ECOLE NATIONALE DU GENIE RURAL DES EAUX ET DES FORETS
ENGREF
TECHNICAL SYNTHESIS
QUANTITATIVE MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES:
COMPARISON OF THE EXISTING ASSESSMENTS OF
VARIOUS TOOLS
LEBOUCHER Bertrand
E-mail: leboucher@engref.fr
January 2006
ENGREF Centre de Montpellier
ENGREF Centre de Montpellier
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KEY WORDS
Water resource, quantitative management, prefectorial
management, royalties, river contract, water table contract
order,
SAGE,
Volumetric
ABSTRACT
Apart from specific agricultural areas, French water resources seem sufficient to handle the
average during an average year. However, during specially dry years (e.g. 2003 and 2005), a
real imbalance between water resources and their uses forced some very restrictive
measures to be applied. These crisis showed the limits of the current tools used in the
quantitative management of water resources in France.
This work is a short summary of the existing assessments of some tools used to manage
water resources. Some management tools try to avoid a crisis either by encouraging people
to save water (e.g. royalties), or planning their removal long in advance (e.g. SDAGE, SAGE,
PGE, quantitative management of water resources), whereas others try to limit the impact of
crisis situations when they have already started (quantitative management of water
resources, prefectorial orders).
Managing water resources on a local scale (watershed) seems to be a good idea. Gathering
frequently the people related to the management of the resources with highly motivated
elected officials appears to be a necessity for the project to move forward quickly.
Finally, the different tools used in the quantitative management of water resources seem to
be more complementary than competitors. In fact, some of them define a regulation
framework whereas others put into concrete effect the measures set out in the schedule.
2
INTRODUCTION
Within the last few years, the imbalance between water resources and their use has been
increasing. The low-water of 2003 is a good illustration of this trend. A low amount of rainfalls
and a particularly long heat wave were the causes of severe low-waters. This event showed
how committed to the management of water resources the authorities could be (77 districts
planned restrictive uses of their water resources) and also the limits of the current tools used
in the quantitative management of water resources.
Many different tools have been used in France to manage water resources (quantitative
management):



regulatory tools (e.g. prefectorial order)
economic tools (e.g. royalties)
tools used for participative water management (e.g. SAGE, contracts)
Some management tools try to avoid crisis either encouraging people to save water (e.g.
royalties), or planning their removal long in advance (e.g. SDAGE, SAGE, PGE), whereas
others try to limit the impact of crisis situations once they have already started (quantitative
management of water resources, prefectorial order).
This report is a short summary of existing assessments of some tools to manage water
resources. It should be helpful to have a better understanding of their limits and to assess
and compare their interest and efficiency. Although brief reviews of the contents of these
tools may precede their assessments, this work contains no exhaustive presentation.
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PREFECTORIAL ORDERS
This section deals with two tools used in the quantitative management of water resources:
prefectorial orders and framework orders. These two statutory tools are greatly interconnected.
O SHORT REVIEW OF PREFECTORIAL ORDERS AND FRAMEWORK ORDERS:
Prefectorial orders
Section 9 of the French Water Act of January 3rd 1992 and its Order in Council of September
24th 1992 allow prefects to temporarily limit or suspend the consumption of water in the event
of threats of drought.
When it appears to be a necessity, the watershed prefect may write an order to coordinate
the actions in all the departments included in the watershed. In this case, all the prefects of
the concerned departments have to write prefectorial orders conform to the one of the
watershed prefect.
A prefectorial order is a widely used statutory tool. The low-water of 2003 is a good
illustration of this trend. Among 77 departments concerned by actual limitations of water
consumption, more than 800 prefectorial orders were published. Also, in the more recent
case of the low-water of 2005, 72 departments had already applied restrictive measures on
the consumption of water on August 30th 2005, and more than 600 prefectorial orders had
been issued before September 16th 2005.
Error!
Néant
Aucun arrêté
Mesures
planifiées
Mesures de limitation des usages non effectives mais des
mesures ont été planifiées à long terme en cas de nécessité
(arrêtés cadre)
Niveau 1: mesures limitées: toute mesure de limitation des usages
inférieures ou égales à 1j/7 ou à 15% du volume sur au moins un
bassin
Mesures
effectives
Niveau 1: mesures fortes: mesure de limitation des usages
supérieures ou égales à 1j/7 sur au moins un bassin versant mais
inférieures à 7j/7
Niveau 3: restrictions totales: restriction totale sur au moins un
bassin versant
Pic. 1 : Prefectorial orders applied in August 30th 2005 (MEDD, 2005)
Prefectorial orders are usually issued after meetings of a group called the “drought cell”
gathering all the representatives of the people involved in the management of water
resources in the concerned area.
