’s ability to refine and load petroleum was
constrained. Exploration and maintenance activities were halted – according to World Bank estimates,
Libya lost 18 billion US$ in terms of revenue (Cortright and Lopez 2000). US unilateral oil sanctions are
believed to have contributed to these trends. By contrast, extraction of crude oil remained stable
during the sanctions period. According to the International Energy Agency, in 1998 Libya pumped 1,39
million barrels a day. The fall in oil revenues is ascribed to global market trends.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
Although the core of the Libyan economy continued to operate much as it had before sanctions due to
the regime’s success in protecting the core elements of the economy, the living conditions of the
population deteriorated sharply after sanctions. Niblock points to thee indirect effects of sanctions
accounting for this development (Niblock 2001:64):
-
Libya experienced severe inflation, partly stemming from the effects of sanctions combined
with a greater dependence on the private sector to import goods. Goods that were subject to
sanctions were acquired by indirect means, which meant substantial payoffs to third parties. In
the absence of air links and with international businesses and institutions wary about
conducting business with Libya, there was a general upward pressure on prices. Inflation
reflected in a fall of the exchange rate of the Libyan dinar against international currencies
(Niblock 2001:74).
-
Anticipating an intensification of sanctions, the Libyan leadership sought to increase its foreign
reserves and assets, while it was receiving less oil revenues due to the falling prices of oil.
-
Finally, the priority allocated to maintaining the oil industry required cuts in expenditures in
other fields, liberating fewer resources to support other sections such as agriculture and
industry (Niblock 2001:69 ).
Sanctions caused cuts in health and education spending which brought about deteriorating social
conditions. With one of the highest population growths in the world (3,3 per annum throughout the
1980s), the balance of population was skewed towards youth. Thus, cuts occurred as needs increased
in these fields (Niblock 2001:79).
The inflation increased the dependence of Libyan populations on direct state support through rationed
subsidised goods and a trend towards secondary employment. Niblock reports even an increase in
corruption: “Whereas there was relatively little corruption in Libya during the 1980s...the growing gap
between the rich and the poor meant that bribery came to characterise the interactions between
public institutions and private individuals” (Niblock 2001:76).
EVASION/ VIOLATIONS
In 1995, two violations were reported to the Libya sanctions Committee, both concerning
humanitarian flights. The first report concerned an unauthorized stopover on 30 January 1995 in direct
contravention of the Committee’s authorization for an emergency medical flight. The second violation
concerned unauthorized flights from Tripoli to Jeddah on 19 and 20 April 1995 (Security Council
1996a).
In 1996, the flight of a Libyan-registered aircraft from Tripoli to Jeddah was recorded as a violation of
the sanctions. A further violation occurred when Libyan-registered aircraft flew from Tripoli to Cairo on
22 June 1996 transporting Qaddafi to the Arab Summit) and back to Tripoli on 23 June 1996 (Security
Council 1996b).
Libyan authorities announced in 1997 that Libyan Arab Airways would resume international flights
immediately. The Security Council responded by indicating that this was incompatible with Council
resolution 748 (1992), which prohibits all international flights to and from that country (Security
Council 1997). Further violations were registered that year: a Libyan-registered aircraft travelled from
Tripoli to Accra, another aircraft flew from Tripoli to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Qaddafi travelled to
Nigeria and Niger (Security Council 1997). Isolated violations of the flight ban increased from 1996
onwards: “A growing disrespect for the sanctions among third-party states threatened to delegitimise
the Council as it continued to demand respect for its resolutions” (Hurd 2005:509). The Security
Council responded by condemning the violations.
In 1998, the number of violations increased considerably: An aircraft transported Libyan pilgrims to the
Haj to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia without authorization, two private Italian planes landed in Tripoli, a Libyan
aircraft travelled to Chad. From August onwards, flight violations were reported in Burkina Faso, Chad,
Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Sudan and
Tunisia. Violations resulted from a Libyan campaign to garner international support against the
sanctions, which registered steady progress. Although the Organisation of African Unity was slow in
championing the Libyan case, it ultimately pressed its support further than did the Arab League
(Niblock 2001:47). As a result of successful lobbying by Libya, in June 1998 the Organisation of African
Unity passed a resolution approving that its members could ignore the flight ban unless the US and the
UK agreed to trial in a neutral country (Niblock 2001:47).
