Talking Past One Another: the Theory of Mind Debate
Marco Fenici
PhD School in Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena;
Via Roma , 47
53100 Siena, Italy
fenici@unisi.it
In the Eighties, by employing the false belief test experimental paradigm
[1], researchers showed that children become able to explicitly predict one’s
behaviour based on the attribution of beliefs and desires to her only around
age four. This was considered evidence that, at age four, children acquire a
theory about the functioning of others’ minds—i.e., a Theory of Mind (ToM).
Since then, several proposals have been advanced to explain four-yearolds’ performance on the false belief test. These proposals have traditionally
been categorised according to two general views. The theory of the theory of
mind—in short, the theory-theory—claims that attributing mental attitudes is
a theoretical matter. It comes in two different versions. According to the
modularist version [2-5], the acquisition of ToM is the outcome of the genetically guided maturation of a specialised neural circuitry enabling reasoning
about others’ mental states. Instead, the child-as-scientist version [6,7] interprets children’s ToM acquisition as a data-driven process resembling, in its
dynamics, to the development of scientific theories.
Against the theory-theory, the simulation theory of the mind [8,9] holds
that ToM abilities cannot be equated in any sense to the (eventually implicit)
knowledge of a theory about others’ mental states. Instead, predicting others’
actions is an empathic process where we put ourselves “in the others’ shoes,”
thereby perceiving their mental states as if they were ours. Then, we run “offline” the same decision system we normally use to make our own decisions.
Finally, we project the decision so obtained on the others.
Prima facie, the theory and the simulation theory are fundamentally different. However, I will argue, despite their apparent difference, they share an
important commitment. Identifying this commitment directs our attention to
an issue that must be addressed by the accounts about ToM acquisition independently of their stance within the ToM debate, an issue that has heretofore
eluded attention.
1. Psychological explanations about ToM acquisition
Let me first introduce the most important accounts of ToM acquisition,
starting from the modularist theory theory. Baron-Cohen [2] explains ToM
abilities in terms of the inner development of an autonomous, naturally selected, cognitive module. This module is specific to the interpretation of others’ behaviour in terms of mental state attribution, it operates on (and only
on) specific inputs, it is not subject to conscious control, it works automatically, and it has a fixed ontogenetic development. The ToM module is neurally localised and may be selectively impaired, as happens in autism.
Considering another modularist proposal, Perner [3] notes that younger
children hardly understand both mental and public representations—such as
maps, pictures, and signs. Unlike Baron-Cohen, he thus contends that children’s difficulty in attributing mental states reflects a difficulty in understanding representations in general. Hence, he describes children’s acquisition of the concept of belief by the supposed development of a three-stage
general domain cognitive module. Initially, infants have just perceptual representations, which are stored in a single updating inner model of the external
world. In their second year of life, children start entertaining multiple models,
which allow them to compare past and future, or reality and pretence. Finally,
four-year-olds are able to construct meta-representations, that is, models
complex enough to store someone else’s view of a situation.
Leslie’s [5] proposal represents a via media between these two. As in
Baron-Cohen’s proposal, he suggests that a ToM domain specific module
might be in place already at the second year of life. However, unlike BaronCohen, and in the same way as Perner, he claims that four-year-olds’ radical
improvement in ToM tasks is made possible by the later development of a
domain general capacity to inhibit one’s own point of view.
Let me now turn to the child-as-scientist version of the theory of mind.
Gopnik [6] claims that, in the same way of scientific knowledge, children’s
early knowledge of the mind goes well beyond immediate perceptual experi-
ence, it enables genuine and productive predictions, and that it is revised in
the light of further evidence. Accordingly, she contends that the cognitive
processes responsible for theoretical learning are also responsible for ToM
acquisition as an instance of general theoretical development.
Carey and Spelke [7] follow Gopnik, and argue further that the development of ToM requires the generalisation of many empirical data that children
acquire through a variety of different sources. However, unlike Gopnik, they
also claim that these generalisations are applied to an initial body of
knowledge that is provided by a domain specific module. Therefore, the
child-as-scientist accounts agree that ToM is acquired as an instance of theoretical development. However, they differ with regard to whether theoretical
development is subserved by domain specific cognitive processes.
