EU Security Architecture in Relation to Security and Development
Mary Kaldor and Marlies Glasius
With assistance from Sarah Cussen
1
Introduction
The European Union has recently accelerated the development of a common security policy.
Is this good or bad for development?
In this paper we argue that the answer depends on the type of security policy
adopted by the European Union. Will the emerging security policy involve the build-up of
military forces to defend European territory on the American model? Or will Europe chose
instead to strengthen its contribution to global security by creating capabilities that could be
used to protect individuals and communities in situations of severe insecurity in different
parts of the world?
In our view, the latter is not only the most realistic approach to European security,
but also the only approach that can make the present preoccupation with security advance
rather than hinder development goals. In today’s globalised world, the security of Europeans
can only be assured through a global approach to security and through tackling the regional
conflicts and failing states that are the main source of ‘hard’ security threats to Europe like
WMD or terrorism. This requires an approach that combines public security and the
extension of the rule of law with economic and social development.
In particular, we put forward the proposal that the European Union should adopt a
human security strategy and doctrine. Human security combines core elements of both
human rights and human development. Such a conception of security may also influence
development policies so that they better serve the needs of individuals and communities who
might otherwise become engaged in violence.
In the next section, we describe current developments in EU architecture and the
tensions between the two approaches. Section three describes the changed global context
and what we mean by a human security policy. Section four contains concrete proposals
relating to European security, development, institutional embedding, and ‘taboo issues’ that
need to be brought into the open to improve human security.
2
Current Developments in European External Policy
2.1. Two approaches to European Security
In the construction of the European Union, there has always been a tension between
different conceptions of Europe. One conception has always been of Europe as a ‘peace
project’. This is an enlightenment idea – many of the great liberal thinkers (Abbé St Pierre,
Rousseau, and Kant) developed perpetual peace projects, which were essentially proposals
for European integration. In the same spirit, the founders of what was to become the
European Union wanted, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, to preclude
another war on European territory.
This continues to be a strong motive in the minds of European citizens: when asked
what the European Union means to them personally, the third answer that comes up in the
Eurobarometer survey, right after the euro and freedom of movement, is ‘peace’. Indeed, 89
1
per cent of respondents consider ‘maintaining peace and security in Europe’ to be a priority
of the EU. It is also considered to be the most effective of EU policies.1
In a globalizing world, the ‘peace project’ has to be understood as a process rather
than an end goal. The coming together of legal relations and a civil space has had to be
reproduced and extended to keep the process going. In the interdependent post-Cold War
environment, the peace project can succeed only as a global project and not as a merely
European one.
The other conception of Europe is as a super-power in the making. There has always
been a strand of Europeanism which sees the project as a way of reversing the decline of
Europe’s Great Powers. Many European politicians have long favoured a common defence
policy because they believed that Europe had the potential to become a superpower rivalling
the United States. Such a policy would build European security capabilities on the same
model as those of the member states, only bigger and better.
The direction of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy is still uncertain,
and at present has elements of both projects. One approach involves the strengthening of
integrated European military forces on a traditional defence model so that the EU can be
either a partner or a competitor to the United States. This approach is based on the
development of Europe as a superpower. According to this approach, the main threats to
Europe are states which possess weapons of mass destruction and/or harbour terrorists. The
main doctrinal changes required relate to technology, from platform-centric warfare to
network- centric warfare.
The other approach is to expand Europe’s capacity to contribute to global security,
to support the United Nations or other multilateral regional organisations. This is closer to
the ‘peace project’ conception of Europe – but it does involve the capacity for using force
alongside Europe’s other external instruments. In this case doctrinal changes have to do with
the principles that govern the use of force and how military capabilities can be combined
with police and other civilian capabilities. Those who support the first approach usually
favour the second approach as well, but as a secondary or supplementary capability, not as
the main thrust of EU security policy. In what follows, we describe how these different
approaches are reflected in the emerging security architecture.
2.2 Evolution of the EU’s External Policies
The founders of the original European Coal and Steel Community believed that if they
promoted integration at the level of society through common infrastructure like steel and
coal, through economic relations such as trade and finance, and through people-to-people
links, the high politics of security and foreign policy would eventually follow. In keeping
with this founding philosophy, the European Union’s emphasis, and its greatest strides, have
until recently always been in the area of ‘low politics’. This is true for its external relations as
well as its domestic policy. Security policy remained in the background after the failure to
ratify the European Defence Community in 1954. For many years, security issues remained
firmly in the sphere of national or transatlantic politics.
1
European Commission (2004) Eurobarometer 60: Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn
2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb60/eb60_rapport_standard_en.
pdf
2
As Leonard and Gowan put it, Europe ‘has developed a new type of power that
starts not with geo-politics but domestic politics. When the US talks to other countries, it is
about the war on terror, Iraq or the ICC. Europeans start from the other end of the
spectrum: what values underpin the state? What are its constitutional and regulatory
frameworks?’2
However, since October 1970, the member states of the European Community have
attempted to cooperate informally on major international policy problems in the context of
European political cooperation. This cooperation was formalized in the Single European Act
of 1986, without changing the intergovernmental nature of the framework. At Maastricht a
further step towards an integrated security policy was taken when member states
incorporated the objective of a common foreign policy into the treaty, which came into
force on 1 November 1993.
The failure of the European Union to act in an effective and co-ordinated way
during the crises in the former Yugoslavia led to further revision in the provisions on
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into
force in 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union are devoted
specifically to CFSP. Of particular significance was the establishment of the office of High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article 26 reads: “The
Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security
policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign
and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and
implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the
Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third
parties.” Javier Solana was appointed to the post on 18 October 1999 for a period of five
years. As of late 2002, the staff of the office was 120 strong.3
Thus, although the Iraq war has shown that members states still fall out and go their
own way over the highest and hottest issues, the European Union has in the last decade
begun to develop more of a common profile on ‘high politics’. But because the member
states wish to keep close control over their high politics, high and low politics are developed
by different institutions, with different logics, more or less in isolation from each other.
Some regions are primarily subject to high politics, other primarily to low politics (see fig. 1).
2.3 Current developments in the ‘high politics’ track: Common Foreign and Security
Policy
The Treaty of Nice
The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, contains new CFSP
provisions, increasing the areas, which fall under qualified majority voting and enhancing the
role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in crisis management. The PSC consists
of representation at ambassador level from the Member States and the Commission. It
prepares recommendations on the future functioning of the CFSP, including European
2
Mark Leonard and Richard Gowan (2004), Global Europe: Implementing the European
Security Strategy,
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/187.pdf
3
Daniel Keohane (2002), ‘Time for Mr ESDP?’, Centre for European Reform Bulletin,
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/26_keohane.html
3
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and deals with the day-to-day running of these issues.
The PSC is also authorised to take decisions under delegated authority from the Council
during periods of crisis management. This includes both civilian and military aspects of crisis
management. Three other structures have been set up in the Council: a Committee for
civilian aspects of crisis management, a Military Committee, and a Political-Military Group.
In addition, a military staff composed of military experts chosen by the member states has
been set up under the direction of the Military Committee.
Figure 1 EU External Policies: High And Low
High Politics
Low Politics
Institution:
Council/Member states
Commission
Priority:
Stability, good relations
Development
Instruments:
Negotiation, intervention
Aid and trade
Aimed at:
Governments
Societies
Countries and
Regions:
Russia, China
ACP states
Middle East
Mediterranean/
Neighbourhood
India/Pakistan
SubSaharan
Africa
Balkans
The Constitution
The new constitution consolidates the EU’s organisation and policies into a single
constitutional treaty, rather than the patchwork of treaties that currently compose the EU’s
legal personality. It includes some measures which, if the Constitution enters into force,
would go some way towards resolving the divide between low politics and high politics.
Most notable is the proposition to merge the roles of the Commissioner for External Affairs
and the High Representative into a new post of EU ‘minister for foreign affairs.’ This change
would ensure that the EU’s two most important external relations tools, aid and diplomacy,
would work together towards the same goals. The new foreign minister will answer to the
Council of Ministers (therefore the member states, not the Commission), and would chair
the meetings on foreign affairs. The decision-takers in EU foreign policy would continue to
4
be the national governments, voting unanimously in the Council of Ministers and the
European Council. Finally, a new External Action Service, under the foreign minister, will
replace the current Unified External Service, which currently answers to the Commission.
3
The tension between a ‘peace project’ or global security concept and a superpower
state security concept does, however, continue to be expressed in the European
Constitution. It refers to a Common Security and Defence Policy (thus bringing together
CFSP and ESDP) which includes both the development of military and civilian assets for
‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations’ (Article 40.1) and ‘the progressive framing of a
common Union defence policy’ (Article 40.2), presumably referring to the defence of
territory. In particular, member states could choose (though are under no obligation) to sign
up to a “mutual assistance clause,” allowing an EU country that comes under external attack
to ask for help from other members. This proposal is particularly controversial in the more
Atlanticist EU countries, who argue that this is the role of NATO. The constitution would
also allow a smaller group of member states to go further on military cooperation.
European Security Strategy
The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, was intended as Europe’s
answer to the American National Security Strategy, which set out the new Bush doctrine of
‘pre-emption’, as opposed to deterrence, and ‘pro-active counter-proliferation’, as opposed
to non-proliferation. It goes much further than the Constitution in putting Europe’s
‘responsibility for global security’ as the centrepiece of a European security strategy,
although it also places special emphasis on the European neighbourhood – Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. It starts from the deep insecurity of people
world-wide as a result of wars, poverty and disease and it argues that ‘security is a
precondition for development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social
infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic
activity impossible.’4 In counterpoint to the U.S. doctrine’s ‘pre-emption’, it posits
‘preventive engagement’, an important idea from a development perspective.
At the same time, it emphasises threats to Europe (terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organised crime). The language of