The Libya Sanctions Committee reported that some Members had invoked the decision of a regional
organisation as overriding Security Council resolutions. The Committee sent letters to the Member
States concerned (Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Mali, Niger and the Sudan) protesting their justification
and insisting on the illegality of the flights (Security Council 1998).
Similarly, in January 1999, the UNSC admonished those members responsible for confirmed violations,
Chad and Gambia (Security Council 1999). Alleged flight violations of the sanctions regime by Chad, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, the Niger, the Sudan and Uganda were reported. Both the
1998 and 1999 reports indicate that the violations had been reported by the US.
The UNSC sanctions were openly challenged by a Non-Aligned Movement committee which urged the
UNSC to “expedite the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya immediately and
irrevocably in view of its full compliance with the demands indicated in the Security Council resolutions
relevant to the Lockerbie issue” (Security Council 2001: 1-2).
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In order to escape from the sanctions regime, the Libyan government conducted campaigns at three
levels: it tried to persuade Western powers to change their positions, contested the sanctions under
international law, and sought to mobilize support in African and Arab countries (Niblock 2001:45). An
unintended consequence of the sanctions regime is that Libya improved its relations with other Arab
and especially African countries in its attempt to win international support for its challenge to the
requests of the UN Security Council.
At the same time, Libya continued to defy the legality of UNSC sanctions by asking the ICJ to pass
judgement on the claim that under the Montreal Convention it was not obliged to extradite the
suspects. Contrary to the expectations of the sponsors of the resolutions, the ICJ ruled that it had
jurisdiction over the subject. According to Niblock, the violations registered by the sanctions
committee from 1996 onwards as a result from the challenge they faced from the OAU seriously
undermined them. By 1997 the sanctions were “in danger of becoming unsustainable” due to the
frequent defections from African and Arab countries (Niblock 2001:52). According to Hurd, the
legitimacy of UNSC sanctions was put into doubt in such a way that “faced with a trade-off between
defending sanction and defending the Council itself” the US and the UK consented to a compromise
they had earlier rejected (Hurd 2005:496).
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
Libya’s limited capacity to refine oil led brought about a decline in the oil industry. In the social sphere,
this led to cuts in education and health and to a trend towards secondary employment as a reaction
towards the deterioration of living standards.
EFFECTIVENESS
As a result of Resolution 883, Libya came closer to complying with UNSC demands. In 1994, Libya
proposed to the Arab League that the two suspects should be tried at the International Court of Justice
in The Hague under Scottish Law. In March 1994, the Council of the Arab League passed a resolution
supporting the idea and calling on the UNSC to consider the proposal. Again, the coercive effect can be
characterised with a (2): Libya’s offer to co-operate approximated UN terms more closely than before,
although it still fell short of the extradition requirement.
The constraining effect can again be rated as (1) given that the refining capacity of Libya was affected.
Libya’s continued activism in regional forums to have the sanctions lifted also indicate its irritation with
the sanctions.
The signalling effect can be rated as (1), given that the norm was well articulated, the message was
fully received and well understood by the target, who intensified in its campaign to bring about the
removal of sanctions. However, at this stage, third party support for the lifting of sanctions after
Libya’s offer to surrender the suspects to an international tribunal under Scottish law mounted, putting
the legitimacy of the sanctions under considerable stain.
EPISODE 3 (8/98 -9/03)
CONTEXT
The third and final episode started when the UNSC decided to suspend the sanctions. This took place
after a diplomatic deal had been stroked against the background of the announcements made by two
regional organisations in defiance of the authority of the Security Council. In 1997, the Arab League
announced that it would allow more medical evacuations from Libya, and the Organisation of African
Unity announced in June 1998 that it would stop enforcing sanctions if a settlement was not reached
by September of that year. In August 1998, the US and the UK offered to hold the trial of the two
Libyan suspects under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands, a proposal immediately welcome by
the Arab League and several individual states.