Finally, let me consider a simulation theorist. Goldman [8] claims that in
understanding others’ behaviour based on the attribution of mental states to
them we run “off-line” the same decision system that we normally use to
make our own decisions. He thus posits two distinct cognitive systems allowing this simulation process. The ‘low-level’ (LL) mindreading system simulates others’ sensations, feelings, and emotions. It is a domain specific system, with a well-defined neurophysiological characterisation, the Mirror Neuron System hypothesis [10]. Instead, the ‘high-level’ (HL) mindreading system allows simulation of propositional mental states, and is defined according to general domain cognitive competences (Goldman’s “introspection”
and “E-imagination.”) Thus, according to a simulation theorist such as
Goldman, ToM acquisition is dependent on the development of both specific
cognitive processes and general cognitive competences.
2. Competence and performance models
All theory-theory or simulation accounts propose specific modules responsible for the attribution of mental states to others. However, as Chomsky
[11] remarks, the notion of cognitive modularity may be interpreted according to two importantly different perspectives. On the one hand, a cognitive
module may be identified with the physical mechanism implementing a particular psychological competence. This approach focuses the effective performance of the cognitive mechanism, thereby its physical structure. On the
other hand, a cognitive module may also be identified according to the competence or knowledge it provides. This abstracts from the physical structure
of the module to focus its function, i.e., what it can do.
This distinction is crucial to understand why theory-theory/simulation
debates are inconclusive. Indeed, all current theory-theory and simulation
accounts of ToM acquisition define the ToM module in the terms of its per-
formance. However, at some point, each covertly interprets the cognitive
mechanism they posit in the terms of the psychological competence it subserves. Baron-Cohen, for instance, conceives the ToM module as the neural
circuitry underlying children ToM abilities. Nevertheless, he characterises the
ToM module’s working in the terms of the psychological competence it provides—i.e., the ability to attribute propositional mental states. Perner’s analysis focuses meta-representational abilities, thus it really concerns a competence model of the ToM module. Instead, Leslie’s proposal gradually shifts
from focusing two-year-olds’ performance in specific tasks to a general view
about the abilities children should be granted at age four.
The same variability with respect to the competence-performance distinction is apparent in both the child-as-scientist and the simulation theory. In
the same way as Perner, Gopnik’s analysis focuses children’s knowledge of
the psychological domain—therefore, their competence in the mental domain—rather than the cognitive mechanisms underlying this knowledge.
Carey and Spelke’s proposal, instead, mirrors Leslie’s one, in that they conceive both psychological processes and competences. The same happens to
Goldman’s simulation theory, which independently introduces a performance
(LL mindreading) and a competence model (HL mindreading) to explain
children’s ability to attribute beliefs to others.
3. Empirical and epistemological issues about ToM acquisition
Although any performance model also implicitly defines a competence
one, performance- and competence-focused models address different issues:
on the one hand, the empirical issue concerning which physical structures
implement a given faculty; on the other hand, the epistemological issue concerning which abilities are presupposed by a psychological faculty.
By focusing the ToM mechanism as a performance module, the proposals about ToM acquisition left on the background the competence level of
analysis of cognitive modularity, hence the epistemological issue. However,
both issues are relevant to understand ToM acquisition, and should not be ignored. In particular, focusing the epistemological issue would be important in
at least two respects. On the one hand, it would help to relieve the opposition
between the theory and the simulation theory. Indeed, the distinction between
performance- and competence-focused interpretations of the ToM module really opposes just the modularist and the child-as-scientist versions of the theory of mind. Instead, it orthogonally crosses the theory-simulation theory divide. Thus the simulation theory is not totally opposed to the theory theory,
but only to those child-as-scientist accounts that exclusively interpret the
ToM mechanism as a competence module.
On the other hand, bringing back the epistemological issue in the debate
might help to focus the problem of the very definition of ToM. Indeed, many
different abilities manifest ToM possession. Among the others: the ability to
consider others’ goals and intentions, to imitate actions, to engage in pretend
play, to lie, to consider others’ linguistic knowledge, to understand humour,
to take part to narratives. On different times, participants to the ToM debate
analysed different sets of these abilities, even focusing the cognitive processes underlying them, the abilities themselves, or even both. Thus, by mistaking differences among psychological abilities, or among processes and competences, for differences among the accounts explaining these abilities, they
end up talking past one another. Focusing the epistemological issue would instead transform what looks like a single debate about ToM acquisition in a
series of micro-debates about the development of each of these individual
competences, with much gain for the general discussion.
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