The Dynamics of Organizational Learning in the Nuclear Power Industry
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The Dynamics of Organizational Learning in the
Nuclear Power Industry
M.A. Candidate
Labor and Policy Studies
State University of New York
Empire State College
October 2000
Patrick W. O’Hara
3 Grissom Place
Salt Point, NY 12578-2024
(845) 266-8609 (home)
(845) 266-4740 (fax)
rescuer@banet.net
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The Dynamics of Nuclear Power
The pressures of increased competition and the demands of a rapidly changing
marketplace have affected the nuclear power industry. Deregulation has been one of
the main drivers of change, forcing a separation of power producers and transmission
services. These pressures have forced a renewed emphasis on cost control and
operating efficiency while balancing the needs for operational safety and reliability.1 At
the same time, this reorganization has precipitated a rebirth of the nuclear power
industry, creating a segmentation and consolidation of the energy industry, whereby
new companies seek competitive advantage through
better control of their
organizational factors. Like other industries, transformational leadership and culture
change efforts have been implemented in an effort to build corporate identity, redefine
group values, articulate strategic direction, and embrace the importance of
multidimensional teamwork as the keys to success in a rapidly changing organization.
The programs, while initially effective in turning around or redirecting an organization,
are limited in their long-term effectiveness by virtue of their dependence on internal
changes to leadership or cultural norms. The nuclear power industry will benefit more
from an organizational learning approach, which is more dynamic, fluid, and responsive
to both internal and external imperatives.
Jacobs and Haber define five general categories of factors that affect the safety and
reliability goals of the nuclear industry.2 The first, “administrative knowledge,” refers to
the knowledge of the organization and the formalization of operations by way of policy
and procedures. The second is an emphasis on communications, recognizing the
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importance of multidimensional communication both internally and externally. The third
is based on decision making, which they define as goal prioritization and organizational
learning: the extent to which plant personnel and the organization use knowledge
gained from past experience to improve future performance. The fourth category
reflects human resource allocation, which includes areas such as performance
evaluation, managing technical knowledge and training. The fifth is based on culture,
which they distinguish as emphasis on ownership, safety culture, and time urgency.
While Jacobs and Haber’s assessment appears comprehensive, it gives a limiting
perspective of to the role of organizational learning, which should likely be an element of
each of the five general categories.
The breadth of organizational learning as a developmental model for the nuclear
industry far surpasses traditional change models, such as those proposed by Bass and
Avolio,3 or Schein.4 The concept of change management through organizational
learning appears more appropriate because it allows for a “holistic” approach, which
may be tailored in scope to the industry. The dynamics of the nuclear industry demand
more than a singular focus on any one factor. Moreover, the approach must be able to
operate in the context of an evolving organizational culture that emphasizes a static
sociotechnical system that is inherent to the nuclear industry: A man-machine interface
that is driven by safety and reliability, otherwise known as the “nuclear safety culture.”
Technology cannot be managed by rigid engineering controls. To appreciate the
dynamics of the human factors on the sociotechnical system, a greater emphasis must
be placed on how these elements affect the worker, operating in a unique environment.
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A Different Breed
The nuclear organization has evolved into a different breed of organization that is
relatively segmented from other types of organizations. A primary classification often
used to describe the industry is that of a high-reliability organization (HRO): a term used
to describe organizations that are mandated to do everything possible to avoid certain
kinds of negative outcomes.5 In short, the ordinary operation of nuclear facilities has the
capacity to permanently damage surrounding communities, more distant inhabitants,
the natural environment, and even future generations, through everyday operational
activities.6 Such distinction has created the need for a high degree of regulation, from
both government and industrial organizations, as well as a need to manage public
perceptions of the risk of operations. Regulation has created a labor-intensive industry
due to the mandate to manage contingencies. The need to conform to regulations has
also created a “machine bureaucracy” of sorts,7 where most activities are reduced to a
policy or procedure, leaving little room for individual discretion or creativity. Other
examples of HROs are the aviation and aerospace industry, which take the same
approach to organizational management as the nuclear industry, emphasizing the
importance of safety culture and organizational factors as a means of creating and
sustaining a safe and reliable organization.8 Nonetheless, the typology of the aviation
industry has been characterized as “decomposable,” – placing a greater dependency on
localized actions and analysis for organizational management -- rather than the
distinction of the nuclear industry, which is characterized as systemic, or “holistic.”9
Such analysis validates the need for a greater approach to organizational management
than traditional systems.