UNSC DECISION MAKING
The Security Council adopted resolution 1192 on 27 August 1998 noting the offer by the UK and the US
for the trial of the two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish court
sitting in the Netherlands and deciding that the measures shall be suspended immediately if the
Secretary-General reports to the Council that that the two accused have arrived in the Netherlands for
the purpose of trial before the court and if the Libyan authorities satisfied French requests .
Sanctions were terminated in September 2003, when the Security Council passed resolution 1506.
Noting steps the Libyan Government had taken to comply with the resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192,
particularly concerning the acceptance of responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, payment of
appropriate compensation, renunciation of terrorism, and a commitment to cooperating with any
further request for information in connection with the investigation, the UNSC decided to lift all
measures, dissolve the sanctions committee and conclude consideration of the item.
POLITICAL WILL
Resolution 1192 was adopted unanimously.
Security Council composition and voting record:

Yes: UK, France, Russia, US, China, Costa Rica, Kenya, Sweden, Bahrain, Gabon, Gambia,
Portugal, Japan, Slovenia, Brazil

Abstentions: none
Russia and China were reportedly critical of the inflexibility of the British and US position (Niblock
2001:51). Another factor believed to have influenced decision making is the fear that the ICJ could rule
in Libya’s favour with regard to the applicability of the Montreal Convention in the present dispute,
which would have removed the legal basis of the US-British position.
Resolution 1506 was adopted with two abstentions.
Security Council composition and voting record:

Yes: UK, Russia, China, Syria, Pakistan, Germany, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Spain, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Angola

Abstentions: France, US
The resolution was sponsored by the UK and Bulgaria.
The members abstaining explained their vote as follows:
The US explained it had not opposed the lifting of UN sanctions in recognition of the steps taken by
Libya and to allow the PanAm bombing families’ compensation settlement to go forward, but that it
continued to have concerns about other aspects of Libyan behaviour such as its poor human rights
record and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Also, it explained that in the compensation
settlement, Libya had tied the payment of some funds to changes in the US bilateral sanctions outside
the scope of UN sanctions, and that the US did not want the vote in the resolution to be misconstrued
as a decision to modify US bilateral measure.
France noted that Libya still needed to make further gestures beyond the requirements for the lifting
of sanctions, and to implement rapidly the agreement reached with the families of the victims of the
UTA bombing and fully comply with the assumed commitments.
PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal)
Resolution 1192 had a distinctive signaling purpose: It was intended to reassure Libya that sanctions
would be lifted if it delivered the suspects for trial in the Scottish court. It was also intended to
demonstrate to the organisations which had addressed letters to the UK and the US that their request
had been taken into consideration. In Simons’ view, “in the absence of any US/UK initiative it seemed
likely that sanctions would gradually melt away” (Simons 1999:96).
AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED
The primary addressee was the Libyan leadership. However, the organisations which had directed
letters to the UK and US are explicitly mentioned in the resolution and can also be considered
addressees: the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States
and the Islamic Conference.
TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures)
No new sanctions were imposed.
COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL
INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with
IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant)
No specific co-ordination was foreseen, but the resolutions were directly related to the requests
submitted to the permanent members by a number of regional organisations of which Libya was a
member: the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and
the Islamic Conference.
President Mandela of South Africa and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan resolved a disagreement
between both sides over whether the suspects would have to serve their sentences in Libya in case of
indictment (Cortright and Lopez 2000:118).
INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional
organization measures)
The European Union maintained an arms embargo after the lifting of UN. On 16/4/99 the Council of
the European Union adopted Common Position 99/261/CFSP confirming measures imposed on Libya in
1986. Common Position 99/611/CFSP lifted all the 1986 measures except the arms embargo. The EU
decided to continue the application of its arms embargo, which was only lifted in October 2004 in
conjunction with the US unilateral embargo (Portela 2005).
US sanctions remained in place. The sanctions imposed originally in 1986 affect all U.S. citizens and
permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and organisations physically in the US, and
all branches of U.S. organisations throughout the world. These included prohibitions against the sale of
US-origin goods, services or technology to Libya; the transfer of Libyan government assets without a
licence; the performance of contracts benefitting Libya; financial dealings with Libya; and the
operation by banks subject to U.S. jurisdiction of accounts used for transactions connected with
investments in Libya.