To be sure that the prefectorial order is observed, DDE, DDAF and CSP may check with
consumers. They also play an important role in communication. Indeed, checking with and
4
meeting consumers gives them an opportunity to explain to people the reasons why such
restrictive measures have been taken. (DIREN, 2004)
It should be noted that some local communities strenghten the measures taken through
prefectorial order by issuing municipal by-laws. The purpose of the latter is usually either to
take more restrictive measures than the ones issued in the prefectorial order, or to take into
account local factors. These municipal by-laws are mainly used to report to worries about
breaks in the drinkable water supply.
Framework orders
Framework orders have been created by the decree 92-1041 of September 24th 1992.
They are usually set up in catchment areas and define the restrictive measures that are to be
applied in the event of droughts.
Thanks to their transparancy, framework orders make the management of water resources
easier when the crisis has already occured than mere prefectorial orders (« in the action »
management). They also help to coordinate the restrictive measures taken by the various
concerned departments, i.e. they ensure the coherence of the actions based in particular on
the principle of upstream-downstream solidarity.
It is important to notice that unlike prefectorial orders framework orders are not limited in time.
Nevertheless, they can be modified.
O REVIEW OF FEEDBACK AND ASSESSMENTS OF PREFECTORIAL AND
FRAMEWORK ORDERS
Feedback on the management of the low-water of 2003 showed that even a massive use of
prefectorial orders and framework orders didn’t give satisfactory results in terms of the
quantitative management of water resources (DIREN, 2004). For example, more rivers
dried-up in 2003 than during an average year (e.g. in the department called Doubs more than
300 km of rivers dried-up, and in the Loire, more than 340 km). Therefore, it seems wise to
analyse and assess the effectiveness of these tools so as to understand what could be
improved.
Assessment of the tools
General remarks :
The “drought cell” appears to have a positive impact on the quantitative management of
water resources. Its frequent meetings help the people involved in water resources to better
understand each other. It usually gathers representative of farmers, Météo France, EDF, the
civil service, drinking water unions, water distribution companies and hydraulic structure
managers. Associations involved either in fishing or the preservation of nature are usually
welcome. However, the composition of the cell often appears to be unbalanced, which
directs the debate on the side of the most represented interest group.
Apart from the inside of the drought cell, the feedback on the low-water of 2003 shows a lack
of information about the measures taken or to see if the crisis became worse.
The implementation of a framework order helps to improve this diffusion of information as the
measures to be taken in case of a crisis are pre-established.
Controlling users of water resources directly on site is an effective way to check whether or
not the restrictive measures are applied but it also helps to broadcast information about the
measures and their causes (e.g. among the 2500 controls made in 2005, about 95% showed
a good respect of the restrictive measures) (MEDD, 2005). However, the multiplicity of the
water resources combined with numerous infringements make on-site controls a really
difficult exercise. To make it easier and more efficient some French departments (e.g. la
5
Vienne) draw up a schedule of the on-site controls with the public prosecutor’s department
before the crisis occurs.
Finally, the lack of coordination between various concerned departments sometimes causes
conflict between people using the same water resource but subjected to different rules of
consumption.
Prefectorial orders :
Prefectorial orders usually set up time-slots during which people are allowed to use water
resources. These time-slots become shorter as the crisis worsens. It may end with a total
ban. Feedback on the 2003 low-water underlined the fact that restrictive measures are
usually adopted a little late with regard to the situation. This may well be the consequence of
a difficult collection of data (pluviometry, level of groundwater and rivers etc) usually carried
out in haste and with little popularity of the measures to be taken by the Prefect. Therefore,
an early management of the drought would seem to be more efficient.
Framework order :
The assessment of the measures effectively applied in the Departments where a framework
order was already established in 2003 shows a net tendency to slowness. In particular the
decisions of application (translation of measures into action) were usually late with regard to
the crisis - especially for the first restrictive measure to be adopted and the measure of total
ban - and less tough than planned in the framework order.
Assessment of results due to the application of prefectorial orders :
It is legitimate for the stakeholders in the quantitative management of water resources to
wonder whether or not the adopted restrictive measures are efficient.
Nevertheless, the assessment of the impact of the actions scheduled in a prefectorial order
appears to be a really tough exercise. For example, when a prefectorial order defines timeslots so that water users (e.g. farmers) are allowed to pump water out only within these timeslots, overequipment can make this measure ineffective as it is then possible for the user to
increase the outputs (the discharge rate) and so to free himself from the time constraints.
Other phenomena interfere too. During the low-water of 2003, the measures of total ban on
water-taking seem to have had a good impact on the flow-rates of several rivers. However, it
is difficult to know if this good impact was mainly due to the prefectorial orders or to the
“natural” halt to irrigation in August.