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The nuclear industry is further segmented by several unique characteristics. First, the
workforce is very homogenous. Diversity experts would characterize the nature of the
industry based on shared primary and secondary dimensions,10 which is represented by
a male-dominated, engineering-oriented workforce with a militaristic background. At first
glance, this may seem discriminatory, yet the predominant applicant pool for nuclear
power operations has historically been from the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion program
– which is predominantly male, and engineering-oriented. This applicant pool has been
attractive to the industry, as these candidates have been preconditioned to the culture
of the HRO and the emphasis on safety culture largely due to the efforts of the visionary
leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, a man considered the father of the nuclear
navy.11 Many of the values and norms espoused by him during the advent of nuclear
energy as a source of productive power (circa 1940), have become deeply engrained in
the nuclear organization, and remain the basis of the “nuclear safety culture.”
Another characteristic of the industry is its view of competition. Today’s nuclear plant
operators do not consider other nuclear plant operators as direct competitors, but more
as a resource to help the industry become more competitive, through the mandated and
voluntary sharing of operating experience. Instead, competition is considered the
operator of the lowest-cost energy alternative, which today is the natural gas
cogeneration facility.12 As such, the competitiveness of the industry is based less on
technology, and more on the development of its human resources, policies and
procedures. This is particularly interesting because a nuclear organization’s success is
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not necessarily dependant on another nuclear operator’s failure. In fact, the failure of
any one nuclear operator may actually jeopardize the entire industry. This creates the
need for a strong support network, and heavy internal criticism for poor performers. The
competitive nuclear operator will thus be the one that is able to build and retain a highly
skilled and motivated workforce. Such emphasis will likely reduce risk, aid in meeting
productivity and quality demands, control costs of injuries and catastrophe, while
meeting the demands for innovation and growth.13 The relationship between a quality
workforce and technology in the deliverance of safety and reliability in nuclear power
organizations has driven its characterization as a sociotechnical system, whereby any
malfunctioning element of the system – an employee or mechanical component – may
disrupt the entire system.14
A Need for Continuous Learning
The dynamics of the nuclear power industry demand a multidimensional approach to
organizational learning. A first dimension rests on the need to develop innovative
systems and work practices internally for market competitiveness. A second dimension
rests on the need to manage the regulatory oversight process. A third dimension rests
on the need to share information among the industry to guarantee the safety and
reliability of nuclear operations, thus assuring public confidence in nuclear energy as a
viable alternative to conventional fossil fueled generation. A fourth dimension rests with
the development of the nuclear workforce – the greatest asset and investment to the
modern nuclear organization.
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The compilation of “lessons learned” within the organization and its proliferation through
feedback loops is one of the most important aspects of competitiveness at the plant
level. Lessons learned stem from post job critiques, whereby organizational and
production factors are discussed to identify problems, both apparent and latent, that
affected the performance of individual tasks and jobs. The goal of lessons learned is to
build into future work packages all of the contingencies to anticipate, avoid, and solve
similar problems that may arise in future work. There are three basic objectives to
lessons learned. First, to reduce the time it takes to complete a job, thus shortening
periods of generation outage or limiting conditions of operation. Second, to reduce the
costs to complete a job, based on timelines for staged tools, labor, and technical
expertise, which may be refined through the process. Third, to increase the ability to
avoid risk by documenting transients and system interactions, which further bolsters the
goals of safety and reliability within the organization.
Developing a system to deal with regulatory issues is also important. This generally
requires the organization to develop mechanisms to adapt to changes in regulatory
policy, which involves continually improving internal policy, procedures, and work
practices. The sharing of operating experience among nuclear operators is also
important, as a means of culminating cumulative industry operating experience: nuclear
operators benefit from the successes and failures of their counterparts, and may model
programs so as to repeat or avoid similar events depending on circumstances. The
need also extends to regulatory violations, in determining the causes, and taking
precautions to assure that the same negative events are not repeated. This type of
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organizational learning benefits the organization internally, and serves as a mechanism
to warn other operators in the industry of potential regulatory issues. Many of the
violations in the nuclear industry require self-reporting under federal regulation. No
doubt, operators that may avoid regulatory pitfalls are likely to be less burdened by the
intense scrutiny of regulatory inspections, or the negative public perceptions of
stakeholders that accompanies enforcement actions.