In addition to the 1986 sanctions, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 (ILSA) extended the U.S.
sanctions regime to foreign entities outside the U.S. The U.S. President must impose two of a selection
of various specific sanctions upon any entity that he determines has engaged in an act prohibited
under the ILSA, unless he decides to grant a waiver in the individual case. In response to the ILSA, the
EU and Canada enacted "blocking legislation" designed to counter-act its extraterritorial application.
Some European companies in particular were granted waivers by the U.S. authorities against the
application of the ILSA (Smith 2003).
The bulk of US sanctions was lifted in September 2004, when the national emergency with respect to
Libya ended: the trade embargo was lifted and assets were de-frozen, flights resumed and the ban on
loans and guarantees were removed. Yet, the US only removed Libya from the list of countries
sponsoring terrorism and fully normalised relations in 2006.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals,
referral to ICC)
IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement)
DIRECT IMPACTS
Given that the sanctions had been suspended since April 1999, their lifting made little difference.
Important constraints were faced by companies interested in doing business with Libya due to US
legislation: The key legal constraint to non-military trade with, and investment in, Libya remained the
unilateral sanctions regime in place under US law. Although primarily concerned with US citizens
nationals and US-based entities, that regime also extends to re-export of US-origin goods, services and
technology and to substantial investments by foreigners in the Libyan oil and gas industry (Smith
2003).
The removal of UN sanctions opened the way for Libya to work towards the lifting of US sanctions and
to gradually reintegrate itself into the international community. Strangely, prior to the Western
military intervention initiated in the context of the Arab Spring in early 2011, signs of Libyan
rapprochement with the former senders were encouraging. In June 2004, the US resumed diplomatic
relations with Libya, first opening a small Liaison Office in Tripoli and upgrading its diplomatic presence
to ambassadorial level in 2006. For its part, the EU was finalising negotiations on a co-operation
agreement with Libya in January 2011.
INDIRECT IMPACTS
EVASION
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQS
EFFECTIVENESS
COERCION
The target behaviour can be most accurately described as (2) approximating the core purposes as
originally articulated in the UNSCR.
In the final outcome, Libya fulfilled most of the demands originally formulated by the UNSC, including
trial of the two suspects in court, compensation for the victims’ families and Libyan abandonment of
terrorism. On the other hand, Libya managed to prevent the trial of the suspects in the US and
obtained assurances that the judicial investigation would not go beyond the two suspects so that it
would not endanger superiors in the regime (Hurd 2005:521).
The position of the senders – the US and UK in particular- shifted as the rate of defections from the
sanctions rose. In August 1998, the UK and the US put forward new proposals for trying the two
suspects in the Netherlands under Scottish law. As observed by Niblock, the similarity between these
proposals and those put forward by Libya and the Arab League reveals the extent to which the US and
the UK made concessions due to pressure from these countries. The formula adopted in the final
compromise coincided with that first proposed by Qaddafi as early as 1994, and rejected by the US and
UK at a time where they believed to be in a better negotiating position.
In sum, the sanction sequence shows that a process of accommodation took place, although sender
and target proved accommodating at different points in time. Intent in avoiding the sanctions or
bringing about an escalation, up until 1994 Libya put forward subsequent proposals for trial of
suspects, while conducting a campaign to delegitimise the UNSC sanctions in the eyes of the
international community. Having proved originally uncompromising, the senders eventually
accommodated in the face of mounting international support for Libya resulting from its campaign.
Niblock claimed to identify the “rally-around-the-flag” effect first formulated by Galtung in his seminal
article on the UN sanctions on Rhodesia (Galtung 1967): In an assessment that echoes criticisms often
directed at sanctions, Niblock claims that the sanctions offered Qaddafi an opportunity to reaffirm its
relevance as a ruler: “there was reason to doubt whether Gaddafi could retain credibility and
coherence that emphasised human rights, democratisation, economic liberalisation...Sanctions
enabled the regime to return to ground upon which it was most secure and effective: projecting the
leader as a defender of the Libyan people against an aggressive and ill-intentioned West” (Niblock
2001:88). However, there is little evidence that sanctions helped Qaddafi cementing his position
domestically, and even less that the Libyan population had a role to play in the operation of sanctions
through the activation of the “societal conveyor belt”. On the contrary, it has been suggested that the
extradition of the two terrorism suspects occurred in the face of considerable domestic political
pressures (Cortright and Lopez 2000:119).