To conclude, although it is difficult to quantify the efficiency of prefectorial and framework
orders, the main factors that may guarantee a positive effect of the taken measures have
been identified : anticipation of the measures and a strong upstream-downstream solidarity
to contribute to equity between water users. Therefore, it seems essential to promote
framework orders since they define in advance the measures to be taken and their
thresholds of application. Then these measures are applied through Prefectorial orders when
a drought occurs. Moreover, unlike mere Prefectorial orders, framework orders take into
account the principle of upstream-downstream solidarity since they are defined on the whole
watershed.
So, to optimise framework orders it seems important to improve the anticipation of the
measures, to make sure that they are simple and gradual by defining few thresholds but in
adapted intervals and ensure the upstream-downstream solidarity on the whole watershed.
The first feedback on the low-water of 2005 clearly shows an improvement in the
management of drought between 2003 and 2005. In particular, the restrictive measures were
taken earlier in 2005 than in 2003 (e.g. there were more framework orders than in 2003, see
picture 2) and the restrictions were also more adapted to the situation of crisis (Prefectorial
6
orders
were
applied
faster
than
in
2003)
(MEDD,
2005).
Etat des arrêtés de limitation des usages
Néant
Mesures planifiées
Aucun arrêté
Mesures de limitation des usages non effectives mais des
mesures ont été planifiées à long terme en cas de nécessité
(arrêtés cadre)
Pic. 2 : French Departments having set up Framework orders in 2005 (MEDD, 2005)
7
TOOLS USED FOR PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT (CONTRACTS, SAGE)
This part only deals with river contracts and SAGE. Other tools of participative management
have been developed such as PGE (low-water management plan) set up in Adour-Garonne
but because of a lack of time they haven’t been tackled in this paper.
O SHORT REVIEW OF CONTRACTS AND SAGE
SAGE and contracts are tools used for participative management of water resources. They
combine meetings, measures planification and regulations on coherent perimeters of
interventions (in the case of river contracts, there might be no regulation approach)
(ROUSSEAU Cécile, 2005).
Since these two tools are complex and look quite similar, they are often little known and even
confused by stakeholders. The table below briefly sets out some important characteristics of
these tools.
Principles
SAGE
Planification tool with regulatory
power (not yet opposable to third
party but the current new law project
may change that)
River contract
Intervention tool that schedule
makings and their financial plan
Mainly management of waterway, water
table and enclosure
Integrated management on the scale
of the watershed
Duration of
application
(approx.)
Perimeter
Field of
intervention
management
supervision
partnership
10 years
5 to 7 years
Catchment area, perimeter usually
Catchment area
defined in the concerned SDAGE and
finalized by the prefect
Underground and surface water
Underground and surface water
management (quality and quantity)
management (quality and quantity)
Management of aquatic ecosystems
Management of aquatic ecosystems
Preservation of wetlands
Preservation of wetlands
CLE (Local Commission for Water)
Prefect and catchment area
committee
No financial contract with the
partners
River committee
Prefect and catchment area committee
Partnership between 4 entities :
State / Region and Department / Water
agencies / Inter-communal Syndicates
concerned by the project
Duration of
Very long (2 to 4 years)
Long (may be shorter if set up after a
elaboration
SAGE)
The main purpose of a SAGE is to formalise a project on water management by setting
common rules, whereas the river contract is a technical and financial agreement without any
legal authority.
Nowadays, contracts and SAGE are tending to become closer, to complement each other. In
fact, it seems that a SAGE is facilitated by the presence of a contract which translates in a
concrete way the orientations of the SAGE on part of its application area (ROUSSEAU
Cécile, 2005). Therefore, in the Drôme department the implementation of the SAGE –
approved by the Prefect in 1997- was made easier by the presence of a first river contract
8
(1990-1997) and a second contract signed in 1999 also helped to put into practice some
recommendations of the SAGE. This trend to couple SAGE and contracts has been
confirmed by the current concern of the MEDD (Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable
Development) to promote operational SAGE (BOURDAT Eva, DESPORTES Geoffroy, PARÉ
Sébastien, 2002). In particular, the contracts following upon a SAGE benefit from better
financial rates.
In the same way, the concrete measures planned in a contract are strengthened by the
elaboration of a more general document with legal impact such as a SAGE.
O ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTS AND SAGE
Contracts :
To illustrate the assessments of contracts related to water management, this part deals more
particularly with river contracts. The information below comes mainly from feedback on
experiments carried out in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Rhône-Alpes and Hérault.