The development of human resources is the key to competitiveness in the nuclear
industry. Many in the industry characterize optimization of its workforce as the “nuclear
safety culture.” More than a culture per se, it is a definition of a sociotechnical system,
much like that of TQM. It involves the relationship between humans and technology,
and focuses on factors that affect human performance, such as employee mindset,
work practices, and procedural adherence. This emphasis places greater responsibility
on proactive workforce planning and organizational development. The systemic nature
of the change process, however, must be recognized as a potential negative influence
on operational outcomes, such as increasing worker anxiety or creating distractions
from the task. As such, the static nature of the sociotechnical system is the source of
stability, rather than the organizational culture: the safety culture represents those core
values that need to be so deeply ingrained in the nuclear organization, that they are
never changed, or affected by complacency.
The greatest challenge to the nuclear industry over the next ten years will be to transfer
this knowledge to a new generation of nuclear operators, as the renewing of the life
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cycle of nuclear power has created a situation whereby the current generation of
operators will likely retire around the same time.15 The organizational learning system
must capture the need to pass-on lessons learned, operating experience, and
regulatory issues in a complete, yet efficient manner.
Elements of a Learning Culture
Schein identifies ten characteristics of a learning culture, which he attributes to the
success of an organization to make its own “perpetual diagnosis” and self-manage
transformation as needed.16 Many of these characteristics are inherent of the nuclear
organization. The first characteristic identified is a dominant organization in the
organization-environment relationship. The assumption is that the organization, through
leadership, vision and shared assumptions, must actively manage the business
environment. The second characteristic calls for a proactive approach to the nature of
human activity, thus encouraging the identification of problems from all levels of the
organization, and implementation of corrective actions. The third characteristic is a
pragmatic sense of reality and truth, which articulates the need for diversity in problem
solving, rather than relying on the way that things have always been done. The fourth
characteristic has to do with assumptions about human nature. The learning culture
needs a work environment that fosters the assumption that humans are good and that
their nature is mutable. This is likely to pose a serious obstacle to the industry due to
the predominance of organized labor in the utility industry and the fact that supervisory
positions are often filled for technical expertise over progressive management skills.
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The fifth characteristic revolves around the nature of human relations, specifically the
questions of groupism vs. individualism, and the level of authority and control. The
nuclear industry is consistent with Schein’s assessment of a midline approach, as
inclusion to the group and teamwork are important, yet the ability to standout, disagree
and advocate an alternative are equally important. Although participative systems have
been the initiator of many creative solutions, the required bureaucracy and
centralization of authority often affects implementation. The sixth characteristic relates
to orientation of time, in which a near-future orientation that looks ahead to see if
process changes are working, is considered optimal. The seventh characteristic is
rooted in the need for communication, which Schein believes must include the
assumption that “multichannel” communication and information are central to the
learning organization. The eighth characteristic relates to the question of sub-cultural
uniformity versus diversity. Schein advocates high-diversity over uniformity. The nuclear
organization, however, is built on standardization of work practices through a plethora of
procedures. It further relies on active membership in a “nuclear safety culture,” which is
inflexible and stabilizing. However, the role of organized labor does provide a dichotomy
or system of checks and balances of sorts, for which union members are afforded
certain protection for disagreeing with the norm, so long as it does not subvert the need
for safety or reliability. The ninth characteristic is the orientation between task and
relationship, which Schein advocates a balance between the two. He notes the
importance of task, which is often emphasized in the nuclear organization due the
strong engineering element of its secondary dimension of diversity. This is another area
where the nuclear organization must work to achieve balance, thus placing more
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emphasis on building relationships. The final characteristic concerns field logic, where
systemic thinking has been identified as being more conducive to the learning culture.
Nuclear experts such as Montgomery and Scalia model a much simpler environment for
organizational learning, which contains four basic elements; vision, culture, a principled
value system, and leadership support.17 For the nuclear industry, the vision may be to
prove that nuclear energy is a safe, reliable, and cost-effective alternative to
conventional generation: the antithesis of course, would lead to the end of the industry.
The organizational culture would reflect the values, practices, and history of the parent
organization with respect to approaching efficiency and allocating resources. The
principled value system is likely synonymous with the static nature of the sociotechnical
system, or safety culture. Leadership support optimizes organizational design, cultivates
positive behaviors, and demands performance at all levels of the organization.
The two models, while appearing quite different in approach, represent much the same
difference between culture management and transformational leadership as approaches
to
organizational
development.