A disputed question is whether the anti-terrorism sanctions regime imposed over the extradition of
the Lockerbie suspects contributed to Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programmes in 2003.
Observers found this decision particularly puzzling given that Libya was coming particularly close to
developing a nuclear weapons capacity (Mueller 2007:74). Different versions exist. It has been posited
that the Libya´s nuclear rollback can be explained through the fear of invasion, given that the
relinquishment of the WMD was announced shortly after the US launched the military operation
against Iraq that toppled President Hussein. Yet, this hypothesis is contradicted by the fact that
Qaddafi had initially offered to give up its WMD since the 1990s, but had not done so before because
the US was more interested in Libya claiming responsibility for Lockerbie (Rublee 2009:155). Secret
talks had been conducted between both parties since Tripoli had made its first offer to give up its
WMD in May 1999 (Jentelson and Whytock 2005:48). It has been posited that sanctions might have
played a role: “the Libyan economy was straining under the UN sanctions…as a result, a growing
chorus of voices inside Libya, including Qaddafi’s son Saif Aleslam, began advocating for change in its
approach to foreign policy” (Rublee 2009:153).
CONSTRAINING
In the Libyan case, there are clear indications that the target was constrained from engaging in
proscribed activity and statements were issued by the target claiming material difficulties (1). The
success of the UN sanctions against Libya has been connected to the parallelism between the
misbehaviour addressed (terrorist bombings of passenger flights) and the measures employed
(aviation ban) (Cosgrove 2000): “The aviation sanctions represented an appropriate reciprocal act of
denying Libyan participation in international aviation” (Conroy 2002). Statements by Libyan officials
were vocal about the damage suffered by the country as a result of sanctions. There are reasons to
believe that such claims were exaggerated: FAO refuted the figures regarding losses in the agricultural
sector put forward by Libya in its reports to the UN. However, for most other figures, no independent
data exist which would allow for verification.
A Libyan official assessment of the economic impact of sanctions prepared in 1998 puts the costs at
about $24 billion. A report by the Arab League from the same year indicates a similar estimate ($23
billion) and identifies the energy sector, commerce, industry, transport and communication and
agriculture as the most affected sectors in order of importance (Niblock 2001:63). However, these
estimates are impossible to verify.
Niblock has described the fact that the core of the Libyan economy was hardly disrupted while the
living standards of Libyans declined considerably as a “paradox” (Niblock 2001:63-64). Interestingly, it
seems that the measures which displayed the most severe constraining effect were not UN-mandated,
but rather US unilateral sanctions focussing on the oil sector. According to Mattes, the US sanctions
had seriously obstructed the development of the extraction industry (Mattes 2009:3), aided by the UN
ban under resolution 883, which covered all equipment need for the extraction of oil and its transport
to the exporting terminals (Niblock 2001:41). The absence of investment and a chronic deficit in
technological know-how had precluded the full exploitation of oil reserves. Indeed, figures of foreign
direct investment flows were remarkably lower in the sanctions period than after the lifting of
sanctions. For the years 1995 to 2004, Libya recorded an annual average of 13 million US$ inward and
52 outward FDI flow. By way of comparison, inward investment flows to Algeria averaged 540 million
US$ in the same period. In contrast, the annual FDI for Libya in the following period 2005-06 averaged
2580 inward and outward 1176 (UNCTAD 2011).
Thanks to the rapprochement initiated with Western countries, Libya was hoping to ensure some sort
of strategic co-operation with would help him overcome the difficulties it had encountered in the past
(Varvelli 2010:3).
SIGNALLING/ STIGMATISING
In the present case, the norm was articulated, penalties clearly communicated, the message received
and fully comprehended by the target (1). However, the target proved just as good as the sender in
contesting the adequacy of the penalties, articulating its defence in the language of “liberal
internationalism” (Hurd 2005) and communicating its position to the audience of third-world
countries.