threats and of defence in the European Security Strategy, which implies a statist view of the
world, rests somewhat uneasily with the global security approach that the document seems
to be espousing. On the other hand, it also argues that, unlike in the period of the Cold War,
‘none of these threats are purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means.’5
The key principle adopted by the ESS is that of ‘effective multilateralism’ which
involves the extension of international law, strengthening the United Nations and cooperating with other multilateral organisations. It argues that the EU needs to become ‘more
active, more capable, more coherent’.
4
A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy (2003) 2-3.
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
5
Ibid., 7.
5
Capabilities
Since 1999, the capacity for autonomous military actions has rapidly been enhanced through
a number of measures. The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999, decided that
‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.’6 It stressed the importance of
crisis management tasks (or military intervention) for the EU -these are also known as the
Petersberg tasks, formulated in the Western European Union (WEU) Ministerial Council
meeting of June 1992. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.
In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council set the headline goal—that by
2003 the Union should be able to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year,
up to 60,000 troops capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks. By the
European Council at Laeken, on 15 December 2001, the EU was operational and able to
conduct some crisis management operations. However, the 60,000 troops are ‘doublehatted’, i.e. they have been allocated simultaneously to the EU and NATO and sometimes
also the UN.
Since then, a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) has been launched to address
the shortfalls in the Helsinki Force Catalogue. This recognises the largely symbolic nature of
the 60,000 force target by formalising the ad hoc suggestions of battle or task groups
proposed by the UK, France and Germany. These battle groups are based on battalion
groups and will equate to approximately 1,500 soldiers, able to deploy within 15 days and
sustainable for 30–90 days.7 The evolution of the Headline Goal from a force catalogue to
dedicated stand-by force improves the deployability of a European response, but
significantly reduces the quantity of forces that can be expected. Moreover, these battle
groups are distinctly national in composition, not multinational forces, reinforcing the EU’s
real dependence on voluntary member states for military capability.8
The EU has also taken measures to strengthen the civilian aspects of crisis
management and this has probably been the most impressive and innovative part of the
emerging EU architecture. The Feira European Council defined four priority areas in June
2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and
civilian protection. At Feira and the European Council at Göteburg in June 2001, the EU set
targets are that member states should be able to provide in these fields: 5,000 police officers
for international missions and to deploy 1,000 of them within less than 30 days, 200 experts
in the field of Rule of Law, a pool of experts covering a broad spectrum of functions in
civilian administration, and, for civil protection, 2 or 3 assessment teams that could be
dispatched within 3-7 hours as well as intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons for
deployment at short notice. These targets were met and exceeded by the Ministerial Civilian
6
Cologne European Council declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on
Security and Defense, Annex III.
7
Smit, N. (2004) ‘EU to create battle groups by 2007’, EUPolitics.com.
http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200404/f43dff69-4b6e-40ab-89da28d9c77d7cee.htm.
8
Ankersen, Christopher (forthcoming 2005), ‘What Colour Is Your Elephant? The Military
Aspect of European Security’ in Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, ed. A Human Security
Doctrine for Europe: Project; Principles; Practicalities, Oxford: Routledge.
6
Crisis Management Capability Conference on 19 November 2002. The civil protection
capability has met with strong opposition from the European Commission, on the grounds
that civil protection has less to do with security policy and more with humanitarian
assistance.9
Various forms of criticism have been levelled at the civilian capabilities formation. First, its
rigid division into four tasks has been criticised. ‘A police mission, for example, cannot
function without a functioning rule of law, and any police reform and assistance that is not
accompanied – even preceded – by rule of law reforms is doomed to failure, as diverse
examples of international police reform in Bosnia, Haiti and El Salvador have shown. What
is required is a much more integrated approach that establishes the rule of law as the
framework within which police, judicial and penal experts work alongside civil administrators
and human rights experts.’10 Moreover, civilian capabilities have been targeted almost
exclusively at the post-conflict scenario. The potential of civilian deployment as a preconflict tool to prevent crises or avert complete implosion has not been recognised in this
context.11 Finally, resources committed on paper do not reflect the reality of the civilian
capabilities that the EU can actually bring to bear in a crisis management operation. It also
provides little guidance in identifying specific civilian expertise. On paper, the EU has 72
judges available for deployment. ‘But at any one time all of these judges are in service in their
domestic legal systems and there is no guarantee that they will be in a position to answer a
call for international deployment. Moreover, capacity in civilian crisis management is not as
interchangeable as that within the military: a prosecutor specializing in domestic abuse is not
equivalent to one with an expertise in organized crime.’ 12
Missions
Most significantly perhaps, the EU has now undertaken several autonomous missions in the
Balkans and Africa, involving military, police and civilian personnel. Three of the missions
(the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operation Proxima in Macedonia,
Operation Just Themis, the rule of law mission in Georgia) have been civilian. Two
(CONCORDIA in Macedonia and Artemis in DRC) have been military and much shorter
than the civilian missions. Now, the EU is planning to take over the NATO-led SFOR
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2004 and the mission will involve both
military and civilian capabilities side by side. (See Annex 1)
In some ways, Operation Artemis in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
represents a possible template for future multi-national interventions. It was quite different
from classic military interventions in Africa whether by the United Nations (peace-keeping)
or post-colonial powers, which were generally aimed at shoring up shaky authoritarian
regimes. It was a response to the emergency situation in Ituri, where various militias
including thousands of young children, were laying waste to towns, looting, raping, carrying
out massacres and causing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. UN forces on
9
See, for example, House of Lords (Select Committee on the European Union) (2003) EU.
Effective in a Crisis? HL Paper 53,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/53/53.pdf
10
Renata Dwan, (forthcoming 2005), ‘Civilian Tasks And Capabilities In EU Operations’ in
Glasius and Kaldor, ed., supra fn.8.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
7
the ground were unable to deal with the situation. For the first time, in its resolution of May
31, the UN Security Council approved an EU mission.
The mission of over 2000 troops was deployed rapidly and the bulk was in place by
July 1. The mission was aimed at security on the ground and the immediate impact was
considerable. However the mission was short and massacres started again in later months.
Many problems, for example, the disarmament of militia or the establishment of effective
police forces, remain to be solved and the EU has been slow to deploy civilian follow-up.13
Artemis forms a prime example of a mission that could have had long-term benefits for
security in the region if only it had been flanked by appropriate development investments.
2.4 Recent developments in the ‘low politics’ track: enlargement, the neighbourhood
policy and Cotonou
Institutions
The division of labour between the Commission’s institutions who deal with the ‘low
politics’ external policies of the European Union are quite complex. They are differentiated
among those countries scheduled for membership (pre-accession), neighbouring countries,
former colonies of European member states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP
countries), and other developing countries.
Enlargement is perhaps the best illustration of the EU method of extending
domestic politics. The absorption and integration of the new members is an extraordinary
achievement and shows the possibilities of an alternative approach to security based on
overcoming divisions, and spreading economic and legal arrangements, instead of defending
borders against possible threats. The enlargement approach is reproduced in a weaker form
in the neighbourhood policy aimed at creating a ‘zone of security’. The neighbourhood
includes Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The neighbourhood receives a
disproportionate share of aid and various association and stabilisation agreements are
negotiated with neighbouring countries. (See Tables at end)
The current Unified External Service under DG External Relations (Relex) is largely
an implementing service rather than a diplomatic service. The Delegations are hierarchically
a part of the Commission structure, exercising the powers conferred by the treaties in third
countries; they promote the Community’s interests as they relate to the common policies,
chiefly the common commercial policy, but agricultural, fisheries, environmental, transport,
and health and safety policies as well. The Delegations play an important role in the
implementation of external assistance, a role that is expanding along with reform of the
management of the EU’s external assistance. Since 2000, they have taken over managing
external assistance projects from start to finish in conjunction with the EuropeAid CoOperation Office.
The European Union and its member states together are the largest donor in the
world. The EC and member states provide 55% of total ODA and more than 2/3 of grant
aid. The Commission is ranked 5th as a provider of ODA, behind the US, Japan, Germany,
and France. As of 2002, the Commission provided more than 10% of Overseas
Development Aid (ODA), up from 5% in 1985. The Commission is the largest donor of
13
Victoria Brittain and Augusta Conchiglia (forthcoming 2005), ‘The Great Lakes Region:
Security Vacuum And European Legacy’, in Glasius and Kaldor, ed, supra fn.8
8
humanitarian aid through its ECHO program. The reach of the EU’s aid extends all over the
world, with more than 150 partners—states, territories, and regional organizations.
The aid is managed across a number of different offices and directorates in the
European Union. Most of them are now managed through EuropeAid14, which was set up
to implement the external aid instruments of the European Commission funded by the
European Community budget and the European Development Fund. In order to reform the
management of external aid, the Commission formally set up the EuropeAid Cooperation
Office on 1 January 2001.15 It does not deal with pre-accession aid programs (PHARE,
ISPA, and SAPARD), humanitarian relief activities, macro-financial assistance, CFSP, or the
Rapid Reaction Mechanism.
Emergency humanitarian action is done through the European Community
Humanitarian Office (ECHO)16, which has been in operation since 1992. ECHO operates
under the Commission. ECHO has a mandate to provide emergency assistance and relief to
the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union organisations.
Objectives of the programs are established by the Directorates-General for External
Relations and Development17 and approved by the Commission, and implemented,
monitored, and evaluated by EuropeAid, which is itself a part of the Commission. DG
Development provides policy guidance to all of the development aid-giving organs of the
EU, including those under EuropeAid, ECHO, and those involved with enlargement.
The Cotonou Agreement
The relationship with the ACP countries is governed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement
signed in 2000. Cotonou replaces a succession of Lomé Conventions and before that the
Yaounde Convention (See Annex 2).
Cotonou was agreed for 20 years, but every five years a financial protocol must be
agreed—how much money the EU commits to the ACP for the next five years. Funds for
development cooperation for non-ACP countries come from the regular budget of the EU,
but there is a separate funding mechanism for the ACP, the European Development Fund
(EDF). Each EU member state negotiates its contribution to the EDF. The 9th EDF (the
current one) has EUR 13.5 billion available to share between the 77 ACP countries and the 6
ACP regions.
As compared with previous arrangements, Cotonou, as its names implies, emphasises
partnership. The basic structure of the Cotonou Agreement is built on three pillars—
development cooperation, trade, and political dimensions. This approach recognises the
necessity of a holistic approach to development, for example aid without governance reform
may alleviate poverty in the short term but will not lead to sustainable development. New
elements of the Agreement with relevance to security policy include:

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which are the new trade arrangements
set to replace the current non-reciprocal preferences in 2008. They will be
14
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/general/mission_en.htm.
For more information on the reform of the management of the European Community’s
external assistance, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/reform/document/presentation.pdf.
16
http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index_en.htm
17
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/index_en.htm
15
9
compatible with World Trade Organisation (WTO) requirements. ACP countries
will be required to gradually open up their own markets to EU products over a
period of up to 12 years. The EPAs are meant to enforce deepening regional
integration. There are alternatives for the poorest countries, like the EverythingBut-Arms (EBA) Initiative which grants duty-free access to all products, except for
arms, from the least developed countries without quota restrictions. The
Commission is negotiating these agreements. Many fear a de facto break-up of the
ACP group as it divides between those able to negotiate Regional Economic
Partnership Agreements and those who have to opt for alternatives. The outcome
is still unsure.

Unlike Lome, Cotonou gives priority to political rather than economic
cooperation. This is expressed in its third pillar, which tries to establish a
permanent political dialogue. Dialogue can take place formally or informally and at
all different levels (national, regional, and global). The conduct of the political
dialogue is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers. The last Lomé
Convention mentioned human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law as
essential elements of the partnership. Cotonou takes another step by including
good governance and specifically addressing the fight against corruption. ACP
countries can also ask to discuss the coherence of EU policies, their impact on
ACP countries, and related issues. A particular emphasis is placed on the root
causes of conflict. Performance against these goals is checked through annual, midterm, and end-of-term reviews. Sanctions can be imposed if a signing country
violates any of the essential elements underpinning the Agreement (such as human
rights).

Article 11 lists a number of activities that shall be supported by the parties with a
view to peace building, conflict prevention, and resolution. This includes support
for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation, demobilisation of former
combatants, etc. It is important that these activities are included as this means that
the EU is open to possibility of financing such operations under the agreement.18

Progress is rewarded: in Annex IV, Article 5: ‘…the Community may revise the
resource allocation in the light of the current needs and performance of the ACP
state concerned’. Under Lomé, the ACP countries received a set amount of aid
irrespective of their progress. Cotonou has attempted to reward countries that
perform well in fulfilling their obligations (based on economic and political
criteria). It is somewhat questionable whether such a reward structure is
appropriate from a security perspective: one might argue that precisely the
countries that do badly need further help, to avoid sliding into conflict.

Promoting local ownership in Article 2: ‘ACP states shall determine the
development strategies for their economies and societies in all sovereignty’. EU
should support the development of national development strategies and work
18
Martenczuk, Bernd (2000). ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement
in a Legal Perspective.’ European Foreign Affairs Review 5: 468 j.
10
within the institutions and capacities in ACP countries. It implies a shift towards
supporting national budgets, rather than funding ‘stand-alone’ projects and
programmes.
2.5 Security and Development
The accelerated evolution of security policy will affect broader EU global policies in several
ways. Various proposals in the constitution for a new foreign minister, an external action
service and the consolidation of aid instruments will bring security and development more in
line with each other. The question is: which line? Are ‘low politics’ development policies to
be de-prioritised or instrumentalised to serve European security preoccupations? Or could
the two be brought together in a manner that serves both ends?
On the one hand, new concerns with weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism, following the lead of the United States and more in line with a state security
approach, are leading to a reordering of aid priorities. The Solidarity Clause of the
Constitution makes an explicit reference to the role of humanitarian aid in the fight against
terrorism. This March EU Foreign Ministers warned their partner countries that their
relations with the EU will suffer if they fail to cooperate in the war on terror. The ministers
endorsed a draft declaration that described counter-terrorism as ‘a key element of political
dialogue’ with other countries. The declaration includes proposals to increase development
assistance for ‘targeted technical assistance’ to ‘priority countries’, and says the EU would
introduce counter-terrorism concerns into ‘all relevant external assistance programmes.’19
There are already a number of examples of the impact of these priorities on
development:

EU aid to Pakistan increased substantially after September 11. The EU
announcement on increased assistance to Pakistan (including additional development
aid and a preferential trade package) specifically referred to the country’s decision to
support the international coalition against terrorism.20

The EU is introducing weapons of mass destruction and terrorism clauses into
partnership agreements21, which, in some cases, can be expensive to implement.

Through its ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ funding (RRM), the EU has initiated a
number of targeted counter-terrorism projects in the Philippines, Indonesia and
Pakistan, as well as at regional level with ASEAN. Projects have included research
into ‘ madrasa’ schools and initiatives on terrorist financing and border management.
Follow-up actions will be funded in the longer term under the normal country or
regional programmes.22
19
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3524626.stm
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/pakistan/intro/
21
Delegation of the European Commission,
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_global_player/1.htm
22
‘Global Security and Development’, BOND Discussion Paper, Updated: July 2004.
http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf
20
11

An aid and trade deal with Syria is dependent on Damascus signing up to an antiterrorism clause23; the EU has suspended free trade talks with Iran while it
negotiates about nuclear weapons.