The
culmination
of
the
two
represent
the
multidimensional characteristics that must be considered in such a dynamic industry,
and to denounce a turnkey “cookie cutter” approach to managing the nuclear
organization. The nuclear organization needs a systemic, or holistic approach, but may
also need to assure that all components are properly identified – such as building a
better understanding of the dynamics of human relationships and culture.
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Implementing a System of Learning
The nuclear industry, for the most part, already has learning systems in place to meet
both internal and external needs. Internally, the learning system continually focuses on
the task, element, or event to determine the contributing factors for a deviation of the
norm, or of an expectation. The deviation is documented in a deviation event report
(DER), which identifies an objective assessment of the deviation, and is generally
written by the worker closest to the deviation. The finder of the deviation also
documents any immediate corrective actions taken. After it is written, the DER is
“initially” screened and categorized by functional area and apparent cause for follow-up
by the department involved. The deviation is also identified in level of importance. The
investigating department researches what the planned outcome was to be, usually by
researching the controlling procedure, policy, or plan. After performing a root cause
analysis and identifying all of the contributing factors, a corrective action plan is
developed, which seeks to mitigate a repeat event through modifying procedures to
better isolate contributing factors. All of the steps of this DER process are logged into a
computerized database for future cross-reference: The process provides a mechanism
to gauge repeat incidences, and the similarity of contributing factors. This analysis helps
determine which components of the system need to be modified, sets long-term
corrective actions, and creates accountability for a definitive completion date.
An appropriate learning system would have to recognize all of the general
organizational factors identified by Jacobs and Haber. The DER system works well to
manage the development of administrative knowledge, thus standardizing work,
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keeping procedures and policies current, without contradictory information and
ambiguity in interpretation. Increasing administrative knowledge is generally beneficial
internally, but is often shared with the industry when deviations are related to
component failure, defective parts, or process improvements that further safety and
reliability. The DER also serves as a mechanism of communication, placing issues of
system failures or deviations in a form accessible to all plant employees. Employees
learn about deviations, and are able to build issues into their memory to aid and develop
their forward thinking: the employees’ ability to recognize the potential for deviations
before performing work. One criticism, however, would be communicating long-term
corrective actions, which generally involves only the parties closest to the event. The
system has also been used for deviations in human performance, which generally are
reactive rather than proactive. These DERs are perceived as more disciplinary related,
than as a learning mechanism, or a means to identify system failure. Little emphasis on
human resource allocation or culture are apparent, which is surprising when considering
that such a system does not work effectively unless all employees at all levels
participate in the problem identification and corrective action programs. Additionally, the
DER system does not effectively capture the effects of internal and external
relationships between the company, management, union, and employee. Such findings
further the argument for an elevation in importance of the human resource function, and
the need for a more “holistic” approach, which emphasizes relational management as a
means of mitigating organizational factors that affect performance.
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Zangari and Cavaleri present “Relational Management” as an alternative to traditional
command and control systems.18 Their approach is based on “developing a useful
knowledge of how relationships affect performance in organizations,” and managing
“the reciprocal pattern of relationships that emerge over time.” Such an approach has
distinct merit in the nuclear industry considering the emphasis on fitness for duty, which
is both mental and physical: the intent being to minimize error by controlling negative
factors that effect performance. Currently the industry takes credit for achieving this
measure through rigorous pre-employment psychological evaluations, random drug
testing, and continual behavioral observation programs. However, this approach is only
effective for detecting aberrancy, rather than the latent issues that may be caused by
any variety of internal or external dynamics. Thus, the concept of relational
management calls for renewed rapport between supervisor and employee: one that
extends further than the worksite, and is concerned with more than immediate on-thejob performance.
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an industry professional group that
advocates operating standards and self-regulation, began initiating a program in 1997 to
address the emphasis on changing the employee-management relationship in effort to
create an environment conducive to organizational learning and high-performance. The
“Excellence in Human Performance,” program19 is a change model designed to present
a new focus that recognizes the effects of individual behavior, management, leadership
practices, and organizational processes and values on the frequency of human error.
This realignment is designed to facilitate organizational processes and values that
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support desired behaviors. While the approach is innovative by way of addressing the
organizational factors that hinder human performance and organizational learning, it
stops short of advocating “soft-people-skills.” Much of the industry’s management
paradigm continues to be tied to the nuclear navy’s system of “discipline” and
“commitment” which resulted from the systems of rank and interpersonal reliance of
naval officers and sailors: everyone lived together and relied on one another, knowing
full-well that the failure of any one man would jeopardize the entire crew. The same
principles prevail today in the commercial sector, yet the people are no longer as
connected or interdependent because work and non-work are separate. However,
outside influences effect performance, and must be recognized and managed through
relational management.