Considerations of international prestige played a role in compelling Libya to comply. UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan stated: “I prefer to think that it played a role [...] apart from living with the
sanctions for seven years, no country likes to be treated as an outcast and outside the society of
nations. [...] Libya wanted to get back to the international community; Libya wanted to get on with its
economic and social development” (Secretary General 1999). Possibly the most obvious evidence of
Libya’s uneasiness with the stigmatisation associated with the sanctions can be seen in its consistent
efforts to champion its cause with Arab and African countries. The support it eventually obtained from
these countries served to tame the isolation it was being subjected to by sanctions and thereby the
stigma of being a sanctionee.
As far as the signalling function towards third parties is concerned, the sanctions were only partially
successful. State sponsored terrorism was fully established as an international crime, but many states
consistently contested the view that such crime should be treated as a threat to international peace
and security and that it justified invoking Chapter VII. Major powers such as China and several Arab
and African countries claimed that it should be best addressed through judicial means and/or Chapter
VI. The resistance to chapter VII measures mounted steadily in view of Libyan steps towards
compliance in the latter half of the 1990s.
SANCTIONS CONTRIBUTION
While Libya claimed to have suffered serious economic harm, the economic element does not seem to
have been the only motivation for Libya’s accommodation. Several authors place responsibility
primarily on Libya’s desire for international prestige: “With the absence of oil and oil revenue from the
UN sanctions regime, their effect was not as comprehensively devastating to the Libyan economy as
the post-1991 sanctions were to the Iraqi economy. However, the sanctions did impose significant
costs on the Libyan government and populations and had an enormous impact on the status and
prestige of the government” (Hurd 2005:505). There is general agreement among researchers that
“removing the sanctions and returning to a more normal relationship with the major Western
economies was the central goal of Libyan foreign policy for nearly a decade” (Hurd 2005:505).
At the root of Libya’s willingness for accommodation were not only considerations of international
prestige, sanctions inconvenienced Libya because they impeded its aspirations to “earn a larger
international role commensurate with its great oil wealth” (Cortright and Lopez 2000:110). In
particular, the ambition of diversifying and modernising the country’s economy appears to
predominate. This is apparent in Libya’s offer to relinquish of WMD, which can be regarded as part of
Libya’s strategy for accommodation with the West and reintegration into the international community.
As posited by Rublee with respect to Libya’s relinquishment of WMD, two different types of
motivations drove reformist forces within the Libyan leadership: a desire to see the Libyan economy
improve and a desire to leave behind its pariah status. It is the combination of these factors that made
the difference: “without the economic sanctions, Qaddafi likely would not have had the motivation to
rethink success. However, without the decision to create a new path for Libya, economic sanctions
likely would not have led to WMD abandonment” (Rublee 2009:157-59). Having always shown a desire
to exert regional leadership, Qaddafi remains the only leader to have decided to initiate a nuclear
weapons programme and later to relinquish it (Rublee 2009:150).
Secondly, Libya’s interest in enhancing economic links with the West was evidenced by its issuing of
new awards granting access for exploration to European companies even before UN sanctions were
lifted (Rublee 2009:157). In the decade following the suspension of sanctions, Libya continued its
economic opening, carried forward reforms geared towards attracting foreign investment and
fostering the emergence of an indigenous small and medium enterprises (Varvelli 2010:1). This trend
continued up until the eruption of the current war in Libya.
The effectiveness of the UN sanctions should be qualified by two main considerations:
Firstly, the lifting of UN sanctions was only seen by Libya as one of the necessary steps in order to bring
about accommodation with the West, first and foremost with the US. It was regarded as a precondition
for reaching the next stage: the lifting of US sanctions. Indeed, the first attempts by Libya to negotiate
with the US the lifting of its sanctions in exchange for the abandonment of the WMD programme were
rebuffed with the justification that the compensation issue would have to be settled first (Mueller
2007:77). Ultimately, the lifting of US sanctions enjoyed equal if not higher priority status for Libya,
which expected to trade its WMD for the US acceptance of the current regime. Qaddafi’s expectation
was reported that “if Libya abandoned its WMD program, the US in turn would drop its goal of regime
change” (Jentleson and Whytock 2005:74).
Secondly, the solution eventually accepted by the Security Council hardly differed from the
compromises offered by Libya in the initial stage of the sanctions. In February 1994 Libya had proposed
that the suspects be tried at the ICJ under Scottish law, a proposal that, in essence, coincides with the
US-British initiative of 1998 that ultimately led to the final settlement.
