Review 2
Timothy J. O’Brien
History 6393
February 8, 2005
The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America
By Stephen G. Rabe
University of North Carolina Press, 1999
Stephen Rabe’s volume takes its title from a comment John F. Kennedy made
during a conversation with British diplomats. Kennedy was trying to impress upon them
the urgency and seriousness of the communist threat to Latin America while trying to
convince their government to support his policies by delaying independence to British
Guiana. The title reveals Kennedy’s obsession with preventing the alleged threat of
communist influence on Latin American countries.
In March 13, 1961 President Kennedy gave a speech that outlined his ambitious
plan to transform Latin American countries into prosperous democratic and just societies.
Dubbed the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy’s program was to be a Marshall Plan for
Central and South America. His speech outlined a ten point plan to transform Latin
America during the 1960’s. The plan was for the United States to support economic
integration, economic planning, common markets, and to solve commodity market
problems. It also called for the strengthening of cultural ties and scientific and technical
cooperation. Rabe uses the Alliance for Progress program as prism to examine Kennedy’s
policies in Latin America
In the first chapter Rabe outlines the origins of the Alliance for Progress. The U.S.
government initiated their Latin American policy because of their fears of radical social
revolution. Kennedy viewed Latin America as a cold war battleground and in support of
his views cited Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s comments that he would back “wars of
national liberation.” Kennedy also accepted the reasoning of National Security Council
Paper Number 68 of 1950. Kennedy was convinced that the fate of Western Civilization
depended on victory in the Cold War. The president called upon his advisors for a battle
plan for the Cold War in Latin America. The advisors concluded that instability, agitation
and even revolution were possible because of the poverty and injustice present in Latin
America. After Fidel Castro’s successful revolution in Cuba, Kennedy was not going to
allow a second communist nation in the region. Rabe concludes that the Alliance for
Progress originated from Kennedy’s pledge to win the Cold War in Latin America.
Rabe’s thesis is the Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress was a resounding flop.
Despite Kennedy’s efforts through the Alliance for Progress programs, unemployment in
Latin America rose from 18 to 25 million during the 1960’s and more than half the
population of the region continued to survive on $120 a year. Aside from the continued
widespread poverty and joblessness throughout the region, military personnel overthrew
six democratically governments during the Kennedy administration.
Throughout the central five chapters Rabe lays out the attempted implementation
and the missteps of the Alliance for Progress programs. In the chapter titled Gunboat
Diplomacy, Rabe shows how the U.S. supported one dictator over another while
forgetting the historical lesson that “only enlightened, socially progressive democratic
leaders could undermine the appeal of communism in Latin America.” One example
Rabe uses to illustrate the U.S. policy of gunboat diplomacy was the support and the
CIA’s role in overthrow attempts of military dictator Rafael Trujillo Molina of the
Dominican Republic. The U.S. inaction in Haiti and its misguided support for its leader
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François “Baby Doc” Duvalier is also examined in light of the Alliance for Progress
programs. What the Kennedy administration learned in Dominican Republic and Haiti
was that despite their idealistic good intentions, democracy and social justice could not be
easily installed into countries with unstable political histories.
Another important chapter is on Destabilization Policies. Here Rabe demonstrates
the inconsistencies of the Kennedy administration’s purported pro-democratic policies in
Latin American. Argentina’s President Arturo Frondizi supported the Alliance for
Progress, took decisive steps toward economic and politic reform and oriented his
country toward the U.S. But because Frondizi didn’t toe the line and support Kennedy’s
Cold War policies the U.S. stood by while the Argentinean democracy was destroyed,
culminating with Fronzini’s removal from office. Subsequent to the appointment of a
puppet the U.S. supported Argentina strongman General Pedro Aramburu because of his
support of America during the Cuban Missile crisis. Other examples discussed by Rabe
include the U.S. destabilizing Jaoa Goulart’s Brazilian government and supporting
Guatemalan military leader Colonel Arturo Peralta after the military overthrew the
government of Miguel Ydigoras.
Rabe conclusion is that the Alliance for Progress failed, but despite that failure
Kennedy’s policies demonstrated a clear case of presidential leadership. Rabe makes the
case that Kennedy gave more attention to inter-American relations than any other post
World War II president. The overriding fault that Rabe identifies is that Kennedy’s Cold
War policies undermined the Alliance for Progress. Other reasons offered were that
America could not easily transfer its institutions and values to Latin America.
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The author’s conclusion that Kennedy’s Cold War policy harmed his Alliance for
Progress program is sound given all the support he lays out in the book. Rabe argues that
Kennedy was an informed and intelligent leader who could discuss key political and
economic issues regarding Latin America. But according to Rabe’s research, the U.S.
spent millions arming and training militaries and police forces in Central and South
America and allowed or supported the overthrow of six governments during Kennedy’s
term. Democracies and social justice didn’t sweep over Latin America despite the
administrations plans. Kennedy’s lofty goals ended up being perverted by his unfounded
obsession with threats of Communist influence and takeover in Latin America.
The author did extensive archival research for the book, but there was no research
conducted in Latin America. While not a fatal error, certainly the book could have been
improved by digging in Latin American archives. Aside from that one quibble, this is an
excellent and well written book that provides an informed and balanced look at
Kennedy’s failed policies in Latin America. Scholars seeking to understand the current
U.S. policy failures in Afghanistan and Iraq would do well to study and understand the
Kennedy experience in Latin America.
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