In short, the industry has done well to manage organizational learning with respect to
administrative knowledge, communication, and decision making as approached from a
technical and performance perspective. However, they have failed to recognize the
importance of latent organizational weaknesses resulting from the lack of relational
management, which affects human resource allocation and culture. Advocating softpeople skills and professional management over technical expertise is paramount to
successful implementation.20
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Benefits to the Nuclear Organization
The nuclear industry would benefit greatly from a properly implemented system of
organizational learning, which would create greater efficiency and further the primary
operating objectives of safety and reliability. The learning organization would create a
self-sustaining organization that is able to continually change to meet the market
expectations of a competitive environment, without compromising core values of the
sociotechnical system. This will be increasingly important as the industry consolidates
under fewer operators, as a system to manage the negative factors of change.
Organizations with learning systems in place will likely be valued higher by the market,
or even be deemed the leaders of the industry. These leaders will also be the
benchmark for under-performers, creating pressure to improve performance or shut
down permanently. A long-range implication may even be to open the door for selfregulation.
Individual organizations would benefit from a competitive standpoint. Reducing repeat
mistakes that hinder performance, reduce profits, or damage the industry’s reputation
have pervasive implications. Refining work processes in response to lessons learned
will also provide greater safety and reliability, save time, and reduce costs. This sets the
stage to increase competitiveness through excellence in human performance. Systems
of self-assessment and feedback are also likely to aid in the early detection of
dysfunctional processes. Organizational learning will demand more emphasis on the
relational factors of the system that affect performance. It will also create a workforce
that is participatory and forward thinking. The learning organization will foster a positive
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work environment, which is exceedingly important for several reasons. The first is the
maintenance of trust, which has been described as the cement that binds together all
other relationships. Trust fosters enhanced morale, reduces turnover, expunges the
rumor mill, increases productivity, and reduces absenteeism.21 Trust also leads to
cooperative behavior, open lines of communication, willingness to take ownership of
issues and tasks, and enhances team-based work systems.22 Interestingly enough,
these same attributes reflect Admiral Rickover’s fundamental principles: commitment,
trust, communication, and performance under pressure.23
Implications on Labor Policy
The dynamics of a successfully implemented organizational learning process have
interesting ramifications for the nuclear industry, which run counter to the emerging
trends of global economic labor policy. Most noticeably, organizational learning has the
propensity to create shifts in employment segmentations. The emphasis on continual
learning -- the “what and why” -- and the accumulation of valuable operating experience
has the propensity to transform “routine producers” into “knowledge workers” by virtue
of a variety of organizational learning achieved through longevity. Such mechanisms
include operating experience, technical expertise, systems perspective, and forward
thinking through lessons learned. Such a shift generates job security, and redefines the
union-management relationship. Hence, the reduction of adversarial relationships
reduces union solidarity and the promotion of non-productive conflict, thus allowing the
industry more flexibility in the utilization of its human resources.24 Operational success
from cost-control and innovative work practices are dependant on participative
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management styles: tapping into the front-line knowledge and operating experience of
workers to predict problems, and find practical solutions, based on first hand information
of the problem and resources needed to solve them.25 Such a system can only be
implemented with a bottom-up worker buy-in, and a committed workforce.
The emphasis on organizational learning and systems perspective may also alleviate
internal pressures toward compartmentalization of work, which naturally results from
organized labor. Such a system encourages employees to learn more than their
functional role, and creates opportunities for spillover knowledge and skills to
overlapping areas. This focus creates a better utilization of the workforce, as
competitive pressures force downsizing of minimum staffing levels. Employees who
buy-in to the safety culture and organizational learning may benefit by opportunities for
temporary occupational changes to make up for short-term staffing shortages, and
emergent needs. Nuclear plants that have carefully managed their organizational
learning well have found that as staffing has been reduced, performance has actually
improved.26 Thus, the incentive for cross-training further reinforces job security, and
creates opportunities for employee development and enrichment. These opportunities
will become increasingly important as the learning culture forces flatter organizational
structures.27 Unfortunately, the resulting limits to upward mobility is perceived as a
drawback in the industry, as the average time from entry level employment to
supervisory level is gauged to be 10-19 years – too long for most fast track career
minded people.28 The industry is always faced with losing their best and brightest, as
they have the most opportunity for mobility outside of the industry. Although the time
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commitment for advancement appears so long, the nuclear industry is approaching a
“life-time” (as measured by the life of the plant or the employee) employment
commitment – which is a factor that helps justify the investment in organizational
learning systems. An emphasis on employee development is easily justified in the
nuclear industry, as performance is tied more to knowledge and expertise of employees
than capital equipment.29 Additionally, the continual learning environment reduces the
negative factors associated with age, and the evolutions of skills obsolesce experienced
by many professions in a high-performance work environment.