In Central Asia, the EU is in the initial phase of a border management assistance
programme which has an important counter-terrorism component.24

Some EUR 250 million from the European Development Fund have been
committed to support African Union peacekeeping operations, through the Peace
Facility for Africa. While material support for the Peace Facility is to be encouraged,
it can be argued that the funds should not have come from the EDF.25
For the moment, most spending on these new priorities still appears to be supplementary to
development aid rather than diversionary.26 Nonetheless, these policies prioritise the security
preoccupations of European politicians at the expense of poverty reduction and alleviation
of human suffering.
However, there are also some indications that European external policies might go in
a direction where global security and development aims go hand in hand. Concern with
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, which is more associated with human
security, has increasingly been incorporated into development programmes. The
Commission considers that the main contribution of development cooperation to conflict
prevention and management is to enhance ‘democratic structure stability’. New
programming instruments, integrating aid, trade and political dimensions, have been
elaborated: Country Strategy Papers (for over 100 countries) and Regional Strategy Papers
(around 10 regions). In its Regional and Country Strategy Papers, the Commission now
routinely looks at conflict indicators. Countries with the most complex conflicts will have
Country Strategy Papers with a strong focus on conflict prevention. On the basis of this
analysis, attention is then drawn to conflict prevention focused activities that external aid
should target.
The impact of EC development policy on conflict was assessed in the 2004 report on
the implementation of EC development assistance in 2003, and efforts have been made to
improve dialogue between the security and development communities within the context of
the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and at ministerial
level.
In addition, the Commission is engaging more and more in rehabilitation activities as
well as DDR programmes. For example, in 2001 the Commission gave EUR 10 million to
the multi-donor Trust Fund for DDR in Sierra Leone and contributed in 2002 for DDR in
Ethiopia/Eritrea.27. There are other post-conflict programmes in, for example, Liberia, the
23
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2004/200400144.htm
http://www.eu-bomca.org/
25
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/eu_africa/eu_africa_en.htm
26
See Ngaire Woods and research team ‘Reconciling effective aid and global security:
Implications for the emerging international development architecture’, Global Economic
Governance Programme
27
The list of DDR programmes funded by the EU is at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/acp/list_of_ddr_programmes.pdf
24
12
Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone which do not come under the same project classification but
have significant DDR components. Monitoring missions have covered several DDR
programmes and the EU has taken a number of lessons from these reports. The EU can
fund DDR programmes by its more traditional procedures but in many cases does so by
grants to international organisations such as UNDP and the World Bank either as sole
contributors or to a pooled fund.28
The Conflict Prevention Unit of DG RELEX is currently developing expertise
through staff training and research in the fields of DDR, security sector reform, and
mediation, reconciliation, and confidence-building processes. In the field of security sector
reform/DDR, DG RELEX has undertaken a “lessons-learned/policy guidance” exercise.
Regarding the prevention of terrorism, the Commission has identified a significant number
of existing technical assistance projects and programmes which contribute to capacity
building in areas relevant to counter terrorism.29
Whether the EU’s security policy will further encroach and obstruct development
policies, or whether the renewed interest in security will in fact strengthen development
aims, depends fundamentally on the conception of security the European Union chooses. If
it goes the road of increased spending to try to catch up with the United States, prioritising
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction over other threats, and imitating the U.S. policies
of ‘war on terror’ and ‘pro-active counter-proliferation’, than development policy will suffer.
If it goes further in the direction that the ESS sets out, of making a contribution to global
security by using the full spectrum of EU instruments, but emphasising multilateralism and
law-enforcement, then such a conception could be beneficial to development policies. As the
EU’s internal and accession policies have shown, some of the EU’s ‘low politics’ instruments
are in fact particularly suitable for strengthening security. As we will argue below, a human
security concept best lends itself to such a holistic approach.
Such an approach could not only increase interest in and availabilities of funds for
development, it could also make the EU’s development priorities more responsive to human
need. In the past, the emphasis of EU aid had been on good economic performance rather
than on the greatest need. As is the case for other donors, criteria like macro-economic
stability, good governance, progress with market reform, or economic growth have been
more important determinants of the composition of EU aid. A study of EU aid towards
ACP countries found that the performance of a country in terms of political rights and civil
liberties plays only a minor role in the allocation of EC aid, and factors such as the degree of
openness and human development play no significant role. Aid was in fact concentrated in
middle-income countries rather than poor countries. EC aid to low income countries has
fallen sharply from 76% in 1990 to less than 40% in 2000. EC aid to poor countries has
declined 12% in absolute terms over last decade.30
The next section will discuss what the human security approach is, why it is needed,
on what principles it should be based, and what the implications of such an approach would
28
for procedures see,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/tender/gestion/cont_typ/alter_index_en.htm and
see also an example of a contribution agreement with UNDP:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/acp/libun4milldocfinal.doc
29
See www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1373/EC
30
OECD DAC 2002. DAC Aid Peer Review of the European Community. (Paris: OECD,
DAC Development Cooperation Review Series).
13
be for development. Section four will make a number of policy proposals related to the
human security approach, which are based on our own earlier studies and those we
commissioned.
3. The Need for a Human Security Approach
3.1 Changed global context
In the aftermath of the Cold War, state collapse has resulted in ‘new wars’ in Africa, the
Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. These wars are unlike either the international or civil
wars of the past. They call into question the distinctions between ‘human rights violations’
by states, ‘abuses’ by non-state actors, and ‘conflict’ between armed combatants: battles are
rare and most violence is inflicted on civilians. Such wars blur the distinction between
internal and external because they spill over borders and involve both local and global actors.
They also blur the distinction between public and private, since they involve regular forces as
well as paramilitary groups, warlords, mercenaries, and organized crime groups. ‘New wars’
spawn an abnormal political economy, in which most income-generating activity, ranging
from Diaspora support to trafficking of various kinds to loot and pillage, depends on
violence and coercion.
Above all, these conflicts make life intolerably insecure for the people who have to
live in these regions. In Western Sudan, hundreds of thousands of people have been forcibly
displaced from their homes as a result of killings, rape, abductions and looting by
government-sponsored militias. In Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, hundreds of thousands
of refugees and displaced people are unable to return to their homes or settle, as their lasting
insecurity has become a political tool manipulated by politicians in support of their positions
in the conflicts. In Palestine, people live in daily fear of land seizures, demolition of houses
and assassination; the inability to protect one's self, family and property produces an
overwhelming sense of humiliation and insecurity among Palestinians. In turn, daily activities
like going to the market or to a café have become perilous undertakings for ordinary Israelis
because of suicide bombings. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, more than three million
people have been killed over the last decade, and millions more have been forced to flee
their homes. And as has happened in many other places, tens of thousands of women have
been raped; gang rapes, rapes of children as young as four and women as old as 80 have
been reported, contributing to the HIV/Aids epidemic in the region. Perpetrators go
unpunished.
It is these conflicts that become the ‘black holes’ generating many of the new sources
of insecurity that impact directly on the security of the citizens of the European Union.
Afghanistan, Colombia, the South Caucasus and the Balkans export or transport hard drugs
and guns to the European Union, as well as trafficking or smuggling people who are often
sexually exploited or forced to work in the illegal economy. The worsening situation in
Palestine and Iraq is used by Islamic militants as evidence of a Judaeo-Christian conspiracy
against Islam, to recruit terrorists. Wars in Africa defeat Europe’s efforts to fight poverty and
disease with development initiatives.
Generally, contemporary conflicts are characterised by circumstances of lawlessness,
impoverishment, exclusivist ideologies and the daily use of violence. This makes them fertile
ground for a combination of human rights violations, criminal networks and terrorism,
which spill over and cause insecurity beyond the area itself. While these developments may
initially have appeared to apply primarily to developing and conflict states, the 11 September
and 11 March attacks have made it clear once and for all that no citizens of the world are any
14
longer safely ensconced behind their national borders, and that sources of insecurity are no
longer most likely to come in the form of border incursions by foreign armies.
3.2 Human security
The idea of human security is an attempt to conceptualize the changing nature of security. It
recognizes that ‘the security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the
decisions of many others – sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously’, and that
‘policies and institutions must find new ways to protect individuals and communities . . . ’31
The Commission on Human Security uses a broad definition: ‘to protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’. It then goes on
to say that what is considered vital differs across individuals and societies, and therefore ‘we
refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security’.
Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan takes a simpler
but equally broad approach: ‘It is submitted that international human rights norms define the
meaning of security’32. While these very broad and holistic notions of human security are
quite intentionally juxtaposed to the much narrower national defence approach, it does in
fact make it rather difficult to found a security policy on such concepts.
However, both the Commission on Human Security and the wider literature on
human rights offer points of departure for a narrower concept. In the Commission’s report,
Amartya Sen conceptualizes human security as narrower than either human development or
human rights. In relation to human development, he focuses on the ‘downside risks’: ‘the
insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily life, or imperil the natural
dignity of men and women, or expose human beings to the uncertainty of disease and
pestilence, or subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury’. In relation to human rights, he
sees them as ‘a class of human rights’ that guarantee ‘freedom from basic insecurities – new
and old’.33 Thus, human security could be conceptualised as incorporating minimum core
aspects of both human development and human rights.
3.3 Reasons for adopting a human security strategy
The first reason is moral: Europe’s interest in human security outside its borders, just as its
interest in development, is founded simply on our common humanity. Human beings have a
right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when
that security is threatened. All human life is of equal worth, and human lives cannot be
allowed to become cheap in desperate situations. There is nothing distinctively European
about such moral norms. On the contrary, they are by their nature universal. But they do
appeal to the European public. Whenever European states have intervened abroad for
humanitarian reasons, whether in Kosovo, East Timor or Sierra Leone, this has been based
on very strong public support, even public pressure, from European citizens. Moreover,
beyond state action, large numbers of Europeans have voluntarily gone to Yugoslavia to
help with post-conflict reconstruction, to Guatemala to accompany returning refugees, or to
Palestine to monitor human rights violations.
31
Human Security Now, Final Report of the Commission on Human Security (2003), 2–4.
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html .
32
Ramcharan, B. (2002) Human Rights and Human Security, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 9.
33
Sen in Human Security Now, supra fn. 30, 8-9.
15
Morality also gives some guidance as to the way in which ‘concern’ for the human
security of others should be expressed in policy decisions. A basic precept is ‘first, do no
harm’. It makes no sense, therefore, to engage in actions that destroy the security or even the
lives of those they are meant to protect, whether we are talking about export subsidies that
destroy the livelihoods of African farmers, state-sponsored military missions, or even civil
society initiatives
Secondly, if the European Union is to respect international law, and if human
security is considered as a narrower category of protection of human rights, as proposed
above, then it is now generally accepted that other states, and international institutions such
as the EU, have not only a right but also a legal obligation to concern themselves with
human security worldwide. Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter enjoin states to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. This obligation is restated in
various human rights treaties. In its new Constitution, the European Union explicitly
recognizes the same obligation. Article 4 states: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the
Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace,
security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in
particular children’s rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ The European
Union does, therefore, recognize that it has obligations concerning the human security of
people outside its borders. However, neither the United Nations nor the European legal
framework has much to say about the nature and extent of these obligations.
The moral and legal justifications for a human security approach are in fact popular
with the citizens of Europe,34 but it is also possible to make a compelling ‘enlightened selfinterest’ case for a human security policy by the European Union. The whole point of a
human security approach is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live
in severe insecurity. National borders are no longer the dividing line between security and
insecurity: insecurity gets exported.
The ‘threats’ that Europeans face are all related to human security and mostly rooted