The « AScA, ADAGE environnement, 2001» study was in charge of analysing 57 contracts
in Rhône-Alpes in 2001. It defined four criteria to assess these contracts:
 Their relevance (comparison between goals and stakes)
 Their coherence (comparison between actions undertaken and goals)
 Their efficiency (comparison between results and goals)
 Their efficacy (comparison between means and results)
Relevance of contracts :
According to the « AScA, ADAGE environnement, 2001» study, their is a real adequacy
between the goals and the stakes of contracts. However, the level of realisation aimed for the
objectives of the contract is usually not so clear. The goals of a contract usually consist of
“restoring the river”, “protecting populations from flooding” etc. The lack of accuracy of goals
makes an assessment of the contract a particularly challenging task.
Furthermore, the balance between the effort put into the achievement of the different goals of
a contract is usually not insured. The problems related to the quality of water or the
prevention of floods concentrate most of the efforts to the detriment of the fight against
pesticides, the quantitative management of water resources or the ecological restoration of
the river (ROUSSEAU Cécile, 2005).
Coherence of contracts :
The coherence of a contract is a subject that is not sufficiently dealt with before signature
(DIREN Rhône-Alpes, 2004). This may be due to the fact that most stakeholders have poor
knowledge of the various management instruments (BOURDAT Eva, DESPORTES Geoffroy,
PARÉ Sébastien, 2002).
The quantitative management of water resources in more a question of setting rules to share
the resource between users than just a question of building. Therefore, a contract may need
a statutory support such as a SAGE to reach its goals. For example when the main goal is to
support a minimum flow for a given river, it is usual to define rules to share the water
resources between consumers. It may then be a necessity to set up a statutory management
tool as a SAGE. The cases of the Orb river and the Astienne aquifer are good illustrations of
this. Both the legal representatives in charge of the Orb river and the Astienne aquifer have
decided to set up a SAGE to complement the existing contracts so as to improve the
management of the minimum flows of the Orb river and to control the amount of water
pumped in the Aspienne aquifer (ROUSSEAU Cécile, 2005).
Efficiency of contracts :
The lack of accuracy in the definition of the goals and the absence of indicators to follow up
the undertaken actions make it almost impossible to assess the efficiency of contracts in
term of quantitative management of the water resources.
9
Efficacy of contracts :
Contracts are particularly adapted to hydraulic operations and river-work. Indeed, as they
make the stakeholders of a given watershed to act in concert, they lead to economies of
scale.
Nevertheless, one of their weakest points is the absence of optional scenarios, even
sometimes the absence of debate on the priorities in term of action. This does not allow one
to ensure that the taken actions are the best in terms of efficacy.
Pic. 3 :Progress status of the river contracts in France in December 1st 2005 (Office International de l'Eau, 2005)
Although river contracts always seem to be interesting in terms of quantitative management
of water resources (AScA, ADAGE environnement, 2001), they may not be the most efficient
tool of management. In particular, river contracts have no statutory reach. Therefore, they do
not seem able to ensure a real commitment of local populations in the project of
management of their water resources (DIREN Rhône-Alpes, 2004).
In the case of quantitative management of water resources, contracts are mainly used to
build structures to support the minimum flow of a river (e.g. contract for the river Doux where
a dam has been built). However, the results are often disappointing. For example, a SAGE is
being set up for the river Doux as the contract has not given significant results. This is
strengthened by a problem of perenniality of contracts. In fact, a contract lasts 5 to 7 years
and is not renewable. Therefore, it only has this short period of time to ensure a good
perennial state for the river. If this difficult task is not achieved by the end of the contract,
then - as there is no more financial support - the upkeep of the river is interrupted
(BOURDAT Eva, DESPORTES Geoffroy, PARÉ Sébastien, 2002). The establishment of
10
statutory tools to manage the consumption of water resources (e.g. SAGE) is a necessity
(DIREN Rhône-Alpes, 2004).
To conclude, the assessment of contracts is made difficult by the lack of indicators of followup and the lack of data on the initial condition of the water resources. From a financial point
of view contracts are a very attractive tool to local communities as the Department, the
Region, the State and the Water Agencies fund the main part of the project. However,
contracts seem to reach their limits when the matters are mainly due to conflicts of use or
regional development. Then a statutory tool seems necessary and it may also be interesting
to couple it with a contract.
If it is decided that a contract is the best solution to solve the current problems in the
quantitative management of a given water resource, the success of the implementation of
this tool mainly depends on four factors (DIREN Rhône-Alpes, 2004) :




A formalisation of the goals and the actions to be taken with their definitions as accurate
as possible and a hierarchical organisation of the actions
A river committee that works properly (regular meetings with people with are
representative of the economic and social tissue of the concerned area, real debates
during meetings)
A good co-ordination of the actions during the whole duration of the contract
A follow-up of the contract to assess it and modify it if necessary. A check-up of the
balance between the efforts put into different themes (quality, quantity of water,
ecological status of the area etc).