Organizational learning is also likely to create value in a proprietary workforce, rather
than seeking monetary savings through outsourcing. The value of culture assimilation
and participation in problem identification and corrective action programs will yield
greater savings in the long run – as this is considered the primary source of reliability in
HROs.30 The decision to “make” or “buy” human resources is not weighted as heavily on
cost as it is on creating value for the organization in the long-run. Industry topperformers have also found sources of additional revenue from outsourcing the
specialists they have developed to other nuclear operators. Operators that do not
develop technical expertise in-house run the risk of dependency on outside factors,
which greatly affect an operator’s ability to manage a station efficiently and safely in the
long-run, and its ability to implement a proprietary workforce in the future due to loss of
station-specific expertise.31 In fact, the need for skilled workers with technical expertise
and understanding of the “nuclear safety culture” have created a hefty demand and
generous compensation for workers willing to work on a per-diem traveling basis,
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providing specialty services during refueling outages – which reflects the single largest
costs of operations: the loss of revenue from generation plus the costs the maintenance
and payroll, which may exceed $5 million per day.32 The best performing operators tend
to utilize their proprietary workforce better, with a less than 10 percent reliance on
outside contractors.33 Retaining a proprietary workforce for non-core competency
positions also provides a pool of culturally preconditioned workers that could be trained
for nuclear specific positions: those that are unlikely to be filled through traditional
means as a result of military downsizing and corresponding changes in educational and
technological policies in the nation’s schools. Many of these positions could be filled
through apprentice-like programs, cross-training, or other job enrichment programs. In
short, the industry would benefit from the decision to develop their own workforce,
rather than rely on outside contractors unfamiliar with the organization.
The Role of Traditional Change Models
In recognizing the benefits of organizational learning systems for the nuclear industry, it
should not take away from the importance of leadership or culture management. In fact,
the various findings reinforce the emphasis of both culture and leadership as the basis
for creating a solid foundation for organizational learning as the self-sustaining
competitive mechanism of the nuclear operator, and the industry. It is quite clear that
the founder of the nuclear safety culture, Admiral Rickover, used many of the leadership
principles described by Avolio and Bass to develop the values, shared beliefs and
assumptions which continue to drive the organizational culture and sociotechnical
system of the industry today. Rickover also introduced the need to balance the culture
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of the organization with that of the sociotechnical system: he often found that the culture
of the conventional navy was not compatible with that of the nuclear safety culture, and
thus placed greater weight on the value for safety and reliability – sometimes to the
point of insubordination.34 Such principled leadership is important to initiate and
maintain progress. Likewise, the emphasis on culture is important in providing the
context for internal and external interactions. The difference, however, is that the
learning organization is not limited by the vision of the leader, but moreover is directed
by a variety of real-time factors that involve both perception and reality. Rather than the
leader sustaining leadership in his own image over time, the attributes of new leaders
are created through the results of incremental changes in vision, policy, and
performance created in response to the comprehensive system of organizational
learning. Culture management will also be a by-product of the system, so long as the
culture is aligned with the learning process. Less emphasis will be placed on the radical
approaches to culture change proposed by Schein such as
“unfreezing, cognitive
reconstruction, and refreezing.”35 In short, the appropriate culture and leadership must
be in place before organizational learning can be productive and representative of the
values of the organization.