in areas of severe insecurity. In ‘failing states’ and conflict areas, the criminal economy
expands and gets exported: the drug trade, human trafficking and the easy availability of
small arms, and even the brutalization of society, are not contained within the ‘conflict zone’
but felt beyond it, including in Europe. When the state breaks down, communalist ideologies
are mobilized, generally rooted in religion or ethnicity; and while this leads first and foremost
to a spiral of violence within the conflict zones, terrorist networks also thrive upon and
recruit from such situations, with the effects again felt in Europe.
In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, these connections with drugs as well as
terrorism are now obvious, but they were not so 10 or 15 years ago. It may also be,
therefore, that, in a case like the Great Lakes region, which does not export terrorism or
drugs at present, the severe insecurity of millions may have as yet unforeseeable
consequences for Europeans.
In a globalized world, the brutalization of a society, with daily experience of high
levels of violence and the cheapening of human life, is bound to affect other societies.
Dealing with terrorism and organized crime only by devising more robust punitive and
intelligence measures within our borders, which may in fact endanger the democratic values
34
European Commission (2004), supra fn.1.
16
and institutions of Europe, can never be more than firefighting. The only real response to
such threats is to address the security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity.
Finally, the best way in which the current security priorities of the European Union
can be reconciled with existing development and human rights goals, instead of conflicting
with them, is through a human security doctrine.
3.4 The Principles of Human Security
The EU should explicitly adopt the term human security to describe its distinctive approach.
Terms do matter. While there is already a recognition by EU politicians that poverty is
relevant to security, a holistic approach is still lacking, and there is instead a competition
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches. Human security is about protecting the safety and
livelihoods of individuals. Hence it is more robust and comprehensive than the term ‘peace’
and, yet, quite different from the more military approach taken by the United States and by
traditional nation-states. Adoption of the language would both help to mobilise public
support and, at the same, time offer the basis for a set of principles that could guide and
streamline policy.
We propose a set of six principles that are drawn from the actual experience of
insecurity in different parts of the world – Central and West Africa, South East Europe, the
South Caucasus and the Middle East.35These principles apply both to ‘freedom from fear’,
i.e., the goal of public safety, and ‘freedom from want’, i.e. the goal of human development.
The principles do not only apply to hot conflict situations. The ESS rightly places
much emphasis on the ‘prevention’ of crises as opposed to the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’.
But it is often difficult to distinguish between different phases of conflict. The conditions
that cause conflict – fear and hatred, a criminalised economy that profits from violent
methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, the existence of warlords and
paramilitary groups, for example – are often exacerbated during and after periods of violence
and there are no clear beginnings or endings. The situation in Palestine, for instance, was
supposed to be ‘post-conflict’ after the Oslo accords, but has clearly reverted to being in the
midst of conflict. The conflicts of the South Caucasus used to be called ‘frozen’, but
‘festering’ might have been a better characterisation. The principles for a European security
policy should therefore apply to a continuum of phases of varying degrees of violence that
always involves elements of both prevention and reconstruction.
In the same way, donors distinguish between humanitarian relief and development
aid. The former is expected to be delivered during a conflict while the latter is supposed to
be designed for the reconstruction phase. Yet sustaining development in all phases of
conflict is essential if the criminalised economy associated with conflict is to be contained.
Indeed, the kind of economic and social priorities that need to be established for
reconstruction are in fact a form of prevention and may offer a better targeted approach to
development in general.
35
See Brittain and Conchiglia, supra fn.13; Mient-Jan Faber and Mary Kaldor, ‘Human
Security in the South Caucasus’; David Keen, ‘Sierra Leone’s War in a Regional Context:
Lessons From Interventions’; Denisa Kostovicova, ‘Old and New Insecurity in the Balkans:
Learning From the EU’s Involvement in Macedonia’; Yahia Said, ‘Middle East Security: A
View From Palestine, Israel and Iraq’, all in Glasius and Kaldor, ed. (forthcoming 2005),
supra fn. 8.
17
This set of principles is intended to guide the actions of high-level EU officials,
politicians in the member states, diplomats, soldiers, aid professionals and other civilians in
the field alike. It is essential to the building of a coherent and effective policy that everyone
should have an awareness and a shared understanding of all the guiding principles.
Moreover, policies based on these principles will have more public support, and hence more
room for manoeuvre, if the European public also understands and endorses them.
Principle 1: The primacy of human rights
The primacy of human rights is what distinguishes the human security approach from
traditional state-based approaches. Although the principle seems obvious, there are deeply
held and entrenched institutional and cultural obstacles that have to be overcome if it is to
be realised in practice. Human rights include economic and social rights as well as political
and civil rights. This means that human rights such as the right to life, the right to housing,
or the right to freedom of opinion are to be respected and protected even in the midst of
conflict.
This has profound implications both for security policy and for development. In
security terms, the central preoccupation of both practitioners and analysts of foreign policy
in recent years has been with the conditions under which human rights concerns should take
precedence over sovereignty. This debate often neglects the issue of the means to be
adopted in so-called human rights operations. This is especially important where military
means are likely to be deployed. It is often assumed that the use of military force is justifiable
if there is legal authority to intervene (ius ad bellum), and the goals are worthwhile. However,
the methods adopted must also be appropriate and, indeed, may affect the ability to achieve
the goal specified. In other words, the ‘how’ is as important as the ‘why’. Unless it is absolutely
necessary and it has a legal basis, personnel deployed on human security missions must avoid
killing, injury, and material destruction.
The primacy of human rights also implies that those who commit gross human rights
violations are treated as individual criminals rather than collective enemies.
In development terms, the primacy of human rights has implications for
conditionality. Ways have to be found to help the individual even where a country has poor
governance or fails to meet various forms of conditionality. Sanctions may therefore be
problematic. Different voices within a country should be consulted on the use of
conditionality, and means have to be found to assist communities that bypass local
authorities. In some regions, such as Latin America, the EU and its members already have a
record of experience with such policies. Such lessons should be spread and should inform a
human security policy.
Principle 2: Legitimate political authority
The end goal of a human security strategy has to be the establishment of legitimate political
authority capable of upholding human security. Again this applies both to issue of physical
security, where the rule of law and a well-functioning system of justice are essential, and to
material security, where issues of legitimate employment and the provision of infrastructure
and public services require state policies. Legitimate political authority does not necessarily
need to mean a state, it could be local government or regional or international political
arrangements. In many conflict zones, it is state failure that is the primary cause of conflict
18
and the reasons for state failure have to be taken into account in reconstructing legitimate
political authority.36
Diplomacy, sanctions, the provision of aid, and civil society links are all among the
array of instruments available to the European Union aimed at influencing political
processes in other countries – opening up authoritarian regimes, strengthening legitimate
forms of political authority, and promoting inclusive political solutions to conflict. The
capacity to deploy civilian personnel is a crucial addition to these instruments. They
represent the EU’s commitment to help build and sustain legitimate political authority in
crisis situations. Even if military forces are to be used, they can only succeed on the basis of
local consent and support. The most that can be achieved through the use of military forces
is to stabilise the situation so that a space can be created for a political process rather than to
win through military means alone.
Principle 3: Multilateralism
We understand multilateralism to have a much more comprehensive meaning than ‘acting
with a group of states’. In that narrow sense, nearly all international initiatives might be
considered multilateral. Multilateralism is closely related to legitimacy, and has three basic
aspects.
Firstly, it means a commitment to work with international institutions, and through
the procedures of international institutions. This means, first and foremost, working within
the United Nations framework, but it also entails working with or sharing out tasks among
other regional organisations such as the OSCE and NATO in Europe, the AU, SADC and
ECOWAS in Africa or the OAS in the western hemisphere. In global terms, the EU may
give priority to its neighbourhood but that priority must be situated in a global context
where different multilateral institutions take responsibility for different parts of the world.
Working with and through international organisations does not mean having a sacred regard
for preserving them as they are. A commitment to effective multilateralism also means a
commitment to reform where necessary.
Secondly, multilateralism entails a commitment to creating common rules and
norms, solving problems through rules and co-operation, and enforcing the rules. The EU as
an international norms promoter rather than a superpower is less threatening to nonEuropean states and offers a pole around which support could be built in multilateral fora
such as the United Nations.
Thirdly, multilateralism has to include coordination, rather than duplication or
rivalry. An effective human security approach requires coordination between intelligence,
foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and security policy initiatives, of the member
states, of the Commission and the Council, and of other multilateral actors, including the
United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and regional institutions. Preventive and proactive policies cannot be effective if they are isolated and even contradictory. Our case
studies have shown that one of the greatest obstacles to an effective security policy is the
lack of coherence between the policies of member states and between the different
institutions of the EU.37
36
See Herbert Wulf, ‘The Challenges of Re-Establishing a Public Monopoly of Violence’
(forthcoming 2005), in Glasius and Kaldor, ed., supra fn.8.
37
See Faber and Kaldor; Keen; Kostovicova, supra fn.34.
19
Principle 4: The bottom-up approach
Notions of ‘partnership’, ‘local ownership’ and ‘participation’ are already key concepts in
development policy. These concepts should also apply to security policies. Decisions about
the kind of security policies to be adopted, whether or not to intervene and how, must take
account of the most basic needs identified by the people who are affected by violence and
insecurity. This is not just a moral issue, it is also a matter of effectiveness. People who live
in the affected area are the best source of intelligence. Thus communication, consultation,
and dialogues are essential tools for both development and security.
Particularly important in this respect is the role of women’s groups. The importance
of gender equality for development, especially the education of girls, has long been
recognised. The same may be true when managing conflict. Women play a critical role in
contemporary conflicts, both is dealing with the everyday consequences of the conflict and
overcoming divisions in society. Involvement and partnership with women’s groups could
be a key component of a human security approach.
Principle 5: Regional focus
New wars have no clear boundaries. They tend to spread through refugees and displaced
persons, through minorities who live in different states, through criminal and extremist
networks. Indeed most situations of severe insecurity are located in regional clusters. The
tendency to focus attention on areas that are defined in terms of statehood has often meant
that relatively simple ways of preventing the spread of violence are neglected. Time and
again, foreign policy analysts have been taken by surprise when, after considerable attention
had been given to one conflict, another conflict would seemingly spring up out of the blue in
a neighbouring state.
By the same token, a regional focus is important in restoring and/or fostering
economic and trade co-operation. The breakdown of transport and trade links, associated
with war, are often a primary reasons for falls in production and employment that contribute
to poverty and insecurity.
Principle 6: The Use of Legal Instruments
For both development and security, the establishment or restoration of a rule of law is of
critical importance. Whether we are talking about dealing with political violence or a
criminalised economy, legal instruments that respect the dignity of the individual need to be
available.
In failed states, where there has been a breakdown of law and order, and in
authoritarian states, where domestic law lacks legitimacy, legal frameworks need to be
established which command widespread assent. Investment is also needed in civilian
capabilities for law-enforcement, i.e. police, court officials, prosecutors and judges. The EU
is just beginning to comprehend this task in the Balkans. The local population should be
involved in the administration of justice as much as possible. Citizens in these situations
need to regain the protection of the law, and to help transform it if the old laws were unjust
or repressive. In some cases, skilled and politically untainted police and legal staff are
available to do most of the work, but they may need international protection and a stamp of
international legitimacy. In other cases, a legal system has to be rebuilt from the ground up,
while there are many in-between scenarios in which training and mixed international-local
staffing would be appropriate.
20
4 Policy Proposals
4.1 Security Policy Proposals
As stated above, the building blocks are in place for the adoption of a human security
approach by the European Union. We recommend three further measures:
An Expanded EU Political and Legal presence
It is very important to have a substantial presence on the ground in areas of actual or
potential insecurity. This is needed for early warning and to acquire local knowledge to help
guide policy. The problems of long-distance intelligence have been graphically illustrated in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Human intelligence based on engagement with local people can be
supplemented by more traditional intelligence methods (technology and espionage) but
should increasingly be considered the centre piece of intelligence.
An expanded use of EU presence on the ground for human security purposes could include:



The new External Action Service. It is exactly in the implementation of development
projects that the EU has its most ‘grassroots’ presence. But the existing Unified
External Service is primarily an implementing service, and has not sought a major
intelligence and information role with respect to potential conflicts. The new EAS
will be more political and have the task of engaging with the key local actors,
especially civil society, and reporting to the Foreign Minister
EU Monitoring Missions. The EU monitoring Mission in the former Yugoslavia was
important both as a source of intelligence and as a way of providing reassurance and
the ground and, possibly, preventing some abuse. Monitoring missions could be
deployed in areas of severe insecurity, for example, the Middle East or the South
Caucasus
Law Shops and Ombudspersons. The EU could support the establishment of local
law shops in areas of insecurity where the local population could gain legal advice
about their rights and how to defend them. But it should also create institutions to
make its own actions accountable to a local population. Where it has a mission, it
should institute an independent Ombudsperson facility where the local population
could seek information or complain about the policies and practices of EU personnel
itself.
A Human Security Response Force38
The EU should establish a Human Security Response Force composed of 15,000 personnel,
of which one third would be civilian, as a standing contribution to UN operations. The force
would be under the overall direction of the new Foreign Minister. It would be composed of
a civil-military core with capabilities for planning, intelligence and facilitating deployment;
5000 personnel at a high state of readiness constantly training and exercising together and a
further 10,000 at a lower state of readiness. The Military component of the force would
consist of dedicated national troops, already promised under the Headline Goals, and
civilians (police, legal experts, development experts) also committed under the civilian
38
This is a summary of the proposals contained in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The
Barcelona Report of the Study Group on European Security Capabilities (2004).
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security%20Report%20Full.pdf
21
Headline Goals. The force would be able to deploy smaller human security task forces of
around 1500 people at very short notice. These are akin to the battle groups but the balance
of military and civilians would vary according to the situation.
The force would be largely composed of professionals but it would be supplemented
by a Human Security Volunteer Force, who could be either mid-career professionals,
interested in making a contribution to humanity, or school leavers. They would volunteer for
two years. As well as improving the capacity to mobilise civilian capabilities, the volunteer
force would provide a way of increasing popular engagement with EU security policy.
The Human Security Response Force would operate in quite different ways from
either traditional pace-keeping or traditional armies. Its main job would be to act in support
of law enforcement so it would be more like a police force, although more robust. The
principles described above such as primacy of human rights, the establishment of legitimate
political authority or the bottom-up approach would all shape the way the force is used. .
The aim should be to protect people and minimise all casualties. This is more akin to the
traditional approach of the police, who risk their lives to save others, even though they are
prepared to kill in extremis, as human security forces should be.
A Force of 15,000 is quite small in relation to global insecurity. The idea is to start
small so that the force can be expanded in the future. The primary purpose of the force is to
be able to act in situations of severe human insecurity (genocide, starvation, massive
violations of human rights) under UN authorisation, so as to strengthen international law
and multilateralism. Such a force would also symbolise the distinctive character of the
European Union as a new type of multilateral polity.
A Legal Framework
The capacity of the EU to act a ‘norms-promotor’, operating within international law,
furthering international law and using legal instruments to enhance security, is hindered by
the absence of a single and coherent body of international law governing foreign
deployments. The EU should engage at the international level to tackle these deficits in the
international legal system and encourage the development of a multilateral legal framework
covering international human security missions.
But it should also devise its own legal framework, clarifying its position both as
regards the legality of deployments per se, and the legal regimes that govern deployed
personnel, military and civilian, and locals, in a conflict area. This would need to build on the
domestic law of the host state, the domestic law of the member states and the rules of
engagement, international criminal law, human rights law, and international humanitarian
law.
4.2 Development Proposals
A human security approach implies more not less assistance for development, since human
development is a key component of human security. As stated above, a human security
approach would also endorse some key principles of development practise such as
partnership, local ownership, engagement with civil society, and gender sensitivity.
At the same time, a human security approach would require some reordering of
development priorities. Recent wars have often been associated with the transition from
authoritarian political regimes and planned economies towards democracy and the market.
Where civil society is weak, typical transitional strategies (macro-economic stabilisation,
liberalisation and privatisation) may have perverse consequences and actually contribute to
insecurity and state failure. Policies needed for conflict prevention and reconstruction
22
require a different hierarchy of priorities. These policies do not just apply to countries
already prone to insecurity but may offer an alternative paradigm for development in general.
Countries whose population live in precarious economic conditions also tend to be countries
vulnerable to conflict. Key economic and social priorities for conflict prevention and
reconstruction include:
The creation of legitimate employment and self-sustaining livelihoods.
Many people join para-military groups or criminal organisations because they have no
alternative source of employment or income. Macro-economic orthodoxies privilege control
of inflation over employment creation. In very poor countries, sustaining primary
production is key. In middle income countries (like the Balkans or Iraq) public works and
restructuring state enterprises are the main ways to generate employment. Restructuring state
enterprises may or may not require privatisation. But unregulated privatisation programmes,
which allowed elites to enrich themselves at the expense of the wider population, have
sometimes been a cause of conflict themselves.39
Combining humanitarian and development assistance
In recent years, humanitarian assistance has grown and it is generally argued that
development assistance only applies on the aftermath of conflict. As argued above, it is very
difficult to distinguish between different phases of conflict. Humanitarian assistance is often
problematic in conflicts because it attracts people away from their sources of livelihood,
especially if it is delivered in camps, and is often ‘taxed’ by the warring parties. Hence it is
important to sustain development assistance through all phases of conflict.40
The politics of infrastructure
Contemporary wars are generally very destructive to infrastructure. Yet energy,
communications and transport links are essential for maintaining production especially in
middle income countries. Integrated infrastructure, often on a regional basis, is an important
way to prevent separation and division of communities. As in the case of coal and steel in
the early days of European integration, expenditure on infrastructure can be viewed both as
employment generating and a stimulus to reconciliation.
Education and social services
In many conflict zones, social safety nets and educational opportunities have been greatly
weakened or are non-existent. Extremist groups (nationalists or religious fundamentalists)
often offer these services and consequently have a profound ideological influence especially
on young people. Education is key to develop new skills especially for those affected by
conflict (displaced persons and demobilised combatants) while social services reduce
insecurity. The importance of education has long been acknowledged in development, but it
has yet to be recognised as an instrument of security policy.
DDR and Security Sector reform
39
See Keen, supra fn.34, on Sierra Leone.
See Stewart, F and Fitzgerald,V (2001) War and Underdevelopment Vol.1 The Economic and
Social Consequences of Conflict, OUP, Oxford, especially Chapter 9 ‘The Costs of War in Poor
Countries: Conclusions and Policy reccomendations’
40
23
Structural adjustment strategies have often recommended cuts in military spending as a way
of reducing overall public spending. However cuts in military spending without expenditure
on security tasks or alternative employment for demobilised soldiers can easily increase
insecurity as the latter try to generate income by selling their services or weapons. Bestpractice examples of successful reintegration, such as Rwanda and Mozambique, should be
studied and spread.41
Support for local justice systems
Support of justice systems is important both before and after conflict. A functioning justice
system may relieve frustrations and curb violence, and actually avert conflict. In the
aftermath of conflict, possibilities for bringing perpetrators to justice may be constrained,
but the European Union should give both political and material support to the various forms
of justice, whether trials or peace and reconciliation committees, that can be negotiated and
are locally supported.
Generating tax revenue
Development assistance and other measure like debt cancellation may help to finance the
above programmes. However, if legitimate political authority is to be restored and sustained,
tax revenue is essential. States in conflict typically are dependent on foreign and/or criminal
sources of income. If the relationship between the state and the citizens is to be meaningful,
tax revenue is essential. Moreover, structural adjustment needs to be achieved by raising
revenue rather than reducing expenditure.
The best source of revenue is income tax since sales taxes tend to encourage
smuggling and customs duties, typically the main source of revenue for countries in conflict,
pose an obstacle to trade. However, income tax depends on employment –another reason
for prioritising employment.
4.3 Institutional Proposals
The proposed changes in the European constitution should increase institutional coherence,
bringing Council and Commission activities relating to security and development closer
together, establishing the post of foreign minister and the establishment of the External
Action Service. This offers an opportunity to embed a new human security policy that
encompasses both security and development and that creates a new, perhaps more popular,
identity for the European Union.
The development community, within the European Commission and beyond, may
have some misgivings about the ‘coherence agenda’, based on fears that development will be
subordinated to the ‘high politics’ of security. But without coherence, none of the EU’s
policy aims stand a chance of being fulfilled. The comment by one interviewee from
Macedonia that ‘No one among the EU talks to each other here’42 was echoed in our other
case studies. Moreover, local warring parties can read these divisions and play different
actors off against each other. The development community’s best option therefore is to
41
See Report, Conference on Regional Experiences and Study Group Meeting, Brussels, 1719 March 2004, Central Africa Workshop,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/StudyGroup/CentralAfricaWorkshop.htm
42
Kostovicova, supra fn.34.
24
embrace coherence, and try to influence the security agenda in the direction of human
security.
In financial terms, the defence element of a proposed human security force can be
covered through restructuring existing European defence budgets. Currently, Europe has 1.8
million men under arms and spends approximately 180 billion euros on defence so this
should not be too difficult to accomplish. Spending on the civilian component should be
increased and paid for out of the CFSP budget and development assistance also would need
to be increased. In the longer run, a big difference would be made if member states could
allocate a part of the defence budgets to the CFSP so that decisions about when and how to
use the human security force were at the discretion of those responsible for the CFSP.
In addition, it would be important to improve the accountability of security policy
both to the European public and to those in zones of insecurity. The former would require
increased transparency, by for example increasing access to public documents, and increased
parliamentary scrutiny both by the European parliament and the parliaments of member
states. The latter would require a complaints procedure to be included in the legal framework
and the appointment of human security ombudspersons, as discussed above.
4.4 Taboo Issues
Unfortunately, the positive approach of exporting the EU method of integration through it
‘low politics’ of development is counterbalanced by other tendencies. There is a profound
disjuncture between European efforts in development and an emerging policy on security
and other aspects of EU and member states policies. There are some issues which are not
considered open to discussion, but which should in fact be subject to serious public debate.
These issues, which we call the taboo issues, include:





Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Actually this is under debate and is less
taboo than other issues. European export subsidies undercut poor farmers in the rest
of the world and directly contribute to losses of livelihood and human insecurity.
The damage done through the EU agricultural policy cannot be compensated even
by the most ambitious poverty reduction programmes.
Increasing the EU budget. At present, the EU budget is capped at 1% of European
GDPs. A doubling of this share could greatly increase the resources available for
global security and might provide a less painful way of reducing the American deficit.
Freer immigration. In the nineteenth century, one third of the European population
emigrated to the new world. This was a major factor in lifting Europe out of poverty.
Freer immigration could offset the aging European population, meet European skill
shortages and greatly assist the emigrating countries.
Control of arms exports. The real litmus test in security sector reform is whether
arms export interests are considered within the programmes. Too often, arms are still
exported from Europe even whilst its foreign ministries and economic co-operation
agencies are pursuing a security sector reform agenda.
Nuclear disarmament. One of the reasons for the weakness of the non-proliferation
regime is the failure of the nuclear powers to live up to their commitments to reduce
their own arsenals. If Britain and France were to abandon the next generation of
nuclear weapons, this would greatly increase the credibility of the EU in dealing with
weapons of mass destruction as a threat to humanity.
25
5
Conclusion
Among the development community, there are rightly concerns about the securitisation of
development. In the past, in theory at least, security issues were seen as the realm of foreign
affairs - high politics – while development was viewed as the domestic realm, having to do
with the low politics of economy and society. In so far as security did invade the realm of
development and, of course, during the Cold War period, security concerns profoundly
affected development policy, it was viewed as a sort of neo-colonialism.
Today, however, it is impossible to separate security and development. The
distinctions between foreign and domestic policy, or between high and low politics are
breaking down. If we stick to an old-fashioned view of security, this could indeed have a
deleterious effect on development. This is because a narrow statist view of European
security would do nothing to overcome the insecurity experienced by individuals and
communities in large parts of the world, especially the developing world. Indeed, the use of
military forces in a war-fighting mode can actually exacerbate insecurity, as may be the case
in Iraq. Moreover, insecurity can no longer be contained –violence has a tendency to cross
borders not in the form of attacks by foreign enemies but through terrorism, organised
crime, or extreme ideologies.
But if Europe were to adopt a human security approach this could benefit
development in several ways:

First, human security is aimed at providing the conditions (physical safety, rule of law
and sustainable institutions) that make development possible.

Secondly, a human security approach necessarily involves an emphasis on human
development because it is very difficult to disentangle physical and material security

Thirdly, the development aspects of human development put more emphasis on the
needs of individuals and communities than on economic performance indicators and
thus could help to reorient development strategies.
26
ANNEX 1
EU OPERATIONAL MISSIONS
First ESDP operation launched by the EU in 2003:
EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina43:
EUPM started on 1 January 2003 as a follow on from the UN’s International Police Task
Force to continue to address questions of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is
the first civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP. Some 500 police officers
from more than thirty countries make up the mission, including from the 15 Member States
and from 18 other countries (countries in the next enlargement: Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; as well as Bulgaria, Canada,
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine). EUPM monitors,
mentors, and inspects Local Police upper/mid management. The mission was established for
a duration of three years, through the end of 2005. The annual budget is €38 million, of
which €20 million from the Community budget.
European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(Proxima)44:
Proxima was launched on 15 December 2003, and is expected to last one year. EU police
experts will monitor, mentor, and advise the country’s police in order to help fight organized
crime and promote European policing standards (required within the implementation of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001), to enhance cooperation with neighbouring states,
and to help create a border police. Proxima is part of the EU’s commitment to aid
Macedonia in moving closer towards EU integration. The mission comprises around 200
personnel, including 150 uniformed police and civilians, from EU Member States and other
countries—the ten accession countries, the three candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania,
and Turkey), Non-EU European NATO members Norway and Iceland, Canada, Russia,
Ukraine, Switzerland, and the United States.
First Military Mission:
European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(Operation Concordia) 45:
Concordia was launched on March 31, 2003, following a request by President Trajkovski and
based on UN Security Council Resolution 1371. The EU-led operation immediately followed
a NATO operation, which ended on March 31, 2003. The operation was initially expected to
last for six months, but on July 21, 2003, the mission was extended until December 15 2003.
The goal of Concordia was to contribute to a stable secure environment and allow the
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (agreed in August 2001 to secure the
future of Macedonia’s democracy and permit the development of closer and more integrated
43
Briefing: http://ue.eu.int/eupm/homePage/index.asp?lang=EN
Official website: http://www.eupm.org/
44
http://ue.eu.int/pesd/proxima/index.asp
45
Briefing: http://ue.eu.int/arym/index.asp
Official website: http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/main.htm
27
relations between Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community). The operation made use of
NATO assets and capabilities, made possible by the completion of work on EU-NATO
arrangements. Some 400 military personnel were involved. Alongside thirteen Member
States (all with the exception of Ireland and Denmark), fourteen non-EU countries
participated (Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey). A Committee of
Contributors was set up for the operation. The common budget was €6.2 million.
First autonomous military operation:
EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Artemis):46
UN Resolution 1484 authorized the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force
in Bunia, the main town of the region of Ituri in North-eastern Congo. The European
military force worked in coordination with the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) to stabilize
security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in the region. The Council made
the decision to launch the operation in meeting of June 5, 2003, and June 12, 2003. The
operation expired on September 1, 2003. France acted as the Framework nation for the
operation and provided the Operation Headquarters in Paris, while the EU’s Military
Committee (EUMC) monitored the operation. The size of the force was 1,800 troops, with
1,200 deployed in Bunia. Forces came from: France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Sweden,
the UK, South Africa, Brazil, and Canada (until July 5). Headquarters personnel came from:
France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, the UK, Hungary, and Brazil. The Member States paid for the common costs of
this operation. Third countries did not contribute.
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – Althea)47
On 12 July 2004, the Council of the European Union decided to conduct a military
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the framework of (ESDP), which will take
over from the NATO-led SFOR mission. The aim is to deploy by the end of the year a
robust force (EUFOR). starting at the same force levels as NATO-led SFOR (7,000 troops),
with a Chapter VII mission to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris
Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. Operation ALTHEA
will be carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with
NATO ("Berlin Plus").
First Rule of Law Mission Under ESDP:
EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS)48
EUJUST THEMIS was launched on 16 July 2004. It is the first Rule of Law mission
launched by the EU in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
and can be seen as part of the development of civilian component of ESDP. The mission is
planned to last 12 months. The estimated total size of EUJUST THEMIS is 10 international
46
EU site: http://ue.eu.int/pesd/congo/index.asp
Informative article: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/31_keohane.html
47
Official website: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=745&lang=EN&mode=g
48
Official website: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=701&lang=EN&mode=g
Factsheet: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Factsheet%20THEMIS%20041026.pdf
28
civilian experts plus local staff. The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) will
exercise under the responsibility of the Council the political control and strategic direction of
the mission. Senior and highly experienced personnel will support, mentor, and advise
central government Ministers and senior officials in order to address challenges in the
criminal justice system.
29
Annex 2
Cotonou Agreement
Brief Timeline

1963 Yaoundé Conventions, the first generation of economic cooperation
agreements between the EEC and the (mainly French-speaking) newly
independent African countries

1973 The UK joins the EEC, bringing its ties to former colonies in Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific

1975 Creation of the ACP group, an alliance of 46 ACP countries

1975 Lomé I Convention (1975–1980), the first major aid and trade cooperation
agreement between Europe and the ACP

1980 Lomé II Convention (1980–1985)

1985 Lomé III Convention (1985–1990), includes for the first time a clause about
human rights

1990 Lomé IV Convention (1990–1995)

1990–1995 Lomé IV bis Convention (1995–2000) reinforces political cooperation
and introduces the possibility of suspending aid in cases of grave violation of
agreed values and principles

1996 The EC starts informal consultations on the future of ACP-EC Cooperation
(the ‘Green Paper process’49)

1998–2000 Negotiations of a successor agreement to Lomé

June 2000 77 ACP countries sign the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in
Cotonou, Benin

49
April 2003 The Contonou Partnership Agreement enters into force
COM (final 96) 570 Green Paper of 20 November 1996
30
31
32
33