Now the question is : will the State be able to follow this trend either from a financial,
technical or personnel point of view ?
SAGE :
SAGE were created by the French Water Act of January 3rd 1992.
“In a hydrogeographic unit or a water-bearing system, a SAGE ( Plan of Organisation and
Management of Waters) plans the general objectives of use, development and quantitative
and qualitative protection of superficial and subterranean water resources, aquatic
ecosystems and wetlands.” (section 5 of the French Water Act of January 3rd 1992).
At the beginning, SAGE was presented as the “miracle” tool to manage water at a relevant
scale (catchment area, aquifer) and solve all the problems related to water resources
(ALLAIN Sophie, 2003).
The picture showing the furtherance of the SAGE thirteen years after their creation puts this
infatuation in a more sober context. Indeed, so far only 26 have been set up.
11
Pic.4: Progress status of the SAGE in France in December 1st 2005 ( Office International de l'Eau, 2005)
It is thus sensible to ask why so few SAGE have been set up.
Assessing this tool of water management is quite challenging. First of all, the adopted
measures vary greatly from one SAGE to another, which makes it difficult to conclude on the
efficiency of this tool to solve problems related to water resources. Besides, assessments
and feedback on existing SAGE are limited. Indeed, the assessment of the first implemented
SAGE in France – the Drôme SAGE, approved by the Prefect in 1997- hasn’t started yet.
The community of municipalities of Val de Drôme just published the specifications of the
study in October 2005 (Communauté de Communes du Val de Drôme, 2005). The drawing
office in charge of this study should hand in the results by the end of 2006.
Finally, it is important to notice that a new bill on water plans to modify the definition of the
SAGE tool (it was adopted in a first reading by the Senate on April 14th 2005). In particular, it
would allow SAGE to be opposable to third persons if certain conditions are reached
(ROUSSEAU Cécile, 2005).
Therefore, when adopted this bill will oblige the existing SAGE and those being set up to be
updated. These potential evolutions of the tool SAGE may nuance the conclusions of this
part.
Before analysing the positive and negative points of SAGE, it is important to specify the
range of application of this tool. It seems justified to set up a SAGE when there are complex
problems in the management of water resources, especially when conflicts of use between
several people appear. In the case of simpler problems, which for example concern only two
12
categories of people, simpler tools such as bilateral agreements or river contracts may be
more effective, faster and cheaper to implement (SHF, 2003).
According to Mr Yves CORTES ( FRANCOIS-PONCET Jean, OUDIN Jacques, 2001), after a
rapid development during the years following their creation, SAGE procedures have slowed
down. The complexity of the procedure of elaboration may explain this slow down. It is
difficult to keep stakeholders involved in the set up of a SAGE motivated when the delays of
implementation of this management tool exceed six years (three years on average for the
emergence of the SAGE, i.e. demarcation of the area of application, creation of the CLE, and
at least three more years for the elaboration. This depends on the initial level of knowledge
on the water resources in the area of the SAGE and the complexity of the problems to be
solved) (ALLAIN Sophie, 2003).
The complexity of the procedure or a lack of political involvement may either explain the fact
that the procedure to set up a SAGE is really slow. For example, it is the absence of
motivated elected members that made the procedure of elaboration of the Marne aval SAGE
to slow down (MATE, 1998). This slowness of procedure introduces a problem of
perenniality of the SAGE. Indeed, an election during the time of the procedure could delay
the set-up of the SAGE as the elected members might change and the new ones may not
feel motivated by setting up a SAGE. Besides, this slowness is coupled with a lack of
flexibility of the process. According to Mr Yves CORTES, president of the CLE of the
Mayenne SAGE, “the quorum [...] with its 2/3 rule, is often difficult to attain” (FRANCOISPONCET Jean, OUDIN Jacques, 2001).
Other problems also occur frequently as a lack of financial support (there is nothing planned
in the current French Water Act about financial support for SAGE) and the fact that the
measures taken through current SAGE can not be opposed to third parties.
 Financial problems :
As a regional councillor in Alsace, Mr Hugues GEIGER said (FRANCOIS-PONCET ; OUDIN,
2001) “I have noticed that SAGE are really long and hard to set up. Besides, there are only
little financial means to achieve this procedure. Therefore, I think that the necessity to create
new financial supports has become stronger and stronger. This might be the only way for the
French government to properly apply the European Directive”.