Summary
The dynamics of the nuclear industry demand innovative approaches to organizational
management as a means to remain competitive and meet the regulatory goals of safety
and reliability. Several studies of the industry highlight the complexity of the nuclear
organization, and the need for a “holistic” approach to organizational management. The
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evolution of the nuclear industry has created a different breed of organization that is
unlike any other. The needs for organizational learning span through four general
dimension, which include market competitiveness, managing regulatory oversight,
sharing operating experience, and development of the nuclear workforce. The nuclear
organization already claims many of the characteristics of a learning culture, with the
exception of a few that would need to be augmented. The implementation of
organizational learning as a development mechanism appears to provide the “holistic”
or “systemic” approach that the nuclear industry demands, providing a real-time
proactive system of change, rather than responding to market directives, regulatory
action or public pressure. Implementing a system of organizational learning would need
to address five general categories of organization factors in order to be effective;
administrative
knowledge,
communications,
decision
making,
human
resource
allocation, and culture. Although the industry currently has organizational learning
programs in place, their effectiveness is limited by a predominant focus on technology
and performance, which excludes many of the emotional factors that affect results. This
paper advocates the need to focus on relational management and “soft-people skills” as
a means of improving organizational effectives and performance. Adopting such policies
will yield widespread benefits to the nuclear industry, as well as stimulate changes in
industry labor policy. Although using organizational learning as a developmental tool is
touted as being more advantageous than traditional change systems, the proper
leadership and culture must be in place before implementation.
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Notes
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2 R. Jacobs and S. Haber, “Organizational Processes and Nuclear Power Plant Safety,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
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3 Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership,
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
4 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership 2 nd ed, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997).
5 Rochelle Lee Klein, Gregory A. Bigley, and Karlene H. Roberts, “Organizational Culture in High Reliability Organizations: An
Extension,” Human Relations, V48, n7, 1995, 772.
6 C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
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Miller eds, Nuclear Safety: A Human Factors Perspective, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1998), 147.
8 Ashleigh Merritt and Robert Helmreich, “Creating and Sustaining a Safety Culture: Some Practical Strategies, CRM Advocate,
1, 1996, 8-12.
9 Klein, Bigley, and Roberts, 775.
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1991), 20.
11 Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
12 James M. Hylko, “Innovation from Within Makes Turkey Point Tops,” Power, July/August 1999, 46.
13 Marilyn Joyce, “The Business Case for Ergonomics/Human Factors,” Occupational Hazards, v60, n12, 1998, 45-48.
14 Gerhard Becker, “From Theory to Practice: On the Difficulties of Improving Human-Factors Learning from Events in an
Inhospitable Environment”: in Jyuji Misumi, Bernard Wilpert, and Rainer Miller eds., Nuclear Safety: A Human Factors
Perspective, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1998), 115.
15 “Manpower Issues Rise with Nuclear Decline,” Engineering News Record, 3/6/00, 60.
16 Schein, 363.
17 John M. Montgomery and Frank Scalia, “Integrating Learning and Organizations,” in Steven Cavaleri and David Fearon,
Managing in Organizations that Learn, (Cambridge: Blackwell Business, 1996), 435-465.
18 Nicolas J. Zangari and Steven A. Cavaleri, “Relational Management,” in Steven Cavaleri and David Fearon, Managing in
Organizations that Learn, (Cambridge: Blackwell Business, 1996), 325-351.
19 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, “Excellence in Human Performance,” September 1997.
20 Montgomery and Scalia, 453.
21 Robert Glaser, “Paving the Road to Trust,” HR Focus, v74, n1, 1997, 5.
22 Gareth R. Jones, “The Experience and Evolution of Trust: Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork,” Academy of
Management Review, July 1998
23 Paul E. Bierly III and J.C. Spender, “Culture and High Reliability Organizations: The Case of the Nuclear Submarine,” Journal
of Management, v21, n 4, 1995, 639-656.
24 Schein, 324.
25 Phil Theibert, “Setting Records – Always Room to Improve,” Nuclear Engineering International, V43, n526, 1998, 33.
26 Tim D. Martin, “Tracking Staffing at US Nuclear Power Plants,” Nuclear Engineering International, v44, n538, 1999, 22-24
27 Montgomery and Scalia, 448.
28 Jennifer J. Laab, “Proactive People Planning Helps Nuclear Units Thrive,” Personnel Journal, v75, n6, 1996, 50.
29 Laab, 50.
30 Klein, Bigley, and Roberts, 773.
31 “Outsourcing Nuclear Operators: Pros and Cons,” Electrical World, v212, n7, 1998, 44.
32 “US Plants Aim to do More of their NDE On-Line,” Nuclear Engineering International, v600, 1997, 40.
33
Martin, 23.
34 Duncan.
35 Schein, 298-303.
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