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In the following box you may add background or reference material that is too generic for inclusion
elsewhere in the template.
Bibliography
Conroy, R. (2002) “The UN experience with travel sanctions: Selected Cases and
Conclusions” in D. Cortright and G. Lopez (eds) Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic
Statecraft, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Cortright, D. and Lopez, G. (2000) The Sanctions Decade, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Cosgrove, E. (2002) The Efficacy of Sanctions. International Security Policy Paper No. 82,
London: International Security Information Service
Drezner, D. (2011) “Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice”,
International Studies Review 13, pp.96-108
Elliott, K. (2002) “Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions” in D. Cortright and G. Lopez
(eds) Smart Sanctions, New York: Rowman and Littlefield
Galtung, J. (1967) “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with examples from
the case of Rhodesia”, World Politics 19(3)
Hurd, I. (2005) “The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism, Libya and the UN Sanctions,
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Jentleson, BW. and Whytock, CA. (2005) “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate
and its Implications for Theory and Practice”, International Security 30 (3)
Mattes, H. (2009) „40 Jahre lybische Revolution: Mehr Erfolg bei der Machtsicherung als bei
der Landesentwicklung“ , GIGA Focus 9, GIGA: Hamburg
Mueller, H. (2007) “The exceptional end to the extraordinary Libyan nuclear quest', in M.
Bremer Maerli and S. Lodgaard (eds) Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,
London: Routledge
Niblock, T. (2001) “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan,
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Portela, C. (2005) “Where and Why Does the EU impose Sanctions?”, Politique
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Rublee, MR. (2009) Nonproliferation Norms, Athens: Georgia University Press
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SIPRI (2009) Military Expenditure Database,
07/09/2011
http://milexdata.sipri.org/, accessed
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Documents
Secretary General (1999) Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary General Kofi Annan at
Headquarters, 5 April 1999, SG/SM/6944
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2011) World Investment
Report 2011.
United Nations Security Council (1992) Letter dated 11 August 1992 from the permanent
representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the
secretary-general, S/24428
United Nations Security Council (1993) Letter dated 19 July 1993 from the permanent
representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the
secretary-general, S/26139
United Nations Security Council (1996a) Letter dated 29 December 1995 from the chairman
of the security council committee established pursuant to the resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the president of the security council,
S/1996/2
United Nations Security Council (1996b) Letter dated 31 December 1996 from the chairman
of the security council committee established pursuant to the resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the president of the security council,
S/1996/1079
United Nations Security Council (1997) Letter dated 31 December 1997 from the chairman
of the security council committee established pursuant to the resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the president of the security council,
S/1997/1030
United Nations Security Council (1998) Letter dated 31 December 1998 from the chairman
of the security council committee established pursuant to the resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the president of the security council,
S/1998/1237
United Nations Security Council (1999) Letter dated 31 December 1999 from the chairman
of the security council committee established pursuant to the resolution 748 (1992)
concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the president of the security council,
S/1999/1299
United Nations Security Council (2001) Letter dated 13 November 2001 from the ministers
for foreign affairs of Burkina Faso, Cuba, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
South Africa and Zimbabwe addressed to the president of the security council, S/2001/1108
United Nations Security Council (1992) Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3063th Meeting,
S/PV.3063, Tuesday 31 March 2003, New York
United Nations Security Council (1993) Provisional Verbatim record of the 3312th Meeting,
S/PV.3312, Thursday 11 November 1993, New York
United Nations Security Council (2003) 4820th Meeting, S/PV.4820 (Part II), Friday 12
September 2003, New York
Websites
Herbert Smith (2003)
http://www.herbertsmith.com/Publications/archive/2003/il17sept2003.htm
US State Department (2011)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm#relations
Interviews
i
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Dr Emanuela Paoletti, University of Oxford, Oxford, June 2010
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Mr Igor Cherstich, School of Oriental and Asian Studies, London, July 2010
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Ms Amal Tarhuni, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, July
2010
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Mr Alvaro Benlloch, European Commission, Directorate General Trade, Brussels,
October 2010
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/libya/