The CLE of the SAGE Nappes profondes de Gironde has found a solution to ensure a
sustainable financial support for the animation of the implementation of the SAGE. It sets up
a principle of “solidarity between users of the water resources” by making people having an
interest or being involved in the causes of the implementation of the SAGE pay for it. This of
course includes all the water consumers of the Gironde water table. According to the CLE,
these fees also make water consumers realise that water resources are rare and precious
(EPTB, 2004).
 Problems due to the non-opposability to third parties:
The fact that the measures taken by a SAGE are not opposable to third parties may interfere
with the efficiency of this tool. For example, this is a problem for the Petite Camargue
Guardoise SAGE as it has no means to fight against people damming up to make sure they
have enough water.
However, the new bill on water should allow SAGE to be opposable to third parties in certain
conditions.
Beyond the general remarks made above on the complexity of setting up a SAGE as well as
on its “badly defined” technical, financial and legal framework (CORTES Yves, 2001),
assessing the SAGE tool is really hard as it gratly depends on its geographical area of
application, the problems to solve and the people involved in them.
Nevertheless, experiences of various SAGE and their procedures have revealed several
conditions that facilitate their success.
 The will for dialogue between stakeholders :
13
Since it is not compulsory to set up a SAGE to manage water resources, communication and
dialogue between all those involved in the management of this natural resource appear to be
essential. Crisis situations such as droughts, floods and conflicts between consumers turn
out to be an essential -even indispensable- engine of dialogue and help water users to be
fully aware of the situation in terms of water resources (France Nature Environnement, 2003).
On the contrary, a lack of conflict may lead to a lack of motivation from the elected members
to achieve the procedure of the relevant SAGE. This is what happened in the case of the
Canche and Authie SAGE.
Moreover, it is a prime necessity not to avoid the reasons of the conflicts. Some CLE do that
to dodge “explosive” situations, though one of the main parts of a SAGE is to help people to
move from conflict to dialogue and co-operation. Thus it is essential for a SAGE to approach
problems by considering all possible opinions and solutions. For example, in the case of the
Nappes profondes de Gironde SAGE the absence of a priori on the way to solve problems
and conflicts happened to have greatly facilitated dialogue between those concerned (SHF,
2003).
However, it seems that the SAGE tool reaches its limits in terms of dialogue in situations of
aggravated conflicts, in particular when they concern significant economic stakes. This is
what happened in the case of the Basse Vallée de l’Ain SAGE. The measures to take
involved hydroelectric structures of EDF upstream of the SAGE area of application. After a
meeting, EDF and the State decided not to implement these measures (Agence de l'Eau
RMC, 2002).
A report written by France Nature Environnement with the help of MEDD entitled “SAGE et
Participation du Public” concludes with: “the elaboration of a SAGE depends mainly on the
political will of local actors -especially elected members- and on the distribution of the
established political power. Therefore, a SAGE may not be a good solution to solve problems
in cases of exacerbated conflicts.” (SAGE et Participation du Public, 2003).
Finally, a mistake is to set up a SAGE to make people adopt a project. In this case there is
no real dialogue and it may lead to an impasse. That is what happened to the Mayenne
SAGE. In fact, the latter was mainly set up to make people agree to a project: to build the
Saint Calais du Désert dam. Unfortunately, the preliminary studies showed that building this
dam may not be relevant which led to an endless SAGE procedure (France Nature
Environnement, 2003).
 The ability to involve all stakeholders:
The ability to locally involve all the people directly concerned by the SAGE as soon as the
procedure starts is essential to obtain a united schedule of actions. The sooner the meetings
between the representatives start the easier it is to make people –especially elected
members of the CLE- understand the real problems they will have to solve in terms of
quantitative management of water resources. Setting up a river contract may be a good
opportunity to think over problems. This is what was done in the Drôme. A first river contract
started in July 1990, i.e. seven years before the SAGE. It scheduled actions in parallel to the
elaboration of the SAGE. It introduced a sort of dynamic among people and elected
members which was extended by the SAGE and a second river contract that was meant to
put into concrete action the scheduled measures.
The existence of a perennial, legitimate and financially strong carrier-organization also
greatly helps to make a SAGE succeed in solving the problems it has been designed for (La
SAGE, une chance pour la politique de l’eau, 2003). According to the inquiry “ SAGE et
Participation du Public » (2003) carried out by France Nature et Environnement, the more
dynamic the carrier-organization, the shorter the setting up of the corresponding SAGE. In
particular, if the president of the CLE is also the president of the carrier-organization, this
may help to quickly finish the elaboration of the SAGE (if of course the president is
committed to this task).
Therefore, the commitment of all those involved in the elaboration of a SAGE –especially the
elected members- is essential for its success. It helps to not avoid critical problems so that
stakeholders may design a better, more efficient plan of action. Avoiding problems related to
14
water resources that may bring conflicts during meetings would only lead to a hollow SAGE
unable to solve the main problems. Actions not properly defined may also have a bad effect
on the efficiency of a SAGE. To the question “is the SAGE tool relevant for the quantitative
management of water resources?” posted on the forum of the website www.sitesage.org
Bruno de GRISSAC answered “SAGE is an efficient tool to manage water resources if its
goals are clear and its measures are precisely defined”. According to the associations
involved in SAGE, the contents of the latter are often disappointing. They are not ambitious
from a legal point of view and they often give vague recommendations with no details about
their modalities of application (France Nature Environnement, 2003).
Finally, to stimulate the creation and application of SAGE it seems important to more involve
both the State and the Water Agencies. They could play an important part and not only as
financial supports but also by providing civil servants, technical means etc (Le SAGE, une
chance pour la politique de l’eau, 2003).
 A global consideration of the problems including local concerns and interactions with
bordering territories, in particular when they share the same water resources :
The choice of the area on which the SAGE is set up plays an important part in its success.
SAGE set up on small areas are known to be easier to manage and more efficient to solve
problems when elected members are really committed to the project (SHF, 2003). However,
the case of the Basse Vallée de l’Ain SAGE shows that links between upstream and
downstream may be strong and are to be taken into account when setting up the SAGE. The
area of this SAGE does not cover the EDF dams built upstream and to which the
management of the flows of the Basse Vallée is strongly linked. Therefore, the actions taken
by the CLE depends mainly on decisions made upstream by EDF (Agence de l'Eau RMC,
2002). Although already voted by the CLE, the chapter of the SAGE related to the
management of the flows of Basse Vallée has been removed by the State during the
approval of the SAGE. This is apparently a consequence of a “bilateral negotiation between
the State and EDF” (France Nature Environnement, 2003).
Therefore, we could think that it is better to set up SAGE on wide areas that cover the most
upstream-downstream processes related to water resources. Nevertheless, the case of the
Vilaine SAGE set up on a large area (about 11000 km2 covering almost 6 Departments) set a
new problem: how could people consider the whole area and try to solve local problems? A
solution would be to set up several SAGE on small areas and to manage their connection
(SHF, 2003). But still, meetings and dialogues with the concerned people the farthest
upstream during the implementation would play a significant part in the success of this
project.
To conclude, tools used for participative management such as contracts and SAGE appear
to be able to solve some problems related to water resources. In particular, their local scale
of application seems sensible as it helps the tool to adapt itself to the local specificities of the
considered watershed and its water users. The efficiency of such tools depends greatly on
the commitment of those involved in the management of water resources. Thus it is of prime
priority for elected members of the concerned areas to carry out the project with motivation
and dynamism.
Contracts and SAGE are two different tools. A SAGE sets a statutory framework whereas a
contract is more an operational tool. Therefore it is essential that the choice of the tool comes
from a real dialogue between all the people concerned by the water resources. Nevertheless,
more than two “rival” tools, SAGE and contracts are complementary; the SAGE sets a
statutory framework and defines the measures to be taken and the contract puts them into
concrete action. Besides, feedback on SAGE and contracts have shown that setting up one
tool is easier when the other has already been set up. They have also revealed some of their
gaps: the complexity and time needed to implement these tools, the difficulties of setting up a
perennial tool of management of the water resources etc. In particular, it is essential for
contracts and SAGE to be able to anticipate the major events of the areas where they are set
up (e.g. demographic increase, new big buildings, the evolution of agricultural areas etc.).
15
ROYALTIES:
Water royalties as well as Water Agencies were created by Act n° 64-1245 of December 16th
1964. The initial role of water royalties was to collect money to ensure financial support to
some selected projects and not to modify the behaviour of water users. Although royalties
related to the “deterioration of water quality” have been defined with accuracy in the Acts –
especially that of December 16th 1964- the definition of other water royalties has been blurred
since their creation.
Article 18 of Ordinance n°66-700 of September 14th 1966 states that “payment of royalties
may be claimed from people or institutions that make interventions of Water Agencies useful
or a necessity because:
- either they contribute to a loss of quality of water
- or they pump water
- or they modify water flow in part of the watershed
Royalties may also be claimed from people who benefit from buildings made with the
contribution of Water Agencies.”
Quality and quantity royalties are computed using the following formula (Agence de l'eau
RMC, 2005):
R=A x C x T
Where R = royalties
A = basis of taxation (quantity of pollution, volume of water taken, etc.)
C = coefficients (geographical position, coefficient of flow for the shunt, etc.)
T = rate (€/ unit of basis of taxation)
However there is no official way to compute the basis of taxation in the case of “quantitative
royalties”.
Nowadays, royalties collected by the Water Agencies are computed by their board of
directors. Watershed committees - comprising of 40% of local elected members, 40% of
representatives of water users and 20% of representatives of the State - give their approval
about the rates of royalties.
Therefore, royalties may be different from one of the six main watersheds in France to
another (Table 1).
watershed
Adour-Garonne
Artois-Picardie
Loire-Bretagne
Rhin-Meuse
Rhône-Méd.-Corse
Seine-Normandie
France métropol.
« quality royalties » (1)
Total(2)
€/hab.
104
96
184
122
296
551
1353
16
20,8
15,9
30,4
21
31,7
23,2
Total(2)
Total royalties(1)
€/hab
138
117
236
139
346
646
1622
21,2
25,5
20,3
34,8
24,5
37,1
27,9
(1) Average
(2) In
over 2000-2002
millions of euros
Table 1: rate of royalties in the six French watersheds (FLORY Jean-Claude, 2003)
This geographical disparity may make the analysis of the thirty year long data on royalties
difficult. Nevertheless, a report on the assessment of Water Agencies issued by the
Commissariat général au Plan in 1997 raised several criticisms about the efficiency of
royalties. In particular, rates are too low to make royalties play an incentivising role: “royalties
16
are not high enough to be incentive (...) Rather than the principle “polluters pay”, it is the
principle “I pay but it is an investment” that governs this tool. In a way water users gather in
groups that intend to “make a profit” out of royalties on a long time-scale.”
The new bill on water resources will harmonise the maximum rates of royalties on the whole
French territory (till now these maximum rates have been set at 0. 2 €/m3 in areas where
water resources are sufficient to cover the needs of users and 0.03 €/m3 in areas where they
are not) (OLIN Nelly, 2005).
The rate of royalties also depends on water users (Table 2). The following table contains
rounded values as they have been averaged over 1997-2002. However it clearly shows that
contributions of local communities (approximately 80%) are much higher than those of
farmers (approximately 1 to 2 %). This result is not as stunning as it may first appear as local
communities also get about 80% of state aid (FLORY Jean- Claude, 2003). Nevertheless,
the “state aid/royalties” ratio is greater than six for farmers (and greater than three if we only
consider quantitative royalties). Even if a total rebalancing is not possible, all water users
(even farmers) think that a partial one would be a good idea (FLORY Jean- Claude, 2003).
Local
communities
Pollution
Resource
S/Total
Industries
Pollution
Resource
S/Total
Agriculture
Pollution
Resource
S/Total
global
Pollution
Resource
S/Total
Royalties in
M€ (averaged
over 19972002)
Distribution of
royalties in %
(averaged
over 19972002)
State aid
(averaged
over 19972002)
Distribution of
state aid in %
(averaged
over 19972002)
932
189
1121
70
14,2
84,2
642
123
765
65,1
12,4
77,5
138
57
195
10,4
4,2
14,6
110
18
128
11,2
1,8
13
2
13
15
0,2
1
1,2
59
35
94
5,9
3,6
9,5
1072
259
1331
80,6
19,4
100
811
176
987
82,2
17,8
100
Table 2: royalties and state aids for local communities, industries and farmers (FLORY Jean-Claude, 2003)
Another point of imbalance exists. 80% of state aids and royalties are devoted to the fight
against pollution, whereas less than 20% are devoted to the quantitative management of
water resources (Table 2). Though the “state aid/royalties” ratio is approximately equal to
one, the imbalance between problems related to the amount of water resources and their
pollution could be worrying. This trend should be carefully monitored to be sure that Water
Agencies do not exclusively focus on pollution problems, thereby dropping problems related
to the quantitative management of water resources.
Finally, royalties are really complex to compute, which makes them hard to understand for
lay people (FLORY Jean-Claude, 2003). This lack of simplicity may make people wonder if
this tool is fair for all water users. It also makes it difficult for people to translate the rate of
royalties into the state of the concerned water resources, i.e. to understand when an alert
about the water resources becoming rare is “broadcast” through the rate of royalties.
17
For royalties to have an incentivising effect, the water demand (e.g. for irrigation) must
depend on the price of water (MONTGINOUL Marielle, 1997). If this is not the case then
royalties will have no incentive effect. An alternative may then be to set up a system of
quotas, or to combine both tools (quotae and royalties).
It is important to notice that when water shortages occur, crops are often already established
and farmers will irrigate at any water cost to save their harvest (MONTGINOUL Marielle,
1997). Then water demand for irrigation does not depend on the price of water so royalties
cannot have an incentivising effect on farmers. It may then be far more efficient to set up
quotas.
18
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20